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A HISTORY
OF SOUTH AFRICA

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A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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*WITH 12 MAPS
2 OF WHICH ARE COLOURED*

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WALKER

PREFACE

EUROPEANS have dwelt on the East Coast of Africa south of the Zambesi for more than four hundred years. During the past two centuries and three quarters they have steadily penetrated the continent from the south-west. If the inception of the Portuguese settlements be taken as the starting-point, European South Africa has a history as long as that of the Americas ; if time be reckoned from the more fruitful Dutch occupation of Table Bay, it has a story almost as long as that of Canada. That story is simple enough for nearly two hundred years after the foundation of Capetown ; but, thereafter, with the migration of the frontier farmers into the interior and their fitful pursuit by the British authorities, it becomes politically more complex than that of any other Dominion and, allowing for the difference in scale, socially more complex than that of the United States.

Until recent times Southern Africa has been a little world to itself, within a ring-fence marked out by Ocean and the vast bulk of Darkest Africa. It has experimented with almost every conceivable type of polity : chartered companies of the old type and the new ; crown colonies and self-governing colonies with typically British flexible constitutions ; independent and semi-independent republics with constitutions more or less rigid ; tribal monarchies, Bantu and half-breed states, and, latterly, protectorates ; the whole, or nearly the whole, ultimately merging in a post-war Dominion with a foreign mandated territory attached.

The social foundations are even more diversified than the political superstructure. On the East Coast are Portuguese, on the West, Germans ; in the central mass of the territory are Afrikanders, descendants in the main of Dutch, French, and West German ancestors, men of various British stocks, and a strong contingent of Jews from Eastern Europe. Indians are numerous in the south-eastern parts ; in the south-west corner, Moslems point with pride to traces of Malay blood ; a few pastoralist Hottentots survive in outlying parts ; a few, a very few, Bushman hunters still lurk in the shadows. In the south-west again are the Cape Coloured Folk, the progeny of Europeans,

PREFACE

Asiatics, and Africans ; in the east, centre, and north, outnumbering all other groups combined, are sturdy Bantu tribesmen. South African humanity ranges from Stone Age man to the twentieth-century trust magnate.

In essaying to tell the tangled story of Southern Africa, I have broken away from traditional methods in two respects. First, I have made no attempt to give an account of each of the component parts of the South African state system as a thing by itself. I have rather tried to tell the story of South Africa, even when South Africa was still in fragments, to trace the interplay of the parts which was always more significant than the doings of any one of them. Secondly, I have made neither the development of self-government and Union, nor the struggle between the British and Afrikaners the main theme. These things naturally loom large ; at times they fill the stage, but they do so at the cost of pushing the principals into the wings. Those principals are Western civilisation, tribal Africa and, to a less degree, theocratic Asia. I have worked with these factors constantly in my mind and, as far as possible, have given them their legitimate place.

For that reason I have ventured to carry the story on to 1924. Six years ago, when I began the book, the obvious term of my labours would have been the consummation of Union in 1910. The revolutionary outbreak on the Witwatersrand in 1922 made such an ending inadequate. That rising was, at bottom, the result of an economic clash between European and non-European. It marked a violent stage in the awakening of European South Africans to the fact that their economic and social problems were only other aspects of the Native problem. That awakening is the chief fact in South African history since Union. By 1924 the swing over of the centre of political gravity from the constitutional to the economic sphere was complete. The Union passed under the rule of a ministry of Nationalists, supported by the more conservative of the rural Afrikaners, and of predominantly British Labour, representing the most radical of the urban population. The strongest bond of union in this coalition ministry was a determination to safeguard 'white South Africa.' The pursuit of that end is a matter of current politics and, therefore, out of place in what is first and foremost a political history.

Of course, in a sense, all South African history is current politics, for the past has been stormy and memories are long. Hence, I have written with the utmost restraint, of set purpose abstaining from pointing morals and adorning tales, especially in

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dealing with the history of the last forty years. This I have done at the sacrifice of colour which, under other circumstances, might well have been applied. For that period above all, I have been content to follow Bacon's advice and, within the compass of my knowledge and understanding, 'to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment.'

In the course of my work, I have been helped by many friends, by far more than I can name in a short preface. But there are some to whom I owe especial debts. Professor Leo Fouche of the Transvaal University College was to have written the first five chapters. Unhappily he was prevented from so doing, but he has revised those chapters in the light of his wide knowledge of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history. Professor R. Coupland of Oxford, Professor W. M. Macmillan of the University of the Witwatersrand, and Mr. A. C. G. Lloyd, librarian of the South African Public Library at Capetown, have read the proofs either in whole or in part; Mr. J. G. Gubbins of Ottoshoop, Transvaal, has shown me numerous documents dealing with frontier affairs during the eighteen-thirties and forties; Sir Drummond Chaplin has allowed me to use unpublished material in letter-books which he kept while he was Transvaal correspondent to *The Times* during 1897-8; the executors of the late Mr. J. G. R. Lewis, sometime Director of Education in South-West Africa, have put at my disposal the completed portions of his projected history of that territory; Mr. J. Agar Hamilton of the Transvaal University College has sent me copies of many documents in the Pretoria Archives; the staffs of the Parliamentary and Public Libraries and of the Archives at Capetown have borne with my importunities patiently. Finally, I have gained information on various points from the unpublished theses of post-graduate students of this and other Universities. I acknowledge this help in greater detail in the Select Bibliography at the end of the book.

ERIC A. WALKER.

University of Capetown,
August, 1927.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE FOOTNOTES

- Bas. Rec. = *Basutoland Records*, compiled by G. M. Theal.
Bird = *The Annals of Natal*, compiled by J. Bird.
Eybers = *Select Constitutional Documents . . . 1795-1910*, compiled by G. W. Eybers.
Misc. Bas. Rec. = *Miscellaneous Basutoland Records* (Cape Archives).
Nat. Not. = *Voortrekker Wetgewing. Die Notule van die Natalse Volksraad, 1839-45*, edited by G. S. Preller.
Rec. C.C. = *Records of the Cape Colony*, compiled by G. M. Theal.
Rec. S.E.A. = *The Records of South-Eastern Africa*, compiled by G. M. Theal.
Theal, Ia, etc. = *History and Ethnography of Africa South of the Zambesi before 1795*, vol. I., etc., by G. M. Theal.
Theal, Ib, etc. = *History of South Africa since 1795*, vol. I., etc., by G. M. Theal.
V.R. Soc. I. = Publications of the Van Riebeeck Society, vol. I.
A. 6-96 (Cape) = Document published by order of the Cape House of Assembly, No. 6 of 1896.
G. 2-84 (Cape) = Document published by order of the Cape Government, No. 2 of 1884.
S.C. 9-89 (Cape) = Report of Select Committee, No. 9 of 1889.
U.G. 4-16 = Document published by order of the Union Government, No. 4 of 1916.

A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA

CHAPTER I

THE DISCOVERY

Pharaoh Necho—Hanno—Great Zimbabwe—‘Arabs’ on the East Coast—Portuguese on the road *ad Indos*—The Portuguese Empire in the Indies and East Africa.

MEN hailed Bartholomew Diaz as a pioneer when he rounded the Cape of Storms; a later generation stood amazed when a ship passed down de Lesseps’ Suez Canal; but long ago the disillusioned Preacher had asked whether there was anything whereof it might be said ‘See, this is new,’ and old Herodotus, the remembrancer of former things, had recorded that both these things at least were ‘already of old time, which was before us.’

Six hundred years and more before the birth of Christ, Pharaoh Necho tried to re-open the Nile-Red Sea canal, ‘the channel leading to the Erythrean Sea,’ first cut by Seti seven hundred years earlier, the channel whose length was ‘a voyage of four days, and in breadth it was so dug that two triremes could go side by side driven by oars . . . and in the reign of Necos there perished while digging it twelve myriads of the Egyptians.’ So said the Egyptian priests, adding that ‘Necos ceased in the midst of his digging, because the utterance of an oracle impeded him.’

A less pious age may well suspect that the death of myriads weighed more with the divine and imperial engineer than did the oracle, but, in any case, Necho left the task to be completed almost in Herodotus’s own day by Darius the Persian. Nevertheless, as South African history bears witness, where the direct road is blocked, there is usually a way round. And so it was on this, the earliest occasion on which the curtain half rises on that history. Necho was determined to put his Mediterranean fleet of Greek warships in touch with the Red Sea squadron. Accordingly, he sent ‘Phœnicians with ships, bidding them sail *Circa* and come back through the Pillars of Hercules to the Northern *610 B.C.* Sea and so to Egypt. The Phœnicians therefore set forth from the Erythrean Sea and sailed through the Southern Sea. . . . In the third year they turned through the Pillars of Hercules and arrived again in Egypt. And they reported a thing which

I cannot believe, but another man may, namely, that in sailing round Libya they had the sun on their right hand.'¹ So Herodotus, who was as near in time to Necho as we are to George Washington, doubted where he should have believed. The Phœnicians' story rings true. If light coir-sewn Arab barks could, in after years, venture as far south as Cape Corrientes, substantial biremes might well have braved the Agulhas swell; the voyagers tell us that they landed each year to grow corn for the next stage of their journey, just as the wrecked crew of the *Haarlem*, Indiaman, did in Table Bay in 1647; above all, they say they saw the sun to the north at midday on their right hand as they coasted westward round the Cape of Good Hope. No Phœnician sailor, 'splendaciously mendacious,' ever invented a yarn like that in the seventh century B.C.

Mendacious or not, Necho's Phœnicians were the last civilised men who claimed to have rounded the southern horn of Africa for a good two thousand years. News even of the coasts that trail away on either hand is meagre. Eighty years after the return of Pharaoh's argosy, Hanno the Carthaginian sailed with a large squadron down the West Coast to strengthen the Punic factories which the Berbers were in the habit of destroying when they could, quite in the fashion of Abd-el-Krim. He pushed on beyond Kerne, the last station on the Rio d'Ouro, had a scuffle with 'wild men wearing the skins of beasts' on the Senegal, rounded Cape Verde and reached Sierra Leone. There he turned back, taking with him one or two of the inhabitants, 'wild men and women covered with hair.' But space on a trireme was limited and these luckless chimpanzees never saw Carthage; for their fellow-voyagers slew them and merely kept their skins to hang in the temple of Juno. So Hanno blazed the trail for Henry the Navigator's captains. No civilised man, as far as we know, made the voyage again till A.D. 1446.

