


The American Army

✧ William Harding Carter ✧

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THE AMERICAN ARMY



WILLIAM HARDING CARTER
Major General United States Army

THE AMERICAN ARMY

By

WILLIAM HARDING CARTER

Major General, United States Army

Author of

OLD-ARMY SKETCHES, HORSES, SADDLES AND BRIDLES

FROM YORKTOWN TO SANTIAGO WITH

SIXTH CAVALRY, ETC.



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With profound respect this volume is inscribed to

GEORGE WASHINGTON

10/31/33

the first Commander-in-Chief, whose customs of war
have come down through the generations to mark
all that is noblest in the ethics of the American army.

Blough

207902

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The manuscript of this volume was begun before the outbreak of the present war in Europe, with a view to setting forth the conditions and methods of administration of the American army, and the urgent need of nationalizing and organizing our military resources while there is no war-cloud on our horizon. During all the earlier years of the Republic, the limitless faith in the ocean barriers guarding our coasts prevented a hearing of those who urged a definite military policy for the nation. Leviathan passenger ships, each capable of transporting a brigade such as fought the battles of the Civil War, have changed all that. We are now at peace with the world and the prayers of every American household are for a continuation of that desirable status for all time, but our interests are too great for us to occupy forever the safe side of every question.

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THE AMERICAN ARMY

I

PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

"A solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all important to the permanency of your felicity as a people."—WASHINGTON.

THE problems of advancing civilization, instead of growing simpler, are becoming more varied and complex, through territorial expansion, race antagonism and unequal distribution of economic power. Nations unable or unwilling to defend their rights are accorded scant respect. Helpless peoples, rankling with injustice, may hold rebellious hearts, but the price of liberty still remains in strong battalions. Elihu Root, jurist, diplomat and statesman, has thus epitomized the necessity for armies:

"No sense of justice, no desire for peace, no kindness of heart can turn aside the inexorable decree of the overwhelming powers that bring war and will bring war in the future, as they have brought it in the past. It lies not in the generous impulses of the

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human heart, but it lies in the working out of the destiny of mankind that no people can avoid.”

A well-balanced distribution of the influence of nations will, in the future as in the past, depend upon the ability of each to guard its own interests. It is folly for one nation to expect favors from another. Nations play unceasingly at diplomacy, but grim-visaged war lurks ever in the background. The wise men of a day and generation, drawing general conclusions from isolated examples, evolve schools of philosophy which are soon shattered by the proofs of rude experience. The most altruistic conceptions are confounded by the actual events of history. Since the foundations of the peace palace at The Hague were laid there has followed a procession of wars, and no amount of hopefulness or literature concerning the prevention of international disputes may be expected to alter materially the course of history, which evinces quite indubitably that interruptions of peace will continue to arise from commercial rivalry or a desire to throw off the yoke of a government become insupportable to the burden bearers.

The greediness of man is responsible for much of the miscarriage of justice amongst his fellow men. So the greediness of nations, arising not from mere selfishness, but from the necessity for providing for the increase of population incident to prolonged periods of well-fed peace, operates to interrupt the course of other peoples, sometimes to their higher civilization, sometimes to their all but annihilation,

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as in the case of the American Indians of the tide-water region, whose country was desired by our own colonizing ancestors. Some of the smaller countries owe their separate existence to that indefinable something called balance of power, but which somehow suggests inability of the more powerful nations to agree upon terms of partition or absorption, with the same ease as in the cases of Poland, Egypt, Korea, Africa, and as seems in a fair way to be done with Manchuria, Mongolia, Persia and Thibet.

The expenditures of nations for war purposes have assumed such vast proportions as to stagger students of history, unless they constantly bear in mind the changes due to steadily increasing civilization and its wealth producing attributes. Without the restraints of modern civilization there would be no encouragement to accumulation, for all would be at the mercy of those who seize and hold.

No great nation has yet been able to establish and maintain a permanent form of government without an armed power to sustain it. Between the societies for the prevention of international disputes and the practical fact of ever increasing armament, there is ample evidence that upon no other subject are men so widely apart to-day as that of war. If there be a middle ground between the extremes of opinion, America should point the way and mark the course. Regardless of arguments, war will continue to be respectable so long as human liberty and the opportunity for progress depend upon the arbitrament of arms. Inspired by the enthusiasm of a just cause,

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men will continue to enlist under their country's banners without regard to the hardships, dangers and paltry pay, to the end that the door of hope may not be closed to them and to their descendants. When the veil is lifted from the tangles of diplomacy, peace-loving nations often find themselves enmeshed in the vagaries of contrary policies due primarily to the efforts of each nation to gain advantage to the end that the prosperity of its own people may be favorably affected.

Civilization has progressed fitfully along rough and often bloody roads but, considered by decades and centuries, progress has been steadfast, and each generation has managed to solve the difficult problems of its own period. It is only a question of concentration of energy upon a given subject, at a particular time, with the best means available. Of all the questions of the hour none is more important than that of preserving peace through comprehensive and well-defined policies and ability to enforce them. The complications arising from an immigration policy with a closed door and a commercial policy of the open door furnish our public officials with practice in mental gymnastics that would be much simplified if our political and military policies were more carefully harmonized.

Our country leads the world in the number of its arbitration treaties, in which are incorporated the principle of preliminary deliberation in international disputes before resorting to war. More than thirty of the forty nations maintaining embassies at

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our seat of government have signified their acceptance of the principle and it is confidently expected that ultimately all the nations will agree to a period of time for reflection, conciliation and adjustment of questions in dispute and thus reduce occasions for appeal to the arbitrament of arms. In the meantime, treaties are useless without sufficient power, separately, or jointly with allies, immediately available to enforce them.

Notwithstanding all the safeguards that a higher civilization may provide, there will continue to come into the life of nations, at uncertain intervals, questions which will arouse so deeply the spirit of patriotism and the resentment of a whole people that those who continue the appeal for peace will be cast out as traitors, and those who lead armies and fleets to victory will be heralded as heroes and their deeds commemorated in bronze and marble. When deep-seated patriotism is aroused, men no longer consider the commercial elements of questions at issue, but, knowing full well the dangers of camp and battle, march forth to do or die, for the honor of the nation's flag, merely a bit of silk or bunting, but a sacred emblem around which are clustered memories of ancestors who have rallied to its defense. This reverent feeling of patriotism, immeasurable in a commercial way, is confined to no age or generation, but lingers in the atmosphere of homes from the frozen fiords of the Arctic North to those opposite regions of eternal ice under the Southern Cross and continues one of the foundation stones

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of stable government. In the face of all theory and academic argument, this has been the history of progress, and out of gigantic struggles upon land and sea civilization has come triumphant and individual liberty has been guaranteed to a greater degree than at any former period of the world's existence.

The affairs of nations call for the best efforts of statesmen and the legitimate development of high and patriotic politics, yet we seem ever to stand and wait at the door of opportunity until each crisis is at the threshold. Our isolation and the rivalries of European nations have served in the past to guard us from the usual results of neglect of an established military policy. All our energies have been directed to the development of a vast agricultural domain and the upbuilding of infant industries, too much devotion to which may in the end subject the nation to a humiliation, which diplomacy may assuage but not remove, with the questionable balm of palaver—an anæsthetic without an operation.

World questions have come to inject themselves into our national life and though we attempt to drug the public conscience by calling interference in the affairs of autonomous nations pacification, restoration of order or merely the protection of the rights of American citizens residing abroad, nevertheless we are becoming gradually accustomed to such employment of our military and naval forces. Whether it be the taking over of the customs houses of neighboring islands, or defending legations in the far-

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distant Orient, or restoring order in disrupted Central American republics, we are gradually assuming the role of arbiter of helpless nations and the human mind can not foresee the trail of consequences which will inevitably follow from precedents trivial in themselves. We are not executing comprehensive policies, but drifting from one international obligation to another, basing our action in each case upon the expediency of the moment.

Vast numbers of high-minded Christian men and women, pondering upon the horrors and waste of the existing war in Europe, honestly believe that the dawn of a new civilization is at hand, and that in the not distant future armies and navies will be maintained only to enforce the decisions of courts of arbitration. Principles sometimes yield to expediency, as laws yield to force, while the cupidity of nations goes relentlessly on undermining the resourcefully planned schemes of men, the destruction and overturning of which may be and oftentimes are rehabilitated only through the carnage of war.

In the face of accumulated and presumptuous wrong, affecting the commercial or political rights of a nation, all fine-spun and academic arguments against war are swept away in the rising tide of public opinion, against which parties and governments are as chaff before the wind. It was this state of the public mind that Washington portrayed in his farewell address:

“Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay

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hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions occur. Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, . . . leads to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concession, by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld.”

It is the acceptance of these unalterable facts that brings to the front, in each generation, those who contend for a military policy adapted to the genius of our political institutions. The ever changing elements controlling a republican form of government seem absolutely athwart the path of a consistent policy, sufficiently enduring to insure a guarantee of military efficiency. Nevertheless, there is a steadily increasing sentiment that a reasonable preparation for probable contingencies is the surest guarantee of peace. It is this sentiment which has brought about the reconstruction of the fleets, which in twenty years have passed from a state of absolute and shameful mediocrity to a high plane of efficiency,

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creditable alike to American shipyards and to a superb naval personnel.

In every crisis of human affairs the pessimist is ever present, and governments can not count upon unanimous support in the adjustment of grave questions. In all our wars we have encountered these conditions. The Tory of the Revolution had his counterpart in the Copperhead of the Civil War and, in both struggles, it was the faith of the few which carried along sufficient mass to deliver the final blows necessary to secure success. Nevertheless, we have regarded ourselves with much complacency as being something different and apart from the rest of the world and our awakening has been long overdue. It may not come until the ruthless development of nature's wealth shall have proceeded to a point when fortune no longer flows, as by a touch of the magician's wand, and we find ourselves in a world's competition which the tariff wall may not forefend. There can be no individual accounting, for the responsibility rests upon the nation, struggling with the manifold problems and seeking for light with as much intelligence and righteousness as ever characterized the efforts of the human race.

The brief war which tore from the crown of Spain the last and finest of her galaxy of colonial possessions, thrust upon America responsibilities of world-wide gravity, demanding more than altruism, if the nation is to enter the tangled fields of diplomacy upon terms of equality with others of like claims to

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greatness. When the diplomats with their courteous formalities have withdrawn; when The Hague and its arbitral opportunities have been scorned and the tocsin of war resounds in the land, history will repeat itself unless we are prepared.

War is one of the recognized instruments of civilization for enforcing the decrees of diplomacy, yet our practice has ever been to drift complacently, confident that the greatness of our unorganized resources will deter militant nations from attacking us.

It is profitless to indulge in academic discussion as to the wisdom of expending national wealth upon fleets and armies, so long as the countries possessing those military essentials continue to be the centers of the world's wealth in treasure, science and the arts. Capital seeks investment at reasonable rates of interest only under governments whose stability is assured. The American army is, and of a right should be, maintained for the preservation of law and order within our own borders and to prevent aggression wherever floats the flag which in a world-wide journey has not lost its benediction. A nation which has not the force at call to guarantee the neutrality of its borders and to give protection to its citizens at home and abroad lacks the very essentials of a sovereign power.

In the closing hours of his mortal career, General Ulysses Grant wrote these warning words:

“To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occur-

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ring among our own people again; but growing as we are in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out."

In the presence of grave emergencies, no other nation has been more prodigal than America of its wealth for military and naval purposes. Our plain duty, based solely on self-interest, now lies in forecasting probable international disputes and their relation to our policies and to make such preparation as will enable us to insist upon proper solutions of questions which might otherwise provoke war. Well considered laws and regulations, administered through a proper military hierarchy, make a national force the safest, the best and by far the most economical having regard to our widely dispersed obligations and the needs for keeping alive military knowledge, traditions and customs which are of great moment to the security of the nation, and which will enable it always to stand with bold front, while the great body of patriotic but untrained citizens are organizing for war.

Sophistry and concealment find no place in our treatment of other nations and the country will continue its endeavor to fulfill its destiny and its duties as one of the great world powers without becoming a nation-in-arms. On the other hand, *it is an imperative duty that our military resources shall be organ-*

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ized and nationalized and that the doctrine of peace at any price shall not be permitted to confuse or retard the execution of that policy.

Accepting without hesitation the doctrine that no amount of desire on our part and no degree of intellectual heights to which we may attain will prevent the recurrence of wars, it behooves us to analyze the problems of the hour and being forewarned to forearm for contingencies by common and general consent and not fritter away our strength by separating in hostile camps under the banners of those who believe in military preparedness and those who pray for peace at any price.

The period following the war with Spain has been filled with accomplishment. Never before has the army found such generous encouragement of professional preparation and such willingness to experiment with every proposed improvement giving genuine promise of success. But reforms move slowly, especially when congressional action is required, for experienced legislators realize that enthusiasm is not always followed by achievement and that policies sometimes change with chameleon-like rapidity. The responsibility of Congress is absolute, under our government, and the only way to ultimate success is to present the needs of the army, under whatever policy may be adopted by the military authorities, leaving to the legislative bodies the determination as to the order in which public funds shall be appropriated for the execution of the manifold projects arising in a great country still in its swaddling-clothes

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stage of development. If the majority of a committee of Congress is convinced of the righteousness of any measure there is encouragement for the future, but without conviction there is no hope. Success by appeal over a committee to Congress is practically impossible. An honest public opinion may and does, often, induce consideration of measures, but the mere padding of newspapers and magazines with inspired articles results not infrequently in more harm than good. The dignity of the service, preserved and transmitted by a long line of educated, gallant and distinguished soldiers, dictates that the problems of the army should be clearly set forth, relying upon the merits of the case to secure consideration and leaving untrammelled the responsibility for action where the nation has placed it.

That the great and small problems of the army have been studied by as intelligent and devoted officers as are possessed by any nation, there is no doubt. Whether the solutions produced from time to time accord with our civil policies is for those in authority to determine. In any event, the late General Upton very clearly pointed the path of duty when he wrote, that:

“Unless we frame and bequeath to the succeeding generations a military system suggested by our past experience and commended by the example of other enlightened nations, our rulers and legislators in the next war will fall into the same errors and involve the country in the same sacrifices as in the past.”

II

LESSONS OF HISTORY

"In proportion as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."—WASHINGTON.

THE difficulty encountered in the past in securing consideration of any comprehensive policy concerning preparation for national defense has been greatly due to the absence of any serious public opinion on the subject. It requires much of study and reflection to arrive at a comprehensive knowledge of any policy of national dimensions, and an educated public opinion is the only guarantee of wise, continuing and certain action. Many worthy causes have been sacrificed as hostages to political expediency even when great principles were at stake. There is a fellowship and a freemasonry in politics difficult for the layman to understand but directly traceable to pressure of constituencies in behalf of local interests. Men in public life well understand that he who hews to the line in any policy for the general welfare which may conflict with local interests stands confronted with the danger of incurring political animosity which will not only avail itself of any opportunity to hamper him, but will gloat over his discomfiture in event of failure.

One of England's most accomplished military

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students has expressed the opinion that: "Republicanism and military efficiency are two hopelessly irreconcilable terms." When we consider the small degree of success which has come from the writings of Washington and a long line of statesmen and military students through the intervening years, in their pleadings for a better state of preparedness for passing from a peace to a war establishment, we are forced to the conclusion that our critic had some foundation for his remark. It should not be assumed, however, that the nation is indifferent concerning the existing army and navy, for the annual appropriation of upward of \$200,000,000 for their maintenance and for reserve supplies, is a refutation of such an assumption.

Provision for the establishment of a proper national defense must take into consideration the character of our obligations, which have materially increased since we abandoned the slogan "54-40 or fight," and retain only the highly charged and inflammable Monroe Doctrine, which seems to carry in its wake a series of responsibilities requiring something more material than diplomatic notes for their adjustment. The terrorism and misrule which so often prevail in the smaller American republics present grave problems to the nation that stands solidly behind the pronouncement which resents and rejects political colonization or interference in their affairs on the part of other nations. With the widespread and vast ramifications of modern commerce and consequent interchange of ideas have come awakenings

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of human aspirations, feebly characterized as unrest, which will not down at command, but are destined to grow in ever enlarging circles in the hopeless effort to insure an equitable distribution of wealth and power as between the strong and the weak, the capable and the incapable.

The most far-seeing student of the military weakness inherent in our government was Alexander Hamilton who wrote much of value on the subject during all the earlier years of our national life. At the close of the Civil War, the late General Emory Upton addressed himself to the task of interpreting its lessons for the benefit of his countrymen and produced a work which remained unpublished during his lifetime but which has become a classic since the true value of his investigations and recommendations has penetrated the minds of military students. Washington's writings, and those of all our military students down to the present time, exhibit a consensus of opinion that the correct principle on which our nation should predicate its defense has as its basis a federal army of regulars and volunteers, under the direct command and control of the President, and that the militia of the states should be comprised of men whose enlistments should be made with the distinct agreement that their services should not be demanded otherwise than as provided in the Constitution.

The costly errors of organization and lack of military policy during the Civil War and the consequent financial burden, have been the most potent causes

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of objection to every plan for putting our peace establishment upon a proper basis for expansion automatically in war. The opinions of those of wide and varied experience, in command of troops during the Civil War, substantiate completely the view that we should abandon all further efforts at preparing to make war as an aggregation of forty-eight states and take the necessary steps to nationalize our war forces during peace. Fifteen years of loyal and earnest effort have been given to the scheme to provide for the national defense through the instrumentality of the organized militia, and the results are wholly unsatisfactory, when the requirements of a war with any nation maintaining a modern army are considered.

It should require no argument to prove that in the emergency of war we would need for our first line not less than 500,000 men at once. The present force of regulars at many isolated stations within the United States, together with the estimated available organized militia, scattered through forty-eight states, would not aggregate in excess of one-fourth the requirement of the first call—mobilization is hardly the term to use regarding forces which have none of the larger tactical organizations complete in peace. There would result an immediate necessity for a call for untrained volunteers.

It seems very certain that we may count always upon less than 100,000 men of the forty-eight states being available as organized militia, with a limited field of action. If this force, which, *to be available*

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for war, must volunteer as individuals after war has been declared, is to constitute our main reliance, then some steps must be taken to increase it many fold. It would seem that as practical people Americans would no longer trifle with so grave a situation, but seek a remedy without delay.

The recent decision of the Attorney General concerning the use of the state forces by the federal power, is based upon the constitutional limitations as to calling forth the militia. The effect upon our military policy is so far reaching, having in mind the continuous efforts to develop the organized militia as part of the first line for service with the regular army in event of war, that a reconsideration of the subject from its foundations is essential to military efficiency. It is certain that the several states are reaching the maximum limit of appropriations which may be reasonably expected for the support of their organized militia, and there can be no doubt that organizations of the special arms if maintained at all must be at the expense of the general government as part of the regular army in excess of the proportions necessary for that force considered as a well balanced army.

It is clearly a national duty to provide for the contingencies of war before the occasion for the use of armies shall arise. The most serious questions of military policy now before the country for solution have arisen as the results of legislation having for its object the precedence of the organized militia over national or federal volunteers. None of the

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schemes proposed by the representatives of the national guard has admitted of allowing the President to exercise control over the state organizations during peace, and so much of the militia legislation of 1903 as did authorize the President to give orders in emergencies direct to commanding officers of the organized militia instead of calling upon the governors of states, was quickly withdrawn by a repeal of the statute.

The failure of execution of the conscription or draft act, during the Civil War, makes it most unlikely that the principle of compulsory service will ever be acceptable to our people, unless the very existence of republican institutions shall be at stake. It is useless for military enthusiasts to suggest such schemes for our army, although it requires but a brief study to bring the conviction that state laws, requiring a year's instruction in the theory and organization of our government and in military training as members of the organized militia before being accorded the right of suffrage, would in a few years strengthen and enlighten the whole fabric of popular government, and be lasting monuments to the commonwealths courageous enough to submit themselves to such preparation for the duties of citizenship.

In self-governing countries it has long been recognized that there is no political danger from an army recruited by voluntary enlistments, and suggestions of inimical possibilities arise only in the minds of demagogues in search of a slogan for selfish purposes. Armies do not declare war nor are

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they responsible for declarations of war. Those who proclaim that the existence of armies induces war would hesitate to assert that the existence of insurance policies is a general incentive to arson, yet the active campaign of present day peace advocates is tinged with equally fallacious arguments.

As the results of the war with Spain unfolded and the causes of many unsatisfactory conditions were analyzed, it became evident that our state of preparation for modern war with a strong and resourceful nation was decidedly in need of improvement. Because of the character of equipment and stores required by armies in the field and which can not be purchased in the ordinary markets of the world, nations are compelled to hold in reserve war funds and to establish great depots of supplies to arm and equip troops and enable them to make the initial movements in campaign without the delay necessary to manufacture arms, equipments and other articles required by soldiers.

Prior to the establishment of the General Staff Corps in our army, the Secretary of War took up the subject and caused this communication, which contains the essence of material preparation for war, to be addressed to a body of officers then recently organized under the title of "The War College Board":

"I wish to reach a definite statement of the quantities of arms, ammunition, equipments and supplies of all kinds which it should be the aim of the War Department to provide and keep on hand for use in

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case of sudden and unexpected hostilities, and also to reach a definite understanding as to the domestic sources from which may be obtained in any emergency a further supply of material for arms, ammunition, equipments and military supplies in excess of the reserve stock kept on hand by the War Department.

“Assuming first, an army of 150,000; second, an army of 250,000, the question being answered in each case both with reference to a campaign in a cold, northerly climate, and with reference to a campaign in a hot climate:

“What is our present supply of each article or class of articles reported as necessary for such an emergency?

“What is our present capacity for the production of such articles?

“What are the domestic sources of supply to which we could look, in an emergency, for the material with which to increase either by purchase or manufacture our war materials of all kinds, and what is the productive capacity of the establishments from which such material could be produced?

“What are the present storage facilities of each of the supply departments and what relation do they bear to the requirements for the storage of the full stock of supplies in that department which you shall report to be requisite under the foregoing directions?

“Are the present places for storage properly located with reference to strategical requirements of

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possible hostilities? What, if any, of the present places of storage should be enlarged? What, if any, should be abandoned? What new places, if any, should be established?

“At present, subject only to the approval of a civilian Secretary of War, the Chief of Ordnance determines where powder, projectiles and equipments shall be kept; the Quartermaster General determines where clothing and equipage shall be kept; the Commissary General, where food shall be kept; but it is not the business of those officers to plan campaigns or determine where these things are most likely to be needed, and there is therefore no proper relations between the place where supplies are kept and the place where they will probably be needed.”

Nothing of militarism in this, but a situation urgent enough to appeal to any statesman. Consideration of the subject was begun by the War College Board and later assumed by the newly created General Staff, but it was nearly ten years before the first general depot was established. Now that the scheme is launched, we are in a fair way to multiply the number of such depots until the probable needs of the army in an emergency will be met, if war will but await our further convenience.

Military men are usually subjected to more or less harsh criticism for every proposal for increase of the army and its appurtenances. Many of those who have been indifferent during peace or in active opposition to the adoption of essential measures of preparedness, become the severe critics of the short-

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comings usually developed by active campaigns without previous and mature preparation. When the resolution reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, concerning the colonization of this continent was under discussion in the Senate, January 15, 1853, General Cass noted then this same disposition, so often manifested, and spoke as follows:

“I have seen a great deal of this political perversity,—this unpatriotic predisposition, which prompts many men always to take part against their country, whatever be the position in which she is placed. I do not recollect a single controversy in which we have been involved with a foreign power, since I have been on the stage of action, when the whole sentiment of the country was united in the cause of the country. I doubt if there is another people on the face of the globe whose history presents so many instances of this want of true national pride—patriotism rather—as our own.”

The grave problems involved in the establishment of a comprehensive and continuing policy are well worthy the study of statesmen, to the end that the lives of America's sons may not be needlessly sacrificed and the wealth of the nation wasted. A correct solution of these problems will demand some sacrifice of preconceived opinions and of personal and local interests. There will be some convictions as to states' rights hard to overcome, but our past experiences and the interests which have been acquired beyond our territorial limits demand that the military resources of the United States shall be nationalized,

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and that the impropriety and extravagance of waging war as an aggregation of forty-eight states, should be recognized by appropriate legislation.

Fortunes may continue to be dedicated to the end that sincere and able men shall carry out the campaign for the abolition of war, yet there will remain the vital drop of red blood coursing in the veins of those who fear not conflict when principles are at stake, and who cherish the memory of bloody sacrifices whose fruits have endured in the life of the nation. It will be difficult to convince the great body of young Americans that it is more patriotic to fight out questions involving the nation's prestige and honor in the arena of intellectual discussion rather than upon the battlefield. We may rewrite history and eliminate the stories of campaign and battle, of daring and suffering, but there will still remain the spirit expressed in the immortal words of Nathan Hale: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

Our people have never been enthusiastic over some of our recent acquisitions of territory and are in nowise anxious to increase our holdings, but the nation is overwhelmingly behind the opening of the trade routes through the Panama Canal and will make any expenditure or sacrifice in the determination and maintenance of policies involved therein.

International duties, whether treaty obligations or merely assumed in the interests of humanity, carry grave responsibilities and demand above all things the means to enforce them. The nation un-

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able to defend itself invites aggression whenever its accumulations tempt the cupidity of other nations. The limit of elasticity of our comparatively small mobile army has been long since reached. To provide for future contingencies Americans should not hesitate to study the questions at issue and having once made up their minds as to the desirable and correct action to insist upon it.

It is morally certain that, not only our altruistic ideas of fair play, but the official construction and delimitations of our recently confirmed treaties of arbitration will absolutely put a ban upon all preparations for war during the period provided for preliminary discussions of matters in dispute. The marked advantage of this to other nations whose armies and reserves are always organized and equipped is apparent, for it would attract no comment for each and every individual of such a force to put himself and his equipments in a state of fitness for immediate service, because it is his duty to do so. In the meantime, we could not fill a single vacancy in our skeleton army.

The most pacific policy on the part of the nation will not preserve it from being engaged in war, more or less frequently. The circumstances and past history of our country suggest the improbability of our ever having a large military establishment in peace, so that it becomes extremely important that as much perfection as possible should pertain to that which does exist.

Parkman, the historian, has wisely said that:

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“In every well-balanced development of nations, as of individuals, the warlike instinct and the military point of honor are not repressed and extinguished, but only refined and civilized. It belongs to the pedagogue, not to the philosopher, to declaim against them as relics of barbarism.”

Americans when aroused concerning matters of principle have always evinced warrior characteristics, but they are not a military people, the modern craze for buttons and badges notwithstanding. They are, however, to be credited with marked ability, morality and energy in business, and they have never hesitated to tear down and build anew when greater success was reasonably to be anticipated.

Shall we continue to sacrifice principles to expediency and evade a national duty, leaving to posterity, as our ancestors have done, the cost of our neglect to read aright and to profit by the lessons of history?

III

MILITARY POLICY

"In proportion as the circumstances and policy of a country forbid a large military establishment, it is important that as much perfection as possible should be given to that which may at any time exist."—WASHINGTON.

THE military policy of a nation is fundamentally dependent upon its political policy. The lamented John Hay, late Secretary of State, has thus tersely stated this relation:

"War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay or rations. Historical judgment of war is subject to an inflexible law, either very imperfectly understood or very constantly lost sight of. Every war is begun, dominated and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war—no beginning nor end of methodical hostilities."

Where the sentiment of a people forbids the maintenance of a regular military establishment sufficient for war purposes, carefully devised laws for putting

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such part of the nation as it may be necessary to employ under arms, should be placed upon the statute books before an emergency arises. Such statutes should be founded upon right principles and have as their basis a simple and practicable scheme for mobilizing armies before or immediately upon a declaration of war, because it is readiness to strike which makes for arbitration and peace. The prestige of a proud nation may be sadly lowered by lack of foresight and preparedness, and patriotism and material interest alike suggest the propriety of giving the highest moral support to those who undertake to prepare the nation in time of peace for the shocking realities of war. For more than a hundred years Presidents have periodically invited the attention of Congress to the fact that unless a system, or policy, for organizing and equipping our military forces shall be adopted in time of peace, the legitimate consequences may and probably will be initial defeat, humiliation, and greater cost of preparation during the existence of a state of war.

At a time when practically every member of Congress was a veteran of the Civil War, and during the progress of our greatest Indian war, the subject of a military policy was under consideration by the House of Representatives and a conclusion was reached that:

“Our army is viewed as a nucleus wherein is to be acquired and preserved military knowledge, and from which should radiate the elements of instruction and discipline, thus to form in time of war a

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competent force endowed with talent to direct it as a whole, and provided with agencies capable of grasping the responsibility, organization, and distribution of numerous supplies necessary to the conduct of successful military operations.”

The world has moved rapidly during the forty years which have elapsed since Congress complacently accepted the announcement of our army policy but failed to provide the agencies for radiating instruction and discipline to form in time of war a competent force with talent to direct it as a whole. A well ordered military establishment requires time and experience for its creation and perfection. Every provision for its being or its improvement must usually follow lines of great resistance arising from the necessity of convincing Congress through its overworked committees. The play for partisan advantage is the rule always in evidence, and nearly all progressive laws for the betterment of government are but compromises, in which wise and patriotic legislators are compelled often to make terms, to the end that great public good may not be wholly sacrificed. No class of legislation should be so free from party clamor as that which has for its object the perfection of the organization and administration of the army, but broad-minded and practical men realize that dreams of perfection in government are Utopian.

All of our wars have been fought, so far as military organizations are concerned, on the principle that our states constitute a confederacy of independ-

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ent governments and not one nation for war purposes. Our history contains only one remarkable variation from this course and this experience is not apt to be repeated, for it is beyond belief that another George Washington will arise in our national existence. The one notable exception to our usual method of raising troops and appointing officers was authorized by this resolution of the Continental Congress:

“Having perfect reliance in the wisdom, vigor and uprightness of George Washington do hereby:

“Resolve, That General Washington shall be and he is hereby vested with full, ample and complete powers to raise and collect together in the most speedy and effectual manner from any or all of these United States sixteen battalions of infantry in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry; to raise, officer and equip three thousand light horse, three regiments of artillery and a corps of engineers and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions and in such places as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general and to fill all vacancies in every other department in the American army; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army.”

Nearly forty years have elapsed since General Emory Upton analyzed the military system which

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had prevailed in America since the Revolution and cited the causes of our weakness to be:

First. The employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military art.

Second. Short enlistments from three months to three years, instead of for or during the war.

Third. Reliance upon voluntary enlistments, instead of voluntary enlistments coupled with conscription.

Fourth. The intrusion of the states in military affairs and the consequent waging of all our wars on the theory that we are a confederacy instead of a nation.

Fifth. Confusing volunteers with militia and surrendering to the states the right to commission officers of volunteers the same as officers of militia.

Sixth. The bounty—a natural consequence of voluntary enlistments.

Seventh. The failure to appreciate military education, and to distribute trained officers as battalion, regimental, and higher commanders in our volunteer armies.

Eighth. The want of territorial recruitment and regimental depots.

As a result of his painstaking study of the Civil War, reinforced with valuable statistics of all our previous military experiences, General Upton recommended that the military system of this nation should embrace, in order, the following forces: the regular army, federal volunteers, militia. The fed-

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eral volunteers, to be officered and supported by the government, and organized in each congressional district; the militia to be supported by the states and to be used only as intended by the Constitution, to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasions.

In commenting upon this subject just prior to his retirement from the office of Secretary of War, Hon. Elihu Root, after a remarkably successful series of appeals to Congress for authority for certain changes of army organization, said:

“One other field of great importance remains to be covered by legislation; that is, the establishment of an adequate system for raising, training, and officering the volunteer forces of the future. It is of first importance that the distinction between volunteers and militia shall be observed, and that, while the selection of officers of the militia shall continue, as it must under the Constitution, to rest with the States, following such mode of selection as they prefer, the officers of the volunteer forces of the United States shall hold their commissions from the President, who is to command them during the war for which they are called out, and shall look to their Commander-in-Chief for the promotion which should reward their good conduct, as well as for such discipline as they may merit; and that an adequate system shall be provided for the selection of such officers and the direct recruitment of the enlisted volunteer force under the authority of the national government.”

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In February, 1906, Hon. William H. Taft, Secretary of War, wrote for publication his views that:

“It is our duty, therefore, if we would be wise in our generation, to make provision for a comparatively *small regular army* and efficient *reserve of volunteers*, and an adequate and *co-operating force of State militia.*”

This was in exact accord with the recommendations of his predecessor in office, than whom none has delved deeper into the conditions, needs and traditions of the army, for he did not fail to perceive how all-important are these traditions, recognized in the oath of honor administered to all members of courts-martial, as “customs of war.” This, then, was the recognized policy of the War Department from the period immediately following the war with Spain, yet so strong was the influence brought to bear in the interest of the national guard or organized militia of the states, that every effort to profit by our previous experience and plain military lessons, through provision for a reserve of volunteers, was defeated, and conditions, far more drastic than ever before imposed, were enacted into laws which actually forbid the government from employing any volunteers even in war, until after all the organized militia, which includes numerous generals and staff officers appointed by governors of states, and whose military qualifications the governors have no possible way of ascertaining, have been received into the service. The national guard or organized militia of the states has really thus brought about a military policy for

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the nation regarded as antagonistic to military efficiency.

The organized militia as yet is the only available military force, other than the regulars, with any training whatever, but the error of the whole situation, and one needing immediate remedy, lies in the attempt to nationalize the militia of the states, and yet retain it under control of the governors until actually in the service of the United States during war, and then to continue the appointment and promotion of the officers in the hands of the governors.

When it was first proposed after the Civil War to establish a war policy involving a small body of regulars and a force of federal volunteers in each congressional district, the arguments fell upon deaf ears for the deeds of the great volunteer armies of 1861-65 were still fresh in memory, and the veterans of that conflict believed that no nation would be guilty of the unthinkable folly of assaulting another nation comprising upward of 2,000,000 men who had experienced recent service in a great war.

An agreement was reached in 1902 between the War Department and representatives of the national guard that a joint act should be urged to provide for improving the condition of the state militia and to authorize the organization of a force of 100,000 federal volunteers during peace, with officers appointed by the President, subject to immediate call for war, and legislation necessary to accomplish this was passed by the House of Representatives. The provision for the officers of volunteers was enacted into

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law in the Senate, but that for the men encountered the opposition of a small group of senators who opposed on principle any system which would take from the governors in time of peace control of volunteer troops raised in the several states and was stricken out, making the first part ineffective. The provision for a body of federal volunteers embodied the result of painstaking study and involves so essential a principle that it should not be abandoned until Congress has further opportunity to determine as to the merits of the system as a whole without necessity for sacrificing part as a compromise, for the proportions and character of special arms to be maintained as regulars in peace are involved in the correct determination of this question.

The able opponent of the proposed legislation creating a volunteer reserve stated in the Senate his objections as follows :

“My purpose in presenting these views is to put myself on the record and register my protest against this legislation, for I am satisfied that as time passes the evil will be seen and realized. . . .

“It takes out a part of the citizen soldiery of a State, provides for their being officered by the United States, and takes them away from the authority and training of the State in which they live and puts them, as far as military duty is concerned, under the exclusive authority of the President and of Congress. The President of the United States can call on these citizens for military duty, but the governor of the State can not, although riot and insurrection may be

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at their doors. These men, thus enrolled and set apart, are to be still citizens and civilians in a State, but the governor can not call on them for any military duty whatever, nor can the State by any law impose any military duty upon them. They are to be subject to the orders of the President in military matters, but not to the orders of the governor.

“The governor of a State is the military head of the State in the same way that the President is the military head of the United States. The duty to preserve order, put down insurrection, to maintain law, devolves upon the governor of a State in the same manner and even in greater degree than it devolves upon the President of the United States. Every citizen of the State capable of bearing arms and not in the active military service of the United States is, by every principle of our government, subject to the order of the governor when required to enforce law and maintain authority. It is a violation of this fundamental principle to enact a law by the federal government which shall set apart a certain class of citizens of the State and say that they shall be subject only to the call of the President and to the military duty prescribed by Congress; that they shall not be subject to the call of the governor or to any military duty which may be laid upon them by the legislature of their State.”

More than ten years had elapsed since this opposition was developed when, during the closing hours of the session of Congress in 1912, the same views were repeated and applied in opposition to any sys-

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tem which carries men in civil life, furloughed as reservists from the regular army until their services shall be needed in war.

The Secretary of War, who had recommended ten years previously the creation of a body of federal volunteers, was present as a member of the Senate, and made answer:

“I have the highest respect for the opinions of the Senator from Georgia. Whatever he says upon a question arising out of the Constitution of the United States I regard as entitled to most serious and respectful consideration. But I think, and have thought for many years, during all the long history the Senator from Georgia has referred to—the history of the attempt to secure something which may be called a reserve force for the Army of the United States—that the Senator from Georgia builds up his opinion, regarding a reserve force, upon an essentially false basis.

