


THE LAST PUNIC WAR



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TUNIS PAST & PRESENT.

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
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


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THE LAST PUNIC WAR





THE BEY OF TUNIS.

THE LAST PUNIC WAR

TUNIS, PAST AND PRESENT

WITH A NARRATIVE OF THE FRENCH
CONQUEST OF THE REGENCY

BY

A. M. BROADLEY

BARRISTER-AT-LAW
CORRESPONDENT OF THE 'TIMES' DURING THE
WAR IN TUNIS

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

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TO

THE RIGHT HON'BLE. EARL DE LA WARR

These Volumes

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PREFACE.



I HAVE associated with my narrative of the French conquest of Tunis the title of Punic War, partly from the fact of the invasion having taken place on the spot which once witnessed three famous contests of antiquity so called, and partly on account of the consistent *Punica fides*¹ displayed in the web of tortuous diplomacy which has practically put an end to Tunisian independence.

If my reader will open the *Almanach de Gotha* for 1881, at page 1029, he will find the following passage :—

“TUNIS (RÉGENCE).”

“Depuis 1575 sous la souveraineté de la Turquie. Le Sultan a réglé, par firman du 25 Octobre 1871 (9 Chabân 1283), les conditions de la souveraineté de la Sublime-Porte sur Tunis et il a renoncé à l'ancien tribut. D'après ce firman la situation de Tunis est à présent celle-ci : Le ‘Bey’ reçoit

¹ “Ego comperio illum Punicâ fide egisse.”—*Sallust.*
VOL. I. b

l'investiture de Constantinople, il ne doit sans l'autorisation du Sultan ni faire la guerre, ni conclure la paix, ni céder du territoire. Il ne doit faire de négociations diplomatiques avec l'étranger que sur des questions intérieures. Il est obligé de frapper la monnaie au nom du Sultan et de mettre ses troupes à la disposition de la Sublime-Porte en cas de guerre."

Within four months from the time when this clear and unmistakable definition of the political status of the Regency of Tunis appeared in the celebrated *Annuaire généalogique, diplomatique et statistique*, the government of the French Republic, without any declaration of war, either against the Bey of Tunis or the Sultan of Turkey, invaded the country, compelled the Bey, by moral if not physical duress, to accept a Protectorate, and finally effected a complete military occupation of the Regency from the Khamír mountains to the frontiers of Tripoli. The virtual extinction of Moslem power in Tunis, after an unbroken duration of more than twelve centuries, is in itself an occurrence of no small political importance, but when considered in connection with its actual and possible consequences, not only in Tunis itself but throughout the whole of North Africa, the "last chapter in the history of the Moors" seems to be likely to excite a durable, and perhaps an increasing, interest. This belief has

prompted me to attempt to write the chronicles of the French Invasion, and to briefly sketch, by way of introduction, the more recent chapters of Tunisian annals.

In 1880 the Moslems of North Africa had almost forgotten the shock occasioned to their religious susceptibilities by the conquest of Algeria, and prior to the events of which I am about to speak, Panislamism had in that region a theoretical rather than a practical existence. Tunis has always been an intact Moslem state, and it contains Holy Kairwán, after Mecca perhaps the most hallowed of Moslem cities. The invasion of the Regency, and the occupation of the shrine, at once converted this sentimental Panislamism into a stern and uncompromising reality.

To these causes must undoubtedly to a certain extent be attributed the rising in Algeria, the so-called insurrection in Tunis itself, the wide-spread agitation in Tripoli, and the crisis in Egypt. So much for the consequences of the "Last Punic War," as far as they concern the World of Islam. In Europe its effects have been hardly less momentous; Italy has become the avowed enemy of France, England no longer believes in the

peaceful intentions of the Government of the Republic, Spain is hankering after Morocco, and Germany is posing as the champion of the Caliphate. In Italy the Ministry of Signor Cairoli fell twice within a month, because it was unable to stay effectually the tide of French Diplomacy, while in France M. Ferry succumbed to the unpopularity which attends a failure, and M. Gambetta was wrecked in the storm to a great extent occasioned by his injudicious support of M. Roustan. All this and much more has resulted from the taking of Carthage. While France has her hands full in Tunis, both Turkey and Italy are openly and almost ostentatiously watching their opportunity. These patent facts can but enhance the historical importance of the events which are related in these volumes.

The policy of England as regards the Tunisian Question has been almost a diplomatic enigma. She sang a song of triumph over the Firman of 1871, still declared Tunis "an integral part of the territory of the Sublime Porte in 1880, then told the Bey just one year later to cheerfully assist at his political suicide, and finally, just six days *after* the convention of Kasr-es-Said, promulgated an

Order in Council, to be cited as *the Ottoman (Tunis) Order of 1881*, the preamble of which justifies its existence by the consideration that “by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen has power and jurisdiction in relation to Her Majesty’s subjects and others *in the Ottoman Dominions!*”

I have endeavoured to tell the story of recent events in Tunis essentially from an English point of view, and to mete out impartially the share of praise and blame ascribable to the different contending parties. In all probability I shall please neither of them. The present result of the expedition in the Regency itself can be described in a word, *chaos*. Mr. Whitaker has very fairly summed up the situation in his useful Almanac for 1882: “Last year,” he writes, “Tunis was a tributary province of the Ottoman Empire, and in a state of profound peace. At the present time, it may be considered as a turbulent, informally annexed dependence of France, nominally under the dominion of the Bey, but really under the control of a French Resident.” The prime mover of the mischief, M. Théodore Roustau, has quitted the scene of his exploits, and M. Paul Cambon reigns in his

stead. Upon him will fall the arduous task of evolving order out of chaos, and cleansing an Augean stable of no small dimensions. He promises well, and Europe will await with pardonable curiosity and some impatience the initiative which must sooner or later follow his study of existing difficulties. It must be remembered in England that the indemnity to the pillaged and bombarded Maltese of Sfax yet hangs fire, that none of the families of the British subjects massacred in cold blood at Oued Zerga or on the Kairwán road have been recompensed for their irreparable loss, and that no satisfaction has been given, or even proposed, for the judicial murder of the British Consular Agent's servant at Hammamet. In these serious matters it is to be hoped that M. Paul Cambon will pour oil on the troubled waters.

I once and for all disclaim any intention of criticising in a hostile manner the conduct and bearing of the French troops. Their work has been performed well and honestly, and the marches of General Forgemol, as well as the organisation of the Susa column by General Étienne and Colonel Moulin, are deserving of all praise. To the French diplomacy concerning the Regency both at Paris

and Tunis, I uncompromisingly take exception, and I fear that the political history of the "Last Punic War" throws its military achievements entirely into the shade. I believe that both M. Saint-Hilaire and M. Roustan "have deserved ill of the Republic," in contriving and promoting the invasion and occupation of this country. At any rate, it is to be hoped that the numerous and serious complications which have been engendered by the "Last Punic War," will serve as a memorable lesson to strong Powers endowed with absorptive tendencies as regards their weaker neighbours, and that the pitiful spectacle of the Paris Assize Court will prove a warning to Political Agents inclined to imitate the diplomatic vagaries of M. Roustan.

I desire to express my obligations to the kindly interest and assistance of the Earl De la Warr, to Colonel Frederick Burnaby for many excellent suggestions, to Colonel Moulin and Commandant Coyne for much assistance in the matter of detail concerning the military movements at Tunis and Kairwán, and to Mr. Vice-Consul Galea, who was good enough to lend me his diary of the siege of Sfax. The reproductions of the curious Spanish pictures illustrating the expedition of

Charles V. have been reduced from large photographs in the possession of H.M. the Queen, which were taken from the original paintings by H.R.H. the late Prince Consort, and a few copies of which were printed by special permission for Lieutenant Colonel Playfair, the learned author of "Travels in the Footsteps of Bruce."

I have to ask the reader's indulgence for irregularities that he may discover in the spelling of Tunisian and other proper names; as distance from England, and the necessity of sending these volumes to press, have prevented me from finally revising the proof-sheets.

TUNIS, *June 20, 1882.*

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TUNIS PAST AND PRESENT.

CHAPTER I.

TOPOGRAPHY OF TUNIS.

THE coast-line of Northern Africa runs almost due east as far as Cape Bon, the Mercurii Promontorium of the Romans, at which point it takes an abrupt turn southwards till it reaches the island of Jerba, famous in history as the fabled abode of the lotus-eaters, and close to the lower extremity of the Gulf of Gabes, once known as the Lesser Syrtis. From this point the shore of the Mediterranean again resumes its easterly course towards Alexandria and the Nile.

The tract of country which occupies the angle thus formed is the Regency of Tunis. As its very name denotes, the *Regency* of Tunis never had any pretensions to be more than a quasi-independent state. The dominion of Tunis is, or rather was, a

Regency or fief of the Turkish Empire, and the Beys of Tunis were both politically and religiously vassals of the Sublime Porte. French historians, more candid than French diplomatists, have admitted this both before and after the eventful 12th May 1881, when a French general, *manu militari*, by a stroke of the pen substituted the suzerainty of the French Republic for that of Abdul Hamid. Only a few months ago, the well-known writer on Algerian subjects, Commandant Villot, wrote as follows:—"The religious tie is so powerful amongst Muhamedans, that the successors of Heussein (the common ancestors of the Beys of Tunis) have never omitted to obtain a firman of investiture from the head of Islamism, nor has any money ever been current except that which bears his name."* More than this, the Beys of Tunis have resisted repeated efforts put forth by Western Powers to induce them to shake off the yoke of their natural lord. M. Thiers, who endeavoured to persuade Ahmed Bey to take this step, was fortunately obliged to abandon his intention, for France has no interest in weakening the authority of the Porte. The dangerous policy of M. Thiers has been almost unanimously condemned by historians,

* Description Géographique de Tunis et de la Régence. Paris : Challamel Ainé, 1881. P. 14.

and especially by M. Guizot in his "Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de mon Temps." In 1877 M. Desfossés says in his pamphlet entitled "La Tunisie":—"Le *Pachalik* de Tunis est toujours sous la souzeraineté de la Turquie." Thirty years ago Pellissier, in his elaborate and almost complete "Description de la Régence de Tunis," remarks that "the suzerainty of the Grand Signor is recognised by law, but more in a theological than in a political point of view. The money is struck in his name, and each day at noon his glory and virtues are proclaimed by a herald before an empty armchair which represents his throne."* A few days before Kairwán fell I happened to go to the Bardo palace. The French Protectorate was then six months old, but the herald and his attendant drummers went through the ceremony as heretofore, and invoked the protection of Allah for the Sultan and Caliph.

The most northerly part of Tunis is only divided by some eighty miles of sea from Sicily. Indeed, a line of rocks beneath the waves, known as the Ferki reefs, forms a junction between that island and the Atlas mountains of the African mainland. It is this strait or channel which separates

* Volume xvi. of the *Exploration Scientifique de l'Algérie*. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1853. P. 11.

the eastern and western basins of the Mediterranean.

“This Tunis,” as Shakespeare says, “was Carthage.”* It afterwards became in turn Africa Propria, Zeugitania, and Byzacium. Numerous authors have handed down to posterity the history of its remote antiquity, but the Tunis of to-day was little better than a *terra incognita* when the events of the French invasion forced the fact of its existence on the attention of Europe and England. The Gulf of Tunis and the now land-locked harbour of Bizerta command the passage of the narrow sea before them, and hence arises the maritime importance of Tunis in the past, the present, and the future. All writers, except modern diplomatists, fully recognise this fact; but unfortunately the statesmen of to-day are not only intent on deceiving each other, but are forced by the exigencies of party to know as little as possible. If the position of Tunis had been as familiar to Englishmen in 1878 as it is now, we might never have witnessed the events of 1881. “If the Tunis lake were only dredged and deepened,” writes Commandant Villot, “and the coast fortified, and if a powerful navy were stationed in the Tunisian roadstead, not only the path to Egypt, but the

* Tempest.

road to India through the Suez Canal, would once more be closed to the people of the West." * A concession to dredge and deepen the Tunis lake has, as a matter of course, followed the Treaty of Kasres-Said, and although M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire wrote to Lord Granville on the 16th May 1881 that "France has no more desire to annex Bizerta than any other part of Tunis," a project for the restoration of its port by French capitalists is now receiving the serious consideration of the French Government. Mr. Perry in his work on Tunis sums up very fairly the state of the case in a few words. "Tunis," he writes, "has the finest position in North Africa. Commercial preponderance and the control of the Mediterranean are the attractions for the Powers which dispute with each other for its possession or its neutralisation." †

The Regency of Tunis is bounded on both the north and east by the Mediterranean, on the west by Algeria, on the south by the Sahara of the Touaregs, and on the south-east by Tripoli. It has an area of about sixty thousand square miles, and a sea-coast 550 miles in length. The

* Description Géographique de Tunis et de la Régence. Paris : Challamel Ainé, 1881. Pp. 43, 44.

† Carthage and Tunis : Past and Present. By Amos Perry, late United States Consul for the City and Regency of Tunis. Providence, R.I., 1869. P. 4.

population of the whole country does not far exceed 1,500,000 souls. The configuration of Tunis is almost identical with that of Algeria. Like Algeria, Tunis has its mountains, its plains, and its coast (*sahel*). Like Algeria, its mineral wealth is almost unequalled. The rocks of Tunis yield nearly all minerals except gold. Its chief river is the Roman Bagradas—the modern Medjerdah, which rises in the Algerian province of Constantine, and after a tortuous course of over three hundred miles reaches the Mediterranean at Porto-Farina near the city of Tunis. The streams in the south of the Regency are comparatively unimportant, and generally end in the great marsh-lakes or Sebkhass of Kairwán, Faráoun, or El Medir.

The face of the country can be conveniently divided into four regions or districts, viz., the Volcanic or mountainous, the Tell or highlands, the Coast, and the Desert. In the neighbourhood of Kef, in Western Tunis, the traces of extinct volcanoes and lava are unmistakable. Mount Betoum in the Khamír or Khroumír country emitted smoke and flames forty years ago. The north and especially the north-west part of the Regency is very hilly, and the richness of its luxuriant oak forests vies with that of the unexplored iron

and lead mines which are known to lie beneath them.

The coast is generally low and sandy, but the land which immediately borders it is almost invariably fertile and productive. The salient features of the Tunisian Tell are vast expanses covered sometimes with esparto grass and sometimes with a layer of thin soil. In the winter the vegetation is abundant and luxuriant; in the summer everything is scorched up by the pitiless African sun. The Tell slopes gradually towards the great marsh-lakes of the far south. The Tunisian Sahara is perhaps richer than any part of the desert in fertile oases.

To follow the course of recent events, some slight description of the interior of the country is indispensable. Each of its four natural divisions must be considered briefly in respect of its inhabitants and its resources.

The volcanic or mountainous district consists almost entirely of the basin of the Medjerdah river, which first enters the Regency in the vicinity of Kef. During the winter rains the Medjerdah becomes a wild mountain torrent, and carries down to the Mediterranean with the noise of distant thunder large quantities of mud and stones. As it approaches the sea it traverses a series of fertile

valleys, which bear the names of Dakhla, Maïcera, Bizerta, and Tebourba. Another river, the Oued Tin, rises near Beja (the Roman Vaga or Vacca), and finds its way across the fruitful plains of Mater into the Chott Eshkel or inner Bizerta lake (the ancient Sisara Lacus). The town of Mater is built on rising ground and commands the surrounding country. It in no way merits any further description. Roman ruins abound in its vicinity. The tribes which dwell on the banks of the Tin belong to the great Algerian clan of Ali Ben Amar.

Ascending the Medjerdah from the often bombarded town of Porto-Farina, the traveller first arrives at Fondouk, a great centre of inland trade. Beyond Fondouk is Bon Shatar, which was once Utica. It was here that Cato the Younger died. The traces of Carthage's most powerful rival still convey to the spectator a tolerable idea of its extent and magnificence. The sea which once washed its quays is now barely visible from the site of its citadel. The ruins of its cisterns are now used as stables, while sheep graze peacefully in its ruined amphitheatre. A learned Frenchman has written a charming volume in which he mentally rebuilds Utica,* the soil of which still con-

* *Recherches sur l'Origine et l'Emplacement des Emporias Phéniciens.* Par A. Daux. Paris : Imprimerie Impériale, 1859.

tinues to yield an apparently inexhaustible harvest to the excavator. Beyond Bon Shatar are the small towns of Jedeïda and Tebourba. In the former General Hamida Ben Ayad, a great Arab landowner, whose family has for half a century enjoyed British protection, has attempted to construct irrigation works on a somewhat large scale. In the latter is the great Moslem college of Sidi Ghars Allah.

Medjez-el-Bab, Testour, and Teboursak, other towns in the Medjerdah valley, will be described in connection with the story of the French expedition. Still farther to the west is Beja, the market-town of the Khamír tribesmen. Like most Tunisian cities, it is built on a hill, and is surrounded by a crenelated wall flanked with small towers. Portions of these fortifications are evidently of Byzantine origin, and the mosque of Sidi Aïssa appears to have once served as a Christian church. The mountainous districts which lie north and north-west of Beja are the abode of the Khamírs, who are popularly supposed to have occasioned the French invasion of the Regency. Khamír-land and the Khamírs will be spoken of at length in the course of the narrative of the war. Some few miles west of Beja the Medjerdah receives the waters of its principal tributary, the Oued Mellégue.

In the valley through which this stream passes is Kef (the Roman *Sicca Veneria*), a place which has played an important part in Tunisian history, and which is situated at a distance of some thirty miles from the Algerian frontier. It was formerly considered almost impregnable, but its powerful fortifications are now nearly in ruins, and it is susceptible of easy attack from the neighbouring heights. The *Zaouias* or convent-sanctuaries of Kef are still much frequented, and its markets are thronged by Algerian as well as by Tunisian Arabs.

Another Tunisian stream reaches the Gulf of Tunis near the little town of Rades, close to the Tunisian Piræus of the Goletta, and within sight of the capital itself. It is called the Oued El Kebir (Great River), and near its mouth bears also the name of the Oued Miliana. Rades, as the Roman *Addir*, once witnessed the great victory of *Regulus* over the Carthaginians. The Oued Kebir was then the *Flumen Catada*. Following its course in a south-westerly direction one reaches the modern ruin of the *Mohammedia*. *Ahmed*, Bey of Tunis, built a great palace and a town there forty years ago. His greatest pleasure seems to have been to reside there surrounded by his army of 30,000 men. He died in 1855, and both town and palace were abandoned. The timber, the

marble, the ironwork, and the tiles have disappeared, and the place has the appearance of a second Pompeii. The great Roman aqueduct close at hand is in far better repair. Its majestic arches still stretch in an unbroken line across the plain, and its canal still brings the famed water of Zaghouán into Tunis itself. On the right bank of the Great River rises the majestic peaks of Zaghouán and Djougár, visible alike from Tunis, Susa, and Holy Kairwán. At the foot of the former mountain is a town bearing its name, built of Roman materials, amidst verdant fruit gardens and running water. Zaghouán has its Roman gateway, as well as a ruined temple. Its limpid spring rises from a Roman vault. Mr. Hodgson, R.A., has immortalised the beauties of Zaghouán in the picture he exhibited in the Royal Academy of 1875.

The coast towns of the Regency are so intimately connected with the story of the last days of its independence that I need say little of them here. Tabarca, Bizerta, Porto-Farina, Galippia, Nebel, Hammamet, Susa, Monastir, Mehdiá, Sfax, Mahrés, Gabes, Jerba, Zerzis, and the Tripolitan frontier will all be spoken of at length hereafter. The history of the central district of Tunis will be told with that of its capital—Kairwán.

The Saharian portion of the Tunisian Regency

comprises the countries of the Beni Zid, the Nefzaoua, and the Djerid. The mountainous territory of the Beni Zid lies between the lake-marsh or Sebkhâ Faráoun (by some believed to be the classical *Palus Tritonis*) and the Great Desert. It possesses many fruitful oases, as does also the district of the Nefzaoua, which borders the Faráoun Chott.

The Chott or Sebkhâ Faráoun almost joins the Chotts of Algeria, and has given rise to one of the most celebrated geographical enigmas of the present century—the *quæstio vexata* of the Saharian Inland Sea, about which some scores of pamphlets have been written since 1870. The Chott is divided into three distinct portions by the Debdeb or natural bridges. Archæologists would have the uninitiated distinguish in three sheets of water the *Palus Tritonis*, the *Palus Pallac*, and the *Palus Libyæ* of Ptolemy, but any complete and satisfactory identification is of extraordinary difficulty. During the past ten years France has sent two exploring parties to investigate the matter, while Italy has also despatched a special commission, and the conclusion now generally accepted is, that the creation of the inland sea is impossible, and that even if it were practicable, the benefit its existence might confer on North

Africa would be very problematical. Sir Richard Wood, C.B., G.C.M.G., Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Tunis from 1856 to 1878, has written an interesting brochure on the subject.* According to Sir Richard Wood, not only is the execution of the scheme prevented by insurmountable natural difficulties, but the attempted identification of the inland marsh-lakes with the lake of Triton is wholly erroneous. He argues with great show of reason that the scene of Jason's adventure was really the little gulf in the Mediterranean between the island of Djerba and the mainland, which for many reasons may be easily mistaken for an inland sea.

The Djerid, an alternation of sandy plains and green oases, is the abiding place *par excellence* of the date-palm. Its chief towns are Nefta, Tozer, and Gassa, and the province is undoubtedly one of the richest in the Regency.

I have endeavoured to describe in as few words as possible the dominion of Tunis. The main object of this book is to furnish the last chapters in its annals, and to tell more particularly the story of its conquest. The unrivalled associations which surround this lately obscure province would naturally tempt one to be discursive at the onset.

* La Question des Chotts Algériens. Par Sir Richard Wood. Marseilles, 1878.

The chronicles of Carthage, the rise and fall of Roman power on its ruins, the invasions of the Greeks and Vandals, the legends of the African Churches, the Moslem conquest of Tunis from Arabia and of Spain from Tunis, the Crusade of St. Louis, the expedition of Charles V., and yet untold *gesta* of the Knights of St. John on this part of the African littoral, are one and all a legitimate portion of Tunisian history. My concern is alone with Moslem Tunis. Down to the year 1830 its story has been ably written from a French point of view.* Since that time I am not aware that anything like a continuous narrative of events has been attempted. I shall therefore endeavour to take up the thread of M. Rousseau's story by way of introduction to the more immediate subject of this book. Some knowledge of the previous political history of the Regency is essential to the just appreciation of the events of 1881. Before that time I shall content myself with the briefest résumé, except when I am able to place before the reader certain information which I have gathered from a careful examination of the ancient archives of Her Majesty's Consulate General at Tunis, and which I trust will be both novel and interesting.

* Annales Tunisiennes. Par Alphonse Rousseau. Paris: Challengel Ainé, 1864.

CHAPTER II.

THE DWELLERS IN TUNISIA.

THE wave of conquest has five times at least swept over Tunis, but, with the exception of the Arabs, none of the conquering races have left any visible imprint on the present population of the country. The levelling influences of Islamism has well-nigh obliterated all differences of origin, and the natives of Tunis are very often described generically as Arabs. Of Arabs *pur sang*, strange to say, there are none, and the name can only with any show of correctness be applied to the nomadic tribes of the interior, which have all mixed more or less with the indigenous Berbers. The term Bedouin is also frequently indiscriminately used when speaking of the tribesmen of Northern Africa. This, too, is an error. The term Bedouin in its strict sense is applicable exclusively to the dwellers on the borders of the Great Desert.

The following classification of the inhabitants of Tunis may be conveniently adopted, viz. :—(1)

Moors, (2) Arabs, (3) Berbers or Kabyles, (4) Turks, (5) Koulougis, (6) Jews. The remaining race distinctions, always excepting the large European colony, have no practical importance.

The term Moors demands some explanation. It formerly served to denote generally an inhabitant of Mauritania. This use of the word has now entirely passed away. It then served to describe the Saracens, who left Africa to conquer Spain and parts of France and Italy, and who at last returned to the countries from which they came. The Spanish Moors form in Tunis an exclusive and aristocratic clan. The word Moor is also applied to the townspeople of the cities of North Africa, who are essentially members of a more or less mixed race.

The picture of the Tunisian Moors has been drawn over and over again. They constitute the most admirable type of the Moslem population. They are generally well made, of almost fair complexion, and possess regular and often noble features. Although they are no longer warlike themselves, they are deeply attached to the religious and political teachings of their creed, and have a considerable influence over their uneducated although more hardy compatriots of the interior. Nearly all the Spanish Moors in Tunis have

adopted some kind of trade, and they invariably show a marked preference for those callings which allow a minimum of exertion and a maximum of indolence. They retail silks, perfumes, incense, jewellery, drugs, and bric-à-brac, and it is difficult to say whether foreigners are more impressed by their dignified languor or their suave politeness. A scent-seller in Souk-el-Attarín (Bazaar of Essences) at Tunis is a lineal descendant of the Abencerrages, while his next-door neighbour (a living portrait of our own Henry VIII. in his prime) represents the lordly race of the Almora-vides. They possess pedigrees of wonderful length and correctness, and retain as heirlooms the rust-eaten keys of their long lost Andalusian homes. They look on trade as no disgrace, and spend their time in filling and sealing hermetically small phials of the otto of roses and jessamine, in gossiping with their neighbours, and in reading and discussing the orthodox *Jowaiib*, the official organ of the Panislamite enthusiasts at Stamboul. They look on the Bey of Tunis rightly or wrongly as a traitor to the Sultan, anathematise the French invaders under their breath, and await with patience the time when a European complication will allow Abdul Hamíd to have his own again in the Tunisian Pachalik. The Moors have a quick sense

of humour, and are able at an emergency to indulge in a keenly pointed repartee. The report of the *procès* Roustan-Rochefort translated into classical Arabic has afforded them unceasing amusement since the beginning of the year, but their excessive mirth over the adventures of the French Minister and his friends the Musallis led them into indiscretion. Their proceedings reached the ears of General Japy, who summoned one of the most venerable members of the ancient confraternity of Moorish scent-sellers to appear before him. "You are always talking against the French," said the general, "and you must be punished." The luckless Moslem in vain protested the contrary. The general informed him that he was sentenced to lose his tongue. The instruments essential to the operation were then produced upon a tray. Then and then only did the Moor forget his dignity. Forgetting his ancestors of Granada and Cordova, he embraced with feverish eagerness the feet of his judge. I need hardly say he was pardoned, and that General Japy was only indulging his sense of humour, and at the same time giving the offender a wholesome lesson in prudence. The incident, however, will become a tradition of the Souk-el-Attarín, and will not be forgotten when the good time does arrive.

The present Bey of Tunis has turned one of his picturesque old city palaces into a public school for the Moorish youth. It was at the Sadikya college I first perceived by experience the Moorish capability of witty repartee. It was just after our defeat by the Zulus, and General Sir A. Cunynghame, G.C.B., was going over the institution. He was requested to examine the boys of the first class. The first question he asked was an unfortunate one :—Could the students point out the provinces lost by Turkey during the late war? If a thunderbolt had fallen in the midst of the room, the sensation of horror produced could not have been greater. The head-boy, with wonderful *sang froid*, pointed out the states in question one after another, but he added, “Perhaps *mon général* will condescend to show us the province in which the English have been so often beaten *ces jours çà*.” General Cunynghame took the boy’s shrewd sarcasm in good part, and carried away with him a high idea of the intelligence of the rising generation of Tunisian Moors.

The inhabitants of the interior of Tunis are, with very rare exceptions, the descendants of the conquering Arab race, which quickly mixed with the Berbers of the country. The Tunisian Arab is naturally dark complexioned, and is generally

bronzed by exposure to the sun. He is muscular and robust, and presents a striking contrast to his Moorish co-religionists. The Arab is always brave, and generally active and energetic. M. Roustan knew nothing of the Arabs, or he would not have observed jocularly to M. Saint-Hilaire that "four French soldiers and a corporal could take Tunis." African Arabs are as a rule given to hospitality, and never refuse a meal to a stranger. Twelve months ago travellers could pass unmolested from *douár* to *douár* (encampment to encampment) over the whole face of the country from Khamírland to the Tripolitan frontier. The Arab Sheikh looks upon *diffa*, or the feeding of wayfarers, as a crowning virtue. Any European could always count on obtaining food and lodging, but an Englishman invariably commanded a welcome. The very name of England was a talisman to the hearts of these simple-hearted herdsmen. They loved to ask about our Queen and our soldiers, to inspect our breechloaders and revolvers, and to talk of their brethren under British rule in the Blad-el-Hind. All this is past and gone now. We advised the Bey to acquiesce in the punishment of the Khamírs by the French, and assured both him and his subjects that if he "co-operated" with the invaders the expedition would go no

further. He acted on our advice, but the French never found the Khamírs, and in six months overran the whole country from Tabarka to Jerba. From the day the French troops appeared before the Kasr-es-Said palace, Englishmen were reckoned with ordinary Roumis and Giaours. The Arabs are good horsemen, and make the best of their wretched flint-lock guns. If they had possessed better arms, the siege of Sfax and the march to Kairwán would have been a very different matter.

The inhabitants of the Tunisian Regency outside the walls of its towns are divided and subdivided into a large number of tribes and fractions of tribes. A list of these clans would only tire the reader, and the names of the most powerful of them will necessarily occur over and over again in the course of the narrative of the war. Each large tribe is ruled by its Caid, who has one or more subordinate Khalifas. The Khalifas in their turn are superior to the Sheikhs, who sometimes only control a small cluster of tents. All these officials are invested and appointed by the Bey, and they all pay an annual tribute in proportion to the extent of their different governments. The manipulation of these nominations has from time immemorial been a source of great abuses, but of late it has become almost intolerable. "A reform

of the list of Caids" sounds pleasantly enough to the European ear. The dwellers in Tunisian tents know too well what it means and what it costs.

The Arabs are capable of real patriotic feeling, quite apart from religious enthusiasm. A year ago the very existence of a community of Arab sentiment was treated as a myth. Europe is almost convinced now that there is some kind of understanding rife amongst them from Tangiers to Cairo. They appear to have combined to make a last stand against extinction or extermination. It was to a very great extent the sending of letters written in blood by the surviving Sheikhs of the Chiaïa tribe to all the great clans in the Regency, immediately after the regrettable occurrences of the 30th March 1881, which provoked the general rising that very soon afterwards took place.

In considering the question of the capability of the Arab tribes to participate in a general and concentrated movement, an important element in the discussion is almost invariably omitted. I allude to the growing power of the *Khouan*, or semi-political semi-religious confraternities, which seem destined to cover the whole of North Africa with a web of Moslem freemasonry. At the head of the associations are the Senoussia, the avowed

opponents of the French "mission of civilisation," of whom I shall speak at length in a future chapter. This powerful brotherhood has sprung into existence during the last thirty years, but it now threatens to overshadow if not absorb the older but less militant corporations. Thirty-five years ago a remarkable report was addressed to the Duc d'Aumale upon this subject by M. De Neveu, chef du Service Géodésique de l'Algérie. Even then the author wrote that "it is absolutely necessary to ascertain the political object of those confraternities, which have undoubtedly produced a remarkable power of combination amongst individuals, have furnished the means for an almost incredible rapidity of communication, and seem destined to play an important part in the affairs of West and Central Algeria."*

These various orders differ chiefly in form, but they are all ostensibly based on the pure tenets of Islamism as expounded in the Koran. Each confraternity claims to have had its origin in a dream of its founder, who is supposed to have received a revelation from the Prophet as to the *farik*, or most acceptable way of salvation. The associations having sway in Algeria, Tunis, and

* Les Khouans. Ordres Religieux chez les Musulmans de l'Algérie. Paris : Guyot, 1845. P. 10.

Tripoli at the present time are seven in number, viz. :—

1. The Senoussia, or followers of Muhamed es Senoussi, having their headquarters at Djárdúb or Djaghdúb in the Libyan desert, twenty-two days' journey from Ben Ghazi in Tripoli.

2. The confraternity of Moulai Taïb, to which Muhamed es Senoussi originally belonged.

3. The Aissaoua.

4. The Kaderia, or disciples of Sidi Abd-el-Kadir el Djelani.

5. The Rahmania, founded by Abd-er-Rahman Bon Kobarín.

6. The Hausalia (a brotherhood of little practical importance).

7. The Tijania, or confraternity of Sidi Ahmed Tijáni.

The supreme director of an order is called the *Khalifa* or "lieutenant," and who has *Mokaddem* or "vicars" in each town. The *Khalifa* transmits his orders to his subordinates, who furnish him in return with details concerning all political events which may occur in their different jurisdictions. The seat of the order in any particular locality is called a *Zaouia*, which seems to be at once a chapel, a school, a place of refuge, an hospital, a library, and a political debating club. The brethren

are charged with the task of preserving a complete record of contemporaneous events. The ceremony of initiation in a confraternity is termed "taking the rose." On two strangers meeting, one often asks the other, "What rose do you wear?" If the person to whom the query is addressed belongs to a brotherhood, he answers, "I wear the rose of Sidi So-and-so;" if not, he merely replies, "I wear no rose, but I am the servant of God and pray to Him with devotion."

I am unable to pursue further an examination of the nature of the Moslem orders, the influence of which it is impossible to underrate. As I shall show hereafter, two of them at least have played already a considerable part in the opposition offered to the French advance eastwards, and it cannot be doubted that they are destined to a very great extent to promote the cause of a Moslem union against Christian aggression.

The Kabyles, or indigenous Berbers, unlike the Arabs, are not nomadic. They are not numerically important as far as Tunis is concerned, and are almost exclusively confined to the mountainous districts of Kef and Bizerta. Most of the masons, porters, gardeners, and manual labourers in the city of Tunis are Kabyles or Djebelia. They differ somewhat in appearance from the Arabs, and are

perhaps not quite as hospitable. They hold, however, in great veneration the *anaya* or safe-conduct given by their chiefs, and have never been known to violate it. They live for the most part in stone huts covered with thatch.

The number of Turks in Tunis is inconsiderable, and so is that of the Koulouglis or descendants of Turkish fathers and Moorish mothers.

The Jewish population in the Regency of Tunis exceeds 60,000, of which about half reside in the capital. They are quite as powerful now as they were once oppressed and maltreated. Some of their ancestors arrived in Tunis soon after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus; a second immigration took place in the time of the Emperor Adrian, and a third was contemporaneous with the Spanish persecutions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Their complete emancipation only dates from the reign of the present Bey. During the time of his predecessor, the English and French fleets came to Goletta, owing to Muhamed Bey sanctioning the execution of an Israelite on a charge of blasphemy. At the present moment the commerce of the country is almost entirely in their hands.

The population of the city of Tunis does not at present much exceed 130,000 persons, which are

distributed as follows, viz.:—Moors, 60,000; Jews, 36,000; Europeans, 20,000; and miscellaneous native races, including 2000 Algerians, 14,000. The European colony in the capital consists of 10,000 Italians, 8000 Maltese and English, together with 2000 French. The story of the dealings of the rulers of Tunis with the governments of the European colonists forms the most important part of the annals of the Regency.

Some but not many of the Europeans now living in Tunis are the descendants of Christian slaves. Up to the month of May 1816, the great nations of Europe were compelled to repurchase those of their citizens who had the misfortune to become prisoners of the cruisers of the Beys of Tunis on the high seas. A large mass of correspondence still exists in the British Consulate General on the subject of these humiliating bargains, which were generally arranged by the fathers of the Roman Catholic Mission. St. Vincent de Paul was himself a prisoner in Tunis. The ransoms demanded generally varied from 500 to 1000 francs. A priest who visited the Regency on an errand of this kind in 1700 has left a most interesting account of his travels in a series of letters addressed to his Superior.* The writer describes the thirteen

* *État des Royaumes de Barbarie, Tripoli, Tunis, et Alger. À la Haye, 1704. Pp. 80-175.*

bagmi or prisons in which the slaves resided. He seems to have been pelted with stones and soundly beaten when passing through the streets, and tells us that the son of the French Consul was disabled by the blow of a Turk. After much negotiation four slaves were purchased, and the priest was requested to perform mass before the Bey, who kept all the necessary vessels in a chest in his room. At the end of the eighteenth century there were still a large number of Christian slaves at Tunis, but M. Chateaubriand declares they were generally treated with kindness. The ransom for sailors was then fixed at 230 Venetian sequins, but 460 were asked for captains and women of all ages.

In 1842, at the instance of the British Consul-General, Colonel Sir Thomas Reade, Ahmed Bey declared that the children born of slaves should henceforth be considered free. A little later he enfranchised all his own slaves, and his example was very generally followed throughout the country. Finally slavery was formally abolished, and the market, on the site of the modern jewellery bazaar, closed for ever. There is still a large number of eunuchs and other negro servants in Tunis, but these enjoy at least nominal freedom. From time to time a solitary negro takes refuge in

the British Consulate General, but a certificate of freedom is always granted as soon as it is asked for. No Mussulman potentate has so earnestly and so honestly endeavoured to carry out his obligations with Europe in the matter of slavery as the Bey of Tunis and his predecessor.

CHAPTER III.

NINE CENTURIES OF POWER, A.D. 648—A.D. 1535.

THE Moslem history of the Regency of Tunis may be conveniently divided into three epochs. The first is the period of Power, the second that of Piracy, and the third that of Decay. It was in A.D. 648 (the year of the Flight 26) that the Arabs, under Abd Allah Ben Saad, marched upon Gabes and Sbitela, then called Suffetula. The great Prefect Gregory raised an army of 120,000 men to oppose their advance, but on the plains of Akouba he lost both his life and his semi-independent dominions. Leaving the conquered province to the care of a chief named Djenaha, Abd Allah Ben Saad returned to Egypt. Sixteen years later Soussa surrendered to the army of Abd Allah Ben Zorbir, and six years afterwards Okba Ben Nafé el Febri took Bizerta (properly called Ben Zert), and in A.D. 670 founded the city of Kairwán.*

After carrying the arms of Islam to Fezzan and

* See Chapter XXXVII.

Morocco, Okba was slain ingloriously in the neighbourhood of Biscara. The oasis which surrounds his tomb bears the name of Sidi Okba to the present day. In A.D. 694 Hassan Ben el Noman destroyed Carthage, Tunis, and the neighbouring towns. Both Okba and Hassan were obliged to struggle against hostile movements of the indigenous Berbers. The annals of Tunis at this point merge for many years in those of Kairwán. Abd el Rahman Ben Habib founded in A.D. 745 the dynasty of the Abassides in the West, but half a century later they succumbed before the Aghlabites under the auspices of the Caliph Haroun el Rachid. Eleven princes succeeded Ibrahim Ben el Agheleb, the first of the line, and it was the Aghlabite sovereign Abou Muhamed Ziadat Allah who conquered Sicily, but in A.D. 909 they were overthrown in the revolution headed by Abou Abd Allah the Fathamite, who obtained the sway from Morocco to the district of Barca in Tripoli. The Obeïdite or Fathamite princes assumed the title of Caliph, and made Kairwán and the Mehdia successively the seat of their administration. In A.D. 972 the Caliph El Moëz conquered Egypt, and left the care of his dominions in Western Africa to his lieutenant Ebn Zeïri, who became independent, and transmitted his province to his descendants—

the Zeïrites. This dynasty struggled successively with the Elmorabetin or Almoravides and the Almohades, who at length obtained supreme power over nearly all the North African littoral. Several powerful Berber clans seem to have waged war against the Almohades, and so far succeeded in weakening their power that, in A.D. 1228, one of their lieutenants, Abou Zakaria Yahya, son of Abou Muhamed Abd el Wahed *Ben Abou Hafs*, declared himself independent in Tunis, and founded the line of Hafsite sovereigns, who exercised supreme power in Tunis for a little more than three centuries.

It was during the reign of the Hafsite prince Abou Abd Allah Muhamed el Mostancer, that the first French expedition to Tunis took place. In the month of July 1270 the fleet of Louis IX. arrived at Cagliari in Sardinia. At a great council held here the king announced his intention of making an attack on the "country of Tunis," the primary object of the seventh crusade. The following are the reasons which he gave for his determination:—"Tunis," said St. Louis, "faces Sicily, and is on the high road to the Holy Land. Tunis can always harass our communications with the East; we must leave no enemies behind us, and we must therefore conquer it first of all."

On the 17th July Louis of France and the princes in his train anchored their ships off Cape Carthage. The landing of the invaders was unopposed, and the king contented himself with entrenching his army amidst the ruins which then covered the site of the great city. "The Arabs," says M. Pellissier, "encouraged by the inaction of the crusaders, came every day to skirmish in the vicinity of the camp. If one pursued them they fled, but when the French returned to their quarters, tired out by a bootless chase, the Arabs turned round and assailed them with arrows and javelins. This is exactly how they treat us to-day."* M. Pellissier must have contemplated with the eye of prophecy the campaign of 1881. Days and weeks passed by and the sorties of the Arabs became more frequent, the soldiers entreated to be allowed to march against them, but the king insisted on waiting for his brother, Charles of Sicily. Then, as six hundred and eleven years later, came the ravages of dysentery and fever. One after another the great chieftains shared the fate of the common soldiers, and the fair hill overlooking the blue waves and purple mountains of the Gulf of

* Mémoires Historiques et Géographiques sur l'Algérie. Par E. Pellissier. Exploration Scientifique de l'Algérie, vol. vi. Paris : Imprimerie Royale, 1844. P. 200.

Tunis became, as it had often become before, a vast hecatomb. The king himself was at last struck down with the fell disease. The Arabs sang in chorus the following song of victory:—

“O Frenchmen, Tunis is the sister of Cairo, prepare yourselves for every kind of misfortunes.

This time the house of Lokman * will be a tomb,
And your keepers shall be Monker and Menákin.” †

St. Louis died. Charles of Sicily arrived the following day and assumed the command of the army. A series of successes on the part of the French induced the king, El Mostancer, to sue for peace. A treaty was agreed on between the three Christian princes and the “Caliph, Imám, and Commander of the Faithful,” which assured the reciprocal protection of French and Tunisian subjects. Priests and merchants were allowed to establish themselves in Tunis. All prisoners were to be surrendered. The Commander of the Faithful bound himself to pay a war indemnity of 210,000 ounces of gold, and an annual tribute of 24,000 ounces to the King of Sicily. The convention was distasteful in the highest degree both to Christian and Moslem, and the chroniclers tell us that even

* Koran, ch. xxxi. 11, 12.

† The Angels of Death.

at that remote period Charles of Sicily was accused of what is now called *tripotages*.

A week after the signing of the treaty Prince Edward of England, afterwards Edward I., arrived. He was justly indignant at all that had been done, and at once set sail for Palestine. The kings of France, Sicily, and Navarre did not embark till October. The "Commander of the Faithful" was afraid his subjects would again come into collision with the Christians, and planned the raising of a mixed corps of soldiers to protect them.* Here we have apparently the prototype of General Lambert's apocryphal legion in 1881. The misfortunes of the crusaders did not end here. A great portion of the fleet was shipwrecked off Trapani, and the avaricious Charles applied all the *flotsam* and *jetsam* without any scruple to his own use. Then the King and Queen of Navarre died of fever at Trapani, and three other members of the royal family of France survived their return from the pestilential camp of Carthage only a few months. The Beni Hafs were never more molested by a French invasion.

* Letters of Pierre de Condé.

CHAPTER IV.


THE CONQUEST OF TUNIS BY CHARLES V.

THE descendants of Abou Abd Allah Muhamed el Mostancer soon forgot to pay their tribute to the kings of Sicily, and the Beni Hafs continued to enjoy absolute power in their dominions till nearly the middle of the sixteenth century, when they succumbed to the successive attacks of the Spaniards and the Turks. The invasion of Tunis by Charles V. was incontestably one of the most celebrated *gesta* of the age in which it occurred; it has been celebrated alike in poetry, painting, and even on porcelain, and its traces have hardly yet entirely disappeared. The emperor brought in his train one Jan Cornelis Vermeyen, who painted ten pictures of the most striking episodes in the campaign. Six of the original paintings were discovered by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and they were subsequently restored and brought to England by the late Prince Consort. The localities depicted in them can be easily recognised by any



CHRISTIAN SLAVES AT TUNIS

From the picture by Jan Cornelis Vermeulen, in the possession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria




SIEGE OF GOLETTA BY CHARLES V

From the picture by Jan Cornelis Vermeyen, in the possession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.




LANDING OF CHARLES V.

From the picture by Jan Cornelis Vermeyen, in the possession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.



BATTLE BETWEEN TUNIS AND GOLETHA.

From the picture by Jan Cornelis Vermeyen, in the possession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.



TAKING OF TUNIS BY CHARLES V

From the picture by Jan Cornelis Vermeeyen, in the possession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria

one well acquainted with the principal features of the country, and I have been enabled to place before the reader the drawings representing the capture of Tunis and the bombardment of the Goletta forts. The remains of the ramparts thrown up by the captains of Barbarossa are still visible. They consist of a triple wall with the intervening spaces filled up by layers of sand, stones, and rubbish. This line of fortification passed from shore to shore, across the neck of land which divides the Mediterranean from the Tunis lake, close to the railway terminus erected by an English company in 1872. In making some improvements in 1874, the lake end of the rampart was cut through. Nearly two hundred skeletons were found outside it. Several pieces of Spanish money, a heap of cannon balls, and some broken weapons were picked up. The bones were afterwards re-interred in the adjoining burial-ground. A skull, pierced apparently by a conical bullet, is still preserved in Tunis. A short time afterwards I pointed out these remains to Sir William Stirling-Maxwell, who remained some time in Tunis and visited all the ruins of the Spanish fortifications. He much regretted he had not seen them before writing his charming book on "The Cloister Life of Charles V.," and his untimely death alone, I believe, prevented him

from becoming the most modern chronicler of the Spanish emperor's African conquest. One of the finest known specimens of majolica ware is covered with a painting of the storming of Goletta, which Joseph Marryat erroneously describes as "an island in the Mediterranean Sea." * It bears the following inscription :—

M.D. XXXI (?)

"Da Carlo d'Austria Imperatore potente
L'alta Goletta inespugnabil tanto
 Astretta e presa con furor repente
 In Urbino nella bottega di Francesco Silvano."

The story of the Spanish invasion of the kingdom of the Beni Hafs has been written by at least a score of Moorish and Spanish annalists. The voluminous records of the Knights of St. John contain the minutest details of the great enterprise. In the carefully preserved archives of the Order I discovered the original MS. instructions issued by the Grand Master to the captains of the Maltese contingent.† In the public library I happened to light on a brief but curious narrative of the expedition compiled by a French knight in 1612.

* History of Pottery and Porcelain. By Joseph Marryat. London: John Murray, 1857. Fig. 38.

† Appendix A.

“Mouley Muhamed, king of Tunis,” writes the Chevalier Boyssat, “died in 1533. He was, it is believed, poisoned by one of his wives, by name Geisa, who desired to secure the throne for her son, Mouley Assem (Hasan), and who at once put twenty-two of his brothers to death. One alone, by name Rascit (Rachid), contrived to escape, who took refuge with the corsair Kheir-ed-Din at Algiers. They went together to Constantinople, and there the Captain Pacha proposed to the Sultan Suleiman the conquest of Tunis, under the pretext of the restoration of Rascit. A fleet was at once prepared, but when it was on the point of sailing Rascit mysteriously disappeared. Kheir-ed-Din, however, reached Tunis, and took it almost without a blow. It was not till he arrived in the very midst of the *castel* of Tunis that he confessed to the absence of Rascit, and boldly proclaimed the downfall of the Beni Hafs and the authority of the Grand Signor. Mouley Assem then fled to Europe and asked the powerful aid of the Emperor Charles.”

The Emperor agreed to assist him. He found in this romantic enterprise the means of carrying out a project he had long before contemplated, and of furthering his ideas of becoming the Defender of Christendom. “Charles,” says Sir W. Stirling-

Maxwell, "stood between the days of chivalry which were going out, and the days of printing which were coming in,—respecting the traditions of the one, and fulfilling many of the requirements of the other. Men of the sword found in him a bold cavalier. Like his ancestors, with lance in rest, he led knights against the Moorish hosts amongst the olives of Goletta."