Our knowledge of men's doings on the East Coast is more substantial and continuous. That is as it should be, for not only does the valley of the Nile, which is Egypt, link tropical Africa to the Mediterranean world, but the East Coast itself looks out upon Arabia Felix and India, homes of ancient and seafaring civilisations. And it is probable that the key to the first and chiefest riddle in the history of Southern Africa must be sought in either Arabia or India.

The riddle itself lies in Southern Rhodesia. In the gold-bearing lands on either side of the Sabi and Limpopo rivers stand

¹ Herodotus, II. 158; IV. 42.

masses of ruins, all of dry-stone. Much of the work is crude, but some of it is of a very high order. There is one great group at Khami near Bulawayo; there are remains of irrigation works in many parts, terraced hill-sides at Mount Fura and in the Inyanga district towards the Zambesi, and lines of blockhouses running from the port of Sofala to the greatest and most famous pile of all, the temple-fortress of Great Zimbabwe. The temple at Zimbabwe, 'the houses of stone . . . with the wall twenty-five spans thick,' is the centre of a group of ruins covering nearly four square miles.¹ It is also the centre of the problem. If we can discover who built it, the problem of the Rhodesian ruins is solved.²

The Zimbabwe temple is a huge elliptical building. A passageway, presumably for processions, passes between an outer and an inner wall of stone blocks through three gateways to the principal altar near the centre; another altar platform stands near a conical tower on the east side, and close by rises a great baobab tree. Once upon a time soapstone birds, perched upon shafts, stood upon the outer wall facing east; the eastern wall is adorned with a row of chevron pattern; the floors are of a kind of stone and cement; there are no inscriptions. Débris tell of a long-continued occupation; ashes, moulds and gold itself tell of gold-smelting; but there are no signs of mining in the immediate neighbourhood of Zimbabwe. The fruitful land around was obviously used for agriculture to support the men who held the temple-fortress on the boulder-strewn hill-top. But elsewhere, from the Zambesi to the south of the Limpopo, there are signs of gold-mining in plenty; quartz-mining with regular pits and galleries which were only abandoned when the water rose upon the miners. From first to last—and Bantu sought gold in their own fashion in these parts as late as the first quarter of the nineteenth century—fully £75,000,000 worth of gold has been taken from these pits. But no man can as yet say who first worked the mines and set up the oldest buildings.

Throughout this vast territory, the buildings are of different dates and probably the work of different peoples.³ This is the case at Zimbabwe itself. The main mass is well built, but the western wall was rebuilt later and much more rudely on a foundation of ash, slag and earth left by gold-smelters; later still, Bantu

¹ Rec. S.E.A., VI. 267; Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*, p. xv.

² Vide J. T. Bent, *Ruined Cities of Mashonaland*; A. Wilmot, *Monomotapa*; A. H. Keane, *The Gold of Ophir*; R. N. Hall and G. W. Neal, *The Ancient Ruins of Rhodesia*; R. N. Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*; D. Randall-Maciver, *Medieval Rhodesia*; J. F. Van Oordt, *Who were the Builders of Great Zimbabwe?* R. N. Hall, *Pre-historic Rhodesia*; S. S. Dornan and J. F. Schofield, *S.A. Journal of Science*, 1915; 1926.

³ Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*, pp. xxvi, xxxvi.

Makalanga occupied the ruins and roughly repaired the breaches. For the rest, the archæologists quarrel and date the original building from the tenth century B.C. to the fifteenth century A.D.

There are those who say that Zimbabwe is the work of mediæval Bantu, others of ancient Sabæans, others again of Dravidian Indians. Maciver, the chief upholder of the Bantu theory, points to the undoubted facts that the Makalanga occupied the Zimbabwe ruins, repaired them and mined in a fashion; that the Mashona, close kinsmen of the Makalanga, at least used them as cattle kraals; that the Barotse also occupied the buildings, and that both Barotse and Makalanga are famous among Bantu for their stone-work. But the weight of authority, as far as numbers go, is against the Bantu theory. No tribesmen, it is alleged, ever built anything like Great Zimbabwe *post memoriam hominum*; the oldest buildings are the finest, and, so far from there being any signs of a development similar to that which raised Egyptian stone-architecture from the lining of cist-tombs to the erection of the Pyramids in a short century and a half, all the signs tell of a decline and 'Kaffirisation.' The walls, the floor, the débris bear the same witness; the lowest floors are of stone and cement from three to five feet below the Bantu floor of clay; the finest gold relics are there;¹ the roughest, barbaric remains are in the upper strata and always side by side with Bantu iron and copper ware. Besides, what Bantu tribe ever set up soapstone birds, or carved a soapstone bowl with the signs of the Zodiac upon it?

Tradition, on the whole, runs against the Bantu theory. The sixteenth-century Portuguese believed that the mines, which they diligently sought, and the ruins, the chief of which they never saw, were 'the Ophir where the Queen of Sheba had her riches, when she went to Jerusalem,' for, after all, there were, according to old Moorish and native tradition, 'certain ancient ruins said to have been the factory of the Queen of Sheba or of Solomon,' and 'the mountain called Fura,' Afura or Aufur sounds very like Ophir.² Learned philologists in modern times have built wilder theories on less substantial foundations; besides, anything might be believed of a land where gold was said to be found not only in stones but growing up inside the bark of trees. Good Father Dos Santos was on surer ground when he observed that, if cargoes could go from Sofala to India in his own day, there was no reason why they should not have gone thence to the Red Sea in the days of Solomon; in any case, the idea that Rhodesia was the home of 'King Solomon's mines' long held the field, and even

¹ Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*, p. xx; Hall, *Pre-historic Rhodesia*, p. 350.

² Rec. S.E.A., I. 22; VII. 275 ff.

so cautious an authority as Sir Harry Johnston suggests that the Phœnicians, kinsmen of Necho's mariners, possibly had stations on the coast as far south as Mozambique.¹

Sir Harry, however, joins the majority who believe with Hall that the mines and most ancient buildings are the work, directly or indirectly, of Sabæans from Yemen, Arabia Felix. A fuller knowledge of the ancient history of Arabia, and a more detailed examination of the Rhodesian remains, may bring greater certainty, but, according to Keane, one of Hall's staunchest supporters, 'the whole land of Havilah where there is gold' was Southern Rhodesia; Tarshish was Sofala, the port from which 'once in three years came the navy of Tarshish bringing gold and silver, ivory and apes and peacocks' to Ophir, and Ophir was the depot in Yemen or Sabæa whence came Sheba's queen along the trade-route which ran through Jerusalem, the depot to which Solomon and his senior partner, Hiram of Tyre, sent ships 'and fetched from thence gold, . . . great plenty of almug trees and precious stones . . . incense from Sheba and the sweet cane from a far country.'

Briefly stated, Hall's thesis is that the Sabæans did not colonise Southern Rhodesia in the modern sense of the word, but that they did exploit the gold-fields and, after many years, built the Zimbabwe temple and other ancient edifices, using as labourers Indians and negroid folk who had long been subject to their influence.² Arabian and Indian influences on the East Coast of Africa are certainly ancient, how ancient no man can say. The Portuguese found 'Arabs' and dependent Indians in possession at the end of the fifteenth century; Massoudi found both peoples already there in the early tenth; the customs of the Bantu Makalanga, now fast dying out, point to intercourse with an Arabia which knew not Mohammed; a certain King Kharabit of Sabæa had interests far down the coast in the days of Trajan; the customs of the people of the Comoro Islands suggest a connection with Arabs or the kindred Idumæan Jews of the time of Solomon.³ Genesis takes the story still farther back, for it tells us that the grandsons of Shem, father of 'Yellow Asia,' were none other than Sheba and Ophir and Havilah; while the son of Ham, parent of 'Black Africa,' was Cush—'the miserable land of Cush' of the Egyptians which we call Nubia—and the sons of Cush were, once more, Seba and Havilah.⁴

In many respects the architectural and cultural remains fit in with the Sabæan theory. The Inyanga irrigation works and

¹ Sir H. Johnston, *Colonisation of Africa*, p. 5.

² Hall, *Pre-historic Rhodesia*, pp. 3, 364.

³ Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*, p. xxxvii.

⁴ Genesis x. 7, 29.

terraced hill-sides are allowed by all parties to be post-Islamic ; but Zimbabwe and other key positions are held by the majority to be inspired by pre-Islamic Sabæan models. There is an elliptical 'Zimbabwe' temple at Marib in Sabæa ; the temple at Sana, ancient capital of Arabia Felix, has a chevron pattern on the south-east wall ; a coin of Semitic Byblos shows an oriented conical tower, an obvious phallus, like that at Zimbabwe. Do not the stone hawks or eagles on the Zimbabwe wall stand for Ashtaroth ? The phallic emblems with which the ruins abound point to a Semitic origin.¹

As for the products mentioned in the Book of Kings, there are plenty of gold and ivory and apes still to be had behind Sofala ; Dos Santos in the sixteenth century saw fine black wood, potential almug trees, exported to India and Portugal ; the pearls of Bazaruta may be allowed to stand for the 'precious stones' of the Hebrew chronicler. But 'peacocks' are a difficulty. Dos Santos hopefully noted that, though he had never seen peacocks near the coast, he had seen natives from the interior wearing what he took to be peacock's crests ;² but failing Dos Santos, the bustard or *paauw* must do duty for the biblical peacock, and that task would seem to be beyond its strength.