“The Senator has said that the spirit of the Constitution forbids the creation of a reserve force other than the militia. I am not endeavoring to give his words accurately, but that is the substance, and the Senator now indicates his assent. . . . The Senator has referred to the two provisions in the Constitution contained in the first article, which sets out the powers of the legislative branch as the basis for the assertion that the creation of any reserve force for the Army of the United States, is in violation of the spirit of the Constitution. He does not say that it is in violation of the letter of the Con-

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stitution, but of the spirit. Those two provisions are, first, that Congress shall have power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. And then there is the further provision—for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

“There are here two independent and different fields of action indicated. The one is to raise and support armies, with no limitation upon the scope of action of the armies raised and supported. The other is to provide for organizing the army and for disciplining the militia, with a limitation upon the use to which the militia can be put. For the power of Congress over the militia is to call it forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and that I take it to be unquestioned, is the enumeration of the things to be done within the territory of the United States—whatever has to be done within our territory—the execution of the laws of the union that are to be executed within our jurisdiction; the repelling of invasions, which must be invasions in our own jurisdiction. For these things the militia must be used. But for all that field of warlike operations which go beyond the frontier of the United States the militia may not be used, and for all offensive defense the Army of the United

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States is the sole military power under the control of the nation.

“ . . . We have during our entire military history experienced upon each recurring occasion of war the necessity of immediately and greatly, and under stress of imminent need for action, increasing the Army of the United States. That is to say, whenever war comes we are obliged to increase the army, which is not subject to the restrictions resting upon the use of the militia. . . .

“In the Civil War, immediately upon the breaking out of hostilities we had recourse to the raising of a volunteer force, and that great conflict was fought by volunteers and not by militia.

“In the war with Spain the first thing we did was to call for volunteers; that is to say, an increase of the military establishment of the United States as distinguished from militia, and that war was fought by such a force and not by militia. . . .

“ . . . I mean the militia of the States; and I am drawing a distinction between those forces which are a part of the military establishment of the United States and the militia of the States.

“When we came to suppress the insurrection in the Philippines, Congress provided for the raising of a force of 35,000 volunteers, the officers to be appointed and commissioned by the President of the United States, and that war was fought by those volunteers in addition to the regular army.

“The militia, including all the organizations which the Senator from Georgia describes, is insufficient

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in number to answer to the demands of the country in any considerable war. The purposes for which its members are enlisted are not the purposes that have to be attained in any considerable war. The constitutional authority of the commander-in-chief of the Army of the United States over them, the constitutional authority of Congress over them, are inevitable to the carrying on of any considerable war by the use of them.

“The only way in which we can prepare for war which would really exhibit danger to our country is to make adequate preparation in time for the increase of the military establishment of the United States. I say that all our history shows that immediately when the stress comes we turn to the increase of that military establishment.

“ . . . Statesmanship consists in foreseeing the necessities of the future. When war comes action must be swift, decisive and effective. There is no time to consider and discuss the details of organization and the machinery necessary to progress. In time of peace, when men can consider deliberately the methods by which the military establishment may be quickly and effectively increased, is the time to discuss and adopt provisions for the machinery, instead of waiting until everybody is in excitement and judgments are swayed by feeling and impulse and then hurriedly adopting a jury-writ system which is sure to be defective and inefficient. . . .”

It is probable that such discussions will in the end crystallize public sentiment and induce Congress

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to enact such legislation as will adjust this very serious question of broad policy on which all else depends. The national guard has long objected to the creation of federal volunteers during peace as a reserve for the regular army unless it be provided that such volunteers shall not be called into any service until after the organized militia shall have been called forth.

The federal volunteers are intended to be a force to be called upon only when a war exists which requires a reinforcement for the regular army, and to be composed of men not restricted as are the militia in their sphere of action. Such a force of federal volunteers should be liable to serve for three years or the war and be comprised entirely of men whose home ties would permit of that length of absence without embarrassment.

One primary and important reason for having the question of a federal volunteer system settled without delay lies in its intimate connection with the proper organization of the regular army. It needs no argument to carry the conviction that the organized militia of the states will never comprise a proper proportion of the special arms but will in future as in the past consist mainly of infantry. The expense of maintenance of proper proportions of cavalry and field artillery is too great to be assumed by any state unless all the states shall agree to provide for their proportionate share. The work demanded of cavalry and field artillery in the regular army, to reach and maintain a recognized and

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proper standard of efficiency, makes it certain that militia organizations of those special arms can not be made efficient for immediate war purposes in the limited time available for instruction. For these reasons, the organization of the regular army can never be based upon its use as a complete field army, for it must always comprise an undue proportion of cavalry, field artillery and special branches to balance the infantry of the citizen soldiery whether federal volunteers, organized militia, or volunteers enlisted during war.

The legitimate conclusions are that the military policy of this nation should embrace as cardinal features of organization, first, the regular army; second, federal volunteers; third, the organized militia or national guard. So long as the term national guard is used for state militia, it will avoid confusion to use the designation federal instead of national for the volunteers.

Under the policy herein suggested the military establishment of the national government would comprise in peace the regular army and the federal volunteers. The active state forces would comprise the organized militia or national guard. The federal volunteers are intended to be organized in each congressional district and to be proportioned among the several branches of the service as may be required by the war establishment, in connection with the regulars. Under this policy, the strength and character of the federal volunteer organizations may be modified from time to time, without disturbance

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of the principles involved. The proportions of the several branches of the regular army being fixed by statutes, the character of federal volunteer organizations may then be determined by the probable needs of the combined forces and their distribution made with due regard to local conditions. Cavalry, for instance, may be more readily recruited and maintained in horse-raising districts than in more thickly populated agricultural sections or cities. The fact that young men may ride their own horses to places of assembly, for drill and instruction, will insure maintenance of organizations in districts too sparsely settled to justify the efforts necessary to create and maintain effective infantry organizations. Similarly, with field artillery organizations, some localities will be more favorable than others.

Under this scheme the general government will be entirely responsible for the support of the regular army and the federal volunteers and the several states responsible for the maintenance of their militia, the national government continuing to furnish necessary arms and equipments. The character of the organized militia, however, should be wholly changed so that there may be no cause for misunderstanding. The officers and men physically fit for and desirous of being a part of the war army, should enter the federal volunteers; the militia should be recruited and maintained primarily for state purposes and subject to call by the national government solely as provided by the Constitution. In any war of magnitude our coasts would be threatened, and in

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order that the regular army and federal volunteers may be available at all times for service as a mobile force beyond our borders, the organized militia may well constitute the main reliance for land defense of the seacoast fortifications.

Under such an arrangement of our military establishment the organized militia would gradually be recruited with men to whom the changed conditions of probable service would be acceptable and those who have heretofore attached themselves to the state organizations with expectation of unrestricted active field service would be induced to enter the federal volunteers where there would be no doubt as to their status in event of war.

The inauguration of this policy would be in line with the best military judgment of the past century. It conforms to the Constitution without evasion or subterfuge. It contemplates a minimum peace establishment of regulars with a dependable support of trained federal volunteers, and a constitutional employment of the organized militia, and should commend itself to patriotic Americans who desire a military establishment proportioned to possible contingencies, maintained without necessity for either amending or evading the Constitution.

There has been no student of military affairs in this generation the equal of Emory Upton. As the result of long and patient study of the armies of the world he wrote:

“The true object to be kept in view in studying European military organization is to present those

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features which are common to all armies, and to indicate those which we should adopt as indispensable to the vigorous, successful, and humane prosecution of our future wars.

“*The impossibility of forming a trained reserve as in Europe* and the certainty that the States can not be relied upon to support a numerous and well-organized militia, even with the aid . . . appropriated annually by the Government, should impress us with the importance of devising some method whereby in peace and in war we may have a national force ready to increase, and support, our troops in the field.”

“The organization of National Volunteers would give us in time of peace a Regular Army, a reserve (National Volunteers), and the Militia, and would enable us in time of war to prosecute our campaigns with vigor and economy, and with that regard for human life which becomes a free people.”

General Upton's views have received the continued approval of Presidents, Secretaries of War and experienced officers of the army, and his conclusions as to the value of a reserve of federal volunteers to be maintained in peace, accords exactly with the result of a similar study of the records made without reference to his previous investigations along that line. It is too grave a situation to be met with mere theories. The burden of evidence is all in favor of complying with the spirit and letter of the Constitution, which contemplates a maintenance by the general government of a national military and naval

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force in peace and war, and that the militia shall not be called forth except to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or to execute the laws of the Union.

Our course for some years has been misleading and improper and a reconsideration and revision of practice as well as of law is demanded by the highest considerations of wisdom, public policy and statesmanship. The time for accomplishment of national military purposes has arrived, but there may be differing opinions as to the fundamental objects and means of attaining them. Those problems regarded as in greatest need of immediate and definite determination involve the employment of the national and state forces in their appropriate spheres.

Unquestionably the best interests of the nation demand that the army of the United States shall consist of the regular army and the federal volunteers, maintained both in peace and war. The batteries, troops, companies, battalions, and regiments of federal volunteers should be organized in congressional districts and in such numbers as may be proportionally and equitably allotted by the President, the total force not to exceed the strength authorized by Congress, and the officers of such organizations to be appointed by the President. The organization and discipline of the federal volunteers should be provided for in regulations approved by the Secretary of War, under an enabling act of Congress. All laws providing for the use of the militia in conflict with the Constitution, as interpreted by the Attorney General of the United States should be formally

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repealed and no further attempts made to provide for the use of the national guard and organized militia for general war purposes. It should be clearly understood that those who desire to serve in war without regard to state or national borders must attach themselves to the federal volunteers.

The effect of this system, besides providing a federal force of potential war power, would be to relieve the states of the unequal taxation now involved through maintenance of miniature armies by some states while others go to the opposite extreme. Much of the militia duty in states could very properly be performed by constabulary, as is now done in Pennsylvania, and leave the national guard to its proper employment—that of preparation to suppress insurrection and grave disorder and to resist invasion.

The establishment of a body of federal volunteers is a practicable military scheme and its full development will create a war asset of recognized and permanent value. The ultimate saving in pensions alone would, in a great war, meet all the expenses incurred for its maintenance in peace. As trained men pass out of the federal volunteers they would remain in their own communities available to aid in organizing and drilling subsequent increments of volunteers, when called forth to war. The dictates of expediency, common sense and economy all combine to suggest the desirability of such a plan to meet the crisis brought on through the inability of the President to call upon the governors for their militia for service beyond our borders. It is morally certain

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that the states will never consent to any plan by which the governors will surrender control over any part of their organized militia or national guard in peace, and particularly so where large state appropriations have been made for their support. A force of federal volunteers or similar force under any other designation, is a military necessity, if we are to avoid considerable increase of the regular army, and we should proceed with its organization without further delay.

It is fully appreciated that such a reorganization of our military establishment will suggest and make advisable many minor changes. It is also recognized that many earnest, worthy and energetic officers of the national guard will feel resentful at the recent course of events and think their efforts have not been appreciated. It is not a question of the efficiency of this or that state organization, but whether or not the whole system is wrong; if so, the public welfare demands an early and comprehensive readjustment. It is certain that if this be not undertaken during peace, another war will find us unprepared and leave us again with an unnecessary burden of debt and possible unhappy termination. All this contemplates no special preparation for a great war but only a reasonable arrangement of our resources that we may mobilize them for the military contingencies likely to come to us as a nation. It has never been our practice to add any strength to our army except in the presence of actual hostilities. It remains to be seen whether the demands of economy,

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the needs of foreign garrisons in our over-sea possessions and our willingness to continually threaten enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine are together sufficient to appeal to our statesmen and to secure approval of the necessary action to create a reinforcement for the regular army in time of peace which will be immediately available for war and thus secure conjointly a thoroughly efficient and modern fighting machine ready for any ultimatum when diplomacy fails.

IV

THE ECONOMY OF PREVISION

"There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."—WASHINGTON.

SUCCESS in war depends upon preparedness, which in turn is based upon the proper organization of military resources, comprising men, money and materials. Loyal men, *physically fit and trained*, properly provided with war materials and sustained by the moral support of the nation and a continually replenished treasury, constitute the most economical guarantee of avoidance of national humiliation. During the progress of war it is not uncommon to draw general conclusions from isolated experiences and to ascribe success or failure to unimportant details. It is only by patient investigation and expert analysis that sources of error and weakness are disclosed.

In the history of the world no other nation has made such lavish expenditures as America for military purposes *after wars*. A mere tithe of the appalling total, devoted to preparation before war, would have lifted a great and increasing burden from the taxpayers. The vast volume of such expendi-

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tures has been incurred mainly for pensions and in this regard no charge may ever be justly made that the Republic is ungrateful. The pension system was adopted early in the career of the nation and has become so influential a factor in political life that no material change may be expected in this generation. Disregarding the earlier wars before pension agents became scientific promoters of legislation, it may be entertaining if not informing to review some of the facts developed under the existing system.

Since the close of the Civil War, a constant stream of laws, making less and less exacting the requirements for pensions, has been enacted until it has come to pass that those who were merely on the rolls for a few days, and the malingerers and deserters all march as veterans of the great conflict upon a parity with the noble men who volunteered and fought to the finish in that fratricidal contest.

In the year 1866, immediately following the close of the Civil War, the appropriation by Congress for the payment of pensions amounted to a little in excess of \$15,000,000. In 1911, forty-five years later, the amount paid out on that account was \$157,325,160.35, the average annual disbursement for the three preceding years exceeding \$160,000,000. Annual pension payments on account of the Civil War have increased tenfold fifty years after the close of the war, and continue on the ascending scale. Since the close of the war in 1865 pension payments on account of service in that war aggregate upward of four billions of dollars.

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At the beginning there was a general public opinion favoring proper provision for the real veterans who through wounds or disease had been placed at a disadvantage with their comrades in the struggle of life. As years went by the resourcefulness of the pension agents increased and finally an act was secured which opened wide the doors, even to the deserter, except one "who left his command whilst in the presence of the enemy, *unless he was sick or wounded*, and that *when the charge of desertion should be removed* against the soldier its effect should be to restore him to the status of honorable service and an honorable discharge should be issued in those cases where the soldier received none, and that *he should be restored to all his rights as to pension, pay or allowances as if the charge of desertion had never been made.*" Even that restriction has now been done away with.

The younger generations had become familiar with the pension system and its large appropriations, so that the pension agents found an open field in the camps of the volunteers in the war with Spain, where their operations were shocking. Thousands of well-meaning young men who had patriotically enlisted, after rigid physical examinations, made their arrangements for pension applications before taking the field or performing any duty whatever. In the brief campaign in Cuba there were five volunteer regiments selected for the Santiago campaign by reason of presumed superiority and readiness for service. Immediately following their re-

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turn home a stream of applications for pensions began and in a brief time a tabulation of the applications was made by the Commissioner of Pensions, and comparisons made with those of five regiments of regulars:

<i>Volunteers:</i>	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Claims filed for pensions.
1st District of Columbia..	0	0	0	472
9th Massachusetts.....	0	0	0	685
33rd Michigan.....	0	0	0	573
34th Michigan.....	0	0	0	615
8th Ohio.....	0	0	0	652
Total	0	0	0	2,997

<i>Regulars:</i>	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Claims filed for pensions.
6th U. S. Infantry.....	17	106	17	162
7th U. S. Infantry.....	33	93	0	249
13th U. S. Infantry.....	18	90	0	87
16th U. S. Infantry.....	13	107	17	143
24th U. S. Infantry.....	12	75	6	125
Total	93	471	40	766

The reports of the Commissioner of Pensions show that between July, 1861, and June 30, 1900, invalid pensions had been allowed, under the general law, to 556,255 volunteers, and under the Act of June 27, 1890, to 451,531, a total of 1,007,786. During the period from July 1, 1861, to January 1, 1901, pensions were allowed to 30,266 regulars, including the wounded and invalided men of more than thirty years of almost constant Indian wars. To make the comparison intelligible, the total number of volunteers who enlisted in the Civil War, reduced to a basis of three years' service is 2,324,516 men. The

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total number of men on the rolls of the regular army during the whole period from 1861 to 1901 is 577,000, including re-enlistments, for which a liberal deduction should be made, to avoid counting the same soldier more than once. On this basis of computation, up to June 30, 1900, 1,007,786 volunteers out of 2,324,516 were in receipt of pensions, while only 30,266 regulars out of 577,000 were recipients of such bounty. This shows that the regulars have been singularly free from any accusation of pension seeking. These figures contain much food for thought besides affording a sound argument in behalf of a well-organized, trained and cared-for body of regulars, to the end that the country may not be subjected to the great expense of calling out volunteers or militia for short service periods with the resulting hospital and pension records. The increase of expense for short term volunteers arises not only from pensions but from the waste and injury of public property which results from their lack of experience.

Washington observed such conditions at the very beginning of the Revolution and makes this reference to the subject in a letter to Congress:

“HEIGHTS OF HARLEM,

“24 September, 1776.

“SIR:

“From the hours allotted to sleep I will borrow a few moments to convey my thoughts on sundry important matters to Congress. . . .

“It becomes evident to me then that, as this con-

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test is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to engage; and, till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them. . . . There is nothing that gives a man consequence and renders him fit for command like a support that renders him independent of everybody but the state he serves. . . .

“When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war. After this, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence by remarking that, to get in their militia in the course of the last year, many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils resulting from this and the destructive consequences which unavoidably would follow short enlistments, I took the liberty in a long letter to recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such reasons for it as experience has since convinced me were well founded. . . .

“Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep fifty or a hundred thousand in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are

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in pay, before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with, or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause. . . .”

The volunteer system has met with much favor in our national life and is so surrounded with sentiment due to past services of a glorious character that it is certain to continue as the main reliance in any great war, and yet the most careful students of the Civil War are quite unanimous in the opinion that the volunteer system with limited conscription, adopted by the southern Confederacy, was more businesslike and a fairer distribution of the burden of war than the purely volunteer system of the North. In the South the services of all able-bodied men were deemed due the government. When the flower of the courageous northern youth had been swallowed up by the armies in the field, the calls for volunteers fell upon ears not so easily attuned to the din of war. Then began a pernicious system of bounties, state and national. New York alone expended upward of \$75,000,000 on this account in the effort to fill its quota of troops.

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No system of raising armies produces a better or more intelligent class of soldiers for a patriotic war than American volunteers. No system, however, could be more unjust from an academic viewpoint. A just and equitable distribution of the duties of citizenship in a republic dictate the righteousness of arranging for the defense of the nation upon a plan which recognizes that each and every citizen owes the debt of personal service in war. There will always be many who, under any rule of right reason, should not enter the service. Campaigning demands the best type of physical manhood, and requires that the mind shall not be harassed by brooding over dependents left without provision for support and liable to become a public charge. Then there are important civil duties which must go on in war. All these details, however, demand action at the hands of those in authority and may not be properly left to personal decision of interested parties. After two years' experience in the great Civil War it was fully realized that, in some contingencies, nothing short of a nation in arms would suffice, and draft legislation was enacted providing for enrolling, calling out and organizing the national forces under the direction of provost-marshals appointed by the President. The orderly procession of events of a nation at war, as contemplated by the Constitution, were thus wholly reversed.

History constantly repeats itself in the formation of our armies: popular excitement, a glowing of local pride, stimulation of patriotism, boys pleading for

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opportunity and the final departure of regiments of untrained men, many of whom are foredoomed to the hospital instead of the battlefield. It cost much in blood and treasure to train the great volunteer armies of the Civil War, but in the end they became regulars in all but name and the equals in battle of any troops in the world. The records contain many instances of regiments fighting courageously after sustaining losses of from fifty to eighty per cent. But war is an expensive school of training and modern wars do not allow much time for preparation before the first blow is struck, and it is the first battle which counts for much in morale and national prestige when the appeal to arms has been made.

The great body of citizens to-day is far less well equipped for military duty in war as militia than their forebears who were accustomed to the use of firearms. Existing law provides for calling out this force in addition to the organized militia, when it is morally certain that they will not become fit in time to join in the first battles of modern war. Given time, under trained officers, good results will follow. It is to provide this time or period for training that the regular army and a body of federal volunteers should be maintained in an effective condition. In these organizations the unfit will be excluded from the beginning, thus reducing the probable list of claimants for hospital accommodations and subsequent pensions. The man who qualifies for his country's defense in the regular army or the proposed

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federal volunteers, is just the same patriot as his brother who offers his untrained self in the new regiments of volunteers; in the former case, however, the country's draft for service is immediately honored, while in the latter instance considerable time must elapse before there is an available asset.

The nation, through its lack of military policy, is historically committed to its present burden for pensions, but with all the warnings of the past half century it would seem the part of wisdom to provide for trained and physically fit men in the composition of our future armies and make possible less exhaustive demands upon the treasury. Those who are rendered incapable of self support by reason of military service, whether by wounds or disease, will never be permitted to go uncared for by the nation. The economy which the nation may wisely introduce, is through provision for a sufficient peace force of regulars and federal volunteers *enlisted for three years, or the war*, to stand in the breach while the second line of citizen soldiers to be enlisted for *three years or the war*, is being taught to shoot, march and take care of itself in campaign.

The enormous roll of men enlisted for the Civil War appears incredible when the small size of the armies engaged in the various campaigns is considered. The abnormal condition arose from the enlistment of large numbers of men for three, six, nine and twelve months. The mainstay of the fighting force was composed of those who enlisted for three years

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or the war, and *nothing short of that requirement should again be embraced or allowed to continue in our army schemes.*

Existing law for calling forth the organized militia or national guard of the several states for federal duty provides that every officer and man comprising the organizations shall be mustered for service without further enlistment. In other words, under this system there will be no enlistment for the war and men with one or two months or less to serve may be transported to the points of mobilization without prospect of rendering any real service to the country, but with sufficient time upon the rolls to justify claims for pensions after the mellow period of memories of the war has arrived in the nation. This may be splendidly sentimental, but it does not treat war as the grave business it has heretofore turned out to be in our history.

The plan adopted in the Civil War after a large experience provided for enlistments for three years or the war and furnished men employed for a sufficient period to justify their systematic training for campaign and battle. By doing away with the expensive, unsatisfactory and all but useless short term men, the number of pensioners of the future would be materially decreased. *One man enlisted for three years furnishes but one probable pensioner and his services will be far more valuable than those of six men called in for six months, each of whom may become a pensioner. The three-months men might, and probably would, in the same period fur-*

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nish twelve pensioners. There can be no more effective way of reducing the number of pensions in future than by adhering to the "three years or the war" enlistment which was so constantly urged by General Sherman and other commanders and students of the Civil War. Such a simple and practicable method of curtailing the enormous expense of the pension rolls of our future wars requires adoption in peace, for if nothing is done until another war may be declared, under the enthusiasm and excitement incident to such events, all precautions will be thrown to the winds and our descendants will be left to count the cost of their forebears' neglect.

The enrolment in our various wars was as follows:

War of the Revolution:

Continentials	231,771
Militia	164,087
	<hr/>
Total	395,858

War of 1812:

Regulars	38,186
Militia	458,463
Volunteers	10,110
Rangers	3,049
	<hr/>
Total	509,808

War with Mexico:

Regulars	26,922
Volunteers	73,532
	<hr/>
Total	100,454

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War of the Rebellion:

Regulars	46,679
Volunteers and Militia.....	2,637,080
Total	2,683,759

War with Spain:

Regulars (June 30, 1898).....	45,669
Volunteers	232,235
Total	277,904

The amounts paid to June 30, 1911, for pensions, including payments to widows, minor children and dependent relatives in the several wars are as follows:

War of the Revolution (estimated).....	\$70,000,000.00
War of 1812 (service pension).....	45,853,024.19
War with Mexico (service pension).....	11,192,205.52
Civil War	3,985,719,836.93
Unclassified	16,488,147.99
Regular establishment since foundation, including Indian wars.....	21,705,852.33

A glance at the history of any of our wars will show how impossible it has ever been to get together a respectable proportion of the number enrolled for the army to prosecute a campaign. This arises from the character of our armies which have in all wars been to a great extent composed of short service men, disqualified by the terms of their enlistment for distant campaigning. There are few instances where any militia or volunteers have remained, willingly, beyond the period for which called forth. All had the same ideals and interest in the maintenance of

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the government, but they were simply victims of a wrong military system. Later on, however, the government, representing the entire people, in its taxation became the victim, for pensions flowed alike to those who marched to battle and those who demanded their release after a few months' service in the midst of a campaign. Prevision demands a different and a better system of raising armies, and in its adoption we should be guided rather by our own experiences than by those of European nations-in-arms.

V

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"I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences."—WASHINGTON.

ANALYSIS of past and existing systems bring military men continually to the question of a determination as to the foundation character of the military establishment which America should maintain, bearing in mind always the actual demands, of peace as well as the probable fields of action in war. To the very large majority of Americans the regular army and its activities in peace are as a sealed book. To many it is known only through the tales of flood and field drifting homeward from time to time from loved ones who have followed the flag in its globe circling journey. In America military matters have been treated usually as questions of expediency, rather than of broad policy, because the abnormal growth of the nation has directed its attention to the

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solution of the manifold and intricate problems of social and economical development arising under a modern civilization for which there are few precedents in the experience of other and older nations for our guidance.

In the not distant past the main functions of the regular army, which dictated its organization, were embraced in guarding the movement of our advancing frontiers, westward, into and over the country claimed as hunting grounds of the Indians, and in keeping alive a knowledge of the art of war in a nation given over body and soul to business. During the long period between the Civil War and the war with Spain, while the country was supposed to be in a state of profound peace, the little frontier garrisons, which made the settlement of half a continent possible, went about their work of carving the path of an empire without expectation of other reward than a consciousness of duty right nobly performed. It was the self-reliance which the frontier training brought about that enabled the generals at Santiago to feel confident that each subordinate would lead his little band of followers through the chaparral straight for the enemy on San Juan Hill.

With no policy other than that dictated by expediency of the moment, the declaration of war in 1898 found the government incapable of putting a single complete army corps in the field until volunteers could be brought into the service. While new regiments were being mustered in and crowded into un-

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sanitary camps, the little army of regulars was rushed aboard improvised transports, landed in the surf of a tropical shore, marched against a fortified city and, in face of all academic teaching, wrested victory from an astonished and superior adversary.

Scarce had the smoke of battle in the war with Spain vanished when the regulars were hurried away upon the distant voyage to the Philippines, to suppress an insurrection notable alike for its wide dispersal, resourceful cunning and viciousness. With infinite patience, prodigious labor and rare courage the army of regulars, and the new regiments of national volunteers, accomplished the difficult task of restoring order in a thousand islands just in time to enable a detachment in force to respond to the cry from the beleaguered legations in Peking and to win new honors in the high character of its services during the continuance of the Boxer Rebellion.

When the military obligations of this country, involving outlying garrisons in the Philippines, China, Hawaii, Porto Rico, Panama and Alaska, are considered, the natural conclusion results that America already possesses a large army. Not so, however, for it is only by undue attenuation that the small force may present a bold front at the most important points. It was not until after the war with Spain, in 1901 when a reorganization of the army took place, that legislation was sought and obtained, which authorizes the President in emergencies to fill the peace organizations to war strength, provided the total

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strength of the army, including Philippine scouts and exclusive of the hospital corps, does not exceed 100,000 men. This legislation is of great importance, in that regiments destined for particular service may be filled with recruits to war strength without depleting others below the minimum or peace strength.

The reorganization of the army then adopted involved other material changes. Through the abolition of regiments of artillery and the formation of a corps of coast artillery, with companies of flexible strength for the service of harbor defense, the administration and training of that arm was much simplified and improved. The subsequent separation of the field artillery and its organization into battalions and regiments was in harmony with modern practice and calculated to insure the proper use of fire in battle. Our previous practice had been quite uniformly to treat the field battery, instead of the regiment, as the unit of organization.

Under the reorganization act of 1901, there was no intention of considering the regular army as a properly balanced field army of divisions, with only sufficient cavalry, field artillery and special arms to make them complete units. On the contrary the strength of the several arms was arranged with a view to having the regular army furnish as far as practicable within its limited strength, the special or auxiliary arms not comprised in the militia, which had volunteered for the war with Spain almost wholly as infantry. It is not now and probably never

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will be possible to insure a sufficient force of trained cavalry, field artillery and other special arms for the first line in war, except by maintaining them in active existence as regulars. It therefore follows, from the point of view of those who advocate the organization and maintenance of the regular army in divisional and field army units that our force is ill assorted.

In considering the organization of the army it should be remembered that many of the laws on the statute books are the result of historic development, while others have come about through special pleading and not as the result of any comprehensive policy. The existing organization of the army has resulted from efforts to improve upon conditions developed at the outbreak of the war with Spain. Reforms of recognized value have come in the intervening period but out of proposed policies there have developed some grave differences as to organization which must be finally determined by Congress to whom the Constitution has committed the power and thereby the duty of raising and supporting armies. These differences relate not only to the general war policy but also to the actual purpose and utilization of the regular army which is the basic element of national defense.

The present organization and authorized strength of the regular army is:

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AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.

	Major Gen-erals	Brigadier Gen-erals	Colonels	Lieutenant Colonels	Majors	Captains	First Lieu-tenants	Second Lieu-tenants	Chaplains	Total Com-missioned Officers	Enlisted Men
General officers.....	6	15	5	7	10					21	
Adjutant General's Department.....		1	3	4	9					23	
Inspector General's Department.....		1	2	3	7					17	
Judge Advocate General's Department.....		1	3	4	8					13	
Quartermaster Corps.....	1	2	12	18	48	102	254			138	403
Medical Department.....		1	14	24	105	205	254			603	
Corps of Engineers.....		1	14	21	47	57	53	43	1	237	1,942
Ordnance Department.....		1	6	9	19	25	25			86	745
Signal Corps.....		1	1	2	6	24	72			106	1,472
Bureau of Insular Affairs.....		1	1	1	1					3	
Fifteen Regiments of Cavalry.....			15	15	45	225	225	225	15	765	14,148
Six Regiments of Field Artillery.....			6	6	12	66	78	78	6	232	5,513
Coast Artillery Corps.....		1	14	14	42	210	210	210	14	715	19,019
Thirty Regiments of Infantry.....			30	30	90	450	450	450	30	1,530	34,128
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.....						11	10	10	1	32	591
Military Academy.....			4	3						7	682
Detached Officers.....			8	9	27	82	74			200	
Additional Officers.....			30	1						31	
Recruiting parties, recruit depots, and unassigned recruits.....											6,266
Service school detachments.....											587
United States Military Prison Guards.....											350
With disciplinary organizations.....											94
Indian Scouts.....											76
Total Regular Army.....	7	26	165	166	468	1,457	1,451	1,016	67	4,823	85,965
Additional force:											
Philippine Scouts.....						52	65	65		182	5,733
Grand total.....	7	26	165	166	468	1,509	1,516	1,081	67	5,005	91,698

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In the number of first lieutenants of the Medical Department are included ninety-nine Medical Reserve Corps officers and sixty dental surgeons. Under authority of Congress the enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, now 4,012, and the 6,000 men authorized for the Quartermaster Corps are not counted as part of the strength of the army.

It should be observed that the total force of mobile American troops comprises 34,128 infantry, 14,148 cavalry and 5,513 field artillery, a total of 53,789 when all vacancies are filled. From this force are drawn the regiments for Alaska, Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines and China, amounting in the aggregate to more than 20,000 men.

The authorized enlisted strength of the line of the army in previous decades subsequent to the Civil War, was as follows:

1870.	1 battalion of engineers.....	762
	10 regiments of cavalry.....	9,300
	5 regiments of artillery.....	5,065
	25 regiments of infantry.....	16,375
	Total	31,502
1880.	1 battalion of engineers.....	200
	10 regiments of cavalry.....	8,450
	5 regiments of artillery.....	2,600
	25 regiments of infantry.....	12,085
	Total	23,335
1890.	1 battalion of engineers.....	500
	10 regiments of cavalry.....	7,970
	5 regiments of artillery.....	2,650
	25 regiments of infantry.....	12,625
	Total	23,745

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1901.	3 battalions of engineers.....	2,002
	15 regiments of cavalry.....	18,540
	30 batteries of field artillery.....	} 18,922
	126 companies of coast artillery....	
	30 regiments of infantry.....	55,080
	Total	94,544

The act of February 2, 1901, authorizes the President to enlist natives of the Philippine Islands as scouts, not exceeding 12,000 in number, but requires that the total enlisted strength of the regular army, including such native force, shall not exceed at any one time 100,000. The actual strength during the past decade has at no time approached the authorized maximum strength. Upon the reorganization of the army, under the act cited, the President under date of October 24, 1902, fixed the authorized strength of the army, including all detachments, and exclusive of native troops, at 59,866 men. The authorized strength has been frequently modified, but maintained always well within the maximum limit of 100,000.

Some distinguished officers in the past have sought to eliminate the question of the strength of the army in time of peace from further consideration at the hands of Congress, by establishing a fixed ratio as to population, the most favored proposition being that of one soldier to 1,000 of population. The population of the United States, and the percentage relation of the strength of the army in each decade from the year 1790 to and including the year 1890, were as follows:

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Year	Strength of the Army			Population of U. S.	Per cent.
	Officers	Men	Total		
1790	57	1,216	1,273	3,929,214	.03 of 1%
1800	318	4,118	4,436	5,308,483	.08 of 1%
1810	774	9,147	9,921	7,239,881	.14 of 1%
1820	712	8,230	8,942	9,633,822	.09 of 1%
1830	627	5,324	5,951	12,866,020	.05 of 1%
1840	733	9,837	10,570	17,069,453	.06 of 1%
1850	948	9,815	10,763	23,191,876	.05 of 1%
1860	1,108	15,259	16,367	31,443,321	.05 of 1%
1870	2,541	34,534	37,075	38,558,371	.10 of 1%
1880	2,152	24,357	26,509	50,155,783	.05 of 1%
1890	2,168	24,921	27,089	62,622,250	.04 of 1%

The desirability of removing the army from the necessity of constant legislation is clearly apparent, but however much the fixed ratio plan may have commended itself in the past, it would not now meet the conditions of our varied requirements. This nation has assumed grave responsibilities in widely separated parts of the world, which may not with honor and safety be trifled with. Their consideration is of the first importance from the view-point of national prestige. The nation relies upon that broad instrumentality—the War Department—to accomplish all things needful to meet the demands of the hour in military matters. Any policy as to the present strength of the army must, as matters of first importance, take into consideration the actual demands of garrisons maintained beyond the continental limits of the United States and the necessity for an expeditionary corps to reinforce them when threatened.

A considerable part of the regular army will, for

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an indefinite period, be required to maintain the Alaska, Panama and over-sea garrisons. It is possible that some or all of these garrisons may require reinforcements from the home forces, but it is not probable that any of them could be reduced in time of war for the purpose of strengthening any other part of the army. It would be inexpedient and politically unwise to allow conditions ever to reach a point where it might be deemed desirable to deplete the necessary over-sea garrisons to meet any home emergency. The minimum force required to maintain the Alaska and over-sea garrisons exclusive of signal companies and medical department organizations has been determined by the War Department to be as follows:

	Philippines	Oahu	Panama	Alaska	Porto Rico	Total for foreign service
Regiments of infantry.....	4	6	3	1	..	14
Regiments of cavalry.....	2	1	1-3	3 1-3
Battalions of field artillery.....	2	3	1	6
Companies of coast artillery.....	24	13	12	49
Companies of Philippine scouts...	52	52
Porto Rico regiment of infantry..	1	1
Companies of engineers.....	2	3	1	6

With this serious detachment from our small army it may be seen at a glance that the remaining force is not sufficient for any extended service in war nor for peace instruction in large tactical units. An earnest effort has been made to improve the administra-

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tion of the army by segregation of the coast artillery and the arrangement of the mobile army—infantry, cavalry, and field artillery—in such manner as to admit of its organization in brigades and divisions in time of peace. Heretofore tactical organizations above that of the regiment were created only for maneuvers or war. The nature of its duties and the vast field over which our small army operates renders it difficult if not impracticable to maintain the integrity of any system embracing the higher tactical organizations. Expediency in emergencies ever plays havoc with policy.

The following table gives the total numbers of organizations now existing in the army of the United States, the total numbers required to meet the minimum requirements of the foreign garrisons, and those which will be available within the United States after providing for requirements of the foreign garrisons:

	Total organizations in military establishment.	Required for foreign service.	Organizations remaining at home after providing for the foreign service.
Regiments of infantry.....	30	14	16
Regiments of cavalry.....	15	3 1-3	11 2-3
Regiments of field artillery.....	6	3	3
Companies of Philippine scouts....	52	52	..
Porto Rico regiments of infantry..	1	1	..
Companies of engineers.....	12	6	6

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It should be apparent to any novice that our newly acquired liabilities leave us in a far worse plight, as regards our army within the continental limits of the United States, than before the war with Spain. Without any opening for criticism of advocating "militarism," it may be stated in the plainest manner, that we are allowing our insurance to dwindle below a reasonable guarantee of home protection. There should be an immediate increase of the regular army and the character of this increment should be determined in connection with the organization of the volunteer force which is to become a part of the army immediately upon a declaration of war, leaving the proper distribution of the several arms of the greater volunteer army for determination later in accordance with the number of men summoned under each call. The problem is one of providing a proper scheme of expansion of a progressive character from a peace footing to a war basis. On the assumption that the existing organized militia will be always available for the land defense of our seacoast fortifications, to repel invasions and suppress disorder when required, the mobile force of regulars constitutes the only immediately available force for any military expedition beyond our territorial borders.