The allied fleet assembled in June 1535 off the coast of Sardinia. "The Pope," says Boyssat, "sent twelve galleys. The King of France sent twenty more to guard the rivers of Christendom,* and the Religion † four ships and the great *carraca*, ‡ commanded by Touchebœuf Clermont, with two hundred Knights. Anthony de Grolée commanded a reserve of seventy Knights, and a regiment of infantry. The Chevalier Botigella directed the sea-forces. On arriving in Sardinia the Emperor received the Knights with the highest honours, and the Prior of Pisa presented to him one Sherif, the envoy sent to the Grand Master by Mouley Hasan. Sherif was able to address the Emperor in good Spanish, being descended from the Moors expelled by Ferdinand from the kingdom of Granada. On the

* Pellissier says "that the French saw in the Turks useful allies, and sent an emissary to Kheir-ed-Din."—*Mémoires Historiques*, p. 47.

† Order of St. John.

‡ Appendix B.

28th June the fleet anchored off the harbour of Utica, now called Porto-Farina. The Emperor's galley stuck fast in the sand, but Prince Doria managed to release it, and the circumstance was hailed as a good omen denoting the desire of the African soil to voluntarily submit to the will of His Majesty." On the appearance of this formidable flotilla of 600 ships before Goletta, Barbarossa repented having withdrawn his vessels into the Tunis lake, and put to death one Louis Pressida, a Genoese gentleman, who had assured him that the Emperor would never come to Tunis in person. The soldiers disembarked *between Goletta and the salt-pits*. There an entrenched camp was formed. The Goletta garrison made frequent sorties against the invaders, in one of which their leader, Jiaffer, was killed. The Maltese *carraca*, "St. Anne," was then brought as near as possible to the Goletta fort, and her artillery in a short time demolished the greater part of it. The Turkish cannon, not being mounted on wheels, were consequently almost useless. An attack by sea was next organised, in which the Maltese ships occupied the position and precedence invariably conceded to the Order. The barque of the "St. Anne" carried three small cannons, and, approaching the shore, greatly harassed the besieged. At last the Emperor ordered a general

assault, which was led by the Knights. The Chevalier Cossier, carrying the banner of St. John, was the first to enter the Goletta, and it was his flag which first floated from the half-ruined battlements. The Turks fled towards Tunis by way of the lake, and Goletta was sacked by the Spaniards. Charles then moved along the right side of the lake (*estang*) towards Tunis. Kheir-ed-Din met him, a league from the town, at the head of eight thousand Moors or Turks and a strong force of Arabs. After a desperate engagement, Kheir-ed-Din was forced to fall back on Tunis. At that time there were several thousand Christian slaves in the dungeons beneath the citadel, which is now called the Kasbah. Kheir-ed-Din felt the danger of having to resist a double attack, and proposed to massacre them. This plan was successfully opposed by his subordinates. The slaves, headed by the Maltese Knight, Paul Simeoni, induced their keepers, two Spanish renegades, to open the doors of the prison. Having pillaged the arms in the guard-house, they expelled the Turkish governor, and afterwards obtained complete possession of the fortress. They found the standard captured by the Turks at Sarmiento, and, hoisting it on the highest tower of the citadel, communicated the news of their victory to the Spaniards outside the walls. Kheir-

ed-Din fled towards Bone, where he had prudently left some of his ships. Then followed a time of rapine and murder, the almost indescribable atrocities of which it is impossible to relate. Charles did not call off his followers from their prey until they began to slay each other in the quarrels which arose over the division of their booty. Then and then only did the generals endeavour to restore order in the army, the conduct of which had, during three days, resembled that of "a hideous band of brigands." When Mouley Hasan endeavoured to protect a Moorish slave-girl, she indignantly spat in his face. The Tunisians could never forgive even the restoration of a Beni Hafs purchased at such a price.

The treaty by which Charles gave back the throne of his fathers to his protégé was a very short one. The following were its conditions:—

- (1.) The release without ransom of all Christian slaves.
- (2.) Freedom of faith and commerce to Christians.
- (3.) The Tunisians to abstain from piracy.
- (4.) Goletta to be ceded to Spain.
- (5.) An annual tribute of 12,000 piastres to be paid to the Spaniards.
- (6.) The suzerainty of Spain to be recognised by a yearly present of twelve horses and twelve falcons.
- (7.) Spain to protect Tunis against all foreign attacks.
- (8.) The castle at Tunis to be

occupied by a Spanish guard until the country was completely pacified. Charles remained a few days at Rades, but before quitting the capital is said to have instituted an order of chivalry to commemorate his victory. The "Cross of Tunis" consisted of a flint and steel suspended from a golden chain bearing the word *Barbaria*.* The Emperor sailed for Italy, leaving a garrison of a thousand men and ten galleys at Goletta. While Italian historians were recording and Italian poets were singing the deeds of Charles and the glories of the Spanish arms, Kheir-ed-Din appeared before Mahon, reduced many of its inhabitants to slavery, and returned laden with booty to Algiers.

* *Études Politiques sur le Royaume de Tunis*. Par le Comte Alphonse O'Kelly. Paris, 1871. P. 13. Count O'Kelly's little work gives some curious details of Mouley Hasan's visit to Brussels in 1534, as a suppliant for Charles' aid, and in 1550-53, when he was an exile and had been deprived of sight and blinded by his own children. The kindness of the Emperor to his unfortunate ally affords eloquent testimony to his really noble nature. He refused to allow Mouley Hasan to do him homage, and in the forest of Soignes made him sit at table with six crowned heads.

CHAPTER V.

SPANISH SUPREMACY.

No sooner had the Spaniards quitted Tunis than insurrections broke out against their ally, Mouley Hasan, in different parts of the country. Holy Kairwán at once set the example by stoutly refusing to recognise a prince who owed his throne to Christian intervention. The Sicilian troops sent by the Emperor in 1537 to Susa were repulsed, and it was not till two years afterwards that Andrea Doria succeeded in re-establishing the authority of Mouley Hasan in the towns of the Tunisian littoral. An attempt to crush the rising of Sidi Arfa in Kairwán wholly failed, and the corsair Dragut became the acknowledged ruler of Susa, Sfax, and Galibra. In the following year (1540) Doria once more recovered Susa for Mouley Hasan, who nevertheless resolved to proceed to Europe in the hope of persuading the Emperor to undertake a second expedition on his behalf. No sooner had he left Tunis than his son and heir,

Mouley Hamíd, seized on the supreme power, and added the difficulties of a civil war to those surrounding the already half-lost cause of the Beni Hafs. His father hastened back to the Goletta, but he fell into the power of the usurper, who caused him to be blinded and loaded with chains. Mouley Hamíd was in turn overthrown by his uncle Abd-el-Malek, and a conflict ensued during which Dragut once more obtained possession of the Tunisian coast towns. On the 10th September 1551 Don Juan de Vega took Mehdia or Africa, and established his nephew, Don Alvar, as its governor at the head of 1500 men. Mehdia was given provisionally to the Maltese Order, but it was finally abandoned and its fortifications destroyed in 1553. Seven years later a Spanish legion was literally annihilated in the island of Djerba. The pyramid of skulls which served to commemorate this Arab triumph was only removed in 1846. Mouley Hamíd, who again recovered his throne from his cousin, Muhamed, son of Abd-el-Malek, was attacked and defeated by Ali Pacha, the Turkish governor of Algiers, on the plains of Beja, and was compelled to take refuge with the Spanish garrison at Goletta. He in his turn was forced to supplicate Philip II. to send an army to Tunis, in order to uphold the last representative of the

Beni Hafs, and expel Caïd Ramdan, the agent of Ali Pacha. The Emperor determined to crush for ever the Turkish power in North Africa, and intrusted the execution of his design to his natural son, Don Juan of Austria. The fortifications of Goletta were strengthened, and a garrison of 4000 men occupied the citadel of Tunis. Mouley Hamíd, becoming alarmed at these proceedings, endeavoured to draw back, and the Spaniards were obliged to select a more docile instrument. Their choice fell on his brother Muhamed, the Taib Bey of three centuries ago. A Minister Resident was found for him in the person of the Count de Cerballon, who played precisely the same part recently allotted to M. Roustan. "The prince," writes one of ^{the} annalists of Tunis, "was forced to share his power with De Cerballon, who sat by his side when he administered justice, suggested the decisions to be pronounced, and at times even compelled him to obey his orders." Meanwhile the Turkish troops, under Hyder Pacha, had withdrawn to Kairwán, and waited patiently the course of events.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TRIUMPH OF THE TURKS.

THE Sultan Selim was soon persuaded to gratify the wishes of his Divan, and attempt the liberation of Tunis from Spanish supremacy. Sinau the corsair was selected to complete the task which Kheir-ed-Din the corsair had begun. The pachas of Tripoli and Algiers, as well as the little garrison at Kairwán, prepared with alacrity to co-operate in the pious undertaking of the Caliph. De Cerballon had hardly time to recall the troops from Bizerta (occupied by the Spaniards ever since the departure of Charles V.), when the Turks appeared before Goletta, which almost immediately fell into their hands. The fortress on the island of Shikli, in the Bahira lake, was easily taken, and on the 3d September 1573 the citadel of Tunis finally capitulated to Sinau Pacha, who once more hoisted over its half-ruined battlements the banner of the crescent. Before consenting to a surrender, De Cerballon saw his followers reduced to thirty fighting men.

Although nearly ten thousand Spaniards were killed or made prisoners during this disastrous campaign, the Turks were allowed to enjoy their conquest in peace, and Sinau Pacha lost no time in organising an administration in the name of the Sublime Porte. Hidder or Hyder, the Turkish captain of Kairwán, was appointed the first Governor-General, with a Divan or Council after the manner of that already existing in Algiers. The troops were henceforward to be controlled exclusively by Aghas or Deys, forty in number, and a Cadi was to determine civil differences, according to the tenets of Moslem jurisprudence. Seventeen years later an internal revolution placed the executive power in the hands of a single Dey, who was declared to have authority alike over the city and the army, and to whom the Pacha, Governor-General, or Bey, was to be completely subordinate. In all public documents and proclamations belonging to this period, the whilom kingdom of the Beni Hafs is uniformly styled the Odjak or Eyalet of Tunis, a term which in later times was freely translated by the word Regency. Ever since the 3d of September 1573, the *kutba* or Friday's prayer has been uniformly recited in the name of the reigning sultan of the Osmanlis, while the current coin has always borne his cipher. From that day to

this, all Tunisian rulers have received the *caftan* or robe of investiture from Stamboul, have governed in virtue of a Turkish *firman* or patent of appointment, and have ever girded to their side the sword of honour, which is transmitted invariably to regents, lieutenants, and viceroys by the supreme head of the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DOMINATION OF THE DEYS (A.D. 1590-1705).

OF the thirty Deys, who ruled on an average a little more than three years each during the seventeenth century, a majority were deposed, while others suffered a violent and, in many cases, a horrible death at the hands of their subjects. The history of this period of external piracy and internal bloodshed has very little interest, if it were not for the fact that, in spite of their constant challenges to Christendom abroad and their ceaseless dissensions at home, the Tunisian corsairs practically held all Europe at bay, and lived and throve on the blackmail which they levied almost with impunity on every power having commerce with the shores of the Mediterranean. The presents which took the place of tribute have really only disappeared with the last generation, and men still living can remember the time when consuls-general and political agents were obliged to creep into the Beylical presence under a wooden bar!

I do not intend to attempt to sketch even in the briefest manner the chronicles of the Deys of Tunis, but shall only mention some few facts connected with their rule, which either refer directly to England, or tend to throw some light on the more recent history of the country. In 1605 M. de Brèves arrived in Tunis, *accompanied by an ambassador of the Grand Signor*, in order to conclude a fresh treaty with France. During his stay at Tunis Hammamet was taken and lost by the Knights of St. John, and its keys hang to this day in one of the chapels of the cathedral at Malta. In 1640 the fleet of the Order, under the Prince Landgrave d'Osia, burned several Tunisian vessels before Goletta, an exploit which forms the subject of one of the frescoes in the palace of the Grand Masters at Valetta. Three years later the Tunisian squadron was sent to assist the Turks at the siege of Candia. Ten years after this the Capuchin Mission was established at Tunis under the auspices and protection of France. Some years previously the Deys had granted to England the burial-ground of St. George, then just outside the Carthage gate, but now in the heart of the city. The original deed of gift is lost, and our first known treaty with Tunis is dated October 1662, in which it is not even mentioned. Some of the tombs recently dis-

covered in this cemetery have considerable interest (see Appendix C). The treaty of 1662 (see Appendix D), which was granted to England at a time when France was threatening to attack the Regency, seems to have restrained very little the piratical depredations of our new allies, for three years afterwards Admiral Black bombarded Porto-Farina "and emptied the *bagnè* of all the English and Dutch slaves." The French burned the Algerian fleet in the Goletta roads, and succeeded in concluding a more favourable treaty with the Bey later in the year, and a second convention in 1672. During the reign of Muhamed Tabak, in 1678, he was attacked by a pretender to the throne also named Muhamed. The following literal extract, from one of the old registers of the British Consulate General, conveys a correct idea of the dangers and difficulties of Europeans in Tunis during the palmier days of Tunisian Piracy.

The DECLARATION of FRANCIS BAKER, CONSUL, FRANCIS BARRINGTON and BENJAMIN STEELE Merchants In this City and Kingdome of Tunis About an Advance Imposed by Sidi Muhamet Bey upon the English Nation amounting to Fifteen Thousand and eleven Dollars viz. :—

That on the 12th Jan^y in the yeare of our Lord 1677 His Excellency Sidi Mahamet Bey appeared with his Forces before this City of Tunis, to the great terrour of the Inhabitants,

and after three days assault (burning downe the Citty gates) he rendered himself absolute Patrone thereof; whereupon Taback Dey with such Turks and Moores as could promise themselves no security from him retired into the Castle which they maintained twenty five dayes, notwithstanding all Mines and other Stratagems of Warre diligently prosecuted by Muhamet Bey to reduce them, the whole Citty being now become his Prey, ourselves, the French Nation, Jewes, Merchants etc suddainly experienced the bad effects of his then unlimited Power, which he improved for the supplying of his urgent wants;—

On the 26th Jan^r. he sent for our Nation and the French to attend him at the Gibbelluchada where having taxed the latter with many frivolous Pretences, and us that our Men of Warre had transported his Uncle, the Hosse Bey (now Bashaw) from Tripoli to Avarin, by which meanes He and his brother Sidi Alli Bey became Capable to contend with him for the Government of this Kingdome, did without any reply forceable and violently seize on Charles Gratiano Consul for the French together with our selves, sending us Prisoners to his Camp about eight miles distance from Tunis, swearing by the Soule of his deceased he would cutt us to pieces that night, and seize on the whole English Estate in this Country, whereupon not knowing what his Tyrannicall spiritt and desperatenesse of Conditions might lead him to, obleiged us to have to recourse to Soclasly . . . with such other Friends as wee judged might have an influence upon him to assuage his fury, Pleading the respect he ought to have to the Articles of peace firm'd by his owne hand, and that the Resentment of his maj^{ty} in having his Consul and Merchants so barbarously treated w^d certainly provoke his Maj^{ty} to vindicate his subjects in such manner as perhaps his Excell^{cy} might repent of this Action, when it was too late, to all which they agreed, telling us we spoke their opinions,

and that they would imediately goe to the Bey to make him understand so much, In all which their endeavours proved fruitlesse at their returne plainly telling us, that neither our lives nor the whole English Estate in the Country were in security unless we complied in the payment of a Summe of money, of which his occasions for the payment of his Army were very pressing. The next day being sent for we were with cruell threatnings and Guards appointed to attend us returned to the Citty, Spahees ordered to seize on all our Debtors, severall of which were putt in Chaines, and a Broker appointed to dispose of the cloth in warehouse, by which meanes he received from us in six days Dollars Five Thousand, but that not satisfieing wee were again sent Prisoners to the Camp, with threatening to have our Leggs and armes broke, and many other barbarous Menaces, where wee remained two dayes and two nights with dreadfull apprehensions not knowing what the result of so severe and unjust treatment would be: till by intercession of our friends our liberty was once more procured, and wee ordered to Compleate the summe of Dollars Twenty thousand, or prepare to be sent to his Castle at Keff about three dayes journey from this Place, and to have the whole English Estate in this country sequestered, before the compleating of which (though continually dogged and persecuted by his Souldiers) wee were a third time remanded to the Camp, where we ordered our Drugerman to acquaint the Bey how much his Officers had received, and that wee desired and expected he should give us noe further trouble &c (when in manner as before) he fell into a most extravagant Passion, ordering our Drugerman to be putt in Chaines, and then telling us his Clemency in not cutting off our heads and seizing on all he could find of the English Estates in Tunis, as was his first resolution when arrivd this Citty Scornefully demanding, what can the King of England doe, take the Goletta, lett him doe it, and Tunis too, choosing that any

Prince should be Possessor of this Country than his Brother, with this and such like extravagant and despairing discourses he then treated us, commanding us to make noe reply, and then ordered us to be a third time carried away Prisoners, but being on promises of compliyance released in the terme of four days, we compleated the sune of Dollars 15,011, When suddaine newes of his Brother Allilis approach, obliged him to raise his seige from the Castle and depart with the new King and such Turks and Coglobys are were in the Citty to attend his Brothers motions in Campagnia Leaving us to Blesse God wee were not at that time in his Camp, when undoubtedly wee had (as many others were) been sent to Keff. In three days time each Armies meett; Mahamat Bey receiving a totall defeate, the new King (Dey) and most of his Turks slaine, himself hardly escaping to his Castle of Keff so that this Kingdome and Citty is again under the command of Taback Dey and Alli Bey. Now the Avance paid by our Nation to Muhamet Bey and his People, with the new King and others instrumentall to the accomodation in ready money cloath and Debts received from the Taylors amounts unto Dollars 15,011, and was for the security of the whole remaining English Estate. In Witnesse to the truth of the foregoing lines wee do hereunto sett our hands in Tunis this the 26th day of April 1678.

FRANCIS BAKER *Consul*
 FRANCIS BARRINGTON
 BENJ^m STEELE.

Charles II. must have written to Muhamed Tabak Dey and Ali Bey on the subject of this protest, for I find that A.H. 1093 (A.D. 1682) they forwarded to England two almost identical answers. The following is Ali Bey's letter :—

To Charles the Second by the Grace of God (King of) Great Britain and others his Maj^{tie}'s Dominions the greatest and most Powerfull amongst the Kingdomes and Nations of the Messias the most worthy and most noble Protector of the Believers in Jesus Christ Allj Beyh the Generall of the Camp & Kingdome of Tunis his faithfull and kynde friend sends hearty wishes of health Prosperity etc Some months agoe I rec^d from y^r Maj^{tie} a most acceptable letter wherein you were pleased to bring a fresh to my memory the injuries my Brother Mahamat Beyh offered unto Frausis Baker y^e Consul and the rest of y^r subjects here; and to take p^ticular notice of the mony he had violently forced out of their hands In answer whereto I entreat y^r maj^{tie} not to wonder at those unworthy Proceedings of my said brother, for he tooke an opportunity whilst I was abroad, with all the land forces of this Gov^{mt} (doing such service as was then judged necessary for its preservation and welfare) and came hither with a great number of outlaws assaulted the unarmed Citty, for a little time made himself master thereof and did most cruelly abuse and plunder every Xtian nation forcing great sūmes of money from them besides impudently attacking our Royall Castle, but when his attempts proved vaine and he knew I had notice of his being here, he and his follow^{rs} fled away But I am ready to pform all the dutys of a true frnd to y^r maj^{tie} and have found a way to render to y^e said Consul and Merchants due satisfatton for the losses they have suffer^d as I believe y^r maj^{tie} will have been informed before this letter kisses y^r Royall hands. I do heartily wish and hope that your Maj^{tie} will lett me be honored for the future with a more frequent intercourse of our letters, because nothing can be more gratfull to me than either the good news of y^r Maj^{tie}'s well being or an imploy^{mt} in y^r services in these parts. I am now to acknowledge the Receipt of many favors from y^r Maj^{tie} by y^e hand of y^r aforementioned

subjects residing here, and entreat the addition of one more. Wee are in great want of Gunpowdr and Saile canvas and doo therefore desire y^r Maj^{tie} to pmitt Francis Baker y^r Consul to send us out such a supply of each as we have told him our necessitys require, this I shall esteeme a singular kindnesse and it will be as a tye on our part to maintain the ancient peace and ffriendship amongst us, which I never had and thoughts of violating. Dated in Tunis 25 Jumad (Elaoul) 1093

y^r maj^{tie}'s

most affectionat true friend

ALLY BEYH Genrall of ye Camps
and Kingdome of Tunis

A few weeks later Ali Bey quarrelled with Muhamed Tabak Dey, and the latter was strangled at the gate of the Bardo. At this time the authority of the Deys was fast fading before the increased powers of the Beys, and the next Dey, Ahmed Chelebi, was actually appointed by Ali Bey, the murderer of his predecessor. The British Agent and Consul-General Baker remaining in England, Thomas Goodwyn was appointed to succeed him, and Charles II. wrote the following letter to Ahmed Chelebi :—

Charles the Second by the Grace of God King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith etc To the Excellent the Bashaw, the Dey and the People of the Citty and Kingdom of Tunis, our well beloved friends and allyes Greeting. Having been pleased to give leave to

our Trusty and Wellbeloved Francis Baker Esq^r our late Agent and Consul Generall residing with you to returne back into this our Kingdome to attend his private concernes here. We have made choice of our Trusty and Wellbeloved Subject Thomas Goodwyn Esq^{re} (as a person of whose integrity and fitnessse to supply that place we are fully satisfied) to succeed him, and have accordingly by our commission under our Royall Signet and Signe manuell constituted the said Thomas Goodwyn our Agent and Consul Generall with your Government. We have therefore thought fitt to acquaint you by these our Letters herewith, and to Recommend Our sayd Agent and Consul unto you, desiring you upon all occasions of our service, and the affayres of our merchants to give him free accesse and audience and to credit him in such things as he shall represent unto you in discharge of his duty according to our said Commission. And so we commit you to the Protection of the Almighty. Given under our Royall Signet and Signe Manuell at our Castle of Windsor the 27th day of August 1683 in the Five and Thirtieth yeare of our Reigne

your Loving Friend

L Jenkins L.S

CHARLES R.

In 1685 the French fleet appeared off Goletta, and the Dey consented to indemnify them for their losses by his corsairs, and to grant his authorisation for the opening a place of business at Cape Nègre. Next year James II. wrote an autograph letter to Muhamed Baktache. This communication was as follows:—

James the Second by the Grace of God King of England, Scotland France and Ireland Defender of the Faith etc To the most Illustrious Lords the Bashaw, Divan, Dei, Bei and

the rest of the Souldiers in the Kingdome of Tunis, Our well-beloved friends Greeting Having in pursuance of what we formerly signified to you directed S^r William Soame Baron^t whome We had appointed our Ambassador to the Grande Signor to call at your City, in order to confirme the peace subsisting between Us and to renew to you the Assurances of Our friendship. And whereas we have lately received an account that Our said Ambassador was seized with a violent sicknesse which obliged him to stop his voyage and that he is since deceased We have thought fit hereby to signify to you that We have fully empowered our Trusty and well-beloved Thomas Goodwyn Esq^r. Our Agent and Consul Generall with you to confirme the peace with you, And therefore we desire you will give him full Credence in what he has to say to you on Our part, in order to Confirming the peace. And we do promise that We shall in Our name agree unto, We will Confirme and ratify, in pursuance of Our intentions to Live with you in perfect ffriendshipe and a good Correspondence to the mutuall benefit of Our People and Subjects respectively. And so committing you to the Protection of Almighty God, We bid you farewell.

Given at Our Court at Windsor the 12th day of July
1686 in y^e seconde year of Our Reigne

Y^r loving friend

Sunderland P

JAMES R.

Mr. Consul Goodwyn lost no time in carrying out the king's orders, and signed a treaty with Tunis on the 2d October 1686.* The following copy of Sir William Soame's instructions was sent him for his guidance :—

* Appendix E.

EXTRACT of Sir WILLIAM SOAME'S Instructions. WINDSOR,
September 21st 1685.

Having thought it requisite that in your Passage to Constantinople you should call at Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, you are accordingly upon your arrivall in the Road before any of the said Places to send for our Consull, and by him give notice thereof to the Government, Letting them know, that in pursuance of what Wee signified to them by Our Letters of the 12th of February last, We have directed you to passe that way to your Embassy, That you might confirme to them Our Resolutions to maintaine the peace and good Correspondence established with them by the Late King Our most Dear Brother of Blessed memory deceased, Which Peace though We look upon as substituting and being in full force, Wee are willing however as an Argument of the Sincerity of Our Intentions to renew in Our own name, which may be done by short Instrument referring to the respective Treaties made viz with Algiers the 10th day of Aprill 1682 by Arthur Herbert Esq^r Late Admirall of the Mediterranean Seas, With Tunis by Sir John Lawson October 5th 1682 and confirmed and renewed the 4th of February 168 $\frac{1}{5}$ With Tripoli May 1st 1676 by Sir John Narborough late Admirall in the said Seas.

It being usuall upon such occasions to send Presents to the Chief Persons of those Governments, We have accordingly ordered Presents to be prepared and put on board the Man of Warr which is to carry you, but though you may intimate to them that you have such Presents, We do not think fit you should cause them to be delivered till you have finished your Business and that all things shall be concluded.

The treaties you shall so renew you shall leave with our respective Consuls to be forthwith sent by some safe Conveyance to us for our Ratification.

Mr. Secretary Pepys appears to have written

to Mr. Goodwyn to express his satisfaction at the speedy conclusion of the treaty :—

M^r. SAMUEL PEPYS TO M^r. GOODWYN AT TUNIS.

S^r

This serves to acknowledge and thank you for y^r of the 9th October, 1686, which calls for noe other answer from mee than my telling you, that I did not faile to communicate the contents thereof to his Ma^y who was very well pleas^d with your proceedings on Occasion of the Confirmation of the Peace with that Governm^t, w^h is hop^d by y^r prudence in y^e ministry of y^r office, will bee of long continuance w^h for y^e sake of y^e King's service as well as the Publick Interest and your particular is desired and wished for by

Your very humble serv^t

S. PEPYS.

Adm^y 21st Feby
168⁶

In 1686 the Sultan conferred upon Muhamed the title of Bey, as well as that of Dey. He died in the following year, having received a short time before his death an important letter from James II.

TO THE BASHAW OF TUNIS.

James the Second etc etc

Greeting. Our subjects trading into your Kingdome have by their humble Petition represented unto us that there are considerable debts due unto them by you for moneys and commoditys by them furnished, which the whole Government owned to be so just and reasonable that as an addition to the former articles of the late Peace, the Bashaw, Day and

Duvan under their respective hands promised to make full satisfaction for them within twelve months then next ensuing with this further clause, that if within six months the French Customs which were abated upon your last Treaty with France from ten to three per Cent were not reduced to the former usance, Our subjects should be dealt with in the same manner, so as in point of Trade to be on equall termes with the French. And We not doubting of y^r readinesse to comply with what you have in so solemne a manner agreed unto, We have thought fit to direct Our Trusty and Well beloved S^r William Turnbull Our Ambassador to the grand Signor in his passage to Constantinople to call at your Port, as well to assure you of Our desire to continue a Peace and friendship with you, as to demand and see the performance and execution of your said Agreement, which we must expect according to right and justice. Given etc etc the 12th day of May 1687

Your loving friend

JAMES R.

Sunderland P.

Muhamed Baktache was succeeded by Ali Raïs, a corsair, who for nearly half a century had been the terror of the Mediterranean. Yet this pirate captain lived to see his alliance courted by Great Britain, and to receive the following curious letter from his "loving friend," King William III., the object of which is fully explained in Lord Shrewsbury's despatch which accompanied it.

William by the Grace of God of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, King, etc etc Defender of the Faith. To the most Illustrious Lords the Bashaw, Dey, Aga, Divan &

Governors of the City and Kingdom of Tunis Our Well-Beloved friends Greeting. It hath pleased Almighty God (by whom Kings Reigne) to call Us and our most serene and dearest Consort to the Imperiall Throne of England, Scotland and Ireland and We have accepted of the Royal Crowne and Dignity at the humble request of the Lords & Commons of the Realm now assembled in Parliament, and We have been solemnly crowned King and Queen on the 11th day of Aprill last in the presence of our said Lords and Commons. We think it requisite to acquaint you therewith as we have done all Kings, Princes and States in Peace and friendship wth Us, and at the same time to assure you, that We on Our part do intend strictly to keep and observe the Peace that was lately made and hath been since confirmed and doth now subsist between our Kingdomes and your Government not doubting but that you will also on your part do and cause to be done by your Subjects what belongs to you for the maintaining and preserving of the said Peace inviolably. We do also intend very speedily to send a nnumber of our men of warr wth some person fully authorized by Us, to renew and confirm the said Peace with your Government and in the meane time our Consul residing there will inform you of the change made in the Passeports which our Ships now use. We have received your letter and are sorry that the men money and goods which were laden on board the English Ship called the Swan have been seized and taken by a French corsair. We should have readily used Our endeavours to procure you satisfaction for the same according to Justice and the amity between Us & your Government were We in Peace and friendship with the french King against whom we have thought itt necessary on the 7th of May last to declare Open Warr by Sea and Land for those Many injuries done by him to Our Subjects and those of our Friends and Allyes And so we Commend you to God's Protection. Given att

our Court at Whitehall the 3rd day of June 1689 in the first yeare of Our Reigne

Your loving friend

WILLIAM R.

LORD SHREWSBURY TO M^r CONSUL GOODWIN.

WHITEHALL *June 3rd 1689*

S^r

I send you herewith his Majesty's letter to that Government (with a Cobby thereof for yourself) which You are forthwith to deliver and to accompany with such expressions of his Majesty's Friendship for them as You shall Judge most proper and acceptable giving them an account of the late revolution here and of the last King's withdrawing himself into France, and of their present Majesties accession to the Crowns of England and Scotland letting them also know that His Majesty hath declared Warr against the French King upon the unanimous Adresse and desire of the Lords and Commons in Parliament and how that (by God's assistance) he intends to Carry it on Vigorously both by Sea and Land against the said French King Joyntly with the States Generall whose fleet is expected every day to Joyne Our's in the Channell. A cobby of the Declaration of Warr you have here inclosed which you must get translated for the better Information of those People using all your skill and diligence to Dispose that Government to breake with the French King in this conjuncture which may prove so advantageous to them and seems to offer them a fair opportunity of having some repairation for those Injurys and Losses which the subjects of that Government (as well as those of most other nations) have suffered by the fraud and injustice of the French. Let Me have an account from time to time by every Conveniency that offers of what occurs in those parts and may be for his Majesty's Service in the present Conjuncture.

The forme of Passes goes also inclosed which will be hereafter signed by at least three of the Commissioners of the Admiralty which you must carefully explaine to those there to prevent all mistakes when their shippes meet ours at sea.

S^r

Your very Loving Friend to Serve you

SHREWSBURY.

In the year 1690 William III. wrote two other letters to Dey Ali Raïs. His successor, Tatar Dey, had the rare distinction of being eaten by his subjects. This event only occurred five years before the author of the "État des Royaumes de Barbarie" visited Tunis, and he says it was described in his presence by eye-witnesses. He writes thus:—"Mehemet Bei accepted his surrender, but the people, who were excited to madness, no sooner saw him, than, in spite of the efforts of the Bey, they fell upon him, tore him to pieces, and by an excess of cruelty only belonging to these Barbarians, eat his flesh." He adds that the widow of Tatar, who regarded Mehemet as the cause of her husband's death, took a piece of his flesh in her hand, and rushed into the Bey's presence. Upbraiding him with Tatar's death, she prayed God that she might live to see him devoured as her husband had been, and, to emphasise her words, actually ate the morsel she carried.

The eighteenth century opened with a war

between the Regencies of Tunis and Algiers, which was only put an end to by the Porte sending written orders to the belligerents to cease hostilities. The position of Dey had now fallen so low that the occupant of the post in 1701 had been formerly a coffee-house keeper. In the following May the Bey Mourad with his sons were massacred at the instigation of one of his officers while travelling to Beja. By a strange coincidence this tragedy occurred at Oued Zergua, destined nearly two centuries later to become the scene of the horrors of the 30th September 1881. In 1705 the last of the Deys was deposed by the Turkish soldiers, and they elected in his stead their most popular captain, Heussein Ben Ali, who assumed the title of Bey, and founded the dynasty which has ever since remained in possession of the Tunisian throne.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BEYS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE advent to power of Heussein Ben Ali and his dynasty wrought little or no change for the better in the condition of the country. The piracy of the Deys became the privateering of the Beys, and civil discord continued as rife as ever, with the sole difference that it was more or less confined to one family. Heussein Ben Ali himself was a renegade Greek from Candia, and although he is often styled El Turki, his descendants have very little Turkish or Arab blood in their veins. In 1708 the depredations of Tunisian corsairs caused a temporary suspension of political intercourse with France, which was only resumed after the execution of a favourable treaty two years later. M. Rousseau* says that about this time the relations between the French Consul-General and his English colleague became so strained that the former officially ordered the French laundress to refrain

* Annales Tunisiennes, p. 103.

from washing Mr. Richard Lawrence's * linen, and the French baker was forbidden to supply him with bread. A fresh treaty with England was negotiated in 1716, and in 1725 an envoy from the Porte obtained a convention for Austria.

Heussein soon began to show an increased disposition to break with France, and his corsairs frequently pursued their prizes to the coast of Provence. A squadron arrived at Goletta in 1728 under M. De Grandpré, and the Bey was compelled to make signal reparation for the behaviour of his captains. Heussein was deposed in 1735 by his nephew Ali Pacha, who in 1740 came to an open rupture with the French Consul-General, M. Gauthier. The French accused the Bey of piracy on their ships, and the Bey retorted by charging the French with sending stores to his nephews. M. Desfontaines and some other historians give a very different version of the *casus belli*. "The rupture between France and Tunis," writes M. Desfontaines, "was caused by the want of tact of our Consul. This agent was ruled entirely by his mistress, who was jealous of a Maltese woman married to a Frenchman. She induced the Consul to expel the Maltese from Tunis on a charge of bad behaviour. The latter sought the protection

* Appendix F.

of the Khaznadar, but the Consul insisted on arresting her. The Khaznadar rescued her by force, and his doing so being construed into an insult to the French flag, the war broke out." * Whatever was the original cause of the dispute, the Bey seemed to determine to proceed to extremities. He ordered M. Gauthier to kiss his hand. The latter demurred, and was threatened with death if he persisted in his refusal. On the 14th May 1740 he was compelled to submit to the humiliating ceremony. Two French vessels richly laden were captured by the Tunisian corsairs off Cape Bon, and the island of Tabarca† was occupied and its Genoese colonists reduced to slavery, on a rumour becoming current that the Lomellini family meditated its cession to France. M. Gauthier managed to escape to Tripoli, whereupon Ali Pacha directed his son to destroy the French commercial establishment at Cape Nègre. A M. Saurins, a lieutenant in the French navy, made a romantic but unsuccessful effort to obtain possession of Tabarca by stratagem. He was brought in an apparently dying state to Tunis, but he ultimately recovered and was released. The heads of the French who perished in M. Saurins' adventure were exposed

* Pellissier. *Mémoires Historiques*, p. 292.

† Appendix G.

opposite the house of the French merchants. A war broke out at this juncture between England and France, which M. Rousseau frankly admits rendered a peace with Tunis “une nécessité indispensable.” Under these circumstances the extraordinary insolence of Ali Pacha went almost unpunished, for by the treaty of 1742 the kissing of his hand by the Consul and French merchants was agreed to, although the immunities of French trade were restored and all the French slaves released.

In 1751 Admiral Keppel and Consul-General Gordon signed a fresh convention with the Bey on behalf of George II., but the Bey rejected our proposals for the cession of Tabarca. During the civil war which ensued between the sons of Ali Pacha in the following year, the whole city was given up to pillage, and the French Consul and merchants were obliged to defend their *fonduck* or residence against the attacks of the populace during several days. The internal dissensions culminated in the death of Ali Pacha and his son in the month of August 1756, and in the subsequent accession of Muhamed Bey, the eldest son of Heussein Ben Ali, who entered Tunis at the head of an Algerian army. On the 2d September the French Consulate was pillaged by the allies of the new Bey,

and M. De Sulauze, the Consul, and his subordinates escaped with difficulty over the terraces of the houses to the British Consulate. Muhamed was succeeded in 1759 by his brother Ali.

The British frigate "Windsor" arrived at Goletta in 1762 with an envoy to announce the accession of George III., but the mission nearly ended in an open rupture; Mr. Cleveland declined to kiss the Bey's hand, and objected to his suite having to leave their shoes at the entrance of the audience chamber. The dispute terminated in a compromise. The Bey excused Mr. Cleveland from the former ceremony, on condition that he brought a number of officers to duly perform it, and obviated all difficulty as to the shoes by receiving the English Mission in a kiosque adjoining the palace. An exchange of presents, as well as a ratification of former conventions, took place. In 1764 M. De Saizieu, the newly appointed French agent, achieved a notable diplomatic success.* Venetian and French ships-of-war arrived almost simultaneously at Goletta. The Bey intended to treat both alike, but M. De Saizieu succeeded in forcing the Venetian captain to be content with a salute of seven guns, to kiss the Bey's hand and to take off his shoes, whereas the French commander got two

* Rousseau, p. 167.

guns more and was absolved from all kind of humiliating ceremonial. But this satisfactory state of affairs did not last long, and in 1770 France was once more at war with the Bey of Tunis. The immediate cause of hostilities was a refusal on the part of the Bey to liberate Corsican slaves on that island becoming a French possession. An Arab historian, El Haj Hamouda Ben Abd el Aziz, has left in his "Kitab-el-bachia" a graphic account of the circumstances which attended this expedition.* The Knights of St. John sent two of their ships to assist the French fleet. Bizerta, Susa, and Porto-Farina had been already bombarded, when a Turkish envoy happened to arrive at Goletta in order to procure the services of a Tunisian contingent to assist the Sultan in his struggle with Russia. "The Turkish agent," says M. Rousseau, "sought the commander of the French squadron, and did not endeavour to conceal the fact that this war would greatly displease the Sultan, as the French forces had chosen the moment to wage war against *one of his provinces*, when he was himself entangled with Russia." His offers of mediation were finally accepted and a peace agreed to. The conditions obtained were not particularly favourable:—Corsica was to be treated as part of France;

* Appendix H.

the coral fishery was to be resumed under certain conditions, but the Bey refused to allow the re-establishment of the warehouse at Cape Nègre. Presents were to be sent by France to the Tunisian Government on the occasion of the peace.

In 1775 the Maltese fleet burned two Tunisian corsairs off Goletta; and the French and English Consuls had a fierce dispute as to which of them was entitled to the place of honour when they both happened to be together in the Bey's presence. This quarrel seems to have occupied for some months the attention of the Cabinets of London and Paris. Nothing of importance occurred during the following year, but in 1777 the French opened negotiations for the cession of Tabarca. The English Government became aware of these *pourparlers*, and Lord Weymouth wrote to Consul Traill on the subject.

TO CONSUL TRAILL AT TUNIS.

ST. JAMES 23rd May 1777

SIR,

I am to desire that you will give attention to what may pass with respect to the Negotiation of the French with the Bey of Tunis for the island of Tabarca and inform me of anything that may be interesting on that subject.

His majesty does not think proper to make any present to the Bey's Son on his being invested with the Royal Robe, and His Majesty expects that you will find means to prevent

an Ambassador from being sent from Tunis. Yet if contrary to his Majesty's expectation and your earnest endeavours such a measure should be determined, then, and in that case only, you are permitted to promise that a Present shall be sent.

You will in the meantime make him a proper Compliment as well as to his son.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant

WEYMOUTH.

In spite of Mr. Traill's effort, Ali Bey sent, two years later, an ambassador to England, and as we were at war with France he was very warmly received. The letters of George III. and Lord Hillsborough to their Tunisian ally were scarcely less cordial than those of William III. and Lord Shrewsbury to the pirate Dey Ali Rais.

KING GEORGE III TO ALI BEY.

George the Third by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Christian Faith, Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, Arch Treasurer and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire &c^a. To the most excellent Lords the Bashaw, Divan, Bey and the Rest of the Soldiers in the Kingdom of Tunis, Our Wellbeloved Friends, Greeting: We have received Your Letter by Sidi Mula Hamet, and it was very satisfactory to Us to find in it the assurances of your friendly Dispositions, and of your Resolution to preserve and cultivate the good Correspondence which has so long subsisted between Our Crown and your Government. You may rest assured that We entertain the same

Sentiments towards You, and that We desire to give You on all Occasions Proofs of Our Friendship. With regard to the other particulars contained in your Letter, We refer to what Our Secretary of State has Orders to communicate to you on Our Part. We recommend you to the Protection of Almighty God, and bid you heartily farewell. Given at Our Court at S^t James's the 26. Day of April 1781. In the twenty first Year of Our Reign.

Your Loving Friend
GEORGE R.

Hillsborough.

LORD HILLSBOROUGH TO ALI BEY.

To the Most Excellent Lord, the Bashaw of the Kingdom of Tunis, Greeting; and Wishes of most perfect Health, true Happiness and Prosperity. Most High and Excellent Lord. The King my Royal Master has commanded me to answer that part of your Letter to His Majesty in which you claim His favour and Protection for the obtaining Payment of Six hundred Pounds British Money due to you from Lawrence Boyd. His Majesty was pleased to order His Law officers to proceed without Delay in summoning to appear before them the said Lawrence Boyd, who acknowledged the Debt, and therefore would have been sentenced to pay it, if it had been in his Power, but he having made appear his total inability to discharge any part thereof, on account of the miserable state to which he is reduced, and His Majesty being unwilling that You Yourself should be a Sufferer by the Misfortunes of any of His Subjects, has ordered His High Treasurer to pay to Sidi Mula Hamet the entire Sum owing to you by the said Lawrence Boyd, but it is hoped you will think it proper hereafter to avoid such Transactions with Persons you are not sufficiently acquainted with, for it is not to be expected

that His Majesty can consider himself as responsible for the conduct of all his subjects. I shall be very glad on all occasions to give proofs of my great Regard to your illustrious Person and Family, and so recommending you to the protection of Almighty God, I remain with the utmost Respect

Most High and Excellent Lord
Your Highness's
Most obedient and most humble servant
HILLSBOROUGH

ST JAMES'S
26 April 1781.*

A few months later Austria was compelled, in self-defence, to sue for a treaty with Tunis through the good offices of the Sublime Porte. The Bey insisted on receiving *an annual tribute* besides a large sum in ready money, and was with great difficulty persuaded to grant a five months' respite to Austrian merchant vessels. A regular convention was not concluded before 1784. On the 26th May 1782 Ali Bey died.

Hamouda, his eldest son, succeeded to the throne without any contention, but did not show himself disposed to depart a jot from the traditions of his forefathers. The Danish Government requested permission to hoist the national flag over its Consulate, but the Bey asked 15,000 sequins as the

* These letters are dated precisely one hundred years prior to the entry of the French troops into Tunis territory on April 26, 1881.

price of the favour, and the Danish admiral was obliged to leave Goletta in despair. Then came a serious and long-lasting rupture with Venice. The Bey demanded an indemnity on account of some Tunisian passengers who had been wrongfully taken to Malta in a ship sailing under the colours of the Republic, and just as this dispute was on the point of being adjusted a fresh quarrel arose concerning the wreck of a Venetian vessel at Goletta, which ended in a declaration of war on the part of the Bey, and the expulsion of all Venetian citizens from the Regency. In September 1784 the squadron of the Republic, commanded by Admiral Emo, arrived at Goletta. All attempts at a settlement proved fruitless, and the ships ultimately returned to the Adriatic. During the following year the Venetian squadron bombarded Susa and Sfax, but did very little damage. Admiral Emo afterwards reached Goletta, and shelled it during the nights of the 30th October and 5th November, but entirely failed to take advantage of his success. No peace was concluded, and in March 1785 Sfax was once more attacked, and finally almost reduced to ruins. The same fate befell in succession Bizerta and Susa. The obstinacy of the Bey seemed to increase with each misfortune, and he now raised his demand for an

indemnity from the Venetian Republic. At this juncture Admiral Emo died at Malta, and although a truce was ultimately agreed on, a definite peace was not concluded till 1792. The Republic actually paid 40,000 sequins to Hamouda Bey, besides sending him magnificent presents in the name of the Senate.

At this epoch the Sublime Porte informed the Bey that he had agreed to guarantee all Austrian vessels from the attacks of the Barbary corsairs; and in conformity with the wishes of his suzerain, Hamouda promised that the Tunisian cruisers should never more molest the ships of the Empire. During the stay of the naturalist Desfontaines at Tunis, an event occurred there which serves to illustrate the boundless power of the Beys at that period. A Ragusan captain was detected at the house of a Jew in the company of a Moorish woman. They were all three brought before Hamouda, who sentenced them to death *séance tenante*. The luckless Ragusan was at once beheaded, the woman was smothered in the mud of the Tunis lake, and the Jew was *burned alive* in the middle of the city. This despotism at home seems to have been reflected in the increase of piracy abroad. Holland and Denmark vied with each other in coming to terms with Tunis, and in

1791 Spain too purchased a treaty from its former dependency at a cost of 100,000 piastres. During our war with France in 1796, an English squadron surprised four French men-of-war at anchor off Goletta. An engagement ensued, in which three of the French ships were taken. This proceeding is very severely commented on by French writers. At this time the French Republic was represented by a Special Commissioner, the citizen Hercules, and a Chargé d'Affaires, M. Devoize. The former accused the latter of a suspicious intimacy with the English Consul, of favouring émigrés, going to mass and singing, "*O Richard, o mon roi,*" upon which he was ordered to Paris to give an account of his conduct, which was, however, deemed to be satisfactory. M. Devoize returned to his post in 1797. Three years before Hamouda Bey had declared war against the United States, and in 1799 the American Government deemed it expedient to put a stop to the depredations committed on their merchant shipping by a treaty. The following are the curious items of the price paid for it, viz. :—50,000 dollars in cash ; 8000 dollars for secret service ; 28 cannons of calibre 12, 14, and 8 ; 10,000 cannon balls ; 300 quintals of gunpowder ; 400 quintals of cordage, and a quantity of jewels.

While the chief Power in the New World was thus paying tribute with all the forms of diplomacy to the piratical states of the Old, the weaker nations of Europe were reaping the fruits of the system which conventions thus ignobly obtained only served to nourish and support. The American Treaty had hardly been signed, when the Tunisian corsair, Muhamed Raïs Roumali, appeared with twelve ships before the defenceless island of San Pietro, to the west of Sardinia, and carried into slavery nearly the whole of its inhabitants. This occurred in June 1799. Three months afterwards Hamouda Pacha, by order of the Sultan, declared war against France, and in accordance with his directions sent his squadron to join the English fleet off the coast of Egypt.

CHAPTER IX.

TUNIS BETWEEN 1800 AND 1837.

THE hostilities between the Regency of Tunis and the French Republic only ceased in February 1802. The Bey, however, soon managed to pick other quarrels with his European allies and tributaries. The Danish Consul fell into disgrace for offering Hamouda some arms mounted in copper gilt instead of gold, and thirty notable Spaniards were relegated to the common prison because two gun-boats sent from Madrid contained eighteen guns instead of twenty-four. It was only in 1804 that these unfortunate persons were liberated, and then only on the Government of His Most Catholic Majesty humbly tendering for the Bey's acceptance a large money present and two *chebecks*, each carrying twenty-six guns. The Dutch fleet also arrived with an envoy charged "to fix the annual payment to the Pacha and if possible to compound for it by giving the Bey a lump sum in ready money." Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising

that Hamouda Bey, proud of his diplomatic successes with Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and the United States, embarked on a deadly conflict with his neighbour the Dey of Algiers which lasted till 1809.