The peacocks are not the only obstacle to an unreserved acceptance of the Sabæan theory. A plausible case has been made out for a Dravidian Indian origin of the mines and chief ruins.³ According to this theory, religious emblems, architecture, the absence of inscriptions at Zimbabwe, the products, the biblical references all point to India and Indian influences much more clearly than to Sabæa. Ashtaroth and other leading Semitic gods were always marked with a star ; but there are no stars at Zimbabwe. On the other hand, phallic emblems point quite as directly to the Siva nature-worship of India as they do to similar cults in Sabæa ; the signs of sun-worship at Zimbabwe, the orientation, the zodiac, traces of the swastika in the chevron pattern and on some of the eagles' beams, the sun-wheel on yet another beam, the very eagles themselves all point to sun-worship. Does not Vishnu ride upon the Garuda eagle, the king of birds ?⁴

Again, nearly all the Rhodesian ruins are round or elliptical ; but van Oordt states, perhaps over-confidently, that nearly all Semitic buildings are rectangular from the temple on the coin of Byblos to the very tents of the Bedouins, and the Arabs told the Portuguese that Zimbabwe, which neither had seen, was square. On the other hand, many old Indian buildings are round, like those 'towers of silence' which were in ruins before

¹ Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*, pp. xl, 104.

² Rec. S.E.A., VII. 278.

³ Van Oordt, *Who were the Builders of Great Zimbabwe ?*

⁴ For Arabian analogies *vide* Hall, *Pre-historic Rhodesia*, p. 348.

Gautama Buddha was born; the description of one ancient Indian temple tallies closely with that at Zimbabwe even to the baobab tree, another mark of phallic worship. And tradition has it that the baobab reached East Africa from India.

The absence of inscriptions at Zimbabwe evidently troubles the champions of the Sabæans. So hard are they put to it that Keane has to assume that the Sabæans of Solomon's day and for long after had 'no knowledge of letters, except, perhaps, of the hieroglyphics, cuneiforms and other scripts of their . . . neighbours.' He even goes so far as to assert that the kindred Phœnicians and Israelites of Solomon's time were unlettered folk.¹ But setting aside the fact that the Israelites at least were in touch with Semitic scripts before the Exodus,² it still has to be explained why the Sabæans did not use the very serviceable scripts of their neighbours. The Dravidian school finds here no obstacle to overcome. There is nothing, they say, to show that the Dravidians could write; hence, they left no inscriptions in Rhodesia.

In support of the Dravidian theory is the fact that intercourse between East Africa and the west coast of India is close and ancient. The Dravidians could run as easily before the monsoons in the tenth century B.C. as their descendants did in the days of Vasco da Gama. Even Hall admits that Indians were present at Zimbabwe as servants of the Sabæans³; but van Oordt, the Dravidian champion, asks why drag in the Sabæans at all, especially as many place-names in Rhodesia are apparently of Dravidian origin. Zimbabwe itself, he says, means the 'gold-works,' 'the gold-mills,' and that is precisely what Zimbabwe was. As for Solomon's men, van Oordt denies that they ever came near Sofala or Zimbabwe. But the Dravidians held on till troubles came upon them, and then, as the Makalanga tell, 'large birds came out of the sky, took the relics and carried them into heaven.' They went, as they had come, in ships taking the images of their gods with them; but they left the soapstone eagles perched in Indian fashion on the walls of Great Zimbabwe.

Latterly, the balance has been tilted in the direction of Bantu origins. Two Rhodesian investigators, Dornan and Schofield, have traversed the Sabæan and, *a fortiori*, the Dravidian theories at all points. The Zimbabwe temple, they claim, was the great place of a Bantu priest-chief; the double walls were for defence; the cement is a mixture of dagga and dung such as modern Bantu use; the phallic cones are cairns to mark the graves of dead chiefs; the eagles were mere totems which once stood at

¹ Hall, *Great Zimbabwe*, pp. xl ff. ² Flinders Petrie, *Egypt and Israel*, p. 31.

³ Hall, *Prehistoric Rhodesia*, pp. 364, 397.

the door of the witch-doctor's house ; the baobab is indigenous. Schofield insists that Zimbabwe and other edifices are typical Bantu ovals and too badly built at that to have a really ancient history ; Dornan adduces native tradition to show that Makalanga were mining gold and occupying some of the Rhodesian ruins when the Matabele, last of a series of invaders, burst in upon them about 1840, and points to late nineteenth-century Bantu buildings elsewhere which exhibit all the architectural features of Zimbabwe.

It may be so ; but the question remains : Who took out all that gold ? The method was laborious and, unless Bantu human nature has changed radically since, it is hard to believe that Bantu did it of their own mere motion. Even Dornan admits that the Bantu who built Zimbabwe may have been directed by Semitic overseers. Thus the Sabæan, the Dravidian, and the Bantu schools hold in common the idea of external stimulus, but they differ as to its origin, extent, and date. And there the issue must rest pending further investigation.

The next stage in the long story of Asiatic influence on the East Coast is more clearly defined. In the seventh and early eighth centuries A.D., Arabia burst its bounds ; the banners of the Prophet swept up to the Oxus, the Taurus and the Pyrenees, and were hardly stayed by the walls of Constantinople and the valour of the Christian hosts in Frankish Gaul.

While Charles Martel was thus grimly winning a future for Western Christendom, Zaide, great-grandson of Ali the son-in-law of Mohammed, led a group of Moslem heretics out of Arabia. These Emozaide came down the well-worn East Coast trade-route as far as the Equator, mixing with the natives as they came. Hard on their heels came three ship-loads of true believers driven out of Central Arabia by hostile neighbours. These men founded Brava and Magadoxo and drove the Emozaide, doubly obnoxious as trade rivals and heretics, into the interior to become middlemen between the tribesmen and themselves. Presently a party from Magadoxo reached Sofala and, finding that there was gold to be had, made a settlement there.

Circa
930 A. D.

915.

A much-travelled Moslem, Massoudi of Baghdad, then appeared on this scene of petty bickering and, like so many later visitors to Africa, wrote a book about it. In his famous *Meadows of Gold* he tells of Arabs and Persians passing along the ancient monsoon trade-route from Madagascar and East Africa to the Malabar Coast and Ceylon ; of the coming and going between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and Sofala ; of the little Bushmen, the Wak-wak, in the parts around Sofala, and of the Zendjs, the

Bantu, who were already pushing southward, bartering gold and ivory, panther skins and tortoiseshell, to Arab traders for the markets of India and China.¹

Two generations passed and the world of Islam was once more on the move. Moslems crossed the Khyber Pass to add a further complication to the problems of India; Seljuk Turks trooped down from Turkestan to turn the line of the Taurus and overthrow the Byzantines at Manzikert; the green-flag Fatimites seized Egypt; Arabian zealots rallied the Berbers at Tunis and pushed thence across North Africa as far as Lake Chad, Wadai and Darfur; the Tuareg Almoravid, Yussuf, set up the first of the Mahdis, the figure-head of a Moslem revival, conquered Senegambia and Morocco and, crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, crushed the rising Christian power of Castile at Zallaca in the year that William the Conqueror finished his Domesday survey. 1086.
This energy radiating in all directions did not leave the East Coast of Africa unscathed. Persian Moslems from Ormuz, Circa 1020.
bitterly hostile to the Arabs, settled at Quiloa. Here their power grew till, by 1314 (in that year the Bruce stood victorious at Bannockburn), their city had become the leading power on the coast. Quiloa controlled Sofala and Melinde, Mombasa, Pemba and Zanzibar, Mafia and Mozambique; it had stations in Madagascar and the Comoros; its sailors knew of the rivers of Sena and Quilimane, the mouths of the great Zambesi.²

Ibn Batuta of Tangier, in the course of travels as wide as those of Marco Polo, noted what this Semitic trading empire was like in the early fourteenth century. The towns, like Tyre of old or Carthage, were perched either on islands or on easily defended promontories. The wood and mud hovels of an earlier day had given way to stone houses with flat roofs and stoeps which overhung the narrow, winding alleys; the fortified palace of the sultan stood upon the sea-front; above the flat roofs rose the minarets of the mosques; around the huddled whitewashed houses stretched the gardens and the palm groves. Aristocrats, who still kept something of their Asiatic blood, and men of wealth, moved slowly along the streets in long flowing robes; Moslems of all colours were privileged to wear the turban and the sword even though the rest of their apparel was limited to a loin-cloth.

The sword was much in evidence. The coast was full of war: orthodox Arabs and Persians against heretic Emozaide, Arabs against Persians, and, on occasion, the infidel 'Kaffirs' against all three. Nevertheless, the Semites mixed freely with the Bantu;

¹ Hall, *Pre-historic Rhodesia*, pp. 72 ff.; Dos Santos quoted by Hall, *P. R.*, p. 83; *ibid.*, chapter 3, on Arab gold trade.

² Rec. S.E.A., I, 12.

they traded with them in the intervals of warfare ; sometimes these tribesmen brought alluvial gold down to the coast ports, but as a rule the half-breeds, with whom the ports abounded, went inland to fetch it.¹ Of settlement inland there was none. The Arabs clung to the coast and exploited the interior, Carthaginian fashion, by levying incredible dues, the perquisite of the powers-that-be in all the East, upon the goods that came into their towns.²

The goods thus won were passed on far and wide by sea. Little *zambucos*, mere half-decked boats, were good enough for the river and harbour traffic ; the more ambitious *pangayos* served for the coasting trade to Ormuz and Yemen ; but it was only the large *dhow*s, ' the great birds from heaven,' which dared to run before the monsoons to Calicut. These vessels were manned as a rule by half-breeds ; but at Calicut, the middlemen were once again ' Arabs ' or Rumi, renegade Greeks, and there too were men from the Far East who had come in their blundering, square-bowed junks with the spices of the Moluccas and the scented woods and silks and pottery of China and Japan. What though the ' Arabs ' had established an outpost at Malacca where now stands Singapore, the yellow men came on to Calicut.

The ships in which the ' Arabs ' fared forth were flimsy enough. Even the *dhow*s were built of roughly split planks fastened together with coir rope and wooden pegs, and their great lateen sails were of closely woven matting. The Moors might use the levantine compass, quadrants and marine charts while European sailors still hugged the shore and pinned their faith on Ptolemy, but the fact remained that they dared not trust themselves to the grip of the Mozambique current south of Cape Corrientes.³ It was their misfortune that at the last they had to struggle for the control of the Indian seas with mariners who could and did.

Intercourse and Moorish pressure had long ago forced the Iberians, Goths and Sueves in the western parts of the Spanish peninsula to make terms with one another. The county of Portugal gradually took shape, fought its Christian and Moslem neighbours indiscriminately, but on the whole the Moslems more vigorously, and won its capital of Lisbon with the help of a body of Crusaders, Englishmen for the most part, who were on their way to the Holy Land. Thereafter, the Moslem revival headed by the Berber Almohades threatened Portugal in common with the other Iberian principalities ; but, by the middle of the

¹ Hall, *Pre-historic Rhodesia*, pp. 73 ff.