Coming from a nation generally accustomed to the use of firearms, the volunteers of 1861 required quite two years before they became the trained armies that eventually settled the war. Of course it is not possible to train all the volunteers in peace who may

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be needed in a great war, but it is essential that all the forces subject to immediate call of the President for active service shall be organized and given as much training in peace as possible. For the next and possibly greater call for volunteers the serious problem will be the absence of a sufficient number of trained officers and men as a nucleus for each organization. That this is not a new problem may be seen from this petition to the Virginia House of Delegates from the officers of the Minute Battalion which had obeyed the first call of the Revolution:

“To the Honorable the Speaker of the House of Delegates:

“PORTSMOUTH, December 1, 1776.

“SIR—In expectation of there being a number of additional troops raised, who are to be on Colonial Establishment the officers of the Minute Battalion now in service beg leave to address your Honorable House, on a matter of infinite importance to themselves.

“The disadvantages, under which they came into their present service hath occasioned them to suffer exceedingly in their private fortunes—especially as they have been continued much longer than they at first expected—disadvantages which nothing but the calls of an injured country would have induced their subjecting themselves to.

“You will not conceive them trivial when you consider that it was in midsummer, when every preparation they had been making for crops, were in their

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progress to perfection—and lost by leaving them. Even, under these circumstances, it is still their fervent wish to continue in the service of their country; in posts of equal rank, with those they have the honor to fill.

“Confined to their duty at this place, they were totally prevented from offering themselves as candidates in their respective counties, by personal application—(the only successful mode) at the choice of officers for the six regiments now raising on Continental Establishment.

“You will conceive it a hardship for the officers of the Battalion; now to be obliged to return to their counties, fall into the militia as common soldiers and at a future day be called into service, among the common mass—under the command of those who remained at home enjoying every conveniency of life—whilst they were sacrificing both happiness and fortunes.

“These sentiments they take the liberty of communicating through you to your Honorable House—and have the honor to be, Sir,

“YOUR VERY HUMBLE SERVANTS.”

No nation has a more intelligent personnel from which to draw its armies. The extent to which the nation may go in the organization of its military resources in time of peace is dictated by its political policies. The peace administration of our army through a War Department heavily burdened with non-military duties has ever made the pro rata cost

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of the soldier so high that Congress avoids as far as possible any discussion having for its object a material increase of the regular army. The fact that the cost of administration goes on without much regard to the size of the regiments is always ignored. The same number of administrative officers could easily handle the business affairs of a much larger army.

The regular army is confronted with serious duties in so many parts of the world that its usefulness as a school of instruction, except for its own personnel, is quite limited. Indeed attempts thus to utilize it so expose its paucity of strength as, not infrequently, to bring it into disrepute in the minds of those who have no comprehensive information as to existing conditions. A practice has grown up of continually attempting to expand the modest force by simulating organizations of the next higher degree—thus skeleton battalions are made to masquerade as regiments and regiments as brigades, when their small numbers should naturally suggest their consolidation into the unit of the next lower order for practice at real war strength.

So far as the army is concerned it needs only added strength to fill any demand which in reason may be made upon it. Its officers are educated and well trained; the men in the ranks are as intelligent, brave and resourceful as any in the world. The army is the best armed, equipped, clothed and fed of any troops ever in our service. The alternating employment in line and staff duties—the detail system—together with rotation of service in over-sea garrisons

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and much consequent travel has enlarged the horizon of all officers and qualified them for administration and command in the higher grades to a degree impossible under old conditions. The army of today could supply a larger number of officers qualified for high command than at any previous period of its history, and the number is being constantly increased through the instrumentality of post-graduate schools and practical application in most varied fields of activity.

The regulars have maintained the honor of the nation upon innumerable fields of combat and their achievements and sacrifices will live in song and story to bring the glow of pride to coming generations. Through their dignity and manhood in the hour of victory and their tenderness and sympathy in public disaster, they have ever earned honorable recognition. Imbued with the principles and customs instilled by Washington in the "Continental"—our first body of regulars to whom the nation owed so much in the struggle for liberty—they have cherished ideals of duty ever incompatible with hirelings and soldiers of fortune. Coming down the century, the regulars are found guarding our frontiers, the friend of the Indian in his hopeless struggle to stem the rising tide of Anglo-Saxon land-hunger, for the course of the pioneer had ever been to enter the wilderness with both rifle and axe and what he conquered he held.

The nation was ostensibly at peace, but during the long period of development of our land-empire

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the little columns of regulars were incessantly battling with Indians that the pioneer might build his cabin and plant his corn in peace. Sometimes a genius would arise amongst the red men and, arousing them to united action, halt the westward movement momentarily, but the inevitable course of destiny swept relentlessly on, and Dade, Canby, and Custer and a host of other gallant souls of the regulars passed to eternity, their honored memory serving but as landmarks of frontier history. Their sacrifice upon the inglorious fields of the Indian wars enshrined them in the hearts of their comrades and with the later generations the stories of their achievements have lived through repetition in the isolated and widely dispersed garrisons of a continent.

Not alone in the protection of the emigrant wagon-trains, ceaselessly winding their way across plain and mountain, did the regulars make their presence felt, but upon the distant battlefields of Mexico, their valor, discipline and steadfastness assured victory from a courageous adversary, superior in numbers and battling among his native deserts and mountains. Coming down to the Civil War period and possessing practically all the knowledge of the art of war in the country, the regular officers were widely dispersed amongst the great army of volunteers and the regular troops almost lost their identity in the meagerness of their strength, yet the influence of such organizations as Sykes's Division of regulars in the Army of the Potomac was of inesti-

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mable value, and there is nothing finer than the stoic courage of Baird's Division at Chickamauga, where, with a loss of fifty-five per cent., they remained firmly in line of battle while heroic Thomas gathered the broken fragments of the army about him for the last stand. There is nothing so democratic, in all military history, as the conduct of the regulars who, as generals, having led armies to victory, surrendered their high commissions in the volunteers, resumed the modest shoulder straps of regimental officers and returned to the frontier to take up again the trail of the Indian marauder, grown overbold through the prolonged absence of his erstwhile guardians.

As the hand of fate pointed more and more definitely to the end the warrior instinct guided the Indian race to its last and greatest wars, but the resistless wave swept over and about them and closed near three centuries of effort to stem the tide of a civilization, altruistic in heart and theory but practical in its execution of the inexorable decree of destiny. With the closing scenes of the Indian wars, the history of the ancient regime was laid away in the lavender of memory. A new era was initiated by the war with Spain, and followed by a train of consequences that has led the army and nation far afield. The old days of the frontier will live in tradition and history, but under the mellowing influence of time the hardships of campaigning against the most cunning and resourceful of foes will fade from memory. This in brief is the story of the past.

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No one can read the biographies and diaries of the generations of soldiers whose services made possible the opening up of this continent, without a feeling of deep and reverent regard for American manhood, as typified by those gallant men during the crude period of our national development.

Raw troops have been known to perform deeds of wondrous courage and of lasting importance, but there is a something called discipline which binds together an army and gives it a dependable morale not akin to the spasmodic action of new levies. The well-disciplined officers and men of the regular army who went to Santiago and whose brief campaign in connection with the naval victories promptly settled the war with Spain, rendered the country a great service not only in Cuba but in the jungle campaigns of the Philippine insurrection, which followed close upon the termination of the war with Spain. In the battle near Santiago, Cuba, usually referred to as "San Juan," the Cavalry Division, serving dismounted, with a strength of 127 officers and 2,522 men, suffered a loss of 36 officers and 339 men killed and wounded. Nearly one-third of the regular officers were killed or wounded, the loss in one regiment being exactly fifty per cent. In Kent's Infantry Division, with a strength of 235 officers and 4,869 men, the loss in killed and wounded was 51 officers and 650 men.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in a volume entitled *The War With Spain*, paid a tribute to the reg-

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ular army in connection with the operations against Santiago, Cuba, in this language:

“The battle of San Juan was preeminently the battle of the American regulars, of the flower of the American standing army. With scarcely any artillery support, armed only with rifles, they were set to take heights and a village strongly held by regular soldiers and defended by forts, intrenchments, batteries, and a tangle of barbed wire fences. This is something which the best military critics would declare well nigh impossible and not to be attempted. The American army did it.”*

Major-General Sir E. T. Hutton, K. C. M. G., C. B., in an address before the United Service Institution in London, said:

“I think all British soldiers owe Sir Howard Vincent much gratitude for a very instructive paper, and for so much useful information in connection with the army of that other great branch of the Anglo-Saxon race which we are so proud to claim as kinsmen. Having during the course of my service commanded in Canada, I have had especial opportunities of being conversant with the feelings and

*That part of the 5th Corps which participated in the expedition to Santiago comprised parts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 9th and 10th Cavalry; the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 20th, 21st, 22d, 24th and 25th Infantry; and two light batteries from each of the 1st, 2d and 4th Artillery. The strength of these organizations, as shown by the rolls, comprised a total of 14,604 men. Of these 4,963 were in their first year of service; 8,699 had less than three years of service, and 10,773 had less than seven years of service.

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ideas of the United States Army, and I also think to a certain extent with the trend of the military developments of which Sir Howard Vincent has been speaking. I should like, first of all, to refer to one or two points as regards the regular army. The United States Regular Army is one of unquestioned excellence in physique, discipline, and general military efficiency. It especially proved its value during the recent Cuban War; and I think if Sir Howard Vincent will allow me to say so, in a great measure its present popularity is due to the extremely gallant and excellent service which it rendered during that campaign in Cuba. It is a well-known fact to those who were present, that the success of the United States arms was almost entirely due to the steadiness and gallantry of the regular troops which took part in that campaign—”

The army has always responded to every demand made upon it to the limit of its strength. That it fades away under the influence of battle casualties is the common fate of courageous Anglo-Saxon armies in all history, but that they have risen and will rise again, even from the ashes of defeat, and move forward at their country's call is equally true. That the American army failed not to repeat its history, we have the words of Hon. Elihu Root, who, as Secretary of War, had every possible means of ascertaining the true state of affairs and who wrote:

“No organization could have produced the results exhibited by the army during the past two years which was not in the main sound and efficient. With

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its handful of regular officers and its small body of trained troops, merged with nearly double their number of raw recruits, and combined with large forces of new, untrained, volunteers, it has in surprisingly short periods of time produced a great body of men, uniformly well disciplined, of good conduct and morale, patient in endurance of hardships, steady, indomitable, and heroic in action, and who, against the debilitating influences of tropical climates, against physical obstacles which seemed insurmountable, and against enemies of superior numbers and approved courage, and armed with weapons of modern warfare, have won a long series of victories unbroken by a single defeat."

Practically all the cavalry and infantry regiments which had participated in the campaign against Santiago were engaged subsequently in the Philippine Insurrection. When peace had been sufficiently restored in the Philippine Islands to justify the inauguration of civil government, the President directed the transfer of authority on July 4, 1902, and that the following order containing encomiums fairly won and deserving a page in the history of that eventful epoch, be read at parade to every American garrison:

"To the Army of the United States:

"The President upon this anniversary of National independence wishes to express to the officers and enlisted men of the United States Army his deep appreciation of the service they have rendered to the country in the great and difficult undertakings

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which they have brought to a successful conclusion during the past year.

“The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the Army in the Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States. The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required at first to overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well equipped with modern arms of precision, intrenched in an unknown country of mountain defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable defense. When this resistance had been overcome they were required to crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush.

“The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all obligations of good faith and of all limitations which humanity has imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while punishing armed resistance,

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to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do with a population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered over a great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north to south, the gravest responsibilities, involving the life or death of their commands, frequently devolved upon young and inexperienced officers beyond the reach of specific orders or advice.

“Under all these adverse circumstances the Army of the Philippines has accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying courage and resolution. Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars it has relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of intimidation and secret assassination by which the peaceful natives were prevented from taking a genuine part in government under American authority. It has captured or forced to surrender substantially all the leaders of the insurrection. It has submitted to no discouragement and halted at no obstacle. Its officers have shown high qualities of command, and its men have shown devo-

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tion and discipline. Its splendid virile energy has been accompanied by self-control, patience, and magnanimity. With surprisingly few individual exceptions its course has been characterized by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the noncombatant. With admirable good temper, sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals its commanding generals have joined with the civilian agents of the Government in healing the wounds of war and assuring to the people of the Philippines the blessings of peace and prosperity. Individual liberty, protection of personal rights, civil order, public instruction, and religious freedom have followed its footsteps. It has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty and peace.

“The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal people of the United States in doing honor to the whole Army which has joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable services.”

The efficiency of a republican army, based on voluntary enlistments, depends upon its contentment with conditions, which in turn depends wholly upon the integrity of its administration. Absence of favoritism and cliques is essential to contented and loyal service. The foundation stones of regular army discipline comprise a frank adherence to the principle of supremacy of the civil law, a thorough knowledge of theory and the highest grade of

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proficiency in the practical performance of every military duty. It is not enough that each regular shall do his best but that he shall know and do what is right. With these ingrained principles it is only necessary that the regular army shall be governed by well considered laws and regulations, administered through a proper military hierarchy, to enable it to keep alive the knowledge, traditions and customs of war, so essential to safeguarding the vast material interests of the nation.

It has come to pass that out of our altruistic sentiment for the people of the neighboring isle of Cuba a line of increasing responsibilities for the nation has unfolded and led the army far afield. The office of the army of to-day in China, the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, Porto Rico and within our continental limits calls for a degree of ability and training hardly comprehended by the public. The character, efficiency and courage of the officers and men of the army have ever been beyond question, due not only to a long and brilliant history of arms, but also to the humanity with which they have handled the problems arising from earthquakes, floods, forest-fires and pestilence, of so grave a nature as to demand immediate, organized and disciplined relief. Through a century of experience the title of "regular" has come to signify safe, conservative and dependable action and the verdict of history during the recent period of world power expansion, will be clear-cut, decisive and unimpeachable as to the character and value of the services rendered by the army.

VI

COLONIAL TROOPS

“Remember, especially, that, for the efficient management of your common interest in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable.”—WASHINGTON.

DURING the past fifteen years the nation has wandered far from the traditional paths of pioneer development and, in consequence, our little army of regulars has found employment in many strange lands. With the thought and hope that each demand would be the last, expediency rather than a comprehensive and previously considered policy has dictated in each instance the employment of our forces. To meet the modest demands of almost any conceivable call for pacification or intervention incident to treaties or the Monroe Doctrine, would drain our country of all the available mobile army remaining at home, and interfere with the timely relief of those employed on foreign service.

Whatever may be the policy of the future as to our political relations with the Philippines, the existing form of government makes them autonomous so far as the collection of customs and internal taxes are concerned and the actual administration of the islands may be likened to that of a limited republic. In the reform of our military system, which seems essential, it would be a serious mistake not to include

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a complete modification of the defense and utilization of the military forces in the Philippine Islands. Some of our most experienced officers have long agreed that the solution of the problem would be best met by appointing the military commander in the Philippines to office, under the Civil Governor, with duties akin to those of a Secretary of War and Administrator of Police. This would not involve much additional administrative force to that now employed for the army and would materially decrease the expenditure in connection with constabulary administration.

The military forces maintained in the islands comprise three classes: American regulars of all arms; Philippine scouts, natives, organized in companies and battalions under American officers and supported out of army appropriations; Philippine constabulary, natives, under American officers with but few exceptions, and supported by the Philippine government. A reformation of the system has been repeatedly urged by those in authority and the time has arrived when the situation should be considered in connection with legislation having for its object the modernization of our entire military system, including regulars, volunteers and militia.

The Philippine scout organizations were brought into existence under an act of Congress providing for a reorganization of the army, without any view other than provision for a temporary force of natives to assist in restoring and maintaining order in the islands. The constabulary, supported by the

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Philippine government, comprises a military organization of natives with a brigadier general at the head and numerous field officers from the regular army as assistants, and has to its credit innumerable gallant actions occurring in the suppression of disorders arising from various causes in a thousand islands. When civil government was substituted for military control in the islands, it seemed obvious that the native troops dispersed for maintenance of order throughout the archipelago would ultimately be placed under the same directing authority that controls the native constabulary. The proposition to transfer the Philippine scout companies from the army to the constabulary was much advocated but the condition of the Philippine treasury did not seem to warrant the immediate assumption of the obligation involved in the support of the additional force. A compromise was effected by an act of Congress which continues the burden of expense for maintenance of the scouts upon the army appropriations, but authorizes their temporary transfer in emergencies to the control of the chief and assistant chiefs of constabulary. The scouts so detached are not subject to orders from any other constabulary officers which places a limitation upon their employment. The scheme was based wholly upon expediency during a critical and unsettled condition in the Philippines, both as to income and public order and should not be continued indefinitely.

The opinion was held by numerous army officers

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that the scouts should remain under military control and be thoroughly drilled and disciplined as a counterpoise to the constabulary in event of any considerable portion of the latter body being seduced into disloyalty by designing native politicians. This argument falls to the ground in face of the innumerable and courageous actions of the constabulary forces in the maintenance of law and order among their own people in all parts of the archipelago.

When our army was first sent to garrison stations beyond the seas, expediency, apparent exigencies of the service, and perhaps some favor, combined to prevent the full quota of officers from accompanying their organizations. In the course of time some officers who continued on duty with their regiments acquired records of tropical service covering many years, while others had little or none. It appeared difficult, if not impossible, to correct the inequality by returning the absentees to their organizations. In the end, the initiation of a corrective was undertaken by the transfer of certain regiments to constitute permanent garrisons in the Philippines, the system being applied later to the organizations serving in the Hawaiian Islands and Panama. Under this scheme, it is contemplated gradually to correct inequalities in length of tropical service at over-sea stations by transferring officers, the non-commissioned officers and privates being privileged by the terms of their enlistments to return home upon ex-

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piration of service, where they may reenlist as privates in home organizations.

To meet existing and increasing responsibilities it seems inevitable that a material increase of our military establishment shall take place in the not distant future. When that occurs it should include a drastic change of method of providing the overseas garrisons now demanded in widely separated parts of the world.

To provide for the garrisons in the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, there should be created an entirely new military force of Colonial Troops, organized especially for that service and not given designations as part of the home army of regulars. The lists of officers of the regular army should be increased by the addition of extra officers of the several grades necessary for duty with the Colonial Troops, and the additional number of men to constitute the enlisted force should be authorized. In the execution of this scheme the Philippine scout companies would be amalgamated with the constabulary and the entire expenses of the native forces for the preservation of order should be borne by the Philippine treasury. The old organizations of the regular army now permanently assigned to stations in the Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Panama, may then be returned to home stations and thereafter previous foreign service should be considered in assigning officers to the new colonial troops. In this way provision would be made for the immediate obligations

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confronting the nation and if, in the future, the political status of the Philippines becomes so changed as no longer to require the American army, the colonial troops there may be returned and the enlisted force transferred to the permanent army units, or discharged, and the officers continued on duty until disposed of by Congress. As our nation grows, the need of trained officers increases and we will never have even a modest proportion of those required to supply our requirements in the preparation of our forces for the exigencies of war.

The minimum garrisons for the Philippine Islands, the Hawaiian Islands and Panama having been determined, it is important that there be created and maintained at home a sufficient force of regulars to constitute at least three reliefs for foreign service, for it is neither economical nor desirable to have our officers and men spend more than one-third of their time at tropical stations. If merely a sufficient army is maintained to alternate tours of foreign and home service, it would make impossible any reasonable arrangement of other necessary service, such as instructors of schools and colleges, the militia, recruiting and numerous other kinds of detached duties of recognized importance.

The garrison of about eight hundred and fifty men maintained in China may be disregarded in the calculations of colonial troops inasmuch as it is detached from the Philippine Islands during the existing temporary emergency. The organizations re-

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quired ultimately for service as Colonial Troops under the existing War Department policy as to garrisons comprise the following:

- Philippine Islands:* 4 regiments of infantry.
2 regiments of cavalry.
1 regiment of field artillery.
24 companies of coast artillery.
2 companies of engineers.
- Hawaiian Islands:* 6 regiments of infantry.
1 regiment of cavalry.
1 regiment and 1 battalion of field artillery.
3 companies of engineers.
13 companies of coast artillery.
- Panama:* 3 regiments of infantry.
1 squadron (4 troops) of cavalry.
1 battalion of field artillery.
12 companies of coast artillery.
1 company of engineers.

To these should be added the proper proportion of staff and supply corps, quartermaster, sanitary, signal, ordnance and others essential to military efficiency. The troops required to garrison Alaska should be drawn from the home army.

To accomplish this reorganization of the forces it will be necessary to add to the regular army the officers and men to comprise thirteen regiments of infantry, three and one-third regiments of cavalry, three regiments of field artillery, forty-nine companies of coast artillery, six companies of engineers, and the proportional strength of staff personnel in accordance with legal and tables of organization authorizations.

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Based on existing organizations this will provide for additions to the regular army as follows:

13 regiments of infantry, total enlisted.....	23,868
3 1-3 regiments of cavalry, total enlisted.....	4,120
3 regiments of field artillery, total enlisted.....	3,384
49 companies of coast artillery, total enlisted.....	5,096
6 companies of engineers, total enlisted.....	988
Total	37,456

The additional officers required for these organizations will comprise:

	Colonels	Lieutenant Colonels	Majors	Captains	First Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	Chaplains	Veteri- narians
Infantry	13	13	39	195	195	195	13	..
Cavalry	3	3	10	49	50	50	3	7
Field artillery.....	3	3	6	33	39	39	3	6
Coast artillery.....	4	4	12	49	49	49	4	..
Total	23	23	67	326	333	333	23	13

Based on the organization suggested in another chapter as most suitable for volunteers of the mobile army—the units-of-threes system—the requirements would be as follows:

13 regiments of infantry, 9 companies and 1 depot company each, total enlisted.....	18,317
3 1-3 regiments, cavalry, 9 troops and 1 depot troop each, total enlisted	3,203
3 regiments field artillery, 6 batteries and 1 depot battery, total enlisted	3,522
49 companies coast artillery, total enlisted.....	5,096
6 companies engineers, total enlisted.....	988
Total	31,126

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The additional officers required for these organizations will comprise:

	Colonels	Lieutenant Colonels	Majors	Captains	First Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	Chaplains	Veterinarians
Infantry	13	13	39	169	169	169	13	..
Cavalry	3	3	10	42	43	43	3	7
Field artillery.....	3	3	7	36	45	45	3	6
Coast artillery.....	4	4	12	49	49	49	4	..
Total	23	23	68	296	306	306	23	13

There are enough extra colonels of the line, without commands, promoted to present grade to rectify inequalities of rank arising from former legislation, to provide colonels for all the regiments of colonial troops. The officers for the additional companies of engineers can be provided, at least temporarily, from the authorized personnel of the engineer corps as soon as the vacancies authorized by recent legislation are filled. Should it develop later that there is need for more engineer officers to fulfill these conditions they can be provided by special legislation.

To add at once a large number of untrained civilians to the regular service as commissioned officers would lower the standards of the army materially and require a long period for recovery. It would be wiser to plan for a preliminary training and professional sifting of those not supplied from the military academy and the army, and add approved can-

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didates at the rate of not exceeding one-fifth the total increment each year. Together with the vacancies arising annually from casualties among the commissioned personnel, this would require about three hundred each year for five years to complete the quota for the Colonial Troops, and provide for current vacancies occurring normally in existing army organizations.

Upon the completion of this reorganization the entire regular army as now organized and comprising thirty regiments of infantry, fifteen regiments of cavalry and six regiments of field artillery with a total strength of 47,077 officers and men with peace strength organizations would be stationed within the continental limits of the United States and Alaska.

Should the unit-of-three system of organization be adopted, coincident with the creation of the proposed body of Colonial Troops, the number of regiments in the mobile army would be increased by the organization into regiments of the surplus companies arising from the change from four to three of these units to each battalion. The coast artillery comprises 170 companies and would not be modified through the adoption of the unit-of-three system for the mobile army.

With the infantry and cavalry, including Colonial Troops of those branches, organized with nine companies and a depot company to each and a depot battery added to each of the present regiments of field artillery, the strength of the army ex-

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clusive of communication, sanitary and supply corps units, all organizations at the maximum or war strength, would be as follows:

Colonial troops	31,123
36 regiments of infantry.....	50,724
18 regiments of cavalry.....	17,298
6 regiments of field artillery.....	7,044
170 companies of coast artillery.....	18,931
Total	125,120

Such increase of this force as may be determined upon should take into consideration the serious obstacles in the creation and maintenance of expensive special arms of volunteers and militia and also the necessity for having a sufficient number of officers of all arms to insure three reliefs in each grade to meet the requirements of service with Colonial Troops.

VII

RESERVES

"The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service."

—WASHINGTON.

A FEW years ago the ranks of the army were depleted, recruits were scarce and there were not so many reenlistments as seemed desirable. It then became the policy of the administration to regard the service in the light of a career for the men in the ranks as well as for the officers, with a view to having the small regular army not only a model for volunteers and militia but also a highly-trained and efficient body of dependable troops for immediate military purposes. In presenting this matter in his annual message to Congress, December 3, 1907, President Roosevelt said:

"Inducements should be offered sufficient to encourage really good men who make the army a life occupation. . . . Increase over the present pay need not be great in the lower grades for the first one or two enlistments, but the increase should be marked for the noncommissioned officers of the upper grades who serve long enough to make it evident that they intend to stay in the army, while additional pay should be given for higher qualifications in target practice. . . .

" . . . the man who serves steadily in the army

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should be treated as what he is, that is, as preeminently one of the best citizens of this Republic. After twelve years' service in the army my own belief is that the man should be given a preference according to his ability for certain types of office over all civilian applicants without examination . . ."

The efforts of the War Department to show Congress that the army should be regarded in the light of a professional body of soldiers were successful, for the pay was increased, special inducements were provided for reenlistments and numerous other things done to make the life of the soldier more attractive to the class of men desired for the army. The result was a great improvement; the organizations began to fill up and enough men reenlisted to insure a broad field of selection for the important grades of noncommissioned officers.

Considerable permanency of personnel is the basic element of the policy which regards the regular army as a striking force of dependable soldiers. Such a force maintained at war strength and not as skeleton organizations in peace, constitutes a school for officers where they may practise the art of war and standardize organizations and methods of training so that they will constitute acceptable models for volunteers and state troops. Under this policy it is expected that experienced and dependable soldiers, when discharged from the service, will be available in their communities to assist in raising and training volunteers and filling many of the important offices for which they will be better qualified than the great

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body of patriotic but uninstructed young volunteers. Honorably discharged soldiers who prefer to return to service in war with the regulars are not only not to be deprived of the privilege, but by statute authorized to receive a bonus for so doing.

With the advent of a new administration in the War Department, a wholly different policy as to the enlisted personnel of the army was brought forward, which contemplates the utilization of the regular army as a training school where young men will be taught the duties of the soldier and then be transferred to the reserve for the remaining period of their enlistments, which were recommended to Congress to be fixed at eight or ten years' duration. Legislation was finally enacted which fixed the period of enlistment at seven years, of which four are to be spent with the colors, and three in the reserve.

Here are found not mere differences of opinion concerning a policy, but two diametrically opposed policies presented to the same Committees of Congress, within a brief period, and each carrying the burden of considerable appropriations. All human institutions are subject to the laws of progress, but care is necessary to the end that mere change be not mistaken for reform. Those military men whose views President Roosevelt so ably championed in 1907 must be credited with proper motives, some ability and much experience. They were confronted with conditions, not theories. The army was ill prepared at the time to perform all the duties which actually crowded upon it, the nature of which de-

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manded a more perfect military machine than can be produced by turning our inadequate army into a training school for reservists. Regimental officers, on duty with their organizations and who are expected to maintain them in a state of discipline and efficiency equal to the difficult and delicate duties upon the Mexican border, in Alaska, Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines and China, and those involving service such as the occupation of Cuba upon two occasions, should not be denounced as non-progressive if they view with some concern a change of policy which may make their organizations less dependable, less a fulfillment of the nation's idea of the "regulars." It is wholly unfair to question the motives of military men because they do not change their views with every new suggestion, but await proof as to the soundness of proposed doctrines. Altogether, the new proposal for short service with the colors and a long period in reserve was a violent overturning of the policy so recently and so forcefully presented to and adopted by Congress, and the opinion that the new policy was quite incapable of meeting the expectations of its supporters, except when applied to semi-permanent or specially assigned organizations and not to the army as a whole, was not without some justification.

Under the new system of long enlistments, seven years, with part of the service in the reserve, it will be many years before any material effect will be visible in the existence of a body of dependable reservists, whose addresses are listed with the War

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Department. If we assume the army to consist of 100,000 men, enlisted for four years' service with the colors and three in reserve, and there were no incidents to occur to interfere with the orderly procedure of events, in theory we might then count upon one-fourth of the whole or 25,000 men annually passing back into civil life and becoming available for a call to arms during the ensuing three years. Those who have not given the available War Department records careful study may well be surprised at the vast difference between the theoretical and actual results. To avoid any possible selection of exceptional examples from the vast accumulation of army records, the following, within the author's personal experience, are believed to show conclusively that the number of enlisted men who will become available as reservists upon discharge from the average organization of regulars, will bear a very modest relation to the total number whose connection with the organization is severed during any given period. The regimental records of the 8th U. S. Infantry for the year ending December 31, 1874, show the changes in personnel as follows:

Discharge by expiration of service.....	42
Discharge for disability.....	21
Discharge sentence general court martial.....	16
Discharge by order.....	21
Dropped	11
Transferred	56
Died	7
Deserted	74
Total	<u>248</u>

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The regiment had exceptionally hard service during 1872, 1873 and 1874, and during the last-named year, there were only eight reenlistments. Deducting those from the number discharged by expiration of service there would have remained but thirty-four possible reservists out of a total of 238 lost to the regiment, had the present reserve law been in effect.

During the six months ending August 31, 1913, the losses from the Second Division, which comprised an average strength of 12,000 men during that period, were as follows:

Discharge by expiration of service.....	761
Discharge by sentence court martial.....	202
Discharge without honor.....	19
Discharge by purchase.....	56
Discharge, all other causes.....	71
Deserted	430
Reenlisted	269

Of those who deserted 127 were apprehended or surrendered. An analysis of the figures shows that for the six months' period the losses of the Division aggregated 1,412. Of the 761 discharged by expiration of service, 269 reenlisted, leaving 492 or about one-third of all those whose connection with organizations was severed during the same period, available as possible reservists had the present law been applicable to them.

The average monthly enlisted strength of the army, exclusive of Philippine scouts, between July 1, 1912, and June 30, 1913, was 86,140. During the

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same period the losses from all causes totaled 25,349 men distributed as follows:

Expiration of period of enlistment.....	12,095
Discharge for disability.....	1,056
Discharged by sentence general court martial.	2,729
Discharged by order.....	4,278
Died of wounds, disease, accidents, drowned, suicide and homicide.....	398
Deserted	4,451
Retired	342
Reenlisted during same period.....	7,033

Had the reserve law been applicable to all men discharged during the year the number of possible reservists would have been 5,349 out of 25,349, whose connection with the service was severed from all causes.

In this connection it is of interest to note the decreasing rate of reenlistments which for all branches was in 1911, 14,172; in 1912, 11,601; and during 1913, 7,033; only about one-half the number of reenlistments as in 1911. The cause of this falling off in reenlistments may be fairly traced to the marked change of policy already alluded to and to widely published accounts of testimony given before Congressional Committees and numerous public interviews antagonistic to men who under previous encouragement had decided to make their careers in the army.

Assuming that the new system, a wholly different scheme from any in the great armies of Europe, where the local authorities have control of the re-

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serves, does not break down before a war there will probably arise an infinite trouble of execution except in the cases of those who really wish to return to the service when summoned. Those who have married, established homes for their families and perhaps invested their all in some business, will surely appeal for release, and in all probability they will be sustained by the sentiment of the community, because the summons will have the appearance of unfairness and it will be viewed as a hardship to take such men, when others perhaps without family ties of a character to prevent service are not required to share in the national defense. Herein lies the difference between a country with a small regular army and a European nation-in-arms, where conscription places the same duty upon all. It may be properly claimed that the individual, who as a lad signed a reserve agreement for seven or ten years, has no just cause of complaint, but there can be but little doubt that in a nation where there is no general resentment at being taxed for pensions to deserters of the Civil War, there will be abundant and successful sympathy for individual reservists, in civil life, who no longer feel the spirit calling to arms. In such a situation, Congress may in one vote destroy the results of years of efforts and call for volunteers as of old, in order to release the reservists from an obligation under which they have become restive because of their paucity in numbers in so large a nation, and for the further reason that *other men with good discharges from the army who are not reserv-*

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ists may reenlist in war and receive a material bounty for so doing.

In this connection it may be well to cite a compilation—widely published—showing the ages attributed to those who enlisted in the Union Army during the Civil War:

Those 10 years and under.....	25
Those 11 years and under.....	38
Those 12 years and under.....	225
Those 13 years and under.....	300
Those 14 years and under.....	1,523
Those 15 years and under.....	104,987
Those 16 years and under.....	231,051
Those 17 years and under.....	844,891
Those 18 years and under.....	1,151,438
Those 21 years and under.....	2,159,798
Those 22 years and over.....	613,511
Those 25 years and over.....	46,462
Those 44 years and over.....	16,071

Of the total men enlisted, 2,778,304, less than one-fourth were over 21 years of age.

The statistics relating to very young boys—mere children—have often been questioned, but it should be remembered that the enlistment of young boys as drummers and fifers was formerly authorized. The author entered the government service at twelve years and six months of age and was employed in the Department of the Cumberland as a mounted dispatch messenger during 1864. The just conclusions to be drawn from the tabulation are that in past wars the young unmarried men and boys constituted the main fighting force.

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The present law provides for a seven years' enlistment, four years with the colors and three in reserve, or should the soldier elect, he may be transferred to the reserve after three years' service with an organization. The reserve may be further increased by enlistment or reenlistment of men with honorable discharges from the army, but during the year following the passage of the law only eight men had enlisted in the reserve, one of whom enlisted in Porto Rico, and at the expiration of two and a half years, only seventeen men had become reservists.

Existing statutes provide that in time of war or when war is imminent, and after the President shall, by proclamation, have called upon honorably discharged soldiers of the regular army to present themselves for reenlistment, physically qualified, honorably discharged soldiers under forty-five years of age not furloughed to the reserve, may be reenlisted and receive a bounty based upon the time elapsed since their discharge from the army not exceeding three hundred dollars in any case. Men of this class are intended to be utilized to fill up the army in the same manner as men furloughed to the reserve. The President may summon the latter class, however, only in the event of actual or theoretical hostilities, *when so authorized by Congress*, and in event of reservists being called back to the colors all distinctions of rank vanish and noncommissioned staff officers, sergeants and corporals, report as privates, while their inferiors in military qualifications

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may aspire to the higher offices in the volunteers raised in every war.

Under the old militia laws which prevailed for quite a century, it was the duty of the captain or the mustering officer of each district to keep a record of all men subject to military duty. This embraced those males born in the district and who continued to reside there until of militia age, as well as those who moved in from other districts. It is no longer the duty of any official to watch over these matters and only the total of militia age available may be surmised by analysis of the census records. There is no uniform military hierarchy in state or nation at this time which may be depended upon to maintain that intimate knowledge of the reservists which will be essential in procuring their prompt return to the army in event of war.

The result of many years of study of the military history of our country has brought the conviction that it is only by maintaining the small regular army always at war strength, and establishing regimental depots, that we may count upon readiness to strike and upon the necessary flow of men to fill the vacancies incurred in campaign, and that for the greater war force we must provide for the maintenance of federal volunteers in peace, with depots in each district, which will insure a flow of trained men to keep those organizations at full strength in war. It is probable that men in each district who have served the prescribed period of training in local volunteer or-

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ganizations will either rejoin them for war or join new volunteer organizations, as officers or noncommissioned officers, without being carried as members of a reserve.

A force of federal volunteers will attract the patriotic young men who feel the obligation to qualify for the service of the nation in war, but who may not be counted upon ever to attach themselves to militia organizations which are more and more frequently employed for the preservation of order during labor troubles. Strike and riot duty have been well performed by many state organizations, but it is not the type of service which appeals to young men generally. It is not contemplated that the potential reserve of federal volunteers shall ever be called into active service except for training and actual war.