No sooner had a peace been signed with Algeria than a fresh complication arose with Spain. The Bey informed the Spanish *junta* that unless the debts of the Consul were paid he should order his corsairs to attack all the Spanish ships they met with, and even to ravage the coasts of Spain. The difficulty was only settled by the payment of a large sum of money. In 1810 the Bey sent Muhamed Djelouli to London to complain of the capture of French vessels by English ships on the Tunisian coasts, and the matter appears to have been satisfactorily arranged. During a revolt which broke out towards the end of the following year nearly all the Turkish troops formerly so powerful in the Regency were annihilated. Peace was hardly restored when England undertook the task of negotiating a treaty for Sicily in consideration of a present of 100,000 dollars. The first mission failing to secure its objects, the whole Mediterranean squadron under Admiral Freemantle arrived at Goletta. The scope of this demonstration was not only to conclude the Sicilian treaty, but to

support an endeavour of Lady William Bentinck to purchase the release of a number of Christian slaves. After much hesitation Hamouda Bey agreed to a convention with Sicily which was to have effect as long as the English occupation of that island continued, and nearly 500 slaves were released. An attempt subsequently made under the auspices of France to obtain the liberation of the Neapolitan captives was not equally successful. The Bey refused to accept less than 400,000 dollars *for a treaty* and the slaves, and as the Neapolitan envoy could only offer 150,000, the negotiations fell through. Hamouda Pacha died suddenly on the 15th September 1814. Native annalists are not agreed as to whether his coffee cup or the snuff-box of his secretary contained the poison which killed him.

Hamouda was succeeded by his brother Othman. Three months later this unfortunate prince was massacred with his two sons at the instigation of his cousin and successor Mahmoud. On the same day his wife gave birth to a son. The offspring of Othman Bey remained a prisoner in the Bardo Palace till 1855, when he was released by Muhamed Bey, his namesake. Muhamed, son of Othman Bey, only died in 1868. The reign of Mahmoud Bey was destined to see the end of the system of piracy,

the remembrance of which will be for ever associated with the very name of the Barbary States. On the 12th April 1816, Lord Exmouth arrived at Goletta. A few months before, the Tunisian captain Mustapha Raïs had attacked one of the islets of the coast of Sardinia, and carried into captivity every man, woman, and child inhabiting it. The Great Powers now decided that armed force was to take the place of cajolery and bribes. In accordance with this determination Lord Exmouth demanded the abolition of Christian slavery. It happened that at this very time Caroline Princess of Wales was enjoying the splendid hospitality of Mahmoud Bey in his city palace. Neither party seemed inclined to yield, and matters assumed a very threatening aspect. The mediation of the royal guest was invoked in vain; Lord Exmouth was inexorable. The Princess sent the greater part of her baggage to Goletta, the British merchants hastened to embark on board the vessels of the squadron, the men-of-war were prepared for action, and the Bey did his best to collect all available reinforcements. The excitement in Tunis became intense, and a pacific solution was considered almost impossible.

On the 16th April Lord Exmouth, accompanied by Mr. Consul-General Oglander and his staff, pro-

ceeded to the Bardo Palace. The flag-staff of the British Agency was previously lowered to indicate a resolution to resort to an appeal to arms in case of failure, and the Princess of Wales expected every hour to be arrested as a hostage. The antecedents of the Bey were not precisely calculated to assuage her alarm, but Mahmoud sent one of his officers to assure her that come what may he should never dream of violating the Moslem laws of hospitality. While the messenger was still with her, Lord Exmouth entered the room and announced the satisfactory termination of his mission. On the following morning the Bey signed a treaty whereby in the name of the Regency he abolished Christian slavery for ever throughout his dominions. Amongst the reasons which induced the Bey to yield to the pressure used by Lord Exmouth was the detention of the Sultan's envoy bearing the imperial firman and robe of investiture at Syracuse. The Neapolitan government would not allow him to depart until the news of the successful result of the British mission had arrived, and Mahmoud felt it impossible to forego the official recognition of his suzerain.

The visit of the wife of George IV. to Tunis is hardly yet quite forgotten. The Bey gave her a guard of honour composed of sixty memelouks, and

during her stay a coach and six was always kept in readiness for her use. The most prominent member of her *suite* was Count Bergami di Brescia, who suggested a variety of amusements, which comprised a fête champêtre amongst the orange groves of the Manouba, and picnics on horseback to the ruins of Carthage, Utica, and Zaghouan. The Princess was extremely displeased at Lord Exmouth's inopportune arrival, and was not even consoled by the salute of 101 guns fired on her departure for Greece the day after the signature of the treaty.

The splendours of the reception, however, did not prevent the diplomatic victory of Lord Exmouth being regarded as a national humiliation by the Tunisians. On the 1st of May the troops rose in open revolt and seized both Tunis and Goletta. The refusal of the Bey's cousins to accept the proffered crown alone prevented the deposition and possible death of Mahmoud. As it was, the insurrection could only be quelled by numerous executions. Ten days later the Sultan's commissioner arrived, escorted by an English brig. The investiture of the Bey and his son was attended by more than ordinary ceremonial, but it nearly occasioned a serious riot on account of Mr. Consul Oglander refusing unexpectedly to kiss the hand of the Bey's

son and heir. This episode engendered interminable correspondence. Mahmoud wrote angry letters to the Prince Regent and Sir Thomas Maitland on the subject of what he styled "the irregular and turbulent conduct of the said Consul Oglander." The following is the Bey's complaint in his own words:—"Setting aside that it is improper to offend against the usages and customs of any court great or small in matters of etiquette Mr. Oglander has exposed himself from his mere pride and caprice to receive a violent and public affront on the 20th inst. without its being in my power to prevent it if it had not been for the prudence and presence of mind of my son who stopped the general irritation upon his having in the most marked manner together with his Vice-Consul Alexis Tulin refused to kiss the hand of my son and heir Hasan Bey, sitting on the throne and receiving then solemnly our sacred ceremony, his investiture with the title of Bashaw from His Highness the Grand Sultan, upon oath administered to all the Divan and grandees of the Regency present at the ceremony, the Bashaw having been so saluted as is always the custom from time immemorial by the French, Spanish and Danish Consuls, who preceded Mr. Oglander, and also by the other Consuls who followed him." In the result Mr. Oglander's conduct was disapproved by his superiors.

The Bey on several occasions endeavoured the next two years to ignore the principal provision of Lord Exmouth's treaty. Early in 1817 the Tunisian Admiral with some privateers actually appeared *in the English Channel* and there captured a Bremen ship. The crew were taken to Tunis as prisoners, and on the Tunisians endeavouring to sell their prize in England, their ships were detained. A most acrimonious correspondence followed, and finally the Bey was compelled to surrender the Bremen sailors, and to sign on the 19th October a declaration that his privateers could "not enter the channels or narrow seas of England." To accomplish this result the visit of several ships-of-war to Goletta became necessary.

Two years later the appearance of a Dutch fleet emphasised the resolution arrived at by the King of Holland to submit no longer to the degradation of paying blackmail under the name of tribute to his ally the Bey of Tunis. Three months afterwards Admirals Jurieu and Freemantle communicated to Mahmoud Pacha the irrevocable decision of the Powers at Aix-la-Chapelle, "to enforce the cessation of a system of piracy, which is not only contrary to the best interests of all States, but is also fatal to the prosperity of those which practise it." The Bey's answer was eminently conciliatory,

but he prudently opened the entrance of the Porto-Farina lake in order to place his fleet of corsairs out of gunshot in a case of emergency. In 1820, an envoy of the Sultan once more imposed a peace between Tunis and Algiers, which he termed humorously "*une paix véritablement définitive cette fois.*" Pursuant to instructions received from Constantinople, Mahmoud greatly increased his fleet, and on the holy war against Greece being proclaimed, a Tunisian division under the corsair Mustapha Raïs joined the squadron of the Captain Pacha in the Archipelago.

The year 1823 is known as "the year of the hats." Acting on some mysterious inspiration, the Bey declared that any Jew detected wearing the ordinary European headdress should be severely punished. This order led to the arrest of an Israelite merchant from Gibraltar, whose protest was strongly supported by the British Consul-General. The Bey at first was inexorable and announced his intention of expelling all Jews from the country who would not wear a black coif. A rupture with England was only averted by the Bey's consenting to intermeddle no further with the costume of Jews enjoying the protection of Great Britain. Two Tuscan Jews presumed on this concession, and appearing in beaver hats were seized and soundly

bastinadoed. This untoward event hastened the conclusion of a convention between the Bey of Tunis and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

A few months after this dispute had been amicably adjusted, a much more serious difference arose. It was discovered that some passengers on board an English ship were really Greek slaves. The British Consul demurred to their disembarkation; and the Bey seized them by force. In consequence of this outrage to the flag an English squadron arrived off Goletta on Christmas Day 1823, but we obtained nothing more than profuse promises as to the future. On the 28th March following Sidi Mahmoud died.

His successor Hossein Bey sent an embassy to Paris to congratulate Charles X., and offer several costly presents to the French King. Like his predecessor Hossein, he did not fail to furnish several ships to the Turkish fleet. In 1827 the war between France and Algeria broke out. Although the Bey maintained a strict neutrality, he did not neglect to keep his army in a state of efficiency. Under these circumstances the *tribute* offered by Sweden in 1827 proved very acceptable. It consisted of a cargo of wood and no less than 125 caunons. The attitude of Hossein in the matter of Algiers can be easily understood. In the first place, he was not

sorry to see the humiliation of an inveterate and almost hereditary enemy; and secondly, he hoped that a successor to the Bey of Algiers would be selected from amongst the descendants of Hossein Ben Ali,—an idea which the French Consul-General lost no opportunity of encouraging. It was under these circumstances that the treaty with France of the 8th August 1830 was executed. A clause, for some time kept secret, ceded to France a conspicuous spot on the site of the Carthaginian Byrsa or citadel for the erection of a memorial chapel in honour of Louis IX.* The fifth article of the convention restored to France the coral fishery as far as Cape Nègre; but the Bey protested against it, and some particulars of the conditions agreed on were never carried into effect.

Here all published annals of the Regency cease, but the voluminous records of the British Consulate-General afford an easy means of continuing them. The period I am about to speak of is undoubtedly one of the most interesting epochs in its history, and I regret I am able only to refer briefly to the most important events. The situation between 1830 and 1880 can be summed up in a few words. France had already begun to cast a longing eye on the Regency. The Beys of Tunis knew it, and in

* Appendix I.

the recesses of their heart hated France and Frenchmen accordingly. At the same time they dreaded complete absorption in the Ottoman Empire, but clung with childish affection to the quasi-independence of their vassalship. England, perfectly aware of the maritime and strategic importance of the country, constantly held the balance between the Porte and France, and time after time prevented by prompt diplomatic action the much-dreaded extinction of the Tunisian Regency. At last a time came when Prince Bismarek said to M. Waddington at Berlin, "Why do you not go to Carthage?" France was not long in taking the hint; and as the old veto of England was wanting, Carthage was taken and Tunis absorbed in Algeria. The tale of this taking is the immediate subject of this book; the diplomacy which postponed that taking for fifty years is the essential feature of Tunisian history during the past half-century. As a study of political tactics, I have found it so interesting, that I regret being able to devote only a few pages to it.

In 1831 the Chargé d'Affaires, M. Lesseps, in the name of France, offered to intrust to the Bey's brothers the Beylical governments of Constantine and Oran. His proposition was gladly accepted, and a large tribute agreed to. Tunisian troops had been already despatched to Oran when the news

arrived that the French Government had repudiated the arrangement. A temporary arrangement was afterwards suggested, but the Bey rejected it and claimed a large sum he alleged having given to M. Lesseps to "bind the bargain." Two years later, Sir Thomas Reade (British Consul-General from 1824) supported a complaint of his Sardinian colleague that the Bey had caused sixty of his Italian servants to receive each 150 strokes of the bastinado for "delaying the preparation of his supper."

French squadrons and frigates are now reported as frequently arriving at Goletta, but their visits were generally followed by the appearance of ships from Malta. At times our influence was eclipsed, but it generally became predominant again when our vessels anchored in the Gulf. The intricacies of this political rivalry were not, however, to perplex much longer Hossein Bey, who, in spite of the complaint of his European attendants, seems to have been a just and kindly man. In reporting his death on the 20th May 1835, Sir T. Reade wrote: "The poor Bey sent for me yesterday to offer his last adieu; but when I arrived, although he recognised me instantly, he was unable to speak. I was the only Consul he sent for. Upon several occasions latterly when I called upon him, he never omitted expressing his most anxious wishes for the continuation

of that good harmony which has latterly so happily subsisted between his Government and England."

Hossein Bey was succeeded by his brother, Sidi Mustapha, who at once addressed a friendly letter to William IV., and expressed an earnest desire to maintain the most cordial relations with England. A mission was sent forthwith to demand the caftan at Constantinople, and at the same time to counteract if possible an idea which was supposed to be entertained of incorporating the island of Jerba in the Pachalik of Tripoli. "The envoy takes with him," writes Sir Thomas Reade, "presents to a very large amount, nearly two millions of Tunisian piastres, consisting of Spanish dollars, the conveyance of which alone from the Bardo to the Goletta required forty-two mules; a vessel loaded with thirty very fine horses with rich caparisons, and another with negro slaves, 200,000 red Tunisian caps, a great supply of otto of roses and jessamine, a quantity of jewellery, many swords, guns, and pistols, besides an enormous quantity of Tunisian butter in jars, which is much esteemed at Constantinople, and a letter of introduction to Lord Ponsonby." Either the butter or Lord Ponsonby touched the Caliph's heart: Sidi Mustapha got his caftan as a pacha of three tails, and the status of the Regency remained unaltered. In May 1836

a new French Consul-General named Schewbel arrived. He persistently refused, by order of the French Government, to kiss Sidi Mustapha's hand on presenting his credentials. As the Bey had "held out his hand *to be kissed* in open Divan," the conduct of M. Schewbel was considered a gross affront. After long and anxious deliberation, the Bey resolved to terminate the *rexata questio* by abolishing altogether the ceremonial of *baisemain* as far as the European Consuls were concerned. A French squadron soon after arrived, and the Bey was invited in a mysterious manner to invoke its assistance against some undefined project of the Porte. Sidi Mustapha declined, and as usual hastened to inform Lord Palmerston of his dilemma. The French continued their efforts to wean the Bey from his Turkish allegiance, but the defeat of the first French expedition against Constantine prevented his taking any decided step. In December 1836 a riot occurred amongst the Maltese, and the Bey (whose sympathies were less English than those of his brother) decreed the banishment of the whole colony *en masse*, and was with great difficulty prevented from carrying his order into execution. Sidi Mustapha continued to weakly waver between the French and the Porte, and the French and the English, till October 1839, when he died.

CHAPTER X.

THE REIGNS OF AHMED BEY AND HIS COUSIN
MUHAMED BEY.

AFTER the accession of Ahmed Bey in 1839, the French party in Tunis used every means to obtain the ascendancy. They decorated and redecorated the Bey's secretary, and brought a zealous ecclesiastic from Algiers to obtain a preponderating influence in the Roman Catholic Mission. The turn matters took in Egypt and Syria two years later seems, however, to have seriously interfered with their plans. During the spring of 1841 the purport of the secret article in the treaty of 1830 transpired, and the French began to build the St. Louis Memorial Chapel on the Carthage Hill. As the walls gradually assumed the shape of a strongly fortified *enceinte*, the Bey became thoroughly alarmed. Sketches and plans were transmitted to England; Sidi Ahmed protested and threatened to construct a martello tower to command the sacred edifice, and finally sent for

Sir Thomas Reade to tell him that "the French were the greatest thorn in his side, and that he threw himself entirely upon the good offices and protection of England." A month later, with the view of further conciliating Lord Palmerston, Ahmed Bey took the first step towards the abolition of negro slavery in his dominions. He issued a decree forbidding the exportation of slaves from Tunis, and liberated all the negroes belonging to his own establishment. Unfortunately for the Bey's peace of mind, Tahir Pacha at this juncture became Grand Vizier at Constantinople. Tahir was, rightly or wrongly, supposed to have a long standing grudge against the Beys of Tunis on account of having been (through the diplomatic skill of the French Chargé d'Affaires) refused permission to land there after the capture of Algiers. Be this as it may, the Bey soon received a letter disclosing a scheme of the Porte to reduce the Regency to the status of a simple province. Ahmed Pacha immediately addressed several letters to Lord Palmerston, requesting the mediation of the English Government. "Only one thing," he wrote, "can be worse for Tunis than its extinction by the Porte, and that is its absorption by France." French ships now remained at Goletta almost permanently, and care was taken to turn the coolness with the Porte

to the best possible advantage. England reassured the Bey by sending him a sword and six field-pieces; and France, not to be outdone, lost no time by offering him a gilded coach and four horses. On the 27th October 1841 "it was driven to the Bardo with great pomp, in the presence of the French Consul and the officers of the steamer, by the coachman and footman in the King's full-dress livery." Ahmed Bey sent Louis Philippe "in return" an Arabian horse, a lion and lioness, two ostriches, and four antelopes. On the advice of Lord Aberdeen, the Bey decided to conciliate the Porte by sending an envoy to Constantinople as the bearer of a more than usually magnificent offering. The list of the presents thus forwarded fills several pages, beginning with "a new corvette, a remarkably fine one, carrying 26 guns, and fitted with stores of every description," and ending with four snuff-boxes for the *Signori della Camera del Grand Signor*. In April 1842 slavery was finally abolished. In a letter to the English Government, the Bey declared that his action in this matter was entirely due to the representations of Sir Thomas Reade.

The Sultan does not appear to have been altogether satisfied with the Bey's munificence, and sent an agent to Tunis with instructions to

insist on "the establishment of *ever so little regular tribute*, which might easily be remitted, but which would prove to *some* European Powers that the Bey and the Regency were not independent." Turkish bearers of vizirial letters were always a serious matter at Tunis, and Ahmed Bey made an almost pathetic appeal to England to help him out of his difficulty. "It is not an easy matter," he told Sir Thomas Reade, "to satisfy my suzerain's envoys. When the last came to take leave I offered him 4000 dollars, but he disdainfully refused them in my presence, and I was obliged to give him six." This particular envoy proved to be exceedingly difficult to manage, and when the Bey did not comply with his demands, he did his best to excite an insurrection. He had the pictures in his room pulled down as an insult to the faith of Islam, and spoke in all public places of the Bey's undue partiality for infidels. To such an extent was this anti-christian *propaganda* carried, that the Turkish emissary had hardly left Tunis, before a riot occurred at Goletta, which was quelled with considerable difficulty. The British Ambassador at Constantinople appears, however, to have succeeded in inducing the Porte to take a more favourable view of the conduct of his vassal.

Nothing of any moment occurred till July 1843,

when much excitement was caused by the invasion of the Tunisian territory by a French force in the direction of La Calle. Just at the same time an attempt was made to absorb the whole of the Citadel Hill at Carthage, in the limits of the St. Louis memorial buildings, and a French squadron appeared before Goletta. The Bey became very much frightened, and as usual sent for Sir Thomas Reade. At his request a letter was at once written to Lord Aberdeen. "It appears to me," wrote Sir Thomas Reade, "that the actual proceedings of the French, in regard to this Regency at the present moment, cannot be viewed without a certain degree of suspicion, for at the same time they violate the territory in so open and outrageous a manner, and send a squadron to countenance by its presence the additional demands of the French Consul with respect to the monument at Carthage, they despatch an armed vessel commanded by a very intelligent Algerine decorated with the Legion of Honour to visit the various ports of the Regency, and his object appears to be to mix with the Moors at the cafés and other spots frequented by them, and harangue them upon the advantages Algiers possesses in being occupied by the French." The storm, however, blew over, but the Bey issued a decree forbidding the export of corn, which involved

the Regency in an open rupture of diplomatic relations with Sardinia. The details of the quarrel are very uninteresting, and the difference was after much delay adjusted by the intervention of England. About the same time the Bey managed to pick a personal quarrel with the French Consul-General, whom he accused of belabouring the coachman of one of the princes, and applying the unparliamentary *bestia* to the prince himself. In the following year a Maltese miller murdered a servant of the British Consul-General, together with one of his Tunisian police officers. Sir Thomas Reade insisted on the criminal being tried by the Bey in person according to the international conventions, and M. De Lagau, the French Chargé d'Affaires, adroitly managed to take advantage of the general unpopularity of the proceeding amongst the Europeans to form a strong cabal against English interests. All the European representatives seem to have joined in this association except Mr. John Howard Payne, the American Consul, well known in Europe as the accomplished author of "Home, Sweet Home." Sir Thomas Reade carried his point, and the Maltese murderer was condemned and executed by the Tunisian authorities. Mr. Nyssen, the Dutch Consul, had gone so far as to intimidate the witnesses in the case, and was summoned in

consequence to appear before the Bey. Prince Henry of the Netherlands happened to arrive at the time, and insisted on the charge being abandoned. The Bey refused compliance with the request, whereupon the Prince returned the rich presents he had received from Sidi Ahmed, and left Tunis somewhat abruptly.

During the spring of 1845 the Duc de Montpensier visited Tunis, and was received by the Bey with marked respect and attention. In the month of December the Bey received the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour. The relations of France with the Tunisian government now became ostensibly of the most friendly nature, but Sidi Ahmed never ceased to ask for the aid of England in maintaining his *status quo* as regards the Porte. Almost at the end of the autumn of 1846 the Bey suddenly resolved to pay a visit to France and England. The latter portion of his programme was subsequently abandoned on difficulties arising as to his reception in the character of an independent sovereign. In the following year the British Government sent the Bey a present consisting of a carriage, harness, and seven Axminster carpets, one of which still decorates the smaller audience-chamber of the Bardo Palace. Although our gifts could not advantageously be compared with the

more magnificent offerings of the French, Sir Thomas Reade was determined not to allow any slight to be offered to British prestige in the Regency. On the 1st June 1847 he wrote the following characteristic despatch to Lord Palmerston :

“MY LORD,—On the 1st May last the vessels belonging to this Regency having fired a royal salute in honour of the King of the French, I thought it my duty to require that an equal mark of respect should be shown to our most Gracious Sovereign on the 24th ult., being the anniversary of H.M.’s birthday, which was accordingly done. This is the first year that such a practice has been established, and the 30th being St. Ferdinand, the Consul-General of Naples advanced the same demand on behalf of his sovereign, but no salute having been fired, the Consul, I understand, has addressed a report to his Government on the circumstance.”

The French representative now redoubled his efforts to induce the Bey to break beyond hope of reconciliation with the Porte ; and England, through her ambassador at Stamboul, quite as actively endeavoured to impress upon the Porte the necessity of maintaining the ancient ties of friendship with Tunis. Sir Thomas Reade was fully alive to the importance of the political intrigue then being actively prosecuted, and did not fail to impress his views on the attention of Lord Palmerston. On the 4th August 1847 he thus addressed the Foreign Office :—

“The Sultan should understand that the best means of destroying the effects of French policy with regard to Tunis, is that of encouraging and promoting a stricter connection with the Government of his vassal. This, my Lord, I venture to submit, is the only practical remedy against foreign intrigues in this country ; and should the Bey see a frank and open policy observed towards him by the Porte, what reason can he possibly have to trust a dangerous neighbour more than a generous and far-placed master ?”

On the 20th December 1847 Her Majesty's steam frigate “Avenger” was wrecked on the Tunisian coast. Lieutenant Francis Rooke and three other persons were the sole survivors of the catastrophe. Mahmoud Ben Ayad, one of the Bey's ministers, now acquired complete influence over his mind, and in the short space of two years succeeded in reducing the finances of the Regency to a state of hopeless confusion. Under the pretence of raising a loan for the Government he obtained permission to quit the country, to which he never returned. About one year previously his father and nephew had been obliged to seek refuge in the British Consulate from his persecution, and Lord Palmerston ordered Sir Thomas Reade to give them protection and inform the Bey that the Queen would not “allow a hair of their heads to be touched.” The Ben Ayads were once hereditary rulers of Jerba, and belong to one of the few

remaining families of the ancient Arab nobility. They have ever since been considered British subjects, and the nephew, General Sy Hamida, is still alive, and prior to the crisis of the 12th May was one of the most trusted councillors of Muhamed es Sadek Bey.

The fall of Louis Philippe seems to have brought about a lull in the constant interference of France in the destinies of the country. Sir Stratford Canning succeeded in placing the relations between Turkey and Tunis on a more friendly footing, and by a judicious explanation of the real interests of suzerain and vassal, counteracted the distrust sown in the minds of both by parties interested in promoting discord. In the summer of 1849 Sidi Muhamed, Governor of the Sahel, was sent as an envoy to offer to the Sultan presents of the value of £66,000. Sir Thomas Reade was then on his deathbed, but the jewels and other articles of value were brought to his house to satisfy him that Sidi Ahmed was once more acting in accordance with his advice. Three weeks later Sir Thomas Reade died. By the especial desire of Ahmed Bey his remains were honoured with as splendid a public funeral as the resources of the Regency permitted. General Kheir-ed-Din, now an ex-Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, com-

manded the guard of honour which escorted the coffin from the Manonba to Tunis. No British representative ever understood the important questions bound up in the future of Tunis more thoroughly than he did, nor have any before or since striven more manfully to support what he conceived to be the English view of the case. Thirty-three years later, his son and successor, Thomas Fellowes Reade, saw the realisation of his father's misgivings, as to what would inevitably happen, whenever England came to view with indifference the fate of her once faithful ally the Bey of Tunis.

Sir Thomas Reade's successor, Sir Edward Baynes, K.C.M.G., did not arrive in Tunis till the 14th March 1850. No event of public importance occurred till the close of the reign of Sidi Ahmed, who died in May 1855. Two years before he had improved his position as regards the Sultan by cordial offers of support in case of the outbreak of a war with Russia; and when this actually occurred, men and money were at once despatched from Tunis to Constantinople.

Ahmed was the last of the Beys of Tunis who enjoyed a shadow of the old power and prestige. In the formation and direction of an army altogether out of proportion to the wants of the coun-

try, he endeavoured to forget the perplexities of his constant diplomatic complications. He employed both French and English military instructors, some of whom have published more or less interesting narratives of their stay at his court. The English words of command brought into use by General Considine, still survive amongst the few remaining regiments of Tunisian soldiers, and I last heard them on the day they were drawn up to conduct the French troops into the Tunis citadel. The only memorial which still remains of the once rich and popular Ahmed Bey, is the dismantled palace of the Mahamedia, of which I have already spoken in a former chapter.

Ahmed was succeeded by his cousin Muhamed, the eldest of the sons of Hossein Bey. He at once wrote a dutiful letter to his suzerain demanding the caftan, sending at the same time £40,000 instead of presents, and a further contingent of 1800 men with horses and arms to assist the Turks in the Crimea. Muhamed Khaznadar, the Vizier of Ahmed, retained his post, but most of the favourites of the late Bey were either arrested or dismissed. Many wholesome reforms were suggested and planned by Sidi Muhamed, but their execution was impeded by the cares and anxieties entailed by his enormous seraglio, which literally surpassed

in extent anything known in history since the time of King Solomon. The fall of Sebastopol seems to have awakened considerable enthusiasm at Tunis, and a *Te Deum* was celebrated in the Cathedral, which was hung with French, English, and Turkish flags. On the 9th October the Sultan's envoy arrived, and presented the Bey with his patent of investiture, the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh, and a jewelled sword, in the presence of the civil and religious officials and the *corps consulaire*. Sir Edward Baynes died in July 1855.

His successor, Mr. Richard Wood, did not arrive in Tunis till the 26th June in the following year. The mantle of Sir Thomas Reade could hardly have fallen on a more able or energetic successor, and he managed to gain in a short space of time the entire confidence of the Bey. In August 1856 Sidi Muhamed sent to the French Prince Imperial, a cradle in silver Moorish work and the Tunisian decoration (which had been instituted by Sidi Ahmed Bey), set in brilliants. The value of this magnificent gift was not less than £10,000. In September, however, the Bey took no notice of the Emperor's fête, and M. Roches, the French Chargé d'Affaires, viewed this omission in so serious a light that he suspended diplomatic relations. The Bey,

after forty hours' reflection, decided to apologise. The language used in Count Walewski's despatch was very severe, and if satisfaction had not been at once accorded, M. Roches was prepared to embark on a French frigate. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor declined the Nishan for his son, on the ground that the *Porte disputed the Bey's right to confer decorations*. Mr. Wood was now admitted to long interviews with the Bey, the result of which soon became apparent. Sidi Muhamed resolved to preserve intact his status as regards the *Porte*, to strengthen as much as possible his alliance with England, and to grant a constitution to his subjects. On the 17th June 1857 an event occurred which seemed to belie Sidi Muhamed's assurances and promises of reform. An Israelite carter named Samuel Sfez, being ill-treated by some Moors, cursed the Moslem faith and roundly abused the Bey and his Government. He was at once dragged before the Bey in person, who referred the case to the Cadi. After hearing some native witnesses he was condemned to death by having *molten lead poured down his throat, and his body burned*. His distracted wife appealed to the Consuls, who hastened to remonstrate with the Bey. It was, however, too late. To hasten matters the unfortunate blasphemer had been be-

headed. "The head of the wretched man," wrote Mr. Wood, "was kicked about by the boys, while men were endeavouring to smash it with stones. A large number of Moors went to meet the corpse in order to drag it through the town, in which design they failed, owing to the interference of the police, but the Moorish women, who repaired to the Jewish cemetery, assisted at its burial with songs and exclamations of joy."

It is impossible to describe the general panic which ensued. Christians and Israelites alike demanded the protection of the European Powers, and several ships of war, including the French squadron, were sent to Goletta. Both Mr. Wood and M. Roches, as well as the French Admiral, had several audiences with the Bey, and the necessity of his at once granting a constitution, of which religious equality was to be one of the fundamental portions, was strongly pressed upon him. On the 9th September, Sidi Muhamed consented to act in compliance with their wishes, and a liberal constitution, embodying many reforms and creating regular tribunals, was forthwith promulgated. The following are the heads of the Bey's decree, which was certainly the most important innovation achieved since Ahmed Bey abolished slavery:—
1st, Perfect security of life and property; 2d,

Equality of taxation; 3d, Equality of all classes and denominations before the law; 4th, Religious freedom; 5th, Limitation of the period of military service; 6th, Admission of Israelite assessors in criminal cases; 7th, Abolition of immunities enjoyed exclusively by Moslems; 8th, Establishment of a mixed commercial court; 9th, Liberty of commerce and abolition of monopolies; 10th, Permission to foreigners to exercise all trades and professions and introduce foreign industries; 11th, Right of foreigners to hold and possess landed property. As a recognition of his conduct, the French Emperor conferred on Sidi Muhamed the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour. The English fleet visited Tunis during the spring of 1858, but the Bey was unable to return the visit of Lord Lyons, as an agreement could not be come to regarding the salute he was to receive.

The English Government, after much deliberation, rewarded the enlightened behaviour of the Bey by a present of cotton seed, which was duly delivered to him by Mr. Wood with some statistics concerning the growth of that useful product. In the month of January 1859 Prince Alfred (the Duke of Edinburgh) visited Tunis, and was entertained by Sidi Muhamed. The arrival of the Prince undoubtedly awakened a very unusual amount of

enthusiasm at the Tunisian Court, and the Bey himself placed round the neck of his guest the diamond medal worn only by members of the Husseinite family. "I hail the arrival of your Royal Highness," said Sidi Muhamed, "with a delight which words cannot possibly express. That the son of the Queen of England should be with us, that I should have been afforded the pleasure of beholding him in my own palace is more than I ever hoped to realise. Myself, my family, and my whole people feel highly flattered by your visit, and consider it as being in harmony with the unbounded respect with which your Royal Mother, her Government, and the British nation are looked upon in this country." Sidi Muhamed, whose state of health had been long very unsatisfactory, died on the 22d September, and two days later his brother Muhamed es Sadek took the oath prescribed by the new constitution in the presence of the whole of his ministers, the civil and ecclesiastical functionaries, and the foreign representatives.

CHAPTER XI.

MUHAMED ES SADEK.

THE first act of the newly proclaimed Bey was to assure the British Consul-General of his desire to maintain intact his political relations with the Porte, and General Kheir-ed-Din was sent with rich presents to Stamboul to demand the usual patent of investiture. On the 24th October Muhamed es Sadek signed his first Convention with France on the subject of the construction of electric telegraphs throughout the Regency, and at the same time decided to carry out the plans of his predecessor for giving the capital a supply of water by the restoration of the Roman aqueduct to Zaghouán. In November Lord John Russell answered in a cordial manner the letter of the Bey announcing his accession to the Queen, but Muhamed es Sadek was greatly disappointed at the communication not having assumed the character of an autograph letter. "It is to me," said the Bey, addressing Mr. Wood, "a matter of unfeigned

regret, that whilst it is from England I expect countenance and support, I should have to represent that it is alone her sovereign who, by not condescending to transmit to me her autograph commands, deprives me of the honour which my ancestors and predecessors have enjoyed till recently, and which I still continue to enjoy from other sovereigns. I hope, therefore, that Her Majesty will be pleased to honour me by continuing a privilege of which my predecessors were so justly proud." The Bey, nevertheless, did not fail to submit to Mr. Wood a copy of his letter to the Sultan, together with a list of the presents forwarded to Stamboul, and to ask as usual for the good offices of the British Ambassador. There can be no doubt that Muhamed es Sadek was at first inclined to fall back once more on the anti-Turkish policy for a short time followed by Ahmed Bey, but the logical arguments of Mr. Wood soon induced him to adopt a different course, and General Kheir-ed-Din was instructed to strengthen as much as possible the existing link between the Regency and the Ottoman Empire.

In January the Turkish Commissioner arrived, and the investiture was performed in the most public manner, although the Bey was uniformly described in the firman as "my Governor-General."

Independently of this circumstance, which had its signification, the "three tails," which are the insignia of a Turkish Pacha of the highest rank, were displayed together with the Ottoman and Tunisian flags. The ever-watchful eye of Mr. Wood, however, observed that a regular throne had been introduced into the audience-chamber, and he hastened to request an explanation of the political significance of the change. The Bey replied as follows:—"We never imagined that the mere change of the shape of our state-chair could give rise to an idea of any change in the present state of the political affairs existing between us and the other Governments. We inform you that this chair is a substitute for the chair which we usually sit upon in our ceremonies, and on which our predecessors have sat for centuries. The change of shape can be of no consequence, for its importance consists in the rules on which it rests. We have not the least scope in the change, and so we inform you." In spite of this little incident, there can be no doubt that the understanding between the Bey and the Porte from this time became one of the most satisfactory character.

The Bey during the summer of 1860 submitted to Mr. Wood a project for the elaboration of the constitution already promulgated by Sidi Muhamed.

It was now proposed to form a Chamber or Senate in great part of a representative character ; the Bey was only to act henceforward with the advice of his Ministers, who in their turn were to be responsible to the Assembly. The financial administration was to be improved by the introduction of a budget and civil list, and a court of appeal and criminal tribunal were to be instituted. In September much excitement was occasioned in Tunis by the attempt of one Sheref El Hashem ("the Damascene") to excite a *jehad* or religious war against the French from the Tunisian frontier. El Hashem was one of the heads of the Kaderia confraternity at Baghdad,* but notwithstanding he ran the risk of deeply offending this all-powerful community, Muhamed es Sadek arrested him and condemned him to death, in order to faithfully carry out his obligations towards France. The last words spoken by El Hashem were these :—"You have sacrificed my life to please your Christian allies, who will themselves soon avenge my death, *for you will be the last of the line of Hussein Ben Ali.*" Two weeks later the Bey was received by Napoleon III. at Algiers. Decorations in brilliants were exchanged between the host and his guests. Muhamed es Sadek was profuse in his promises of

* See page 24.

cordial support to France and French interests, and even Mr. Wood was reluctantly obliged to report that "the influence of France is now in the ascendant." Some of the remarks of the Emperor were not forgotten by the Bey, and especially an assertion, two or three times repeated, that the Turkish Empire was soon destined to inevitable dissolution. Soon after his return he requested Mr. Wood to come to see him at the Bardo.

After repeating what the Emperor had said about Turkey, the Bey remarked, "You see that I am forced to conciliate my formidable neighbour by all the means in my power. Any two common Arabs on the frontiers have the power to bring about a serious misunderstanding between us; but had my country been separated from Algeria by the sea, my conduct and my policy would have been very different." On the 15th November the Bey handed personally to Mr. Wood a copy of the amended constitution he was about to promulgate for transmission to the Queen. "We trust," he observed, "your august sovereign will appreciate the difficulties and obstacles attending the transition from an old to a totally new form of government. At the wish of England, my cousin Ahmed abolished slavery, and it is at her suggestion, expressed through you, that we now grant liberty

and freedom to our subjects. Can Tunis give further proof of her trust in England?"

On the 23d April 1861 the Bey in person opened both the Legislative Assembly and the Supreme Court. The city was illuminated at night, and public rejoicings took place on an extensive scale. On the following day the Bey attended the first sitting of the Legislative Assembly in the Dar-el-Bey or city palace, and delivered a spirited speech from the throne, concluding with these words:—
“I have honestly endeavoured to remove all pretext for complaint against my administration, and it now remains for you to promote by your enactments the well-being of the inhabitants of this country. I call upon God and this assembly to witness my words, and I pray Him to lend you His aid in putting my measures into execution.”
Upon this the gaudily painted council-room resounded with the cries of “May God grant a long life to our prince!” Shortly after this Prince Louis Napoleon and the Princess Clothilde visited Tunis, and were, together with the Bey and his Prime Minister, present at the inauguration of the newly built French consular residence. Although a shower of foreign decorations (the grand crosses of Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway amongst the number) was the immediate consequence of

the constitution, the new Chamber, and more especially the new courts, became increasingly unpopular, and a tumultuous mob even invaded the precincts of the Bardo. The offenders were subsequently pardoned, but the conviction gained ground that serious troubles were at hand.

During the following year the Bey resolved to send a special envoy to congratulate the Sultan Abd el Aziz on his accession to the imperial throne. In May 1862 the first local loan, which was afterwards to be the cause of so much mischief, was contracted, and about the same time some of the Algerian tribes led by Spahis in the French service attacked the Tunisian clan Boughanem on the Tunisian side of the frontier. This greatly irritated the Bey, and he received very favourably a proposal by Mr. Wood to enter into a convention permitting British subjects to hold real property in the country. During the autumn the Khamírs rose in rebellion against the Bey owing to the imposition of an extraordinary poll-tax. In spite of the natural difficulties which the dense forests of their country present, the heir-apparent in a short time succeeded in restoring order. It was just at this juncture that a timely visit of the Prince of Wales and the Crown Prince and Princess of Prussia created a very happy impression on the

Bey's mind as regarded his relations with England, and very formal assurances were given him that as long as he followed the policy he had already adopted he might always count on the friendly offices of Great Britain. Two months later the present King of Italy arrived in Tunis, and during the festivities which ensued somewhat surprised his suite by investing the Bey with the insignia of the Annunziata. Victor Emmanuel some months afterwards confirmed by patent the spontaneous nomination made by his son. The pecuniary embarrassments of the Bey soon passed beyond the reach of local loans, and in May 1863, after long negotiations, he borrowed £1,400,000 from Messrs. Oppenheim and Erlanger for fifteen years at the interest of twelve per cent. From this date began the long series of financial difficulties which have not a little contributed to the virtual absorption of the Regency.

During the summer the Bey had occasion to complain of three specific raids on his subjects committed by Algerian tribesmen. "These incursions," remarked Mr. Wood, "are unfortunately becoming more frequent, and now generally lead to remonstrances and misunderstandings between the French authorities and the Bey's Government. In the last aggression reported, it is, to say the

least, singular that the French troops at Tebessa did not interfere to prevent the attack." The Bey at last signed the convention allowing British subjects to hold landed property in the country. This diplomatic success was hardly of less importance than the abolition of slavery and the constitution itself, and the more so as no similar concession had ever yet been before granted in any Moslem country.

The year 1864 was ushered in by a revolution of the Arab tribes. In order to pay the interest due to Messrs. Oppenheim and Erlanger the poll-tax payable by every Tunisian subject was raised from 36 to 72 piastres, and the attempt to levy this wholly exorbitant demand terminated by a serious revolt. Beja was besieged, Matar fell into the hands of the insurgents, and the Governor of Kef, proceeding to join his post, was killed by the warlike tribe of the Boughanem. M. De Beauval, who had succeeded M. Roche as French Chargé d'Affaires, within a few hours of the news of the outbreak reaching Tunis, went to the Bey and *demandé in the name of the Emperor the abrogation of the constitution.* "Your Organic Laws," he said, "are wholly and solely the cause of the present discontent. The Arabs are tired of your regular tribunals and prefer your summary justice ;

and if you do not choose to go back to it, they will make you." The Bey curtly declined. The Emperor at Algiers had received an emblazoned copy of the Tunisian code, and had highly complimented its author. Muhamed es Sadek could not as yet understand the inexpediency of a too liberal and constitutional state existing on the frontiers of the dominions of the Algerian Bureaux Arabes. As usual, he took refuge from his perplexity in an interview with Mr. Wood. Meanwhile the disaffection spread southwards. Sfax and Susa were threatened, and the Bey at last realised the fact that he was almost defenceless. While he was elaborating his constitution and receiving foreign grand crosses, the remains of his cousin Ahmed's force had dwindled down to a few regiments of tattered soldiers, who were more able to knit stockings than face the hardy tribesmen of the interior. It was under these circumstances decided that the Tunisian commander-in-chief should treat with the rebels. Meanwhile M. De Beauval sought an interview with the Bey, and said that the British convention must be also annulled as a second cause of offence. The Bey declined even to discuss such a proposal, whereupon M. De Beauval rejoined "that he had become English and would repent of it." He went on to say that the Regency was

really under the protection, not of France, but of the French Consulate-General, and that he demanded the dismissal of the Vizier Mustapha and General Kheir-ed-Din as the supporters and promoters of Anglo-Turkish views and interests.

The negotiations with the revolted tribes took a favourable turn, and the obnoxious tax was repealed by proclamation. Meanwhile several British ships of war arrived as well as a French squadron. M. De Beauval at once repaired to the palace, accompanied by the Admiral, some officers of his staff, and Colonel Campenon, formerly military instructor in the Tunisian army. The French Chargé d'Affaires renewed his demand for the abrogation of the Organic Laws and the dismissal of his Minister. The Bey absolutely rejected the former request, but observed that "as he had made a constitution to please England and France, he had no objection to unmake it, provided the two Governments were agreed on the subject." Colonel Campenon then violently denounced the Prime Minister, and said that "while he had been heaping up riches the country had grown too poor to maintain the standing army necessary for its defence." So warm an altercation then ensued that the Bey and Sidi Mustapha were obliged to leave the room.

The Italian fleet now hastened to join the English

and French vessels. Although no hostile movement was made by the tribes in the interior, the rebels sacked Sfax on the 30th April, and obliged the European colonists to take refuge in the ships lying off the town. Their wrath seems to have been particularly directed against the Government farmers and monopolists, and their houses and stores were pillaged "even to the nails." It was agreed that if disorders occurred at Tunis the marines of the English, French, and Italian ships should proceed thither by boat to assist the male inhabitants in constructing barricades and defending the European quarter. The critical situation of the whole country did not deter M. De Beauval from continuing his endeavours to still further embarrass the Bey. He put his various demands in the form of an ultimatum, and sent M. Jules Lesseps with it to the palace. In order to facilitate a solution of the difficulty, Sidi Mustapha tendered his resignation, and the Bey finally threatened to abdicate in four days.

This seems to have brought matters to a deadlock. M. De Beauval attempted to induce the Admiral to land troops at Goletta, but before he had time to do further mischief, England, France, and Italy had agreed to a *joint* action regarding Tunis. The time for the French to take Carthage

had not yet come. A week later Haider Effendi, the Commissioner Extraordinary of the Porte to "inquire into the state of affairs at Tunis," arrived at Goletta with three Ottoman ships. Before the vessels finally anchored, Admiral D'Herbington went on board, and endeavoured, both by persuasion and threats, to induce Haider Effendi to refrain from landing. The Turkish envoy prolonged the discussion sufficiently to enable him to take up an advantageous position, and then quietly refused to comply with the propositions made to him. The advent of Haider Effendi added not a little to the difficulties of the situation. During the month of May the revolution continued unabated. The rebels at Sfax pronounced the deposition of the Bey and hoisted the Ottoman flag, and the European colonists at Susa three times took refuge in the European ships in the roadstead on the false alarm of a general rising. Meanwhile the Bey held long conferences with Haider Effendi, and used every exertion to prepare a small force to march into the disturbed districts. During all this time the four fleets remained at Goletta and on the coasts, while the tortuous diplomatic game was being played out at Paris, London, Turin, and Constantinople. Lord Russell's prompt and vigorous action had at the onset nipped M. De Beauval's schemes in the

bud by inducing M. Drouyn de Lhuys to accept the principle of joint action in any case, but a fresh obstacle to his plans soon afterwards presented itself. Italy now for the first time became a factor in the Tunisian question. Her ships contained soldiers and engineers as well as sailors; her press talked magnanimously of a wholly disinterested Italian occupation on behalf of the Allied Powers; and France began to perceive that her jealousy of England in Tunis must be henceforth transferred to the proceedings of Italy.

The summer of 1864 passed away in groundless alarms. M. De Beauval made various efforts to furnish an excuse for intervention by keeping alight the smouldering embers of the insurrection, but he was doomed to disappointment. The rebel chief Ali Ben Ghadam made his peace with the Bey, and the influence of the Tijania confraternity, to which he belonged, was also directed to putting an end to the conflict. After a series of conferences held at Kairwán, the Sheikhs of the southern tribes determined to give in their submission, provided the English Consul-General would guarantee their personal safety, and at length the revolutionary movement was successfully confined to the towns and villages surrounding Susa. During all this time the French press alternately denounced Turkey and

England as the cause of the insurrection, which it was alleged had been excited and fostered as an excuse for bringing the Regency under the direct rule of the Porte. This theory, however, was soon destined to receive a rude shock. When Ali Ben Ghadam decided to abandon the rôle of an agitator, and asked to be allowed "to retire from the world and spend his days upon a small plot of ground on which he would build a *zaouia* of the Tijania brotherhood," he voluntarily placed in the hands of Muhamed es Sadek three extraordinary letters which he had received from M. De Beauval through one Giovannino Mattei, the French Consul of Sfax. They merit to be handed down to posterity as unique specimens of diplomatic ingenuity, and the more so as their authenticity never appears to have been denied. It need hardly be said that the French naval and military officers were entirely ignorant of these or any similar communications.

LETTER No. I (*Literal Translation*).