² *Rec. S.E.A.*, III. 93 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 12 ; III. 77, 93 ff.

thirteenth century, the Almohad empire had broken up and Portugal, a full-blown kingdom now, had conquered the Moorish Algarves. 1262.

The enlarged kingdom of Portugal was still small and mountainous and much of its land was in the hands of the king, the Church and the military Order of Christ who by no means made full use of it; nevertheless, by the middle of the fourteenth century, she had developed her abundant fisheries somewhat; her Jews and conquered Moors gave her some little wealth with their wool and silk; a Genoese, Pessanha, had organised her navy; her commerce, widespread for so small a state, put her in touch with Italy, Flanders and England. Under the glorious House of Avis, her people became conscious that they were a nation, but still more were they conscious of the neighbourhood of the Shereefian sultans of Morocco, whose pirate barks harried their coasts and whose continued independence was an affront to inveterate Crusaders. Their king, reviving St. Louis' great dream of a Tunis dependent on France, determined to conquer Morocco. Accordingly, what time the English archers were smiting the French chivalry at Agincourt, and Christendom assembled at Constance was burning John Hus, the Portuguese took Ceuta. The European exploitation of Africa had begun. 1415.

Among those who distinguished themselves at the taking of Ceuta was Prince Henry, grandson of John of Gaunt and second son of the Portuguese king, half Portuguese, half Anglo-Frenchman, a very typical product of the West.¹ Knighted for his valour and appointed Grand Master of the Order of Christ, he, a Renaissance Cecil Rhodes, used the revenues of the corporation he now controlled to finance exploring ventures. For, being minded to see how far the power of the Infidels extended in Africa and to set a limit to it 'for the glory of God and the profit of Portugal,' he retired to the promontory of Sagres, built himself a house, a chapel and an observatory, studied navigation and shipbuilding, and planned those voyages which, after his death, opened the sea-road from the West to India.

The Navigator's motives were mixed, for he was only human. There was the crusade against the Moroccans; there was missionary zeal and the hope of making touch with that potent Christian monarch, Prester John, wherever he might be—perhaps in Abyssinia; there was the acquisition of gain, for it was notorious that Moslem caravans crossed the Sahara southward to Bilhad Ghana, the land of wealth which we call Guinea. Had not Edrisi the Moor shown that land on the map he drew Circa
1150.

¹ C. R. Beazley, *Prince Henry the Navigator*; R. H. Major, *Life of Prince Henry of Portugal*.

long ago for Roger II, the Norman king of Sicily? There was growing confidence, for knowledge was reviving in the West. The Church Fathers might hold fast to Ptolemy and vote

Anyone doubting him sold to the demon.
 Their observations were formally noted ;
 Still—better maps could be got from the seamen.¹

Genoese sailors and Balearic islanders had ferreted about beyond the Pillars of Hercules for many years past ; their *portulani* showed many things that did not appear with the Land of Nod and Ultima Thule in the orthodox atlases ; one good map of 1351—it is still preserved in the Laurentian Library at Florence—showed Madeira ; Portuguese and Spaniards, the latter fortified by a Papal Bull, were actually competing for the Fortunate Isles, the Canaries, and, in the very year of the taking of Ceuta, the Spaniards made good their claim to Tenerife, ‘wonderful among islands of the earth.’

Doubtless Prince Henry’s plans took more definite shape as the navigation proceeded. Could his captains but find the West Nile, the river which watered Ethiopia ‘as the East Nile doth water Egypt,’ they could join hands with Prester John and take the Moslem world from the rear. But gradually the scheme grew bolder. The Laurentian map showed something else besides Madeira. In spite of Ptolemy’s South Land which made the Indian Ocean a land-locked sea, it showed the southern horn of Africa and an open road to the East, the land of jewels and silks and spices, desirable wares which were still in the hands of the Infidels and only reached the West through the Italians—at a price. Might not the Portuguese find their way to these lands for themselves, circumvent the grasping Venetians and, rounding the Cape, fall on the Ottoman Turks from behind? It did not look such a very long voyage on the map and these Ottomans were a growing peril ; already they had conquered most of the Balkan peninsula ; Byzantium alone held out against them ; it would be an act worthy of a Christian prince to overthrow the Great Soldan.

From whatever motives and with whatever end in view, Prince Henry sent his captains forth.² They colonised Madeira, planting there the vines and sugar-cane of Cyprus ; far out in the Atlantic they settled the Azores, with Flemings for the most part ; bold Gil Eannes rounded Cape Bojador into a sea of ‘darkness and

¹ *Saturday Westminster*, July 11, 1914.

² On the Portuguese discoveries and conquests *vide* Rec. S.E.A., I. 1-46 ; II. 26 ff. ; III. 67 ff. ; V. 349 ff. ; VI. (De Barros) 147 ff. ; Scott Keltie, *Partition of Africa* ; W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, I. ; Acton, *Lectures on Modern History*.

ghosts'; a little later, Antonio Gonsalvez and Nuno Tristan ventured past Cape Blanco and brought back gold dust from the Rio d'Ouro as well as ten slaves, 'real Guinea natives,' who were duly 'converted to the true way of salvation.' Thus did the Renaissance Portuguese revive in Europe the domestic institution of slavery which had died out during the Middle Ages. 1442.

They did so under the most exalted patronage. Pope Nicholas V granted remission of sins to all who took part in this new crusade, gave Portugal the sole privilege of seizing and converting the peoples of Darkest Africa, and guaranteed to the king at Lisbon the possession of all lands south of Cape Blanco *ad Indos*. Many erring souls would be brought to God by the discoverers; black ivory would help to pay the cost of the discoveries, and the Portuguese Government buttressed the Bull with a charter granting Henry the monopoly of the African trade and one-fifth of its profits. The idea of reaching India was thus fully formed, and 'philanthropy and five per cent.' began to play their part in the opening-up of Africa.

In the course of the next few years a full thousand slaves were landed at Lisbon under licences issued by the Navigator, and soon Diniz Diaz was able to report that he had rounded Cape Verde and passed Sierra Leone, old Hanno's furthest south. 1448. It was the Navigator's furthest south also. It is true that the good Italian, Cadamosto, cheered him with the news that he had been far up the 'West Nile' (Senegal) and gathered authentic news of Moslem Timbuctoo from the local inhabitants, 'tawny Moors, . . . a filthy race, all of them mean and very abject, liars and traitorous knaves.' Evidently Cadamosto fared better at the hands of the negroes, 'well-built, noble-looking men, with an Emperor so honest that he might well have been an example to any Christian,' which, in the mid-fifteenth century, did not imply a high standard; but Cadamosto added nothing to Prince Henry's knowledge of the road to the East. The Portuguese had reached the Gold and Slave Coasts; discovery and the crusade paled before the delights and profits of commerce. So in due time 1460. there died Prince Henry the Navigator, 'a Prince so mighty who had sent so many fleets and won so much from Negroland and had fought so constantly against the Saracens for the Faith.'¹ And Prester John was still to seek and the Great Soldan was enthroned at Constantinople.

Exploration was presently resumed at the price of giving one, Fernan Gomez, the monopoly of the slave trade provided he discovered 180 leagues of coast. The bargain was kept; on an average a thousand negroes were imported annually to mix their

¹ Beazley, *op. cit.*, pp. 269, 273, 305.

1471. blood with the Portuguese peasantry ; Dahomey, Bornu and the mouths of the Niger were found and the Equator was passed. Ten years later the energetic young king, John II, secured a base on the Gold Coast by fortifying São Jorge de Mina (Elmina) and 1485. then sent Diego Cão southward to discover the Congo estuary and plant a stone pillar (*padrao*) at Cape Cross.

With the road to the Indies thus visibly opening before him, King John determined on a great effort. Ships and methods of navigation had improved markedly. It is true that there was no means of fixing the longitude, and the great wooden astrolabes would only give a fair reading of the latitude on dry land ; but John got the best expert advice available from Rodrigo and Joseph, a Jew, and 'one Martin of Bohemia, . . . who prided himself upon being a disciple of Joanne de Monte Regio, an astronomer renowned.'¹ These men gave him 'tables of the declination of the sun' which made his captains independent of the stars and astrolabes.² But John's chosen captain, Bartholomew Diaz, still clung to the coast as far as Angra dos Voltas, presumably the mouth of the Orange river. He was then blown far out to sea, and tacking back, he made landfall after many days at Angra dos Vaqueros. The inhabitants of Mossel Bay, almost certainly Hottentots, did not wait to be interviewed ; they fled inland with their herds of cattle and left Diaz to push on eastwards to the Infante (Fish ?) river. Diaz must have known, from the trend of the coast and the warm-water current which flowed down against him, that he was heading straight for the Indies ; but his men would go no farther and he had to turn back. And 'being about returning they discovered that so many ages unknown 1486. promontory, which they called Tormentoso or Stormy, because of a great tempest they met with there ; but our king gave it the name of Cabo de Boã Esperança . . . from the great hope it gave of discovering the Indies.'³

Hope might spring eternal in the royal breast, but for a time faith seemed to be lacking in the hearts of the royal councillors. It is true that even before the return of Diaz they had sent two messengers overland to find India and Prester John ; but one emissary, Paiva, was lost and though the other, Pedro de Covilham, found Prester John, he was held in honourable captivity in Abyssinia to the end of his days.⁴ Covilham did, however, contrive to send a reassuring message back to his sovereign. 'If you persist to the Southward, Africa will come to an end. When the ships come to the Eastern Ocean, let them ask for Sofala and

¹ He meant Martin Behaim of Nuremberg and Johan Müller of Königsberg, Regiomontanus.