It is more than probable that the seeming unpopularity of service in militia organizations, under state control, and which prevents those forces from ever becoming the dependable national reserve required for war, will continue as long as their use as constabulary prevails. With a century of experience in the effort to avoid the maintenance of a considerable regular army by giving encouragement to militia, we are compelled to admit that the evidence is all against the theory that the state organizations will ever constitute a dependable reserve available for service with federal troops. We may continue the hope that a body of men worthy the name of reserve may materialize under the existing militia statutes, but it is vain when we consider the probable

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field of action of any army we may need in the years to come.

Much has been written recently concerning the practicability and value of the short enlistment as a means of increasing the reserves of partially trained soldiers. There can be no question that under experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, the average group of recruits may be taught the drill regulations and trained in field firing sufficiently in six months to prepare them to render valuable service in war, provided the whole period is devoted solely to instruction. There is a vast difference, however, between such an organization and a body of soldiers prepared for active service and any attempt to turn the whole regular army into such a training school will disqualify the organizations as to readiness to meet immediate demands for distant service. The experiment has been tried in a few organizations, and it is entirely practicable to give the matter a more generous trial, but the organizations designated as training schools should be removed from the roster for active service.

The recent establishment of two or three summer camps for college students is justified from the standpoint of arousing interest and creating a public opinion, but if relied upon to produce trained men for the ranks, or qualified aspirants for command, they will bring disappointment, because from the very nature of our needs the results of the camps must be insignificant. A few of the larger colleges and universities have for years been turning out well-drilled

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young men from their cadet corps, who constitute splendid material for officers and noncommissioned officers of the proposed reserve of federal volunteers.

When we consider the ages attributed to upwards of two million of the young men who fought in the Civil War, it would seem that without turning ourselves into a nation-in-arms we could safely give encouragement to the extension of the military departments already existing in schools and universities, and the establishment of a government school in every state for the education and military training of young men as officers of volunteers. It should be borne in mind at all times that training our boys and young men in sanitation, military exercises and marksmanship does not in the least subject the nation to a just charge of so-called militarism, for such instruction is for the purpose of fitting them physically and technically for the arduous duties of a soldier's life. Without such training, they more readily fall victims of preventable diseases. If never called to serve in war, their training is not lost, for through it, they have become more valuable citizens in their several communities. The statutes relieving certain religious sects from military service should all be repealed in order that the available members of such bodies may be employed in the hospitals, supply depots and in other ways to relieve able-bodied men whose religious principles do not deny them the right to use force in defense of their liberty or to resist encroachments upon their native soil.

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The value of a body of trained soldiers, in reserve, carried on furlough from their organizations, is theoretically of highest potentiality. The essence of failure of the system in our country lies in the fact that our army has never been territorialized. When that is accomplished, we may then develop a genuine asset in local reserves, trained in regiments devoted to the instruction of short term men while the current demands upon the army for over-sea and other service are met by war strength organizations with regimental depots for training their own recruits. Many of our experienced officers in the past have deemed the utilization of men with former service as most appropriate with the new volunteers, and particularly that men discharged as regimental noncommissioned staff officers, and as sergeants of companies, would be more valuable as officers or non-commissioned officers of high grade in the volunteers than if brought back to serve under the reserve system as privates in the regulars. Any system which induces men of former service to reenter in war meets with general approval, the difference of opinion being solely as to where they may be best utilized.

The young men who enlist and follow the flag to distant shores should be given every encouragement while in the service to qualify themselves for advancement. The number of commissions available in the regular army is sufficient to reward only a very small proportion of the good men. Every civil service position under the War Department and many in

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the postoffice and possibly other departments should be given to discharged soldiers qualified for the various duties. Once adopted, the men would strive to reach a high degree of fitness and an honorable discharge with a certificate from the commanding officer should take the place of the civil service examination.

In time of war it is of immense advantage to have railway employees familiar with army conditions and movements. It is not too much to expect that a campaign of education among railroad presidents would develop a spirit in harmony with a scheme that would send a small but constant stream of young men of certified character and fine physique to their roads for employment. Men who have served two or three enlistments in the army are usually manly, straightforward soldiers, whose characters are well established. They have ever been the backbone of the discipline and esprit which has always carried the regular organizations to victory.

Similar experience, even if briefer, in the federal volunteers, should gradually make available in every district an ever increasing number of trained, reliable men of great value. Their communities will gradually come to recognize them and also the value of the system which produces such men.

VIII

REGIMENTAL DEPOTS

"It is much easier at all times to prevent an evil than to rectify mistakes; it is infinitely better to have a few good men than many indifferent ones."—WASHINGTON.

A DEPOT system for passing trained men into the ranks of organizations employed in active campaign is absolutely essential to an economical and efficient conduct of war. Our wars have all been excessively expensive due to the neglect of this most important feature of military organization. During the Civil War the killed represented only a small fraction of the losses in the average regiment. Sickness, with long periods of convalescence, desertions, and reported missing, constituted together an appalling total. The large regiments that went to the front shrunk rapidly in numbers and although the reduced organizations represented the survival of the fittest, and grew daily more valuable with experience of camp, march and battle, it was only a question of time when by mere attrition many of them ceased to be regiments except in name. Regiments which had entered the service with a thousand or more strong soon fell to half that number. In the meantime, the number of officers and noncommissioned officers remained constant so that the real loss fell upon the bone and sinew of the fighting force—the privates. Some relief was demanded

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from a system which was rapidly sapping the strength of the various armies. New regiments of volunteers with full quotas of officers were constantly coming into service. The remedy applied by Congress was drastic, extravagant and calculated to discourage the whole army in the field through the loss of its trained officers and noncommissioned officers. The sections of the law enacted which gave the most severe blow to efficiency directed that whenever a regiment of volunteers should become reduced to one-half the maximum number prescribed by law, the President was authorized to direct the consolidation of the companies of such a regiment, and the War Department order issued in conformity with the law, directed that each regiment "of the volunteer army now reduced, or that may be reduced hereafter, as set forth in said sections," should be consolidated into six, or a less number of companies and the colonel, major, one assistant surgeon and such company officers and noncommissioned officers as might be rendered supernumerary by the consolidation should be mustered out of service.

General Sherman emerged from the Civil War with a reputation for soldierly ability second only to that of General Grant. As a military student and a forceful writer his reputation is unexcelled. That he was quick to discern the evil effects of the consolidation order and prompt in his efforts to bring the military mistake to public attention may be best shown by quoting a letter written to his distinguished brother, then a senator:

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“CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG, April 23, 1863.

“DEAR BROTHER—I have noticed in the Conscript Act the clauses which empowered the President to consolidate the ten companies of a regiment into five, when the aggregate was below one-half the maximum standard, and to reduce the officers accordingly. Had I dreamed that this was going to be made universal, I should have written you and begged you for the love of our ruined country to implore Lincoln to spare us this last fatal blow. Two years of costly war have enabled the North to realize the fact that by organized and disciplined armies alone can she hope to restore the old and found a new empire. We had succeeded in making the skeletons of armies, eliminating out of the crude materials that first came forth the worthless material, and had just begun to have some good young colonels, captains, sergeants and corporals. And Congress had passed the Conscript Bill, which would have enabled the President to fill up these skeleton regiments full of privates who soon, from their fellows, and with experienced officers, would make an army capable of marching and being handled and directed. But to my amazement comes this order. This is a far worse defeat than Manassas. Mr. Wade, in his report to condemn McClellan, gave a positive assurance to the army that henceforth, instead of fighting with diminishing ranks, we should feel assured that the gaps made by the bullet, by disease, desertion, etc., would be promptly filled, whereas only such parts of the Conscript Law as tend

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to weaken us are enforced, viz. : five per cent. for furlough and fifty per cent. of officers and noncommissioned officers discharged to consolidate regiments. Even Blair is amazed at this. He protests the order can not be executed, and we should appeal to Mr. Lincoln, whom he still insists has no desire to destroy the army. But the order is positive and I don't see how we can hesitate. Grant started to-day down to Carthage, and I have written to him, which may stave it off for a few days, but I tremble at the loss of so many young and good officers, who have been hard at work for two years, and now that they begin to see how to take care of soldiers, must be turned out. . . .

“If not too late, do, for mercy's sake, exhaust your influence to stop this consolidation of regiments. Fill all the regiments with conscripts, and if the army is then too large disband the regiments that prefer to serve north of the Potomac and the Ohio. Keep the war south at all hazards. If this Consolidation Law is literally enforced, and no new draft is made, this campaign is over. And the outside world will have a perfect right to say our Government is afraid of its own people. . . .

“Affectionately yours,

“W. T. SHERMAN.”

Having applied the thoroughly democratic and righteous rule of conscription to carry on the war in which the life of the nation was at stake, Congress had full power to demand that the law be executed

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in such manner as to fill the ranks of all existing regiments and that the raising of new regiments be stopped. The very provisions for mustering out reduced regiments constituted an acknowledgment that the other part of the law providing conscription to fill the ranks was doomed to failure.

Much of the writing in which prominent officers of the Civil War indulged subsequent to the close of that conflict bore generally upon discussions of various campaigns and battles. A very few urged the nation to profit by the lessons of that war and almost without exception their words were unheeded. The clearest proof of this exists in the fact that practically nothing had been done to perfect a depot system of meeting losses at the front at the time war with Spain was declared. Everything done from April, 1898, until the close of the Philippine Insurrection was pushed with characteristic American vigor, but an historical examination of the sequence of events and the remedies applied leaves the conviction that nearly all legislative, administrative and executive action was based on emergency consideration and the expediency of the moment. The country gloried in the easy victory over Spain, but remained anchored to an obsolete and defective system of maintaining the fighting efficiency of its field armies so far as filling the losses in campaign. History will repeat itself, and unless a remedy is found in peace which will function in war, similar conditions will prevail again. When the war with Spain was declared, instead of having a plan which had

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received the sanction of Congress, the hands of the clock were turned back to 1861. Volunteer regiments were brought into service and hurried to large camps before proper provision could be made for them. Thousands of recruits were enlisted for the regular army, but as nearly all the regiments had gone to Cuba before the recruits could join and be equipped and there were no established regimental depots, the men were assembled in large numbers, under a few strange officers rebelling at heart at being compelled to remain behind when their comrades were joining battle with the enemy. It was nobody's business to look after the men of any particular organization. If another war is allowed to find the nation with no better system for expanding the army and maintaining its efficiency in the field, so far as replenishment of its ranks is concerned, public condemnation will follow as surely as it did in 1898, even though that same public may continue quite indifferent to the whole subject of army efficiency until war is declared.

To accomplish proper results, some form of depot organization is absolutely necessary. There may be several feasible plans for accomplishing the purpose, but the essential thing to be borne in mind is that in preparing each regiment for war there must be a prearranged plan under which the regiment will know that its sick and wounded will not only be cared for but returned to duty through its own depot, without undue delay, and that permanent vacancies in the ranks will be filled with acceptable re-

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cruits, trained by those interested in the welfare of the regiment. These questions satisfactorily solved make for economy, contentment and efficiency. The depot system here mentioned should not be confounded with the experiment with "home battalions" during the Philippine Insurrection and the last occupation of Cuba.

As a military proposition strong regiments make for good morale, increased confidence and battle efficiency. Weakness in the real battle element, the fighting privates, on the other hand, stands for discouragement, excessive guard and fatigue duty and a lowered capacity for efficient military employment of all kinds. A regiment, in the mind of the average general officer, stands for a specific organization possessing certain vital characteristics, and whenever the number of men in the ranks has become reduced to one-half or one-third the proper number, that particular organization suffers in consequence.

Very early in the Civil War this question of filling up organizations at the front became acute, and on December 3, 1861, an order was issued forbidding any more regiments of volunteers to be raised except upon the special requisition of the War Department, and at the same time established a recruiting service under general superintendents for each state, with general depots for the collection and instruction of recruits. The futility of this plan was soon recognized and early in 1862 officers detailed for the volunteer recruiting service were directed to recruit for their own regiments. Later in the year

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it was ordered that all men who desired, singly or by squads, to join any particular regiment or company in the field, should be enrolled and forwarded at once and that "recruits for regiments now in the field will be permitted to select any company of the regiment they may prefer."

That the absence of a prearranged depot system was a constant source of embarrassment is evidenced by repeated orders and instructions on the subject such as:

"A large number of volunteers are absent from their regiments who are now fit for duty. To enable them to return, the Governors of States are authorized to give them certificates or passes which will entitle them to transportation to the station of the nearest United States Mustering Officer or Quartermaster, who will pay the cost of transportation for the soldier to his regiment or station."

"At large camps, depots, or posts, where absentees arrive en route to their companies, the commanding officers will immediately set apart a particular place where the men may be quartered, in buildings, tents, or huts, as soon as they arrive, and may, *without delay*, receive food and clothing. Parties will be detailed to await at landing places the arrival of such soldiers, and to direct them to their quarters. They will be assigned immediately to temporary companies, composed as far as possible of men from the same regiments or brigades. . . ."

There was much vacillation of policy. On April 3, 1862, orders were issued that recruiting parties

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for the volunteer service should be disbanded, the public property used in connection therewith sold to the best advantage and the offices closed. On the first of the following month it was announced that authority would be given to *governors of the respective states to recruit for regiments in service* when requested by commanders of armies in the field, and on July 25, 1862, orders were issued establishing the recruiting service for each volunteer regiment in the field.

All of which goes to show the economic desirability of fixing upon a plan in peace when there are not so many conflicting interests to be subserved. Of course it is well understood that the policy of to-day may be destroyed to-morrow, even if established in conformity to law, but it is certain that carefully devised plans written in the statutes in peace are not so apt to be overturned in war as those brought forward as hasty and ill-digested schemes based on the expediency of the moment.

In order to obtain the views of general officers of experience in the war with Spain, a study of a depot system was prepared by the author and submitted some years ago to a number of them and the following excerpts exhibit their views on this very important question:

Lieutenant-General J. C. Bates:

“You so well state the necessity for a depot system and the advantage of a home station for the regiment in the field that I fully agree with you except on one point, that is, the organization of in-

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fantry. I am fully convinced that the enlisted strength of a company of infantry should not be greater than 104. . . . I believe this is as large a body as a captain, not mounted, can control, and I think the commander of a company of infantry should not be mounted. . . .”

Major-General F. D. Grant:

“Permit me to say that your proposition in general for recruiting regiments at the front and feeding the firing line in time of war is not only interesting and of great value, but must be regarded by all serious-minded men as of vital importance; your article strikes me as being more interesting than anything ever suggested before on that line in this country. . . . The fact that Congress must be appealed to in the matter should not deter those who are charged with the task of preserving the best welfare of the army, to go to any extent necessary in order to prevent a recurrence of the deplorable experience of the great Civil War as well as those which would have happened in the recent Spanish-American war had it continued.”

Major-General J. M. Lee:

“I fully agree with you as to the necessity for depots; but I believe the depot ‘home company’ taken from each battalion will prove an expensive and unsatisfactory experiment. I am not, however, wedded to any special plan. The desideratum is, to find some method which will fill up the old regiments in time of war instead of letting them run down to skeletons by organizing new regiments. . . .”

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Major-General J. F. Bell:

“ . . . There is no question but that the system of furnishing recruits to organizations in the field during time of war is badly in need of reform. I know of no better suggestion that has ever been made, than the one you suggest, and I should be greatly pleased to see a systematic plan, based upon your suggestions, given a fair trial. I believe it would work far more satisfactorily than the present system. During the time I commanded a volunteer regiment in the Philippine Islands, I frequently found it necessary to send an officer to collect the men who were in hospitals and who had worked their way back to the headquarters of the regiment in the city of Manila. This led to the detailing of an officer to remain at those headquarters all the time, and thereafter I had no trouble having men returned to the regiment as soon as fit for duty, instead of attaching them to the headquarters in Manila.”

Brigadier-General F. Funston:

“Your arguments in favor of a depot company for each battalion are very convincing, but would it not be better in case of volunteer regiments to send each regiment to the front as a whole, and as the campaign progressed and the inevitable number of sick and wounded convalescents became available, to send those for each regiment to some previously designated place in the State or general locality whence the regiment came, to constitute the nucleus of a depot detachment for the regiment? . . . Two

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months of any kind of service would furnish enough men, unequal to duty at the front, who would be glad enough to come home and drill recruits.”

Brigadier-General C. C. Carr :

“I have been so strongly impressed by the array of facts and the effective manner in which they have been employed as a foundation for your argument and appeal for a better method of keeping up to their maximum efficiency the different arms of the service in time of war, that nothing has been left for me to suggest except the adoption of the scheme you have proposed and an early trial of it with such means as may be available. In my opinion, the only possibility of securing it is in time of peace, when there are few persons interested in opposing it, and bringing the whole power of the government to bear to prevent its repeal on the occurrence of war.”

The officers whose views are quoted represent in their service every phase of army experience; three served through the Civil War, one of whom was in the volunteer infantry, one in the regular infantry and one in the cavalry. Of the remaining three one has served thirty-five years in the regulars, one resigned from the regular army and reentered the service in the war with Spain, and one served in the volunteers of that war and was appointed therefrom in the regulars.

It is of sufficiently recent date to be remembered, that in 1898 large numbers of soldiers drifted about the country to hospitals or their homes, without descriptive lists or means of identification, and created

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just such a condition, on a smaller scale, as that which existed in 1863 when Congress felt called upon to take cognizance of the situation. It should be recognized that similar conditions will arise again, in any serious or prolonged war, unless some means be devised to correct or reduce the evil. It can never be wholly eradicated when armies are actively engaged, but as training in the use of the first aid package has reduced materially the percentage of losses from wounds, so the adoption of a home station or regimental depot will conserve the strength of the army by inducing the absent from any cause, except desertion, to find their way to comrades, and recognition which carries a personal interest, food, clothing and pay. It would be in the interest of economy, if there is a probability that war will continue for a prolonged period, to construct temporary barrack and hospital accommodations for each depot establishment. This would insure good sanitary arrangements and more continuous and effective instruction than if the men were kept in rented quarters or under canvas.

The regimental depot affords a means of decentralizing the recruiting of the army. The centralization of too much of the detail of army administration in the War Department has caused most serious difficulties in the past and similar experiences may be expected in future, if the root of the evil is not laid bare and corrective measures applied. The mass of letters and telegrams coming from recruiting stations, rendezvous, state camps, mustering officers

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and innumerable other sources during periods of war excitement will break down any system which has ever existed or which may be adopted, unless control over many details heretofore receiving attention at the War Department is distributed to local authorities. Any system, which will insure full strength to tried and trained regiments in contact with the enemy, reduces expenses of maintaining the army and lessens subsequent pension claims. That the depot system will accomplish this and more, there can be little reasonable doubt. This subject has been under consideration for half a century in this country, just the same period of delay as occurred between the appearance in General Lee's army at Petersburg of an inventor with his "Artis Avis," or bird machine, from which he proposed to drop explosives within the lines of the besieging army of General Grant, and the utilization of the modern aeroplane for a similar purpose; between the use of the submarine boat with fixed torpedo of the Civil War and the development of the present cruising submarine of tonnage equal to the old line of battle ships; and in the general adoption of smokeless powder in our army, after its properties and adaptability for military purposes had been demonstrated by our own officers.*

*It is a remarkable fact that our army, which gave the encouragement necessary to Professor Langley and the Wright Brothers to lead onward in the development of aeroplanes, has in its official archives a record which establishes our failure to forecast the utilization of smokeless powder and permitted our troops to engage in battle half a century later, handicapped with black powder, with all its target exposing qualities, in the hands of our

REGIMENTAL DEPOTS

“In consequence of the quickness and intensity of action of the guncotton when ignited, it can not be used with safety in our present firearms. Without a modification of this agent, or a great change in our firearms the use of guncotton for military purposes, is not to be recommended,” was the conclusion reached and the use of smokeless powder in our military firearms awaited its development and application for non-military uses.

European nations rely upon their regular armies and trained reserves to prosecute war. In the past we have relied upon organizing armies after war is declared, expecting them to get their training in the

artillery and volunteers. This is the record, in part, of experimentation made at the Washington Arsenal:

“The discovery of explosive guncotton, announced last year by Professor Schonbein, naturally attracted at once the attention of the military world, and when a patent for the invention was taken out in this country, the new compound was subjected to trial at this arsenal, in order to compare its effects with those of gunpowder, and to ascertaining the practicability of using it in firearms. Under date of December 3, 1846, I had the honor to make the following report of these experiments:

“Wishing to try the explosive cotton in a large cannon, as well as in the musket, I prepared, according to Schonbein’s formula which had been made known to me, as much of it as my other pressing engagements left me time for.

“The mean velocity of the ball in 17 rounds, with 60 grains of guncotton is 1,670 feet a second, and the mean of 48 rounds with 120 grains of musket powder is 1,600 feet. The mean velocity of the ball in 23 rounds—good cannon powder is 1,427 feet, almost exactly the same as that, 1,422 feet given by guncotton.

“Having determined, by my experiments, that 60 grains would be the proper charge of guncotton, to give the requisite force to the musket ball, I made the following trials:”

Here follows a description of results obtained by loading muskets with abnormal charges to represent the errors of soldiers under the excitement of battle, resulting, with smokeless powder, in bursting of the gun barrels. The musket barrel of that period of muzzle-loading arms was calculated to withstand the explosion of two, three or four cartridges at one time.

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expensive school of actual war and making only spasmodic and ineffective provision for replacing the losses of campaign. The establishment of a regimental depot system for the existing mobile army and its application to volunteers and militia, when called into active service by the President, ought to go far toward eliminating the evils from which we have suffered in the past.

IX

FEDERAL VOLUNTEERS

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace."—WASHINGTON.

THE Constitution specifically places upon Congress the power and duty of declaring war and providing armies to carry it to a conclusion. It is essential that the force necessary for initiating war should possess a national character and be under the direct control of the President. *The militia, which, in the nature of things, embraces all state troops, can not be invested with this national character until it has been called into the service and then only for a limited use within our borders.*

Since the war with Spain, efforts have been continuous to provide for the automatic transition of the national guard or organized militia of the states from a peace to a war basis, as part of the federal force, but notwithstanding the ingenious devices arranged to nationalize the state organizations, they still remain "militia," available only for service as authorized by the Constitution which not only enumerates the specific occasions when the state forces may be called into service, but forbids their employment for any other purpose. It should be borne in mind that the liberality of the general government toward the militia during recent years has failed to

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develop any increase in strength and the opinion of those best informed on the subject is quite unanimous that no improvement is to be expected unless Congress shall appropriate pay for the state organizations, while leaving them still under the control of the governors, in nowise a national force until they have individually volunteered in war.

It has been shown how very meager a force of regulars remains available within the United States, after detaching the garrisons necessary for the outlying possessions. A statement of the legal status of the militia, the only other existing military force, may well be repeated.

The Act of May 27, 1908, contains a limitation upon military efficiency, peculiarly embarrassing when the extent and distribution of the forty-eight states are considered: "When the military needs of the Federal Government arising from the necessity to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, can not be met by the regular force, the organized militia shall be called into the service of the United States *in advance of any volunteer forces which it may be determined to raise.*"

The most recent statute relating to the war establishment, the Act of April 25, 1914, provides for raising the volunteer forces of the United States in time of actual or threatened hostilities, and definitely prescribes that the land forces of the United States shall consist of the regular army, the organized land militia while in the service of the United States, and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize. The

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new statute modifies the Act of May 27, 1908, to the extent that after the organized land militia *of any arm or class* shall have been called into the military service of the United States, volunteers *of that particular arm or class* may be raised and accepted into service, in accordance with the terms of the act, regardless of the extent to which other arms or classes of militia shall have been called into service. It should be borne in mind that for any military operations beyond our borders the militia can not be called into service but must volunteer, so that until the members of each organization decide whether or not three-fourths of the minimum number prescribed as the strength of the particular unit will volunteer, the President is debarred from calling for volunteers of similar arms or classes. All this, be it observed, is to take place after war is upon the nation.

Some of our problems may become international in character at a moment unforeseen and unpropitious. In an age when ruptures of diplomatic relations come so suddenly as to preclude the possibility of remedying grave defects, there should be no reliance upon any system concerning which there is a shadow of doubt.

To avoid the waste inseparable from going to war without proper preparation there must be devised and ready a complete system for passing from a peace to a war establishment. There should be no necessity for congressional action at such a time beyond the exercise of its functions of declaring war. The responsibility for proper preparation for war is,

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in the final analysis, placed by the people on the War Department and it should be known there at all times just what force and supplies are available.

Our people are somewhat misled by the very vastness of our military resources which, to be of any potential value, must be organized and directed by a central authority. It is only through coordination of available men and material in peace, that organization and administration may be so perfected that the nation can pass to a war establishment without undue friction. While the millions now being spent upon the state militia are not a total loss, the return in the shape of an immediately available army bears no relation to the asset we would have in a force of federal volunteers at whatever cost.

Once the organization of the federal volunteers is completed, the need for so large a force of organized militia would no longer exist and that force may then be reduced to such numbers as the states may be willing to provide for by commonwealth appropriations. Young officers, noncommissioned officers and well instructed privates of the organized militia should find a field of broader usefulness in the new federal volunteers, their places in the state forces being taken by men whose family or other ties might serve to limit their field of military employment.

The territorial distribution of federal volunteers should embrace every congressional district wherein should be established the local depots for receiving and training the recruits required in war to maintain

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the organizations in the field at maximum strength. No danger to the liberties of the people lies in this scheme—on the contrary it contains the only fair distribution of the debt of personal service in the hour of the country's need. Being a federal force, the expense incident to the organization and maintenance of proper arms, equipments and supplies to be in readiness for active service, will of necessity be borne by the general government.

At the present time there are 435 members of Congress, apportioned on a basis of 212,407 of population, and while the population in each district is not exactly the same, for the practical purposes of apportioning federal volunteers, they may be so regarded. Infantry constitutes the basic foundation of all armies, and we should begin by establishing one regiment of federal volunteer infantry in each congressional district. With this force as a foundation, authority should be granted to the President to add other organizations, line and staff, of the types and character of those maintained in the regular army, the whole to constitute a force so proportioned as to be capable of mobilization as brigades, divisions and corps or field armies.

All enlistment contracts in the federal volunteers should be for two years, with privilege of reenlistment, and an express provision that in event of mobilization for active service, all enlistments shall be automatically extended for three years or the period of the war, if terminated in less than three years.

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The appointment of officers to continue under a scheme of age and grade apportionment and satisfactory accomplishment.

In order that the federal volunteers shall be prepared in a thorough manner for the duties of active service and maintained in a state of readiness for immediate mobilization for war, each regiment should be commanded by a regular officer and there should be in addition an adjutant, a quartermaster, a sergeant-major, a quartermaster sergeant, a commissary sergeant and an ordnance sergeant selected from the regular army for permanent duty with each organization. The colonels should be selected from the field of officers or captains of not less than five years' service in command of companies.

The increments of special branches required to make a properly balanced force should be assigned to localities in the vicinity of stations of the regular army garrisoned by similar organizations. It will then be practicable to train cavalry, field artillery, engineers, signal and hospital corps organizations by periodically assigning them to actual duty as part of the regular organizations, utilizing the public animals and equipment for the purpose. That will insure practical instruction in the least expensive manner.

It is recognized by all military men that the creation of any force worthy the name of army demands trained officers of established character. Our military and naval academies are maintained in a manner unequalled the world over to supply officers of

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the regular forces. For the greatly increased numbers required by the war establishment other measures are necessary and they should be perfected in peace. Occasionally, in war, a leader of marked ability to command, but without previous technical training, may reverse the usual order and master the details of the military profession from the top downward. Dependence upon these rare exceptions should not lead the nation astray as to the necessity for training for the business of war in the most comprehensive manner.

The officers of federal volunteers should all be appointed on the recommendation of the colonel and in the initial stage should be taken preferably from such of the experienced young officers of the existing organized militia as may desire to enter the new organizations; from honorably discharged soldiers of the regular service and graduates of schools and colleges having courses of military training of the standards fixed by the War Department. In this connection, attention may well be directed to the anomalous condition brought about by the statutory requirements for military instruction in agricultural colleges receiving government aid. It would serve a national purpose in a much more practical way to establish outright government schools in the several states where military instruction shall be considered as of first importance. Legislation along these lines has recently been proposed in Congress and is most worthy of consideration.

When the communities once take upon themselves

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the public duty of encouraging their own local troops to give a good account of themselves, we shall see the nation backed by all the patriotic power which righteously comes from those for whom the government is maintained—all the people and not some of the people. In their awakening, they will demand trained officers to prepare and lead their sons in battle and it will be the duty of the federal government to meet this demand. It was this urgency of the Civil War which was contemplated by General Grant when he said: "It would have been a great deal better if the regular army, except the staff and the staff corps, had been disbanded at the outbreak of the rebellion and the officers sent home to their respective states for the purpose of entering and helping organize the volunteer army."

The passing of the Indian warrior and his vast hunting grounds and the increased density of population have had the effect of diminishing the military characteristics of Americans. As they recede farther and farther from aptitude in the use of firearms and familiarity with the dangers and hardships of campaigning, it is necessary to evolve some system which will serve to inculcate the characteristics no longer derived in the school of experience. The training of the individual as a federal volunteer at his own home will tend to ameliorate, if not correct this condition.

With any given organization, drill regulations can be evolved so as to make a workable machine for the service of regulars, but having in mind the greater

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war army of untrained or partly trained volunteers, it is the dictate of wisdom to provide the simplest possible organization and make the drills of the company, the battalion and the regiment as nearly identical as consistent with the battle functions of each.

Congress has, from time to time, fixed by statute the details of organization of the several branches of the service. Modifications of ancient formations for drill and battle action have come usually as the result of improvement in arms and material. Simplicity in drill and tactical evolutions for volunteers becomes of paramount importance not only for actual battle action, but to bring about ease and rapidity of training new troops.

Our present organization of infantry comprises three battalions to the regiment, three regiments to the brigade and three brigades to the division. Each battalion has four companies. The cavalry is similarly organized, except that the company is called "troop" and the battalion is called "squadron" and comprises four troops.

It is quite generally accepted by military students that many millions would have been saved in the Civil War had each regiment been localized and provided with its own depots for receiving and training recruits. It is certain unless the depot companies are designated in peace, that when the critical moment for action comes there will be much scheming and straining to avoid being left behind. Of course, as incidents of campaign send homeward the wounded, the weak and the sick, those at the depots will find

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their opportunity for service at the front. It follows that the tactical organization should lend itself to that form of administration which includes a depot for each regiment.

The two elements, therefore, to be considered in devising the organization of federal volunteers are simplicity of drill throughout and a sufficient number of companies to admit of permanent depot organizations. In order that the war army may be organized and administered as a harmonious whole, the regular army should be given the same organization as that which may be provided for volunteers. This would automatically place upon the organized militia the same organization.

The matter of simplicity is not difficult of adjustment, for it is only necessary to cut off one company from each infantry battalion and one troop from each cavalry squadron. Then by arranging the regulations for habitual division of the company into three platoons we have the very simple arrangement of drill which enables the training of the three platoons in the company, the three companies in the battalion, the three battalions in the regiment, and the three regiments in the brigade, to proceed upon similar lines and by practically identical commands, thereby greatly reducing the amount to be committed to memory, in taking over the duties of the higher units. The division of the units into threes lends itself perfectly to formation of line to the front from column, by both flanks, and also to echelons in three lines. The necessity of a simple and rapid system of pass-

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ing from column to line and for taking up formations in echelon has become very apparent in view of the effectiveness of modern field artillery, especially of shrapnel fire. Formation of line from column and of column from line, comprise the major portion of tactical evolutions in war.

Some objection has been offered in the past to cutting off a company from the battalion because of the reduction of strength of the regiment. It is quite certain that three companies in which the vacancies arising in campaign are kept filled by their regimental depot will be habitually in better condition to meet the enemy than a battalion of four companies without a depot organization. To meet this argument it has been suggested that another battalion be added to each regiment. This not only sacrifices the very great advantage of the tactical possibilities of the units of threes, but retards promotion to the grade of captain too much for effective service. Our army in the past has experienced the deplorable results of delayed promotion to the grade of captain. It must be borne in mind that the men in the ranks are usually very young and their energies should not be sacrificed through the control of captains too old for their grade. The addition of another battalion would make the climb up the ladder to the grade of colonel at an age appropriate to the command, hopeless except to those who enter the service at the minimum age.

To provide properly for the new army of federal volunteers, it is necessary first to reorganize those

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branches of the regular army which are to be copied in the new organizations. In this reorganization we should give careful consideration to the question of localizing, territorially, the regular regiments, in such manner as to best serve the purpose of utilizing them in connection with the federal volunteers. This applies with special force to the cavalry, field artillery, engineers and signal corps organizations.

The immediate result of the reorganization of our thirty regiments of regular infantry, with three companies to each battalion and one for the regimental depot, would be to release two companies from each regiment, sixty in all, available for the creation of six new and very much needed regiments, requiring only the addition of the necessary field and staff officers—six colonels, six lieutenant colonels, eighteen majors, eighteen captains, six chaplains, eighteen first and eighteen second lieutenants and the authorized regimental and battalion noncommissioned staff officers, band and detachments. There is no other possible way of gaining so much efficiency at so little additional cost as by this reorganization.

Similarly, the reorganization of the cavalry would release two troops from each of the fifteen regiments, a total of thirty troops, available for the creation of three more regiments of cavalry, by the addition of the necessary field, staff and noncommissioned staff officers, bands and detachments. The existence of a depot troop for the training of recruits and horses is even more essential for cavalry than is a depot for infantry and is dictated by every principle of economic administration.

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The present field artillery regiment does not admit of any detachment of an organization as a depot. To create a depot requires the addition of a battery. This branch of the army is so deficient in numbers that a considerable increase is necessary and the reorganization should embrace not only the additional depot organizations, but a sufficient number in all to take over the siege artillery added to the army from time to time and avoid the necessity of withdrawal of coast artillery from the permanent fortifications to man material with the mobile army.

The assertion is sometimes made that our sea-coasts are unduly fortified, and that few, if any, of the batteries will ever fire a hostile shot is sometimes made an excuse for detaching coast artillery to other duties as part of the mobile army. This latter is possibly true, but it arises from the very presence of the guns with trained gunners to man them. Our system of harbor fortification, adopted when the nation was deep in humiliation over the sacking and burning of the capital, is not likely to be materially modified, for without it our fleets would be anchored to our coasts and deprived of the great advantage arising from carrying the war into the enemy's waters.*

*General Simon Bernard, a graduate of the École Polytechnique, a distinguished engineer of the French Army and alderman of Napoleon, was granted an indefinite leave after the battle of Waterloo and came to America at the invitation of the government, still rankling over the destruction of the capital at Washington, in the then recently closed War of 1812. General Bernard was commissioned as Brevet Brigadier General and Assistant Chief of Engineers, United States Army. During his service, 1816-1831, and under his technical advice, fortifications were begun at almost every harbor of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts,

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With the reorganization of the regular regiments provided for, we may then consider the greater army of federal volunteers. There are 435 congressional districts, to each of which it is proposed to assign one ten-company infantry regiment of federal volunteers, comprising nine companies of 150 men each, which, with the machine gun platoon, regimental detachment and depot company, will aggregate about 1,500 men. This would give theoretically a body of 652,500 volunteer infantry enlisted in peace, with an enlistment contract providing for two years' service in peace and, in event of war, its automatic extension for three years or during the war, if less than three years. And be it understood, this is not a standing army, for it is not contemplated to withdraw the federal volunteers from their customary vocations any more than the organized militia is now withdrawn, but to systematize their training and provide officers of approved merit to lead them in active service.

It is contemplated that the course of instruction in each regiment of federal volunteers shall embrace not only the training in rifle practice, drill and camp sanitation, so essential to successful campaigning, but also instruction covering the organization and character of our government and the duties of citizenship. In this manner it is expected to win the approval and cooperation of the residents of each district by proving the merit and value of the system

among these the great Fortress Monroe. Subsequent to his return to his native land, he was created a baron and field marshal of France. At the time of his decease he was Minister of War of France.

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which provides for a war army at a fraction of the cost of a similar force maintained as regulars.

It is entirely probable that the existing war in Europe will cause a modification in the proportions and employment of cavalry and field artillery, and the number of federal volunteers allotted to these branches may well be determined after the history of the operations becomes available. In the meantime the minimum number necessary under our existing tables of organization should be authorized and assigned to favorable localities, not restricted to congressional districts, but distributed with reference to horse supply and probable opportunity for training. Incidentally, this will afford opportunity for a census of horses and mules available for war purposes. It should be borne in mind that during the Civil War the number of cavalry regiments became too great for the supply of horses. Much more satisfactory results may be expected from restricting the organization of cavalry regiments to the number which can be sustained in campaign by a regular flow of trained men and horses from the regimental depots. In fixing upon the proportions of cavalry to infantry it should be remembered that in any war of magnitude, involving invasion, a considerable part of the infantry would not be embraced in the mobile army, but assigned to the land defense of seacoast fortifications.