In the name of the one God. From M. De Beauval, French Consul in Tunis, to our beloved, respected, and learned Seid Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam. After greetings, we have to inform you, first, that we solemnly swear by the Almighty who sent the gospel with Christ that we will not hide from you anything nor the wishes of our Government. The arrival of our ships of war at the Goletta is with the object of forcing your Government to accede to your demands, without which

your property, your persons, and your well-being will be imperilled. When we asked the Bey to comply with your desires, he desired to have four days to consider his answer, at the expiration of which time he replied that you had not made the demands that we had stated to him, but that some evil-doers were circulating these reports; in proof thereof he mentioned the arrival of the Kabyles in order to pay him their accustomed homage. We were obliged to wait. After a few days, some self-styled Sheikhs of the Kabyles came, followed by others. On their arrival, the Bey informed us that all the tribes were coming, which we know to be incorrect, as we are aware that these individuals are the inhabitants of shores of the neighbouring lakes, and consequently are people of no importance, their sole object being to receive the robes (investiture) promised them by the Governors as well as the protection of the Government. We feel confident that this circumstance does not weaken your union and confederacy for the attainment of your objects as well as the prosperity of your country. We will now acquaint you with what will strengthen your cause, inasmuch as the facts we narrate tend to the ruin of your country. Your Ministers have made a treaty with the English just before your revolt, the first condition of which is that the English shall have the right to possess and hold immovable property, such as houses, farms, and lands. You will be deprived, therefore, of this kind of property, because your fortunes do not equal theirs. For instance, a field for which you cannot afford to pay one thousand piastres, and in which, according to your manner of farming, you could only sow one kaffis (measure) of wheat and another of barley, the English can afford to pay ten thousand piastres for, because by a superior mode of farming they could plant cotton and other rich produce, which you have neither the means to do nor the custom. Secondly, they desire to construct railroads similar to those in our own

countries, to remain in their possession until their income shall have paid off the capital, the accounts to be accepted as presented by them. This is just the manner to take possession of your country; for according to their laws whoever obtains an uninterrupted possession of anything for twenty years becomes the proprietor of it; and the lord of the soil, notwithstanding the legal instruments he may possess, may ask the Almighty for its restitution, their laws giving greater weight to possession than to documents. Thirdly, to open in Tunis a bank with a large capital, for the purpose of lending money at interest, thereby converting all your people into debtors, thus carrying out the Arabic proverb that "your creditor becomes your lord." Fourthly, that all lands and mountains where gold, silver, lead, and other minerals are found shall appertain to the English, they having the right of working them on their own account. The consequence will be that any one might be dispossessed of his own lands by their researches, since, should they discover any minerals, the lands will become their property, to the exclusion of the rights of the true possessor, inasmuch as the mineral grounds have been sold to them by the Government. These nefarious transactions, which no one who has any feeling of humanity can tolerate, have aroused the anger of my Government, and its object in sending the fleet is to obtain the dismissal of the Minister and the abrogation of the Organic Laws, upon which the aforesaid treaty is founded. As the abrogation of the constitution will carry with it the annulment of the aforesaid treaty as well as the fall of the Minister who is its maker, with the aid of God there is not the slightest necessity for these *disgraceful* transactions. I must also acquaint you that France, my powerful country, makes great efforts for the welfare of all countries, and particularly for that of Tunis, owing to its proximity to Algeria, and also for the princes of the Husseinite dynasty. I have also

to inform you that your Ministers are pressing the Bey to send a camp of soldiers with artillery by way of "Bejia" and Kirwan, with the intention of separating the tribes from you in order to weaken you. You must, and it is your duty to come to "Sidy el Hatab" (a sanctuary within three leagues of Tunis) with about four thousand horsemen, informing me of it a day or two previous to your arrival. You will then ask for a general conference, and I shall be with you and for you, and nothing shall occur but what will be advantageous.

Greeting from the writer of these characters, Giannino, Consul at Sfax, at present in Tunis, and who writes the present letter by order of M. Consul Beauval, agent for the Emperor of France—may God render him victorious—and from your affectionate friend Campenon, French colonel.

25 HODJIA 1280 = 1st June 1864.

(At the foot of the letter is a seal with red wax effaced and some European letters.)

P.S.—If you are unable to come, send us a certified document from the principal chiefs of all the tribes and their followers, containing all their demands from the Tunisian Government, as well as what may be satisfactory to you.

LETTER No. 2.

In the name of God. To the beloved, accomplished, and learned Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam. We have to inform you that we have forwarded to you three letters previous to the present one, and we do not know whether they have reached you because we have not received any reply to them. Their contents referred to many of your affairs in which we take an interest, as the Almighty can witness. We are now obliged to allude to some of them, and to acquaint you with

what has now come to our knowledge. In the first place, we swear by the gospel that we will not hide anything from you, and that we are firmly supporting you in all your demands, in all of which we concur with you, but that we shall greatly regret if you relinquish any of them, being persuaded it will be to your injury and will lead to the shedding of your blood, which the Minister desires above all things. Amongst the matters discussed at the Dar el Bey (residence of Ottoman Commissioner) was the requisition to the Sultan to send ten thousand soldiers to attack you. When, however, our Government became acquainted with it, it forced these troops to return from Malta, and it addressed itself at the same time to the Sultau, to whom it made known the oppression to which you were subjected, and in consequence of which you had risen to demand your rights. The Sultan acceded to its remonstrances and intrusted to us the settlement of your affairs with the Bey. From this we derive two advantages—first, your welfare, and, secondly, the prevention of the arrival of Turkish troops in Africa, which does not suit us. When the Minister became aware of it, he despatched General Sy Hussein to Susa to spread the news that the French were aiming at the possession of Africa, with a view to create enmity between us, having found us to be your supporters. Should your demand for Turkish intervention become public, our opposition to the arrival of Ottoman troops will be thereby weakened. We also inform you that the Minister has sent yourself Ben Beshir to “Bejia” for the purpose of inciting the tribes against you, so that upon the arrival of the camp it may find them prepared to join it. Be therefore on your guard, as we have apprised you of all that concerns you. In short, we swear by the head of the Emperor of France, that should the Minister remain in your country he will completely destroy you. With salutations from the commander-in-chief of the French ships of war stationed at

the Goletta, from the French Consul-General in Tunis, and from the French Colonel residing in Tunis.

10 *Moharrem* 1281.

LETTER No. 3.

To the beloved, well-guided, &c., Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam.

We inform you that we have previously sent you several letters to which we have received no acknowledgment, in consequence of which we address you the present letter, to the effect that we still adhere to our words and give you our firm support, since we do not differ from you, as will be verbally explained to you by the bearer. We have to request you on the receipt of this letter to come to "Seïd Aly el Hattab," or to some other place near Tunis, there to convoke an assembly, and, amongst others, to ask for me, in order to enable me to join the meeting, so that your demand may be submitted through me, that the Bey may not again say that you had not made such and such demands; because, whenever I speak to him on the subject, he desires me not to listen to public reports.

We believe that the camp will be delayed, notwithstanding that its departure is purposely announced that you may hear of it and postpone your advance, as your arrival is not desired, inasmuch as it would strengthen our proofs against them (the Ministers), and which are favourable to you. Pay no attention to the Minister's statements, because all his acts are contrary to truth: they are all intrigues directed against you. In brief, the bearer of the letter will inform you of all our intentions in your behalf, he being a trustworthy friend of ours. When you come he will accompany you; listen to him, and do not act in opposition to his advice.

Salutations from the French Consul-General in Tunis, from

the commander-in-chief of the French fleet at the Goletta, and from the French Colonel residing in Tunis.

Dated 15 Moharrem 1281.

The French Admiral, Count Bouet Willaumez, had for some time felt misgivings as to the *bona fides* of M. De Beauval's policy, and the perusal of these letters and other authentic reports induced him to make such representations to the Imperial Government as produced the indefinite postponement of the establishment of that "*prépondérance naturelle*," which again and again finds a place even in the correspondence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Meanwhile, although the rebellion was well-nigh stamped out, the fleets still remained on the coast. Then came another diplomatic struggle. Who was to go first? If France took the lead, it might be said she was driven away by Turkey and England; supposing Italy was left behind, there was a possibility of her carrying out a purely platonic occupation on her own account; but if the Turkish Commissioner went before the rest, the Moslem population would consider that he was flying from the *giaours*. After weeks of correspondence, a programme was drawn up with the assent of all parties. It is a noteworthy fact that Lord Russell and Mr. Wood induced the other interested parties to leave the English ships behind to keep the peace.

Programme of the Departure of the French, Italian, and Turkish Squadrons, fixed to take place on Friday the 23^d September 1864, at 11 o'clock a.m.

1. The Vice-Admiral Count Bouet Willaumez, commander-in-chief of the French squadron, will give the signal to his vessels to light their fires by hoisting a yellow flag.

2. The Italian Admiral will simultaneously give the same signal.

3. The Turkish frigate will also light her fires.

4. When each of the squadrons shall be ready to start, the national flag shall be hoisted to the mainmast of the ship bearing the commander-in-chief.

5. The Turkish frigate shall do the same.

6. When the squadrons are on the point of departure, the French and Italian Admirals shall give a signal by dipping their respective flags.

7. The two allied squadrons shall then move forward, with the exception of the vessels of the commanders-in-chief.

8. The Turkish frigate shall then set sail.

9. The Admirals will start as soon as the Turkish fleet has passed them.

10. The squadrons will wait for their commanders-in-chief beyond Cape Carthage.

Agreed to on board the "Solferino" in the roads of Tunis, 20th September 1864.

(Signed) BOUET WILLAUMEZ. ALBINI.

Soon after the departure of the fleets the Bey's troops defeated the rebels outside Susa; a rising in Djerba was promptly put down, and the Bey's authority re-established from Tabarca to the Tripolitan frontier. Before he quitted Tunis, Muhamed

es Sadek informed Haider Effendi that recent events had convinced him that the only chance of preserving the Regency from his neighbours was to follow the advice of England and strengthen his connection with the Porte. "Assure my Imperial Master," he said, "that I look forward to an early opportunity of placing our relations on a firm basis, and beyond the reach of caviil and dispute."

On the 4th November a lamentable accident occurred to eight officers and four men belonging to H.M.S. "Orlando." Their boat was swamped returning from an excursion to the coast, and none of the bodies were ever recovered. Friends of the deceased often inquire for some memorial at Tunis. None was ever erected here, but a tablet near the Auberge de Castille in Malta records the date of the catastrophe and the names and rank of the victims.

The Bey's gratitude to England was almost boundless, and he addressed the following letter to the Queen, in answer to a communication from Lord Russell expressing Her Majesty's satisfaction at the restoration of peace in the Regency.

Praise be to God!

To the exalted sovereign who is praised both for her virtues and their effects, which are as glorious as they surpass

the power of description, the offspring of powerful sovereigns, at whose commands both sword and pen obey, our friend the Lady Victoria, Queen of Great Britain. May her reign be exalted, and may the praises of her excellences never cease to be repeated !

After the salutations the most suitable to your royal rank, which is exalted above all description.

We have received from your illustrious Minister in Your Majesty's name a pledge of your gracious favour, emanating from that amity which has been established and consolidated in the course of ages, and which, having been transmitted as an inheritance by fathers and ancestors, has ever been fruitful of beneficial effects, and has led to paths of prosperity. That pledge is the gratification which Your Majesty in her benevolence (the full extent of which the bounds of a letter cannot possibly detail) has felt in consequence of the restoration of peace in this kingdom and of the return of the population to their accustomed obedience.

The admirer of your exalted character feels convinced that Your Majesty's wish is in unison with what is contained in the said kind letter, to the effect that your sincere intention is the maintenance of our present usages without diminution or disturbance. For this expression of clear and manifest beneficence we shall be ever grateful.

Written by Your Majesty's ever faithful humble servant of God, the Muchir Mohamed Essadek Basha Bey, possessor of the Tunisian kingdom.

The 11th Jumad el Thani 1281.

11th November 1864.

The Bey now resolved to send an envoy to Constantinople to thank the Sultan for his sympathy during the insurrection, and especially for a donation from the Imperial privy purse of £50,000.

At the same time General Kheir-ed-Din had private instructions to bring about, if possible, a clear and definite understanding as to the future relations between the Regency and the Porte. It was arranged that the embassy should leave Goletta on the 17th November. On the morning of the 12th M. De Beauval called unexpectedly at the palace. He no sooner entered than in an imperious manner he enjoined the Bey not to send any agent to Stamboul. The discussion waxed warm between them, and De Beauval at last told Muhamed es Sadek clearly that he would bar the passage of General Kheir-ed-Din by force. He refused to take the Bey's hand on leaving, and quitted the room with angry and significant gestures. A cabinet council was held immediately, and it was resolved to hasten the envoy's departure. Next evening General Kheir-ed-Din went on board the Tunisian steamer the "Beshir" at dusk. At that time the French ironclad "Invincible" was lying off Goletta. The commander at once sent a messenger on board, who intimated to the General the desire of M. De Beauval that he should put off his journey till instructions reached him from Paris. Kheir-ed-Din demurred to such a request, and the French officers left the ship. It grew dark, and the "Invincible" began to burn blue-fires and dis-

charge rockets. Suddenly the "Beshir" started on her journey, and the "Invincible" followed in her wake. The two vessels approached the islet of Zembra at the entrance of the Gulf of Tunis. A dangerous channel between the rock and the mainland gives any vessel taking it an advantage of several miles. The "Beshir" unhesitatingly entered the passage at full speed and was lost in the darkness. It would have been sheer madness for the "Invincible" to follow, and she returned during the night to her anchorage at Goletta.

General Kheir-ed-Din did not only take with him to Constantinople a simple letter of thanks. He received a memorandum containing certain instructions which were to form the basis of a firman defining the Turkish supremacy over Tunis. While Muhamed es Sadek was awaiting with fear and trembling the result of his mission, he was agreeably surprised by the recall of M. De Beauval. The French could never forgive him the failure of his burlesque attempt to capture the Tunisian Envoy-Extraordinary on the high seas, and he was summarily replaced by M. De Bellecourt.

At the beginning of the year 1865 the Bey learned that General Kheir-ed-Din's mission had been completely successful. The conditions which were to govern their future regulations were agreed

on, and were embodied in a confidential vizirial letter, which contained a distinct assurance that upon the Bey's application a regular firman would be granted.* It was, however, decided that the whole matter should be for the present kept a profound secret. Prince Arthur of England arrived at Tunis during the spring, and was, as usual, most hospitably entertained, and in the month of May Earl Russell decided to confer on Muhamed es Sadek the Grand Cross of the Bath.

This fact, coupled with the moral support he had doubtless received from England during the campaign of M. De Beauval, made a deep impression upon his mind. "Whenever my people see my breast covered with the ribbon of the Bath," he said to Mr. Wood, "they will appreciate and understand the fresh protection they have thereby acquired, and to whom they must turn for succour and counsel in their moments of perplexity and embarrassment."

The Bey was strongly urged to invite the Emperor of the French, who was meditating a second visit to Algeria, to include Tunis in his programme, but he thought it most prudent to limit his attentions to a congratulatory mission. Taib Bey (now a prisoner in the Bardo palace)

* Appendix K.

represented his brother on this occasion, and received the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. When he came back, Taib told the Bey that the Emperor had twice remarked to him that "he should much like to visit the site of ancient Carthage, to elucidate some points with reference to his history of the life of Cæsar." "I did not fail to tell him," added Taib, "that they were all ploughed up, and that there was nothing whatever to be seen." The French about this time successfully pressed upon the Bey a second telegraphic convention. During a great part of the year 1865 active negotiations were carried on to obtain a unanimous consent of the Powers to the issue of the firman between Tunis and Turkey, but the opposition of France prevented any agreement being arrived at. The Bey on the 31st July received with great ceremony the insignia of the Bath at the hands of Lord Yelverton, and although he is probably more decorated than any other living man, he has always shown a marked preference for his English order ever since. His satisfaction, however, was not destined to be of long duration. The insurrection had hopelessly crippled his finances; a letter had been intercepted from his Consul at Bone, M. Allegro, offering to stir up an insurrection on the frontier in the interest

of France ; it was no longer a secret that Marshals Randon and MacMahon were again urging on the Emperor the necessity of asserting French rights over Tunis ; and at last, on the 21st September, Baron Saillard arrived at Goletta as the bearer of an ultimatum. The Governors of Tunis and Keff had administered the bastinado to two Algerian subjects in the Tunisian service, some Arabs had attacked a coral boat, and a forest had been burned on the frontier. Baron Saillard was consequently instructed to demand from the Bey prompt and signal satisfaction. This time Muhamed es Sadek surrendered at discretion : the officials complained of were dismissed, the venerable Prime Minister was sent to the French Consulate-General to ask pardon from Baron Saillard, and a notice was issued that henceforth Algerian Arabs under all circumstances would be treated as French subjects. At this price the Bey of Tunis obtained another respite.

In 1866 the financial troubles of the Tunisian Government came more prominently into notice. The state bonds remained unpaid ; the European merchants protested ; and finally, M. Musalli (one of the Bey's interpreters) was sent to Paris to negotiate a loan. Money proved very difficult to get, and even the Bey's steamer the " Beshir " was seized for debt at Malta.

The following year was not less disastrous for the Regency. The absence of rain, which commenced in 1866, continued, and the complete failure of the crops engendered first famine and then typhus. Italy now in turn threatened an interruption of diplomatic relations, because the Bey refused to pay the debts of the Tunisian princes, although their creditors had been again and again warned of the risk they were running. After much negotiations, an actual rupture was only prevented by the Bey paying about thirty per cent. on the total sum claimed. Mr. Wood was unfortunately absent, when, in September, the tribes around Beja once more raised the standard of revolt. Troops had no sooner been sent to the disaffected districts, when the news spread that Muhamed es Sadek's younger brother, Adil Bey, had left his palace at the Marsa to place himself at the head of the insurgents. Sidi Adil was betrayed and fell into the hands of Ali Bey. He was brought a prisoner to Tunis, and died of "a rheumatic fever, caught by imprudent exposure in the Beja mountains," on the 5th November. It is popularly supposed he was poisoned, but the evidence is exceedingly contradictory. Sidi Adil was never a robust man, but persons who knew him represent him as being by far the most intelli-

gent and patriotic of the sons of Hussein Bey. He indulged in dreams of becoming the real leader of the Arab tribes, but he wholly failed in his attempt to realise them. The Bey now conceived that a widespread conspiracy existed against his person, and his suspicions were shared and fostered by Muhamed Khaznadar, who had held the office of Prime Minister for over thirty years. On the 5th September, General Sy Reschid and General Sy Ismael Sunni, two of the most prominent members of the Beylical Council, were arrested in their houses, dragged to the Bardo, and strangled by the common executioner. The city gates were shut during the perpetration of this outrage, and before any of the European Consuls could leave Tunis, both the victims had ceased to live. No occurrence had caused such widespread disapprobation since the judicial murder of the Jew Sfez ten years before. Mr. Werry at once repaired to the Bardo to remonstrate with the Bey. Muhamed es Sadek declared that he had ample proof of the guilt of the accused, and that, as the constitution had not been again put in force since its suspension in 1864, he was not bound to bring them to trial.

The famine, cholera, and typhus continued their ravages far into 1868, and the Bey and the Beylical Government were alike on the verge of

bankruptcy. Mr. Wood hurried back to Tunis to endeavour to prevent the apparently inevitable collapse. In addition to the two foreign loans of 1863 and 1865, the Bey had created an internal debt with various European merchants by a series of operations called "conversions." These loans and the usurious interest paid upon them were by no means the only cause of the national insolvency. The insurrection had involved the Government in extraordinary expenses; the State Treasurer, Caid Nessim, had crossed the Mediterranean to Leghorn, leaving a deficit of twenty-five millions of francs; and the pestilence and famine of 1866, 1867, and 1868 had prevented the collection of the usual amount of revenue. But there was another and more serious reason even than these: the Bey was surrounded by Memelouk Ministers and favourites, who invariably entered his service without a piastre, and heaped up enormous fortunes in the midst of the general ruin. The Prime Minister, Mustapha, himself was a Greek slave from Scio; and the *teskera* or order for the purchase of General Kheir-ed-Din, when a handsome Circassian youth of sixteen, has lately figured as an exhibit in the dispute as to the Ben Ayad succession. Ahmed Bey in 1855 left 120,000,000 of francs in the Tunisian treasury, to be dissipated by his successor,

Muhamed "the Magnificent," in cargoes of beautiful Georgian, Turkish, and Circassian slave-girls from Stamboul, leaving only a very small surplus to be swallowed up by French engineers in bringing pure water to Tunis over the aqueduct of Adrian. From the hour of his accession to the throne, Muhamed es Sadek was almost in the power of a series of Memelouk favourites, who found in foreign loans that source of profit which the diminished revenues of the country no longer afforded.

In 1868 it was already evident that the Bey must compound with his creditors. The clamours of the French, Italian, and English bondholders could not much longer pass unheeded, and very serious remonstrances were addressed to the Tunisian Government by the foreign representatives. The French Chargé d'Affaires at first sought to propound a scheme exclusively under French auspices, but now, as in 1864, neither Italy nor England would consent to be ignored in the arrangement. It is under these circumstances that the International Financial Commission came into existence, in virtue of two proclamations bearing date the 5th July 1869 and 23d March 1870, and made with the concurrence of the three interested Powers, under whose guarantee the Bey's decrees

were to be carried out. The only advantage secured by France was the right of appointing a French employé as "inspector of finance," whereas the other functionaries of the Executive Council are Tunisians. Although the Tunisian bonds of the Unified Debt of 125,000,000 francs were destined to become an important factor in the Tunisian question, the history of the Financial Commission is neither edifying nor interesting. Everybody who got "into" the Commission upheld it, and everybody who was kept outside in the cold denounced it. Its chief memorial will be a score of unreadable pamphlets in support of both sides of the case. During the past ten years the much-abused Commission has paid a fair proportion of the coupons as they became due, and the various "inspectors of finance" have been eminently honest, if not universally popular. The sources of Tunisian revenue having now become more than ever impaired by recent events, the creditors of the Tunisian Government will not probably object to a fresh financial adjustment, provided always that the present obligations are paid them at par. If this course is not thought expedient, they will certainly prefer to see the joint guarantee of the three Powers remain undisturbed.

CHAPTER XII.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

A GENERAL excitement amongst the Arabs very naturally followed the commencement of hostilities between the Emperor of France and the King of Prussia. The Bey did his utmost to please both parties, and, as might be expected, succeeded in satisfying neither. The travellers Rolfs and Wetstein were denounced by M. De Botmilian as German emissaries of so dangerous a description that their daily walks were watched by a detachment of Tunisian soldiers, and a local *avoué* caused a copious interchange of telegrams with Berlin by announcing his intention of forming a Foreign Legion in Tunis to take service under the Government of Tours. After an unsuccessful attempt to reach the interior, the German savants were compelled to leave the country in self-defence, and the Tunisian Contingent seems to have died a natural death about the same time. To counter-balance the effect of the news of the disasters of

Sedan and Metz, M. De Botmilian fell back upon the ancient scare of a meditated Turkish invasion from Tripoli; notwithstanding which, the Bey showed an increasing determination to obtain from the Porte the execution of the vizirial letter of 1864.

A year or two before, the Bey in a weak moment had granted two important concessions of arable ground to Italian and French subjects. An Italian agricultural company obtained an estate at Jedeida, while a French citizen, the Count de Sancy, was put in possession of the fruitful domain of Sidi Tabet, on the banks of the Medjerdah. Both these kindly acts on the part of the Bey were destined to entail important results; the former became the indirect cause of the Bey's hastening his demand for the Imperial firman, and the latter has contributed not a little to the events of 1881. The Italian *concessionnaires* were hardly installed at the Jedeida when they put forward claims to exercise such jurisdiction over the inhabitants as would constitute an *imperium in imperio*. Some local disputes with the Arabs living on the property induced them to precipitately retire, and present an elaborate claim for consequential damages on account of unreaped harvests, unborn herds, and even unhatched eggs. Signor Pinna pulled

down his flag, and Italian newspapers talked quite as loudly of an expedition and occupation on behalf of the Società Commerciale, Industriale ed Agricola, per la Tunisia in 1871, as the French press did in connection with the Société Marseillaise exactly ten years later. Mainly through the good offices of Mr. Wood an arbitration was agreed upon, in which, in spite of many disadvantages, Muhamed es Sadek came off victorious.

The Bey soon perceived that he was now likely to enter on a new phase of existence as a political bone of contention between France and Italy, and a milch-cow for adventurers from both countries in search of indemnities. No time was therefore to be lost; and in the following September General Kheir-ed-Din was sent once more to Stamboul to seek the firman, according to the terms of the agreement arrived at in 1864. M. De Botmilian protested, but the Bey observed that the step he had taken was rendered absolutely necessary by the pressure lately brought to bear on him by the "friendly Powers." Kheir-ed-Din returned with the Sultan's rescript, which was read on the 18th November 1871 in the presence of one of the largest and most brilliant assemblies which ever filled the audience-hall of the Bardo palace.*

* Appendix L.

Meanwhile the Financial Commission was gradually taking shape under the care of M. Villet. Early in 1873 it became evident that a "palace intrigue" had been set on foot against the Prime Minister, and that General Kheir-ed-Din, supported by M. Villet, was endeavouring to supplant his father-in-law. The investigations of M. Villet as to past accounts were not supposed to be favourable to Sidi Mustapha, and the Bey lent a ready ear to the suggestion that his "faithful servant" of 1864 was the main cause of the financial crisis which had so perceptibly diminished his power and independence. The old man was imprudent enough to quarrel with the ruling favourite, Mustapha Ben Ismael, and his granting by a private letter a permission to open an English bank at last afforded the pretext which had been so long wanted. In order to gain his object, Kheir-ed-Din went over temporarily to the French party, and a new and energetic Chargé d'Affaires replaced M. De Botmilian to put the plan into execution. On the 16th September M. De Vallat arrived in Tunis, and on the 3d November General Kheir-ed-Din became Prime Minister, to fall four years later by the influence of the same persons who had wrought the ruin of his predecessor.

According to Oriental usage, the fallen Minister

was despoiled of his property, and he probably owed his life to the strong representations of the Italian Government. An attempt was made to arrest him ; but his wife, the sister of Ahmed Bey, passionately clung to her husband, and threatened to follow him through the streets with uncovered face and dishevelled hair if the soldiers took him from her. Even Kheir-ed-Din shrank from such a scandal as this. No one ever saw Sidi Mustapha after his disgrace. His jewels and plate (including souvenirs from half the sovereigns of Europe) were sold by public auction six months later, but the sum realised was insufficient to pay the debt he was declared to owe to the Tunisian Treasury. Mustapha is now dead, and lies beside his royal brother-in-law in the mausoleum of the Beys of Tunis.

Meanwhile the French undertaking at Sidi Tabet had hardly made more progress than the Italian farm at Jedeida. In consideration of improving materially "the breed of horses, cows, and sheep" in the Regency of Tunis, the Bey had given a grant to the Count de Sancy of fourteen hundred hectares of the most fertile land in his dominions. M. de Sancy had, according to his own showing, no capital to lay out on the property, and although his concession was purely personal, he set out for

Paris to find a partner for the Haras of Sidi Tabet. He finally succeeded in interesting in Tunisian agriculture an American lady, Mrs. Mary Frances Ronalds, who desired to forget amidst fresh scenery and pastoral pursuits the annoyances of a lawsuit *en séparation de corps et de biens* which had been lately tried in the Parisian courts. Mrs. Ronalds came to Tunis with her partner, and for a time the firm of Sancy-Ronalds presided over the destinies of a dairy farm with considerable success. But Tunis had not long the privilege of deriving a portion of its supplies from Sidi Tabet. M. De Sancy ceded his rights to a member of the ex-imperial family of France, and Lieutenant Lucien Napoléon Theodore Bonaparte-Wyse became a partner in the fresh association known to the French tribunals as that of Ronalds-Wyse. From the day that M. Wyse became the guiding spirit of the farm at Sidi Tabet, everything went wrong. The Tunisians refused to purchase their butter, eggs, and poultry of any one but Mrs. Ronalds, and before three months had passed away the partners were almost at open warfare. Their somewhat unromantic daily correspondence formed a notable feature in the various *causes célèbres* which ensued. A single specimen is sufficient.

M. WYSE TO MRS. RONALDS.

SIDI TABET, 3d October 1872.

MADAM,—I send you a blind sheep which has grown thin, and which you had better sell, as well as some onions which remained over. John also sends you five cowhides to dispose of. Please send me a plough and some knives. Accept my respectful compliments.

L. N. B. WYSE.

M. Wyse becoming dissatisfied with the business, sold a portion of the stock, whereupon Mrs. Ronalds prosecuted him criminally. M. De Vallat was stony-hearted enough to throw every possible difficulty in the way of her demands for justice, and M. Wyse triumphed for a time, and sued M. De Sancy for selling rights, which he did not possess. His success was not, however, to be of long duration. Both M. De Sancy and Mrs. Ronalds had friends in high places, and M. De Vallat was recalled. The incidents of the agricultural adventures of Mrs. Ronalds and her partners for a moment seemed to obscure the graver matters at stake, and for a time even the *prépondérance naturelle* was forgotten. The Baron de Billing was appointed to the vacant Consulate-Generalship, and came to Tunis irrevocably pledged to work out a Sancy-Ronalds policy with energy and zeal.

M. De Billing joined his post in May 1874. The various judgments pronounced in the *affaire*

Wyse were made the subject of an appeal to Aix, and Mrs. Ronalds went thither in person to interest in the woes of the partnership Sancy-Ronalds the President of the court and the Cardinal Archbishop. Complete success attended her efforts, and on the 20th August the whole of the decrees issued in favour of M. Wyse were reversed. The time had now arrived for decided action at Tunis, and the annihilation of M. Wyse was intrusted to M. Elève-Consul Cassas, who has since distinguished himself by very nearly involving the Republic in a war with the Queen of Madagascar. Bonaparte Wyse was arrested and conducted through the streets to the public prison, and the *raison sociale* Sancy-Ronalds reigned supreme. The Baroness de Billing now took the Tunisian question in hand; Mustapha Ben Ismael was accused of trespassing on the premises of the Saint Louis Memorial Chapel, and publicly insulted at a ball given at the French Consulate; and General Kheir-ed-din received letters of so menacing a character that he was obliged to refer them to the Duc Decazes. During the short reign of M. De Billing, M. Musalli was a candidate for employment in the Tunisian Foreign Office, and his wife became a conspicuous member of the Sancy-Ronalds party, which waged a deadly warfare against the faction Bonaparte-Wyse. During

the autumn of 1874 M. Oscar Gay arrived at Tunis with an aggressive scheme in his pocket. While the Baroness de Billing was giving her attention to the weightier details of Tunisian politics, her husband and M. Musalli supported the plan for rebuilding Carthage, and once more utilising the Cothon or harbour of Rome's ancient rival. The Bey, however, turned a deaf ear to their proposals, and M. Gay was forced to postpone his projects for a more convenient season.

While the great Ronalds-Wyse controversy had apparently absorbed the attention of France, and while the peculiar features of the Billing *régime* were diverting even the Tunisians, Mr. Wood had not been idle. An English company had laid down a small railway joining Goletta to Tunis and the Bardo; an English bank had begun its operations, notwithstanding the anathema of M. De Vallat and the rest of the *corps consulaire*, and English capitalists were preparing to light the town of Tunis with gas. In the meantime the friends of M. Bonaparte-Wyse relaxed no effort to procure the removal of M. De Billing, and the rescue of Mrs. Ronalds' offending partner from his uncomfortable quarters in the Bey's common prison. The controversy between the Baroness and the Tunisian Premier hastened the inevitable

end, and the Baron de Billing was somewhat abruptly recalled.

Early in 1875 M. Théodore Roustan became Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires of the French Republic at Tunis. M. Wyse was released to carry on his appeals in France, and study the projects for the Panama canal; Mrs. Ronalds left Tunis for ever, and the "improvements in the Tunisian breed of horses and cattle" at Sidi Tabet were for the moment forgotten.

For a short time nothing in M. Roustan's line of action betokened the coming storm, but already in 1875 his extraordinary intimacy with the Musalli family was violently attacked in the "Gazette du Midi," and he was obliged to retain M. Pelletier, a local legal practitioner, to answer the exposures contained in that paper by a series of articles in the "Peuple." Elias Musalli came to Tunis nearly five and thirty years ago as a soldier of fortune. He was a Copt by birth, had received a fair education in one of the Egyptian seminaries, and brought a recommendation from a high official at Constantinople. He became the protégé of the Prime Minister Mustapha, and rose to the position of Sub-Director in the Tunisian Foreign Office. Thirty years ago he married the Signora Louisa Traverso, an Italian lady, whose universal popu-

larity materially assisted his progress. During the long administration of M. Roche and the short interregnum of M. Moulin, General Elias Musalli played a prominent part in the trials and difficulties of the Tunisian Government, and he rendered more or less valuable assistance to all the parties interested in the financial operations of 1863 and 1865. As a matter of course General Musalli became rich, and after the fashion of Tunisian grandees built himself a palace. At last, however, there came a French Chargé d'Affaires "who knew not Joseph," and General Elias Musalli fell through the influence of General Kheir-ed-Din, and the hostility of MM. Villet and Botmilian. His final dismissal was caused by an unfortunate mistake. M. Musalli had forgotten the exact amount of the Bey's donation to a ball given for the benefit of the European hospitals, and advantage was taken of a discrepancy between the offering which was actually put into the collection plate and the sum which the General had received, to abruptly inform him that his services were no longer required. MM. Villet and Leblunt were unromantic enough to give a more uncharitable and matter-of-fact version of this untoward accident during the Roustan-Rochefort trial, but all historians must agree that its immediate result was to de-

prive the Bey of the benefit of M. Musalli's exertions.

Within a year of M. Roustan's arrival, M. Musalli again began to climb the ladder of Tunisian statesmanship, and a new palace soon quickly rose by the side of the one which had been sold under the pressure of the calamities of 1870-71.

In May 1866 the Bey transferred a concession he had granted, for a railway along the Medjerdah valley to a French company styling itself the *Société des Batignolles*. For a while the undertaking seemed to hang fire, but it was suddenly announced that by a law promulgated on the 25th March 1877, the French Government had agreed to guarantee a profit of six per cent. on the total outlay. So unusual a proceeding naturally awakened the suspicions of the Bey, and General Rustem was sent to Constantinople to confer with the Sultan on the political outlook. Then came strained relations between Russia and Turkey, and the beginning of the movement now called Pan-Islamism. One of the Senoussia brotherhood was sent by Abdul Hamid to invite the co-operation of the Sultan of Morocco, in a general union for the defence of Islam, and a scheme was propounded for strengthening the position of Tunis by adding

Tripoli to the Regency, and raising the Bey to the position of Khedive.

Before anything could be definitely settled, the Turco-Russian war actually broke out. By an extraordinary infatuation Italy joined France in an attempt to persuade the Bey to cast to the winds the firman of 1871. Even while contradicting a report that Italian troops were being assembled at Naples with a view to a possible descent on Tunis, the Italian Consul-General did not conceal from the Bey that unless he was very prudent, Italy might be compelled to "assert her rights over the Regency."

The Grand Vizier at once wrote to demand from the Bey the assistance guaranteed in the firman of 1871. A Council of State was immediately convoked in which the Sheikh-el-Islam called on the members to support Muhamed es Sadek in performing his duty towards the Sultan. A lengthy debate ensued, and the possibility of a descent on Tunis by the Russian fleet was pointedly alluded to. It was at last decided to confine the action of Tunis for the present to a voluntary money contribution. The circular of the Sultan explaining the motives for the Holy War was read in all the mosques throughout the Regency on the 2d June, and owing to the enthusiasm excited by it, nearly

two millions of piastres were collected and sent to Stamboul. M. Roustan now in vain pressed on the Bey the necessity of proclaiming his neutrality, but his endeavours were rendered fruitless by the reasoning of Mr. Wood, whose valuable services in Tunis were rewarded with the Knight Commandership of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.

Napoleon III. is said in a weak moment to have once offered Tunis to Italy, and one or two of the Bey's advisers would have preferred an Italian Protectorate to the Turkish suzerainty of 1871, but ever since the fall of the Empire it is clear that no French diplomatist ever seriously entertained the idea of an Italian partnership in Tunisian affairs. Some indefinite *pourparlers* as to an ultimate division of the spoils, seem to have been quite sufficient to prevent Italy from giving her cordial support to that consolidation of the relations between Tunis and Turkey which was so eminently calculated to ward off the final catastrophe. In the Italian Green Book of 1877 Mazzini thus puts forward the pretensions of Italy as regards Tunis with praiseworthy frankness:—"One of our principal paths to progress will be a mission of civilisation, to be carried out at the first possible opportunity on the shores of Tunis. Just as Morocco belongs to Spain and Algeria to France, so does *Tunis*, the

key of the centre of the Mediterranean, belong to Italy. The Roman flag floated on Mount Atlas after the fall of Carthage, and up to the fifth century we were masters of the country. The French have now cast their eyes upon it, and they will have it too in a short time, if we are not up and doing." Italy was wrong in not joining England in 1870 to link the fate of Tunis indissolubly with that of Turkey, and she was doubly wrong when she adopted a policy of militant provocation towards France, unless indeed she was prepared to resist by force the invasion of the country. If the words of Mazzini represent in any way the opinion of Italian statesmen in 1877, concerning Tunis the action of Italy in the Regency seems almost inexplicable. At all events there can be little doubt that from about this time the ancient rivalry of England and France in Tunis gave place to the more animated and acrimonious competition between France and Italy. The history of the latest phase of this rivalry is that of the French invasion.

The Sultan was hardly satisfied with the Bey's pecuniary assistance, and urgent demands arrived for men and horses. Just at this critical moment General Kheir-ed-Din was requested "to go to his house to repose himself, and return when the Bey had further need of his services." The real causes

of his downfall were the unbending and imperious manner he had adopted to his colleagues, his habit of telling in plain language wholesome truths to the Bey, and the silly ambition of the minion Mustapha Ben Ismael. The Turkish party in the Cabinet accused him of being too French, and the French themselves denounced him as fanatically Turkish. The former faction relied on an article in the *Jowaiib* which described him as preventing the despatch of a contingent to Stamboul, while M. Roustan never forgot his adventure of 1864 or forgave his bringing about the firman of 1871. In addition to this the views of M. Roustan and the Musallis would be best furthered by the vizirial mantle descending on the shoulders of a fool and a puppet. Kheir-ed-Din was neither one nor the other ; Mustapha Ben Ismael was a combination of both. It was, however, impossible to promote Mustapha to the post, quite unfledged as he was in Oriental diplomacy, and General Muhamed Khaznadar, the Colonel Muhamed of the days of Ahmed Bey, was accordingly nominated as a stop-gap. Mustapha meanwhile received the appointments of Minister of Justice and Lord Privy Seal (Sahab Ettaba), and was also appointed to the Presidency of the Financial Commission.

Mustapha is destined to play so important a rôle

in the annals of the French invasion that his history must be no longer neglected. Twenty years ago, a little boy in a tattered shirt and battered red cap, was often cuffed for somewhat too obtrusively picking up cigar ends in the European cafés of Tunis. A benevolent Maltese tavern-keeper gave him a suit of clothes, and for a few months he got more kicks than *bakhshish* from his master's customers. When tired of serving infidel wine-bibbers he became the apprentice of a barber, and then the servant of one of the officers of the Turkish Guard. This same little boy is Mustapha Ben Ismael, ex-Prime Minister of Tunis, Knight Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, Grand Cordon of the Crown of Italy, and Grand Cordon of the Civil Division of the Military Order of Spain. Muhamed es Sadek was the first to perceive his natural abilities, and transferred him from the service of the Turkish colonel to his own. Little more need be said of his career till we find him in 1877 Tunisian Lord Privy Seal, and by some peculiar fiction sometimes described as the Bey's "son-in-law" and at others as his "adopted son."

A fortnight after Kheir-ed-Din's downfall a thousand mules and horses left Goletta on three Turkish transports for the seat of war. I am not inclined to believe in the charge freely brought

against Kheir-ed-Din of trimming in favour of France when the Turkish cause became almost desperate, and I think his past history is a sufficient guarantee for his loyalty to the Bey and the Sultan up to the time of his downfall, but his going to Paris in October to confer with M. Roustan seemed to be an ample justification for the Bey's suspicions. Kheir-ed-Din was now ready, as subsequent events showed, to do anything to revenge the wrongs he had received from Muhamed es Sadek and Mustapha Ben Ismael. Meanwhile fresh requisitions arrived from Constantinople, and 4000 men were prepared in obedience to the Sultan's command. The Russian Consul now became the centre of attraction in Tunis and the object of M. Roustan's blandishments. The very existence of M. Nyssen, blind, crippled, and bed-ridden, was almost forgotten, till one morning in December 1877 he received instructions to break off diplomatic relations with the Bey. M. Roustan tried to make the declaration of war as theatrical as possible, in order to see if at the eleventh hour he could induce Muhamed es Sadek to break off his connection with the Porte. Another very efficient instrument of torture was now brought to bear on the already terrified Bey,—the Havas Agency announced the imminent bombardment of Goletta by the Russian squadron.

M. Roustan went once more to the Bardo to see the effect of M. Nyssen's communication and the Havas menace. He was doomed to disappointment, Muhamed Sadek would not forsake his suzerain and Caliph. "You say I am independent," said he to M. Roustan, "where are your proofs for this statement? My position has been defined by the firman, but apart from this I am also bound to take into consideration the sentiments of my people as followers of the faith of Islam."

The year 1878 opened with a misfortune. Early in February the French steamer "Auvergne" was wrecked in the neighbourhood of Tabarca, and subsequently pillaged by the mountain tribes. Although the Tunisian Government paid an indemnity of 300,000 francs, M. Saint-Hilaire has since endeavoured to make the case of the "Auvergne" one of the charges contained in his indictment against Tunis. No sooner were the French claims settled than an Italian question arose over the hull of the ill-fated ship. The Bey was injudicious enough to sell the wreck as she lay by public auction. Some speculative Italians bought her for a trifle, and went to Tabarca to effect a salvage. At the sight of some Arabs they retreated to Tunis, and preferred a consequential claim for damages against the unfortunate Bey. This second "international

complication" cost the Government another 50,000 francs.

It now became necessary for Mustapha to win his spurs as an ambassador. He was sent to Rome to congratulate King Humbert on his accession, and came back with an Italian grand cordon, almost inclined for an Italian alliance forthwith. In the face of this move on the part of Italy, M. Roustan redoubled his activity; he first placed before the Bey the draft of a partly political, partly commercial convention for his consideration. The matter was kept a profound secret, but I am able to state its conditions. They were as follows:—

1st. The Bey to declare the Sultan's firman void.

2d. To transfer the Tunisian public debt to a syndicate of French capitalists, who would undertake to pay the coupon.

3d. To grant a concession to a French company for the making of a railway to Bizerta, including the construction of a port and the cession of a large area of ground.

4th. To define the frontiers of Tunis and Algeria afresh.

5th. To concede the irrigation works at Tebourba to the Société des Batignolles.

M. Le Blunt, the French Financial Member of the International Commission, opposed the com-

mercial portion of the scheme, and was recalled to France. Notwithstanding this measure the Bey was inexorable. M. Roustan now resolved to take the management of Mustapha very seriously in hand. The Bey was asked to send a mission to Paris to felicitate the Marshal President. As King Humbert had been already congratulated by Mustapha, there was no reasonable grounds for refusal. A decoration of the Abd-el-Aman in diamonds was prepared for Marshal MacMahon, and two ordinary Nichan grand cordons for M. Waddington and General Chanzy. General Musalli was attached to Mustapha's suite, and took with him a recommendation for the cross of officer of the Legion of Honour on his own account. During his stay in Paris several very important matters were discussed. The extension of the Compagnie des Batignolles line to the frontier was agreed upon, and it is believed that Mustapha received either French naturalisation, or an order entitling him to protection. He returned to Tunis wearing the grand cross of the Legion of Honour. The proud distinction of conferring upon him the grand cordon was reserved for M. Saint-Hilaire.

Then came the Berlin Congress, and the conversations of Lord Salisbury about Tunis.

The despatches interchanged between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury are too well known even to need being quoted from. M. De Blovitz, the Paris correspondent of the "Times," who was in Berlin at the time, gives the following account of the circumstances under which the now historical fiat of "Take Carthage" went forth from the lips of Prince Bismarck. "It is hard to say," writes M. De Blovitz, "how France came to be convinced that at the Berlin Congress, Prince Bismarck invited M. Waddington to take Tunis. Probably it was the result of words which were passed from mouth to mouth, and got exaggerated at every repetition. What the Prince said was merely one of the sallies he sometimes indulges in, and to which he himself attaches no importance. He himself told me, 'On first seeing Lord Beaconsfield, I said to him, You ought to have an understanding with Russia instead of thwarting her. You might leave her free at Constantinople, and yourselves take Egypt, which would compensate you for your complaisance. France would not be so vexed as may be imagined, and, in any case, Tunis or Syria might be given her as an equivalent!' I took this at the time and still take it for a jest, but the Prince had previously spoken in the same strain to Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington.

The former made no answer, because Prince Bismarck was then in the dark as to the Cyprus convention, while M. Waddington answered, what he afterwards publicly repeated, that France had no design on Tunis, but could not allow any other European Power to instal itself there, and thus imperil her Algerian possessions. Thereupon came the news of the Cyprus convention, on which the French press began attacking M. Waddington, asserting that the English occupation of Cyprus was a rebuff for French diplomacy. The Italian papers were still more excited, and blamed Count Corti for not returning from the congress with some island in his pocket. This was the starting-point of the Tunis question in Italy, and of conversations, not only between Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, but between M. Waddington and Count Corti. M. Waddington declared throughout that France had no design of annexing Tunis, but would not tolerate any European neighbour there."

Just before the congress met, M. Roustan received information that there was a probability of Germany making an effort to secure Bizerta. He immediately suggested to both his English and Italian colleagues the necessity of urgently requesting their respective Governments to adopt a joint action against Teuton aggression. During the sittings

at Berlin, however, he received a letter detailing or purporting to detail the "Take Carthage" conversations. Within an hour he was at the Bardo detailing the last performance of "*la perfide Albion*" to the affrighted Bey. Mr. Wood was hurriedly sent for, and at once communicated the current report to the English Foreign Office. In a short time a reply was received denying categorically that any offer of Tunis to France had been made by England at Berlin. The contents of the despatch, together with a pro-Turkish speech of Lord Beaconsfield, were published in the Tunisian Government Gazette, and this prudent step alone prevented the Bey accepting one or more of M. Roustan's proposals. That Lord Salisbury meant to include the total absorption of this country when he spoke of the legitimate extension of French interests, can hardly be asserted even by his enemies, but that any deviation at all was ever made from the prudent policy so ably carried out by Sir Thomas Reade and Sir R. Wood must always be a subject of regret.

On the 28th July 1878, Mustapha Ben Ismael became Prime Minister. In the following month Signor Mussi arrived at Tunis on a political mission of considerable importance. His former visits to the Regency were paid in the capacity of agent to

a certain Count Vandoni, who had preferred an enormous and preposterous claim against the Tunisian Government for services rendered as the Bey's consul at Geneva. This consideration alone should have prevented the choice of Signor Mussi to treat on matters of a diplomatic character. Without even feeling his way, Signor Mussi at once communicated to Mustapha his ideas both about French aggression and the best method of checking it, and the whole of his conversation was, as a matter of course, transmitted by telegraph to the Quai d'Orsay the same evening. He then asked for the cession to Italy of Bizerta, which was at once refused. Next day he submitted a plan for constituting Bizerta a free port under the joint guarantee of the three Powers. He also enjoined both the Bey and his Minister to make no kind of concession in France relating to M. De Sancy's demands, which were again becoming troublesome. Having almost thrown down the gauntlet to France, Signor Mussi returned to Italy. A month later the ex-Prime Minister Kheir-ed-Din was summoned to Stamboul.

M. Ferdinand de Lesseps came to Tunis early in November 1878, charged with the especial mission of converting Muhamed Sadek to the dogma of an Inland Sea. Failure with M. de Lesseps is almost impossible, but he found both the Bey and Mustapha

unexpectedly intractable. All his eloquent descriptions of a regenerated Central Africa and an increased rainfall consequent on evaporation, were wholly lost on his incredulous hearers. "Your Inland Sea," said the Bey, "may make your Algeria more secure, but it will cut off my richest province, the date-yielding Djerid. Dates never thrive in the neighbourhood of salt water, and your sea would ruin every palm grove in my country. I can never give my consent to so dangerous an experiment." M. Lesseps told M. Roustan that his careful education of Mustapha had been thrown away, and went back to France greatly disappointed.

About a month later Signor Licurgo Maccio arrived in the Regency to join his post as Italian Agent and Consul-General. He came, as M. Roustan fairly enough describes it, "with the sound of trumpets and the pomp of war." Immediately after the gunboat which brought him had anchored off Goletta, a number of mysterious-looking cases were landed and transmitted to Tunis. Next day came Signor Maccio and with him forty marines. As soon as they reached the Italian consulate the boxes were opened, and each man took out his carbine. A double file of soldiers was then improvised, a band played, and Signor Maccio entered his future residence with military honours. The consequences

of this almost incredible act of folly can easily be imagined. The militant M. Roustan recognised in this display a militant Signor Maccio, and went as fast as his carriage could carry him to induce the Bey to enter a formal protest against Italian aggression. An immediate estrangement between the two *consuls de combat* was only avoided by the happy mediation of Sir Richard Wood, by whose advice the Bey contented himself with sending a friendly message to Signor Maccio requesting him "not to do it again."