² Rec. S.E.A., VI. 165.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 1-46.

the Island of the Moon (Madagascar) and they will find pilots to take them to Malabar.'¹ The message can hardly have reached Lisbon before Diaz had reported that there was in truth an end even to Africa; nevertheless, many of John's councillors were averse to taking further action 'as it would be greatly envied by all the kings and republics of Europe, as also by the Sultan of Babylon and the kings and lords of India themselves.'²

So Leopold of Belgium must have felt when he, the least of Western monarchs, proposed to acquire the coveted Congo basin; and John's advisers also feared that the search for India would damage the prospects of conquests in North Africa and their cherished Guinea trade. But a greater fear and the king's urgency at last forced their hand. The Genoese Columbus sailed westward under the Spanish flag and found the 'Indies';^{1492.} at least, he said he had, and the most disreputable of Popes, Alexander Borgia, divided the world between Spain and Portugal. Those Powers prudently interpreted the Papal Bull by treaty, but this Line of Tordesillas only made mention of the western^{1494.} hemisphere. What might happen on the other side of the globe remained to be seen. In any case, Portugal must be quick if it wished to make good its monopoly over the road *ad Indos*. Wherefore, on the death of John, Manuel the Fortunate took action, spurred thereto by the news that another Italian, John Cabot, had sailed westward on behalf of Henry Tudor, the new^{1497.} King of England.

Manuel chose Vasco da Gama for the venture.³ Da Gama was equipped with improved brass astrolabes, which he distrusted, and the knowledge that Columbus had struck out boldly and sailed straight for thirty-six days before reaching the Bahamas. He, therefore, struck out with equal boldness from the Cape Verde¹⁴⁹⁷⁻ islands and sailed southward in a wide sweep for no less than^{1499.} ninety-three days. He sighted land at St. Helena Bay, doubled the Cape, passed up the coast of Natal at Christmastide and named it, and reached Arab Mozambique. His reception and his own behaviour there were not altogether happy, but at Melinde, farther up the coast, he fared better and acquired the services of a Gujarati pilot, one Malemo Cana, who was 'so expert in navigation that being shown an astrolabe he took little notice of it, as one who was used to more considerable instruments.'⁴ Under Cana's guidance the Portuguese ran before the monsoon, and on May 16, 1498, 'with great rejoicing and with the sound of trumpets after dinner . . . they cast anchor two leagues from the city of Calicut.'⁵

¹ Quoted by Abbott, *Expansion of Europe*, I. 95.

² Rec. S.E.A., III. 68.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 70 ff.; VI. (de Barros) 149 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 6, 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III. 86.

Early in 1499 da Gama was back once more in Lisbon. He had left an unsavoury reputation behind him at Calicut and 115 of his original company of 170 dead on the way ; but he brought with him definite news of Bombay, Ceylon and Sumatra, and a cargo of spices which paid the cost of his expedition sixty times over. In his joy Manuel the Fortunate assumed the style of ' Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and China ' !¹ Pharaoh Necho of famous memory, King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Lord of the Two Lands, Son of the Sun, Beloved of the Gods, Lord of Diadems, triumphant, could hardly have done better.

Da Gama's trumpets at Calicut echoed round the globe. And well they might, for they proclaimed the confirmation of ancient history and the outflanking of the Turk, and heralded the opening up of one-third of the world to Christianity, the ruin of the trade of Venice, and the transference of the balance of power at sea from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

The rise of the Portuguese empire in the East was very rapid. True, in spite of the vast profits of his voyage, da Gama was forbidden to return to the Indies for more than twenty years, possibly because of his violence at Calicut ; but his successors carried all before them. They came at a fortunate time. The Arabs were divided against themselves ; their ships were feeble and, though the European cannon were more remarkable for noise than efficiency, the Portuguese were vastly superior to the Moslems in body armour, discipline, and the great good luck which at first attended them and on which they regularly counted. Conditions in India were equally favourable. As Christians they were welcomed by the Indian Nestorians, whose existence surprised them mightily ; they found that the Zamorin of Calicut was merely *primus inter pares* of a host of petty Malabar rajahs, accustomed to men of divers faiths, keen to trade and hampered by a chivalrous mode of warfare of which they took full advantage. There was no strong government in all India. A quarter of a century was to pass before Baber, first of the Great Moguls, placed his foot in the stirrup of resolution and his hand on the reins of the confidence of God and marched against the dominions of Hindustan.

At first, Portugal's policy was mainly commercial, not to say piratical. But her seamen did seek to secure one or two bases for their trade. Pedro Cabral, tacking too far westward, discovered and annexed Brazil in the name of His Most Faithful Majesty ; he and de Nueva then sank a Moorish squadron at Calicut ;

¹ Abbott, *Expansion of Europe*, I. 105.

Duarte Pacheco killed the Zamorin, drove out the Moorish middlemen, and firmly established the Portuguese arms in Cochin and Cannanore; Saldanha put into the watering-place under the shadow of Table Mountain, wherefore men called Table Bay by his name for more than a hundred years to come. Then came a change. The losses in the trade might be heavy—Cabral lost eight of his thirteen ships—but the gains were enormous and the damage to Venice grievous. The Bride of the Adriatic tried to come to terms with the Lord of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. She was snubbed for her pains and promptly sought revenge. The Sultan of Egypt was anxious for his customs revenue from the Indian traffic—£290,000 a year, no less—which was threatened by the Portuguese 'Crusaders coming the other way, and robbing the Moslems of their resources.'¹ Venice helped the sultan, who proposed to sweep the newcomers off the Eastern seas.

Portugal prepared for the coming storm. She sent Francesco d'Almeida to win and hold a series of naval bases as a sure foundation for economic predominance. St. Helena was occupied as a post-house on the road; everywhere on the East Coast the Arabs were crushed or overawed and forts raised at Sofala and Mombasa, Quiloa and Mozambique; a footing was made in Ceylon, and d'Almeida was granted his crowning mercy when he destroyed a great Arab and Egyptian fleet at Diu.²

D'Almeida thus made the Indian Ocean a Portuguese sea for a hundred years, but already the ground had been cut from under his feet by that royal ingratitude and official jealousy which was to be the bane of the rising Portuguese empire. D'Almeida stood for a naval policy: command of the sea and as little responsibility for the land as possible; his successor, Affonso d'Albuquerque, was a conscious imperialist whose aim was to found self-sufficing colonies and extend Portuguese authority in the East. D'Albuquerque harried the East Coast on his way out, seized Brava and Socotra, thus hampering the Arab Red Sea traffic, and was greeted with imprisonment on his arrival in India. But at last d'Almeida had to release him and sail home. He never saw Portugal, for he landed in Table Bay, and 'as it is always the character of the Portuguese to endeavour to rob the poor natives of the country,' a quarrel arose with the Hottentots who slew him and many of his companions as they struggled towards their boats through the heavy sand of Salt River beach.³

D'Albuquerque was the real builder of the Portuguese Indian empire. He seized Goa and made it the capital; he occupied

¹ Acton, p. 56.

² Rec. S.E.A., I. 13, 14, 62, 99; II. 43; III. 113, 122; V. 382; VI. 246, 288; VII. 187.

³ *Ibid.*, II. 45.

Malacca to control the Far Eastern trade ; he took Ormuz and thus closed the gates of the Persian Gulf, and narrowly failed to repeat this success at Aden. Before his death, he had 20,000 men holding fifty-two stations scattered along 15,000 miles of coast.

1538. Few important additions were made to this imperial Jonah's gourd thereafter. Diu was secured ; two years later the Portuguese appeared in Japan, but their hold there was of the slightest ;
 1556. they then occupied the poor harbour of Macao, and finally
 1564. seized the rich Moluccas, the plum of the spice-trade. In Africa, their hold was confined to the coasts and islands even more rigidly than in the Indies. At first they made good progress on the West Coast ; they occupied the islands and San Salvador, whence Christianity made such headway that there was soon need for a negro bishop ; but Christianity failed to come to terms with polygamy, the Bula Matadi headed a pagan reaction, and the ferocious Jagga burst in upon the ' land of war and trade.' With experience sailors ceased to hug the shore, and the islands ceased to be of much importance ; on the mainland European influence was confined to the purlieus of S. Paulo de Loanda and Kabinda, where alone the slave-trade made it worth while for the Portuguese to hold on.¹

The East Coast settlements were equally unsuccessful. By 1520, the Portuguese held Quiloa, Zanzibar, Mombasa, Sofala, Mozambique, Brava and other minor posts. They then spread southwards, settled at Sena and Tete in the lower Zambesi valley, 1531-
 1535. took Quilimane at its mouth and occupied Delagoa Bay, the Rio de Lagoa, ' now called Espirito Santo, since Lourenço Marques visited it.' Mozambique, hitherto a town of small importance, 1544.
 1558. supplanted Sofala as the local capital and, about the same time, Portuguese ships began to call at Inhambane.²

In spite of this fair show, the Portuguese occupation of the East Coast was a long-drawn-out, expensive failure.³ Set on a fever-sodden coast with a barbaric hinterland, the settlements had no chance till the development of the interior from the south in the course of the nineteenth century gave them something from which to draw sustenance. There was no real colonisation for lack of women ; the posts were expensive to maintain ; Arab rulers like the Sultan of Zanzibar might pay tribute, but Bantu chiefs had to be subsidised, for it was to them that the Portuguese looked for the gold and silver which were at first all that they desired. The influence of the Portuguese on the interior was

¹ Johnston, *Colonisation of Africa*, p. 33.

² Rec. S.E.A., I. 14, 62 ; III. 33, 94, 122 ; VI. 265.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 103. On trade and colonisation *vide* Rec. S.E.A., I. 22, 80 ff. ; II. 405 ; III. 216, 223, 464, 489 ; IV. 2, 35, 39, 213, 279, 423 ; VI. 268 ; VII. 186, 218, 366 ; VIII. 364, 406, 478.

trifling. They neither mined¹ nor traded themselves; their jealousy of the Arabs was such that they refused to have them as middlemen; they merely ousted them and waited at the ports for the streams of gold to flow in. Such gold as was forthcoming was dust, and it was in miticals, a given weight of dust, that the currency was reckoned; but there was little enough of it, and from the first men lamented that the Sofala trade was 'a great expense for so little revenue and profit.'² Already, Mozambique was running on the annual deficit which has persisted unto this day.