The increments necessary to provide the reliefs required to man the seacoast defenses in war should be provided by companies of federal volunteers per-

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manently assigned to the particular batteries rather than by organization of regiments similar to those of the organized militia. This would insure competent direction and control of fire by trained officers and gunners assisted by volunteers. Organization of federal volunteers of the coast artillery branch should not be limited to the districts immediately adjoining the coast defenses. The type of men best fitted for the duty is found in the industrial centers. If their recruitment and organization are committed to the officers of the coast artillery the necessary gun crews for war purposes will soon materialize, whereas, under the existing militia system, ten years of effort has failed to develop any comprehensive relief of a serious situation.

In all this there should be every encouragement given to local pride, not only of the state and district, but of the county, for this would tend to eliminate the prodigious stream of desertions such as occurred from the volunteers of the Civil War and which has been a continuous source of deep concern and regret to those responsible for the recruitment of the regular army. A young man would hesitate to quit his command in the field if he knew he would have to account for his absence at the home depot of his regiment.

It has been quite plainly established that we can not count upon all the men of any organized militia regiment volunteering for war. Then there are some old militia organizations of established reputation, that may be much better utilized than by volunteer-

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ing in a body, for their records of past services establish that they furnished a large number of officers of volunteer regiments in the Civil War and in the war with Spain and they should be expected, in any future emergency, to act in accord with their past traditions.

The latest statute on the subject prescribes an enlistment period of four years for volunteers, the same as for the regular army, omitting the period in reserve. The enlistment period for federal volunteers is recommended to be fixed at two years, with the automatic extension for three years or the war, in the event of hostilities, notwithstanding the fact that after experimentation in Europe with the two-year term it was abandoned in favor of three years. Two years is the shortest time which will permit of a fair degree of instruction, and proper ideas of the discipline essential for fire control, while still engaged in civil affairs. Our system of training should be adapted to the purely volunteer soldier. To secure the best results and enable a progressive course of instruction to be followed, arrangements should be made for receiving recruits, at specified dates, in sufficient numbers to constitute workable units.

Under the proposed reorganization of the infantry, the cavalry and field artillery of the regular army we secure, at a minimum expense, a model of organization peculiarly adapted to volunteer troops and with the marked advantage of having the depot machinery always available for filling vacancies in the firing line. As the federal volunteer regiments

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are organized the number of field officers and captains and noncommissioned staff officers of the corresponding branches of the regular service should be increased in order to supply the skeleton personnel of regulars necessary with each volunteer regiment. When the federal volunteers have been organized the support of the organized militia, except as to arms and equipments of government model, should be taken over by the states.

The proposed army of regulars and federal volunteers will cost more than the existing force of regulars and organized militia, but the one will be an asset of highest potential value and probably equal to any emergency likely to arrive without warning, while the other is unequal to the smallest military contingency within the forecast of statesmen and students.

The system of federal volunteers has encountered active opposition from the higher officers of the national guard, and this may always be expected. Until public opinion on the subject of national defense becomes more masterful than this narrow but concentrated opposition, no change may be expected. In so grave a matter, Congress is entitled to the generous approval of a non-partisan public opinion, because the policy will call for continuing appropriations to be balanced, however, later on by that preparedness for war which makes for lessened obligations for pensions and claims in the years to come.

X

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

"A corrective is, indeed, highly necessary. The practice of furloughing officers, and then renewing the furloughs from time to time, is extremely injurious to the service, and ought to be discontinued on ordinary occasions. And that of frittering away the army into small garrisons is, if possible, worse. It will never be respectable while these evils exist; and until it can be more concentrated, and the garrisons frequently relieved by detachments from the main body, discipline will always be lax. . . ."

—WASHINGTON.

THE urgency of establishing and maintaining an expeditionary force to serve as a model tactical unit and school of practice for our generals and staff officers, has long been apparent. The accomplishment of this most needed feature of our military establishment has not been practicable for various reasons, the primary one being an insufficient number of regiments to meet the recurring needs of actual service.

If we are to have, as military men are agreed we should, an expeditionary force in readiness to proceed to threatened points, where initial success should make for simplicity and economy of subsequent operations, we must organize, equip and maintain it at all times with its complete military hierarchy of commanders and staff officers, ready to move at a mere signal without necessity of detailed orders from the War Department. The practice of

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giving orders in great detail concerning every conceivable subject has long been the bane of our army and has served greatly to intimidate and curtail the initiative of a most reliable and well-educated body of officers. The establishment of the higher tactical organizations should accomplish much in decentralizing the giving of orders and gradually foster confidence in our generals, who by all tests, except those of exercising large commands, in war, have justified such confidence.

The expeditionary force should be comprised of complete organizations at war strength and maintained in a modest cantonment requiring only caretakers during their absence on active service or in field instruction. In event of a serious war, the cantonment would fill a most important need as a rendezvous for the concentration and instruction of volunteers, and when no longer required for that purpose, the buildings would be available for use as hospital accommodations during continuance of hostilities.

Nations can not engage in war merely to test their military systems, but wisely provide opportunities for the development of weak links in the chain of theory. The most useful method of accomplishing this is by trying out men and material on a sufficiently large scale to furnish employment for the generals and the administrative staff upon whom rests the responsibility once war is declared. The British have solved the problem at home by the establishment at Aldershot of an expeditionary force,

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ready to proceed to distant points of the empire whose garrisons encircle the globe. Here are acquired by all grades the habitude of service in war organizations. No other nation has had such varied experience in the problems of transportation and supply as the British and their methods and expedients in campaign appeal naturally and strongly to men of Anglo-Saxon mental processes.

While we carefully observe all nations with a view to noting the development of military material, the problems of the British are more nearly akin to those confronting us than any to be found amongst other nations. In fact, the train of liabilities which has followed in the wake of the war with Spain, together with the absence of conscription and dependence wholly upon voluntary enlistments for recruiting our army make the military problems of the two countries practically identical. There is not a new discovery but has been thoroughly understood and commented upon by conservative officers who appreciated full well the obstacles to be encountered in any attempt to graft European systems upon the American army.

The government already possesses a handsome property, comprising about 2,500 acres of blue-grass land, with an artesian water supply, apparently inexhaustible, near the important trunk railroad center at Indianapolis, Indiana. The value of this site for a division cantonment has been tested by actual occupancy on several occasions during combined instruction of the regular army and national guard.

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The military reservation is an asset of great value as a site for mobilization of volunteers in any serious war. It occupies a central location as regards distribution of population and with its exceptional railroad facilities would enable an expeditionary force to be promptly put in motion, in an emergency, to the north, south, east or west with nearly equal facility. It is in the very midst of the great granary of the nation and but a few hours distant from several of the world's greatest meat packing industries. Here is found neither the extreme cold of our more northern stations nor the debilitating heat of those nearer the gulf. In a material way the plan commends itself for the great economy of maintenance of such a command at a central point of food and clothing supply. Its influence upon the training of volunteers and militia should be marked, for here would be solved in practice all theories relating to improvements in methods and materials. The establishment of such a command does not conflict with any policy of the government and harmonizes perfectly with the views of a great body of our officers who have recognized the need for such action ever since our nation assumed duties in so many widely separated parts of the world. Especially will such a force be needed in view of our relations arising under the Monroe Doctrine, for American interests may demand a show of force at any moment and without time for proper mobilization of units not maintained by the army in peace.

We have the site, we know the urgency of the need

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and we have but to make a beginning based upon the ultimate strength of the expeditionary force to be assembled in order that the upbuilding shall be progressive and require no destruction or reconstruction. The future force to be provided for at first should embrace a complete tactical division at war strength, with the commanders and staff necessary in war, who should execute all the functions of their office without dependence upon territorial commanders or supply officers other than for the possible utilization of the most economical markets.

The reservation at Indianapolis already contains Fort Benjamin Harrison, comprising recently constructed permanent barracks and quarters for a regiment of infantry. Inasmuch as the existing scheme of organization for a division provides for twelve regiments, the twelve company barracks and corresponding officers' quarters afford an ideal opportunity and ample means to try out a depot system by assigning one of the barracks to each of the regiments of the division which will comprise the expeditionary force assembled in cantonment in the vicinity.

The policy adopted some years ago in relation to the distribution of the army in permanent posts has been recently the cause of serious misunderstanding between the War Department and Congress. General Sheridan has always been credited with the responsibility for the policy of locating, at some distance from large cities, the permanent posts for the mobile army, construction of which was begun about

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the time it became apparent that the Indian question was approaching final settlement. The upbuilding of various so-called permanent posts progressed steadily for some years. In a few cases, entirely new sites were obtained in the vicinity of large cities—as at Atlanta and Chicago—but the usual plan followed was to construct anew at or near the sites of old posts. The reorganization of the army under the Act of February 2, 1901, necessitated provision for additional organizations, but as the regular regiments were nearly all on foreign service, the matter was not urged. In March, 1903, the Secretary of War decided to have further construction carried on under some definite system, and directed the War College Board—the General Staff Corps had not then been organized—to recommend a general allotment of the available appropriations in such manner as to constitute a continuing policy. The board recommended that a comprehensive and progressive study of the subject of stations of troops and projects for quartering them should be continued from year to year, with a view to utilizing the appropriations to the best advantage and to prevent the useless expenditure of public funds at posts which, in the near future, might be abandoned or completely modified. The board then proceeded to recommend, in detail, a distribution of available appropriations, all to be expended at existing posts, and further recommended withdrawal of troops from certain other posts with a view to gradually assembling them in regimental garrisons, except that a few

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of the larger posts should have mixed garrisons of cavalry, field artillery and infantry. This policy, recommended by the War College Board, was approved by the then Secretary of War.

In his annual report for 1906, the Secretary of War, Hon. William H. Taft, referred to the subject in this language:

“It seems to me the general policy should be to do away with the small posts as rapidly as possible and to concentrate the army as far as practicable in regimental and brigade posts, care being taken to utilize in every possible way those posts of recent construction, and especially those which by their location are capable of being expanded into regimental or brigade posts without too great cost. . . .

“The change to brigade posts ought to be made gradually, and we should avail ourselves of those posts which are nearest now in point of capacity to brigade posts, and which have reservations sufficiently large to permit the maneuvers of brigade or larger bodies of troops. The posts which I recommend for enlargement to brigade posts are shown in the following list:

“Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.

“Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

“Fort Riley, Kans.

“Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

“Each of these posts may well be made a command of a brigadier general, and if the present purpose of the Department is carried out will be made

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so even before the completion of the structure necessary to garrison a full brigade. . . . At Fort Sill, in Oklahoma, there is a very fine military reservation of 50,000 acres, with an adjoining forest reservation which can be properly used for military maneuvers, which will make a total reservation of 100,000 acres. This ought to be ultimately made into a brigade post.

“Fort Oglethorpe, which is now situated on part of the reservation of the Chickamauga Military Park, can be enlarged by the purchase of 15,000 acres of land at a very reasonable price, probably not to exceed an average of \$15 an acre, and this could be made the brigade post of the southeast. A brigade post upon the western coast ought to be constructed at American Lake, Washington, which is commended most highly as a proper place on Puget Sound, though the cost of the reservation will be high. With seven or eight brigade posts and the full regimental posts which we now have, I think the army would be properly distributed and housed with a view to its efficiency and proper training.”

In his annual report for 1909, the Secretary of War, Hon. J. M. Dickinson, under the head of “Military Policy,” said on the subject of army posts:

“In order to . . . permit of practice under war conditions in time of peace by the Regular Army and Militia in combination, the United States should be divided into a number of territorial and tactical districts, so that the organized militia of the States comprising such districts may be conveniently com-

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bined with the Regular Army stationed therein into permanent brigades, divisions and corps for instruction and tactical organization. *It will probably be found desirable to have in each State in such a district at least one military post. . . .* No post smaller than a regimental one is of real value from a military standpoint, so far as education, discipline and drill are concerned.”

The original idea of having some large posts with garrisons of the three arms of the service was to utilize them in each case as a basis of a larger force of regulars and national guard; they were never intended as brigade posts in the sense of tactical brigades of the mobile army which comprise regiments of the same arm of the service.

It should be remembered that during all the years which have elapsed since the construction of permanent posts to replace the frontier cantonments was begun, the units of the army were provided for on a peace basis, and the barracks were calculated for minimum strength organizations. The expansion of a peace strength company to a war strength organization introduces a physical factor of serious proportions for not only must barrack accommodations be doubled, but entire plans of posts already completed must be changed for the reason that building sites, sewers, roads and water supply were all based upon the smaller units and no spaces were left for additions. In fact, many of the posts were completed before 1901 when authority of Congress was obtained for expansion of regiments during

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emergencies from a peace to a war strength basis. Similar difficulties arise whenever cavalry or field artillery units are substituted for dismounted organizations in posts constructed for infantry, for stables, gun sheds and forage storehouses, blacksmith shops and corrals have to be provided. The organization of the field artillery into regiments and its redistribution several years ago involved the abandonment of many new and expensive barracks constructed without warning as to the change of field artillery organizations.

A new policy recently under consideration at the War Department had for its object an abandonment of the former system of maintaining garrisons in posts established at some distance from cities, and contemplated the construction of barracks within city limits for the men only, requiring the officers to find accommodations wherever available.

It will be observed that the questions concerning the distribution of the army, its tactical organization and the construction of posts have grown to be far more complex than would be the case if we had a new army and the disposition of it to consider as an original and single proposition. A redistribution of the army to meet new demands for foreign garrisons has become a necessity, and unless the army is increased, or foreign garrisons reduced below what are now regarded as essential, some of the garrisons must be withdrawn from posts within the United States in the near future, this regardless of

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the policy of bringing the mobile army together in large tactical units.

Successful achievements under legislative control are mainly the results of compromises. In the end it will probably be found that the best interests of the nation will be served by a combination of the several plans for caring for the army and that regimental posts will continue to fill a highly useful purpose, especially when grouped in territorial areas permitting of concentration for practice in brigade and division training. When the army is increased, as now seems absolutely necessary, if it is to meet fairly the duties pressing heavily upon the present force, it would not be advisable to abandon any of the existing regimental posts unless they are badly placed with reference to fulfilling the important part to be performed in future in connection with the instruction of volunteers, reservists and militia.

Improvements in material and implements of war are based upon experiments which would be greatly facilitated and expedited if there existed a permanently mobilized expeditionary force where exchanges of views could be obtained concerning matters of interest to the mobile army. The more scattered the army, the more difficult to reach definite conclusions concerning important matters.

Whatever may be the policy finally to prevail concerning widely dispersed regimental posts, nothing should be allowed to prevent the concentration of at least one complete division at war strength. Its

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value as a training school for generals and supply and sanitary officers will alone be worth the cost. The habitude of service with war strength organizations will be of inestimable value and make for economy and dispatch in the practical operations of war.

XI

ARMY ADMINISTRATION

"No sound mind can doubt (the essentiality of military science in time of war, any more than) the moral certainty that the most pacific policy on the part of a government will not preserve it from being engaged in war more or less frequently."—WASHINGTON.

THE great administrative branch of the government known as the War Department, and presided over by the Secretary of War, ranks second to none in real importance. The vast business carried on under the direction of the Secretary is of the most varied kind, involving expenditures in the aggregate probably exceeding those of any department of the government during the century just passed. Much of this business has little or no connection with the military arm of the government, but by a process of accumulation of statutes and authorities, resulting often from the expediency of the moment, the present dimensions have been reached—dimensions so vast in extent that it is beyond the physical power of any Secretary of War to exercise more than a general supervision of the great administrative machine under his control.

When the Colonies, through the Declaration of Independence, found themselves confronted with a contest, upon the result of which their liberties de-

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pended, they were without any form of administrative government calculated for war, which in all ages requires certain fixed elements—men, munitions, arms, clothing, food, a military hierarchy, and last, but not least, a substantial money chest. There was much groping in the dark, for, while the minute men were also riflemen of the highest type then known, there was wanting that cohesion and system which can be supplied in no other way than by a properly organized military department.

When one considers the Declaration of Independence and the wonderful document embodying the Constitution of the Republic, it becomes difficult of belief that the same talented men who so wisely framed these incomparable state papers could have had any part as members of Congress in the conduct of military affairs during the Revolution. The student of military history stands aghast at the revelation of stupidity and jealousy which characterized the conduct of Congress in dealing with the practical business of establishing and perpetuating independence after having proclaimed it.

During the Revolution Congress issued the commissions to generals and staff officers, and, by resolution, frequently dictated the control of military affairs in minutest detail. At the earnest solicitation of General Washington, a committee, consisting of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, was appointed to hear Colonel Tudor on the subject of the insufficiency of the disciplinary articles for the government of the army, and this resulted in the adop-

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tion by the Continental Congress, September 20, 1776, of the British Articles of War, which, in turn, had been bodily drawn from those in use by the Romans. The adoption of the Articles of War laid the foundation of that discipline not inaptly defined as "the orderly sequence of events," which in time brought the Continentals to a capacity to contend successfully with British veterans and as allies to rival the best troops of France.

The expediency of establishing a War Office was constantly urged upon Congress, and on June 12, 1776, the method of conducting military affairs by resolutions of that body was discontinued, and the "Board of War and Ordnance," consisting of a committee of five members, was established. Among other duties this board was charged with "superintending the raising, fitting out and despatching all land forces ordered for the service of the United Colonies; immediate care of all artillery, arms, ammunition and warlike stores not employed in actual service; to keep a register of the names of all officers of the land service, with rank and date of commission; accounts of the State and disposition of the troops in the respective Colonies." This board continued to act until Congress created, by resolution of October 17, 1777, a Board of War to consist of three persons not members of Congress. That seeming necessity for jealously guarding against any possible encroachment of military power induced the legislators to provide specifically that the proceedings of this board should be subject to in-

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spection of Congress once a month, or oftener, and that *every member of Congress should have free access to the records of the board, with the right to make copies of all documents except returns of armies, provisions or military stores*, which could be obtained only on the order of Congress itself. The personnel of the board changed frequently, and the question of a quorum gave considerable trouble. Finally, on October 29, 1778, Congress provided that the Board of War should consist of two members of Congress and three persons not members, and that three should constitute a legal quorum in order that important matters should not be unduly delayed.

The Board of War continued to exercise its functions until Major General Lincoln accepted, on November 26, 1781, the office of Secretary of War, which, with those of Superintendent of Finance and Secretary of Marine, had been authorized February 7, 1781, under the act creating certain executive departments. By resolution, Congress, from time to time, assigned various duties to the Secretary of War, and required and enjoined upon all military and other officers connected with the army to observe his directions. July 3, 1782, he was specifically "authorized to order all persons to be arrested and tried for disobedience of any orders which he is empowered to issue."

The various duties outlined for the Board of War during the Revolution, and subsequently for the Secretary of War, resulted from resolutions based upon the necessity for meeting emergencies arising

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from day to day. It was not until January 27, 1785, that "An Ordinance for ascertaining the powers and duties of the Secretary of War" was passed. The War Department as now known may be said to have had its foundation laid in this ordinance which prescribes in great detail the powers and duties of the Secretary of War.

Matters drifted along under makeshift devices, which, however, were furnishing that experience in administration which culminated in the conviction that the confederation was too frail a vessel to supply this great continent with a stable government. During this period the functions of the office of Secretary of War embraced, to a great extent, both those of a commander-in-chief and those of an administrative and executive officer. In the organization of the government under the Constitution, the President having been made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, Congress enacted, on August 7, 1789, that there should be a principal officer in the Department of War "called the Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States agreeable to the Constitution, relative to military commissions, or to the land *or naval forces, ships* or warlike stores, or to such other matters respecting military or *naval* affairs as the President shall assign to the said department, or relative to the granting of lands to persons entitled thereto for military services rendered to the United States,

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or relative to Indian affairs; and furthermore, that the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order or instruct." The Navy Department was created by the Act of April 30, 1798, and thereafter ceased to be an adjunct of the War Department. Up to this date it will be observed that the War Department included in the scope of its administration the work of three executive departments—War, Navy and Interior, as now constituted. At the time of the establishment of the present War Department General Henry Knox, who had been Secretary under the former regime was reappointed to the office by President Washington. General Knox's familiarity with the requirements of the office enabled him to establish administrative methods upon a proper basis at the outset. The entire business method of the department was based upon the idea, which has since been confirmed by the Supreme Court, that the Secretary of War is the representative of the President with full legal powers with respect to all administration and control of the army and its affairs. The only change in this has been when Congress, from time to time, has provided that specific things be done by or under the direction of the Secretary of War, and which without specific statute would not be an attribute of any particular executive department.

Prior to the Act of July 16, 1798, the War Department suffered much embarrassment in the matter of

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supplies, because all purchases of and contracts for supplies for the military service were made under and by the Treasury Department. The change made in the methods of purchase were not sufficiently drastic to meet the conditions then confronting the Republic, which appeared to be unwillingly approaching a rupture with France, the able and efficient ally of the Colonies in their struggle for independence. The resulting legislation enacted March 3, 1799, established the system which has since prevailed by authorizing and requiring the Secretary of War to make purchases and enter, or cause to be entered into, all contracts for providing annually all clothing, camp utensils and equipage, medicines and hospital stores necessary for the troops and armies of the United States. The political dissension of the times, together with the paucity of national resources and lack of adequate means of defense caused serious embarrassment in the hour of danger.

Fortunately, the country was saved from hostile collision with France, but the war scare had given much food for thought to public officials. It had become evident thus early that the militia act of 1792 was lacking in the elements essential for producing a reliable combatant army. In 1803 the President invited Congress to cause a review of the militia laws, and the result was the adoption of a resolution requesting the President to write to the executive of each state, "urging the importance and indispensable necessity of vigorous exertions on the

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part of the State Governments to carry into effect the militia system adopted by the National legislature agreeably to the powers reserved to the States respectively by the Constitution of the United States, and in a manner the best calculated to insure such a degree of military discipline and knowledge of tactics as will, under the auspices of a benign Providence, render the militia a sure and permanent bulwark of National defence." The nation has for a century continued to play battledore and shuttlecock with a militia system.

Under the Confederation the Secretary of War possessed much authority subsequently specifically designated as prerogatives of the President. While the relations between the President and Secretary were left untrammelled with any restrictions in the Act of 1789 creating the War Department, it gradually came to be understood that when Congress specifically names the Secretary of War in connection with legislation regarding matters falling within his department, there is no disturbance of system or of the harmonious relations between the President and his cabinet officer. This adjustment has received recognition through decisions of the Supreme Court wherein the Secretary of War is regarded exclusively as the active agent of the President in all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the War Department, and, in short, for military purposes the order of the Secretary of War is the order of the President—the Commander-in-Chief.

As early as 1809 the Secretary of War declared

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“that the business of the Department had increased beyond what the capacity of any one man could perform.” It was not, however, until 1812 that Congress made an effort, coincident with the increase of the army, to give some relief to the Secretary of War from the vast burden of details that pressed upon him. The President proposed that the relief be afforded by the addition of two assistant secretaries, but Congress established the present system of bureau chiefs who control the various staff and supply departments. The Act of March 3, 1813, authorized the Secretary of War to prepare general regulations defining and prescribing the respective duties and powers of the officers composing the various bureaus. Thus it will be seen that in groping for some method which would make it possible for the Secretary of War to perform the higher functions of his office, without being crushed with the burden of details, a bureau system was introduced, with a number of semi-independent chiefs, each working along his own lines without of necessity having any knowledge of the character and extent of equally important work going on in other bureaus. The army is absolutely dependent upon these administrative and supply bureaus, and success depends upon the coherent total of all their efforts. The methods remain practically the same to-day as in the War of 1812, except that through a long course of years there has grown up a system of laws and regulations fixing in great detail the duties of the various bureaus. There is a most complex and

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expensive branch of another executive department to audit and control all the accounts.

The severe hardships of war and military life in general result in wastefulness and loss of public property, and some well-devised system is essential to protect the treasury from undue strain. Through a long course of years, the principles early enunciated by Secretary of War Calhoun, that some one must be held accountable for each and every article of public property; that each chief of bureau must be responsible that all accounts are promptly and properly rendered, and that all disbursements are made from funds advanced on proper estimates, have prevailed. During the earlier years many of these functions were performed by civil agents, but military rank was gradually conferred upon all the principal officials of the War Department who were called upon from time to time to exercise their functions in contact with troops. From modest beginnings, both as to duties and rank, the staff bureaus of the War Department have gradually reached their present proportions. Several of these bureaus are of comparatively recent origin, but to trace the growth of others would be to follow the army through the vicissitudes of a century of able and earnest military effort.

When the Civil War Secretary, Edwin M. Stanton, took up the work of the Department, which for four years laid such a mental and physical strain upon him as few men could bear, he found a condition cal-

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culated to bring discouragement to the stoutest heart. The relations between the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army had long been of such a character that the latter officer had removed his headquarters to New York City. It became necessary to reorganize the business methods of the various bureaus to meet the exceptional tasks confronting them in the organization, equipping and supplying of an army suddenly increased from about ten thousand to ultimately more than one million men in actual service.

The general system of administration was similar to that pursued during the Mexican War, and much reliance was placed on the veterans of that conflict. The history of the great struggle is still fresh in the minds of the American people, but it may be safely stated that only a very limited number have a proper appreciation of the great administrative work performed by the War Department during the days and nights of the whole four years of war. There were periods of marching, of battle, and of monotonous camp life for the average regiment; but for the Secretary of War and his coadjutors there was one unending round of high tension work.

Armies are useless without food, clothes, ammunition and transportation, and to obtain and distribute these essential requisites in the quantities demanded during the Civil War required administrative and executive ability of a high order. The absence of a directing and coordinating professional authority

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in the scheme of army organization threw an immense strain upon the Secretary of War and President.

Nothing in all previous military history equals the business administration of the War Department as exemplified in the muster-out and transportation of the great volunteer armies to their homes at the close of the Civil War. The great burden of current expense was quickly reduced, a matter of vital importance at the time.

Following close upon the muster-out of the volunteers a reorganization and increase of the regular army took place. A portion of the new army was destined for service in the Southern States during the reconstruction period. The duties required of the army during the long and disastrous efforts at sustaining "carpet-bag" governments were intensely distasteful to both officers and men, as well as to the better element amongst the southern people. To be sure the Civil War had just closed, and it was necessary to reestablish law and order throughout a vast territory inhabited by a negro population, which regarded the army as the embodiment of that power which had struck off the shackles of slavery. The use of the army at the polls and in civil matters generally has ever been repugnant to American ideas, and at this period it only succeeded in embittering the southern people to such an extent that one of their first and most insistent policies, after the reconstruction, was to demand a reduction of the regular army. Under this

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pressure the maximum strength of the army was fixed at 25,000 men, and so remained until the outbreak of the war with Spain.

The War Department had continued in charge of the Indians until the close of the Mexican War, after which period their affairs were managed by Indian agents, with minimum salaries and maximum temptations. Many times the army was compelled to stand idly by and witness the perpetration of wrongs, and when the Indians, in desperation, "broke out," the War Department was called upon to bring about another era of peace. Year after year regiments were summoned to the field, sometimes under tropical suns, and again in the land of blizzards, where the icy winds made campaigning miserable alike to pursuer and pursued. With each recurring surrender the Indians were restored to the tender mercies of the agent and his harpies, only to find their grievances multiplied.

As years wore on the settlers, with their wire fences, closed in slowly but surely around the reservations, and the fact dawned upon the Indians that the wild, free life of the West had gone. The march of civilization had swept away the old life and left but mere remnants of once proud tribes stranded as driftwood along the shores of progress. Encountering only the worst elements amongst the whites, too often the mere outcasts of society, the poor warriors, shorn of the power wielded by their ancestors, turned restlessly for some light to those with whom they had battled and at whose hands

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they had often suffered defeat. The War Department resumed charge, when army officers were again installed as Indian agents and gradually laid the foundations of lasting peace by showing the Indians the utter futility of contending against inevitable fate.

The Indian question having been finally settled, a plan was adopted by the War Department of bringing together the scattered fragments of the regular army, which in its entirety did not equal in number a single army corps. The necessity for guarding isolated and exposed points had for years prevented proper instruction of officers and men in the administration of maneuvers of battalions, regiments and brigades, but in minor warfare they were not outclassed by any soldiers the world over. To accomplish the best results numerous small posts were abandoned and regimental posts established.

The unwillingness of Congress to recognize the urgent need of men to garrison the growing coast defenses, while continuing to spend millions upon fortifications and guns, caused the War Department grave concern. After years of pleading for proper legislation, a piteous appeal was finally made for two additional regiments of artillery, and action was slowly maturing in this regard when other events occurred which rapidly roused the country to action.

For more than half a century Cuba had been a source of incessant anxiety and trouble to every administration. Forty years previously—December, 1858—President James Buchanan, in complaining

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in a message to Congress of past conditions, said: "Spanish officials under the direct control of the Captain General of Cuba have insulted our national flag, and in repeated instances have from time to time inflicted injuries on the persons and property of our citizens. . . . All our attempts to obtain redress have been baffled and defeated. . . . The truth is that Cuba, in its existing Colonial condition, is a constant source of injury and annoyance to the American people. . . . It has been made known to the world by my predecessors that the United States have on several occasions endeavored to acquire Cuba from Spain by honorable negotiation. . . . We would not, if we could, acquire Cuba in any other manner. This is due to our national character. . . . Our relations with Spain, which ought to be of the most friendly character, must always be placed in jeopardy whilst the existing Colonial government over the island shall remain in its present condition."

There was a widespread sentiment throughout the United States in behalf of the Cubans in their insurrection against Spanish domination, but the Secretary of War and his co-workers were advised of the unprepared state of the army and of the defenses for immediate war. Everything which could be legitimately done at the time was hastened forward to make up for past neglect, but guns, ammunition and armies do not appear by magic.

The country had not engaged in war since the close of the gigantic struggle of 1861 to 1865; no progress

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in legislation had been made in a hundred years so far as utilization of organized militia was concerned, and there was no law extant under which the War Department could take any of those preliminary steps so essential to success in war. During April all of the little regular army which could be spared was assembled in southern camps and organized in brigades and divisions. This was a measure of extreme precaution; the results at Santiago prove it to have been one of those fortunate strokes upon which the fate of nations often hang.

Notwithstanding the many years of threatening clouds, there was no well-defined plan for organizing the army when called into active service. Brigades, divisions and corps gradually came into being through the expediency of the moment. A heterogeneous mass of staff officers was distributed to the general officers, and in many instances, instead of being useful, they proved to be encumbrances. In numerous cases the generals in command detailed subordinate regular officers to perform the duties while the volunteer officers held the higher staff rank and drew the pay of offices requiring technical knowledge, which is not immediately supplied through patriotism and willingness to serve. The humiliating experience of some of the great volunteer camps should be enough to prevent a repetition of such mistakes.

The need for ships was urgent, and the navy was seeking them at the same time as the army. The War Department had had no previous personal ex-

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perience with transports, and the history of the Vera Cruz expedition of the Mexican War appeared to have been forgotten. General Shafter's magnificent corps was sent to Santiago, inadequately equipped, and had the navy not come to the rescue, the success of the campaign must of necessity have been endangered through the impossibility of, or long delay in, effecting a landing. Once in contact with the enemy, the American army, as usual, added laurels to its already long list of successful campaigns, but in doing so prevented the country from seeing clearly the results of neglect of sound policy.

The expedition to Porto Rico, and that across the wide Pacific to Manila, were sent with less haste, and were somewhat better equipped. But experience was being obtained, and now, after having become possessed of a fleet of transports, the War Department is enabled to point with just pride to many years of such successful endeavor that its record is not exceeded by that of any of the great steamship lines. This service ultimately reached such a degree of efficiency that thousands of troops have been transported seven thousand miles across the Pacific, without material accident, in sufficient comfort to have them ready for immediate field service on arrival.

With the signing of the protocol, it became necessary to reduce the forces, but as the Spanish army in Cuba was still intact, it was decided to proceed at once with the muster-out of only 100,000 volunteers. The occupation of posts in Cuba to be evacuated by

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Spanish garrisons employed 50,000 troops. The question of withdrawing the volunteers from the Philippine Archipelago caused the War Department much concern. Peace once an accomplished official act, all volunteers would become entitled to discharge. The department concluded, therefore, to ask outright for a regular army of 100,000 men, and the House of Representatives passed a bill to that effect, but it failed in the Senate. A compromise of a temporary regular army and another force of volunteers was agreed upon. The muster-out of the volunteers for the war with Spain was completed as rapidly as possible, having in mind the economy of the moment as well as protection from fraudulent claims for pensions in the future.

In the Philippines the army was confronted with many serious problems, the solution of which demanded a showing of well-organized force. The enlistment and transportation of the new volunteers to a scene of action ten thousand miles from their homes for a comparatively short service, involved such an appalling expenditure of public funds that the President withheld his consent to the organization of the new regiments until conditions became so critical that the reinforcement could no longer be delayed. The excess of cost of this force of volunteers over what the cost would have been had regulars been employed, with the usual three years' enlistments, has been estimated by the various bureaus of the War Department to be \$16,374,009.04, quite an item even in these days of abounding wealth. The

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new volunteer regiments were raised and commanded by regular officers, and were splendid organizations, but they were of necessity brought home and mustered out with an average of fifteen to eighteen months' service over-sea, altogether a very expensive proceeding.

The exchange of troops in the Philippines to enable the volunteers who went out in the first expedition to come home, was effected during active insurrection which continued until a force of nearly 70,000 men was assembled in the Islands.

It became evident that makeshift devices would no longer serve the purpose, and the Secretary of War presented the needs of the service in carefully prepared legislation, which, while not accomplishing everything desired, gave the Department a sufficient force to meet the urgent demands upon the army in Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, Alaska and at home.

Ever since the spring of 1898 the officials of the War Department have discussed the confusion which arose, and have constantly sought the best means of preventing a repetition of conditions which might lead to humiliation and temporary defeat in a war with an enterprising and audacious enemy. After mature consideration, the Secretary of War settled upon the plan for the establishment of a General Staff Corps, with a chief at its head who is the Chief of Staff for the whole army. Under this plan the misnamed office of Commanding General has disappeared. It had ever been a delusion and a disap-

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pointment for the distinguished soldiers who had occupied it, with constant but fruitless efforts to invest the office with something more than a name.

The reliability and excellence of the river and harbor works, under the War Department, caused the nation to turn to it when all those previously selected to dig the Panama Canal had acknowledged failure. Under the system developed by the Corps of Engineers, its officers, headed by the incomparable Goethals, have brought that great public work to a completion well within the time limit of the estimates. It is, and will remain, a fitting monument to the War Department in general, and to the Corps of Engineers and their alma mater in particular.

The administration of civil affairs of great importance to the nation have been entrusted to the War Department until the burden of even slight supervision on the part of the Secretary of War leaves little time for proper attention to the original functions of his office in connection with the army. War has become a complicated and absorbing science demanding a knowledge of a vast array of principles and details on the part of those responsible for the administration of armies. The time has arrived when the burden should be rearranged and the parts not correlated with preparation for and the conduct of war should be severed from the War Department so as to bring the labors of the office within the mental and physical capacity of supervision of one man. If this can not be accomplished then there should be a new office created,

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that of Secretary of the Army, to correspond with that of Secretary of the Navy. The necessity for some drastic action may be readily appreciated by a slight consideration of the variety and importance of subjects requiring the personal attention of the Secretary of War, and to which are added other burdens at almost every session of Congress.

It is not an easy matter radically to recast a system, such as that involved in the organization of the War Department, because of the personal interests within and without the department to be conserved, but it is certain that unless some of the burden is lifted from the Secretary of War and dispersed by authority of law amongst designated assistants, or transferred to other branches of the government, the centralization which has grown up will break down or militate against full success, for the duties have long since outgrown the capacity of any individual.

It is a compliment to the War Department system that Congress should commit to it so many matters requiring discretion, integrity and quick action, as in the case of floods, earthquakes, fires and other great public calamities. It shows that at heart public men, as well as the people, have confidence in the honesty, capacity and integrity of the army.

XII

COMMAND OF THE ARMY

"If an army was in existence, and an officer were invited to take command of it, his course would be plain, for he would have nothing more to do than to examine the constitution of it, and to inquire into the composition, to enable him to decide . . . The difficulty in which you expect to be involved, in the choice of general officers, when you come to form the army, is certainly a serious one; and in a government like ours, where there are so many considerations to be attended to and to combine, it will be found not a little perplexing."—WASHINGTON.

THE present status as to the command of the army is the result of more than half a century of discussion, involving, from time to time, some of the most celebrated men of their day. The army regulations in force prior to 1855, those of 1836, 1841 and 1847, defined the duties of the officer assigned to command the army, as follows:

"The military establishment is placed under the orders of the Major General Commanding-in-Chief, in all that regards its discipline and military control. Its fiscal arrangements properly belong to the administrative departments of the staff, and to the Treasury Department, under the direction of the Secretary of War."