About this time a change seemed to come over the Prime Minister Mustapha, and he showed unmistakable indications of restiveness in the matter of French pretensions. I have never been able to entirely fathom the motives for his new line of conduct, but I believe it was to be attributed partly to the strong personal feeling of the Bey, which he dared not offend, partly to the influence of the partisans of the Panislamite movement at the court, and partly to an affront which he received from M. Roustan.

The year 1878 was not destined to pass away without its *casus belli* and *ultimatum*. The hero of the next episode in Tunisian history was the Count de Sancy, of the now almost-forgotten firm of Sancy-Ronalds. To console the count for the

troubles which attended his first effort "to improve the breed of Tunisian horses and cattle," M. Roustan in July 1877 induced the Bey to grant him another concession of land, on which he agreed to keep a certain quantity of stock. The rights he acquired were declared to be purely personal, and he was exempted from the payment of all the usual taxes and duties. To avoid all future disputes the Tunisian Government inserted the following clauses in its decree, viz. :—1st, "That the grant was to be forfeited *ipso facto*, if, on the 1st July 1878, the number of animals agreed on were not forthcoming ; 2d, That the estates so conceded were to be considered as Tunisian property, subject to Tunisian law, and to be treated as still forming part of the Beylical domains."

In February M. De Sancy wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, in which he stated that he had been unable to fulfil his engagements, "on account of the interrupted communication with Europe consequent on the Russo-Turkish war," and because the Bey had not put him in possession of the whole land stipulated for. The first excuse was absurd, the second untrue, and both contradictory. M. De Sancy received a civil answer declining to accept his pleas, and in July a commission went to Sidi Tabet to ascertain the real state of things in accord-

ance with the terms of the concession. Even M. De Sancy himself signed the *procès-verbal* attesting his own failure to carry out the conditions he had agreed upon. The Bey then published a decree, in which he declared the grant at an end. A long correspondence next ensued, during which M. Roustan made several appeals *ad misericordiam*, and finally the Government determined to expropriate M. De Sancy, according to the local law he had agreed to abide by. A notice to quit, sent to the French Consulate-General, was treated with contemptuous silence, and the agents of the *concessionnaire* were found to have leased out portions of the estate in defiance of the conditions of the original donation. The Bey wrote to M. Roustan saying he intended to take possession, and he received an answer asserting that the land was French property, and that if any one ventured upon it "he would find a French janisary on the border." A reply was sent couched in the most conciliatory terms, declaring that if any opposition was offered the persons sent to take possession would at once withdraw, and confine their action to a platonic protestation. Accordingly on the 9th December, a deputation, composed of the Austrian Consul, General Bacouch, M. Quéillé, the French Member of the Financial

Commission, General Arbi Zaruck, and Mr. Santillana, the Bey's interpreter, started on the bootless errand of asserting the Bey's rights. When they reached the hedge forming the boundary of the property, a French *cavass* or guard sprang out from behind it and shouted in a loud voice, "This land belongs to France." The Tunisian *posse comitatus* hastily retired, and assuaged their wounded feelings by an eloquent protest. The telegraph was then set to work, and the Bey's wanton trespass on the private domicile of a French citizen was in a few hours announced throughout the length and breadth of France. On the 7th January 1879, M. Sumaripa, M. Roustan's interpreter, appeared at the Bardo and placed an ultimatum in the hands of the Prime Minister. It ran thus:—"Unless the following conditions are accepted, the Chargé d'Affaires of France is determined to break off diplomatic relations with the Bey of Tunis: 1st, An inquiry to be ordered forthwith into the claims of M. De Sancy; 2d, The Prime Minister *in uniform* to appear at the French Consulate-General, and publicly apologise for the insult offered to France; 3d, The functionaries who carried out the Bey's instructions to be immediately dismissed from his service." For a time the Bey hesitated as to what course he should take. His telegrams to Paris

miscarried or were delayed, a French squadron as usual appeared opportunely at Goletta, and the "friendly powers" would or could do nothing but give advice. The Bey surrendered at discretion; Mustapha next morning asked pardon in the presence of a gaping crowd at the French Consulate-General, and M. Roustan announced that M. Waddington would be satisfied with the dismissal of the only English subject in the Bey's service, Mr. Santillana. A committee of three Frenchmen and two Tunisians was appointed to fully investigate the effects of the Turkish war on M. De Sancy's philanthropic attempts "to improve the breed of Tunisian horses and cattle." What they reported never transpired, but in the result M. De Sancy's grant was fully confirmed. Next year he transferred all his rights to the well-known French company called the *Société Marseillaise*, which has now kindly undertaken "to improve the Tunisian breed of horses and cattle," and pays or should pay M. De Sancy a very satisfactory annuity. When the Italians tried to treat the Jedeida as Italian soil in 1870, the French were loud in their professions of horror at such an uncalled-for aggression, but when Sidi Tabet, by a fiction of M. Roustan's, became a French property in 1878, it was regarded as the legitimate development of a perfectly justifiable preponderating influence!

The year 1879, which opened with the Sancy incident, saw in April the inauguration of the French railway into the interior. M. Oscar Gay de Tunis returned to the Regency in May to prosecute, under M. Roustan's auspices, his project for a new Carthage. Since he first unfolded his idea to M. De Billing in 1874, he had rendered it more attractive by making a cathedral, in memory of the African martyrs, one of its salient features. The Musallis did their best to help M. Gay, but the Bey had had quite enough of the St. Louis Chapel on the Byrsa to induce him to set his face against the plan. M. Roustan, however, had no difficulty in procuring him substantial consolation for his disappointment. The Bey invested M. Gay with the grand cordon of the Nichan, and gave him a present of 25,000 francs besides. With praiseworthy frankness M. Gay has himself published the history of a portion at least of this princely gift. As a mark of his gratitude, M. Gay left a certain sum with General Musalli for his wife. The General again forgot to deliver it, and Madame Musalli was foolish enough to complain in writing to M. Gay. This letter formed one of the exhibits in the Roustan-Rochefort case.

In April Sir Richard Wood quitted Tunis. He was at least spared the pain of seeing the untoward

end of all his labours. The memory of his work in the Regency yet lives, and his diplomatic successes will not easily be forgotten. It is the fashion now to speak of such men as Sir Richard Wood as belonging to the old school, and as being behind the age. It may be true, but it is also an undeniable fact, that during the fifty years Sir Thomas Reade and Sir Richard Wood represented Great Britain in Tunis, the name of England was honoured and esteemed from one end of the country to the other.

CHAPTER XIII.

BEFORE THE STORM.

IN July 1879, the Bey took a bold step in direct opposition to M. Roustan's views. In spite of the various difficulties he had to encounter, he established a Council of State, and announced that from henceforth he should submit all matters of importance for its consideration. As nearly all the members of the council have taken a more or less prominent part in the events which preceded the Kasr-es-Said Treaty, I think it best to mention their names. Muhamed es Sadek's last Cabinet was composed as follows, viz. : President—Sy Mustapha Ben Ismael. Ordinary members—Sy Muhamed Khaznadar, ex-Prime Minister ; General Sy Hussein, Minister of the Interior ; General Sy Selim, Minister of War ; General Sy Ahmed Zerouck, Minister of Marine ; Sy El Aziz, the Bey's Secretary ; General Sy Muhamed Baccouch, Director of the Foreign Office ; Sy Mustapha Raduan, Secretary of the Financial Commission ; Sheikh Bokhris, Under-

Secretary to the Bey ; General Sy Mourabet, Governor of Kairwán ; General Sy Arbi Zerouck, President of the Municipal Council ; and Sheikh Muhamed Beïram, Administrator of the Oukf or Charitable Trusts. The necessity of discussing all proposals made in the council afforded the Bey an excellent excuse when either M. Roustan or Signor Maccio urged him to take some imprudent step ; but in August the Prime Minister was induced to obtain a concession for a state *Monte de Pieté*, which put into the hands of a French subject the virtual monopoly of pawnbroking operations in the Regency. The Italian Consul-General protested, and the scheme, although since confirmed, has never yet been carried into effect.

In September Mr. Thomas Fellowes Reade arrived in Tunis, after thirty years' distinguished service in the consular department, to succeed Sir Richard Wood as the British political agent. Born in the Abdellia Palace at the Tunisian watering-place of the Marsa fifty years before, Mr. Reade's appointment was naturally popular with all classes of the Arabs, and especially so with the Bey. His dream in life had always been to return to Tunis, and there gain the same power and good name as his father possessed before him ; inheriting the political creed and strong sympathies of Sir Thomas

Reade, he hoped to maintain and increase the English influence already fostered by Sir Richard Wood. Mr. Reade, however, only came to see the end alike of Tunisian independence and British prestige, but while keenly sharing the sorrow of the Tunisians themselves, he has faithfully obeyed the orders of his superiors.

A few days later a Greek Consul came to Tunis for the first time, and proposed to the Bey an exchange of orders. Muhamed es Sadek only wished he could so easily satisfy M. Roustan and Signor Maccio. A Tunisian general was at once sent in the company of M. Valensi, the Bey's second interpreter, with a case of Nichans to Athens. After the ceremony of investiture, M. Valensi addressed the king in a speech beginning with the following sentence:—"I am charged by my august Sovereign, the Bey of Tunis, to inform your Majesty that since the arrival of the Greek Consul, *almost all the assassins and brigands in his dominions have entirely disappeared.*" . . . The king, however, took the reflection on his country thus accidentally conveyed in excellent part, and the Tunisian mission is not yet forgotten in Greece.

Early in 1880 M. Géry arrived at Tunis to obtain a concession for a port at the Goletta, but the Bey declined for the present entertaining the

proposal. Not to be outdone by M. Roustan, Signor Maccio asked for permission to lay a telegraphic cable from Cape Bon to Sicily, but he was now encroaching on one of the most valuable and serviceable of the pretended French monopolies, and the Bey dared not grant his request. Muhamed es Sadek was doubly wrong; in the first place, the French monopoly is a myth, and secondly, it proved to be the exclusive possession of the telegraph, which more than anything else facilitated the aggression of April 1881.

The three telegraph concessions made by the Tunisian Government to France are now before me. The first is dated the 24th of October 1859; the second, the 19th of April 1861; the third merely provides for a telegraph station at Bizerta, and contains the same provisions as the preceding ones. The first concession consists of only ten articles. In the first article the French are allowed to construct a line from Tunis to the Algerian frontier, and it is provided that, on its completion, the Tunisian Government may obtain possession of it, by reimbursing the French Government for its outlay. Of so temporary a nature was this first grant considered, that it is expressly stipulated, in the fourth and fifth articles of the convention, that, as soon as the Tunisian Government obtained the line, the buildings em-

ployed for the service should revert to it, and the French officials should resume their functions as French telegraphic *employés*. From the first word to the last not even the faintest shadow of a monopoly is created by the concession of 1859. We now come to the second convention of 1861. It contains only eleven articles, and admits of only one interpretation. Article I. runs as follows:—"Le Gouvernement Tunisien rachète les lignes du télégraphe électrique créés en Tunisie par les soins du Gouvernement Français depuis la Goulette, Tunis et Bardo jusqu'à la frontière Algérienne moyennant une somme de 91,997 francs et centimes, montant des dépenses faites pour leur installation. . . . Le Gouvernement Tunisien *laisse toutefois provisoirement* au Gouvernement Français, le soin d'exploiter les dites lignes *jusqu'au moment où il jugera convenable d'en charger lui-même.*" The following articles grant permission to erect stations in other parts of the Regency of Tunis on precisely similar conditions. Article IX. provides that "le Gouvernement Français aura le droit de faire attacher en un point quelconque de la Régence un ou plusieurs cables sous-marin, reliant les lignes de la Régence à un point quelconque d'Europe ou d'Afrique. *Le Gouvernement Tunisien conserve toutefois le droit d'accorder la même autorisation à tout autre Gouvernement.*"

If the Government of Tunis had ever contemplated the creation of a monopoly in favour of France it would not have reserved the right to acquire itself the lines at any moment. The grant is merely permissive in its terms, and creates no exclusive privilege whatever, nor can any such privilege be inferred from the most strained construction of the contract.

Signor Maccio had every right to resent the decision of the Bey, but he was unwise in losing his temper and indulging in a bitter quarrel with the Prime Minister, the effect of which was only to improve the position of his opponent.

The French had lost the harbour and the Italians the telegraph, and both now turned towards some new field of contest. Nothing could suit this purpose better than the little English railway between Tunis and the sea. If the French secured it they would possess an outlet for their extensive lines of the interior, and complete the circle of communication between the sea-coasts of Tunis and Algeria; if it were purchased by the Italians, the system of French railways in the country would be like Muhammad's coffin suspended between earth and heaven, and Italy would hold in her hands the approach to the Tunisian capital. Both parties were anxious to buy, and the English proprietors

equally willing to sell—*at a price*. The Com-mendatore Rubattino sent over Mr. Santillana to England to commence negotiations. A preliminary agreement was signed, and Mr. Hodges, the Secretary of the Tunisian Railways Company (Limited), went to Rome to arrange the details. Meanwhile M. Géry got wind of the march stolen on them by their competitors, invited by telegraph another agent of the vendors to come over to Paris, and then and there concluded a purchase of the railway for £105,000. A telegram suddenly called Mr. Hodges back from Italy, and the Italian party felt they had been in turn outwitted. Just as Mr. Hodges was leaving Rome a paper was thrust into his hand. It was a formal authorisation from the Minister of the Interior to deliver to Signor Rubattino “copies of all telegrams sent or received by the Englishman Hodges since his arrival at Rome.” It was stipulated in the contract entered into with M. Géry that the transaction must receive the approbation of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. The battle-field between France and Italy over the spoils of the Bey of Tunis was consequently transferred for a time from the shores of Africa to the sober precincts of Lincoln’s Inn. Both Signor Rubattino and M. Géry soon plunged into the thick of the fray, and Italy found an un-

expected ally in the person of Sir Richard Malins. Mr. Santillana came to England to do battle for the Italians, and he left no stone unturned to requite the cruel treatment he had received from M. Roustan at the time of the De Sancy *ultimatum* a year before. The caustic sarcasms of the judge attracted as much attention to the case at home as the murdering of French, Italian, and Tunisian names by the English lawyers excited amusement abroad. At last Vice-Chancellor Malins annulled the contract with M. Géry, and it was ordered that the line be resold by public auction for the manifest, and, as it turned out, substantial benefit of the shareholders who had originally purchased it for £40,000. This sale was fixed for the 6th July. The French and Italian Cabinets exchanged messages on the subject, and at the suggestion of Italy it was agreed to leave M. Géry and Signor Rubattino to fight the battle out amongst themselves. As the fatal day approached, M. Roustan felt there was something wrong, and took the bold step of forbidding the Bey in writing to transfer the line to the Italians, "whatever may be the result of the auction in London." The excitement caused by this manifesto had hardly subsided, when a telegram reached Tunis stating that the English railway had been purchased by Signor Rubattino for £165,000.

It afterwards transpired that when M. G ery presented himself before the person charged by the Court to effect the sale, he found there as his competitor Baron Heath, the Italian Consul-General. He had no time to communicate with the French Government, and when he reached the limit fixed by the Company he represented, he was forced to yield to his rival, who had at his back a very satisfactory guarantee from the Government of Signor Cairoli. The French were sure never to forget or forgive an advantage snatched by such means as this, yet the friends of Signor Maccio were weak enough to celebrate this triumph of Punic faith as a great national victory. From the 7th July 1880 diplomatic war to the knife was declared between M. Ferry and Signor Cairoli and M. Roustan and Signor Maccio. The object of the contest was predominance in Tunis.

M. Roustan's primary endeavour was to efface the consequences of the recent defeat. The French railway for the residue of a term of ninety-nine years could not go to Goletta, but what was to prevent its being carried a couple of miles eastwards, to Rades, a village, which, like the town of Goletta, is built on the shores of the Mediterranean? A concession was demanded for a French line from Tunis to Rades. As a proof of being in

earnest, the Bey was only allowed twenty-four hours to reply. The proposal was so contrary to the spirit of the original concession to the English company, that the Bey summoned up courage to reject it, and M. Roustan was obliged to withdraw his objection to the transfer to Signor Rubattino, because it was found out that after all the Bey's consent was not a *sine quâ non*. The pressure now brought to bear on the Bey by M. Roustan and his satellites was almost unbearable. Before the end of August they obtained concessions for a harbour in the Tunis lake (which was to cost an enormous sum, and presented no other advantages than a probability of causing epidemic fever during its construction, and a tolerable certainty of killing Goletta and the Rubattino railway when completed), as well as for railways to Bizerta and Susa. It is generally believed that M. Roustan also received a formal promise that all concessions for public works in the Regency should henceforth be first offered to French capitalists.* Affairs remained in this unsatisfactory state till December, when we heard rumours of troops being massed on the frontiers. M. Roustan reassured the Bey with

* This surmise now turns out to have been correct. The lucky monopolists were none other than the Société Bône-Gulema, represented by M. Géry.

an official denial, but his words were apparently belied by the appearance of a French squadron at Goletta.

At this very moment M. Léon Renaud, Deputy to the French parliament, arrived in Tunis. It was at once rumoured that he was intrusted with a special mission to the Bey, that he was an emissary of M. Gambetta, and that he was come to bring matters to a crisis with the Italians. These reports emanated chiefly from the Musallis and M. Roustan's personal friends, and when M. Renaud took up his abode at the French Residency, the uninitiated made up their minds that Tunis was on the eve of great events. M. Roustan at once presented M. Renaud to the Prime Minister, and it soon became everybody's secret that the cut-and-dried draft of a concession had been presented to the Bey for signature. The Bey became very much perturbed, and at once communicated with the representatives of Italy and England. There was certainly some ground for this alarm, as the projected Credit Foncier of M. Renaud combined in itself the *imperium in imperio* of the Italian Agricultural Company, and the ambiguity of the De Sancy cessions. In a word, M. Renaud asked for an exclusive permission to issue bank-notes to the value of all sums advanced by him as loans in

the country, and required the Government to give a guarantee "in order that the bank should lose nothing by the loans it contracted." I have the draft *in extenso* before me, but everything is summed up in these words. M. G ery had already got a promise of all the railways, and M. Renaud wanted a promise of every financial operation present and to come. The Bey himself suggested the means of escape. From the dusty archives of the Bardo were hunted up the protests which M. De Botmiliau had induced all the *corps consulaire* to make against the far less innocuous English bank seven years before. On the 23d May 1873, the French Charg  d'Affaires had declared that a permission granted to Messrs. Ranking of London to issue bank-notes was illegal, "comme exposant le pays   des sinistres consequences trop faciles   pr voir," and on the 23d of December 1880, the same functionary asked the same Government not only to allow M. Renaud to issue bank-notes to a practically unlimited amount, but to guarantee him against all ultimate loss! When M. Renaud went next day to receive an answer, the Bey put the protests into his hands and said he would act according to the advice contained in them, and refused to sign the draft M. Renaud had been good enough to prepare for him. The Bey asked his secretary to return the original scheme

to M. Renaud. "Keep it, Highness," answered the Deputy of Corbeil (I quote the *Gaulois*), "I will leave you my project. Think over it, and although you refuse it now, you will some day, after useless struggle, accept it. You will have once more to acknowledge the preponderating influence of France, but you will have lost all claims to her gratitude!" The parting interview with Mustapha was even more stormy, but, to be just to M. Renaud, it is not historically true that he threatened the minister with hanging as soon as the French troops got into Tunis, if he did not induce the Bey to sign the Credit Foncier Concession. M. Renaud's attempt to centralise Tunisian finance ignominiously failed, and he went away in a rage.*

* Appendix M.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ACUTE STAGE OF TUNISIAN POLITICS.

SIGNOR MACCIO opened his campaign of 1881 with three strategic movements. He made his peace with Mustapha, and gave the weak but willing Prime Minister the questionable benefit of his advice and counsel; he persuaded the Bey to send the son of his predecessor to meet the King of Italy at Palermo, and he gave considerable encouragement to the *Mostakel*, an Arabic journal which now began mysteriously to appear at Cagliari in Sardinia. On the 7th January, Prince Heussein, accompanied by Signor Maccio and a representative deputation from the Italian colony, embarked for Sicily on board the Italian despatch boat, "Stafetta." Ten days later they returned to Tunis completely satisfied with the result of their mission. The king had assured Prince Heussein that Tunis could always reckon on the countenance and support of Italy, and had invested him with the grand cordon of the order of SS. Maurice and Lazare. In addition

to the flattering tale told by the prince, the hints dropped by Signor Maccio were eminently calculated to raise hopes of the most fallacious description.

Although it has never been proved that Signor Maccio actually founded the *Mostakel*, his connection with it did not very long remain a secret. Signor Pestalozza, the interpreter of the Italian Consulate-General at Tunis, had a short time before brought from Syria two Copts named Zainzain and Bokhos, and these two worthies commenced to print a patriotic journal, the main feature of which was an Arabic hotchpotch of everything unkind which had been written about France in Europe during the few days preceding its appearance. Signor Pestalozza supplied some of the articles, and was trusting enough to leave his MSS. in the hands of General Musalli's compatriots. The *Mostakel* contained few original ideas, and certainly nothing to excite the smallest religious enthusiasm, but it was not pleasant for the French to have a weekly budget of their failings spread broadcast all over Algeria. They had a fair enough grievance against both Signor Maccio and his injudicious subordinate, but they tried to make a mountain out of the mole-hill. Europe was asked to believe in sober seriousness, that this insignificant Sardinian leaflet was calculated to excite a religious war against the Christians

from Tangiers to Baghdad. The *Mostakel* did not advance the Italian cause a jot, but it served to fan the flame which the success of Signor Rubattino had kindled, and to confirm the suspicions which the pilgrimage to Palermo had excited. When M. Roustan heard his Arab servants laughing over the accounts of his visits to Madame Musalli and his dinner-parties at Mustapha's, he knew to whom he owed the annoyance and acted accordingly. The French troops had not got to Tunis before M. De Sancy awoke M. Roustan one morning to say that Zainzain had offered to tell the secrets of the *Mostakel* for a consideration, while Bokhos repaired to Paris to make the best bargain he could for Signor Pestalozza's MSS. A short time afterwards he sold his *dossier* to a patriotic banker, and it was finally published in the *Paris* newspaper, but contained nothing beyond the veriest bathos. The only result of this department of Signor Maccio's diplomacy was to irritate the French, to put money into the pockets of two Levantine adventurers, and to materially increase for three days the sale of a Parisian evening journal.

M. Roustan was not inactive during his opponent's absence in Sicily. By his advice the parties interested in Tunisian commercial development, liberally subventioned a large section of the French

press, and the *Agence Havas* began to throw out *ballons d'essai*. As early as the 12th January the following telegram was circulated in Tunis:—

“PARIS, 11th January.”

“A letter from Algiers to the Havas Agency proves that a French Protectorate over Tunis is indispensable for the security of the Algerian frontier. France seeks no annexion, but she will never allow a rival influence to be established there.”

The *Temps*, commenting on this letter, indicates the services rendered by France to Tunis, asserts that an uninterrupted protectorate of fifty years constitutes *ipso facto* a permanent protectorate, and concludes with these words,—“He who touches Tunis touches France!” On the 31st January M. Roustan had a long interview with Muhamed es Sadek. Almost as soon as they were seated the French *Chargé d’Affaires* made a most astounding announcement to the Bey. “Mustapha,” said M. Roustan, “has been intriguing at Constantinople to succeed you. He has sent £25,000 to Sheikh Zafar, the Sultan’s *imám*, to get the succession altered, but the Sultan was so displeased with the proposal that he has decided to dethrone you in favour of your arch-enemy Kheir-ed-Din. France, your ancient ally, will protect you; are you pre-

pared to accept her protection?" The Bey knew the first part of the statement was a diplomatic falsehood, and so doubted the whole. After a lengthy conversation he finally declined to alter the *status quo*. "We are all in the hands of God," he said, "and if force is to overcome right and justice, all I can do is to leave my fate and that of Tunis to Him."

England was not, however, destined to be a mere spectator of the game of chess between the French and Italian *consuls de combat*. The Enfida case soon threatened to make her also one of the parties to the dispute. The story of this fresh phase of the Tunisian question can be told in few words.

A British subject, Mr. Levy, had possessed, and successfully cultivated for many years, a large estate on the coast of the regency of Tunis, called the *Suyah*. Europeans holding land in this country, as in all others, are amenable in transactions concerning it to the *lex loci*, which, in this particular instance, is the Muhammedan code. One of the best known and most frequently practised principles of that law is called *shoofâ*, or pre-emption, which may be shortly described as the right of a partner or neighbour to acquire any property sold in which he has a share, or which is contiguous

to his own estate, on paying down the purchase money agreed on by the original vendee. This right is as frequently resorted to through the local courts at Tunis by European settlers as by Arab proprietors. General Kheir-ed-Din was the owner of a very important domain bordering on Mr. Levy's estates, and even surrounding a portion of his lands, which property is known as the Enfida. During the autumn of 1880 Mr. Levy entered into negotiations for its purchase, and obtained promises of support from his friends to raise the required capital. Suddenly the news reached Tunis that Kheir-ed-Din had sold his estate to the Société Marseillaise, the French financial company which had already succeeded M. De Sancy at Sidi Tabet for a large sum, but on the express condition that the sale was to be effected according to Muhammedan law. Mr. Levy then determined to invoke his right of *shoofâ*, and no sooner had the Société Marseillaise completed the formalities of purchase (which they did in the manner prescribed by the law and immemorial custom of Tunis) than he made the requisite declarations, and was, with the sanction of the *cadi*, placed in possession of the Enfida. The original purchasers were next obliged by the requirements of Muhammedan law to sue Mr. Levy before the *cadi* to test the validity

of his right, and so conscious were they of this, that they had actually left a zone of land, one mètre in width, all round the estate still the property of Kheir-ed-Din, in order to place Mr. Levy out of the category of contiguous neighbours. It, however, transpired that this fiction must ignominiously fail on account of Mr. Levy possessing gardens within the Eufida, and a *coup d'état* was hastily resolved on by M. Roustan.

Mr. Levy was put in possession on the 12th January. On the following day, he left his agents in a house on the estate called the Dar-el-Bey, and furnished them with a written authority to hold it on his behalf. He then proceeded to plant trees on different parts of the estate, plough fields, and perform other acts required by law of an exerciser of pre-emption in possession. During his absence the agent of the French Company arrived, accompanied by M. Roustan's chancellor, a M. Robin, and an armed dragoman. In vain Mr. Levy's agents protested, and exhibited their authority, which had been duly executed by Arab notaries; they were forcibly ejected from the house. Fortunately, however, for Mr. Levy, the Arab notaries who accompanied the French party refused to complete the deeds of sale, on account of Mr. Levy having legally exercised pre-emption, and this appears to

have induced M. Robin to hesitate before extending his system of forcible ejections to the workmen occupying for Mr. Levy the other portions of the estate. Mr. Reade, the British Agent and Consul-General, entered a vigorous protest against the conduct of M. Roustan, which had excited universal indignation throughout the whole European colony. This feeling soon extended itself to the Tunisian Government and its subjects, for M. Roustan hastened to announce that he regarded the Enfida also as a French property, and would admit of no interference on the part of the local courts, or no application of the local law. Mr. Levy appealed for aid to Lord Granville, and M. Roustan brought two additional French ships of war to intimidate the Bey in case of need, as well as to exercise a salutary influence on the *cadi* if he endeavoured to assert his legal authority. As soon as the facts became known in England, the English press warmly and unanimously advocated Mr. Levy's appeal for assistance, and Mr. Montague Guest, M.P., in the House of Commons, and the Earl De la Warr in the House of Lords, called the attention of the Government to the conduct of M. Roustan, and the necessity of supporting the protest of Mr. Reade. Communications passed between the two Governments, and on the 7th February

Sir Charles Dilke informed the House of Commons "that the English and French Governments had agreed that the question should be dealt with by the local tribunals, under whose jurisdiction the matter properly comes," and Lord Granville made a similar statement in the House of Lords. Both Mr. Guest and Lord De la Warr had recently visited Tunis; they were both aware of the system of terrorism pursued by the French representative towards the Bey; and they had both carefully inquired into the merits of this particular case. On it being announced that the French ironclads had been sent to Tunis, Mr. Guest energetically remonstrated, and two British ships were also sent there. The French vessels were immediately withdrawn, and the "Thunderer" and "Decoy" returned to Malta. Mr. Levy was for the time being left in possession of the property, and his final discomfiture postponed to a more convenient season.

The Enfida dispute attracted great attention in Italy, and it was hoped that by adopting some common course of action the realisation of M. Renaud's vengeance might be averted. The unreasonable conduct of Signor Maccio very soon placed any such combination out of the question. His next quarrel with the French was the "straw which broke the camel's back," and, as luck would

have it, the Italians were entirely in the wrong. Ten years before the Bey of Tunis granted to Messrs. Tolmé and Mancardi the concession for a railway line to Hammám-el-Lif. Mr. Tolmé was dead, and Mr. Mancardi had quitted Tunis eight years before. The Rubattino Company, in its first flush of victory, got a transfer of his rights from Mr. Mancardi, but even he had lost the original grant. According to the spirit of the cession itself, it had long since ceased to have effect, and no reasonable man would ever have thought of reviving it. As soon as Signor Maccio learned that the French railway to Susa was to pass through Hammám-el-Lif, he conceived the notion of gaining one more advantage by stopping the works on the plea of an infringement of the Mancardi grant. To this end the dead and buried concession was brought forward, and in consequence of a vigorous protest from Signor Maccio, the Bey was induced to suspend further progress pending a search for the missing title-deed. Then, and then only, did M. Roustan determine to furnish the Government with some more tangible pretext for promptly extinguishing Italy and Signor Maccio, and at the same time putting the French political and commercial *prépondérance naturelle* at Tunis beyond the possibility of further cavil.

The consul for the Bey of Tunis at Bone was one Joseph Allegro. His father had held the same post before him, and while eating Tunisian salt, had actually proposed in writing to raise such an insurrection as would amply justify a French invasion and annexation of the country. The young Allegro was the offspring of an Arab mother, and his life had been chiefly spent amongst the half-savage tribes of the Algerian frontier. Sidi Yusef Ben Ali (M. Allegro has since definitely assumed this name on openly professing the Moslem faith) had for years dealt almost professionally in border raids, and was equally clever either at exciting them or suppressing them. Before the arrival of M. Roustan the abilities of Yusef Ben Ali were almost hidden under a bushel, although the figure of his mother, in orthodox veil and *haïck*, waiting for the arrears of her son's pay at the door of the Bey's treasurer, was a familiar feature to every one frequenting the Bardo palace. There was another kindred spirit still nearer to the border: M. Panariello at La Galle, knew perhaps even more about the Khamir tribesmen than Yusef Ben Ali. He was their factor, broker, general agent, and trusted friend on the coast, and had grown rich in buying their cork, wool, and grain, and selling them guns, powder, and shot in return. Although

an Italian by birth, a well-distributed cross of the Legion of Honour had induced M. Panariello to link his fortunes with those of the Republic in general and the *Société Transatlantique* in particular. I have seen both these gentlemen several times since the real nature of the *chasse aux Khamirs* has become self-evident, and they both laugh very heartily over the deception practised. They have, however, no sympathy for each other. M. Panariello points out triumphantly that Yusef Ben Ali thought it prudent never to go amongst the Khamirs since he was appointed their Governor, while Yusef Ben Ali says that M. Panariello never ventures outside La Galle without an escort. It was to these humble but devoted friends that M. Roustan addressed himself, when the acute stage of Tunisian politics at length arrived.

I have in a former chapter spoken of the Khamirs and other tribes which inhabit the neighbourhood of the Algerian frontier. The boundary itself is tolerably well defined by a line of hills running southwards from Tabarca. The Arabs on the eastern slope of the range are subjects of the Bey of Tunis, those on the western owe allegiance to the French Republic. "I really cannot say," said M. Panariello, "when I was at La Galle in September 1881, which of the two gives the most

trouble. The Algerian Arabs are generally the thieves, and the Tunisian the receivers; they remain good friends as long as they are robbing third parties, and only quarrel when it comes to a division of the spoil. These border squabbles have occurred over and over again any time these thirty years, and nobody cared about them, *till*," he added, "*it was convenient to do so.*" If the Tunisian Arabs have sometimes been the aggressors, scores of cases are on record in which the Algerians have wantonly violated Tunisian territory, but the Bey of Tunis never thought of invading Algeria "for the protection of *his* frontier," any more than France could justify the occupation of Belgium by a case of cattle-lifting having occasioned loss to some French subjects on the confines of that kingdom.

While Sidi Yusef and M. Panariello were arranging for an opportune fracas on the borders, M. Roustan was very active at Tunis. Although his own *entourage* never contained a single Frenchman, he set in motion a purely legendary *côterie* styling itself the French colony. Before the outbreak of hostilities, there were not more than a score of French residents of position and respectability in Tunis, and yet throughout all the recent events, the utterances of half-a-dozen individuals, headed

by the deputy or representative, have been treated in Europe as if they expressed the wishes, ideas, and political feelings of some large and influential body of men, having a peculiar knowledge of the difficulties of the situation, and the largest, if not the only, stake in the future of the country. About the 20th March an Address was got up by "the colony," and presented with a silver cup to M. Roustan. The former took the extraordinary shape of a sweeping bill of indictment against the Bey of Tunis. On its publication in Europe by the good offices of the *Agence Havas*, Muhamed es Sadek (who still believed in a Christian sense of justice and the amity of nations) hoped to counteract its effect by a letter to M. Roustan, of which copies were submitted to the agents of the "friendly powers."

"Letter of his Highness the Bey to M. Roustan, Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires of France."

"It is now some time that the press of Europe occupies itself of Tunis, and our Government has not deemed it advisable to pay great attention to the most contradictory news published in different countries. The Algerian press, more particularly, has not spared the most lively attacks against Tunisian administration and its functionaries. It has gone so far as to assert that the frequent quarrels which arise between the Arabs on the frontier were, if not the work of

our Government, certainly rendered possible by our indifference *vis-à-vis* of the culprits. Our Government has been able to face without the slightest apprehension, these attacks, being persuaded, as it has always been, that our sentiments of friendship towards France, and the acts by which we have been constantly enabled to manifest them, would have sufficed to justify our Government in the eyes of any one desirous of judging the real situation with impartiality. But now a manifestation of a most exceptional character has taken place, and our Government, fearing that a prolonged silence might misguide public opinion on the matter, has considered that it would be betraying its duty if it did not call the attention of the Government of the Republic to the real state of affairs at Tunis. In fact, by an address which has been officially handed to you, and of which nobody here imagines the contents, a great part of the French colony deplors that its interests are offended, that its rights of property are not respected, that personal security is compromised, and that, finally, the engagements contracted by the Tunisian administration with French subjects are not observed. It therefore asks that the Government of the Republic should be informed of the real state of affairs, and that ready measures, and if need be, energetic ones, should be taken to put an end to the inconvenience of such a state of affairs.

“Nothing is easier than to refute one by one all these accusations. No one, in fact, could contend that French citizens do not possess in perfect tranquillity in the Regency their landed property just as is the case with the subjects of every other power. Every one can verify in the clearest way possible that the complete absence of any criminal attempts prove how far the personal safety of foreigners in general run no risk. The countenance which our Government has always given to every enterprise in which Frenchmen are interested attests its desire scrupulously to maintain the engagements

taken. In its situation with France and her representatives, our Government believes to have constantly demonstrated its desire to keep into good account the friendship of a powerful and respected neighbour, but it has likewise proved the importance which it attaches to this friendship, forwarding with marked deference, and often anticipating, its desires.

“The proof lies precisely in the innumerable undertakings accorded to Frenchmen, and the flourishing conditions of which exclude completely the assertion that efforts have been made to overcome the assertion of our Government. It is with pain that we enter into all these details, which we would have esteemed it useless to enumerate, had it not been for the act of public accusation which aims at discrediting our Government in the face of the French Cabinet, and to justify the ill-feeling of France. A step so unjustifiable on the part of the French colonists can only, however, offer to our Government the occasion to declare, as it now does, its sentiments, and to request the French Government itself to appreciate its conduct and to restore that tranquillity which, in the interests of all, it considers indispensable.

“Persuaded as it is of having never offended international obligations with the Government of the Republic, our Government ardently desires that its good intentions should not be ignored by anybody, and much the less misstated in a public document. It is in confining ourselves to the same principles, which have been the constant rule of our conduct, that we consider in their just value the French interests existing in this country. And it is in the presence of so undeserved an accusation, which aims at compromising our Government in the eyes of that of France, that we submit this to the equitable minds of the enlightened men who direct the affairs of state of the powerful French nation, our neighbour, and we cannot doubt that a conscientious and loyal appreciation of the situation will give us perfect justice.

We trust that the Government of the Republic will not refuse us that mark of sympathy in the interest of strict justice, giving us on this occasion a fresh proof of the friendly dispositions which have always been shown us, and for which we feel truly grateful. We pray you, M. le Chargé d'Affaires, to communicate with your usual benevolence this letter to your Government.—*Written on the 24 Rabi Ettani 1298, March 24, 1881.* MUHAMED ES SADEK."

Seven days after M. Roustan received the Bey's letter, some sort of disturbance took place on the frontier, and the hitherto unknown Khamírs suddenly became famous throughout Europe. What really happened on the eventful 30th March near the confines of Khamír-land nobody will probably ever know exactly until we have the pleasure of reading the autobiography of either Yusef Ben Ali or M. Panariello. Fate unexpectedly came to M. Roustan's aid, and while a few Khamír horrors were being hastily got together, Colonel Flatters perished with his mission in a real massacre far away in the Sahara. The two events became hopelessly confused, Colonel Flatters and the Khamírs were at once bracketed together under the common head of "Horrible Outrages" (*Observer*, April 3d, 1881), and everybody made up their minds that the "drapeau menacé de la France" (M. Roustan's speech to the French "colony," March 20th) must be promptly

and efficiently avenged. While the newsboards of London and Paris were covered with the legends, "French Expedition against Tunis," "Daring Raids of Tunisian Tribes," and "Continued Fighting on the Algerian Frontier," the Bey of Tunis was in blissful ignorance of what had taken place. As soon as he knew his danger through the medium of foreign telegrams, he immediately despatched one of his most trusted servants at the head of a small force to investigate into the real or imaginary offences of the Khamírs. Meanwhile the Havas Agency prosecuted its campaign with almost feverish activity, and between the 1st and 4th April the Parisian press was plentifully supplied with a series of fictitious but ferocious combats. Some of these messages are really inimitable, *e.g.*, in a telegram of the 1st April we read: "A Tunisian Caid has collected about 3000 men of the Kegla tribe (?) and led them to Sidi Diamessi (?) on the frontier, for the purpose of surprising, on the pretext of a conference, the French commandant in the Soukharas district. The latter, however, having been forewarned of the Caid's intentions, succeeded in effecting his retreat." Here is another specimen: "According to intelligence just received, numerous Tunisian subjects have left Tunis to join the Khamírs. A case containing 100 kilogrammes of *ball* cart-

ridges, sent to the Khamírs by Tunisian Jews, has been seized by the administration of the Tunis Railway." The third is a still greater geographical puzzle than the others, but even this was swallowed with the rest : " It is rumoured that on the Tunisian terms being rejected, the Bey has appealed to Italy. The Khamírs are endeavouring to obstruct the road to Beja, to prevent French occupation. The Governor of Beja has demanded reinforcements from Tunis, being in fear that *his* town would be occupied by the marauders and shelled by the French!"

Within a week M. Jules Ferry had resolved to avoid *an interpellation on the part of M. Léon Renaud*, by the Government deciding to chastise the Khamírs on Tunisian soil. Not only was Tunis to be invaded by a French army, but M. Saint-Hilaire assured the representatives of foreign powers at Paris, in the most formal manner, that "the operations about to commence on the border-land between Algeria and Tunis are meant solely to put an end to the constant inroads of the frontier clans into Algerian territory, and that the independence of the Bey and the integrity of his territory were not in any way threatened." This declaration was made with a full knowledge of the fact that M. Roustan had already endeavoured to coerce the

Bey several times into accepting the "protectorate," and will ever remain as a lasting blemish on the diplomatic integrity of M. Saint-Hilaire. The announcement of this disguised war against Tunis was very differently received in Italy and in England. Lord Granville believed "in the single-mindedness and thorough honesty of M. Saint-Hilaire," and even credited the Khamír raids. He was good enough to advise the Bey to co-operate against the Khamírs, or in other words, to assist in the destruction of a portion of his own subjects by foreign troops on his own soil, and upon the flimsiest and most preposterous of pretexts. Italy indulged in tall talk, overturned her ministers, and did nothing at all. We will leave General Farre at Paris busily engaged in picking up stray battalions for the coming expedition, struggling feebly with the confusion worse confounded of the hospital and commissariat services, and driving a bargain for superseding the ordinary transport ships by the *flotilla* of the Société Transatlantique, and return to Tunis.

CHAPTER XV.

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

ON the 5th of April the Bey received two important communications. The first was the report of General Younes el Dzeri and Colonel Allela Jauini as to what had really happened amongst the Khamírs, and the second was a formal announcement by M. Roustan of the coming invasion.* As might have been expected, the alleged violation of Algerian territory turned out to be more than problematical, and the Khamírs were ready and willing to submit unreservedly to their sovereign's decision. Two days later M. Roustan called at the palace, and had a long interview with the Bey. "I am astonished," said Muhamed es Sadek, "at the message you bring me. I have already taken energetic measures to ensure tranquillity on the frontier, and yet you say my country is to be occupied without even asking me to redress any grievances you may have to complain of? Your Government can never contemplate

* Appendix N.

such a step. If I am so treated I shall protest as a vassal of the Sultan, and you alone will be responsible for whatever may happen. This responsibility will be greater because you will attack me without even a notice of the commencement of hostilities." It is not surprising that even M. Roustan found some difficulty in answering such cogent reasoning as this. He professed to be almost convinced, and promised to telegraph the substance of the Bey's remarks to Paris. The next day M. Roustan forwarded to the Palace M. Saint-Hilaire's reply:—

April 7th.—M. Roustan to the Bey.

In consequence of the communications I have lately received from your Highness's Government respecting the military preparations now going on in France and Algeria with a view of repressing the attacks of the frontier tribes, I have forwarded to my Government the observations addressed to me by your Highness on the subject. I have just received the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to these communications, and at once transmit the annexed copy to your Highness.

April 7th.—M. Saint-Hilaire to M. Roustan. (Telegram.)

I have received your telegrams respecting the explanations desired by the Bey. Be good enough to declare to His Highness that we appreciate the faithful friendship of which he has so often assured us, and of which we have now to ask for tangible proofs. A serious peril threatens the integrity of our territory and the safety of the inhabitants living there under the protection of our laws. That peril springs from

the insubordinate tribes occupying a portion of the Bey's state, and against whom an imperative duty of legitimate defence forces us to act with vigour. We cannot unfortunately reckon on the Bey's authority to reduce these tribes, with the requisite energy and promptitude, to a state of submission rendering them henceforth harmless ; but we have a right to count on the Bey's military forces to assist us in the work of necessary repression. Our generals consequently receive orders to come to a friendly understanding with the officers of the Tunisian troops, and to give them notice of the moment when the exigencies of strategic movements will induce them *to borrow for their operations Tunisian territory either near La Calle or in the Medjerdah Valley*. It is as allies and auxiliaries of the Bey's sovereign authority that the French soldiers will prosecute their march. It is also as allies and auxiliaries that we hope to meet the Tunisian soldiers with the reinforcement with which we intend definitively to punish the misdeeds of the common enemies of the Bey and ourselves.

On receipt of these communications a council of state was at once convened. The Bey sent an urgent message to ask Mr. Reade to come to the Bardo, which was immediately complied with. "What am I to do?" asked Muhamed es Sadek. "M. Roustan has, I fear, got me here" (clasping his throat). Mr. Reade strongly urged on the Bey the necessity of proving his ability to preserve order by at once sending an army to the frontier under the command of the heir-apparent, in order to obviate all further ground of complaint on the part of France. The

Bey demurred on the plea of an empty treasury, but as the council supported the plan proposed, the Government cashier offered to advance the necessary funds. A week later Ali Bey started for the frontier with several thousand men. From this moment the Bey seemed to take the whole direction of affairs into his own hands, and even Mustapha lost all real influence with him. The council sat for several hours in the Kasr-es-Said Palace, and the Bey himself dictated a long telegraphic despatch to the Sultan, and personally supervised the draft of the following letter to M. Roustan :—

April 9th.—Muhamed es Sadek to M. Roustan.

We have received your letter of April 7th, 1881, by which you inform us that the Government of the Republic has resolved on inflicting a chastisement on some of the Tunisian tribes. We are surprised at such a decision being taken by a friendly government with which we have always striven to maintain the best relations and retain its friendship, but which in turn treats us with measures of this kind, which give us much pain. In the affair now engaging our attention we have hitherto seen only petty incidents customary with border tribes, and frequently belonging to the same state. Immediately on learning the existence of troubles in the direction of our frontiers, we hastened to send to the spot a commissioner, accompanied by a troop of horse. From the reports addressed to us by that delegate we became certain that tranquillity prevails in that direction, and that those tribes are uneasy rather as to their own safety, owing to the

military movements they notice on French territory, of which they fancy themselves the object. However this may be, the troops we have just sent, and who will soon be followed by others, are more than sufficient to maintain permanent order and tranquillity. In the event of its being proved that some of our tribes have committed misdeeds, our delegate has the power of seizing the culprits and punishing them according to their crimes. Our having taken these measures should demonstrate to your Government the efforts we are constantly making in this matter for the purpose of reassuring the Government of the Republic as to what might disturb the tranquillity of Algeria. We cherish a hope that the French Government will not carry out its intentions. If, despite our assurances, it persists in that decision, we are bound at once to apprise it, that such a determination would bring us into discredit amongst our own population and Foreign States, and might raise other complications and dangers not at this moment to be foreseen. Moreover the entry of French troops on Tunisian territory would constitute a violation of our sovereign rights and would prejudice the interests of foreign governments in our country, and which are placed under our charge. It would, above all, constitute a violation of the rights of the Sublime Porte. From all the foregoing considerations, we inform you that we can in no way accept or accord the execution of the measure contemplated by your Government, and consisting of the entry of French troops on our territory. In case of that execution being effected against our will we hold the Government of the French Republic responsible for all the consequences which might result.

A circular and note were also prepared and transmitted simultaneously to the different members of the *corps consulaire*.

April 9th.—Muhamed es Sadek to the Foreign Representatives at Tunis.

The Chargé d'Affaires of France has brought a complaint against the Khamírs who belong to our tribes. Correspondence having passed between that officer and our Government, we have thought it right to deliver to you herein enclosed a copy of these notes. As the entry of troops on our territory is an infringement of our rights and of that of the Sublime Porte, we have replied to M. Roustan, and written to the five Great Powers letters, copies of which are also enclosed. We bring this to your knowledge for your information and that of your Government, in order that you may be conversant with the situation.

The Bey's Note.

Our attention has recently been called to the conflicts which have taken place between the Tunisian and the neighbouring Algerian tribes near the Rekba, in which thefts and other crimes have been committed on both sides. We at once sent high officials to the spot with the mission of conferring with the French delegate and arranging these affairs after the manner of settlement in use between us in such matters. An understanding was not effected, and finally the Algerian delegate twice abstained from appearing at the conference on the appointed day, on the pretext that he was unwell and had no instructions. During this time other isolated acts of the same kind took place between individual members of the Tunisian tribe of the Khamírs and some individual members of the Algerian tribes—acts which are common among neighbouring clans, even when they belong to the same State.