Twice there were promises of better things. There was a Bantu potentate in the interior, the Monomotapa, whom the Portuguese dignified with the title of Emperor and whose realm even mid-seventeenth-century map-makers showed stretching from the Zambesi to the Fish river. As a matter of fact he was paramount chief of the Makalanga, ruling from his wattle and daub capitals, the *zimbaoes* of N'Pande and Mount Fura, territory which ran some 750 miles inland along the south bank of the Zambesi. His power was not what it had been, for the chiefs of the Sabi country and Quiteve behind Sofala and Manica, where Umtali now stands, had all broken away; but many chiefs still owed him allegiance and he was a power to be reckoned with.³

Jesuit fathers presently arrived to preach the Gospel to the Bantu. Da Silveira and Fernandez went first to the Batonga^{1560.} near Inhambane; thence da Silveira went to Mount Fura where he speedily baptised the complacent Monomotapa and many of his followers. Da Silveira's success was short-lived; Moorish jealousies destroyed his hopes; he was martyred, and the effort ended.⁴ Nearly twenty years later the Dominicans arrived, fixed their headquarters at Mozambique and soon set up branch^{1577.} stations at Sofala, Sena and Tete. Most of their energies were perforce expended on the European and half-breed inhabitants of the towns; such as they could spare for the tribes were long unavailing as the hinterland was being ravaged by fierce bands of Bantu invaders from the north. This terror past, the rivalry between the Hounds of the Lord and the Company of Jesus seriously hampered the work of evangelisation, and it was not until 1630 that the Dominicans were established in any strength up the Zambesi valley.

Missionary effort, then, was comparatively speaking, a failure. The search for gold, the other lodestar of the conquistador stage of European expansion, was a failure *sans phrase*. Dom

¹ Like the Arabs, the Portuguese occasionally induced natives to dig gold for them.

² Rec. S.E.A., I. 80 ff.; Scott Keltie, *Partition of Africa*, p. 57.

³ Rec. S.E.A., III. 353 ff.; VI. 390 ff.; VII. 273 ff. ⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 73, 94 ff.

1571. Sebastian, the young King of Portugal, determined to give substance to an empire in South-East Africa which should rival that of Spain in the Americas by finding and conquering the gold-mines. He therefore divided his Indian dominions into three parts: 'Malacca,' stretching from China to Pegu; 'India,' from Ceylon to Cape Guardafui; and 'Monomotapa,' from Guardafui to Cape Corrientes. Over this last he appointed Francesco Barreto as 'captain-general and conqueror of the kingdoms,' with instructions to conquer first Manica, the gold-fields that lay nearest to Sofala.¹

1572. Barreto and his officers proposed to take the shortest route inland, but Father Monclaros, a strong-minded Jesuit, insisted on marching up the pestilential Zambesi valley. Monclaros had his way; it was summer and, at Sena, horses, cattle and men began to die. Monclaros put the blame for the sins of the tsetse fly upon the Moors, who, he said, were poisoning the grass, and, though Barreto was justly sceptical, he induced the captain to slay some of the Moslems on the ground that they meant to poison the water supply. The ill-fated expedition plodded on. It reached the court of the Monomotapa, helped him to defeat a rival on the Mazoë river, and then staggered back to Sena.² Next year, Barreto tried again, but at Sena 'this great man, having escaped so many bullets, . . . fell by the words of a religious man,' dying broken-hearted at the revilings of Monclaros.³ One, Homem, succeeded him and reached Manica by marching straight inland from Sofala; but he soon came away in despair; the fort he had built as a base for the search for the reputed silver-mines of Chicova was destroyed, and King Sebastian suppressed the captain-generalship of Monomotapa.⁴

1574. Then came the waves of Bantu invaders, which so harassed the missionaries. Fierce men they were, cannibals on occasion and at all times wholesale slaughterers of the peaceful Makalanga. Nor did they spare the Portuguese. They were beaten off at Melinde, but they destroyed Quiloa, sacked Mombasa and took Tete.⁵ At last these Abambo and Amazimba stormed away southward, and the Portuguese were free once more to seek a revenue. There was plenty of amber, ivory, wax and ambergris to be had in their own possessions, but by this time they knew that there was but little gold.⁶ However, they still hoped much from the gold and silver mines of the interior; they maintained three markets

¹ Rec. S.E.A., VI. 266, 357; VII. 281.

² *Ibid.*, III. 204 ff., 223; VI. 358 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 27 ff.; VI. 383, 386.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VI. 406; VII. 290, 302.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I. 409; II. 401; III. 489. The commerce of the coast consisted of 'gold, ivory and ambergris with the hope of silver mines.'

inland, all furnished with Dominican churches and one of them with a Portuguese judge, who dispensed Portuguese justice by grace of the Monomotapa. On the coast, the captain of Mozambique held the monopoly of the trade 'towards the Cape' and fitted it easily into one small ship each year; the ivory revenue of Sofala was eaten up by the fort and its garrison; a three years' lease of all Cuama and Monomotapa yielded no return; the opening of the gold and silver trade in East Africa to Portuguese subjects on payment of the royal fifth simply gave rise to contraband trade in the ivory, tar and other products which were still reserved for the officials; soon the captain of Sofala, who had bought his position from the Viceroy, was spending his own money on the defences of his town. Meanwhile, the hope of silver at Chicova had proved to be only a hope, and the Portuguese had abandoned their efforts to conquer Monomotapa.¹ Prestige and the slave-trade with Brazil alone induced them to hold on to their decaying East Coast settlements. 1635.

That decay was part of a general decay. Signs of troubles to come had shown themselves in the army and navy before ever Manuel the Fortunate was dead. The soldiers intermarried with the natives of India and Africa. It was d'Albuquerque's policy, and his successors preferred married to unruly single soldiers; but the effect was to relax discipline and reduce the troops to the level of an armed mob. Discipline slackened in the navy also; the government sacrificed the seaworthiness of their ships to mere size and sent great floating castles, such as *Revenge* shattered at Flores in the Azores, to face the winds and currents of the Cape. The luck departed; the candid de Couto soon had to lament that his countrymen were not nearly such good sailors as the Dutch and English interlopers, and Linschoten noted that the Portuguese marvelled that 'the Englishmen being . . . heretics and blasphemers of God, with so small and weak vessels,' passed the Cape so easily.² 1521. 1598.

The corruption of the civil service was as bad as that of the armed forces. The spoils system was in vogue almost from the first; good men like d'Almeida and Barreto were broken by slander and jealousy; the effort to check the corruption which flourished under a system of royal monopoly leased out to swarms of officials, the morally halt and lame of Portugal, killed da Gama; the sale of the royal monopoly of trade to a company merely ruined the company, which sank under the weight of short-term officials with a truly Chinese conception of the meaning of 'the squeeze'; the fate of Portuguese India was sealed when the

¹ Rec. S.E.A., I. 23; II. 405; III. 412; IV. 2, 35, 39, 213, 279; VII. 270, 282.

² *Ibid.*, IV. 423; VI. 392; Linschoten, *Voyage*, II. 246.

King bade the Viceroy auction all commands of fortresses, official posts and profits of voyages. Thereafter government and commerce became a mere organised robbery by an orientalised, semi-European ruling caste whose work was done by slaves and wealth produced by peoples whose very languages they never tried to understand. St. Francis Xavier was of opinion that no Portuguese official in India could save his soul, and de Couto frankly admitted that all the world, even the Kaffirs, despised the Portuguese as barbarians.¹

The record of the Church was little better than that of the State. Saints like Xavier in Japan and less-known heroes in the back-blocks of East Africa shine like stars upon a dingy background. The clergy destroyed the Hindu temples in Goa, introduced the Inquisition to harry Jews who had sought refuge in India from persecution in Portugal, and finally tried to force the Gospel on the native Goanese. The Indians, who already despaired of justice at the hands of their lay rulers, abandoned the capital of Portuguese India. It was small consolation to the Viceroy that the religious orders flourished so vigorously that they became a serious drain on his dwindling resources.

The reaction of the Indian trade on Portugal itself was disastrous. Portugal at the end of the fifteenth century was a state of 3,000,000 inhabitants averse to exporting silver and possessed of few products which Indians desired. In the early days, when the trade was more a matter of buccaneering than anything else, huge profits were made; but these soon ceased; the locking up of capital in ships and cargoes for long periods was inconvenient; the shipping losses were grievous and the loss of life appalling. For a full hundred years, one in nine of the ships that sailed from Lisbon *ad Indos* never came back, and sixty per cent. of the men who set out never saw India.² Yet royal and clerical incitement flogged Portugal on to a task beyond her economic strength, a strength sapped in advance by the expulsion of her Jews. Lisbon trebled in size in eighty years, other towns grew vastly and the importation of slaves set men free for overseas ventures; but slave-holding gave rise to miscegenation, the growth of big, ill-developed estates, the elimination of the peasant and all the social and economic evils of the servile state. Honest work was despised as fit only for Jews and Moriscoes; the poor sponged upon the rich and the rich on the government; the price of necessities rose; famine and disease stalked; the total population declined, and at last Portugal expelled her industrious Moriscoes.


The expulsion of the Moriscoes was an act of Spanish policy.

¹ Keller, *Colonization*, p. 117 ff.; Rec. S.E.A., VI. 392.

² Acton, *Lectures on Modern History*, p. 58.

1492.

1609.



AFRICA and the EAST INDIES

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1578. The restless Dom Sebastian had ended his dreams of African conquest on the stricken field of Alcazar-Kebir ; his successor had soon died and, with him, the House of Avis ; Philip II of Spain had annexed Portugal and all that it stood for. Henceforward, for two generations, the Portuguese empire languished under the dead hand of the Hapsburgs of Madrid, and Portugal, too proud to work, had perforce to learn how to starve.
- 1580-1640.

CHAPTER II

THE DUTCH OCCUPATION OF THE CAPE, 1581-1679

The United Provinces—The Dutch East India Company—English and Dutch in Table Bay—Foundations, 1652-62—Marking time, 1662-79.

Commanders : Jan van Riebeeck, April 7, 1652-May 6, 1662 ; Zacharias Wagenaar, May 6, 1662-Sept. 27, 1666 ; Cornelis van Quaelberg, Sept. 27, 1666-June 18, 1668 ; Jacob Borghorst, June 18, 1668-March 25, 1670 ; Pieter Hackius, March 25, 1670-Nov. 30, 1671 ; [Council of Policy, then the Secunde, Albert van Breugel, acting Nov. 30, 1671-Oct. 2, 1672] ; *Governors* : Isbrand Goske, Oct. 2, 1672-March 14, 1676 ; Johan Bax, March 14, 1676-June 29, 1678 ; [Secunde, Hendrik Crudop, acting June 29, 1678-Oct. 12, 1679] ; *Commander* : Simon van der Stel, Oct. 12, 1679 onwards.