The authority of the Commanding General was further specifically extended to cover supervision of everything which entered into the expenses of the

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military establishment, and to "see that the estimates for the military service are based upon proper data and made for the objects contemplated by law and necessary to the due support and useful employment of the army."

In 1855 the regulations were changed and the Commanding General practically ceased to exercise command of the army, until 1864, when under pressure of the necessities of a great war, General Grant was assigned to command with unlimited authority over all its parts. As soon as the war closed the office reverted to the conditions existing between 1855 and 1861.

Generals Scott, Sherman, Sheridan and other distinguished soldiers found themselves harassed with the impossibilities of the situation, and the War Department is filled with records of efforts to find a solution satisfactory alike to the Commanding General and to the Chiefs of Staff Bureaus. It remained for the war with Spain to disclose, in the most glaring manner, the need for some reform of so impossible a military situation. Long and bitter experience had shown the impossibility of defining any line of separation between the duties of the Commanding General of the Army and those of the Secretary of War. All attempts to accomplish this had brought nothing but controversies and misunderstandings.

Immediately after the inauguration of General Grant as President, having in mind his own troubles as Commanding General, he authorized the Secretary of War to assign General Sherman to command

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the army, and to order that all official business which required the action of the President or Secretary of War should be submitted through the Commanding General. General Sherman, in assuming command, on March 8, 1869, announced the Chiefs of Bureaus as his "general staff." When a new Secretary of War assumed duty, a few days later, he caused to be rescinded all the instructions except those directing General Sherman to assume command of the army, which removed the Chiefs of Bureaus from his control.

Gradually the practice took form and became fixed whereby the office of the Commanding General of the Army was reduced to an empty title and, at the last, the Adjutant General exercised the authority of the Secretary of War and became, in effect, the real commander. Although all orders were issued in the name of the Commanding General, he was not always consulted, and frequently knew nothing of important orders until they had gone into effect. The situation had reached a crisis intolerable to the soldiers of high rank selected from time to time, and assigned to command the army, and none could fill the office without becoming restive under the conditions. It should be remembered that for more than forty years the office had been filled by general officers who had won such distinction in campaign and battle as would, in any other country, have led to the highest honors being conferred upon them.

This situation at the War Department, bad enough in peace, became obnoxious and impossible in the

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face of a foreign war, and the efforts to fix the responsibility for blame made it clearly apparent that a complete reorganization of the whole system was a vital necessity. The controversies arising at the time were of such a character that much of the good work accomplished, in spite of the system, was quite ignored. As a matter of fact, with a very small available regular army—less than the strength of a modern division—the nation forced a declaration of war. The President called for 125,000 volunteers, and the corridors of the White House and the War Department became blocked immediately with applicants for commissions in the army. The actual operations essential to raising and organizing the army were interfered with to such an extent as to relegate that important work to the hours of darkness when the Department was closed to visitors. Another call for volunteers was made and the process of moulding brigades, divisions and corps progressed with celerity and great success, when it is considered that there had been no real preparation for war of any kind beyond operations against the Indians and the reconstruction of harbor defenses during the preceding thirty years.

Under the prevailing system, or lack of system, it had been impossible even to formulate plans, let alone execute general policies. The situation was understood by military students and, having in mind the rapidly changing world conditions, continuous efforts were made to procure and arrange for possible contingencies all the information concerning

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foreign armies which could be properly obtained, for our army has never taken kindly to the shifty methods and unreliable data of a secret service. But through all the years there had been a continuous effort to side-track the Commanding General of the Army, and it was so successful that when the crisis came the blame for defects and mistakes could not be justly laid at his door and in the end was charged against the War Department and its bureaus.

The controversy concerning the relations of the bureau chiefs to the Secretary of War and their independence as to the Commanding General became acute as far back as the reorganization of the army in 1821. Being dissatisfied at what was claimed to be interference on the part of the Commanding General, the Adjutant General, Roger Jones, on January 24, 1829, submitted to Secretary of War Porter an "Analysis of the theory of the Staff which surrounds the Secretary of War," which contains all the elements of the tempest which raged for three-quarters of a century. After enumerating the several bureaus General Jones wrote that:

"These several departments constitute so many avenues through which the various acts and measures of the Executive which refer to *commissions* and *appointments* in the Army; to permanent fortifications; the construction of Ordnance; Quartermaster's supplies; Subsistence of the Troops, etc., are communicated and executed and such is the symmetry in this organization, that whilst each member of the Military Staff of the War Department is con-

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fined to the sphere of his own peculiar functions, all regard the Secretary as the common superior, the head of the harmonious whole. . . .

“It will be plainly perceived then, that the Adjutant General’s Office is now (as kindred offices for more than twenty years have been) an important division of that branch of the Executive Government, denominated by law ‘The Department of War;’ and that it is the place where everything ‘relative to military commissions,’ *under the Secretary of War*, is conducted and registered. . . .

“These practical duties of the Adjutant General, under the Secretary of War, may be properly termed *administrative* in contradistinction to his *Military Staff* duties under the *General in Chief* and the former are essentially the same, which, at various epochs of legislation since 1797, have been performed by some such *Staff Officer*, denominated, ‘The Inspector;’ ‘The Adjutant and Inspector;’ ‘The Adjutant and Inspector General’ and finally, since 1821, ‘The Adjutant General.’

“Have these, or similar Executive functions ever been assigned to any general officer of the line of the Army? Are they compatible with the high duties of a Commander of the Army? Ought a General in Chief to crave these subordinate responsibilities and is it to the interest of the Army, thus to relinquish the glories of the field? . . .

“In this new state of things therefore, consequent upon the Reduction of ’21, the ‘*ci-devant*’ Adjutant and Inspector General’s Office which pertained to

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the War Department but now denominated 'The Adjutant General's Office,' was also made accessible to the Commanding General, for whatever referred to the *Troops* the *Posts* and *Military Commands*; whilst all the Records and documents '*relative to Military Commissions*' were, in the nature of things, retained and reserved for the sole and paramount jurisdiction of the Secretary of War. Like his predecessor (the late Adjutant and Inspector General), the *Adjutant General*, but not the *General in Chief*, continued to be the keeper of the Records already enumerated, under the *Secretary of War*, and to whom, he, only is responsible for all duties, which, are connected in any manner whatever, with '*Military Commissions*.' On the other hand, the Adjutant General, is responsible to the *General in Chief*, as Chief of the Staff according to the definition of duties found in the General Regulations for the Army.

" . . . It has remained however for the present General in Chief, aided, it is thought, by the Chief Clerk of the War Department, to claim jurisdiction in some of the enumerated duties exhibited in the above analysis, which, during the command of the lamented General Brown, were practically acknowledged at the War Office to pertain to the Adjutant General. Thus for example until *recently* all papers and documents referring to *Commissions* and *Appointments*, were sent direct, from the War Office to the Adjutant General, but now, it seems as if it were attempted and that without the knowledge of the

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Secretary of War, to throw into or pass through the hands of the General who commands the officers, the appointments and commissions of the same officers. . . . If the Hon. Secretary requires information respecting the fortifications or of the cannon necessary to garnish them, where is the resort for such information? Is it to the General in Chief—No: recourse is had to the Colonels of Engineers, and of Ordnance. Does he demand a report on the State of the provisions, or of Medical Stores for the Army? Is reference had to the General in Chief—No: The Commissary General of Subsistence and the Surgeon General are the Officers who would naturally be called upon to submit such Reports. Then where is the advantage, or the propriety or expediency of disturbing the harmony and rationality of this beautiful system which encircles the War Department? Wherefore, let it be respectfully enquired, attribute to the General in Chief functions, which would connect him with '*Military Commissions*' and which of all others, are the very last he should or can advantageously, have to do with? He is denied jurisdiction over the fortifications while in progress or construction; and Ordnance and clothing, until the one is placed in the Bastion, and the other in the Soldier's knapsack—yet, he strangely may have something to do with '*Military Commissions*'!

“ . . . It surely never could have been within the contemplation of the President to regard the General in Chief, as having a right to act in any other character, than *commander of the Army*; but,

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if he be more than this (correctly speaking, one should say less), why then 'General Headquarters' are metamorphosed into a second rate bevican, fixed at the seat of Government; and the highest Military officer known to the Army thus forsaking a higher destiny becomes in fact no other than one of the 'Chiefs of Staff' attached to the War Office."

Presidents and Secretaries of War had not been left in ignorance of the situation and the ancient controversies attending it. After General Sheridan had been rebuked and humiliated over matters trifling in themselves but which assumed a character of vital importance when considered in connection with the independence of the Chiefs of War Department bureaus in their relations with the Secretary of War, he, the leader of armies in war, was forced to sulk in his tent, while the petty affairs of our little army were administered through staff bureaus and their representatives at the several headquarters.

General Sheridan's successor—General Schofield—was one of the ablest students and most experienced administrators in the army. He had commanded a large field army in the greatest war of modern times and had filled the office of Secretary of War at a critical stage of our history. President Cleveland was desirous of ending an impossible military situation and, at his desire, General Schofield submitted his views relative to military administration and command, and it was a national misfortune that the President's term of office expired before he was able to accomplish a needful reform.

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General Schofield defined the issues and based his discussions under two clear-cut propositions:

“What are the duties, and what the authority, of the Commanding General of the Army, and of the General officers commanding Divisions or Departments, or armies in the field?”

“What are their relations to the War Department and to the several bureaus thereof, or Staff departments of the army?”

Those are the questions, definitely stated, which had given rise to so much controversy and had never been satisfactorily answered. The practice had varied extremely and the desirability of the establishment of well defined principles as a guide to all concerned in the complex duties and responsibilities of military administration and command had become apparent. Not only was the authority of the Commanding General of the Army denied by bureau chiefs, but complaints were constantly made concerning their interference with the several parts of the line of the army by giving orders direct to staff officers serving under the general officers commanding the troops. It was fully set forth to the President that to permit the staff officers of the War Department to exercise authority over the army, independently of, and without even the knowledge of the Commanding General, would be destructive to that unity of authority which is indispensable to the efficiency of the service, creating a military system under which anything worthy the name of an army could not possibly exist for any considerable time.

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It should be observed that the duties and responsibilities of command are not in general defined by statute, but are rather derived from military usage. A general officer, especially assigned by the President to the command of an army in the field, or of a territorial department or division, is necessarily clothed with great military authority, to be exercised in his discretion, subject to approval or disapproval only of his military superiors. The exercise of command necessarily involves the expenditure of money, governed by the general regulations of the War Department, but in respect to which a commanding general must in many cases exercise his discretion. In this his relation to the Secretary of War is that of an administrative subordinate, no less so than the chief of a staff bureau. While independent of each other they are responsible to a common superior—the Secretary of War.

The state of the appropriations or the fiscal regulations may not permit of doing all which the military interests seem to demand. The Commanding General, under his responsibility to the Secretary of War, must act promptly upon his own judgment as to the military necessity. On the other hand, a chief of bureau, not responsible for action or failure to act, may decide calmly to review the case and disapprove an expenditure already made. Every officer is entitled to the judgment, in approval or disapproval of his acts, of his superior officers in regular line of succession up to the head of the department to which he belongs. We now reach the crux of all controver-

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sies for chiefs of bureaus generally considered that here they came under the broad and protecting wings of civil administration in connection with appropriations as to the expenditure of which the treasury officials outranked all military authority. As a matter of fact, the authority of the Comptroller, exercised through his decisions, had long since become a serious factor in military administration, for it always had an appearance of unfairness to order a subordinate to make expenditures which would fall under the ban of that official. This subject was frequently injected into the controversy by appeals arising between commanders of troops and staff bureaus.

Through a long series of ingeniously contrived items of legislation, embodied generally in appropriation bills, the estimates for which are prepared in the War Department bureaus, the authority of the Commanding General of the Army and the general officers commanding the troops became limited mainly to the approval of detailed expenditures, definitely authorized through chiefs of bureaus. This situation was the cause of numerous briefs and pamphlets upon the general subject by those who contended that the Secretary of War could not legally delegate authority to chiefs of bureaus, thus practically placing them over the Commanding General of the Army and the general officers commanding troops who were their seniors in rank. The statute requires the Secretary to perform his functions, but does not authorize him to delegate them to chiefs of bureaus.

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Experience in numerous efforts had shown the impossibility of defining any line of separation between the duties of the Secretary of War and those of the Commanding General of the Army, and the offensive sore was allowed to fester until the existence of war established the clear cut necessity for remedial action. The history of the War Department and all the controversies arising therein were laid bare. Gradually certain principles seemed to formulate themselves, for throughout it was considered that all parties were honest of conviction in the matters in controversy, and were simply victims of an irreconcilable situation.

There were two evils clearly to be avoided, the arbitrary exercise of authority by the Commanding General, acting without the knowledge of the Secretary of War, and the equally arbitrary course where chiefs of bureaus exercise authority without the knowledge or consent of the Commanding General. An army, however large and complex in organization, must act under one head. The orders of the supreme power must come to and be transmitted by that head to the several subordinate bodies, according to the function of each and with regard to its relation to the others.

The functions of bureau chiefs should be, as far as practicable, delimited and prescribed in law and regulations in such manner as to admit of their being given much discretion in respect to all matters entrusted to or which concerns their departments. In this way the chiefs are trained to assume responsi-

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bility and are relieved of the embarrassment of presenting continually to a superior matters which require more time for proper consideration than the superior can give, when the number of staff chiefs is considered.

After casting of many nets in vain, it became gradually apparent that the Secretary of War, as the representative of the President, could not surrender the authority to command to any other official in occupancy of office at the War Department, whatever his title. The office of a Commanding General had therefore ceased to be anything but a name, a mere mockery of command. It was useless to begin a new century of discontent and conflict in the administration of army affairs, and the decision was finally reached that the office of the Commanding General of the Army should be abolished and that the command should thereafter be exercised by or in the name of the Secretary of War, through a Chief of Staff.

The Commission appointed to investigate conditions arising out of the war with Spain stated in its report:

“For many years the divided authority and responsibility in the War Department had produced friction, for which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. The Constitution makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he can not transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects a Secretary of War, who is his confidential adviser. The

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President must have the power of selection of his General-in-Chief as he has of his Secretary of War; without this there can be no guarantee that he will give, or that the Secretary of War will place in the General-in-Chief, that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony. Neither the President nor the Secretary of War should have in command of the Army an officer who is not working in harmony with him.”

In his testimony before the Commission, General Schofield said:

“Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong study and large experience, that the proper position for the senior officer of the army on duty at Washington is not that of Commanding General, a position which is practically impossible, but that of General-in-Chief, which means in fact Chief of Staff to the President.”

It was apparent that the conditions desired to be brought about could not be effected by creating the office of Chief of Staff for the senior general officer of the Army, who might be a gallant leader of armies yet not possess the particular qualities demanded as the adviser of the Secretary of War and supervisor of the technical work of the staff bureaus. It would have been impossible to have inaugurated this change by merely assigning an army general as Chief of Staff to exercise functions similar to those performed by General Halleck during the Civil War, for a multitude of minor statutes had been passed during the intervening years, some of which might

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have served to give color to resistance to such authority.

It was fully recognized that other changes were desirable coincident with the abolition of the office of Commanding General of the Army, and legislation was asked for to abolish permanent chiefs of bureaus and to fill the offices by details for periods of four years. The legislation changing the permanent staff departments into corps comprised of officers detailed from the line was effected at the same time as the change of tenure of chiefs of bureaus; it was not until two years later, 1903, that legislation was obtained authorizing the substitution of a Chief of Staff for a Commanding General in the War Department.

The legislation authorizing a Chief of Staff also created a General Staff Corps to assist with War Department administration and to perform very important functions in connection with preparation for war. The organic act charges the Chief of Staff with supervision over the staff bureaus, but the legal technicalities which were found an insuperable obstacle to giving the Commanding General of the Army such supervision of staff bureaus were overcome by requiring all authority to be exercised by the Chief of Staff in the name of the Secretary of War, and not in his own right of command.

The change of form has satisfied the legal objections, and while contention and friction may never be entirely eliminated, eventually, when practically all the staff except the engineer and medical officers

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will be detailed line officers, all friction due to bureaucratic pride should be eliminated.

The command of armies, as well as of territorial departments will continue, as in the past, to be exercised by general officers of the army specifically assigned to such duty by authority of the President.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, while theoretically exercising no command in his own right, as a matter of fact determines the line of action and gives, in the name of the Secretary of War, orders concerning a very large part of the business coming before him, consulting with and harmonizing the recommendations of the bureau staff officers when necessary. This admits of coordinating the action of all the bureaus and affords an opportunity for safeguarding the army in its varied duties. The system of command through a Chief of Staff, removable at pleasure, differs materially from command by the senior general officer of the army when assigned as Commanding General. The Chief of Staff may or may not be the senior officer of the army. His detail as such chief is limited to a tour of duty not exceeding four years, and it is especially provided that if, at any time, he finds himself not in personal accord and sympathy with the President and the Secretary of War in the execution of his office it becomes his duty to apply to be relieved. The office of the Chief of Staff constitutes a supervising military bureau of the War Department, and the supervisory power covers duties pertaining to the command, discipline, training and recruitment of the army; military op-

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erations, inspections, fortifications, military education and instruction and kindred matters and, in an advisory capacity, includes such duties connected with fiscal administration and supply as are committed to him by the Secretary of War. The supervisory power of the Chief of Staff extends to matters of organization, armament, equipment, discipline and training the militia. All orders and instructions affecting the army are issued through the Chief of Staff and communicated to the troops and individuals by the Adjutant General.

In the performance of his enumerated duties and as the adviser and in representation of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff calls for information, makes investigations, issues instructions, and exercises all other functions necessary to secure proper harmony and efficiency of action of all those subject to his supervision. It will be observed that while the Chief of Staff is entrusted with practically all the power denied in former years to the Commanding General of the Army, it is required that he shall not set up any claim of authority except in representation of the Secretary of War, who, as a civilian Cabinet minister, overburdened with civil duties, may never be expected to have that familiar knowledge of the service which can be acquired only after years of actual experience.

In the final analysis, the Chief of Staff has far greater power than was ever sought for or expected by the distinguished Commanding Generals of the Army, who urged in vain that the rights and duties

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of the great office should be defined and its dignity protected from constant humiliation. The authority of the Chief of Staff, being exercised in the name of another—a civil superior with only a general knowledge of military matters—presupposes that those things needful and necessary for the proper service of the army will be undertaken only after consultation with and approval of the Secretary of War. The office of Chief of Staff, therefore, carries with it a great responsibility, for the very reason that all action is under cover of authority of the Secretary of War. It remains for the future to determine whether lust for power may create dissension to the great detriment of the public interest, in which case the solution of the grave question undertaken through the substitution of a Chief of Staff for a Commanding General of the Army would prove unsatisfactory.

It is within the power of the President to relieve a Chief of Staff, but this authority does not extend to the chiefs of bureaus, who are appointed and confirmed by the Senate for periods of four years. Repeated efforts were made to secure legislation to reserve places in the several staff corps and departments for officers selected to serve as chiefs of bureaus, so that in event the interest of the service should dictate relief instead of reappointment at the expiration of a tour, the officer relieved could return to his proper grade and rank in the permanent establishment. For the past ten years sufficient antag-

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onism to the proposed legislation existed to prevent its enactment, but it has been recently provided that places shall be retained on the army lists of their appropriate grades for chiefs of bureaus who may *hereafter* be appointed, making the present chiefs practically permanent. Such questions are not so simple and easy of adjustment as mere questions of discipline. There is a grave danger, under our form of government, in having too frail a tenure of office of those responsible for public business involving large disbursements, for dissatisfied contractors, with powerful political friends, would find it more desirable to urge removal than to combat a conscientious official. One of the most disagreeable burdens of official life arises from efforts of contractors to secure relief from specification requirements rather than performance with probable loss or reduction of profits. All these conditions must be carefully considered in making changes in methods of doing public business.

There is nothing in the theory of army administration and command, through a Chief of Staff, that should render full success improbable, and especially after the date when the principal bureau officers will all be detailed officers of the line. There is an adage as old as war which recites that armies may be led but never driven, and which suggests that mutual respect for differing opinions and a tactful fulfilment of official duties is a sacred obligation of those responsible for the administration and command of the

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army. When this view fully obtains, controversies should cease and the Chief of Staff and all heads of bureaus should move forward in harmonious action as the united staff of the Secretary of War, acting as the representative of the Constitutional Commander-in-Chief—the President.

XIII

THE GENERAL STAFF CORPS

"To remark to a military man, how all-important the General Staff of an army is to its well-being, and how essential consequently to the Commander-in-Chief seems to be unnecessary."
—WASHINGTON.

THE crying need of the army during the past half a century had been that of a General Staff or body of officers whose business it is to do the preliminary planning for the army in order to prepare it for war and to make of its various elements a harmonious working machine. The only practicable way to secure the needed reform seemed to lie in a frank statement to Congress that a continuance of existing conditions in the command and administration of the army was inimical to the welfare of the nation. The proposed abolition of the office of Commanding General of the Army, and the establishment of a General Staff Corps whose head should be the Chief of Staff of the Army was not the result of caprice, experiment or desire for change, but was suggested by the recorded experience of three-quarters of a century, including the great Civil War, where more than 3,000,000 men struggled for the mastery, and the war with Spain and its train of new and strange experiences. No trained mind could examine the records of that long and eventful period without reaching the conclusion that a drastic modification of

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our system was justified by every military and business consideration. Many of the functions devolving upon the General Staff in other countries had been performed in our army by officers of various staff departments and of the line, because such business did not properly pertain to any particular corps and the performance of it seemed needful for the well-being of the service. There was no central authority, other than the Secretary of War, empowered to coordinate and direct the manifold interests of the various branches of the service—staff and line. The proposed establishment of a General Staff Corps was received without enthusiasm by Congress as well as the army, and even at the present day it fails of much support which should have been given in generous measure. To military men preparedness to strike is the watchword to success. If reasons be longer needed in justification of the creation of the General Staff Corps, let those who are still in doubt ponder on the experience of this warlike but unmilitary nation in 1898.

When it had become certain that a declaration of war with Spain was a question of but a few days, the following order was signed by the Adjutant General:

“WAR DEPARTMENT,
“ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,

“WASHINGTON, April 13, 1898.

“Lt. Col. T. Schwan, Lt. Col. A. L. Wagner, Major W. H. Carter are appointed a Board to formulate plans for the call of a volunteer force to the number

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of 40,000 for active field service; and 20,000 for reserve sea-coast service. The Board will make any recommendation that, in its judgment, the possibilities of the day seem to call for.”

The report of this board was desired immediately and was made as follows:

“WAR DEPARTMENT,
“ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,

“WASHINGTON, April 14, 1898.

“MEMORANDUM

“Two kinds of duty will devolve upon the Army.

“*First.*—The defense of our sea-coasts.

“*Second.*—Offensive operations against the enemy’s territory.

“The duty of the first kind will require sea-coast artillery and a force of infantry to protect the batteries from land attack. The second will require infantry, cavalry, and field artillery.

“It is a well-known fact that raw troops can not be depended upon to conduct offensive operations successfully, but they can be depended upon when acting upon a pure defensive, especially behind intrenchments. The infantry for the sea-coast defenses should, therefore, be taken from the volunteers or militia. The offensive operations would require our best and most proficient troops, and the forces for this purpose should, therefore, be composed of the regular infantry, cavalry and light artillery, supplemented by the best regiments and batteries of the volunteers.

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“The prompt concentration of the forces destined for offensive operations is desirable for two reasons. First, to give the troops a period, however brief, of instruction in the movements of large bodies, such as brigades and divisions. Second, their concentration for the purpose of embarkation.

“For the first of these purposes concentration at any points offering facilities for drill and instruction would be sufficient. Bearing the second object in mind it would seem best to concentrate the troops for organization and instruction at points where they could embark for the operations which they are to undertake, as it would not be advisable to compel them to entrain and detrain at an intermediate point when their concentration could be effected with a single entraining and detraining.

“The embarkation of the troops for Cuba could be made from Tampa, Mobile or New Orleans, or better, from these three bases at once, as the embarkation could be more rapidly effected in three fleets of transports—one from each of these ports—which could concentrate off Key West.

“It is believed that it would be best to have the regular troops brigade with the volunteers, one regiment of regular infantry and two of volunteer infantry, constituting a brigade. The regiments of regular infantry should at once be each designated as the nucleus for a brigade bearing its number; thus the First Infantry would be the base regiment of the first brigade; the Twelfth Infantry, of the twelfth brigade and so on. The seventy-two regiments of

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infantry thus brought together could be formed into three army corps. From two to four batteries of artillery should be attached to each division as divisional artillery, and, as a reserve, at least six batteries to each corps as corps artillery. One regiment of cavalry should be assigned to each corps as corps cavalry, and the remaining seven regiments should be grouped into a cavalry corps. Every available man in the infantry, cavalry and light artillery of the regular army should be taken for the army of invasion. This would embrace all the cavalry of the Regular Army and all the infantry except the Fourteenth.

“The following concentration of the regular army is, accordingly, recommended: The 1st, 7th, 10th, 15th, 18th, 20th, 23d, and 24th Infantry and 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Cavalry at New Orleans. The 2d, 3d, 4th, 8th, 11th, 12th, and 16th Infantry and 6th Cavalry at Mobile. The 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 13th, 17th, 19th, 21st Infantry and 3d Cavalry at Tampa.

“The volunteer infantry sufficient to complete brigades to be sent to each of the designated bases and a sufficient number of batteries of volunteer artillery to be sent to raise the number of batteries with each corps to a minimum of at least twelve and a maximum of twenty.

“These points of concentration should be designated without delay to the Chiefs of the supply divisions, who should receive instructions to regulate their movements accordingly, and an officer should

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be sent to each of these points at once to select suitable ground for camps and maneuvers.

“It is evident that the measures here proposed would leave our interior military posts without garrisons. It is recommended that a detail consisting of one officer from each garrison and two men from each company be left at each garrisoned post; and it is suggested that the Quartermaster General be authorized to hire watchmen in such numbers as may be necessary to assist in the proper care of the posts, and that in hiring such watchmen preference be given to retired enlisted men.

“The measures proposed in the preceding paragraph manifestly relate only to those posts which could, without detriment to the public service, be left ungarrisoned for some time. Other posts, especially those in the Indian country, need garrisons and such garrisons should be obtained at once from the volunteer forces, for even comparatively raw and inexperienced troops might be utilized for the purpose of keeping Indians in check when such troops would be of very little account in Cuba. Such posts as Forts Sheridan, Leavenworth, Crook, Snelling, Thomas, and Columbus Barracks, should be utilized as recruiting rendezvous.

“Assuming that the Department Commanders are to take the field it is recommended that an officer be designated to act as Adjutant General at each Department Headquarters to represent the Department Commander in his absence.

“The above recommendations are based upon the

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understanding that it is not deemed expedient to concentrate the Army at Chickamauga Park. If it be deemed practicable to concentrate the entire forces at that point the advantages to be gained by organizing and instructing the Army at a single point might outweigh the disadvantages of a double entraining and detraining. As soon as a concentration of the troops has been decided upon it is recommended that a general officer be sent to each point of concentration without delay, to assume command of the troops as they arrive.”

The Commanding General of the Army had as his military family at that time only his personal staff officers and an Assistant Adjutant General. The Adjutant General of the army had established an Information Division in his own office, but there was no General Staff to plan for and guide the orderly procedure of a nation from a state of peace to that of war. It was a humiliating lesson to those in authority in a nation about to engage in a foreign war of its own choosing. In the bustle and confusion incident to creating an army, there was no time to give to questions of great moment the study and research they deserved. The result was hasty, ill-digested action with its train of consequences. It is not practicable to discuss the economic features in detail because there is no basis for calculation, but enough is known to justify the assertion that a General Staff, possessing the authority of law for its existence, could have arranged in advance of war the mass of details with reference to distribution, transportation

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and mobilization of armies, and the establishment of supply depots, in such manner as to have effected a vast saving of men and material.

It has never been claimed that a General Staff will prove a panacea for all the misfortunes which may overtake a nation engaged in war, but history contains innumerable instances showing that previous preparation for war tends to abbreviate the period of active hostilities and thereby to effect immense saving in life and treasure. Under the old system, before the creation of the General Staff Corps, it was quite possible for a bureau chief to work along his own lines in ignorance of, and on a different basis from, what other bureaus were doing—a course contrary to every economic and business principle. Through the agency of a General Staff, military and political policies may be harmonized as becomes our form of government and the chiefs of War Department bureaus and others whose functions have to do with waging war may be brought into line and work more coherently and to a common purpose.

During peace the duties of a General Staff Corps consist, to a great extent, of bureau work—including the preparation of maps, the drawing up of schemes for organization and concentration of troops, the formation of plans for the national defense, and a study of the higher military science to keep pace with modern progress. The soldierly spirit, informed by experience of actual service with troops, must ever be the actuating impulse of such an organization, and for this reason all officers of such a corps

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must return periodically to service with the line. Any system which allows officers of the General Staff to degenerate solely into bureau officers, will cause them to forfeit the respect of the line of the army. It is on this account that a sufficient number should be maintained in such a corps to furnish ample details both for office employment and for duty with various branches of the army, interchanging from one kind to another at frequent intervals.

Above all else, the personnel of a General Staff Corps should be selected with reference to ability, and without any suspicion of favoritism. There is a widespread opinion that influence is more potent than trained talent and fitness. Republics do not differ much from monarchies in some ways, and it is Utopian to expect, under any form of government, a system which will always put the best man in the place, with or without influence. Favoritism will occasionally help an individual but the service at large is quite sure to observe it and to exaggerate it to such a degree that it will react unfavorably, sometime, upon the source of it as well as upon the recipient. It is possible, however, that the common idea as to the success of influence in forcing men to the top is exaggerated. It would be a grave misfortune to the army if this opinion were to fasten upon it even though the finger of scorn may point unerringly to glaring instances. It is certain in the long run, that the officer who accepts his commission with a determination to fit himself thoroughly for each grade as he progresses in the army, and for as much

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more as lies within his power, and who performs his duties in a conscientious, intelligent and forceful manner, is more apt to rise in the estimation of his brother officers and his superiors than he who performs only the duty required of him and that in a perfunctory manner. Fortunately for the country, it is considered discreditable among the great body of army officers for one not to be thoroughly posted in his professional duties. It should of right be expected that no details to the General Staff Corps, except from officers who have displayed character and talent sufficient to justify their being placed amongst a professionally trained body of ambitious and competent men, shall ever be made.

In the comparatively brief existence of the General Staff Corps there has developed, as was anticipated, the question as to the proper manner in which effect should be given to the determinations reached by such a body of officers on the various matters affecting the army. It had been expected that the detailed studies of all questions by members or sections of the General Staff would be considered by a council of senior officers responsible for maintaining consistent courses of action, which would ultimately constitute fixed policies. That the recent course of events in this regard has varied from the original conception is no cause for alarm. The foundation stones have been carefully laid even though the character of the superstructure may, from time to time, be modified to meet the views of an ever changing personnel.

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It ought not to be necessary to state that the officers of the General Staff serving with the commanders of troops are there for the purpose of furnishing professional information; to assist in the preparation of detailed plans and orders and to relieve their commanders from as much as possible in order that they may devote themselves to the consideration of the higher questions of command and make success more probable. A Commanding General can act more intelligently in a theatre of campaign which has received the careful study of the General Staff, if he has an officer of that corps at hand who can elucidate and explain the situation upon which orders for the movement of supplies and troops may be based, than the same general can do if dependent upon his own efforts and those of a group of staff officers suddenly assembled about him at the outbreak of war, and of whose qualifications he is, to a certain extent, ignorant.

The General Staff should always justify its existence by making certain that important matters which require investigation shall be given grave consideration by a body of selected and highly trained officers, whose time should not be frittered away with routine affairs, and whose opinions should be based upon systematic examination and mature thought. It is only in this manner that the evils of hasty and imperfectly considered opinions may be escaped and the necessity for continual reversal of action and revocation of orders may be avoided.

In the earlier efforts, an attempt was made to de-

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wise legislation which would create a General Staff Corps, by consolidation of the Adjutant General's and the Inspector General's Departments; but a careful study of the matter determined against disturbing the Adjutant General's Department, which, besides being the bureau of correspondence, is the office where are deposited and arranged for current reference all the records pertaining to the armies of the United States and which have been the basis of settlement of pensions and other service and war claims amounting to many thousands of millions of dollars. Those for pensions alone have exceeded \$4,000,000,000 since the Civil War. This decision not to compromise this vast business by consolidation was not arrived at without careful study and consideration. It was demonstrated to the satisfaction of those in authority at the time, that it would impede and impair the proper development of a General Staff Corps, along the lines of its most promising usefulness, if it was created out of another department, or through a consolidation of two departments. The necessary legislation was therefore asked for and secured to create an entirely new General Staff Corps and to assign to it the duties which, while most important, had long been neglected because they had never, by statute or custom, pertained to any particular department or part of the army. A careful examination of the duties prescribed for the General Staff Corps is sufficient to convince those familiar with the duties and records of the Adjutant General's Department that there is

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ample employment of a legitimate kind for both corps.

We do not consolidate the fire department with the public health or street cleaning departments because of a period of no fires or a smaller number than were expected, and likewise there should be no modification of the General Staff Corps organic act until a fair test has been made covering a sufficient period to eliminate all personal equations, and to obtain a resultant composite picture of the real merits and defects, if any, of the system. The General Staff Corps was created mainly as a selected and highly trained body of military experts to plan for war rather than to perform the duties of routine administration, other than that necessary in co-ordinating the work of the line and the several War Department bureaus.

There have always been some who advocate amendments to the Constitution whenever its restrictions prove embarrassing, but as the decades go by it is seen more clearly how very few changes have been really needed. So excellent and long needed a law as that which provided for the establishment of the General Staff Corps should be studied and executed in the good faith advised by Washington in his Farewell Address:

“It is important likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country would inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one depart-

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ment to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all other departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions of others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our own country and under our own eyes. . . . But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.”

XIV

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"It is not my intention to dispute the powers of the President to make this or any other promotion, which his inclination or the solicitation of others may prompt him to; but I will add, without fear of contradiction by any one acquainted with the usage and prescriptive right of armies that if he wishes to preserve the peace and harmony of ours, rules must be observed, and the feelings of the officers attended to in promotions. . . . As respects myself, I have no object separated from the general welfare to promote. I have no predilections, no prejudices to gratify, no friends, whose interests or views I wish to advance at the expense of propriety."—WASHINGTON.

SUBSEQUENT to the war with Spain, and after full opportunity for personal observation, Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, testified before a committee of Congress, that: "There is not an abler body of men to be found anywhere in the world than the officers of the American Army."

Whether or not this opinion is too exalted, the history of the past fifteen years discloses no call of duty which our officers have failed to meet with courage, intelligence and professional equipment of a high order. Happy augury for the future that, in a country abounding in business opportunities, so many men of established high character, education and honorable ambition continue willing to sacrifice the chances of wealth and ease and submit without

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murmur to the discomforts and dangers of the military service.

The army in its methods of selection and training of officers and verification of results is on an entirely different plane from any other profession. Candidates enter the army as officers through West Point, by service in the ranks, or by direct appointment from civil life and in every case examinations are held to determine their entrance qualifications. Once in the service, the officer is continually tested in the duties of his profession, theoretical as well as practical, in the garrison schools and at the various other army schools. From his entrance into the army as an officer until he has reached the grade of field officer, usually a period of twenty-five years or more for the line, constant instruction and examination are the order of the day, and no officer can be promoted who has not been certified as qualified for the higher office by a board of his superiors in rank.

Time and again since the nation assumed the role of a World Power there have been thrust upon junior subalterns the determination of grave questions involving diplomacy, commerce and the law, international, civil and criminal. A correct decision, with prompt and forceful action, may tide over a grave emergency, whilst an honest error may live to mar a record through a lifetime of loyal service. These are the chances that every candidate for a military career must needs take. In taking these professional risks, the young officer, if he anticipates

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a contented life, must accept the general rule and be satisfied with a consciousness of duty honestly performed as the highest reward that will come in the majority of cases. If perchance, others of not greater merit be called for important service, he must needs nerve himself against the sting of envy, else it may poison his mind and inspire him with discontent. Despite the small number of chances of obtaining high rank, and with assured prospects of frequent hardships and deprivations, there has never been a time when candidates of approved character and merit were not in waiting for commissions in the army.

In the army, as in the navy, there are representatives of many families which have sent sons of every generation into one or the other, and sometimes both services. Almost without exception these sons may be counted upon for loyal and gallant services because of personal characteristics, as well as pride in the records of their families. Respect for the uniform is usually bred in the bone of these men and they value the privilege of following in their fathers' footsteps beyond the opportunities of material success in business.