As soon as news of the latter acts reached us, we sent an officer with a party of cavalry to make inquiries about them, to restore order, and prevent our tribes from committing acts

of violence against their neighbours, even in case the latter had commenced the aggression. Our delegate has assured us that our tribes have done as we requested, and that order has not again been disturbed. Not content with that single measure, we have sent our Minister of War at the head of an expeditionary column, composed of regular troops and cavalry. We have also decided on sending our brother, Sidi Ali Bey, with another column, which is in process of mobilisation, with the object of definitively securing tranquillity in those parts and of settling the respective claims. Meanwhile, we receive the letter, a copy of which you will find enclosed, by which the French Chargé d'Affaires announces to us that the Government of the Republic has decided on chastising some Tnnisian tribes. In the reply we have sent to him, and of which you will also find a copy enclosed, we pointed out to the French Chargé d'Affaires that we had already taken the needful measures with regard to our tribes. We have at the same time protested against the eventual entry of French troops on our territory, which is considered by us as a violation of our rights and of those of the Ottoman Empire, of which Tunis forms an integral part. We have also made to the Sublime Porte a detailed report of all that has passed, in order to free ourselves from responsibility in regard to it. The interests of foreigners, subjects of the European Powers at Tunis, being bound up with those of the Regency, we have deemed it right to address ourselves to you, as well as your colleagues, representatives of the Great Powers, requesting you to inform your respective Governments on the situation. We appeal to their well-known sentiments of justice and equity, that they may aid us with a view to protecting our rights and those of the Ottoman Empire. We beg them likewise to put an end to acts and menaces which would result in dangers for which we decline all responsibility.

On the 13th April the Bey received a long cipher telegram from the Sultan, expressing the entire satisfaction of the Porte at the steps already taken as regards the Khamírs, and urging the Tunisian Government to maintain the position it had assumed. Meanwhile the Cairoli Cabinet fell in consequence of a vote of want of confidence (presumably recorded by reason of its not sufficiently energetic policy concerning Tunis), but no other political combination was found capable of replacing it. The Bey continued to preserve the attitude taken up in his protests, and the French press divided its attention between Tunisian enormities and General Farre's difficulties in getting together the troops necessary to punish them.

The foreign representatives met on the 12th April in solemn conclave at the French Consulate, to consider the precautions necessary for the preservation of order in the capital, and securing the safety of the European colonists throughout the country. M. Roustan prudently said nothing, but left it to his warm adherent, M. Theodorovich, the Austrian Consul, to suggest that they should collectively hold the Bey responsible for all eventualities. As this measure was not agreed to, the meeting broke up in confusion.

Next morning crowds of natives and Europeans

repaired to the Bardo Palace to witness the start of the Tunisian army under the command of Ali Bey. The men were all fairly well equipped and armed, and it was a matter of general astonishment that so much had been done in the six days which had intervened since the Bey decided on the expedition. I shall describe in detail the Tunisian camp when I come to speak of the Khamír country, but it seemed to me there was hardly one of the spectators forming part of the enthusiastic crowd which witnessed the departure of the little force, who did not join in the cries of "May God give you success and bring you back in safety," and hope that the Bey's promptitude would obviate all necessity for the violation of his territory. The echoes of the salutes which announced the setting-out of the heir-apparent for the frontiers had hardly died away when M. Roustan arrived at the Kasr-es-Said Palace and sought an audience of the Bey. The French Chargé d'Affaires said that he had come to ask if the Bey intended to co-operate with the invading force and attack the Khamírs in the rear? Muhamed es Sadek replied that "he was ready to cut off his arm to maintain his old friendship with France, but that he could never be a party to exciting an inevitable insurrection in the country, by joining the French in a war on his

own subjects." He concluded with these words, "You yourself, as well as your friends, tell me that you are my only sincere well-wisher. If this is so, give me a proof of it, and testify to your Government what you really know about the Khamirs and the measures I have taken to give you any satisfaction that may be asked for." "I will do so immediately," said M. Roustan, as he took his departure.

On the following day the Havas telegram stated that a gunboat belonging to the French fleet had been fired on from the Tabarca forts, and soon after its receipt the interpreter Sumaripa was sent to inform the Bey that "France was determined to obtain satisfaction for the insult, and uphold the honour of her flag." Messengers were at once despatched to the spot, and it was ascertained that the affront consisted entirely in the Governor having refused permission to the crews of some French boats "to land and march across the mountains into Algeria."

Day after day passed away, and the expected move forward was still delayed. The activity of M. Roustan's agents was redoubled. General Musalli and the Bey's physician, Mascaro, undertook to convince the refractory Prince himself, while Sumaripa and the future "master-of-the-

mint" Volterra, took charge of the Prime Minister. As soon as each successive post brought its burden of newspapers, the most warlike and menacing extracts were translated into Arabic and judiciously administered to the inmates of Kasr-es-Said, while every conceivable argument that ingenuity could suggest was employed to induce them to abandon the logically unassailable position they had almost spontaneously assumed. These efforts were seconded by official correspondence couched in increasingly angry language, but the Bey showed no signs of yielding and gained an advantage over M. Roustan in each calm and dignified reply. The letters exchanged on the 15th April have never yet been published.

M. Roustan to the Bey.

TUNIS, April 15th.

HIGHNESS,—The Government of the Republic has learned with infinite pain, that I have not been fortunate enough to secure your co-operation in the repression of the Khamirs, and the operations necessary to prevent the recurrence of disorders on the frontier. Nevertheless, it retains its conviction that energetic action is necessary.

In the presence of so grave a difference of opinion (of which the consequences may be still graver), I venture to renew my demands with that "respectueuse liberté" which your condescension towards me alone can justify. I cannot believe the decision arrived at is final, in spite of the declaration made to me by your Highness, and repeated yesterday by the Prime Minister to my interpreter (Sumaripa).

The departure of the camp yesterday morning affords a new proof in support of my arguments, and demonstrates conclusively that the present situation is wholly irrational. Amongst the troops which have set out under the command of Ali Bey, and the crowd which witnessed their departure, there was neither a soldier nor a spectator, who believed that they were marching against the Khamirs and *not* against the French. This idea is not confined entirely to the natives ; it is shared in by a great number of Europeans, as can be proved by the current of general public opinion since yesterday (*sic*).

I am aware that all this is entirely at variance with the wishes of your Highness, who has ordered the troops to retire on the approach of the French forces. But will these wise precautions guard against eventualities, which may arise from the exciting influence of people who say they are enemies of France, but are in reality enemies of your Highness? Nobody can say so, and it is this fact which encourages me to entreat your Highness to consult your true interests and trust entirely to the honour and friendship of a Power, the protection of which has never failed either the Hassanite dynasty or the country it rules.

The Bey to M. Roustan (April 18th, 1881).

We have received the letter which you have been good enough to address to us under date 15th April, and we have taken note of its contents. When we explained to you, both verbally and in writing, the reasons which prevent us from consenting to the entry of the French troops into our territory, and the amalgamation of our own army with them in order to co-operate in their movements, we had hoped that you would have been struck by the truth of these reasons on looking into them, and that you would have taken into consideration the serious danger which would result from such co-operation.

We had thought, too, that the statesmen who govern France with such wisdom and equity, would also have understood how legitimate these reasons were, and would have found them just; this belief on our part was founded on the great faith we put in your kind offices as intermediary, knowing that you would place the matter before your Government in its right light, and that you would point out to them the serious consequences which would result from such a step, and which no one could prevent.

Unfortunately for us, your above-mentioned letter destroys all illusion on this matter.

We are therefore compelled, in order to protect the interests which are intrusted to us, and to avoid the disasters which we foresee must befall the inhabitants of our country, to bring again to bear the same reasons which we have already given you both verbally and in writing.

You are aware that we have spared no effort and no diligence in adopting those measures which the circumstances required, and which we put into execution thoroughly and loyally.

How then should we be obliged, by a neighbour (with whom we have been always careful to live in perfect union, and to protect his rights as an ally), to accept a position so little becoming to our dignity, and which would expose the whole population to serious perils, which it would be impossible for us to avert?

We believe that, up to the present, there exists between us no difference of opinion as to the programme which we propose to follow.

This plan is to make the Khamîrs indemnify the victims of their depredations, to punish the authors of known outrages, and to take steps to prevent their recurrence.

Upon these points we are quite agreed, and we will carry them out by the means usually employed in this sort of affair.

The only secondary matter upon which we might differ, is

the manner of executing this plan, but it is clear that once we are agreed upon the principle, the way of carrying it out cannot create a difficulty, especially when there is no question of such a nature as should be hard to solve, as you remark in your own letter.

You are also aware that the army commanded by our brother Ali Bey left last Thursday. The instructions given to its chief are to put himself in communication with the commander of the Algerian forces, in order to beg him to state the claims which the Algerians make against the Khamir or other tribes; to submit, also on his part, the demands of our tribes against the Algerians; to cause those who may be in the right to be indemnified for their just claims; to punish the guilty; and to take such steps as shall appear to us to be necessary to ensure the future tranquillity of the frontier.

Such being our intentions and our determination (as we have already declared to you, and as we have notified officially to the governors of our various provinces), we cannot conceal from you that it is with great sorrow we perceive from your above-mentioned letter, that you do not appear to have much confidence in the steps we propose to take in this affair, and that you have based your opinion on rumours, which, admitting that they were circulated, originated from people who are not only our enemies but those of your Government.

We have, however, assured you, by our letter of the 12th inst., as well as in the interview we had with you last Wednesday, that we would never under any circumstances allow our troops to oppose the French soldiers.

We have especially enjoined the commanders of our army that in the event (which we still hope will not take place) of the French troops entering upon Tunisian territory, in opposition to our wish, that they should cease all operations.

This is all that we can recommend to them.

In case this violation of our territory should cause unforeseen

disorders to arise, we decline all responsibility, and we should find ourselves compelled to renew the declarations contained in our letter of the 8th inst.

We would, nevertheless, beg the Government of the Republic (counting always on its friendship), to leave us our liberty of action and not to cripple it by carrying out the determinations set forth by you, for the very probability of such a proceeding would neutralise the effect of the efforts made by us, and which we have enumerated above.

We hope, therefore, that by means of your valuable and friendly intervention, your Government, recognising the loyalty of our intentions, and the sincerity of the friendship which we heartily desire to maintain with it, will take into consideration the situation, and will help us to arrive at the object which is, according to your own showing, the reciprocal wish of us both.—*Written the 19th gomad El Aoul 1298.*

Early on the 20th April, a messenger arrived at Tunis with a letter from the Governor of Tabarca, informing the Bey that the commander of the forts had been invited on board the French ships, which had arrived on the coast, and strongly urged to surrender the fortress. The instructions sent to Colonel Taib Masmuri contained but four words:—"Yield only to force." These were barely despatched, when a formal demand for the evacuation of Tabarca was made by M. Roustan.

M. Roustan to the Bey (April 20th).

HIGHNESS,—The Government of the Republic is justly astonished at the declarations contained in the letters which

your Highness did me the honour to address to me some days ago, and reiterated in your communications to the foreign representatives at Tunis, which tend to repudiate the responsibility for any disorders which may occur in case the French troops enter on Tunisian territory to chastise the Khamírs. The French Government hoped that this unusual language on the part of a Sovereign was the consequence of your Highness' pre-occupation for the public safety. Unfortunately the conversation of the Prime Minister with different people, and particularly with some members of the Consular Corps, no longer permits any misconception on the subject; but, on the contrary, establishes beyond doubt the threatening character of these declarations. My Government, which could not remain indifferent to this position of affairs, has consequently charged me to declare to your Highness that if any evil befalls our subjects or any other foreigners, it holds your Highness and your Prime Minister exclusively and personally responsible. I also take upon myself to inform your Highness, in the meantime, that the French troops must establish themselves at Tabarca for their operations against the Kroumírs, and to beg your Highness to be good enough to order the withdrawal of the Tunisian troops from that locality, in order to avoid any encounter, according to the promise which your Highness was good enough to make me some days ago. This precaution is the more necessary, as our flag has been received at Tabarca with gunshots by some soldiers in the service of your Highness, as I had the honour to inform you the day before yesterday.

The members of the Council were at once sent for, and after a long discussion drafts were approved for an answer to M. Roustan and another appeal to the foreign representatives.

The Boy to M. Roustan (April 20th).

We have received your letter of to-day, and have considered its contents. We are surprised at your complaint concerning our Prime Minister in the matter of the public safety, which you allege has induced your Government to change its opinion as to our declaration in this respect. Our Prime Minister has done nothing else than repeat our declarations to you and the other foreign representatives, which we resume thus:—We are constantly using our greatest efforts to maintain and ensure by every means in our power, public order and tranquillity. We repeat to you that under ordinary circumstances we can guarantee the safety of all the inhabitants, but in the extraordinary event of the invasion of our territory by French troops, which may produce complications and a general excitement in all parts of the Regency, it would be difficult for us, notwithstanding all the efforts that we continue to put forth, to guarantee the maintenance of order. It seems to us that it would be equally difficult for the Government of any other country to do so if it found itself in a position analogous to ours. In consequence, if public tranquillity is menaced by reason of these circumstances, it is not reasonable to hold the Sovereign of the country responsible. We are, therefore, unable to accept any such responsibility either for our Government or our Prime Minister. You also ask us to cause our troops to evacuate Tabarca, in order to allow of its occupation by French soldiers, and you base your request on our promise to you not to permit our troops to come into collision with the French. We reiterate this promise, and have instructed our officers accordingly, but we can never consent to the violation of our territory. It follows, therefore, that we cannot consent to the occupation of Tabarca demanded by you; but if the French troops enter by force on our territory our soldiers have instructions not to oppose them.

We feel it our duty to tell you at the same time, that as the entry of French troops on Tunisian territory is contrary to our rights and to those of the Ottoman Empire, of which this Regency forms an integral part, we are compelled to renew the declaration we have made to you in our former letters, that we consider the occupation of any part of our territory as a violation of our rights, against which we solemnly protest, at the same time declaring that we can accept no responsibility for the consequences which may ensue from it.

The Bey to the Corps Consulaire (April 21st).

On the 20th of April the Chargé d'Affaires addressed us the letter, a copy of which is now subjoined. This letter relates to a demand we can never accept, as you will see from our answer to the same. You cannot ignore the fact that if the French soldiers enter on Tunisian territory, however large or small may be their number, a danger of very great gravity has been pointed out to you. We have organised and despatched an expedition for the settlement of the dispute; order and tranquillity reign up to this moment throughout the country—a fact which you can yourselves attest—but, if the French troops enter our territory, it is impossible for us to guard against the immense dangers which may result from such an invasion. We are, therefore, compelled to repudiate all responsibility for the consequences of such an event, and to throw it entirely on him who is the cause of it. We inform you of this for the protection of all interests involved, and beg you to acquaint your Government telegraphically of our declaration, which we trust, in its wisdom and equity, will lead it to admit the legality of the motives for the attitude we have assumed, and to bring to the examination of our difficulty the spirit of impartiality with which we know it to be endowed.

CHAPTER XVI.

AN INTERVIEW WITH THE BEY.

THE Bardo Palace, or official abode of the Beys of Tunis, is in reality a walled town, surrounded by a ditch, about two miles from the gates of Tunis. It has evidently existed ever since the time of the Spaniards, for the name is clearly a corruption of the Spanish Pardo—a royal domain just outside Madrid. The Bardo contains a bazaar, a mosque, and a Turkish bath, the three outward and visible signs of all Tunisian cities, both great and small, besides a hall of justice, two audience-chambers, a quadrangle usually known as the Court of Lions, the public offices, a series of dungeons for political offenders, and an enormous *seraglio*, behind the latticed windows of which European gaze has never penetrated. No Bey of Tunis has ever been known to inhabit the palace of his predecessor, and each occupant of the throne has generally built a pleasant place for his residence according to his own devices. Ahmed Bey lived far away in the

Zaghouán plain, while his successor preferred to enjoy the cool breezes of the Mediterranean amongst the palm groves and vineyards of the Marsa under the shade of the Carthage hills. For several years Muhamed es Sadek "avoided the evil eye," by transferring his court to the half-ruinous Bardo enclosure, in which some of his ministers now built convenient dwelling-houses. One of them, Sy Ismael Sunni, purchased a plot of ground in the smiling Manouba plain just outside the Bardo fosse, and erected a four-storied mansion after the fashion of an Italian barrack or English workhouse, which he called inappropriately enough the Kasr-es-Said, or the "abode of felicity." Sy Ismail did not live to see the orange gardens blossom round his new house, for in 1867 he was accused of participation in the romantic rebellion of the Bey's brother, Sidi Adel, was dragged from the gilded apartments of Kasr-es-Said to the executioner's chamber in the Bardo, and there strangled with a silken cord. Muhamed es Sadek confiscated the property of his dead minister, and removed his *penates* from the gloomy old *seraglio* of his ancestors to the more cheerful palace on the other side of the ditch. Kasr-es-Said has proved almost as unfortunate for the prince as it did for his servant. The very room in which Sy Ismail Sunni struggled with his

captors, has now witnessed the extinction of even the remaining shadow of Tunisian independence. It was in Kasr-es-Said that the last "possesseur du royaume de Tunis" became a vassal of France.

In April 1881, both the Bey and his Prime Minister were living in the Kasr-es-Said Palace, the only picturesque feature of which is the great garden of roses, jessamine, and orange-trees, in the midst of which it stands. The wide expanse of stucco façade is almost blinding in the sunlight, as one approaches the entrance by an avenue of palm and pepper trees, and above the roof floats the green, red, and orange-coloured silk banner, bearing as a device the golden two-bladed sword of the Hassanite dynasty. It was thus that I saw Kasr-es-Said on the 23d April 1881. Muhamed es Sadek was anxious that people in England should be acquainted with his troubles, and he asked me to come to the palace early on the morning in question. The only sign of the impending crisis was the entire desertion of the *bureaux* at the Bardo, which were left in undisputed possession of General Musalli and one or two of his subordinates. Ministers and employés now crowded the ante-rooms of Kasr-es-Said, the Council of State held perpetual session in one of the drawing-rooms, and the corridors were thronged with Tunisian

officers and Arabs from the interior. The department of Foreign Affairs had temporary quarters in a little chamber on the ground floor, which possessed several sofas but no table. A solemn silence was maintained throughout the building, in which the wives of both prince and premier were sharing, behind the gratings of the harem windows, the common anxiety. Cigarettes and coffee were almost forgotten. Every new-comer from the city underwent an ordeal of whispered questioning:—Is there any news from the frontier? What do the latest newspapers say? Has the English fleet come? Are the Italian troops already at Palermo? The Turkish music was playing as usual at the door when I arrived, and M. Sumaripa, the confidential agent of M. Roustan, had just left the palace, after delivering a verbal message to Mustapha. When I met the Prime Minister he was holding a letter in his hand. In order to avoid mistakes Sumaripa had given him a copy of his instructions. It was a last attempt on the part of M. Roustan to induce the Bey to commit political suicide. The memorandum ran as follows:—“The recent declarations made by the Bey to M. Roustan and the *corps consulaire* have increased the anxiety already excited by his first communications. It is true that His Highness asserts his firm intention to maintain

order, but he adds that he can no longer be responsible for it when once the expedition against the Khamirs commences. In the presence of these apprehensions in the mind of His Highness, M. Roustan informs him that he is ready to place at his disposal a company of marines, together with two cannons belonging to the French frigate in the roadstead, which force will be amply sufficient to maintain order in and protect the European quarter. But as we are now, and desire to remain in peace with the Bey, the disembarkation in question can only take place on the express demand of His Highness. Ask for an immediate answer, and in case of refusal say that we take note of it." Mustapha had already given orders for a reply to be sent to M. Roustan, and having called M. Conti, the Bey's interpreter, we ascended the staircase together and entered a small *salon*. The room was typical of the whole place. The floor was covered with Sicilian tiles, and the wooden ceiling painted with wreaths of red, yellow, and blue flowers. Window curtains, sofa cushions, and *portières* alike consisted of faded yellow damask. The table was missing, but there were two chests of drawers, each supporting a clock flanked by two artificial bouquets in Parian vases. A side door opened, and the Bey entered; he took me kindly by the hand, and asked

me to sit down. Mustapha also occupied a place on the divan, but M. Conti remained standing. The Bey is a fine-looking old man, with grey hair and beard, and a ruddy complexion. His features are rather Turkish than Arabic, and I never saw trouble more clearly written on a human face. He was dressed in a black frock-coat and red trousers, and wore only his Pacha's sword and Turkish and Tunisian orders. Muhamed es Sadek at once began the conversation:—"You have come lately from England, do Englishmen believe in the Khamírs?" I replied that "I was afraid they knew very little about them, but that the English press had unanimately deprecated the expedition." He said he knew that, and was grateful for the sympathy of Englishmen, but that he wished to make his case more widely known both in England and Europe generally. He then, with much animation and gesture, spoke at considerable length as to his grievances. He commenced by observing that both he and his predecessors had received, during more than two centuries, continued marks of sympathy from England, and that on their part the Beys of Tunis had always followed implicitly every suggestion made by the English Government. His cousin Ahmed was the first Mussulman sovereign who had abolished slavery, and he had himself first granted

permission to British subjects to hold land in the Regency, and had done everything to promote English interests in his country. He regarded with peculiar pride the high distinction the Queen had conferred on him in sending him the Grand Cross of the Bath, as well as many other assurances of her approbation. The Bey expressed his surprise that his position as a vassal of the Sublime Porte had ever been questioned in Europe. No Bey of Tunis had ever ascended the throne without the Sultan's investiture, and he himself had received three separate firmans of appointment from Abdul Aziz and his two successors. He pointed out that his jewelled sword and the Order of the Osmanlie in diamonds were the insignia of his rank as Pacha of Tunis. The firman of 1871, about which much has been said, was merely a confirmatory and declaratory act, which was elicited from the Sultan by the accident of one of the Powers calling the *status* of Tunis in question. The Bey added several details on the subject of the subordinate political position of Tunis, and declared that he and his predecessors had scrupulously carried out every demand of their suzerain, both during the Crimean war, and again in 1878. His principal consolation under the present trial was the unqualified approval of his conduct twice already conveyed to him by

telegraph from the Sultan. He alluded to the explicit treaty engagements he had entered into with the Powers, by which he guaranteed equal privileges to all Europeans in his dominions, and said that if he had favoured one nation more than another it was undoubtedly France. Till a very recent period his relations with France had been most cordial, and he had never refused any request made to him by her representative which he could grant with any show of justice. France possessed a railway which crossed his dominions, as well as the sole means of telegraphic communication with Europe. He alluded in the strongest terms to the course pursued by the Havas Agency, which had endeavoured to deceive the world as to the Tunisian question, and to the attacks made on him by the Algerian press, and particularly the *Akhbar*; but in spite of all this, he said he would never ignore the importance of legitimate French interests in the Regency, or abandon the hope of the restoration of his old cordial relations with the French Government, which only very recently had acknowledged his efforts to maintain perfect order on the frontier. He said that M. Roustan had unceasingly pressed on him for thirteen months the acceptance of a French protectorate, and he added with energy, that, apart from his treaties

with the great Powers, his political and religious relations with the Sultan would never allow him to accept it, and that nothing could ever change his fixed determination on the subject; although his suzerain alone had spoken, he could never believe that England and Italy were indifferent to his fate. Not only had they both large and important colonies, but they could not ignore the consequence of the complete subversion of the government of his country which M. Roustan asked for. He left this, however, to their own just appreciation, but they had in the past ever insisted on an equality of treatment at his hands. He bitterly complained of the conduct of M. Roustan towards him, and said that it had made his life a burden to him for some time past. As regards the Khamírs, a calm investigation would show that the true details of the dispute were these:—France had assured Europe that she desired to punish the Khamírs, but in a few days his own troops, under the command of his brother, had occupied the part of the country in which they lived, and any satisfaction France desired would be readily given. This being the case, no shadow of an excuse existed for invading his territory, and imperilling the peace of his country and the safety of the European colony. M. Roustan had for some days asked his permission for the French troops to

occupy his territory, but he never could consent to this step, either in his own name or in that of the Sultan. He expressed his strong indignation at the attempt which had been made to shift the responsibilities of the consequence of the invasion upon him, and especially at the suggestion which M. Roustan had that day made to him to concur in the disembarkation of French troops with two cannon at Goletta. He pointed out that such a proceeding must inevitably lead to very serious consequences. He said that every foreign representative must testify to the perfect order prevailing in the country in spite of warlike rumours and continued menaces, and he left it to such Englishmen as Earl De la Warr and Mr. Guest to let England know, from their own experience, how he had governed, and whether he was or was not entitled to the sympathy of England. He felt sure an inquiry would lead a generous nation like that of France to a different opinion concerning him. He said he had no quarrel whatever with France; that he would always further her interests in Tunis; but that, as a vassal of the Porte, nothing could ever induce him to accept a French protectorate of his states, or allow his territory to be occupied without protest. An armed resistance he could not make, but he would be at his post to maintain order and

public security. He felt that he must leave his fate to the justice of Europe, towards both himself and his suzerain.

After taking leave of the Bey, I went into the temporary office below to read over the reply to M. Sumaripa's demand, which had been approved by the council. The letter was couched in the following terms:—

The Bey to M. Roustan (April 23d).

Our Prime Minister has brought to our knowledge the communication which has been made to him in your name by M. Sumaripa. You state that additional anxiety has been created amongst the European colonists by reason of the recent declaration which we have made to you and the representatives of the friendly Powers, and suggest that this impression should be removed by the landing of a force of marines with two cannons from the frigate at Goletta, in order to reassure the European population of Tunis. You add that this measure can only be adopted with our consent, because by God's goodness we are at peace with your Government, which desires to remain on friendly terms with us.

We must first thank both you and your Government for this spontaneous declaration of its wish to continue at peace with us. We are obliged also for your solicitude for our good and for the preservation of public order, of which we consider your proposal itself as an evident proof. We regret, however, to be obliged to decline your assistance because the result would be contrary to what you imagine, and its acceptance would amount to a confession of our inability to maintain order, which is far from being the case. You are yourself a witness, that, under God's providence, nothing whatever

has happened to justify the fears entertained by the colonists, and that order everywhere prevails. The interpretation you seek to give to our declarations is at variance with the declarations themselves. We have assured both your honourable colleagues and yourself that as long as things continue in their normal course we will answer for the public order and tranquillity, and that in any case we will do our utmost to prevent the smallest breach of the peace. We repeat to you, however, once more, that if any portion of the Regency is invaded by the French troops, we may find ourselves in the presence of a general rising, which will spread all over the country notwithstanding our efforts to suppress it. It is this danger we have endeavoured to point out, and for which we must decline all responsibility.

We still hope that the Government of the Republic will take all this into serious consideration, and will reflect on the various perils which an invasion of our country may engender. We trust, therefore, that we may be permitted to exclusively treat the matter of the Khamirs, concerning which we shall arrive at a solution of a satisfactory nature, and such as will secure the end we both profess to have in view.

M. Roustan was very wroth at this unexpected refusal, and in the course of the afternoon sent one of his janissaries to make a round of the Consulates with the following protest in the shape of a circular :—

M. Roustan to the Corps Consulaire (April 23d).

The undersigned Chargé d'Affaires of the French Republic has the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of all the representatives of foreign nations at Tunis. In view of

the renewed declarations of the Bey in his last communications to the consuls, and of the alarm they have caused among the population, the undersigned has thought it his duty to inform His Highness that he was ready to place at his service the landing party of the "Jeanne d'Arc," at present in the roads off Goletta, with two cannons, an amply sufficient force to maintain order in the European quarter, and protect it against any aggression. The undersigned only added that the landing could not take place except at the express request of the Bey, who, this very morning, formally declined these offers. The undersigned takes note of the refusal, and loses no time in informing his colleagues of the fact. They will conclude therefrom, like himself, that the uneasiness the Tunisian Government feels as to the maintenance of order is less great than that which it affects to be, or else that it has determined to accept, whatever occurs, the responsibilities it has hitherto tried to decline.

Before leaving the palace the Prime Minister told me that the Bey had determined to charter a steamer to carry his telegrams for Constantinople to Marsala, as it was worse than useless for him to avail himself of the French line, and offered to allow me to take advantage of this mode of communication. I was therefore able to telegraph an account of my conversation with the Bey to England the next day from Trapani in Sicily. Mustapha was very anxious for me to join Ali Bey's camp amongst the Khamírs in order "to see what really took place," but I told him it was impossible for me to leave Tunis. He then repeated several times, "We must have a witness,

an *English* witness," and I suggested to him that perhaps Mr. Perkins, a British resident in Tunis, would be able to meet his wishes. Mr. Edmund Arthur Perkins started for the Khamír country the same day, and continued to send valuable information to Tunis until the final retreat of Ali Bey. His journal has especial interest, as unlicensed writing was strictly forbidden amongst the invaders. Every correspondent who joined the French columns was forced to sign the following undertaking, which was very strictly adhered to :—

"I engage on my honour not to transmit any information, either directly by telegraph or letter, or by third persons, without having the *visa* of the commander of the column or of the officers he has delegated. I admit that any breach of that engagement exposes me to all the rigours of martial law. I moreover admit having been warned that if the journal in the name of which I am accredited publishes news of a nature to be of use to the adversaries of France, I may be forthwith escorted back to the nearest port of embarkation, and that residence in Algeria be forbidden me."

It was hardly probable that the intelligence department of the Khamírs (and, according to M. Roustan's own showing, they were the only "enemies of France") comprised a collection of European journals, but the very existence of such restrictions has rendered all communications from

independent sources of additional importance, and, as events afterwards proved, Mustapha was wise in his generation, when he determined at any cost to have a "witness" with the Tunisian troops amidst the Khamírs.

CHAPTER XVII.

FRUITLESS APPEALS.

ANOTHER day passed away in feverish suspense, but at noon on Monday, the 25th of April, a messenger arrived from the governors of Kef and Beja, and rode in hot haste to the Bardo Palace. An hour later, and all Tunis knew that the invasion had begun. Shortly afterwards, an urgent message called me to the Prime Minister's city house. I found Mustapha in his favourite sitting-room over the great gateway. The corridors leading to it were crowded with Arabs, but nobody seemed to know what to advise. The *boudoir* of the Tunisian Premier was arranged, as I soon found out, with an evident view to Oriental diplomacy. A long sofa lined the side of the room, which was almost entirely occupied by the grated window looking into the court below, upon which Mustapha habitually sat and smoked. Opposite the entrance was a handsome walnut-wood wardrobe with a long looking-glass, and a similar piece of furniture faced

the window. I remember nothing else in the apartment except a coloured print of the King of Italy, half-a-dozen clocks all indicating a different hour, and a horrible mechanical toy which represented over and over again the death of Cleopatra. I found General Muhamed Bacouch, Director of the Tunisian Foreign Office, in consultation with the Prime Minister, who had before him the letters received that morning from the interior, as well as two or three of the memoranda of Sy Ali Bey. Holding up the latter, Mustapha said, "Here are the proofs of the Khamírs having entirely submitted, and yet you see the invasion has taken place? Is it possible that war can be made against us without notice? What is to be done?" I very naturally suggested that what had happened was as yet unknown in Europe, and that the time had now come to make another protest, and address an appeal to the Powers. Just at this moment an energetic knocking was heard at the outer door, and the servant announced that General Musalli had brought a communication from M. Roustan. Mustapha said quité collectedly, "Prepare a protest for us while I get rid of him;" and touching a spring, the wardrobe door opened and disclosed a passage leading to a second chamber, which seemed also to contain nothing but sofas and

clocks. I had barely time to draft the papers he required with a pencil in a note-book, when General Bacouch called me back to the Minister's room. What had passed in the meantime seemed to have strengthened Mustapha's determination to resist, and he summoned M. Conti to translate the protests. "This will do very well," he said, "but we must show them to the Council." Taking my hand, he opened the glass door of the second wardrobe, and we entered the large drawing-room, to which the Cabinet had adjourned its meeting from Kasr-es-Said. Here there was a large console table, around which General Bacouch, General Arbi Zerouck, Sidi El Aziz, General Muhamed Khaznadar, and two other members, were sitting, in the midst of a wilderness of gilding, looking-glasses, and ruby velvet. The Prime Minister took his seat, and the state of affairs was discussed at length. A messenger was sent to the office of the Rubattino Steamboat Company, and the agent, Signor Ravasini, agreed to get one of the packets under steam at Goletta by ten o'clock. The protests were adopted, and M. Conti never left his seat till copies had been prepared for Constantinople, London, Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome. At last all was ready, and a special train conveyed the packet containing the messages to Goletta. As

we parted, General Bacouch said to me, "Now at any rate England must say something, she cannot remain silent, and we shall at least know our fate." Sy Arbi Zerouck answered, "England has always protected us, she will not abandon us now." They were both doomed to be disappointed. After a brief gleam of sunshine under the new *régime*, General Bacouch was "placed upon the retired list;" General Sy Arbi Zerouck was banished from Tunis within a month of the anxious evening we spent together at Mustapha's palace, and the faithful and honest Antonio Conti was dismissed from the Government service before the Kasr-es-Said Treaty was hardly a week old, because he had done his duty to the prince he served.

Next morning the following protest was tendered to M. Roustan:—

"Our Governor of Kef informs us that a French military column has entered the territory of the Tunisian tribe of Sharen, and threatens the city of Kef. The Governor of Beja informs us likewise that another French column has penetrated into the Khamir territory. The invasion of our Regency has taken place without any notice to our Government, and at a time when you yourself admit that peace exists between Tunis and France. We declare this invasion of our territory to be a violation of the law of nations. We, therefore, solemnly protest against it, in our own name and that of His Majesty the Sultan, of whose empire Tunis is an integral part, and must appeal to the justice of the

Great Powers. We declare the French Republic to be solely responsible for the consequences which may ensue from this invasion of our state."

The text of the telegram sent to England from Trapani by the steamer which left Tunis on the night of the 25th April is as follows :—

The Bey of Tunis to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, London.

His Highness the Bey of Tunis begs your Excellency to lay the following message before Her Majesty the Queen of England and the British Government. In spite of the protestations which we have made in our own name and in that of our suzerain the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, and notwithstanding the proofs we have given of our ability to repress any excesses of the Khamír frontier tribe which may have given cause for complaint, and the fact that the troops commanded by our brother and heir now occupy that portion of our dominions which they inhabit, the Government of the French Republic has caused its troops to invade our country, and, not content with entering that portion of the Regency where the Khamírs reside, have occupied a part of our territory far distant from the locality in question, and entirely unconnected with it. The repeated protests which we have made, both in our own name and in that of our suzerain, have been disregarded, and our territory has been violated without a declaration of war, either against ourselves or our political superior, and this with a total disregard of the usual rules and observances prescribed under circumstances by the law of nations. We are at a loss to understand the reason why we are so treated by a great and powerful Government, with which we have always been on the most cordial terms, and whose interests in our Regency we have

studiously and constantly endeavoured to promote. We are the more astonished at the measures resorted to against us because the French representative has not interrupted his relations with us, and only two days ago he assured us that as peace prevailed between the Republic and ourselves, a landing of French soldiers on our coast could only take place with our own consent and concurrence. Under these circumstances we appeal to our august ally, Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, as well as to all the Governments, signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. We do this the more readily because the country which we govern is, as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, entitled to the protection sought for. We are willing to submit unreservedly all complaints brought against us to their friendly arbitration. We feel assured that the Great Powers of Europe will take into consideration the treaties they have entered into with my predecessors and myself, and will not ignore our constant endeavours to guarantee equal privileges and impartial justice to all European subjects residing in our state. In our hour of dire distress we implore the Great Powers to interpose their friendly offices on our behalf. We believe that justice is on our side, but we leave the consideration of our position, as well as our own interests and those of our suzerain, to the justice, impartiality, and generosity of the Great Powers.

(Signed) MUHAMED ES SADEK.

The invasion of the Regency was begun by three military movements—viz., the taking of Kef, the bombardment of Tabarca, and the advance into the Khamír mountains. On the 26th of April the citadel of Kef was surrendered by its governor to General Logerot. There had at first been some ideas of resistance, and the French cannons were

already in position on one of the adjoining hills, but the Bey's orders were at last acted upon, and the French flag floated over the Tunisian standard on one of the oldest and most renowned fortresses of the Regency. The fall of Kef opened the whole of the Medjerdah valley to the column Logerot.

The taking of Tabarca gave rise to a number of exaggerations. The Arabs reported some hundreds of deaths to have been caused by the shells of the besiegers, while the French affirmed that the resistance was confined to "a little skirmishing with sharpshooters." A few weeks later I met in Tunis Colonel Taib Masmuri, the defender of the old stronghold of the Lomellini. Although he was prudently reticent as to whether he had or had not returned the French fire, he showed no disinclination to tell the tale of his adventures. "It is untrue," says Masmuri, "that any one ever fired at the French gun-boat. On the 25th April a French captain landed and *offered me many inducements* to surrender the fort. I refused to do so, and in the evening the Admiral himself sent me a letter reiterating the demand, and telling me that, if necessary, force would be used. I cannot write myself, but I got a notary to frame an answer saying that I had referred the matter to Sy Ali Bey. On the 26th April about two P.M., suddenly

and without any notice a heavy fire was opened on the fort from the ironclads. The second shot killed three of my soldiers, and in a few minutes a piece of falling wall brought me to the ground and wounded me in the thigh. When I managed to rise I saw several dead soldiers near me. Meanwhile some of the Khamírs had crossed from the shore, and managed to get twelve barrels of powder from the magazine. I contrived to swim to the land, and after wandering about for three days reached Ali Bey's camp." After the bombardment the Khamírs were greatly frightened by an exhibition of the electric light, which has never been quite forgotten. The details of the advance across the frontier will be found in Mr. Perkins' journal of the fortnight he spent in the heart of the seat of war.

CHAPTER XVIII.

A FORTNIGHT AMONGST THE KHAMÍRS.

I STARTED from Tunis by the French Railway early on the 23d of April, accompanied by a native guard, and having in my possession an order from the Tunisian Prime Minister enjoining the officials in the interior to "receive me as a friend," and render me every assistance in their power. On my arrival at the Beja, about eighty miles west of Tunis, I found everything and everybody in the greatest state of confusion. Although this little town is the centre of an essentially horse-breeding district, it seemed to be now impossible to hire or purchase the beasts of burden necessary to enable us to proceed to Sy Ali Bey's encampment, although the Hlifa or vice-governor did all he could to help me. The tribesmen of the vicinity had already withdrawn to the mountains, and the townspeople would not part with their animals at any price. Arabs were seen in all directions busied in fixing new flints to the locks of their guns and sharpening rusty swords

and even pieces of hoop-iron inserted in the ends of cleft sticks. I was evidently eyed with suspicion, although the Hlifa told everybody I was "Sidna's (the Bey's) friend," but he would not permit me to walk about the streets unless accompanied by several guards. As luck would have it, some carts were driven into the town, and the authorities promptly "requisitioned" the horses for our journey, the owners being very handsomely paid for the accommodation.

I started from Beja at dawn, and having a long ride before us we pressed on at full speed. Fortunately our steeds proved equal to the occasion. Our road lay across the mountain districts leading to the range inhabited by the different sections of the Khamír tribes, and the crops were already quite high in the cultivated ground. At the commencement of our journey we did not meet a single living being, but as soon as we got fairly into the mountains, solitary foot passengers and groups of Arabs were to be seen every now and then. They were all armed after their old-world fashion, and looked at us unpleasantly enough. My guide begged me not to enter into conversation with any of them, and ordered them unceremoniously out of the road, when they occasionally stopped and stared at us. Once or twice some of the Arabs asked in a surly tone if

I was a Frenchman and what I was doing there, but they seemed to be reassured when I answered them in their own language that I was an Englishman. They then invariably said (and this occurred repeatedly), "If you are an Englishman, you are our friend. Why does not your people come to our assistance?"

As we neared Ali Bey's camp, we met long files of Arabs, men, women, and children, returning to their *douars* (camel-hair tents) with the remains of the goods they had taken thither for sale. At length we reached our destination, after a tedious ride of over eight hours' duration. I sent in my credentials, and in a few minutes gained admittance. I must confess that I felt somewhat uncomfortable under the gaze of several thousand Arabs, who all appeared to regard me as an intruder, and my helmet in the midst of a perfect sea of red caps, made me doubly conspicuous. As, however, I was personally acquainted with most of the superior officers, I soon began to feel myself more at home.

Sy Ali Bey desired to see me immediately, and received me with evident cordiality. He seemed to be in total ignorance of what was going on at the Bardo and in Tunis, and was most anxious to learn the details which I was able to give him. He complained bitterly of the false position in

which he was placed, and of the absence of instructions to enable him to carry on his negotiations with General Forgemol, who was encamped on the Algerian frontier. He said he was sometimes afraid "that there was double play going on at the Bardo," and that if this was so he might never see Tunis again.

"I received," continued the heir-apparent, "distinct instructions to protest energetically against the entry of the French troops into Tunisian territory, if such an attempt should be made, yet the French general declares that M. Roustan has already obtained the Bey's assent to his advance."

Ali Bey was encamped at Sidi Salah, about twenty-five miles from the Tunisian frontier line, and almost on the confines of the Khamír country. Another body of the Bey's troops, numbering about 3000 regular soldiers, commanded by Sy Selim Ferik, Minister of War, was stationed at about two miles' distance from the boundary, and actually within sight of the Algerian fort of Roum-el-Souk, where the French troops, under the command of General Forgemol, were gradually collecting. Another small contingent under the Governor of Beja had its camp midway between the positions of Sy Ali Bey and Sy Selim, and the Khamír country.

Ali Bey's encampment presented a very pictur-

esque and curious sight. Most of the so-called regular troops had been specially drafted for the occasion, and all that can be said of them is that they were, almost without exception, composed of fine powerful men. They seemed, however, very uncomfortable in the uniforms they were evidently quite unaccustomed to wear, and when marching, most of them unceremoniously took off their boots, tucked up their trousers to the knee, and trudged forward barefooted and bare-legged. The "irregular" Arab cavalry looked remarkably well on their spirited Barb ponies, with their handsome accoutrements, their own becoming dress, and stately bearing.

The tents were large and difficult to move, and those occupied by the Bey and his suite were ponderous marquees. If a strong wind happened to be blowing, twenty or thirty men usually struggled for an hour at least with the canvas of the Bey's pavilion before it could be got into shape. The baggage was even more cumbersome than the tents. The heir-apparent's own luggage consisted of a number of wooden trunks covered with brown leather, and thickly studded with brass-headed nails. One of them was devoted to syrups, sweetmeats, and *zoedone*, the orthodox nature of which was duly certified by the Bey's imám, or chaplain, who

found it necessary to make several trials of the drink before he pronounced his definite opinion. The Bey's personal cortège was as miscellaneous and remarkable as his baggage. At its head was Dr. Stresino, his physician-extraordinary, whose duties were of a very varied nature. In the first place, he had to administer harmless and agreeably coloured potions to cure imaginary ailments, he was expected to make himself pleasant whenever the prince was dull, and to play chess whenever required, always contriving to be the loser. The Bash-Káhwajee or "head coffee man," was certainly the next in importance. His tent immediately adjoined that of His Highness, and in it a large pot of water was continually kept boiling over a charcoal fire. He was expected to produce cups of coffee at a moment's notice. During the march he was always close to his master's heels, with all his paraphernalia in saddle-bags, and ready whenever called on to perform his duty. After the Káhwajee came the chaplain, the water-bearer, the gun-bearer, the pipe-bearer, and the sword-bearer. The jester was a very important personage indeed. He was privileged to say what he liked, and the coarser his jokes the more they were appreciated. Whenever the camp was moved Ali Bey mounted his charger for a few minutes, and then betook himself to a gilt

coach, drawn over the roughest ground by four mules. Beggars abounded, and some of the Bey's trunks contained linen and cloth to enable him to indulge freely in the virtue of almsgiving.

Outside the lines were rows of booths and stalls, at which blacksmiths, gunsmiths, butchers, and grocers busily plied their trades. Public criers went the rounds all day vociferating the last bids for a horse, a cow, or a *bernous*, as the case might be. The *tout ensemble* gave one the idea of a huge fair, and unless you entered the tent of Ali Bey or that of his prime minister, Sy Tahar Zouch, no one would imagine that matters of the greatest moment were engaging the attention of the heir-apparent, who studiously assumed a cheerful demeanour when in public.

Outside the camp the scene was somewhat different. The mountain tribes* are all divided into sections or sub-divisions, each being under the orders of its own chief. Upwards of thirty of these fractions had arrived at the camp to solemnly acknowledge the authority of their Bey represented by the heir-apparent, and thus contradict General

* The Khamírs are subdivided into the Slouls, the Dedmaka, the Meselma, and the Shihia. The kindred tribe of the Rekba comprises the Ouchetetas, the Ouled-Sebira, the Merassen, the Ouled Ali Mefedda, the Fzours, the Beni Mazen, the Ouled Sultan, the Hakim, and the Razouán.

Forgemol's eloquent platitudes as to "Tunisian impotency." After the performance of the ceremonies usually observed on such occasions, each chief withdrew with his followers, and took up his position about a mile from our encampment. The hillocks around us were therefore thickly studded with the tents of these tribesmen, but their occupants had a thoughtful defiant look, which contrasted strangely with the gay appearance of the camp. They were all, without a single exception, armed to the teeth, and seemed eternally occupied in discussing the probable intentions of the French, or polishing their arms and counting their bullets. They would never agree upon any plea to part with their arms, so Ali Bey was compelled to receive them with all their weapons upon them.

After my first interview with Sy Ali I found that a large tent had been prepared for my use, and a good horse likewise placed at my disposal. A few minutes later a messenger from Sy Ali Bey brought me a Tunisian *sheshiyah* or red cap, which he suggested my wearing, to avoid any unpleasantness with the irritated mountaineers. I soon discovered that it was convenient not only to do this, but to assume the entire Arab costume, and it afterwards turned out that it was very fortunate I did so. I found many opportunities of verifying what

had actually taken place on the frontier, and had subsequently been grossly exaggerated by the French Government and press. The original disagreement (afterwards magnified into a *razzia* or raid) was a dispute as to the *part-ownership of a cow* between a Tunisian and Algerian, and could really have been settled in five minutes at a police court. As, however, the French Government complained very bitterly and threatened to take some measures on their own account, the Bey sent some responsible officials to inquire into the matter and to punish the offenders if necessary. Everything was done to smooth matters, but still the French were not satisfied, and insisted that the Bey must practically exterminate the border tribes. In order to avoid a complication, Muhamed es Sadek sent one camp after another to the spot, and gave the heir-apparent strict orders to examine into any charges preferred and severely punish the offenders. It was hoped, of course, that the Khamírs would resist the Bey's authority. When it became plain that nothing was further from their intentions, General Forgemol refused to furnish any details of grievances and announced that France had resolved to undertake the task of taming the Khamírs herself.

I was quite surprised to see the alacrity with

which these reputed savages obeyed the orders of the Tunisian officials. Several of the tribes came in in my presence to formally make their submission, and the sight was interesting and almost imposing. The effect of the ceremony was heightened by the wild mountain scenery amidst which it took place. On these occasions the Bey used to sit in state under a large open tent, surrounded by his suite and principal officers. The civil and religious chiefs of the tribe were first admitted into the camp alone. One after another they walked straight up to Sidi Ali, and bowing respectfully, took his hand and placed it on their heads, afterwards kissing the palm. This done, they all stood aside in a group, and the rest of the tribesmen in full war costume, entered in single file. They each carried a gun loaded only with powder, a pair of huge pistols in their belts and two or three knives of different sizes. On their feet they wore raw leather sandals, and their legs were bare to the very top of their thighs. Round their waists was a broad girdle and pouch reaching upwards to the chest (almost exactly like those used amongst the Circassians), which contained their ammunition. They were all wiry, muscular, and powerful men, and would really be formidable enemies at close quarters. Once inside the lines they defiled before

the heir-apparent, running in a circle and calling out lustily *Ya Sidna*, or "Oh, our master," in token of their submission. When just in front of Sy Ali they discharged their guns and left the camp to take up the quarters assigned to them. After a number of these tribes had in this manner confirmed, as it were, their allegiance, the chiefs were carefully examined by Sy Ali Bey as to the supposed disturbances. They denied them in the most emphatic manner, and gave the fullest details of the few insignificant disputes which had really taken place. These men repeatedly declared that they admitted their responsibility towards the Bey, and would readily deliver up any of their tribesmen whom it was found necessary to bring to justice. They even offered to remain hostages in the camp, as a pledge that they would carry out their promises. All this took place in my presence, and as nothing could have been accomplished in a more satisfactory manner, an impromptu general rejoicing took place in the evening. The Arabs, in their innocence of heart and politics, now felt sure that everything would be arranged amicably and satisfactorily. Ali Bey at once wrote a despatch to General Forgemol, informing him of the action he had taken, and asking him to furnish details of any grievance or offence, in order that the culprits might

be at once brought to justice. I shall never forget the visible dismay which spread through the camp, when our messenger returned with the following reply :—

General Forgemol to Sy Ali Bey.