THE annexation of Portugal by Spain was an almost unmixed evil for the Portuguese empire overseas. Spain ruled in the East but her interests were in the West ; the Spanish system of administration was even more rigid and centralised than that of Portugal ; worst of all, Spain's enemies became Portugal's, and Spain's foes were many. The Portuguese, by reason of their own exclusive commercial policy, could expect no mercy from trade rivals, and now their ill-defended possessions lay open to attack by every French Huguenot, English sea-dog, or Dutch sea-beggar who saw fit 'to singe the King of Spain his beard.' All these people were finding their way into Eastern waters : Sir 1580-1591. Drake rounded the Cape, that 'most stately thing' ; van Linschoten followed in a Portuguese ship ; five years later came Sir Thomas Cavendish, and, in 1591, James Lancaster, first of all Englishmen, set foot ashore in 'the goodly bay' at the base of Table Mountain.¹

The French and English, however, busied themselves as a rule in Spain's *mare clausum* in the West. Competition was most

¹ Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations*, XI. 132, 342 ; Hakluyt Society's publications, LVI., LIX. ; Linschoten, *Voyage*.

likely to come from the Dutch who had long had an indirect interest in the Eastern trade. The lordly Portuguese had scorned the retail trade; it was sufficient for them if they brought the spices to Lisbon and there passed them on to humbler folk for distribution throughout Europe. Lisbon thus became the meeting-place of men of divers nations, who listened eagerly to tales of 'all the wealth of Ormuz and of Ind.' None had listened more eagerly than the Dutch; but now that Philip ruled at Lisbon, the Dutch came there no more. For the northern provinces of the Netherlands had revolted. Holland, Zeeland, Guelderland, Utrecht, Gröningen, Overijssel and Friesland had banded themselves together in the Union of Utrecht and, led by William of Orange, had thrown off their allegiance and offered the sovereignty of the Netherlands to the French Duke of Anjou. Philip's answer came short and sharp. He outlawed William and set a price upon his head. Then, having annexed Portugal, he closed the port of Lisbon to Dutch shipping.

Philip's embargo forced the Dutch to go to the East themselves. Spain's road to the Indies lay south-west and Portugal's south-east; the English were diligently seeking a north-west passage; the Dutch therefore decided to go by way of the north-east and planted a factory at Archangel. Their first efforts were necessarily tentative but, once the combined artillery of God and Queen Elizabeth had shattered Philip's Invincible Armada, they bestirred themselves in good earnest. De Moucheron pushed on through the ice to Nova Zembla, but the road was too hard and, in the following year, Cornelis Houtman found a more excellent way. With four ships he challenged the Iberian monopoly and sailed round the Cape to Java. Three years later, a score of Dutch ships, equipped by a number of small trading companies, made the voyage to India. Thus, long before the weary struggle with Spain was ended in 1609, the Dutch were fairly embarked on the East Indian trade.

Economically, the United Provinces were well equipped for the work. The country was small but it had many resources. Safe behind their ships and dykes, an industrious people relied on dairy and wool-farming, the cultivation of root and grass crops, and the intensive horticulture which rose to such strange heights in the tulip mania of the sixteen-thirties. There was cloth weaving and good linen at Leyden; the spoils of the sea were taken by the hardy fishermen of Holland and Zeeland; Amsterdam itself, men said, was built on herring barrels. Geography made the Dutch a nation of middlemen set at the crossing of the sea, river and roadways of Western Europe; the coasting trade of the West and, above all, the Baltic corn-trade brought

1576.

them wealth ; their financial power increased. The Spanish Terror had ruined Antwerp in the south ; war and, presently, treaties closed the Scheldt ; Philip broke the Italian bankers and the Fuggers of Augsburg and Antwerp by repudiating his debts ; his successor persecuted the Jews. Amsterdam reaped the benefit of all this wild sowing. Financiers, Belgian refugees, and Jews fled to the northern port as to ' their great new Jerusalem,' and Amsterdam became the banking centre of Western Europe.¹

Ships and men and capital were thus available for the Indian voyages. Politically, the Dutch were not so well equipped. The United Provinces were organised as a loose federation of sovereign provinces, each with its estates and stadtholder, who jointly controlled finance and foreign policy. Each province was itself a collection of towns and each town was ruled by a council elected in Gröningen and Overijssel and co-opted elsewhere. The central government was cumbersome. Delegates from the provincial estates formed the States General, the national legislature, which controlled peace and war, alliance and taxation, but had little power to act effectively without the concurrence of the provincial authorities. A council of state, a captain-general and an admiral formed a shadowy central executive.

It was a constitution in keeping with the centrifugal traditions which had survived the centralising efforts of Burgundian dukes and Spanish kings. The western provinces, economically preponderant, had interests other than those of the eastern ; each province had its own navy ; sacrifices for the common good were apt to be made only in emergency, and even then, as in the English North American colonies later on, each province had a very human desire for its neighbours to show their hands first. The provinces themselves could not always count on the local patriotism of their inhabitants, for there was much truth in the saying that the Netherlander recognised no Fatherland but only a father city.

Nevertheless, there were forces which helped the Lion of the Netherlands to hold the seven arrows fast in his paw. There was external pressure, by Spain first and afterwards by France ; there was a concentric system of government whereunder members of the republican burgher class, jealous of the House of Orange and, as Arminians, hostile to the Calvinistic clergy, controlled the town councils, the provincial and central estates, and the great East and West India Companies ; there was the House of Orange, strong in the support of the Reformed clergy and the mass of the people, stronger still in the fact that until 1650 the heads of the house, Maurice of Nassau, Frederic Henry and William II, were

¹ Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, p. 15.

as a rule captains-general, admirals and stadtholders in five of the seven provinces and at all times worthy descendants of William the Silent ; there was, lastly, the great weight of the province of Holland. There lay The Hague, the seat of the national government, and Amsterdam, the commercial capital ; there also were Dordrecht, Rotterdam, Delft, and Leyden. Holland paid as much in taxes as the other provinces put together ; its shareholdings in the East and West India Companies were in proportion ; it alone sent ambassadors to Paris and Vienna. Politically and economically, the United Provinces were Holland writ large, and Holland was Amsterdam.

The political and constitutional structure of the United Provinces was faithfully reflected in the Dutch East India Company. There were at first four rival companies trading with India in Amsterdam, two in Rotterdam, and others in Middelburg, Delft, Hoorn and Enckhuisen. Naturally, ' they sailed . . . the shoes off each other's feet.'¹ Cut-throat competition in a trade which demanded large capital and, east of Suez, found safety only in numbers, that, far more than fear of Spanish warships or the new English East India Company, was the hangman's whip that drove the companies towards union. Pressure by Maurice of Nassau, his rival Jan van Oldenbarneveltdt, advocate of Holland, and the States General at last induced the rival companies to come together. It was hard work to achieve so much, for, apart from local patriotisms, the Dutch were suspicious of monopoly and inclined to favour individual as opposed to corporate enterprise. Nevertheless, the thing was done and the 1602. East India Company received its charter.

It was the day of chartered companies. The States General nominally claimed sovereignty over the prospective possessions of the Company eastward from the Cape and westward from the Straits of Magellan ; the Company's servants were bound by oath not to set up an absolutely independent government in the sphere of the charter ; short of that the government leased to the Company, for twenty-one years, all that sovereignty implied, especially the monopoly of trade as far as Dutch subjects were concerned. The connection between the great commercial corporation and the State was close : the Government took a large block of shares, 20 per cent. of the loot of Spanish and Portuguese shipping, and customs dues on certain classes of goods ; it looked to the Company for independent action at sea in case of war ; it charged it heavily each time the charter was renewed. But

¹ Keller, *Colonization*, p. 389, quoting de Reus, p. xii. On the Dutch East India Company *vide* Keller, chapters 10, 11.

during the long intervals between these renewals, the amount of control exercised by the Estates General was trifling. The leaders in the legislature were also directors of the Company, and Dr. Jekyll could hardly be expected to catechise Mr. Hyde too closely in public, and, before long, the directors dared to tell the States General that the East Indies were their own to sell to the King of Spain himself if they chose.

1621. The connection between the Company and the nation was equally close. Only Dutchmen were allowed to hold shares, but small subscribers were encouraged, so that the Company might become as wide as the Dutch nation. The Company was to be the nation in one of its commercial manifestations and, to increase public confidence, a regular account of its doings and financial condition was promised. The report was as regularly postponed and, to the end, the true state of the Company was known only to its directors.

'Jan Compagnie' itself, like the United Provinces, was a federation; the original companies survived in the Chambers into which it was divided and, had it broken up, each of its component parts was quite capable of functioning on its own account. There were four Chambers. Each had its own directors elected by the estates of those provinces which had subscribed at least 50,000 florins. These *Bewindhebbers* numbered some sixty or seventy, and of them twenty were allotted to Amsterdam, twelve to Zeeland (Middelburg), and fourteen each to the Chambers of the Maas (Delft and Rotterdam) and the North Quarter (Hoorn and Enckhuisen). The predominance of Amsterdam was deserved, for that chamber supplied half the original capital of 6,440,200 gulden (by 1672 it had furnished three-fourths) and equipped half the fleets. Hence Amsterdam had eight of the seats on the governing Council of Seventeen which were filled by the States General from lists sent up by the *Bewindhebbers* of the various Chambers. Zeeland, which supplied a quarter of the capital and the ships, had four seats; the smaller Chambers had two each, and the seventeenth member was chosen by Zeeland and the smaller Chambers in turn. Conduct of policy lay with the mighty Seventeen, subject, from 1650 onwards, to review by a Vigilance Committee of eight directors at The Hague.¹ It was to the Seventeen, the *heeren majores in patria*, that, by the space of a hundred and fifty years, the rulers of the Cape Colony were destined to give an account of themselves.