In a nation so much given to genealogical research, in the effort to locate ancestors who have rendered the nation some service, it is remarkable that many men are entirely content with the service of their forebears, and oblivious to the fact that they too might render some public service to which their descendants could, in time, point with pride. The cov-

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eted privilege of membership in one of the numerous patriotic societies seems to satisfy the ambition of altogether too many able-bodied descendants of virile ancestors. The British nobility and landed gentry have ever given not only of their best blood to the army, but have habitually supplied the greater part of the fortunes necessary for the support of the large body of officers. This burden has always been regarded as a patriotic duty to the Crown and, through several centuries, these traditional gentlemen have freely risked and often sacrificed their lives in protecting the rights of some distant and obscure trader over whom floated the British flag. Strange to say, that in America those who by reason of accumulations of property have assumed the role of the leisure class, seldom consider the propriety of devoting themselves or their sons to the public service, except as ambassadors or ministers at foreign courts.

While it is true that the number of desirable appointive offices has become extremely small because of the constant extension of the civil service system, there still remain many opportunities of which the sons of the wealthy could avail themselves for rendering public service to the nation. In a country under whose flag enormous fortunes have become the rule, and under whose laws protection is guaranteed to vast aggregations of capital in single families, public opinion should encourage the members of these families to some participation in the government beyond the mere payment of taxes. The army

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and the navy, through the medium of the national academies, are always open to a considerable number, and many do take advantage of the educational facilities furnished by these institutions; but, with few exceptions, they resign before opportunities for distinction have arrived. Many of the young men of wealth, who have thus quitted an honorable service which abounds in fine traditions, have taken up active business or professional careers. Others have sacrificed their trained talents to the idle life of the leisure set, which, in America, has few resources worthy of men of their education and character. If more of such men should seek and remain in the service, they would not only honor their families by so doing, but, here and there, opportunities for distinction would come to some, whose names would be inscribed with credit upon the pages of the nation's history. The satisfaction derived from social successes of an otherwise idle life is as naught compared to the pride which comes of having rendered the state some gallant or useful service.

Every man physically fit and of proper age, whose titles to property are confirmed and protected by the laws, should not only be ready to take part in the defense of his country, but should regard it as a solemn obligation to qualify himself for it by some service in peace in the army, the navy or the active militia. The Constitution rests upon the basic theory that every able-bodied citizen is part of the nation's bulwark, and it should be made impossible that any of those described shall, in future, be al-

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lowed to avoid service in war. This once adopted as a national policy, those upon whom the call for service would fall would endeavor to qualify for it. There is always an infinite need of educated officers with practical training when war comes.

With all the advantages and all the drawbacks weighed in the balance, there remains a goodly margin in favor of the army as a career for a man adapted to the profession of arms. It is entirely possible for a young man to live with decency and credit upon his pay, but a small private income removes the anxiety incident to extraordinary and unforeseen contingencies. There are frequent occasions when, as public officials, both army and navy officers become involved in heavy expense which in justice should be met from the public purse. It is to their credit that they generally measure up to such occasions like gentlemen, even though their doing so may subsequently involve them in unpalatable economy. Altogether, whether in the government of Indian or Oriental tribes, in the fair and patient handling of angry mobs, in the tender nursing of earthquake sufferers or in the supreme test of battle, the army has ever conducted itself in a way to deserve well of the country and to encourage those who regard the army as a career.

The officers of our army come from the nation at large and should be truly representative. Those who are graduates of the military academy at West Point are accredited mainly to the congressional districts of all the states and those appointed from the

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ranks and direct from civil life are nearly as widely dispersed as to birth and citizenship. With so useful an institution for establishing and moulding the character of young men, it is a national misfortune that all aspirants for army commissions should not have the benefits of the education and training assured by the course at West Point. The value of the West Point preparation, in establishing subordination and character, is shown comprehensively by army statistics.

Since and including 1890, appointments have been made to the Corps of Engineers and to the line of the army as follows:

Graduates from the U. S. Military Academy...	1,771
From the ranks of the army.....	649
From civil life.....	<u>1,769</u>
Total	4,189

Of these there have been dropped from the rolls by dismissals of courts-martial, for desertion and forced resignations:

Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy....	17 or about .95 of 1%
Appointments from the ranks of the army..	38 or about 5.5%
Appointments from civil life.....	64 or about 3.6%

The records seem to establish that the process of elimination at West Point, *before appointment to the responsible position of commissioned officer of the army*, is very thorough. As to the initial qualifications for the military profession upon graduation, there should be no question. As to the results of competition in actual service, the records of the

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Civil War show that before the four years' struggle had ended the Army Commanders in that great conflict were Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Meade, Thomas, Schofield, Burnside, Hooker, Rosecrans, McClellan, Halleck, Buell, Ord, Howard, Pope, Slocum, Canby, Wright, McDowell and Curtis.

Among the Corps Commanders were Reynolds, Newton, Hancock, Couch, Humphreys, Heintzelman, French, Keys, Gordon, Granger, Stanley, Sykes, Warren, Griffin, Smith, Wright, Steele, Reynolds, Parks, Gillmore, Williams, Davis, Smith, Foster, Franklin, Emory, Grover, McCook, Augur, Hartsuff, Gibbon, Weitzell, Stoneman, Pleasanton, Merritt, Wilson and Fitts-John Porter.

Among the Division Commanders were Doubleday, Stevens, Ricketts, Rufus King, Richardson, Webb, Sully, Hays, W., Hays, A., Berry, Prince, Hamilton, Whipple, Elliott, Ward, Casey, Ayres, Morell, McCall, Robinson, Barnes, Getty, Russell, Neill, Seymour, Davidson, Carr, Wilcox, Brannan, Saxton, Ames, Turner, Gordon, Greene, Smith, Baird, Carlin, Morgan, Hazen, Ransom, Martindale, Palmer, Wessels, Sherman, T., Abercrombie, Ruger, Kautz, Jackson, Buford, Gregg, Custer, Kilpatrick, Upton and Mackenzie.

All of these were graduates of the military academy. Of their nongraduate brothers-in-arms of the old regular army none were in command of armies, only Sumner commanded a corps, and Kearney and Mower commanded divisions.

Given also with equal emphasis in the armies of

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the South and justified by the results of a score of campaigns and of a hundred battles, this is the verdict of the greatest of our wars. No lesson in war was ever more clear-cut and decisive. After a desperate struggle of four years, involving over three millions of combatants, the officers of a little body of ten thousand regulars, almost wholly graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, commanded as Lieutenant or Major Generals every army in the field, nearly all of the army corps, and a large proportion of the divisions. In every great battle of that war both sides were commanded by graduates of West Point.

It was not only in the Civil War that the West Point training proved its value, for following the Mexican War, General Winfield Scott wrote:

“I give as my fixed opinion that, but for our graduated cadets, the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas, in less than two campaigns, we conquered a great country and a peace, without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.”

On the occasion of the Centennial celebration at West Point in 1902, Hon. Elihu Root said:

“All honor to the volunteers who have been and who must always be the main support of our country in war. All honor to the genius, the courage, the self-sacrifice of the men, many of whom I see before me now, who have won immortal renown as

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generals of the volunteer army. They will be the first to say aye when I declare that the formative power, the high standard of conduct, the informing spirit of every American army is to be found in the regular army of the United States. All honor to the officers of the regular army, who in true republican fashion have worked their way up from the ranks as did Chaffee, Commanding in the Philippines. And all honor to the officers who, turning aside from the allurements of wealth and honor in civil life, have been appointed to the army as civilians, accepting the slender income and the hard life that is known to accompany the duties of a soldier. They will be the first to say aye when I say that the informing spirit, the high standard of the regular army are derived from the graduates, the teachings and the traditions of the Military Academy. Happy augury for the future that here where for a hundred years honor has ever ruled—honor made up of courage, truth, compassion, loyalty—is to be found the formative and controlling power of the American army of the future—regular, militia and volunteer. No army inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy can ever endanger a country's liberty or can ever desert its country's flag."

Promotion in the army under normal conditions is usually extremely slow. With all the losses incident to the war with Spain, the Philippine campaigns and the employment of troops in China, promotion has not been accelerated to a point which enables an officer to get his eagles and the command of

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a regiment with less than from thirty to thirty-five years of service. For the young lieutenants recently commissioned the climb upward looks interminable, but the element of chance usually plays a prominent part in keeping up an average movement towards the top. The methods of filling vacancies in the lowest grade of commissioned officers is in accord with the American theory that no door of public employment should be closed to any citizen. For nearly a hundred years promotions from the ranks followed the British custom of restriction to meritorious non-commissioned officers who had proved their courage and their ability to command men. Not satisfied with this open door, legislation was enacted so that any private of two years' service and within certain age limits may compete for a commission in an examination which requires no greater ability than is called for by the entrance examination at the West Point Military Academy. The law was intended to open the door for commissions to all men without possibility of their aspirations being barred by prejudice. Many misfits have resulted and altogether the real object of the law—to elevate the character of the whole personnel of the ranks—has not been realized in the slightest degree. On the contrary, the presence in the ranks of young men, not infrequently the kinsmen of officers, whose sole object is to obtain commissions and who generally elect to serve in particular organizations with expectation of rapid advancement to the noncommissioned grades, has a disheartening effect upon

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other men, particularly the "back-bone" of the army—the sterling old noncommissioned officers who, through defective education or over-age, are not qualified to compete in the examinations. Many of these young aspirants for commissions through the ranks adopt that course after failure to obtain appointments as cadets. It would be a real advantage to the service if commissions direct from the ranks were reserved for meritorious noncommissioned officers of approved courage and exceptional qualifications in control of men, and all young candidates, between the ages of 18 and 22, who pass the preliminary examination for enlisted men, should be sent as additional cadets to West Point, where sufficient accommodations exist for them, instead of being promoted as commissioned officers. The individual and the nation would be the gainer by full utilization of the military academy whose product in trained and disciplined men has justified its existence as a business proposition aside from the public need of a special institution devoted to military instruction in a country whose policy demands a minimum army.

The lesson of all this is clear-cut and decisive. The public welfare demands that the corps of cadets at West Point should comprise the maximum number possible to educate there without changing the standard. A probationary period of appointment should be created for candidates for commissions from other sources in order that every reasonable precaution may be taken to insure the exclusion of demonstrated

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unfitness. It should be borne in mind that waiving defects and deficiencies of candidates results in placing them in line for promotion to the most responsible military office in the army—that of colonel of a regiment—which in due course will be reached through seniority promotion.

While pride in the past glories of the regiment has not departed, the abolition of regimental promotion and the establishment of lineal lists for all grades in each branch of the service—artillery, cavalry, infantry—has tended to create a broader *esprit-de-corps* of the arm and in fact of the whole army. The old system had its merits but resulted in so much inequality of promotion and in so many cases of apparent injustice that few, if any, would discard the new system which has done so much to enlarge the horizon of personal experience, through contact with an ever increasing number of brother officers, as well as in a greatly extended knowledge of the world, geographically and socially. The adoption of lineal promotion has made it possible not only to promote officers in the order of entry into their arm of the service but, through a system of examinations before promotion, to inflict a definite penalty upon those who fail to measure up to the professional requirements. Under a system of regimental promotion this would be impossible because of the influence of accident of employment and lack of uniformity in the flow of promotion in the several regiments.

Following the adoption of lineal promotion came the detail system of staff employment, which has

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far more merit than has usually been conceded to it. Under this system all the staff corps and departments, except the Corps of Engineers, the Medical Corps and possibly the Judge Advocate General's Department, will be comprised eventually of detailed line officers. As admission to the line of the army is confined to the lowest grade, that of second lieutenant, and under carefully devised regulations for examination before appointment and before each subsequent promotion, eventually all the corps of staff officers will have had previous instruction and experience in the line, and the opportunity for further appointments to important positions in the staff, direct from civil life and based solely upon political influence, will have disappeared. The bringing about of this condition was long and successfully opposed, the influence thrown against it being strong enough to delay the necessary legislation for half a century. It was primarily a determination to improve the staff corps and departments, in their relation to the needs of the line, that at last brought about the reform.

Owing to various increases of the army and frequent disturbance of the list of officers available for staff assignments, the full value of the detail system has been temporarily impaired, but that the principle is correct and its ultimate importance to the army as a fighting machine very great, there can be no reasonable doubt. It is certain that our system of military education and training, up to the point of practical application in the larger organizations

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of divisions and armies, is unexcelled and that American officers generally are splendidly equipped for all duties, line and staff. This has been well exemplified in the very satisfactory performance during the past fifteen years of a wide range of exceptionally difficult and delicate duties arising in the various foreign possessions which have come under our flag and in the Relief Expedition to Peking, the Pacification of Cuba, services in China, and the long-continued border patrol on the frontiers of Mexico.

In making details under the new system to the several staff corps and departments, they were by an administrative order, allotted to the different branches of the line in accordance with their strength of commissioned officers. The law does not require this, it having been intended to leave it within the discretion of the President or his representative, the Secretary of War, to make details in such manner as to prevent radical inequalities of promotion in the several branches of the line.

Questions involving rank and promotion have been prolific sources of appeals, decisions and acts of Congress since the days of the Revolution. More heart-burnings have been caused by actual or imagined wrongs in that regard than from probably any other cause, and some of the deepest grievances have come from injuries arising from efforts to repair presumed wrongs in other cases.

Prior to the establishment of the detail system in 1901, scarcely any administration passed into history without influence being brought to bear to ad-

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vance some officer over others without reference to or involving the question of merit. For many years appointments and promotions to the staff departments were regarded in the same light as other patronage, but from time to time the field of selection was limited by statutes until finally in 1894 it was enacted that: "Hereafter all appointments to fill vacancies in the lowest grade of the Adjutant General's, the Inspector General's, the Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments, respectively, shall be made from the next lowest grade in the line of the army."

When the usual reorganization of the army following a war took place in 1901, tremendous pressure was brought to bear to have officers with brief service in the volunteers appointed in the regulars with rank above those of long, faithful and excellent service. It was successful to a degree in the staff departments, with the result that some comparatively young men soon reached the highest grades of field officer without having served at all in the line of the army. The light in which army patronage is viewed at such times may be illustrated by citing some of the appointments made. Among the faithful White House employees during the war with Spain were an executive clerk, a telegraph operator and a doorkeeper; the clerk was commissioned a captain in the Pay Department, the telegraph operator a captain in the Signal Corps, with temporary rank of lieutenant colonel, and the doorkeeper was appointed a military storekeeper with

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rank of captain and subsequently through the operation of an act of Congress reached the rank of major in the regular army. When the war with Spain began there were many officers in the army who had served as lieutenants more than twenty years before reaching the grade of captain.

In urging the interchangeable or detail system of staff employment, the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, said:

“I have found many cases of officers who have been doing their duty silently and uncomplainingly, asking no favors and having no friends at court, out on the frontier, enduring the hardships of army life, and who have the feeling that men get appointments here at Washington, and they are at the center of things and know the President and the Secretary of War and the Senators and Members of Congress, and that they can get about what they want. The feeling is that the staff officers constitute a close corporation here, with all the luxuries, and the privileges and all the power. I think it will be beneficial to every branch of the service to have the men who have been in the staff offices in Washington going back into the line, and that the instruction and the kindly feeling and the better understanding which will be produced by that will be a great benefit.”

In advocating in the Senate the adoption of the detail system and abolition of permanent staff commissions, Senator Proctor, formerly Secretary of War, said:

“When a vacancy occurs in the staff the promo-

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tions are made regularly and an appointment is made at the foot of the list. Less care is used than would be in an appointment to a higher place. The scramble for the place commences months before the vacancy actually occurs. It is a mere statement of fact to say that the man who has the strongest pull usually gets the place. Senator A or Senator B has a relative or a constituent with powerful influence behind him, and he demands the appointment and gets it. The appointee has received a promotion of a grade, not upon merit, but by influence, and in doing it has jumped many of his fellow-officers. No system could be better calculated to kill ambition. Under a detail system a good officer would doubtless be selected early and serve on different staff corps and have the all around training so important for high command.”

If the introduction of the detail system in the staff corps and departments accomplishes nothing more than the elimination of the heart-burnings arising from such conditions, it will have justified itself.

Promotion by selection is now confined solely to the grade of major general and brigadier general, except in the Judge Advocate General's department. This method has resulted in some junior officers being appointed to the rank of general because, as given out at the time, they could not be appointed or advanced to any intervening grade as a reward for gallant and distinguished service. This is a serious matter and one easily remedied without the aboli-

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tion of seniority promotion for the army generally. Should Congress be asked to enact a law granting the power to the President to reward gallantry and achievements of recognized excellence in active service in the field during war by promotion to the next higher grade, and provide that officers so advanced shall be carried as extra numbers in the higher grade and not retard the regular flow of seniority promotion, there would be every probability of securing action, for there could be no legitimate objection on the part of the army.

To understand that the fears of the line officers absent from the circle of personal acquaintance and influence are not without some justification, it is only necessary to review the selection promotions since the war with Spain. Since the reorganization of the army in 1901, there have been one lieutenant general and nine major generals appointed by selection from chiefs of bureaus, including chiefs of artillery, serving at the War Department. Of these five were retired immediately following their advancement and five were assigned to line duty as general officers. As this left several chiefs of bureaus without promotion to the highest grade, influence was brought to bear upon Congress and a special act was passed which, by a peculiar arrangement of language, provided for advancing four other chiefs of bureaus with rank of brigadier general to the rank of major general, upon retirement.

During the same period forty-four officers of the permanent staff were promoted to be brigadier gen-

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erals, five of whom were assigned to duty in the line under their new commissions. Colonels of the line very naturally complain that their chances of ever reaching the grade of general officer are materially lessened by such appointments and have been practically a unit in desiring legislation to restrict promotions to the position of general officer to officers of the line, as promotions to chiefs of bureaus have been restricted by law to officers holding permanent commissions in the staff corps. There are only six major generals and fifteen brigadiers for duty with the line, and it may readily be seen how colonels of regiments should feel aggrieved at each diminution of already slender opportunities for advancement.

Such conditions in the army, particularly that of a Republic with a regulated civil service, are sources of constant discontent, and it was to get rid of the possibility of such things in the future, and to relieve the President of some of the solicitation for preferment, that laws were recommended to and enacted by Congress to limit future appointments in the army to the lowest grades of the line and to supply the officers for the several staff departments by details from appropriate grades of the line.

There is still another reform necessary, in order that all candidates for commissions as lieutenants of the line may receive like treatment. If a cadet at the military academy is pronounced deficient upon his final examination, which determines whether he shall be recommended for appointment

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to the grade of second lieutenant, there is no possibility of the deficiency being waived by the Secretary of War. The practice of waiving defects, both mental and physical, of those examined for appointment from civil life became so common during the Spanish War period as to be fraught with serious consequences, because the second lieutenant of to-day becomes in future the commander of a regiment by the process of seniority promotion. Various laws have since been passed in the effort to regulate appointments to the army but no regulations hold in the face of influence, and consequently nearly every competitive examination for appointments to the grade of second lieutenant has met with the same fate—overruling of boards, changing of marks and waiving of mental and physical disqualifications. Until Congress specifically enacts that the results of competitive examinations shall have the sanctity of law, and not be subject to review or waiver by higher authority, there need be no expectation of a change of the evil practice. The War Department authorities are possessed of full power to prescribe the character of the examinations and having exercised that power no subsequent interference is demanded by any public interests. The integrity of the corps of officers constitutes the foundation stone of efficiency. The removal of their first commissions from even a suspicion of influence will be of marked value in the course of time.

In 1857, when one of the periodic efforts to im-

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prove the service was being made, the Secretary of War invited attention to what he considered defects of organization and said:

“One of the greatest errors of detail is the separate, independent character of our staff corps. This removes them from their proper position as aids or assistants to the commander, and constitutes them his equals. It contracts the sphere of observation, and experience, and thus unfits the officer for change or advancement, and begets an accumulation of precedent and prerogative at war with the vital principle of military organization—the inviolable and undivided authority of the head.

“A general provision dispensing with the staff bureaus and giving the President authority to regulate the duties on the principles above stated, and to transfer, when necessary, officers to and from the line and staff, would restore the institution to its proper effectiveness.

“We have retained another fault, abandoned, at least practically, in almost every service among civilized nations, even the most aristocratic and monarchical. This is promotion by seniority. Age and experience should bring excellence; but the test lies in the actual possession of the latter, and not merely in the circumstances which, it is assumed, should produce it. Seniority, with the requirements essential for position, ought certainly to give precedence; but, without these, that dignity and respect which belong to rank and command can never be secured.

“All that has been urged in favor of retaining it

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with us is the danger of political or personal favor governing a selection. There may be danger from this source; but, by the rule of seniority, the worst officer of the army must, if he lives, come to be one of the most important and responsible officers under the government—the colonel of a regiment. By selection, it is possible that the very best may not always be chosen, though the chances are in favor of this hypothesis; but certainly, the very worst never will be, and this is surely a gain on the present rule.”

Congress has given the army the full power to eliminate the quite inconsiderable number of officers who fail to measure up to the established standards of examinations for promotion and boards have only to remember that each time an officer of doubtful aptitude and efficiency secures an advanced grade, he is one step nearer the command of a regiment and has acquired an additional appeal to sentiment and sympathy of the next board, by reason of longer service.

The desirability of having none but the most competent in the higher grades of the army needs no argument. The defectiveness of a system which admits of a single incompetent officer arriving, through the process of seniority, at the head of a regiment is equally obvious. The power of influence, personal, social and political, has been in evidence too long to have escaped the attention of even the trusting and generous natures which so much abound among the officers, and at no period have they been willing to hazard their careers by selection promotion under

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any system of efficiency ratings or boards yet devised.

It sometimes happens that at about forty-five or fifty years of age a lethargic condition takes possession of an individual and progress seems arrested. No further examinations, perhaps, being required, it is possible for an officer so afflicted to drift along without committing himself in any way, until, through seniority, he reaches the grade of colonel. Such cases are rare, but the government is justified in protecting itself against such an occurrence because the colonel absolutely controls the welfare and training of from 1,200 to 2,000 officers and men.

It is entirely probable that a limited system of selection, applicable to the grade of lieutenant colonel only, would commend itself to the army. If upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the grade of colonel in any branch of the army, a board of three colonels of that arm of the service be constituted to examine into the records, personality, temperament and professional equipment of the senior lieutenant colonels and to recommend whether the senior should be promoted, it would tend to assure that none but physically and mentally alert officers would command. It should be provided that in event the senior lieutenant colonel is not deemed qualified to command, he shall be promoted and retired. The number who may be passed over should be limited to three, or at most, five, so as to keep in mind that the system is to insure active colonels and not to create promotions for deserving officers lower down on the

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lists. By starting this system with an examination of all colonels and retirement of any not deemed qualified to command a war strength regiment, it would then be entirely safe to establish promotions to the grade of brigadier general by seniority in the lists of colonels. This would confine selection promotions to the two most important grades, those of major general and colonel, carrying normally the command of a division and a regiment, respectively, the two important administrative and tactical organizations in our service. In our navy, seniority prevails throughout and from the splendid character of service always rendered by that branch of the service, we may justly conclude that mediocrity would never prevail in the army under the seniority rule, with limited selection in the two most important grades.

XV

ARMY SCHOOLS

"The establishment of an institution of this kind (military academy) upon a respectable and extensive basis, has ever been considered by me as an object of primary importance to this country."—WASHINGTON.

IT IS a common observation, that practical qualities in a soldier are more important than a knowledge of theory. The very truth of this has sometimes been made the excuse for indolence, which, except in rare and gifted individuals, may destroy efficiency. Other things being equal, the officer who keeps his mind alert by intellectual enterprise, and who systematically studies the reasons of action and the conditions and difficulties with which he may have to deal, will develop into the stronger practical man and better soldier. The necessity for the soldier, above all others, being familiar with the history and imbued with the spirit of our institutions, lends encouragement to and indicates the importance of thorough and broad education for military officers.

Theoretical study is of moment in any profession, but in the army, which makes immediate application of every scientific device, a knowledge of theory is indispensable. To be an ordinary line officer one need not be a distinguished scientist but to be a good

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line officer one can not have too much knowledge of science, the law, business and the various trades, for all have more or less application to military purposes. The primary and essential qualifications for a good officer are an ability and aptitude to command men and to get the utmost limit of endurance from them, willingly, when the service demands it. This can come only to those to whom the men in the ranks attribute the possession of professional ability, coupled with common sense and judgment. A small knowledge of the duties of a general is not of so much consequence to a lieutenant, as a large and varied knowledge of small things useful in the instruction and care of his men. Arising from the practice and traditions of the British service, it was long the custom in our army to depend largely upon drill sergeants, but with the passing of the rough and ready period the necessity for a different school of training became obvious. It is recognized that mere knowledge of theory is of little value to the army officer unless he has the power of practical application. It has been found that the applicatory system of education is best adapted to post graduate work of the army and wherever possible that method is employed.

The large influx of young men appointed from civil life, from the ranks of the army, and from volunteers with brief service in the war with Spain, made it necessary to rearrange and extend the system of instruction of officers, not only to develop their capacity for higher grades but to prepare them for

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the duties of the grades to which they had been appointed. Prior to the war with Spain a system of lyceum instruction was established at all army stations with a view to affording opportunities for professional improvement. After a considerable trial it became evident that no uniformity of results could be expected from a system which was greatly dependent upon the personality of the various commanding officers. After careful consideration it was decided to abandon the lyceum system and to establish a more comprehensive scheme, under which every officer entering the service is required to establish his qualifications to perform the duties of his office and his fitness is made a matter of record.

There has long been established in the regular army a system of examinations for promotion which has no connection with the scheme of instruction. The legal machinery in connection with these examinations, however, is expected to play an important part in ridding the service of any individual officer, should inefficiency be developed during the progress of the general plan of education and training, established in the garrison and service schools.

While certain principles remain fixed the rapid progress in the development of materials causes radical changes in methods of making war. In our army it has been found necessary to have post graduate instruction in many forms to keep pace with modern improvements. The military educational system now comprises :

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The Military Academy for cadets at West Point.

The Army War College.

The Army Staff College.

The Army School of the Line.

The Coast Artillery School.

The Engineer School.

The Mounted Service School.

The Army Medical School.

The Army Signal School.

The Army Field Engineer School.

The Army Field Service School for Medical Officers.

The School of Musketry.

The Field Artillery School of Fire.

There are also schools for training bakers and cooks for the army. At each military post a garrison school for instruction of officers and a school for the instruction of enlisted men are maintained.

The educational scheme contemplates that beginning his career in the garrison school every officer shall be required to fit himself thoroughly for the responsible duties of his grade, including familiarity with company and post administration and that of the staff and supply service. Those officers who exhibit the most aptitude in the garrison schools are regarded as having a right to precedence when selections from their grade are made for attendance at the Army School of the Line. Similarly selections are here made for the advanced course in the Army Staff College. Eventually the distinguished graduates of the Staff College, after a tour of service with

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their regiments, are destined for participation in the course of study at the Army War College where they will have an opportunity not only to observe the work of the General Staff in connection with war plans but also to participate in similar studies. In this way it is expected that the nation will eventually have at its disposal a highly trained body of officers whose qualifications are a matter of official record based upon progressive work.

The rapid development of modern science, as applied to the art of war, caused the establishment some years ago of various special service schools which now form an important part of the general system. The intricate machinery of modern, high-power, coast defense guns and the problems of submarine defense necessitate a scientific training for the economical and proper management of this expensive arm of the service and this is supplied at the coast artillery school in the most approved manner.

The Mounted Service School is utilized for cavalry and horse artillery and not only serves as a school of application but embraces a school of equitation which is gradually establishing a high standard of horsemanship and developing some officers to a degree entitling them to rank amongst the very small number in the world in the class of horse-masters, which includes far more than mere ability to ride and train a remount. Here also are maintained schools for farriers and horseshoers which have given the army standards of work equal to any

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in the world and far superior to that found in the average civil community.

The Army Signal School is a valuable adjunct to that branch of the service and has been of great assistance in training experts, as well as in perfecting material, and has resulted, on the whole, in the line of the army having a most perfect and satisfactory system of field communication, the equal of any in the world. Other nations have expended funds more lavishly for aeroplane work since our army initiated it, but the full measure of usefulness of aeroplanes has not yet been determined. No large force can be moved in modern war without discovery. Most important and satisfactory results have been derived from ground lines and the portable wireless system of communication within the limits of our own forces.

The Staff Corps have their special arrangements for instruction of their own officers in the Engineer, the Field Engineer, the Medical and the Army Field Service School for Medical Officers, all of which maintain standards well abreast of anything in modern armies. Officers of the organized militia are admitted to the various schools provided they are qualified to undertake the course with profit. The history of our country points clearly to the fact that at the outbreak of every war there is a demand for trained officers far beyond the supply.

Upon the reorganization of the army following the war with Spain a large number of young volunteer officers who had seen service in the field were

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appointed in the regular army. It was very essential that these officers should be grounded in the theories of the profession in order to qualify them for their duties and for the examinations required for the higher grades.

The whole scheme of army post graduate and other schools results from a fixed policy, the object of which is to make our small army as perfect as possible not only in the performance of its own duties but in its capacity as instructor for the greater army of citizen soldiers necessary in every war of magnitude.

In striving to meet the demands of a new era, differing widely from conditions during the period of the Indian Wars, the War College Board was created soon after the termination of the war with Spain. The duties imposed upon this board were almost wholly of the character of general staff employment. The senior officers of our army had long been occupied quite exclusively in the details of administration, with inadequate opportunity for the study of the broader military problems, the consideration of plans for future campaigns and the coordination of the many military agencies involved in the harmonious employment of an army. Out of these efforts to meet properly a genuine need have come the system of post graduate schools, the War College and the General Staff Corps.

Appreciation of the opportunities afforded our officers for perfecting their military education is constantly shown by the results of their work. In the

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war with Spain and the subsequent insurrection the value of the education and training previously given was manifested by the splendid manner in which they performed every military duty and the success with which they assumed the new and grave responsibilities involved in civil functions in recently occupied territory of an unfamiliar and resourceful enemy. The delicate situations constantly arising under a military government of an alien civil community, just emerging from insurrection, can only be appreciated by those who have carried the weight of responsibility. It is to the credit of the army and the nation that the American officers not only measured up to all the scientific requirements of their profession, but that during the long period between the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of civil government the affairs of 8,000,000 Orientals were administered by them with the integrity and fidelity only found in those who serve without mercenary ends and for the reward of a consciousness of duty well done. A nation which can continue to command such service is to be congratulated.

XVI

THE TRIUMPH OF MEDICAL SCIENCE

"It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."—WASHINGTON.

WHEN war with Spain was declared, those in authority did not contemplate an immediate movement in force upon Cuba, for the climate of that island in midsummer was regarded with particular aversion. But the destiny of nations conforms not always to the schemes of men and so when Cervera's fleet appeared in the harbor of Santiago the departure of the army was hastened and the downfall of Spanish power followed almost immediately. The army, with a marvelous burst of energy, had driven home the attack at Santiago and by its lavish expenditure of strength, under conditions of peculiar hardship, laid itself bare to the insidious fevers of that tropical island.

The occupation of Cuba without undue delay became a necessity. The problems of sanitation and disease prevention became at once far more formidable than ever before in the history of our army.

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Disease has always been the scourge of armies and to such a degree that those who have marched and engaged in battle have, at times, suffered less than those subjected to the monotonous routine of crowded camps.

Yellow fever, the most dreaded scourge of the West Indies, was not slow in making its appearance and its victims numbered some of the bravest and most honored of the invading army. And yet further sacrifice was demanded in order that the history of the scourge might be traced beyond doubt. Courage far greater than that called for in battle was now demanded and it is to the honor and glory of American arms that volunteers were found to submit themselves to the anxiety, pain and horrors of the experiments which in the end have placed civilization under a debt of gratitude to the army in general, and especially to Walter Reed, Carroll, Lazear and their confreres, whose names and fame will go down the centuries with the veneration due to men who have accomplished things worth while.

It had become essential, before any real constructive work could be done, that the mysteries of propagation of yellow fever should be determined. After a series of experiments remarkable alike in their inception and successful culmination, the culprit mosquito was run to cover. Not only was the military occupation of Cuba made possible but also the fulfillment of the dream of the centuries—that of the construction of the Panama Canal. In the past so helpless were we in the face of yellow fever that

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the arrival of a single case at one of our Gulf ports was sufficient to cause immediate establishment of a physical line of quarantine backed by fear and firearms.

While the army was struggling with the problems of sanitation in the islands over which our flag floated in the wake of war, the nation at home was aroused over the hysterical reports of death and sickness in the great volunteer camps. Typhoid fever had run its rampant course and the only immediate remedy seemed to lie in dispersing the troops as rapidly as possible. Out of this experience was born the determination to prevent such conditions in future, but the requirements of successful sanitation have ever demanded labor beyond the voluntary efforts of those whom it was designed to protect.

The story of unhealthy camps has ever been the same. It is only in the very recent past that medical science has made known the possibility of preserving health through careful attention to well known laws of sanitation. The cost in death and broken health of its younger men in each war has been a serious draft upon the vitality of the nation. An officer in the mobilization camp of General Zachary Taylor's army on the Rio Grande, in 1846, recorded conditions in his diary which states:

“The mortality in our camp at Camargo was appalling. The dead march was ever wailing in our ears, and even at this distant period I can scarcely look back to our brief stay there without a shudder.

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At almost every hour of the day funeral escorts of various regiments might be seen following the bodies of departed comrades to that vast and common cemetery, the chaparral, where officers and men, 'in dust, without distinction, lie.' The large hospital tents were constantly full—the dead being removed at sunrise and sunset, but to make room for the dying."

The hospital and pension records of the Civil War disclose a story of disease only exceeded in pathos by the silent bivouac of unknown dead in the national cemeteries. Had the armies of that period been concentrated in the proportions now common in great wars, the conditions would have been correspondingly worse. And amongst all diseases of camp and hospital none was more to be deplored than typhoid fever. But the science of investigation has once more gained the victory and by means of anti-typhoid inoculation a remarkable degree of immunity has been established.

The immense advance in camp sanitation and the great value of typhoid inoculation as a protective measure may be illustrated by comparing the experience of the Maneuver Division of Regulars in Texas, during its concentration from March until August 1911, with that of the Second Division, Seventh Army Corps, which was organized at Jacksonville, Florida, about June 1, 1898, and remained there in camp until October. This division was not conspicuous in its typhoid record for that time, and is

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selected because of the close similarity of its conditions of service to those of the Maneuver Division in Texas. The two divisions were encamped in nearly the same latitude and for about the same length of time. Each had a good camp site and an artesian water supply of unimpeachable purity. While the period in camp of the Second Division, Seventh Army Corps, was later in the year, the number of men in the Maneuver Division was larger.

Table showing for the regiments of the Second Division of the Seventh Army Corps, assembled at Jacksonville, Fla., the mortality and morbidity from typhoid fever:

Regiments	Mean Strength	Cases of Typhoid Fever		Deaths from Typhoid Fever	Deaths from all Diseases
		Certain	Certain and Probable		
Second Illinois	1,095	253	341	18	22
First North Carolina.....	1,164	147	227	16	20
Second New Jersey.....	1,153	185	318	29	32
First Wisconsin	1,232	209	311	46	48
Fiftieth Iowa	1,097	164	253	33	33
Ninth Illinois	1,288	153	248	18	28
Second Virginia	1,220	105	152	17	20
Fourth Virginia	1,274	135	231	21	28
Forty-ninth Iowa	1,236	378	612	50	50
Total	10,759	1,729	2,693	248	281

Table showing for the organizations composing the Maneuver Division at San Antonio, Texas, the

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morbidity and mortality from typhoid fever, March 10 to July 10, 1911:

Organization	Mean Strength June	Cases of Typhoid Fever Cer. and Prob.	Deaths from Typhoid Fever	Deaths from all Diseases
Eleventh infantry	924
Fifteenth infantry	969	2
Eighteenth infantry	1,022
Thirteenth infantry	929
Twenty-second infantry	1,033
Tenth infantry	1,016	1
Seventeenth infantry	954
Twenty-eighth infantry	951
Third field artillery.....	847	2
Fourth field artillery.....	741	1
Engineer battalion	536	1
Signal corps	197
Ninth cavalry	744
Eleventh cavalry	1,143	3
Sanitary troops	795	1*	..	1
Total	12,801	1	0	11

*This patient, a private of the hospital corps, had not completed his immunization, having taken only two doses. The case was very mild and would perhaps have been overlooked but for the rule that blood cultures were made in all cases of fever of over forty-eight hours' duration. The Widal reaction has no diagnostic value in immunized persons, as all respond to it. Forty-nine cases of typhoid fever, with nineteen deaths, were reported as occurring in the city of San Antonio during this period.