We have received your letter by which you demand a list of our reclamations and details of the crimes which the French Government alleges to have been committed by the Khamírs and other mountain tribes belonging to the state of your august brother and sovereign. *We have on several occasions communicated the details of these complaints, and it is therefore superfluous to repeat them now.* We have orders to punish the tribes which have committed the aggressions and *against which you have been impotent to act.* We can only obey these orders, but this does not prevent the maintenance of the friendship which has existed for centuries between the two countries !

The blow almost overwhelmed Ali Bey, who believed, in the simplicity of his heart, that the French had no other object beyond the punishment of the Khamírs. An express was at once sent to Tunis with a copy of General Forgemol's letter, and an urgent demand for instructions.

The same evening we received letters from the governor of Kef, stating that a second body of French troops was being assembled at Sidi Yussef close to the frontier, and that an attack on Kef itself seemed imminent. Sy Selim added to our

perplexities by informing us that the French were apparently preparing to cross the frontier at Roumel-Souk, and that six gunboats could be seen off Tabarca. I was fortunate enough to make the acquaintance of Sheikh Salah El Khamíri, one of the most popular and influential chiefs of the clan. I told him that I was anxious to go through their country, and see for myself what was really going on. He at once offered to take me under his protection, and during the night we quitted the camp together. By his advice I left all my European clothes behind, and I was soon the only Christian to be found in the midst of twenty thousand armed Arabs, all ready at a moment's notice to defend their mountains against the invaders.

From the various accounts, emanating from a French source, I, like everybody else, had been led to suppose that the Khamírs were little better than savages. I soon discovered the deception or mistake. During my stay amongst them, as soon as they were assured I was an Englishman, they treated me with kindness and consideration, readily discussing with me the all-engrossing topic of the movements of the French.

The Khamírs are agriculturists and cattle-breeders, and the country offers many and exceptional facilities for their pursuits. Springs of

excellent water are plentiful, the pasture is luxuriant, and the dense forests afford good shelter. They manufacture their own gunpowder, are very clannish, but submit without a murmur to the authority of their chiefs. Some live in huts, others in tents, but these latter are not nomadic. The Khamírs are frugal, but perhaps fare better than their brethren of the plain. The women spin a superior kind of woollen *bernous* (cloak) and weave blankets. A large quantity of tobacco of an excellent quality is grown, but nobody smokes. Every one, on the contrary, takes snuff. It is generally calculated that there are from fifteen to twenty-five thousand fighting-men in the whole range of mountains. All the adults are for the most part armed with flint-lock guns about seven feet long, and made without any idea of balance. It consequently generally requires a strong man to keep the muzzle level. The mountains are very steep, and the only passes are very narrow paths, in most places not more than two or three feet wide. Dense forests often cover the heights, and the richness of the vegetation adds considerably to the extreme beauty of the scenery. Oak and cork trees, the white thorn and "locust-bean" trees, wild vines and giant ferns, all grow and thrive together in one luxuriant tangle. Men born under such accidents

of nature as these, are, of course, hardy, fearless, and capable of enduring extraordinary fatigue.

As I was already acquainted with General Sy Selim, I received a very cordial welcome from him on reaching his camp. All was now confusion there, owing to a company of French troops having crossed the frontier at Aïn Ismain on the evening of the 23d April. We were almost within hail of the French fort of Roum-el-Souk, and could hear the bugle calls distinctly. Around our camp a few of the tribes had pitched their tents, and it was with considerable difficulty that they could be prevented from attacking the French, who were now in the midst of their corn-fields. The greatest excitement prevailed, and we were constantly on the *qui vive*. To aggravate matters, a messenger arrived from Tabarca, who informed us that attempts were being made every night to land from the French gunboats, and that Taib Masmuri, the governor, had been asked to deliver up the fort, which he declined to do.

As soon as dawn broke on the 26th April we discovered that the French soldiers, who had for the last few days encamped about three miles' distance from us, had moved their position during the night. While endeavouring to ascertain the road they had taken, we suddenly heard at about

nine A.M. sharp firing in the mountains, and almost simultaneously the distant booming of the cannon in the direction of Tabarca. The scene that ensued around us is almost indescribable. In the twinkling of an eye the Khamír tents were struck, and they started at a trot, yelling at the tops of their voices, in the direction of the firing. A band of about fifty, more desperate than the rest, made a rush towards the fort of Roum-el-Souk, about three miles distant, and we could see a detachment of cavalry coming to meet them. Sy Selim immediately sent some of his mounted Arab irregulars in pursuit, and they succeeded in turning back the courageous little party of Khamírs, who pleaded with tears to be allowed to have "just one shot at the occupants of the fort, even if they died a moment afterwards." My faithful friend Sheikh Salah had meanwhile disappeared in order to do his duty in the mountains, and for some time I was afraid that I should be compelled to remain in the camp. But I happened to meet one of his companions, who was going in the direction of Ali Bey's position, and with him I approached the spot where the fighting was taking place. All along the mountain paths we traversed, we met files of Khamírs in full war costume rushing at full speed in the same direction. Lying down on

the crest of a hill I could witness distinctly what was going on. The French were in a small valley surrounded by the heights on all sides save one. The slopes were evidently alive with Arabs, concealed behind projecting rocks, brushwood, shrubs, and trees. Both sides were sustaining the fire. It was evident that the French hoped that the Arabs would have been induced to come down to the plain, but although the Khamírs made several very courageous attacks, they invariably retired to the hills, being perfectly well aware of their good position. Several French soldiers were killed in this first engagement, but the Khamírs lost seventy-eight men, besides having over one hundred and fifty wounded.

At length I got back to Sy Ali Bey's camp. All the Arabs who had pitched their tents in its vicinity when I left, had already gone off to the assistance of their neighbours. The Bey was, as might be expected, greatly perturbed, for the parting shouts of the Khamírs were quite the reverse of complimentary, and he felt that he might be attacked at any moment. In pursuance of the instructions he had received, he had sent a protest to General Forgemol as soon as he knew what had happened at Aïn Ismain, and had already got the following answer:—

General Forgemol to Sy Ali Bey.

We have received your second letter to which we now answer.

We have the honour to inform your Highness that our troops have entered on Tunisian territory, *in accord with the Bey of Tunis*, as we are informed by the Minister of War of France. According to this same understanding the Tunisian troops are to give us free access into the country of the enemies which we have come to chastise, and that in consequence they will retire to such positions as we shall indicate.

L. FORGEMOL.

We now learned that on the previous day the French had shelled and almost completely destroyed the fort of Tabarca, over which the Bey's flag was flying at the time, and which was actually garrisoned by Tunisian soldiers. Even the regular troops now seemed inclined to join the Arabs, who openly accused the Bey of treachery:—"You told us," they said with much show of reasoning, "that if we kept quiet all would be well, and now you see what has happened. The children of Ali Ben Hassan have sold our country to the French!"

On the 28th April, at two o'clock A.M., we stealthily commenced our retreat in fear and trembling. The Bey was about equally afraid of his own soldiers, the Khamírs, and the French, and he keenly felt the bitter humiliation of being obliged to leave his own subjects to their fate. After a few hours'

march we found that we were only separated by some low hillocks from a French camp at the Gendouba. We hurried on as fast as possible, but we perceived later that French troops were marching from another point apparently across our road. The Bey sent on a messenger to the officer in command to say that as he had not come there to make war with the French, he was anxious not to interfere with them, and merely wished to know whether the road would be left open to him. As the messenger delayed his return, it was decided to pitch our camp at Ben Bachir, about four miles from the village of Souk-el-Arba, where the French forces entering the Regency by way of Kef had already arrived. At length the messenger came back, saying that the commanding officer wished to meet Sy Ali Bey at once. Sy Tabar Zouch was sent, but was angrily told "to tell his master to come himself," and given a note on a scrap of torn paper to serve as a sort of summons. Although very tired, Sy Ali Bey set out for the Souk-el-Arba railway-station, where his meeting with General Logerot was to take place. Some hours later he returned, and at once asked me to come to his tent to hear how he had been treated. He was exceedingly angry, and folding up the general's note put it in his purse, saying he should always keep it as "a

remembrance of French politeness, which he had often heard of but had never before experienced." "When I got about half-way," said the Bey, "I was peremptorily stopped by the sentinels, who would not let me pass for some time. At last I reached the station and waited there for half an hour. Then General Logerot appeared, and without saluting me said abruptly, 'What do you want?' I replied that I had merely come there in consequence of his invitation. He answered that he had nothing to say to me, and had only called me because he fancied that I had something to say to him. He added that I had done well to leave the Khamir mountains, and must recall all the other troops there without delay; that I must on no account go either to Kef or Beja, and was to find my way back as best I could through Testour and Teboursouk. He then turned his back on me and left the room. If I, the heir-apparent, am used thus, what will be the fate of our subjects? Please let people in England know how we are treated." As soon as the Bey had finished telling me of his misfortunes, he wrote a letter to his brother asking for leave to return to Tunis. In compliance with General Logerot's intimation, we now began to march slowly in a southerly direction. On the 30th April some chiefs of the Ouled Bou Salem tribe

joined us and brought a letter from the French Caid of the frontier, which had been addressed to them and the sheikhs of the Kooka tribe, stating that unless they submitted to the French they would be attacked forthwith. Messengers from other tribes also arrived, and bitterly complained of the heavy requisitions made upon them by the invaders. These facts served to dissipate all that remained in the mind of Ali Bey of his illusion as regards the object of the French expedition.

The following day (April 30th) a most lamentable affair occurred almost on the scene of our first camping ground during the retreat at Ben Bachir. This is what actually happened :—The French sent *spahis* to the Sheikhia, the Ouled Bou Salem, and Gendouba tribes, with a demand that each of them should provide 300 horsemen mounted and equipped, *to serve with the French as spahis*, besides 200 baggage mules or horses, each followed with a man to carry barley. The Sheikhia having replied that they had neither horses to give nor any inclination to go, the French this morning marched into their territory, burned their *douars* in many places, and attacked the inhabitants, who were obliged to take refuge in the mountains. Several women and children were killed, The Bey's tent was soon surrounded by crowds of Arabs calling

out, "Our crops, cattle, and horses are being destroyed; we are ourselves attacked, and yet all you tell us is to keep quiet. We are all subjects of the Bey, will he do nothing to save us? Why did you not let us fight against our enemies?" The scene was one not easily to be forgotten. A number of witnesses were examined as to the attack on the Sheikhia, and Sy Ali Bey drew up a report which was sent to Tunis.* The evidence was carefully sifted, the various depositions were recorded separately, and every means taken to arrive at the truth. It is greatly to be feared that Turkish atrocities can no longer claim to be unique. The camp was moved on the 3d May to a point between Beja and Oued Zerga, but the Bey's perplexities increased every day. On his sending to Medjez for the usual supply of barley, a note was brought back from the general saying it was not to be touched. "I am only surprised," wrote the general, "that you remain in a country where the French are waging war." As the heir-apparent was powerless to do any good, and as his position from being humiliating had become ridiculous, I was not astonished at General Logerot's surprise. As far as Sy Ali Bey was concerned, the campaign ended as soon as he turned his back on the Khamirs, and as

* *Vide* Chapter XX.

no interest could attach to his perambulations under the paternal direction of French officials, I decided on the 4th May to return to Tunis. This step was also rendered advisable by a move of M. Roustan to get rid of a troublesome but impartial witness. When I wished Ali Bey good-bye, he said with tears in his eyes, that "it would have been better for him to have fought side by side with the Khamírs and have taken the inevitable consequences, than to suffer slights and insults which none of his race had ever borne before."

CHAPTER XIX.

AT BIZERTA.

THE seaport of Bizerta, or Benzerta—the Hippo Dzarytus or Zarytus of the Romans—is, like Goletta, situated on the shores of the Mediterranean. It is built on a narrow tongue of land which divides the sea from two vast sheets of water of great extent and depth, once known as the Hipponitus Lacus and Sisaræ Palus, and now commonly called the lakes of Bizerta and Gebel Ishkel. The shallow canal which joins the Mediterranean to these land-locked seas divides Bizerta into two distinct portions. The one covers a small island formed by a bifurcation in the channel of the canal, and joined to the land on either side by bridges of great antiquity; the other rises on the slope of a hill and is surrounded, like most Tunisian towns, with a crenellated rampart, and crowned by a dilapidated *kasbah* or citadel. A large part of the higher quarter of Bizerta has shared in the decay of its fortifications, but a series of marble fountains, surmounted by

elegantly carved inscriptions, still testify to the existence of a past period of Moslem power. The fantastic windings of the house-bordered canal give to Bizerta the appearance of a miniature Venice in reduced circumstances. In making the circuit of the *enceinte* wall, I remarked an inscription placed upside down in the bastion. Although much disfigured, the words YPPOS SARITOS were plainly discernible. The vaulted roofs of the magazines and shops in both parts of the town are supported almost invariably by Roman columns. The English janissary Haj Hamda took me to his corn-store to see what he termed “an inscribed pillar.” I read in bold characters :—

IMP CAES
 MAVR IIIIVS
 ANTONINVS
 PIVS IIII X AVG
 PARTHICVS MAX
 BRITANNICVS MAX
 GIRMANICVS MAX
 IRIB POIX VIII
 COS IIII PP
 RIS III VII
 XLIX



There was a time when English statesmen knew

the importance of the great land-locked harbour lying behind the crumbling walls and straggling streets of Bizerta. The lakes have been surveyed and re-surveyed by English seamen, but apparently only for the purpose of pointing out the expediency of acquiring them to our neighbours. A glance at the chart of the Mediterranean shows better than pages of reasoning what the possession of Bizerta really means. After assisting in a survey of the lakes in 1845, Lieutenant Spratt contributed a valuable paper on the subject to the "Journal of the Geographical Society," containing a complete description of the locality.

"The lakes," writes Lieutenant (now Admiral) Spratt, "have often been noticed by the Ancient and Middle Age authors under the names of Hipponitus Lacus and Sisaræ Palus.

"The Hipponitus Lacus was the more northern and larger of the two lakes, and answers to that of Bizerta, taking its modern name from an important fortified town situated at its mouth. The Sisaræ Palus is now called the Lake of Gebel Ishikel, from a high and picturesque mountain rising from its southern shore, but which must have been formerly an island, as it is now separated from the plain by an extensive marsh.

"The two lakes run in an east-north-east and

west-south-west direction of each other, and are each about eight geographical miles long. The Lake of Bizerta is five and a half miles broad, whilst that of Gebel Ishkel is only three and a half. This latter is a remarkable turbid shallow lake of fresh water, but the former (Bizerta) is clear, and nearly as salt as the sea with which it communicates.

“The greatest depth of the water in the Lake of Bizerta is eight fathoms, with an average of from five to six throughout.

“The channel by which it communicates with the sea is at its north-east angle, and is about four miles in length and half-a-mile broad, except near its mouth, where it is contracted into a narrow winding canal. In the wide channel there is a depth of from four to seven fathoms, but in the intricate part between the fishery and the bar at the mouth of the canal, which in its windings is nearly a mile in length, there is from two to ten feet only. Across one part of the channel there is a solid stone bridge of seven narrow arches, and again a little below it the channel is obstructed by rocks, said to be the foundation of another bridge.”

On the 1st May 1881 several French ironclads appeared off Bizerta. The governor of the town was summoned to surrender it to the French, and in compliance with the Bey's orders he at once

declared that he should offer no resistance. Before nightfall a French garrison occupied the town, the French flag was flying on the forts, and the chastisement of the Khamírs assumed a new phase of its gradual development. Never perhaps in the history of the world's warfare, was a more important conquest effected without the striking of a blow. When the news reached the Bey at Tunis, he said, "I am sorry to see my flag dishonoured at Bizerta, but *now* at any rate England and Italy cannot remain silent." Muhamed es Sadek was, however, as events soon proved, egregiously mistaken.

The following protest was at once sent to M. Roustan :—

May 2d, 1881.

The Governor of Bizerta has informed us yesterday that several French ships of war appeared before Bizerta, and the occupation of the city and forts was demanded by the French, under threats of recourse to violence. As we are at peace with France, the governor was not in a position to resist ; and the French troops have occupied Bizerta and hoisted the French flag on our forts. This occupation, at a time when we are at peace with your Government, is a proceeding without precedent, and is opposed to all the rules and prescriptions of the law of nations. In consequence, we protest in the most solemn manner against this occupation. We must express our sorrow at being thus treated by a Government which we have always endeavoured to conciliate, and with which it has been our constant endeavour to preserve the most friendly relations.

The best commentary on this "proceeding without precedent" is contained in Admiral Spratt's letter, which appeared in the *Times* of the 16th May.

Admiral Spratt to Mr. Montague Guest, M.P.

I fully confirm the fact of the Lake of Bizerta being easily made available for the fleets of the world, or for any of them—and at a small cost—for I would risk my reputation upon its being effected for less than a quarter of a million. All that is necessary is an excavation of about a quarter of a mile through the narrow strips of alluvial plain that separates the lake from the Bay of Bizerta, and some dredging for about the same length on either side of this narrow strip, so as to connect the deep water within the lake with the bay outside, and thus open it to the Mediterranean, by which means the largest ships of any navy and the fleets of the world could find accommodation and security within Bizerta Lake; and it would thus become the finest and most commodious harbour in the Mediterranean. Situated as it is, at the threshold of the central strait of the Mediterranean, if possessed by France or by Italy, it would become the most important strategic naval port within it, and completely command the communications between the eastern and western divisions. France, which now, in Toulon, is 400 miles distant upon one flank of that line, would thus be only four hours' steaming from it on the other flank, where not only could she have another naval arsenal, but a spacious and perfectly enclosed basin for the secret practice of torpedo fleets, gunnery exercise, and even some manœuvring with a few ships, and all in what would become a secret port. Consequently, all the political as well as the commercial interests of other nations between the east and west, to say nothing of Malta, would be at the mercy of

France or Italy—whichever becomes possessed of this most important strategic harbour—as will be evident to every one possessing a knowledge of the physical conditions, depth of water, and capacity of the Bizerta Lake, as shown in the *Journal of the Geographical Society*, to which you have referred in your recent letter in the *Times*. In the interests of the future peace of Europe, neither of the great naval Powers should become possessed of it—neither France, Italy, nor England—all having equal interest in its neutrality, and neither having a right stronger than the other to wrench it from the neutral Power now in possession, and in rightful possession of it. Any transference of it to either of the three naval Powers would at once place the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, in the near future, in the hands of that Power, and would be an irresistible incentive to that nation to devote double its energies to the development of its fleet, and a naval preponderance, involving a necessity on the part of the others to do the same in the interests of their commercial and political prestige. Such are my views as a naval officer founded on long experience with the interests now connected with the Mediterranean, and with a perfect knowledge of the lake and locality of Bizerta. As the Italian press has recently very fully entered into, I may say exposed, these interests, I, as you have requested it, give you the above facts and details, being no longer under any necessity of retaining them from the general public.

Mr. Guest shortly afterwards published a pamphlet on the subject of Bizerta, illustrated with charts and maps of very great value.* His zealous efforts to show that the occupation of this important

* The Tunisian Question and Bizerta. By Montague Guest, Esq., M.P. F. Chifferril & Co. London, 1881.

naval position was but another step to the fulfilment of the Prince de Joinville's dream of converting the Mediterranean into a French lake, did not find favour in May 1881 with those in high places. Lord Granville was content with M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire's assurance, that "France never contemplated incurring the expense of constructing a harbour at Bizerta," and limited his action to taking a note of the declaration. At the time I am writing, I learn that French engineers are busy with their plans on the site of Hippo Zarytus. The "near-future" will, however, evidently enable posterity to judge between Lord Granville and Mr. Guest.

CHAPTER XX.

THE THREE WEEKS' WAR.

ALTHOUGH by a diplomatic fiction Tunis was supposed to be in a profound state of peace on the 1st May 1881, an invading force was slowly but surely closing in around the capital. General Forgemol and his subordinate columns were already chasing the Khamírs from ridge to ridge of their native mountains, General Logerot was advancing from Kef along the Medjerdah valley, while General Bréart was in undisputed possession of the town of Bizerta. In spite of all this the Bey seemed doggedly determined to hold out, and the widespread ill feelings amongst the Arabs induced the British and Italian colonists to present petition after petition, asking for the presence of ships of war to ensure their personal safety. During the 1st May the Bey received two communications, neither of which was calculated to diminish his anxiety. Ali Bey sent him a very graphic and highly coloured report of the conflict between the

French and the Sheikhia tribesmen at Ben Bachir, and the Governor of Bizerta wrote that the French flag had already supplanted the Tunisian standard on the *Kasbah*. The former document ran as follows :—

“The *chaouch* (sergeant-major) Chaaban and the squadron of cavalry which had been sent to protect the railway arrived at the camp this evening.

“The *chaouch* has stated to me that a French column has arrived from Algeria this morning, and that the General commanding the troops at Souk-el-Arba sent yesterday an armed force to the Gendouba, Ouled Bou Salem, and Sheikhia tribes to demand from each a contribution of 300 horses for the *spahis* and a certain number of mules. The two former clans pleaded that their poverty prevented their compliance with the request, but the Sheikhia formally refused to do as they were asked.

“In consequence of this refusal, a strong detachment of French troops entered the Sheikhia country and attacked them. The Sheikhia defended themselves; the French burned their *douars*, killing men and women; the wounded were taken to the General, who ordered them to be beheaded one after the other. The women were not even spared. . . . The *chaouch* himself reports that he saw a burned *douar* containing two women. . . . Such were the horrors that met his eyes that the *chaouch* was forced to take another road to avoid the dreadful sight.”

The sensation produced by the publicity given to this letter at Tunis can well be imagined. A council was at once called as usual, and a protest

and appeal to the foreign representatives were drawn up. They were never presented, and in the evening an effort was even made to suppress Ali Bey's letter. Mr. Perkins' inquiries made it very probable that the *goums* or Algerian irregulars who led the assault, committed various excesses according to their wont, but the picture of General Logerot superintending a systematic decapitation of the wounded is palpably overdrawn. The treatment of the Sheikhia on the 30th March was, however, signally avenged by the Arabs exactly six months later at Oued Zerga.

In fairness to the French I must place on record the version of the occurrence given me by M. Joel Le Savoureux, the correspondent of the *République Française*, who was near the spot at the time. "At five o'clock on the morning of the 30th March," says M. Le Savoureux, "a reconnaissance, consisting of two battalions of the 1st Regiment of Zouaves commanded by Colonel Hervé, was sent in the direction of Ben Bachir, about four miles to the north of the railway. The evening before, the tribe of Ouled Bou Salem had asked the General to send them some troops in order to protect them from their neighbours. The captain of the *goums* approached to within thirty yards of a *douar*, and called out that the French soldiers would do no harm

either to life or property. The answer was a discharge of musketry from behind a cactus hedge. On this the Zouaves were placed in position, and reinforcements were sent for, which consisted of two battalions of riflemen, two of Zouaves, and two squadrons of *chasseurs d'Afrique* and hussars. The Ouled Bou Salem were slowly driven back, and entered the valley which was to become the real battlefield. This valley is almost in a line with the plain, from which it is only separated by hills of trifling height. Its other side is formed of steep mountains. The resistance now became stronger on account of the assistance of the Sheikhia, who rushed down from their hills. It is believed also that some Khamirs took part in the engagement, but the total number of combatants did not exceed 1500. As soon as the reinforcements arrived, the cavalry executed a movement on both flanks and drove back the Arabs to the end of the valley, where the Zouaves and riflemen attacked them with the bayonet. The Arabs defended themselves bravely. As the French troops advanced they found the *douars* abandoned and set fire to them. When obliged at last to yield, the Arabs sought to gain the mountain tops. At this juncture they were harassed by the projectiles from a battery in the plain. At five P.M. the

enemy was no longer in sight and the retreat was sounded. As no wounded were found it was supposed that the Arabs had themselves given them the *coup-de-grace*. Amongst the dead were two women. They had been shot fighting, and had ammunition upon them and guns in their hands. Eleven prisoners were brought to the camp. The *goumiers* collected over 2000 head of cattle."

It is almost impossible to reconcile these very different versions of one event. General Logerot emphatically and repeatedly denied the truth of *chaouch* Chaban's report as endorsed by the heir-apparent, but even according to the most favourable statement of the facts, there can be no doubt, that the rout at Ben Bachir was unnecessarily destructive of human life. At any rate, it quite convinced the Arabs of the fallacy of the Bey's assurances, and effectually prepared the way for reprisals and revenge.

The Bey was not the only person at Tunis to receive astounding intelligence on the 1st May. On the same day M. Roustan wrote to Mr. Reade that at the battle of Ain Ismaïn on the 26th of April a European had been observed *in the ranks* of the Khamîrs, and that moreover the person in question had shot dead Lieutenant Fayet, an officer of

the 22d Regiment. "His description," added M. Roustan, "corresponds exactly to that of Mr. Perkins." This story was never seriously persisted in, and at length formally withdrawn. When details were asked for, the offender was said to have worn "a black cloak and broad felt hat." It was of course proved by many witnesses that Mr. Perkins was always dressed in an Arab costume and red cap, and "the broad felt hat" turned out to be quite as apocryphal as the "ranks" of the Khamírs. The accusation of M. Roustan and the correspondents' test of General Farre were both prompted by the same motive—a desire to keep things quiet. They were eminently unworthy of the great nation in whose name they were made, and the authors have both since fallen under the lash of that very public opinion they sought to stifle. The wholesale suppression of telegrams during the crisis has only been atoned for by the excellent manner in which the service has been carried on ever since.

The excitement of the 1st May was followed by an anxious pause. The Sultan sent repeatedly cipher telegrams to the Bey of a reassuring nature, and transmitted a copy of the circular sent to all the Turkish ambassadors abroad concerning the Tunisian question.

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 3d.*

My several circular despatches will have informed you of the present state of affairs at Tunis and the standpoint we have ever taken up respecting the question. A mere local accident—namely, a foray of some barbarous tribes on Algerian territory, which, from the outset, the Tunisians had expressed their readiness to punish—has, however, to our great surprise, led to an expedition of French troops to Algeria. It appears from the latest information received from the Pacha of Tunis, that French troops are advancing into the interior of the country, after seizing on several fortified positions. His Highness thinks that so important a military movement, and so rapid a march through his province, in spite of the declarations of France to the effect that she is not actuated by any idea of conquest, seems to denote one of two objects, either the taking possession and occupation, or a protectorate of Tunisia. In the presence of such a state of things, the gravity of which no one can overlook, His Highness and the population imperatively call upon us to exercise those sovereign rights which, without contest, belong to the Porte, in order to come to their aid, and protect a province which forms an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Relying on our rights, and entertaining a deep sense of the duties that devolve upon us regarding a population which is subject to the Sultan, we lately proposed to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin to come to an understanding with them, or directly with France, to bring about a settlement calculated to give satisfaction to the grievances of the French Republic. That appeal has remained unanswered, and we are driven to inquire whether the Powers, departing from their sense of equity and justice, mean to retain their passive attitude in that respect. As for ourselves, we cannot regard with indifference the events taking place in a portion of our master's dominions, and we cannot help questioning

whether immutable justice always guides European Cabinets, or whether they mean to remain passive while might triumphs over right. It would be painful to us to have to come to such a conclusion. It would lead to a perturbation of the general peace which the Porte and the Powers desire, and would henceforth create a commotion which would be most serious in the present state of the East. We therefore entertain a confident hope that our appeal will not be disregarded by the signatories of the Berlin Treaty, which guarantees the vital interests of the Ottoman Empire, and that they will be good enough to entertain our proposal for a frank and conciliatory understanding, which might bring about an appeasement of the Tunisian conflict to the satisfaction of all parties, and in conformity with the desires of the French Government. You will communicate this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government to which you are accredited.

(Signed) ASSIM.

Even these messages were powerless to remove the uneasiness produced by the continued silence of the Powers. After much delay both English and Italian ships at last arrived at the Goletta. On the 5th May it was decided at a council held at Mustapha's house to telegraph by way of Palermo a second appeal to the five Governments. I was present at this meeting, but everybody felt that we were now hoping against hope. Notwithstanding this conviction and the redoubled assiduity of M. Roustan's three emissaries, the Bey and his minister still remained firm. The message despatched on the 5th May was as follows:—

The Bey of Tunis to Lord Granville, London.

I now confirm my telegraphic despatch to your Excellency in date the 25th of April, in which I informed you of the invasion of this Regency by the troops of the French Republic, under circumstances which I submit are contrary to the law of nations, and against which I have most solemnly protested in my own name and in that of my august sovereign. The Government of the Republic has assured alike the cabinets of Europe and myself that its intentions are exclusively to punish the Khamír tribes for some predatory acts, which, it is alleged, were committed on the Algerian frontier. In spite of these explicit declarations, my city of Kef has been occupied; the French troops are now marching on Beja; my forts at Tabarca have been destroyed and the site occupied; other tribes besides the Khamírs have been attacked, and a French garrison now holds my city of Bizerta, over the citadel of which the French flag now floats. What other measures are contemplated concerning this country I know not. I call on the foreign representatives at Tunis once more to bear witness, both to the success of my efforts to give satisfaction to the Government of the Republic in the matter of the Khamírs, who all submitted readily to my authority, and to the efficient order I have maintained till this day throughout my dominions. It is impossible to foresee what disaster may befall the inhabitants of this country if this invasion is continued. Under these circumstances, I leave unreservedly my own fate and the destiny of this state to the decision of the Great Powers and my suzerain, imploring those ancient allies with whom I have maintained unbroken faith to adopt such measures of mediation as may stay the scourge of war which has visited the peaceful inhabitants of my dominions, and equitable adjudication on any complaints which the Government of the Republic may entertain against my government or myself.

Next morning (May 6th), the Bey learned that several tribes were preparing to set his waning authority at defiance. The Caids of Medjer, Sharen, Ouled Bou Ghanem, and Ouled Ayar, arrived at the Bardo, and asked for an audience to tell their tale. They said that on the defeat of the Sheikhias on the 30th April their surviving chiefs wrote letters in blood (purporting to be that of their slain women and children), asking them for help to resist the French, and avenge their wrongs. It was at first agreed to place their request before the Bey, but unluckily they captured a messenger who was bringing an official letter from Tunis to Sy Ali Bey. To their dismay they found that this despatch, far from holding out any encouragement to resistance, directed him to retreat before the French forces, and maintain a strict neutrality. As soon as this was known, the anger of the Arabs was entirely directed against the Bey, whom they accused of betraying his country to the French. The Caids took refuge from the general indignation in a neighbouring *zaouia*, but it was at last agreed that they should be allowed to go to Tunis to see the Bey in person. Muhamed es Sadek met this deputation of the untutored lords of the interior in the hall of justice, in which for nearly a quarter of a century he had almost personified absolute power. The

chiefs bent before him and kissed his hand as usual, but it was evident to everybody that they were not convinced by his half-hearted assurances. At last he promised to give them a letter under his sign manual, which, he said, must satisfy all his faithful subjects. I subsequently obtained a copy of the Bey's declaration, which took the form of a circular. Its text was as follows:—

To all the Caidis and Governors of the Regency of Tunis.

We have previously ordered that our recommendations to preserve order in your districts be brought to your knowledge. We have learned that you have done your best to carry out our wishes and we express our satisfaction.

It has, however, come to our ears that the entrance of the French troops upon our territory for the affair of the Khamirs, has produced excitement amongst certain tribes. We have protested against the violation of our territory, which has been perpetrated without there being any reason for hostility between us and the Government of the French Republic or any declaration of war. In any case, this matter will be arranged *diplomatically and peacefully*. To this end we are now engaged, in concert with the Imperial Ottoman Government, and with the aid of other friendly Powers.

In consequence, it is the duty of each individual to preserve order everywhere, to allow of a favourable solution being arrived at with moderation and without disturbance. We recommend you not to abandon your posts, in order to prevent by your presence the people under your rule from doing any act contrary to our desire. You will enjoin this course of conduct upon them in the most urgent manner, and you will deter them from listening to interested people who

wish to stir up strife. You will also explain to them the consequences which disobedience of these injunctions may entail upon them.

The five Caid^s rode away with their message of peace, but the tribes refused to be convinced. One of these very Caid^s was the first to proclaim the treason of the Bey, and he is at the present moment an exile in Tripoli.

Incessant rain now caused a momentary lull in the military movements, but French newspapers were not allowed to want copy. The European public were informed that "Mustapha, the Tunisian Prime Minister, being apprised of the occupation of Bizerta, summoned the principals of the religious bodies to confer with him, and they (the principals or the religious bodies?) afterwards proceeded to Kairwán, with the object, it is stated, of preaching a holy war," and "that Signor Pestalozza, the dragoman of the Italian consulate, repaired in disguise to the camp of Ali Bey on a secret mission, and after his return conferred with General Bacouch." Such intelligence as this may well provoke a smile now, but it was then the old story of the boys who pelted the frogs. Telegrams of this kind effectually sealed the fate of Tunis, and the long-suffering Bey acquired the reputation of a crafty and bloodthirsty fanatic.

In the interval strong reinforcements disembarked at Bizerta, and by the 8th May the two brigades of Generals Maurand and Bréart were prepared to march. On that day I happened to go early to the Kasr-es-Said Palace. The excitement felt amongst its inmates had, if possible, increased since my last visit. Soon after my arrival General Bacouch entered the little saloon, used as an office on the ground-floor, with an open letter in his hand. A mounted messenger had brought it to the Bey, after a ride of fifty miles through the torrential rains of the preceding night. The missive in question was from the Khalifa or sub-governor of the rich district of Mater. In two sentences the Bey was informed that one Hmed Ben Yusef, an Algerian envoy, had arrived at Mater from Bizerta, and had invited the tribes of the province to sign a declaration "in which they acknowledged the French supremacy, and agreed to receive the French troops as brothers." The Khalifa reported that the Mater tribes were already showing their teeth. At General Bacouch's request I proceeded to draft the following protest to M. Roustan, although the absence of a table presented a formidable difficulty :—

The Bey of Tunis to M. Roustan (May 8th).

M. Roustan, Chargé d'Affaires of France, Tunis,—The Caid of Mater has informed us that an emissary sent by the

Commander of the French troops now at Bizerta has asked him whether the tribe of Bajaoua, the inhabitants of Mater, as well as the mountain tribes of Mogod and Hozels and others, were willing to receive the French troops, and has insisted on obtaining an answer to this demand before midday to-day. This intelligence has caused us as much pain as surprise. You have assured us repeatedly that the expedition against which we have protested had no other scope on the part of the French Republic than the settlement of the Khamír frontier. To-day it is proposed to occupy the most important parts of the Regency. Even admitting that we had consented to the entry of the French troops to punish the Khamírs, and that we had not protested against this violation of the Tunisian territory, as we have uniformly done, it is not the less a fact that the proposed occupation has no relation to the Khamír country, and that we are unable with force to resist the projected movements. Nevertheless, we have issued instructions to the Caid of Mater to prevent any resistance to the French troops in this province. We confirm our former declaration and once more call your attention to the dangers attending this increasing invasion. At the same time, we renew our protestation, in our name and in that of the Sublime Porte, against the occupation of the province of Mater as contrary to the law of nations.

Before this business was finished, the Prime Minister entered the room. He seemed much agitated, and spoke with unusual rapidity. He said that M. Saint-Hilaire had assured Lord Granville the French meant to punish the Khamírs and nothing more, but the proposed occupation of Mater showed him that these assurances had deceived alike the British Government and the Bey. He said:—

“What has the province of Mater to do with the Khamirs? I now see clearly, in spite of all that has been said to the contrary, the French are determined to pick a quarrel with us and create a pretext for further action. Mater is one of our richest provinces, and its mountain tribes are powerful and some of them warlike. If they resist when they see their crops destroyed and *douars* burned, who can tell what accusation will be brought against us? Where is the French programme to stop? While M. Saint-Hilaire is giving pacific assurances at London and Rome, and the Sultan is trying to interest Europe in our fate, we are being subjected to threats and menaces in which the Khamirs are not even mentioned.”

He continued :—

“Yesterday, Dr. Mascaro, the Bey’s physician, told his Highness that great evils would befall him and our country if he did not at once ask M. Roustan what the French wanted, but the Bey told him to attend to his physic and leave politics alone. Dr. Mascaro, however, asked me privately if the Bey was waiting to have his palace surrounded, and I to have my hands manacled (crossing his wrists) before we accepted M. Roustan’s terms. I asked him to bring his propositions in writing, but he refused. What does it all mean? England has been told one story, but you must let her know what is being asked from us here.”

While Mustapha Ben Ismael was yet speaking it was announced that M. Roustan’s carriage had arrived at the gates of the garden, and terror took the place of excitement. “In a few minutes,” said the Minister, “we shall know our fate. Wait and you shall hear it.” He hastily retired, and entered

the Bey's private rooms. On the previous day M. Sumaripa, the French dragoman, had complained of one of the attendants failing to rise on his approach, but neither he nor M. Roustan could complain of the homage they received on this occasion. The audience lasted exactly eighteen minutes, and during this time perfect silence prevailed in the crowded ante-chambers. No one was present but the Prime Minister, M. Conti (first interpreter), M. Roustan, and M. Sumaripa. On quitting the Bey, M. Roustan passed bowing and smiling through a double line of Tunisian officials to his carriage, and an audible sigh of relief passed from one end of the palace to the other as soon as his carriage disappeared on the Tunis road. The Minister re-entered the apartments near the entrance and said to me—"You want, I suppose, to know M. Roustan's *ultimatum*, but I have a surprise for you. He asked for nothing at all. After the almost hourly messages of Dr. Mascaro and others we expected to hear of the protectorate, an indemnity, and other similar conditions, but M. Roustan referred to none of these things. He told the Bey that the visit was a private one, but that he had come to assure His Highness of his real affection both for his person and for Tunis. He said the Bey was not to be deceived by appearances. France was the true

ally of Tunis, and had no quarrel whatever with the Bey. What does it all mean? Is it possible that France is bound by the promises which Lord Granville and M. Cairolì announce, and that M. Roustan's friends are trying to induce us to seek ourselves conditions which the Bey regards as opposed alike to his religious and moral duties? We both want Europe to know what is passing under the cloak of this Khamír business, so that she may duly weigh M. Saint-Hilaire's assurances before we are destroyed."

The two columns now left Bizerta almost simultaneously. That under General Maurand took the direction of Mater, following the shore of the Bizerta lake, while General Bréart marched towards Tunis. The rain fell incessantly, and the soldiers were often nearly knee-deep in mud. This circumstance necessarily occasioned great delay. Halts were frequently called, and Jedeida was not reached till the 10th May. The march was exceptionally fatiguing, and the Société Marseillaise were considerate enough to entertain the superior officers at a substantial breakfast, on the troops passing through the historical domain of Sidi Tabet.

The news of the arrival of the "allies" in the immediate vicinity of the capital, extinguished the faint hopes of foreign mediation in the hearts of the Tunisians. I went to Mustapha's palace in the

afternoon. The blank despair on the faces of its inmates contrasted strangely with the undisguised glee discernible on the countenances of Musalli, Mascaro, and Volterra, who now mustered in great force. Signor Pestalozza was with the Prime Minister when I arrived, and as usual counselled firmness and "consideration for the interests of the Great Powers." "Don't talk to me any more of the Great Powers," cried Mustapha, "what in God's name have the Great Powers done for us?" When Signor Pestalozza left that room he knew that the *rôle* of Italy was played out in Tunis. I found the Tunisian Premier alone with M. Conti. "I do not blame you," began Mustapha, "you have done what you could, but I have been deceived by"— Here he abruptly stopped. After an awkward pause he continued, "Can you suggest any remedy even now? Is there anything further to be done? Are all the Powers leagued with France against us? I answered *faute de mieux* that the last move of France had been a sudden one, and that the European Cabinets might be apprised of what had taken place by telegram. He looked at his watch. It was already past three o'clock, and the Italian boat started for Cagliari at six. After reflecting a moment he said, "Send the messages, they can do no harm;" and turning to me he added, "This may perhaps

be the last kindness you can do us ; at any rate, you will testify that I did my best to save Tunis from France." The indefatigable M. Conti at once set to work, and the Italian packet left an hour late with the messages on board.

The Bey of Tunis to Lord Granville, London.

The advance of the French troops in this Regency continues. Hitherto we have succeeded in reassuring our subjects by reiterated declarations that the French operations would be strictly confined to the punishment of the Khamirs. We believed that the assurances given to the Powers and to our suzerain justified our so doing. Notwithstanding these protestations, the French camp is to-day within seventeen miles of our capital, and during their march the French forces approached it even nearer. These undeniable facts tend materially to lessen the effect of the injunctions we have given our subjects, and have even led to our own conduct being very seriously animadverted on in our own dominions. We have redoubled our efforts to persuade our subjects to offer no resistance to this invasion, but our task becomes more difficult as a disregard of the assurances given becomes more apparent. Is it possible for us to tell how long we may be able to maintain order among the unoffending tribes, who see their dwellings, herds, and crops sacrificed by the march of the French troops? In these circumstances, and in view of the extreme urgency of the case, we implore the British Government, as well as the Governments of the other Great Powers, to take such measures as may at least induce the Government of the Republic to declare its intentions in respect to our Regency and make known the complaints which it may consider itself justified to prefer against us.

MUHAMED ES SADEK.

Before this telegram reached London all was over.

The night of the 11th May was spent in anxious watchfulness by the inmates of Kasr es Said. A council of state sat for hours, the Bey's carriages being kept in readiness till its session was ended. It was first proposed that Muhamed es Sadek should follow the example of many of his ancestors and find a temporary refuge in Holy Kairwán. The Bey, however, had neither the moral courage nor the *physique* necessary for such a bold step as this, and the project was dismissed. Mustapha Ben Ismael urged his sovereign to go that very night to the Dar-el-Bey or city palace in Tunis, and close all the town gates, leaving it to the French to have recourse to actual violence. The more timid counsellors opposed the plan as likely to cause a tumult, and it was also abandoned. It was finally decided that the Bey must remain where he was and trust to *kismet* for a solution of his difficulties. On the eventful evening in question I paid a visit to Hammida Ben Khoja, the *Sheikh-el-Islam* or supreme ecclesiastical authority in Tunis, who lived in the very centre of the Arab city. Sy Hammida was at the same time one of the handsomest and fattest old men I ever saw, indeed he appeared to have arrived at such a pitch of rotundity that he was unable to stand without overbalancing himself.

In a huge turban consisting of a twisted Cashmere shawl, seated on a Kairwán carpet, and surrounded by illuminated Korans on arabesque lecterns and a circle of white-robed *ulema* or disciples, Sy Hammida Ben Khoja presented just such a picture as Hodgson would delight to paint. As might be expected, Sy Hammida was full of the woes of his country and his faith, and at once proceeded to discuss the *quæstio vexata* in classic Arabic. He said that since the troubles began, his son, brothers, and himself had preached assiduously, both publicly and privately, patience, forbearance, non-resistance, and implicit obedience to the Bey in the mosques of Tunis. They had written letters to the same effect to their subordinates at Kairwán and throughout the Regency. Nevertheless, he had heard that it had been announced in Europe that a religious war had been advocated, and that a revolutionary conspiracy had been discovered in the chief mosque of Tunis. This was absolutely false. He had told the people that they, being weak, could not resist the invaders. If they wanted the sympathy of Europe they must gain it by forbearance. Even if their flocks and herds, which were the sole wealth of the Tunisians, were destroyed, this patience would ultimately entitle them to the good offices of the friendly nations when the injustice of the

invasion became known, as it ultimately must. Europe must now see that the punishment of the Khamírs really meant at least a French protectorate of Tunis, which was utterly opposed to the civil and religious duties of the Tunisian people. The invasion of the Regency was unnecessary, for the Khamírs submitted before the commencement of it, and it was especially cruel as involving ingratitude for the continued services rendered by Tunis to France. For fifty years the European nations had refused the extradition of political prisoners, but Tunis always surrendered fugitives from Algeria, maintaining complete neutrality in all troublesome times, especially during 1870. France ignored this now. He should exert himself to second the Bey's efforts to maintain order, but he was certain that his teachings would be almost powerless, especially among the tribes of the interior when homes, crops, and herds were destroyed. If no other European nation had an interest in Tunis, he hoped that justice and humanity would prompt a friendly intervention. The Tunisians knew how the English press had been just to them in their sore trial, and should not easily forget it.

The next chapter will show how much Muhamed es Sadek, Mustapha Ben Ismael, and Ahmed Ben Khoja were mistaken in their estimate of European justice and humanity.

CHAPTER XXI.

AT KASR-ES-SAID.

MUHAMED ES SADEK, Bey of Tunis, has two brothers, who, according to the local law of succession, are one after the other the rightful heirs to the throne. Ali the elder was born in 1817, and Muhamed Taib, the younger, four years later. They both live in stucco-fronted palaces at the Marsa, receive an ample income from the State Treasury as princes of the blood, are surrounded by a little band of courtiers and dependants, and appear on public occasions in all the glory of their diamond decorations. Ali is shrewd and rich, Taib is poor and credulous, and both of them inwardly hate the French with their whole heart. The heir-apparent is entitled to a *vizier* of his own, and in the person of Sy Tahar Zouch he enjoyed the services of one of the cleverest and most capable men in the Regency. Both Ali and Taib had physicians-extraordinary attached to their persons, and I have already explained the influence which these functionaries are able to

acquire. The stubbornness of Muhamed es Sadek concerning the Protectorate, had, at a comparatively early stage of the Tunisian question, induced M. Roustan to see what terms could be made elsewhere in case of necessity. Overtures were in the first instance made to Ali Bey through Sy Tahar Zouch, but neither one nor the other would entertain the proposals, and M. Roustan never forgot or forgave the rebuff. Sy Taib was a happy man amongst his greenhouses, his orange-trees, and his early lettuces, till M. Roustan held out to him the prospect of a crown. In his medical attendant M. Burguet, M. Roustan found a zealous ally, and Taib was soon persuaded that the throne overshadowed by the Protectorate was better than nothing at all. In a weak moment he consented to supplant his brother in the best interests of the mission of civilisation, and a French passport was given to him for the protection of his person, for which, M. Roustan says, he procured Burguet a present of 30,000 francs. Poor Taib's dream of power was somewhat disturbed, when Madame Musalli and her brother appeared on the scene, bringing a framed portrait of M. Roustan as a guarantee of fair play, and asked for his signature to a bond for a large amount, to place his speedy elevation to the throne beyond the possibility of

a doubt. On the 12th May, Taib Bey was ready to come to the Bardo under a French escort and accept everything that could be demanded of him within an hour of his proclamation. During the whole of that eventful afternoon, Taib Bey sat in a gilt coach before his palace door, waiting for the detachment of troops which was to conduct him to his new friends. Darkness came on and they never arrived. An hour after a short note informed Doctor Burguet that Taib Bey was no longer wanted. M. Roustan was entirely mistaken in his man; Taib amongst his hot-houses, orange groves, and vegetables was a very harmless individual, but Taib Bey, with the *idée fixe* of ascending the Hassanite throne, and smarting under the blow of a wholly unexpected disappointment, became a formidable enemy. From that moment some of the bitterest opponents of the Minister Resident were to be found within his own camp, and the result has been disastrous to both parties. M. Roustan has lost his satrapy at Tunis, and poor Taib Bey, it is true, is at the Bardo—but half walled up in a prison.*

In the early morning of the 12th May, the troops of General Bréart, followed by those of General

* Taib was at length released through the mediation of M. Cambon on the 20th April 1882.