The health of military commands is usually measured by the constantly non-effective rate which represents the average number constantly sick in each thousand men. This was for the Maneuver Division twenty-two per thousand, which can be better ap-

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preciated when it is stated that the rate was thirty-four for all troops in the United States for the year 1910. This epoch-making achievement was not accomplished by merely waving a magician's wand but through the generous cooperation of line officers and men and employees of every grade, with the medical officers and sanitary squads, for the proper sanitation of crowded camps involves far more of practice than theory. As to the spirit which pervaded the command, the sanitary inspector has reported:

“The sanitary inspector usually dealt directly with the regimental sanitary officer and was accompanied by him on his inspections. The latter was held responsible for the sanitary conditions of his camp, and if sanitary defects were found, he was considered to be at fault unless he could show that he had made proper efforts to have them corrected.

“If the regimental surgeon was unable to bring about a correction of the defects, the matter was taken up by the sanitary inspector with regimental authorities. It is interesting to note that it was never necessary for the sanitary inspector formally to use the authority granted him by the commanding general. It seemed to be well understood that the sanitary inspector was only insisting that the commanding general's orders be carried out, and it was always possible to arrive at a satisfactory understanding without friction or controversy.

“With few exceptions, organization commanders were more than willing to carry out any directions or suggestions concerning ways and means of pre-

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-serving the health of the commands. Considerable difficulty was encountered at first in putting the scheme of sanitation into effect, largely on account of a lack of appreciation of the necessity and purpose of the measures prescribed.”

Immediately upon mobilization of the division, orders were given making typhoid inoculation compulsory and the results have not only justified the action, but fixed a model for future camps. The area available for the encampment was very restricted. With the infantry division were two regiments of cavalry, about the equal of a European cavalry division; two regiments of field artillery, a battalion of engineers with a ponton train, ambulance and field hospital companies, all of which were accompanied with wagon and pack train transportation. To provide immediately for the proper sanitation of the camp, the following instructions were promulgated:

“General Orders,

“No. 2.

“HEADQUARTERS MANEUVER DIVISION,

“SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS.

“March 11, 1911.

“The following regulations for camp sanitation are published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

“1. The chief surgeon is charged with the general conduct and supervision of the medical department in the performance of its duties, and will make such assignment of personnel as may be required.

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“2. The sanitary inspector is charged especially with the supervision of the sanitation of the camp. It is the duty of commanders to remedy defects reported to them by the inspector.

“3. The camp water supply is pure and wholesome and no sterilization of drinking water is necessary. Precaution must be taken, however, to prevent subsequent contamination by keeping all containers scrupulously clean and protected from dust and other sources of infection.

“4. The senior medical officer of each command will make at least one inspection daily of the command to which attached, and report any sanitary defects, with proper recommendations to remedy the same, to his commanding officer, who will immediately take the necessary steps for their correction, if within his authority. If beyond his facilities, or if considered impracticable, he will immediately forward the report, with full remarks, for action of higher authority.

“5. Organization commanders will be held responsible for the police of their respective camps. Each company or similar organization will construct incinerators as prescribed in Section 216, Field Service Regulations, for the disposal of all solid and liquid garbage of the organization, and no other disposition will be made of such wastes. Human waste will be disposed of in pits provided with latrine boxes unless other provision has been made. Two urinal cans will be placed in each company street at night. Latrine pits will be burned out, and seats

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scrubbed daily; crude oil and straw or other material will be used. Urinal cans will be burned out daily and bottoms covered with milk of lime before put in use. Defilement of the ground in or about the camp is absolutely prohibited. Manure will be hauled to a designated dumping ground, and there burned with the aid of crude oil. Rock pit crematories will be used for disposal of general wastes of camp areas not under the jurisdiction of commanding officers.

“6. No food, drinks, or like commodities will be sold in camp except in the authorized exchanges.

“7. Sanitary squads composed of medical officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the hospital corps will be organized by the chief surgeon. The sanitary squad will supervise and assist in the disposal of camp wastes. Civilians employed as sanitary laborers will be employed by the quartermaster's department and turned over to the medical department. The sanitary police officer will make requisition on the chief quartermaster for such transportation, labor, or material as may be needed. When assigned to this service they will not be diverted to other uses except by order from these headquarters.

“By Command of Major General Carter:

“STEPHEN C. MILLS,
“Colonel, General Staff,
“Chief of Staff.”

It was clearly comprehended that conditions on the Mexican border might eventuate in the troops

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comprising the Maneuver Division being called upon for active field service, and it was inadvisable to inaugurate the system involving the expensive and cumbersome incinerators and other patent devices experimented with at camps of instruction in recent years. There was no transportation available to carry along the heavy and bulky apparatus and it was not desired, for many reasons, to increase materially the transportation accompanying the command. It was, therefore, decided that no methods should be employed which would require material change when the troops should proceed upon the march, else time would be wasted and disaster invited. All apparatus connected with the sanitary system was of the simplest kind and within the labor and capacity of troops to install quickly. Storage of garbage and kitchen slops in receptacles was forbidden. The old camp custom of burying garbage was dispensed with, for such pits become breeding places for myriads of flies. Open pits lined with small boulders, with a continuous fire, were found entirely efficacious for destruction of kitchen garbage, but on account of the incessant rains, simple forms of covered incinerators were constructed and used by some organizations while in the permanent camp. The handling and storing of refuse near the kitchens pollutes the ground, attracts flies and furnishes them breeding places. If the garbage is hauled away in cans or carts it is practically impossible to prevent it being slopped over, with consequent ground pollution and attraction of flies. Fire alone

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seems to solve the question of its immediate and proper disposal in the vicinity of kitchens.

The past ten years have given a very extended experience to army veterinarians, not only in our own country but in tropical islands, and they have become familiar with all known diseases of animals, many of the most serious of which have never been introduced in this country. There were more than 6,000 horses and mules distributed through the camp of the Maneuver Division, tied at picket lines. Very few regimental veterinarians were present and an improvised corps was created through temporary employment of additional civilian veterinarians. The experience of the division was similar to that of the Civil War where, in the final analysis of records, it was found that in our country armies require one horse or mule to every two men in campaign. The animals of the Maneuver Division were exposed from the very first to most inclement weather, consisting of a series of northers, accompanied by cold rains, making the surrounding soil a sea of mud. It required incessant labor to ditch and partially drain the ground around the picket lines without conducting the contents amongst the adjoining tents of the troops and, often, for days at a time, the animals were forced to stand in mud above their fetlocks. Such conditions not only subjected the animals to the grave danger of being rendered unserviceable by "thrush" and a disease of the heels known as "scratches," but made it more difficult to maintain a good sanitary condition of the camp.

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Owing to the receipt of frequent shipments of animals from large sales depots, some diseases were introduced in the camp, but although glanders prevailed constantly in the vicinity, it was excluded by a rigid system of inspection of all animals entering the camp limits. Of the more than 6,000 horses and mules with the division, 562 were treated at the improvised canvas hospital of which 201 were suffering from shipping fever, strangles and kindred diseases, and 361 were invalided because of injuries and lameness. The loss of animals treated at the hospital during the existence of the division was twenty-nine, being five and one-sixteenth per cent. of those admitted and less than one-half of one per cent. for the whole number of horses and mules present in the camp during its existence of five months.

The picket lines were stretched between compactly camped regiments and their cleanliness was an essential part of the sanitary system. The refuse from the picket lines was disposed of by hauling to a dump several miles from camp where it was destroyed by burning with crude oil. The ground about the picket lines was carefully swept and once a week hay was spread over the surface and burned to destroy any larvæ of flies which had found lodgment there.

No new sanitary principles were attempted but only a scientific application of well-known methods used at various times. There was some perturbation because some recently patented, expensive and cumbersome appliances, adapted for permanent camps, were not put in use, but the results proved

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that our army tactical unit—the division—may camp and march in comparative immunity from disease with little, if any, more impedimenta than was carried during the Civil War. The simplicity and practicability of the methods used appealed strongly to experienced soldiers and enlisted their zeal in carrying them out. Efficient sanitary schemes can best be formulated and carried out under the direction of specially trained medical officers, having a knowledge of the origin, nature and diffusion of infectious diseases, and the proper methods of combating each. The early detection and prompt isolation of infectious diseases is absolutely necessary to prevent epidemics. The results of the scientific system employed speak for themselves in a record previously unequalled as regards healthfulness and simplicity of methods, and at a cost a mere fraction of that involved at some maneuver camps.

In 1913, the Second Division was concentrated about Galveston Bay with a view to service over-sea, but was kept in that vicinity throughout the year. The main camp site at Texas City was to all appearances far less favorable than that occupied by the Maneuver Division in 1911, but with the immediate adoption of the same sanitary rules and the use of the anti-typhoid inoculation, the 12,000 men were enabled to continue their field training through the varied weather, winter and summer, with a remarkable health record. The results obtained in these two divisions may be achieved by other commands with the same care and labor.

And in other lines the battle for prevention of dis-

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ease has been waged and nowhere with more remarkable results than by the army in Porto Rico and the Philippines where parasitic infection is giving way to the regeneration of the afflicted people. One of the most remarkable incidents in medical history is that involved in the regeneration of the old Spanish prison called Bilibid, in Manila. The mortality here had reached the abnormal proportions of 238 per 1,000. Through relief from overcrowding, improved diet and proper sanitation, the rate was reduced to 70 per 1,000, where it remained until an examination of the 3,500 remaining prisoners disclosed that eighty-four per cent. were afflicted with intestinal parasites; fifty per cent. with two varieties and twenty per cent. with three or more. Of the whole number fifty-two per cent. were afflicted with hookworm disease. Proceeding then with proper treatment the death rate in this prison, with a previous record rivaling that reported of the Black Hole of Calcutta, the death rate fell to thirteen per 1,000. This disclosed not only the previous foulness of a prison and the victory of science, but suggested the broadening field of usefulness of preventive medicine to restore vigor to thousands of weaklings ignorant of the sapping of life's blood and energy. War loses some of its terrors when the experience flowing from it discloses so signal a triumph of medical science in prevention of diseases whose toll of death in the past has rivaled that of bullets.

XVII

THE ORGANIZED MILITIA

"To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year."—WASHINGTON.

THE terms "Organized Militia" and "National Guard" have been adopted officially to designate those state military organizations which participate in the appropriations by Congress and to differentiate them from the untrained body of citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five available as militia or levies in mass. There is a wide variation in the strength, discipline and effectiveness of the state forces. Some states have practically no troops at all, while others have regularly organized brigades and divisions. These latter are the organizations which have shared in the appropriations provided by Congress, and which have been declared by the attorney-general in an opinion rendered February 17, 1912, as not being available for national service beyond our borders. The national guard of many states has long since reached a degree of instruction which has caused them justly to resent being classed as militia in the old acceptance of the word, and the decision of the attorney-general that:

"The constitutional provision here considered not only affords no warrant for the use of the militia by

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the general government, except to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or to execute the laws of the Union, but, by its careful enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it forbids such use for any other purpose” came to them as a distinct shock.

A large number of the officers and men of the national guard have devoted their time and fortune to its improvement, under the belief that in event of war the organizations to which they belong would be immediately called into service with the regular army. Several schemes have been proposed to overcome the situation brought about by the decision of the attorney-general, which was not rendered as an abstract opinion but at a time when the probability of calling out the state organization for active duty beyond our borders was deemed imminent.

The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power :

“To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

The Constitution further provides :

“That no state shall, without the consent of Congress, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

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Some of the states now maintain military organizations quite equal in extent to the entire regular army as it existed prior to the Civil War. Appropriations by Congress for the militia have doubled under recent legislation, and their improved condition has been held to justify recognition through a further annual appropriation of, possibly, \$10,000,000 to pay the officers and men of the existing organizations, notwithstanding they remain state troops.

Since Washington expressed his convictions so fully upon the subject, much has been written about the failure of militiamen to make good, and there is no gainsaying that the record is decidedly against the employment of levies of short service men by whatever name they may be designated. The organized militia of the present day, however, should not be compared with any body of troops ever previously employed in this country under the designation of militia. Organized, armed, equipped, and subject to training under the laws and regulations governing the regular army, they constitute a military force far better prepared for immediate active service than the best of new volunteer organizations. So long, however, as the national guard or organized militia remains in its present legal status, it is not an immediately available asset, and it will constitute a serious blunder on the part of the nation if the existing system is not thoroughly revised in the near future.

When the war with Spain was declared, it was

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found necessary to prepare legislation, which would enable the military organizations existing in the several states to participate in the war with their original organizations intact. Congress provided for this by authorizing the President to accept the service of any company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment of the organized militia which would enlist in the volunteer army in a body. No provision was made for receiving into the service the many generals and staff officers of state troops. The generals and staff officers needed for the whole army of regulars and volunteers were appointed by the President as "United States Volunteers," not accredited to or having any obligation to any state. There was a natural feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the generals commanding brigades and divisions and their staff officers of the state organizations at being left out and all subsequent legislation proposed by them has had in mind the recurrence of such a condition in event of another war. There was also a general opinion that better results would have followed if some method could have been found of ordering the various state contingents into active service without waiting for each individual militiaman to volunteer. Some organizations declined to volunteer and of those which did purport to volunteer as a body, so large a number of individuals failed to do so that the war efficiency of many organizations was materially reduced for the moment because of the small number of old men mustered into the service, and through the sudden influx of large numbers

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of recruits. Strong influence was brought to bear to reduce the number of privates required in organizations which volunteered, and it was successful to such a degree that it became necessary for the President to make another call immediately for men to fill up the companies which, like all militia organizations, had full complements of officers. Out of the dissatisfaction at that time have come the continuous efforts to modify the laws under which existing state organizations shall be received into the army for war before any volunteers may be accepted.

As between the trained or partially trained active organizations of militia and new regiments of volunteers, there should be no question of relative initial efficiency. *The whole matter revolves about the probable value of any body of troops, for national purposes, which is maintained by and solely under control of a state, during peace, even though appropriations for their support are made by the general government. The history of our country since colonial days, a period of a century and a half, renders a steady series of verdicts against the probability of success of any combination of national and state forces where the latter remain during peace under the actual command and control of the several governors, who appoint the officers and direct, as provided by the Constitution, the training according to the discipline provided by Congress.*

As a matter of actual practice there is embarrassment in joint maneuvers and operations between

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the regular army and organized militia for the reason that officers and men of the organized militia conform to the instructions prepared and issued by the regular army commanders only as a matter of courtesy. Even where the government has gone to great expense in preparing camp sites for them at maneuvers, organizations of state troops have at times felt entirely authorized to come or stay away in their discretion. The fact is the officers of the regular army and organized militia have gone on making the best possible out of a really impossible military situation.

During the War of 1812 three members of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rendered an opinion that while the militia may, under the language of the Constitution, be employed to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and to repel invasions, *the governors of the several states have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies exist so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States and if, in the opinion of the governors, the conditions do not require obedience to the call, they are not required to obey it.* It is a matter of regrettable history that the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut exercised their discretion at that time, and refused to furnish militia on the call of the President.

This was a hundred years ago, but the memory of it caused the insertion in the statutes of 1903, which provided for reorganizing the militia, of a provision which authorized the President to call out any por-

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tion of the militia by direct orders to the several commanding officers. No sooner was this law enacted, however, than attempts were begun for its repeal, and at the first favorable opportunity the law was changed and provision made that the call for the militia by the President must be made to the governors. The inherent defects of any military system which depends upon state executive action in forty-eight sovereign states, some of them an empire in extent, should be apparent to the merest novice in military administration.

A great part of the existing organizations of state forces had settled these questions in their own minds and had no doubt that they had already volunteered by entering the organized militia with a declaration of intent to serve without regard to state or national boundaries. The individual may not be the arbiter of his own fate in this matter, and it is now certain that the most ingeniously contrived statute to overcome the obstacle may be declared unconstitutional at a moment inconvenient to the individual and perilous to the nation. If, therefore, the methods of transition from state forces into the national army, when war is imminent or declared, are to be always matters of argument and doubt, the country is leaning upon a broken reed and a more stable form of support to the regulars should be devised. Any system which fails to utilize the enthusiastic and patriotic young men who have been preparing themselves in existing state organizations for the duties of active service will be seriously defective.

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It is not necessary to hark back to Washington and Hamilton for their views on the utilization of colonial and state troops called out for federal service, but they wrote much on the subject and were insistent in their efforts to evolve a more stable military system out of the widely scattered communities of their day. The question then was and now is, whether or not the efforts to nationalize the state militia should be abandoned and a more stable and unobjectionable system of providing for the military needs of the nation be adopted.

The amounts appropriated by the local legislatures for maintenance of their militia organizations vary greatly in the several states. The amount appropriated by Congress for distribution to the states of arms, equipments, supplies and funds, for their organized militia remained for three-quarters of a century at a fixed annual sum of \$200,000. This amount which was originally fixed in the Act of April 23, 1808, usually referred to as section 1661, Revised Statutes, was increased February 12, 1887, to \$400,000, on June 6, 1900, to \$1,000,000, and on June 22, 1906, was further increased to \$2,000,000 annually. In addition to this continuing annual appropriation, there is another of equal amount, \$2,000,000, annually, under a different act of Congress usually referred to as section 13 of the militia law. Since the passage of the Act of January 21, 1903, for reorganizing the militia, appropriations have steadily increased and cover a much wider range of subjects than in prior years, as shown in the following analysis of the several acts of Congress:

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APPROPRIATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, 1903-1911

Fiscal year ending	Statute or Act of Congress	Title of Appropriation	Amount	Purpose
June 30, 1903	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 6, 1900.	Arming and equipping the militia.	\$1,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1903	Act of March 2, 1903.	Arms, uniforms, and equipments, organized militia.	2,000,000	To provide one complete set of equipments for each regiment, battalion, squadron, company, and troop of militia.
June 30, 1904	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 6, 1900.	Arming and equipping the militia.	1,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1905	Act of April 23, 1904.	Field artillery material for the organized militia.	585,000	To procure field artillery material for the organized militia of the several states, territories, and the District of Columbia.
June 30, 1905	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 6, 1900.	Arming and equipping the militia.	1,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1906	Act of March 2, 1905.	Field artillery material for the organized militia.	516,000	To procure by purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc., as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip all of the organized militia.
June 30, 1906	Sec. 1661, R. S., etc. Act of June 22, 1906.	Arming and equipping the militia.	2,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.

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APPROPRIATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, 1903-1911

Fiscal year ending	Statute or Act of Congress	Title of Appropriation	Amount	Purpose
June 30, 1907	Act of June 12, 1906.	Encampment and maneuvers, organized militia.	700,000	For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army.
June 30, 1907	Act of June 12, 1906.	Field artillery material for the organized militia.	550,000	To procure by purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc., as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip all of the organized militia.
June 30, 1907	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended by Act of June 22, 1906.	Arming and equipping the militia.	2,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1908	Act of March 2, 1907.	Field artillery material for the organized militia.	564,377.90	To procure by purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc., as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip all of the organized militia.
June 30, 1908	Act of March 2, 1907.	Encampment and maneuvers, organized militia.	1,000,000	For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army.

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June 30, 1908	Act of March 2, 1907.	Subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.	10,000	For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.
June 30, 1909	Act of May 11, 1908.	Encampment and maneuvers, organized militia.	1,000,000	For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, etc.
June 30, 1909	Act of May 11, 1908.	Field artillery material for the organized militia.	550,000	To procure by purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc.
June 30, 1909	Act of May 11, 1908.	Coast artillery equipment.	25,000	Equipment of coast artillery armories, organized militia, to provide fire-control equipment, dummy guns and mortars, mounts for dummy guns, dummy ammunition, and other appliances and devices for instructional purposes in armory buildings of the coast artillery companies of the organized militia.
June 30, 1909	Act of May 11, 1908.	Subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.	10,000	For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.

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APPROPRIATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, 1903-1911

Fiscal year ending	Statute or Act of Congress	Title of Appropriation	Amount	Purpose
June 30, 1909	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 22, 1906.	Arming and equipping the militia.	2,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1909	Act of May 27, 1908.	Arms, uniforms, equipment, etc., organized militia.	2,000,000*	To procure by purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc., as are necessary to arm, uniform, and equip all of the organized militia. *NOTE—Not to exceed this amount in any fiscal year.
June 30, 1909	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 22, 1906.	Arming and equipping the militia.	2,000,000	To provide arms, and uniforms and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1909	Act of March 3, 1909.	Arms, uniforms, equipment, etc., organized militia.	2,000,000	To procure by purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc.
June 30, 1910	Act of March 3, 1909.	Subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.	17,000	For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.

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June 30, 1910	Act of March 3, 1909.	Encampment and maneuvers, organized militia.	425,000	For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army.
June 30, 1910	Act of March 3, 1909.	Equipment of coast artillery armories.	25,000	Equipment of coast artillery armories, organized militia, to provide fire-control equipment, etc.
June 30, 1910	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 22, 1906.	Arming and equipping the militia.	2,000,000	To provide arms, uniforms, and equipments for the organized militia.
June 30, 1910	Act of May 27, 1908.	Arms, uniforms, equipment, etc., organized militia.	2,000,000	To provide for the purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc.
June 30, 1911	Act of March 2, 1910.	Subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters, etc.	20,000	For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.
June 30, 1912	Act of March 23, 1910.	Encampment and maneuvers, organized militia, 1910-1912.	1,350,000	For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army.
June 30, 1911	Act of March 23, 1910.	Equipment of coast artillery armories.	25,000	Equipment of coast artillery armories, organized militia, etc.
June 30, 1911	Sec. 1661, R. S., amended June 22, 1906.	Arming and equipping the militia.	2,000,000	To provide arms, uniforms, and equipments for the organized militia.

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APPROPRIATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, 1903-1911

Fiscal year ending	Statute or Act of Congress	Title of Appropriation	Amount	Purpose
June 30, 1911	Act of May 27, 1908.	Arms, uniforms, equipment, etc., organized militia.	2,000,000	To provide for the purchase or manufacture and issue to the organized militia, such arms, etc.
June 30, 1912	Act of March 3, 1911.	Equipment of coast artillery armories.	338,170	Equipment of coast artillery armories, organized militia, etc.
June 30, 1912	Act of March 3, 1911.	Subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers, etc.	20,000	For subsistence, mileage and commutation of quarters for militia officers attending service and garrison schools.
June 30, 1913	Act of March 3, 1911.	Equipment and maneuvers, organized militia, 1911-1913.	350,000	For paying the expenses of the organized militia, which may be authorized by the Secretary of War, to participate in joint encampments with troops of the regular army.
June 30, 1912	Act of March 3, 1911.	Field artillery material for the organized militia.	770,000	For the purpose of procuring field artillery material for the organized militia, etc.
June 30, 1912	Act of March 3, 1911.	Exchanging or issuing new pistols.	300,000	To provide for equipping all of the organized militia with standard pistols, holsters, and pistol cartridge boxes and ammunition therefor.

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The District of Columbia has a separate annual appropriation which averages about \$80,000. It is also authorized by the Act of March 1, 1899, *to draw any amount of supplies from the regular army appropriations on requisitions* approved by the Secretary of War.

There are other expenses of a minor character, connected with rifle competitions, paid by the government, which is also called upon to furnish regular troops for guards, markers, range officers and other duties in connection with rifle competitions, whose transportation and other expenses are charged to the appropriations for the regular army. The appropriations made by Congress are allotted to the several states in proportion to the strength of the organized militia in each. The states are expected to devote the funds to the purchase of the necessary articles properly to equip the organizations and maintain them in readiness for active field service. The articles procured from the appropriations by Congress include batteries of field artillery, small arms, equipments, tentage, wagon trains, clothing and everything required or presumed to be required by an army.

The total strength of the organized militia according to the returns of 1913, was 9,130 officers and 111,672 men. When the number of men enlisted in the organized militia of the states is considered, it may be concluded that service in the active militia is neither popular nor deemed an exhibition of patriotism by American men as a body. Many men join the organized militia in good faith, who under

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any law of averages will not be available for active field service in an emergency. The actual number now reported in service seems to represent the maximum possible to put in the field and for whom arms, clothing and equipage must be maintained in readiness. It may be safely inferred that no material increase in numbers is to be expected under existing conditions.

The general government has been dealing with the organized militia with increasing liberality, in recent years, but the strength as a whole has not materially changed since the adoption of the new legislation which purported to make of the state forces a stable and dependable part of the first line for war.

The tabulated returns for December 31, 1911, show the reported strength of the organized militia to be:

	Officers	Enlisted men
Cavalry	262	3,919
Field Artillery	276	4,797
Coast Artillery Corps	476	7,240
Infantry	6,315	91,789
Corps of Engineers	131	1,112
Signal Corps	96	1,368
Medical Department	823	2,515
Ordnance Department	167	66
Quartermaster's Department	127	92
Subsistence Department	78	42
Adjutant General's Department	131
Inspector General's Department	90
Inspectors of Small Arms Practice.....	122
Judge Advocate General's Department.....	85
Pay Department	68
General officers of the line.....	42
Aides (extra officers)	16
Chaplains	132
Totals.....	9,437	112,940

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In 1912 there were 9,142 officers and 112,710 men, and in 1913, 9,130 officers and 111,672 men, a decrease of twelve officers and 1,038 men. The reported strength of the organized militia of the several states, Territory of Hawaii and the District of Columbia for 1913, with the number of males, as reported by the Adjutants General of States, available for military duty, and the number of militia age, eighteen to forty-four years, inclusive, according to the census of 1910, are as follows:

State, Territory or District	Strength of Organized Militia, 1913		Number of males available for military duty as reported by the Adjutants General	Number of males of militia age, per Federal census 1910
	Officers	Enlisted Men		
Alabama	178	2,391	352,678	401,145
Arizona	45	477	40,538	58,962
Arkansas	111	1,248	351,492	311,792
California	252	3,360	357,434	665,522
Colorado	137	1,309	133,450	203,982
Connecticut	184	2,457	149,552	257,996
Delaware	41	441	32,469	44,634
District of Columbia	139	1,507	80,199	78,349
Florida	93	1,127	187,945	171,688
Georgia	223	2,675	572,946	497,095
Hawaii	39	426	13,475	64,663
Idaho	50	790	33,760	86,384
Illinois	506	5,408	1,037,455	1,330,556
Indiana	179	2,297	647,449	580,557
Iowa	213	2,768	306,669	475,829
Kansas	130	1,694	376,735	370,227
Kentucky	170	1,843	342,162	457,493
Louisiana	60	1,082	486,070	338,343
Maine	109	1,339	104,841	151,325
Maryland	173	1,799	204,024	271,373
Massachusetts	452	5,341	576,303	760,324
Michigan	199	2,551	521,667	616,729

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State, Territory or District	Strength of Organized Militia, 1913		Number of males available for military duty as reported by the Adjutants General	Number of males of militia age, per Federal census, 1910
	Officers	Enlisted Men		
Minnesota	218	2,724	227,824	491,113
Mississippi	116	1,327	401,460	345,745
Missouri	256	3,320	663,503	721,166
Montana	53	557	45,848	123,232
Nebraska	134	1,038	131,100	267,497
Nevada	none	none	12,012	29,383
New Hampshire....	94	1,164	41,248	90,357
New Jersey	330	4,052	609,610	597,513
New Mexico	49	599	55,623	73,097
New York	1,056	14,901	1,616,528	2,156,361
North Carolina....	251	2,317	352,658	392,192
North Dakota....	52	577	60,696	145,628
Ohio	529	5,611	929,646	1,076,928
Oklahoma	56	896	226,043	357,933
Oregon	109	1,358	136,472	190,553
Pennsylvania	768	9,766	1,134,153	1,788,619
Rhode Island.....	106	1,252	101,361	125,213
South Carolina....	154	1,755	217,393	276,788
South Dakota.....	71	608	90,702	140,635
Tennessee	127	1,707	341,883	423,088
Texas	174	2,387	502,777	804,980
Utah	31	323	45,464	84,449
Vermont	72	773	50,858	73,685
Virginia	207	2,492	277,650	398,728
Washington	91	1,147	236,212	340,872
West Virginia....	100	1,283	186,451	275,048
Wisconsin	195	2,768	497,922	497,922
Wyoming	48	640	27,947	54,654
Total.....	9,142	112,710	16,127,357	20,538,347

Numerous estimates have been made as to the probable number of men who would turn out with their state organizations on the call of the President, and expert opinions agree that between sixty and seventy-five per cent. of the total strength on

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the rolls could be relied upon for immediate compliance.

In the national guard all sorts of arguments and schemes seem necessary to secure even the minimum numbers in many organizations required to participate in camps of instruction and maneuvers. To illustrate this phase of the matter, at a recent encampment of the national guard, sixteen and one-third per cent. of a regiment numbering 422 men had not been in service a sufficient time to qualify for attendance at a camp of instruction and they could only become entitled to pay by crediting them with alleged military instruction at a school. The actual conditions are disclosed by an analysis of the pay rolls of the regiment, from which it appears that the largest number of men in any company was forty-five; the smallest twenty-six. The company having forty-five present reported fourteen, recently joined, as having had "school instruction." In a company of thirty-seven men, fifteen were reported as having "school instruction," which entitled them to pay while in camp. The rolls of another regiment numbering 377 men showed similar conditions with sixteen and one-half per cent. qualified for pay by "school instruction." These facts are not stated in unkindly criticism but such conditions must be considered in all schemes for national defense, based upon the organized militia. The conditions are not surprising; on the contrary, with the little encouragement given in any American community to those struggling to maintain efficient militia organizations

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the wonder is that they manage to accomplish what they do from year to year.

It is not to be expected that a movement, such as that undertaken when the change of form of the militia enlistment to one containing an agreement to serve upon call of the President without regard to border lines, could be fully developed in a brief period. That the recent laws have failed to meet the expectations of the national guard, and of the War Department which gave earnest support to the legislation containing the modifications of the old militia laws, is made evident by the proposition to have Congress appropriate for the payment of the state forces for attendance at all drills, camps of instruction and maneuvers. It seems to be generally accepted now that no further improvement in existing conditions in the organized militia may be expected until the necessary legislation for pay is obtained from Congress. On the other hand, there is a disposition not to increase expenditures for any forces which are not available for duty beyond our borders, which is the character of service most frequent in the army since the outbreak of the war with Spain, and this view is undoubtedly the most sound by reason of the accumulated evidence in its favor.

When it is considered that the population of the country is nearing the hundred million mark, the total strength of the organized militia is not sufficient to justify the continuance of existing statutes which prevents any organization of volunteers being considered until after war has been declared and

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the organized militia has been called into service. This status of legislation has resulted from the active efforts of the association of officers representing the interests of the national guard, who have held the opinion that the organization of volunteer regiments, for national purposes, would, in time of peace, react unfavorably upon the organized militia.

The serious trouble with the whole situation is that all our efforts since the war with Spain have been directed along wrong lines, doubtless influenced by the high degree of efficiency which obtains in a few regiments of the national guard. It will require great moral courage to admit this error but the sooner it is done the better off the nation will be so far as real preparation for war is concerned. Let it be recognized then that the state forces, whether designated national guard or organized militia, are definitely restricted to the duties for which, and for which only, they are available under the terms of the Constitution and as set forth in the recent decision of the Attorney General of the United States.

Various methods have been devised for overcoming the obstacle raised by the decision of the attorney general, that the Constitution forbids the use of militia for any purpose not stated therein because of its careful definition of the occasions upon which the state forces may be called forth. One method which seems to have found most favor is embraced in a proposition to draft the militia organizations into the army whenever war is imminent or declared. Congress has wide discretion in its constitutional au-

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thority to raise and support armies and *may properly declare that all men between twenty-one and forty-five years of age, or all men between five feet and six feet in height, or with any other defined qualifications, may be drafted into the service, except that plenary powers may cease when they conflict with the Constitution wherein the use of the militia is formally limited as set forth by the attorney general.*

There has been some disposition to claim that the national guard is not the militia contemplated in the Constitution, but if it is not, then it must be declared to fall under the ban of the provision which forbids any state to keep troops or ships of war without the consent of Congress.

It is humiliating to think of so much effort having resulted in such complications. There are occasions when it is wiser and, in the end, more profitable, to admit defeat and begin anew upon a more stable foundation. Makeshifts in law will be unsatisfactory because of their liability to be overturned upon the first appeal. The nation needs a dependable war army and the time seems propitious to begin its upbuilding by adopting a system against which there can be no legal assault.

The strength required to meet any probable emergency having been agreed upon, the force should then be apportioned in the several arms, between the regular army, and federal volunteers, the officers of volunteers being appointed by the President, in whom authority should be vested to provide for their training in peace and calling forth for war.

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Such a body of federal volunteers would not be subject to call from a governor of a state directly, but will be available under the orders of the President, in conjunction with the regular army, when disorder in any state has become too great for suppression by the local authorities. The effect of this movement upon the states would be to encourage the employment of constabulary and to restore the organized militia to its true functions and to avoid the apparent necessity for adopting resourceful expedients for evading the language and spirit of the Constitution. This method of procedure may shock the pride of some of the old national guard organizations, but it is a safe and reasonable prediction that within a few years the federal volunteers would become a body of dependable soldiers whose numbers would bear a more definite relation to the nation's needs for war purposes than will ever be possible with state militia. It may as well be recognized that the doubts which have adhered in the minds of many public men, as to the course we have been following at considerable cost, have now been justified by the opinion of the cabinet officer whose sworn duty it is to advise correctly the administration as to interpretation of the statutes. The suggestion of wisdom is to rebuild from a new foundation in accordance with law.

In his Farewell Address, Washington wrote:

“The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government. But the constitution which at any time

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exists, until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. . . . Toward the preservation of your government and the permanence of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular opposition to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretext. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system; and thus to undermine what can not be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other institutions—that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable.”

With the official decision and the views of Washington before us it would seem that the only course which should receive consideration for a moment, is that which conforms absolutely to the highest law of our land. Not so, however, for the first step sug-

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gested contemplates an evasion of the Constitution so as not to disturb the organized militia in a status brought about by much careful planning and nursing. That status involves two features, one relating to appropriations by the general government for support of state organizations, and the other to questions of rank and command. As to the first, it is merely a question for Congress to determine as to how far it is desirable to go in maintaining state forces for national purposes, bearing in mind the limitations upon their employment. The second is a far more serious question.

In all but two states of the Union militia officers below the rank of major are elected by the men, and the field officers by the company officers. It is needless to point out that the appointment and promotion of officers in such manner is wrong in principle and tends to pernicious results so far as the discipline and efficiency of the troops are concerned. Volunteer troops with experienced officers in command have proved their greater efficiency by the promptness with which they have acquired instruction and a high state of discipline. While all American soldiers enter the ranks voluntarily the word volunteers is used to designate a body of troops neither regulars nor militia, and enlisted ordinarily for a specified period or for the war, and the statute law recognizes the distinction between the three classes.

The statutes provide that:

“The organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the Army of the

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United States and of the Militia of the several states when called into the service of the United States: Provided, That in time of war the Army shall consist of two branches which shall be designated, respectively, as the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United States.

“That the Regular Army is the permanent military establishment, which is maintained both in peace and war according to law. That the Volunteer Army shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent. . . .”

Through a series of acts of legislatures many states have adopted tactical divisions as their unit of organization for the appointment of officers, but not a single state has succeeded in fulfilling the obligation of supporting all the parts necessary to complete a division for war purposes, although the major generals, the brigadier generals and all the staff officers are quite invariably appointed. If this merely related to parades and reviews, the matter would be of no consequence to the nation at large, but this is far from being the case. As long as the tactical divisions are organized under state laws, and are solely under the control of the governors, it is not practicable to assign experienced regular officers to command them. It is impossible to acquire, by experience in the organized militia, the knowledge of active service and of the real business of war which should be possessed by officers entrusted with the direction of large commands in campaign and no person should be entrusted with the

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leadership of American armies who has not prepared himself and been recognized as having the necessary professional equipment. Any other course is unfair to the men in the ranks and a source of weakness in the execution of great plans where professional knowledge is of more importance than enthusiasm and patriotic desire to accomplish something.

From the point of view of the nation at large a very undesirable condition has been brought about, mainly through the instrumentality of an active body of national guard officers in their earnest efforts to place the state forces upon a satisfactory basis. As recently enacted laws now stand, no volunteers are presumed to be called out until all the organized militia has been accepted in the service, and this carries along all the high ranking officers, who therefore become senior to all regular officers of corresponding grades who may be subsequently authorized by Congress to command volunteers. In other words, the trained and proved officers, educated through a long period of years of active military service under the general government, must needs be employed under generals appointed by governors of states in time of peace and for reasons which perhaps would not have been effective had the governors recognized that the peace appointments would carry actual command in war. Such a system is devoid of right reason and common sense and this was so recognized when war with Spain was declared and Congress refused to authorize the accept-

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ance of any organizations of the national guard above that of a regiment which might volunteer for the war. No one would ever think of suggesting the appointment of a naval militia officer to be an admiral of the fleet, but a great many Americans feel certain that they can fill the position of general officer with distinction, although the military profession demands more technical preparation than ever before.

An infinite variety of reasons could be elaborated to show the need of correction of the system under which we are now drifting to certain disappointment.

THE END



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