Maurand, were seen crossing the low hills which skirted the further extremity of the Manouba plain, and their approach could even be perceived from the "Abode of Felicity" itself. Before eight o'clock the interpreter Sumaripa was already at the palace. He brought a letter from M. Roustan saying that the President of the Republic had appointed General Bréart to negotiate a treaty with the Bey, and requesting that an audience be granted him forthwith. He also asked that the General be allowed to bring with him some of the French troops from Jedeida. The Bey ordered a reply to be prepared expressing his *gratification* to see General Bréart, but declining energetically an interview with the troops. Before the letter was ready, the outposts of the French force reached the villas and gardens of Manouba, hardly more than a mile from the palace. Two hours later the main body of the troops with a battery of artillery arrived, and amidst a drenching downpour of rain occupied the Bey's cavalry barracks and the old dwelling-house of Kheir-ed-Din, the latter by especial permission of the *Société Marseillaise*, under the care of whose agents it had been cleaned a few days previously.

The excitement in the city continued to increase, and nearly all the shops were closed. The interview on which the fate of Tunis depended was

first fixed for noon and then postponed till four o'clock. Meanwhile the outposts were judiciously pushed up to within 200 yards of the garden behind Kasr-es-Said, and the cannons were so arranged as to be plainly visible from the upper windows. At three o'clock a long cipher telegram arrived from Constantinople. It commenced with these words:—"On no account sign any convention with France referring to a proposed protectorate. Say that you will submit the matter to us. The Porte is actively negotiating a satisfactory arrangement comprising the evacuation of your territory. Although it is unnecessary, we shall send a special commissioner to Tunis with two ships of war." After reading it the Bey swore that no power on earth could induce him to disobey the injunction of the Sultan. A few minutes after this incident M. Roustan, now accompanied by Elias Musalli, reached the palace. At the door he was joined by General Bréart, who rode in the rain from the Manouba camp accompanied by about twenty officers of his staff and an escort of cavalry. The whole party (excepting of course the escort) immediately went upstairs into the very room in which I had seen the Bey a fortnight before. The General and his suite were fully armed, and the usual compliments were entirely dispensed with. Besides the Bey, the Prime

Minister, M. Roustan, M. Conti, and General Musalli were alone present. The draft of the treaty was already prepared, and had been copied that morning in the French *Chancellerie* at Tunis. General Bréart took the paper from his pocket and placed it before the Bey. The following is an exact translation :—

Draft Treaty.

The Government of the French Republic and that of His Highness the Bey of Tunis, wishing to prevent for ever the renewal of the disturbances which have recently occurred on the frontiers of the two states *and on the coast* of the Regency, and being desirous of drawing closer their ancient relations of friendship and good neighbourhood, have determined to conclude a Convention to this effect, in the interest of the two High Contracting Parties.

In consequence the President of the French Republic has named as his Plenipotentiary M. le General Bréart, who has agreed with His Highness the Bey upon the following stipulations :—

ARTICLE I.

The Treaties of peace, friendship, and commerce, and all other conventions actually existing between the French Republic and His Highness the Bey of Tunis, are expressly confirmed and renewed.

ARTICLE II.

With a view of facilitating the accomplishment by the French Republic of the measures which it will have to take in order to attain the end proposed by the High Contracting

Parties, His Highness the Bey of Tunis consents that the French military authorities should occupy the points which they may deem necessary to ensure the re-establishment of order and the security of the frontiers and of the coast.

This occupation shall cease when the French and Tunisian military authorities shall have recognised by common consent that the local administration is capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of order.

ARTICLE III.

The Government of the French Republic undertakes to give constant support to His Highness the Bey of Tunis against any danger which may menace the person or dynasty of His Highness, or which may compromise the tranquillity of his states.

ARTICLE IV.

The Government of the French Republic guarantees the execution of the Treaties at present existing between the Government of the Regency and the different European Powers.

ARTICLE V.

The Government of the French Republic shall be represented near His Highness the Bey of Tunis by a Minister Resident, who will watch over the execution of the present instrument, and who will be the medium of communication between the French Government and the Tunisian authorities for all affairs common to the two countries.

ARTICLE VI.

The diplomatic and consular agents of France in foreign countries will be charged with the protection of Tunisian interests and of the nationals of the Regency. In return,

His Highness the Bey undertakes to conclude no act having an international character without having communicated it to the Government of the French Republic, and without having previously come to an understanding with them.

ARTICLE VII.

The Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Highness the Bey of Tunis reserve to themselves the right to fix, by a common agreement, the bases of a financial organisation of the Regency, which shall be of a nature to assure the service of the public debt and to guarantee the rights of the creditors of Tunis.

ARTICLE VIII.

A war contribution will be imposed on the unsubdued tribes on the frontier and on the coast. A further convention will settle the amount of it and the method of collecting it, for which the Government of His Highness the Bey hold themselves responsible.

ARTICLE IX.

In order to protect the Algerian possessions of the French Republic against the smuggling of arms and munitions of war, the Government of His Highness the Bey of Tunis undertakes to prohibit any introduction of arms or of munitions of war by the Island of Djerba, the Port of Gabes, or the other ports of the south of Tunis.

ARTICLE X.

The present treaty will be submitted for the ratification of the Government of the French Republic, and the instrument of ratification will be returned to His Highness the Bey with as little delay as possible.

The Bey for some minutes even declined to look at the paper, and repeated several times that he did not understand French. At last it was handed to M. Conti, who made a running translation into Arabic. The following dialogue then ensued through the interpreter:—

“*Bey.*—Will you give me a written translation in Arabic ?

“*General Bréart.*—What you have heard is enough.

“*Bey.*—At any rate you will grant me twenty-four hours for consideration ?

“*General Bréart.*—Certainly not. I expect an answer before eight o’clock to-night, and shall remain here till I get one.

“*Bey.*—May I lay the treaty before my Council ?

“*General Bréart.*—Do as you like between this and eight o’clock.”

The General and his *suite* left the room. M. Roustan turned to the Bey and said that all he had told him was now verified. He added, “Your Highness has nothing to do but to sign, and if you decline to do so it does not matter, for there is another who will.” Musalli took the minister aside and whispered to him that his further resistance would be punished as high treason. “When you were last in France,” he said, “you became a French citizen, you are therefore amenable to the French

military code, and unless the Bey signs to-night you will be *tried by court-martial and shot.*" M. Roustan and his friend then joined General Bréart. All that had happened was already known to the frightened councillors. One after another they voted for accepting the treaty ; the president of the municipality alone told the Bey that his death was of no consequence compared with such a disgrace, and implored him to hold out at all costs. The Prime Minister, under the influence of Musalli's communication, sided with the timorous majority. Even now the Bey hesitated, and his decision wavered in the balance. The chief eunuch approached him with a message. The ladies of the harem had seen the cannon and the soldiers from behind the lattice work of their windows, and implored him "*to sign and save their lives.*" Five minutes later he sent to inform M. Roustan that he accepted the inevitable. For the first time in his life he affixed in trembling characters the words Muhamed es Sadek Bey to a document written in a European language. Turning to the General, he said, "*Now at any rate you need not go to Tunis?*" "Highness," answered General Bréart, "I only receive commands from my own superiors," and turning on his heel, quitted the room. As soon as he was alone the Bey could no longer control his feelings, and gave way to the wildest

despair. He resolved even then, to make one more appeal to the suzerain whose allegiance he had an hour before cast off for ever. He ordered M. Conti to prepare a telegram explaining what had occurred and send it to Constantinople *via* Sicily by the Palermo mail on the next day. The message was accordingly despatched :—

Bey of Tunis to Grand Vizier.

The French forces, of which I had announced the arrival at Jedeida, approached on Thursday evening the central seat of my authority, and their commander, accompanied by a detachment of cavalry, came to my residence, and proposed to me to sign a treaty of peace imposed by France. He gave me four hours to consider, and declared that he would not withdraw till he had received an answer. Seeing myself under the pressure of an army near the centre of my authority, I was obliged to sign the treaty without having examined or discussed it, in order to save my honour and avert bloodshed. I notified at the same time to the commander that I acted under pressure and compulsion.

On the following morning the Bey inaugurated the new régime by investing General Bréart with the grand cordon of the Nichán. The sullen dissatisfaction of the townspeople could not be mistaken, and while General Bréart was still at the Bardo, a deputation came there to ask for some authentic information as to what had really been done. Mustapha and General Musalli received it. “Is

it true," asked an old scent-seller at the head of it, "that Tunis has been sold to France?" "Nothing could be further from the fact," answered Mustapha, "the Khamírs having beaten the French, the latter have taken refuge under the shadow of the palace walls, and we are giving them bread until they go back to their own country." Two days later M. Roustan was named Minister Plenipotentiary of the First Class and Minister Resident at Tunis, and Signor Cairolí's cabinet was a second time overturned at Rome as a censure on his conspicuous diplomatic defeat.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PROTECTORATE.

MY next three chapters treat of contemporaneous events which happened within a short time of the conclusion of the Kasr-es-Said Treaty in different parts of the Regency. While M. Roustan was endeavouring to turn his new position to the best advantage, the Bey, as might be expected, spared no effort to conceal the nakedness of the land from his outraged subjects. In the first place, a Tunisian version of General Bréart's interviews with Muhamed es Sadek duly appeared in the Government Gazette. This extraordinary document contrasts strangely with the patriotic utterances of three days before.

NOTICE.

Praise be to God.

The Raid (Gazette) informs the public that yesterday (Saturday) His Highness the Bey had a satisfactory interview with General Bréart, the Commander-in-Chief of the French

army which happens to be in the neighbourhood of the capital. This meeting took place in the presence of the Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General of the benevolent French Government. Its object was solely to prove the friendly relations which exist between the two countries. His Highness suggested to the General the prudence of abstaining from a visit to the metropolis, on account of the excitement it might produce, and also requested him to go away with all his troops. The General acceded to the demand, and assured His Highness that he and his soldiers would depart by the same route as they had arrived by, in order to reassure the inhabitants and secure public tranquillity.

We hasten to give publicity to this news.

TUNIS, 17th *Djoudada et Thani* 1298 (15th May 1881).

Unfortunately for the Bey the Raïd was powerless to deceive anybody.

Tunis now assumed, as far as the European quarters were concerned, an appearance of unwonted gaiety. A score of newspaper correspondents at least arrived from the interior, to seek a respite from the official gag and the hardships of camp life; officers in mufti thronged the streets, and the legendary French colony, with its cohort of Israelites, Mozabites, and Algerians, prepared to do honour to the conquerors. M. Roustan did not permit the Raïd alone to enjoy the prerogative of issuing notifications. The ink was hardly dry on the treaty before the following circular was composed:—

NOTICE.

I have the honour to inform you that General Bréart, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic and Commander-in-chief of the French troops, will be happy to receive the nation on Sunday the 15th May at half-past ten o'clock.

(Signed) TH. ROUSTAN.

What took place on that eventful occasion cannot be better described than in the words of the telegram sent to the *Standard* by Mrs. Taylor, the witty and talented correspondent of that paper:—

Generals Bréart and Maurand came by train from Manouba. They proceeded on foot from the station to the French Consulate, escorted by Tunisian soldiers.

M. Roustan received them in the uniform of his new rank, which he had already prepared, in anticipation of his elevation as French Minister.

M. Valensi, who acted as spokesman of the deputation of French inhabitants, said in the course of his address that he did not know whether most to admire the valour of the French troops during the campaign, or the admirable diplomacy of the French Minister, by which the present situation had been brought about.

The correspondent of the *Temps*, speaking in the name of the Press, regretted that, after the privations and toils undergone by the French troops, they should not be permitted to march through the capital.

M. Roustan replied that the magnanimity displayed by the French upon this occasion marked a new era in their relations with Tunis. France would develop the resources of the country, securing her preponderance, and enabling her agents to rival those of friendly nations.

In the afternoon a grand review was held at Manouba in the presence of the generals, M. Roustan, the Musallis, and a crowd of Maltese and Italians.

These passing gaieties were not allowed to postpone for any length of time the more serious business connected with French "protection." Ali Bey came back to Tunis and refused to give a written promise to adhere to the terms of his brother's convention, which the Sultan now declared by telegraph to be null and void. This refractoriness was not destined to be of long duration; the stoppage of his income soon convinced Ali Bey of the practical inconveniences of patriotism; he signed the declaration required of him, burned his ships by tearing up General Logerot's note which he had kept as an emblem of Gallophobism, and became from that day the devoted friend and ally of France. In the course of the 16th and 17th May, M. Roustan discovered in the heart of Tunis a conspiracy which threatened alike the Bey and the Protectorate. Of course all details and evidence were superfluous, and so M. Roustan confined his action to presenting the now docile Muhamed es Sadek with a list of the proscribed traitors. By a mere coincidence it contained the names of all those persons who had been unfavourable to M. Roustan's views during the acute stage of Tunisian politics.

Arbi Zerouck, the President of the municipality, managed to escape in the middle of the night to the British Consulate-General; M. Conti was dismissed for his over-zeal in promoting fruitless appeals, and the rest of the supposed culprits avoided the same fate by "making friends with the mammon of unrighteousness," and conciliating the presiding genius of the new *régime*. El Arby was fortunate enough to obtain permission, through Mr. Reade's intercession two days later, to put the Mediterranean between himself and his persecutors. The patronage now at M. Roustan's disposal was judiciously bestowed; General Elias Musalli succeeded M. Conti with the exalted rank of a Tunisian *Ferík* or General of Division, and Sy Hsuna Meteli, the Bey's buffoon, became President of the Tunisian municipality. A year has passed since then: Sy Hsuna has now the best carriage and finest pair of horses in Tunis, but the streets of the town have become an impassable quagmire.

The French troops now occupied successively Mater and Beja, but signs were not wanting of rocks ahead. The Bey's circular announcing the "re-establishment of friendly relations with France" was received with derision all over the interior. When the injunction "to receive the French like brothers" was proclaimed at the Enfida, the Arabs

declared they "would have nothing to do with the slayers of the Sheikhia," and the few remaining employés of the *Société Marseillaise* took refuge in Tunis under an escort of Mr. Levy's tenants. About the same time England met the just reward of her credulity. On the 19th and 23d May the Maltese ships "Nuova Stella" and "Santa Maria" were boarded and searched by the Commander of the French gunboat "Léopard" off the Tunisian coast.

A week later another evidence of the still smouldering flame of Arab discontent was afforded by the murder of M. Seguin, the correspondent of the *Télégraphe* at Beja. On the 28th May, M. Seguin was walking a short distance outside the town when he was suddenly set upon by an Arab fanatic, who, quitting a group of natives on the road, rushed upon him and felled him to the ground with a heavy stone. Seguin, who was a small, thin man, attempted to defend himself with a dagger which he drew, but his assailant snatched it from his hand and inflicted no less than eight fearful wounds about his head, chest, and stomach before he could be dragged from the body of his victim. Seguin bore his sufferings with much courage, and died in great agony at six o'clock the next morning. His assassin was a deserter from the 2d Regiment

of Algerian Native Infantry—commonly called Turcos—and is said to be a native of Morocco. I afterwards learned that M. Seguin was not more than thirty-two years of age, and was a brilliant scholar; he had been a pupil of the Ecole Normale, and his career might have been a very successful one but for the extreme violence of his political sympathies and antipathies. He joined the Commune heart and soul, and acted as Private Secretary to Rossel during his occupancy of the War Office. M. Seguin contrived to escape, or he would most probably have met with the fate of his chief. As it was, he left his country until the amnesty, earning his living by giving lessons. About a year before his death he published a very remarkable book describing the military forces of the various European Powers, and estimating the probable results of the next trial of strength between France and Germany. The title of the work is “La Prochaine Guerre.” But the next war was in Tunis, and M. Seguin himself was one of its earliest victims.

Ten days afterwards a crowd assembled outside the gate of Beja to see the murderer die. As he was marching to the place of execution, he was heard to exclaim, “I have done my duty; I have killed a Christian. The Prophet and forty Houris are waiting for me in Paradise.” His eyes were

bandaged, he was made to kneel, and died apparently without a pang. It is significant that whilst he was being executed, an Imam, or Moslem priest, stood forth from a neighbouring minaret, and called all faithful Moslems to prayers. A large crowd of natives witnessed the execution, but no show of feeling was perceptible.

The end of the limited monarchy constituted in favour of M. Roustan by the Kasr-es-Said Treaty was now at hand. Nothing short of absolute power could satisfy his ambition; the Pro-Bey of Tunis must be *aut Cæsar aut nullus*. This position could only be attained by the French Minister Resident becoming Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs with General Elias Musalli as permanent under-secretary. On the 8th June M. Roustan announced the realisation of this measure to his former colleagues in an imperial circular:—

TUNIS, June 8th, 1881.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that I have just transmitted to the Bey of Tunis the Act of Ratification of the Treaty of Guarantees concluded on the 12th of last May between the Government of the French Republic and that of the Regency, a copy of which is enclosed. Article 5 of that treaty stipulating that the French Government shall be represented at Tunis by a Resident Minister, the President of the Republic has been pleased to confer upon me that function in virtue of the Commission, a copy of which I also transmit. On his side the Bey, in order to ensure, in so far as he

is concerned, the execution of the Treaty of Guarantees, has delegated by a decree (the translation of which you will find enclosed) the Resident Minister of the French Republic as his sole representative in his relations with the agents of the foreign Powers at Tunis. In bringing these various documents to your knowledge I am anxious to assure you of my earnest desire to maintain, in the *double functions* which I am invested, the good relations existing between the two Governments, and between them and that of the Bey, and I hope I may count on your part on the reciprocity of these sentiments.—I am, &c.,

ROUSTAN, *Resident Minister of the French Republic.*

As a matter of course M. Roustan's first act in his new capacity was to promulgate the Bey's decree upon the subject:—

Whereas the execution of Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Treaty of Guarantees concluded between the Regency and the Government of the French Republic necessitates the constant intervention of the Resident Minister of the Republic in the relations between our Minister for Foreign Affairs and the agents of the Powers at Tunis, and whereas, desiring to avoid the complications which might result from this state of things, we delegate, for the prompt despatch of business, the Resident Minister of the French Republic as our sole official intermediary in the relations with the representatives of the Foreign Powers accredited to our person. We invite the said Resident Minister to communicate the present decree officially in our name to the Government of the Republic and to the agents of the Foreign Powers at Tunis.—Signed on the 11th Redjeb 1298 (8th June 1881). Countersigned, MUSTAPHA, *Minister of the Bey.*

One only of the foreign representatives hastened to offer immediate compliance with the terms of this almost insolent *pronunciamento*. The Chevalier Charles Tulin de la Tunisie at once tendered to M. Roustan the congratulations and adhesion of Germany. Such unexpected condescension was, however, looked on a little suspiciously both at Tunis and in Paris. During the crisis at Tunis M. Tulin certainly did his best to efface from the memory of Frenchmen his very different conduct during the dark days of 1870. In his youth M. Tulin had written an erudite work to prove that Tunisian consuls were really miniature ambassadors; later in life he had been ready to call before a court of law some luckless individual who had dared to assume the name *De Tunis* in disparagement of his own high sounding title of *De la Tunisie* (the unfortunate Bey being the fountain of honour in both cases,) and he finished his career by becoming the *alter ego* of M. Roustan. M. Tulin, bristling with decorations, learned in etiquette, and deeply versed in the *Almanach de Gotha*, was an excellent type of the old school of Tunisian diplomatists. Not wishing to change his peculiar patronymic from De la Tunisie to Du Protectorat, he left Tunis as soon as he had done homage to M. Roustan and has never returned there.

Mustapha was now seized with an uncontrollable desire to see face to face the new allies and masters of Tunis. The Pro-Bey granted the required permission; some *ahads* and *nicháns* were prepared as fast as the Tunisian jewellers could make them, autograph letters containing complimentary nothings were written, and a French man-of-war was placed at his disposal. M. Roustan nominated his suite, General Elias Musalli, Dr. Mascaro, and the broker Volterra, now Master of the Tunisian Mint. The whole party assembled at the Goletta, in the wooden pavilion on piles built out into the sea, commonly called the Summer Palace, to take leave of the Bey. At the supreme moment Muhamed es Sadek placed around the neck of M. Roustan the same decoration as had up to that time been reserved only for princes and potentates. The act was logical enough: M. Roustan had become the sovereign of the nearly broken-hearted old man. Later in the day the "Jeanne d'Arc," with its precious freight of Tunisian worthies, left for Marseilles. Nobody has appreciated the humour of the situation more keenly than M. De Blowitz, who had been for many days undergoing *malgré lui*, a gradual process of disenchantment, concerning Tunis. "The proper aim of the agents of a country," he wrote a day or two later, "is to serve it with all their might, and have in

view, as their recompense, only the honour of having served it. But in truth, if M. Roustan has substituted himself too ostentatiously for his Government, the Bey offers the more curious spectacle of a man who surpasses in self-abasement anything the East has as yet yielded of the kind. The delivery of the riband to M. Roustan is one of those sickening comedies which are only played in the extreme east and on the confines of civilisation. The journey of Mustapha, who is in a hurry to prostrate himself before his conquerors, the enthusiastic declarations of the Bey, and the lofty attitude of M. Roustan, certainly form one of those unsavoury scenes which should be preserved in history as a warning."

Five weeks before, Mustapha was described in nine-tenths of the French papers not only as an arch-enemy and an Italian emissary, but as a criminal of the deepest dye. The Kasr-es-Said Convention intervenes, and this same Mustapha now arrives in France. It is here that we must look for the *dénouement* of this unsurpassed comedy of political folly. The correspondent of the *Daily News* has immortalised the scene in his telegram of the 15th June 1881:—

Mustapha Pacha and his suite arrived at Toulon at seven o'clock this morning, in the "Jeanne d'Arc." The Bey's Premier

was saluted by fifteen guns. He visited the squadron in the harbour, and breakfasted on board the "Colbert." Then he returned to the "Jeanne d'Arc," and was rowed on shore in the admiral's boat. The Sub-Prefect received him. Mustapha Pacha was dressed in a black coat, with the fez. He wore the Grand Cordon of Nichán, the Cross of the Legion of Honour, and the cordon of the same decoration which has just been conferred on M. Roustan. He left Toulon this evening for Marseilles, Lyons, and Paris. Apartments are engaged for him at the Grand Hotel, where he stays ten days. It is rumoured that he will visit London *incognito*, then return to Paris for a week, and go back to Tunis by way of Bordeaux, Madrid, and Algiers.

I must leave Mustapha to distribute his *nicháns* and *ahads* with General Musalli's assistance at the Grand Hotel, and return to the serious side of the war in Tunis.

CHAPTER XXIII.

HOW THE FRENCH TOOK MATER.

THE history of the first French expedition to Tunis contains so much diplomacy and so little fighting, that I have decided to give Mater and General Maurand a chapter to themselves. An additional reason for my doing this is my being able to ask somebody else to tell the story. Mr. Thorwald Llewellyn Smith is an Englishman and a farmer. For some years he has cultivated some of the rich pasture-land between Mater and the Gebel Ishkel Lake, and has naturally acquired considerable influence amongst the Arabs of the neighbourhood, whose language he fluently speaks, whose petty disputes he has sometimes settled, and whose bodily ailments he has often cured. Mr. Smith's white house, cattle-sheds, and trim hedge-rows, standing in the midst of his corn-fields, are all visible from the low hill on which the town of Mater is built. "The Arabs take very little notice of date," writes Mr. Smith in answer to my appeal to describe the

taking of Mater, "and consequently, although they may remember that the French invasion began in the spring-time, during the year of the Flight 1298, they would certainly not be able to say that the 5th of May 1881 was an ill-fated day for the inhabitants of Mater. It was on that day that Sheikh Hmed Ben Yusef of the Algerian clan of the Mukranees, but born and bred on Tunisian territory, came over to Mater from Bizerta as an envoy of the French. I cannot pretend to say what his real instructions were, but it is certain that if he had been specially commissioned to stir up all the mountain tribes of the vicinity to rebellion, he could not have done his work better. The Arabs were already more or less excited and indignant at the way in which Bizerta had been occupied the previous week without a blow being struck in its defence, as well as at the free and easy way in which the French were walking over their country; and, in the innocence of their hearts, they were anxiously awaiting definite instructions from the Bey, through the Caid of their district, to prepare to resist and turn out the invaders.

"On the 29th April (two days prior to the occupation of Bizerta), men had come running to Mater from the coast between Tabarca and Bizerta, saying that the French fleet, consisting of two hundred

vessels at least, had appeared in the offing, that a landing had been effected, and that fortifications were being built! The chief people in Mater at once sent letters to the heads of the surrounding tribes, summoning them to collect all the cavalry and fighting men they could, and come to Mater for the purpose of opposing the invaders. They also sent off letters to Tunis, asking the Caid, who resides there, for his orders. They were very enthusiastic and anxious to begin, and on a man crying out, 'It seems that though the thief is at the door, the watch-dog is chained up,' his simile was very much applauded. These simple, ignorant, but courageous people could not be made to comprehend that they had no chance against their well-armed and disciplined foes. A day or two later it transpired that the 'black crow' which had given rise to the story of the landing, was the shipwreck on the coast of a little Corsican brig laden with empty barrels. The captain and owner of the boat was brought to Mater. He spoke Italian and claimed that nationality. The Arabs treated him well and sent him on to Tunis, while guards went to the coast to see that the remainder of the crew were well cared for, and that the ship and its cargo were not meddled with.

"I do not say that if these people had been

recognised as Frenchmen, they would not have been, under the existing provocation, ill-treated, or possibly killed. Every Arab in Mater knew what had been done at Tabarca and was being done amongst the Khamírs. As it happened, however, both captain and crew escaped unhurt, and according to their own showing had nothing to complain of. Nevertheless, when some days later Mater was occupied, the tribes adjoining the scene of the disaster were given up to indiscriminate pillage; their huts were burned, their women's bracelets taken away, and their cattle confiscated. The punishment was as severe as it was unmerited, unless it was a crime for these poor people to have allowed a French vessel to be wrecked on their coast.

“As days passed by, the Arabs were in an increasing state of uncertainty as to the course they ought to pursue, but were fully determined to be loyal to their Bey, if he proved true to his trust, and in any case and under all circumstances not to allow the French to conquer them without a struggle. The sensation produced, therefore, can be very well imagined, when Hamed Ben Yusef appeared suddenly on the scene, loudly declaring that the Bey's dynasty had passed away for ever, and that those who did not side with the French must be pre-

pared to fight for their independence and their homes.

“Their first idea was to kill the envoy, who by the insolent way he spoke almost seemed to court death; but luckily for him the Khalifa, or sub-governor, Hamda El Kateb, who possessed considerable influence over the tribesmen, refused to leave his side. During the darkness of the following evening Sidi Hamda managed to smuggle the emissary out of the place, but in doing so he ran considerable risk, as many of the Arabs rushed wildly about the town calling out that the Khalifa had been bribed to facilitate the man’s escape.

“Soon after the arrival in Mater of Hamed Ben Yusef the heads of the tribes came in a body to consult me, and ask me if I knew the truth about what was going on between the French and the Bey. I naturally answered, that not having been in Tunis for some time, I was as ignorant as they were. They then entreated me to go on their behalf to the Prime Minister; and I accordingly started the same afternoon and rode to Tunis, a distance of some fifty miles: this was on the 8th of May. Early the next morning I went to see Mustapha, and told him all that had happened. He promised to send a letter by a special messenger, but could not give me any satisfactory answer for

the tribes, merely repeating over and over again, 'that they should not oppose the entry of the French into Mater if they came there.' When I returned with this message on the afternoon of the 9th May, I found most of the chiefs assembled about a mile on the Tunis side of the town awaiting my arrival. They were not at all pacified by Mustapha's answer, and declared that Mater did not belong to the Bey, but to the Arabs, and that they would not give it up. About 8000 of them were now assembled about six miles on the Bizerta road, and they appeared to be determined to march on Bizerta itself.

"It was with the greatest difficulty, and after employing every means of persuasion in my power, that I prevented this rabble army of half-mad fanatics from marching to certain destruction. They at last came back to Mater, and made night hideous by repeated false alarms that the French were upon us; each of these scares being accompanied by a rush for their horses, and a general stampede in the direction of a bridge which crosses a little river outside the town. This bridge is in a hollow, and the foolish people thought they could defend it, although, of course, it would have been quite untenable. Fortunately enough for the Arabs, the French did not arrive till the 18th May, when

most of the mountaineers, tired out with waiting, had gone to their homes. General Maurand's task was consequently a very easy one, for he was only opposed by a handful of horsemen and a rabble of the countryfolk mostly armed with bludgeons, amongst whom, unorganised as they were and totally ignorant of the methods of modern warfare, it was not difficult to create a panic. A few well-directed shells soon put them to flight, and as soon as they heard the projectiles exploding behind them, they imagined they were entirely surrounded, and fled in all directions. Very few lives were lost: one or two only of the most hardy horsemen who rode right up to the enemy's ranks were shot, and the French did not lose a single man. Having now met their foes face and face, the Arabs were better able to form an accurate idea of the immeasurable superiority of the invading forces, and it was quite sufficient that one tribe should lay down its rusty swords and gaspipe-looking guns, for all the rest to follow the example.

“As soon as the tribes had consented to obey the French, detachments were sent round to collect their arms. I do not suppose that there were many weapons given up that would be considered worthy of a place in the *Musée d'Artillerie*, for every man who had a decent gun hid it away, in expectancy

of the arrival of the Sultan's troops, and surrendered some venerable Belgian flint-lock instead. These from their enormous length look as if they were sold by the yard, and are only preserved from bursting by the fact that the powder usually sold in the Regency is about two-thirds charcoal, and consequently not very strong.

“I was now to reap the reward of my honest endeavours to preserve the Arabs from a helpless struggle, and give the French the most bloodless of victories. No sooner had the French occupied Mater, than fifty cavalry made a sortie and galloped all over my property, treading down the ripe corn and frightening the horses. After devastating the kitchen-garden, they rode up to my labourers' huts, the inmates of which immediately fled. I then went to Mater and expressed a hope that General Maurand would prevent the destruction of my property. The General conducted me outside his tent, and addressed me in a loud voice before all his troops as follows:—‘The French forces have behaved in a magnificent manner throughout the campaign (they had only marched fifteen miles from Manouba), and I am astonished that a member of a civilised nation, as you appear to be, could complain of anything the French might do for the furtherance of civilisation; and learn, once and for

all, that in time of war the French do not confine themselves to roads, but always take the shortest cut to victory and glory !' The next day, however, I had another visit from the troopers, and a corporal held a revolver at my servant's head.

"I soon perceived that it would be impossible for me to remain in Mater under the reign of terror. My property had already been greatly damaged, and it was very necessary that I should protect the rest of it. Several of the Arabs of course came to me, as an old friend, to ask my advice, which was invariably 'to obtain the French *aman* as soon as possible.' A day or two after a Maltese horse-dealer and a Greek tobacco-merchant called at my house, to ask my influence and good offices to get them some custom from the troops. After this the attitude of the General became so menacing that I felt I was no longer safe in Mater ; and although I was in the midst of my reaping and harvesting, I was compelled to come to Tunis to place the matter before my own authorities. The same day my friend the General wrote the following letter concerning me to General Bréart :—

“MATER, *May 24.*

“MY GENERAL,—I had the honour to report to you in my despatch of yesterday the arrival at Mater of the English and Italian Consuls of Bizerta, as well as the almost arrogant

attitude of Mr. Smith, an English subject and a large land-owner of Mater. The relations between these three persons are a mystery to no one here. I learn to-day that Mr. Smith has supplied powder and bullets to the Arabs who fought against you on the 18th. He possesses within about three kilometres to the north-west of the camp, in the midst of a *douar*, a residence which is said to be a meeting-place of Arab emissaries and others, and a centre of intrigues against us. Perhaps he keeps our enemies informed of all our movements, and it may be that it is to him we owe the shots which are fired at our patrols. The presence of such a person close to Mater is really intolerable. But for his being an English subject I should have already taken rigorous measures against him, and I cannot leave you in ignorance how much this situation adds to the difficulties which I have already to overcome here, in order to rally by degrees the mountain Sheikhs, and I hope, that in concert with the Minister of France at Tunis, you will find means to secure us against his proceedings. I have just learnt that Mr. Smith has left for Tunis.

(Signed) MAURAND.'

“I had no sooner arrived at Tunis than M. Roustan made an official complaint against me to the British Consul-General, but very fortunately he enclosed the above copy of General Maurand's report. The Italian Consul at Bizerta turned out not to have been at Mater for eight years, while his colleague of England, a timorous mortal, had never quitted his house since the taking of Bizerta! The other charges in the letter are not less apocryphal. Even M. Roustan was obliged to declare that he would not support the accusation, and after a fort-

night I returned to my farm. Of course I duly made a claim for all my losses, but I have never heard anything more of it from that day to this, and I suppose it is peacefully reposing in some pigeon-hole in Downing Street. General Maurand was, I believe, severely reprimanded, but he took his revenge. I was boycotted at Mater, and no Frenchman was ever allowed to hold any communication with *Smeet le Kroumir*. My punishment extended even to Bizerta, where a month later, the hotelkeeper told me my polluting presence would lose him the custom of *MM. les Officiers*, and begged me to decamp. I am not sorry, however, that I was the means of preventing a great loss of life by a little good advice given in season to the brave but ignorant natives of the Mater district."

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE CHASSE AUX KHAMÍRS.

BEFORE M. Roustan had managed to convert the French Protectorate over Tunis into a personal dictatorship, France was already heartily tired of the Khamírs. The expedition which began in the enthusiasm of credulity was destined to end amidst a storm of universal ridicule. No amount of press restrictions could conceal the patent fact that the Khamírs were difficult to find and still more difficult to catch, and early in June the comic papers of Paris and Lyons were either representing Generals Vincendon and Forgemol engaged in a minute examination of the Tabarca mountains with Brobdignagian magnifying glasses, or portrayed the Commander-in-chief carefully searching a bush with a lantern, and singing to a popular refrain:—

“ Forgemol dit la lanterne à la main
 —J’ai beau chercher. Où diable est le Kroumir ?
 Il était là, disait on, hier matin
 Sœur Vincendon, ne vois tu rien venir ? ”

The question was then, *Où est le Khamír?* It has never been answered yet, and there seems little probability of its being ever entirely cleared up. An enterprising Paris manufacturer patented a mechanical toy which consisted in the perpetually revolving figures of a mounted Arab pursued by a French hussar, and called it the "*Chasse aux Kroumírs*" (Khamírs). This man at least understood the humour of the situation, and the movements of the toy are hardly more monotonous than the details of the enterprise it so fairly represents.

M. Albert de la Berge has devoted twenty pages of his "History of the Tunisian Expedition" to the events in Khamír-land between the 27th April and the 16th June, but even he begins his narrative with an apology for its barrenness of any notable event:— "The attack on the Khamírs," he writes, "is rather a great military manœuvre, or a voyage of topographical discovery, than a war in the ordinary sense of the term." Although I can hardly agree with M. De la Berge, in the absence of any precise information as to the scientific result attained by the enterprise, I should certainly advise my readers to skip over this chapter as inevitably dull and uninteresting.

Up to the night in which Ali Bey made good his retreat to Ben Bachir (April 27th), very little pro-

gress had been made by the invading columns. The Vincendon brigade, which formed both the centre and the advanced guard, was then encamped on the Kef-Cheraga plateau close to the frontier, and from which reconnoitring parties were despatched to operate in two directions. The column of General Galland was to the left, on the ridge known as Reched Mankoura, but the brigade Ritter, now commanded by General Caillot, had returned to the camp at El Aioun. This force had encountered severe resistance, and the cause of its retrograde movement has never been satisfactorily explained. Torrential rain now impeded any further progress; the soldiers, encamped in a thick fog, were severely tried both by wet and cold; and after the first day's fighting the main body of the Khamírs had disappeared to the north. The huts of the Ouled Cedra were given up to the *goumiers* of their Algerian rivals, the Ouled Nehed, who completely destroyed them. During the two following days the neighbouring valleys were explored *en reconnaissance*; at times a brush with the Khamírs took place, but oftener nothing was found but abandoned villages. On the 1st May all the three brigades received orders to unite at El Hammam and to move eastwards towards Fernana. Meanwhile the force under General Brem occupied the station at Souk el Arba,

while General Logerot led his column northwards, also to take up a position at Fernana. The object of this combined movement was to surround the Khamírs, who *were supposed* to be concentrated around a famous *kouba* or sanctuary, on the summit of a lofty mountain, called Djebel Sidi Abdallah Ben Djemel. On the 5th May the three brigades arrived at Feldj-Mana, close to the foot of the Djebel Abdallah, and the camp was established upon three hills, and there some few of the Khamírs gave in their submission.

General Logerot had by this time arrived at Ali Bey's old camping ground at Sidi Saleh, and on the evening of May 6th General Forgemol was able to join him there from Feldj-Mana, to decide on a plan for the attack on Djebel Abdallah, where several thousand Khamírs were still believed to be assembled. At dawn, on the 8th May, twelve battalions from the three columns Caillot, Vincendon, and Galland, left their knapsacks in the camp, and started for the *marabout* of Sidi Abdallah Djemel. The white dome of the saint's tomb could be seen five miles off, but the advancing troops only came across recently abandoned *douars*, in some of which the embers were still smouldering. As the summit of the mountain was gained, the Khamírs were perceived disappearing on the other side of it. Three

hundred head of cattle, however, fell into the hands of the troops. At eleven o'clock A.M. the General arrived at the *marabout* itself, where he was received by a very old and dirty Khamír, who declared he was the guardian of the place, which was of the meanest description, although revered for a long distance on both sides of the frontier. With the exception of this solitary ecclesiastic, not another living soul was visible. The immediate vicinity of the *kouba* seemed to be the necropolis of all Khamír-land. The corpses were covered with the thinnest layer of earth, and an opening was actually left above the head. Many of the unfortunate victims of the 26th April had evidently been buried there in the odour of sanctity, and the poisoned atmosphere about the spot rendered the *marabout* a most undesirable abiding place.

While the flying column under General Delebecque was climbing up to the great Khamír shrine, bent on the hopeless *chasse aux Khamírs*, General Logerot had pushed on to a position about seven miles north-east of Fernana, in the direction of Ben or Bou Matir, but found that it would be necessary to carry out somewhat extensive works before the country could be made accessible to cavalry and artillery. Then followed another series of *reconnaissances*, but all attempts to come up with any

number of Khamírs seemed fruitless. One day a few of them were dislodged from a ravine by firing the brushwood, but on the morrow (May 10th) they came back close to the camp and killed three soldiers before their presence was discovered. On the following morning the French moved to a position between Sidi Abdallah and the Meridj mountain, in the direction of Ain Drahan ("the silver spring"), where a junction with General Logerot was to be effected. "Our soldiers," writes M. De la Berge, "found the dead bodies of some Khamírs in the forest, several deserted huts were burned, the barley crops on the march were reaped, and the engineers received orders to destroy the marabout of Sidi Abdallah." The same afternoon General Logerot reached El Fedj, and while the camp was being pitched, the Algerian irregular cavalry were sent ahead towards Ben Matir. They suddenly came upon the enemy, and although strong reinforcements were sent to the front, the Khamírs for a long time managed to hold their own, till dislodged from their position by the fire of the mountain guns. Ten soldiers were placed *hors de combat* on the side of the French, of whom five were killed. Stations were now permanently established at Ain Drahan and Fernana, and strongly garrisoned. On the 14th May the columns Caillot and Vincendon

marched towards Ben Matir, which was evidently the strategic stronghold of that country. The way lay through woody defiles, which the Khamírs had endeavoured to make impregnable by throwing down huge oak-trees across the paths, and the passage was undoubtedly a task of serious difficulty. It was however accomplished, with the loss of some of the baggage mules, and a junction effected with General Logerot's troops coming from El Fedj. The column commanded by Colonel O'Neill sustained an engagement with the Khamírs in the woods during some hours, but with the exception of this comparatively unimportant resistance, the rich valley of Ben Matir, the most fertile spot in the whole country, was occupied without a blow being struck. Here a certain number of tribes made their formal submission, but other clans continued to hold out. The Mekna only yielded after two engagements, and the Ouled Yahia never asked for the *aman* till they had lost both homes and herds (June 1st).

This is a brief outline of the operations which the summer heat now brought abruptly to a close. The *razzias* and *reconnaissances* which were necessary up to the very day of their termination, afford the best proof of their incompleteness and insufficiency, except so far as to give a tangible colour

to the invasion of the country. The plague-stricken post at Fernana has been abandoned, and French garrisons now only remain at Ain Drahan and Tabarca. As far as I could ascertain from M. Panariello, during my visit to La Calle four months later, the practical result of the campaign has been to give the Khamírs at least a semi-independence. In September they were in a position to declare that unless an obnoxious *Caid* was removed, they would no longer pay any taxes, and Sidi Yusef (Colonel Allegro) has never even attempted to join his post as their governor. M. Panariello declares that the entire subjugation of the frontier tribes must be the gradual task of years, and will require engineering works upon a large scale before it can be completed.

By the 20th June only about 6000 men remained in the country, comprising the garrisons at Bizerta, Kef, Tabarca, Manouba, Ghardimaou, Fernana, and Ain Drahan. It now only remained for General Farre to congratulate the country, the army, and himself—a task which he hastened to perform in the following “order of the day :”—

Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers,—At the moment when the operations on the frontiers have ceased, I am happy to recognise the services which the troops engaged in them have rendered, and to congratulate them on the results obtained.

They have amply justified the confidence expressed by the

President of the Republic when not a year ago he presented their colours to each army corps.

In all ranks unrivalled zeal and patriotism have been displayed during this arduous campaign. The soldiers have endured untold privations in the midst of an impenetrable country and under the disadvantages of an unfavourable climate and constant bad weather. Nevertheless, their ardour has surmounted all obstacles, and I am rejoiced to congratulate them.

But I must not the less congratulate their chiefs,—the officers of all grades, the functionaries of all classes, the zeal, intelligence, ardour, and capacity of whom have contributed to obtain such satisfactory results from our young troops.

Their incessant care and paternal vigilance *have preserved sanitary conditions which are really surprising*, when the circumstances and difficulties of the operations themselves are considered.

I must address special congratulations to General Forgemol, whose supreme command has been exercised with rare wisdom; to General Delebecque, who led the column which took the principal part in the operations; to General Logerot, who knew how to give *une énergique impulsion* to his soldiers; to General Bréart, who represented our country under *difficult circumstances*, as well as to the generals and superior officers under their orders.

These services will not be forgotten. Every one who has taken part in the campaign has earned the gratitude of the Republic.

The Minister of War,

(Signed) FARRE.

At the very time when General Farre's proclamation was issued, the streets of Marseilles were witnessing the unedifying spectacle of a *chasse aux*

Italiens as a melancholy sequel to the *chasse aux Khamírs*. On the evening of the 17th June, as a portion of the expeditionary corps were defiling in triumphal procession through the "capital of the South," General Vincendon heard, or thought he heard, furtive hisses issue from the Italian Club. Turning towards the building he exclaimed aloud, "*Merci, Messieurs les Italiens.*" This incautious expression bore disastrous fruit, and for three days not an Italian's life was safe in Marseilles. It was afterwards proved that the Italian hisses were as imaginary as the *Khamír* raids. A French gentleman, who was on the balcony of the building in question at the time (M. Gibon), hastened to publish an emphatic refutation of General Vincendon's ill-timed accusation in the following terms :—

I, the undersigned, a Frenchman standing on the balcony of the Italian National Club on the afternoon of the 17th, when the troops passed, formally protest, out of respect for the truth, against the accusation that the hisses were given from that balcony. Neither I nor any other person in my company made any manifestation hostile to our valorous soldiers, and I should have been the first to repress any such act, and to denounce its author. I declare that the rooms of the Club were empty at that moment, and that the only persons present were Signor Tonietti and his son Enrico Pierruzzini and Raffaello Pirri, who were on the balcony with me.

But it was too late. Signor Oddo, an unoffending Italian dentist, who, after a quarter of a century passed in curing the toothache of successive Beys of Tunis, had come to settle in Marseilles, was one of the first to be knocked down and brutally kicked. He at last escaped with his life by a miracle, but only to break up his establishment and seek refuge in Naples. Several Italians and Frenchmen were killed, and Italy's cup of vengeance fairly ran over. Anti-French demonstrations spread from one end of the Peninsula to the other; and the word "Marseilles" has become the watchword of Italian *vendetta*, effacing the memory of half a century of friendship, and blotting out the recollection of Magenta and Solferino. Behind the real grievance of the riots of Marseilles the militant policy of Signor Maccio will be forgotten. Two weeks later the French fleet was bombarding the city of Sfax in Southern Tunis, and three parts of the Regency were in open revolt.

The French papers were not the only ones to realise the grim humour of the whole business. A few verses from *Punch*, in explanation of a cartoon in which the Republic of Peace is seen trying on the garb of war, sums up the first epoch of the French Invasion with caustic correctness:—

France (trying on Casque) loquitur—

BECOMES me ! *La République c'est la paix ?*

Oh yes, precisely.

And yet this Mars-like headpiece, I must say,

Fits rather nicely.

Revanche ? La Guerre ? La Gloire ? Powder and Steel ?

Oh never, never !

I do thank Heaven that I no longer feel

War's scarlet fever.

I chose this fashion, and have no desire

For hasty changing,

Only just now and then dress does require

Some re-arranging.

I grow pugnacious ? Such reports are wild,

Mendacious rumours ;

Although of course I'm not to be reviled

By rascal Kroumirs.

Fancy ! I'm not a *Caquet Bonbec* quite,

A barnyard scratcher ;

And if *la France* had a desire to fight,

How few could match her !

That Bey's a bit too bounceable ; he'll find

Swelling brings ^sdizziness.

The Powers ? Perhaps they will be pleased to mind

Their proper business.

Confound— But stay—no temper ; that an old

Imperial lunc is,

But which of them will have the cheek to scold

Concerning Tunis ?

The notion stirs my blood, makes my tint turn,

My voice swell louder ;

They think me tame ? Then I *shall* have to burn

A little powder ;

A shot or two perhaps might tend to strengthen
 My moral fibres,
 And cause the physiognomies to lengthen
 Of foreign gibbers.
 Eh? What? That Circular of SAINT-HILAIRE
 Causes hilarity?
 Disgusting! Foreign critics, I declare,
 Are void of charity.
 I've been a Saint in patience all men know—
 Almost *too* saintly;
 Astonished Europe thinks my blood must flow
 Feebly and faintly—
 Let those who doubt me read the declaration
 Of *mon cher* FERRY.
 "Respect for law, strict justice, moderation"—
 True, true—oh, very!
 Annex? *Fi donc!* I solemnly proclaim
 'Tis false, completely.
 But—— Well this jaunty headpiece, all the same,
 Becomes me sweetly.

(*Left admiring herself.*)

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

CORRIGENDA, VOL. I.

- Page 2, quotation from M. Villot's book to end, line 2, page 3.
" 13, line 17, for "Gassa" read "Gafsa."
" 23, line 24, for "furik" read "thrik."
" 30, line 14, for "Soussa" read "Susa."
" 30, line 15, for "Zorbir" read "Zobir."
" 30, line 15, for "Febri" read "Fehri."
" 34, line 7, for "Menakin" read "Menakir."
" 42, line 2, for "Cossier" read "Copier."
" 45, line 14, for "Galibra" read "Galippia."
" 48, lines 3 and 16, for "Sinau" read "Sinan."
" 89, line 21, for "Jurieu" read "Jurien."
" 128, line 13, for "Consul" read "Vice-Consul."
" 148, line 6, for "Rofls" read "Rohlfis."
" 148, line 14, *et passim*, for "Botmilian" read "Botmiliau."
" 158, line 23, for "Le blunt" read "Leblant" *et passim*.



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