The Company thrust its way into Portuguese waters with vigour. Within two years of its foundation it possessed itself

¹ V.R. Soc., IV. 43; Déherain, *Le Cap de Bonne Espérance au XVII^e Siècle*, p. 7 (n).

of Bantam, the coveted Moluccas and Java; seized Amboyna and half Timor in due course, and made a series of unsuccessful attempts upon Mozambique.¹ A regular government was soon organised in the East; Pieter Both became first governor-general with five and, presently, nine officials to advise him, and, a little later, this Council of India was stationed at Batavia in Java, the capital henceforward of the Dutch East Indian empire.

These years of growth were trying. There were no dividends forthcoming in thirteen several years between 1611 and 1634, and the attacks of one, Willem Usselinx, caused the directors much anguish. For Usselinx shared Bacon's opinion that 'merchants have gain for a pole-star and greed for a compass and are unfit to rule,' and, even though he was driven to take his outrageous plans for a colony of free men innocent of slavery and commercial monopoly to Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, not all the efforts of the Seventeen could prevent the issue of a charter to a West India Company whose sphere ate into their own as far westward as New Guinea, or persuade the government to grant them a renewal of their own charter on what they considered reasonable terms. Nevertheless, the Company's men found their way to Siam and Japan; they built factories at Pulicat on the Coromandel coast and at Surat; they failed to exclude the English from Bantam; but they drove them out of Amboyna, not without bloodshed for which Oliver Cromwell made the Netherlands pay dearly at a later day; they occupied Formosa to strengthen their hold on the China tea-trade, and, even when Japan closed her gates to foreigners, they alone of Europeans were allowed to carry on a precarious traffic from the barren isle of Desima off Nagasaki harbour. In that same year the Company occupied Mauritius and then seized Malacca, where all the sea-roads of the Far East meet, founded a refreshment station at the Cape and, by the conquest of Ceylon, offset their expulsion from Formosa at the hands of Chinese pirates. Meanwhile Dutch sailors had haunted the forbidding western shores of Australia and one of them, Tasman, found the island which now bears his name, skirted New Zealand, Fiji and Tonga, and narrowly missed anticipating Captain Cook's discovery of the fertile eastern shore of the great 'Southland.'

Thus, when the golden age of the independent Netherlands was drawing to its close, the Governor-General and Council of India controlled seven sub-governorships: Amboyna, Banda, the Cape, Ceylon, Macassar, Malacca and the Moluccas. Of these the youngest and, from the official point of view, the least

¹ Rec. S.E.A., VII. 333.

desirable was the Cape. A full century and a half had passed after its discovery before a permanent European settlement was made there. The Portuguese had given it a wide berth. There was no gold to be had; the Hottentots were reported to be killers of all strangers; there was no doubt that the Cape itself, 'the Lion of the Sea,' surpassed its inhabitants in ferocity towards Portuguese mariners; besides, the Portuguese had St. Helena as a posting-house to India on one side of Africa and Mozambique on the other. But it soon became tolerably certain that either the Dutch or English would occupy the halfway house to India. The course their vessels took to and from the Indies decided that. The course from Europe lay southward in Hanno's tracks to a point off Sierra Leone, then south-westward along the coast of Brazil, and thence on the prevailing westerly winds to the Cape. Portuguese vessels crept up the Mozambique channel to Goa, but the rest ran far out towards the coast of Australia and then on the South-easter to the Spice Islands. The homeward course lay southward of Madagascar to the Cape once more, and so home by way of St. Helena. In other words, the Cape was the one point, coming and going, at which ships must make landfall.¹

1615.

The English Company very nearly anticipated its Dutch rival. Sir Thomas Roe put into Table Bay with four ships on which were 'some Japonezas returning to their own country,' and also eight 'lewd malefactors' to whom King James, least bloodthirsty of monarchs, had granted their lives on condition that they went exploring and thereby gained much-needed time for repentance. These men were set ashore at Table Bay; one was killed by the outraged Hottentots; four others were swept out to sea on a raft; the survivors were rescued and taken home to England, where they promptly stole a purse and were hanged for their pains. In the following year three more gaol-birds were landed, but a tender-hearted captain took them off and carried them to Bantam. Then, four years later, a much more definite attempt was made to secure the halfway house to India. Andrew Shilling and Humphrey Fitz-Herbert of the English Company's service 'took quiet and peaceable possession of the Bay of Saldania' in King James's name; but that canny sovereign declined the gift and Table Bay still waited for a master.²

It waited for full thirty years while Dutch and English ships put in more and more regularly for fresh water and the letters which they left for one another under the 'post-office stones' which now adorn South African museums. Meanwhile the

¹ S. F. N. Gie, *Geschiedenis van Suid-Afrika*, I. 43 ff.

² E. Terry, *A Voyage to East India*, pp. 24 ff.; Harris, *Collection of Voyages*, I. 149; *Letters received by the East India Company*, III. 119, 317; IV. 122; *The English Factories in India, 1618-21*, p. 215; Barrow, *Travels* (1801), I. 2.

June,
1620.

Dutch East India Company took St. Helena and notably increased its holdings in the Indies, and the West India Company strengthened the grip of the Netherlands on the West Coast of Africa at Goree, Elmina, and Axim. Then, the Indiaman, *Haarlem*, was wrecked in Table Bay. The crew reached shore and remained there, growing their own food in the style of Necho's mariners, till they were rescued by the return fleet twelve months later. They were glad to go and gladdest of all was their commander, Leendert Janssen, who had had much trouble with his men. No one had a good word to say for the Cape. The admiral of the return fleet cursed it because there were so few supplies available that he had to put into St. Helena, and one of the ship's surgeons, Jan van Riebeeck, who spent much time ashore, gave a most uncomplimentary description of the Hottentots, 'a faithless rabble.'¹ Yet when Janssen was asked to report, he did so in cordial terms; a certain Proot also signed Janssen's *Remonstrantie* and, after much debate, the Chamber of Amsterdam was instructed to make the Cape a strongly-held rendezvous in place of St. Helena, where dogs were sadly ravaging the game.²

1617-1645.

March, 1647-March, 1648.

1649.

1650.

The task of founding the refreshment station on Table Bay was entrusted to the surgeon van Riebeeck, a thick-set, determined little man of thirty-three or so, tanned by the sun of the West Indies, Siam and China, and hard-bitten with the winds of Greenland. His instructions were precise. He was to build a fort 'to bear the name of the Good Hope' capable of housing some eighty men, to plant a garden 'in the best and fattest land,' and to keep on good terms with the natives for the sake of the cattle-trade.³ Perhaps, as Janssen and Proot had suggested, 'if God bless the work,' many souls would be 'brought to the Christian reformed religion and to God' (these things still looked well in a prospectus); but, in any case, the new commander must make sure of the water-supply and the meat, vegetables and fruit which were to save the lives of many who must otherwise die of scurvy. Captains could put off their sick to recover in the pleasant Mediterranean climate of the Cape, take on fresh hands and still earn their bonus of £50 by making the run from the Texel to Batavia within six months. The Cape then was to be occupied as 'a depot of provisions for the ships.' The directors were insistent on that score. For that purpose alone, they told a later governor, was the place kept up at great expense.⁴

So on April 6, 1652, the three ships, *Goede Hoop*, *Dromedaris* and *Reiger*, dropped anchor in Table Bay after a run of four

¹ *Journal* 1651-62, I. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 28 ff.

² *Lett. Rec.*, 1649-62, I. 1 ff.

⁴ *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, pp. 15, 16.

months from the Texel with only two deaths. It was a good omen and, next day, van Riebeeck stepped ashore to begin the history of the Cape Colony.

Van Riebeeck ruled the Cape for ten years, not without reproachful appeals to the Seventeen to 'think of our removal and promotion . . . in India'; nevertheless, he did his duty by his employers.¹ His first business on landing was to build his little fort of the Good Hope, a humble erection of earth and timber, on the site of the present General Post Office. Having thus guarded the water-supply, he set his master-gardener, Hendrik Boom, to lay out the Company's garden, and himself organised a government for the new settlement.

The machinery of government was easily organised: indeed, it was in a great measure in existence before van Riebeeck landed. Far in the background were the *Heeren Majores*, the mighty Seventeen. Instructions might reach the Cape from them or from one or other of the Chambers, usually the all-pervading Chamber of Amsterdam; the Cape reported and requisitioned on them in the same way; a copy of the Commander's journal had to go to Holland each year, where it might or might not be read, for certainly some of the Chambers never received copies. But Amsterdam was far away; *instans tyrannus* was the Governor-General at Batavia. The Commander must take the oath of obedience to His Excellency; appeals lay to him and his Council of India; the books must be sent in annually for inspection and reports on the state of trade at intervals; from Batavia came orders to curtail expenditure, to direct the movements of shipping, and to see to it that the Company's crews were supplied with better food in future.

But even Batavia was three months' sail away to the eastward, and eighteen months might pass before an answer was received to a despatch. Isolation ensured that the powers of the local government at the Cape were very great. That government was vested in the Commander, since for many years the Cape was not sufficiently important to warrant a full-blown Governor, and a Council of Policy. The Council was really a ship's council and might become a Broad Council by the inclusion of officers from ships in the Bay. That was the common practice in the Company's fleets, and van Riebeeck had summoned such a council to his flagship a few days after leaving the Texel when he was

¹ On van Riebeeck's governorship *vide* Godée-Molsbergen, *Jan van Riebeeck; Déherain, Le Cap de Bonne Espérance au XVII^e Siècle*; Leibbrandt, *Précis of the Archives: Letters Despatched, 1652-62; Letters Received, 1649-1662; Journal, 1651-62; Rambles through the Archives; Resolutien*; Blue Book, No. 50 of 1835, pp. 9 ff.; D. Moodie, *Specimens of the Authentic Records of the . . . Cape*.

faced with heavy weather and the proximity of Prince Rupert's privateers. The Commander took the chair at the Council, be it narrow or broad, unless a superior officer was present. To such he must give way, whether he was an ordinary commissioner or a high commissioner armed with the plenary powers of the Seventeen. But in these early days ordinary commissioners were rare and no high commissioner landed till 1685, when the *heeren majores* were minded to transform their refreshment station into a real colony.

The personnel of the Council of Policy varied ; but, whatever its composition, it was Leviathan. It was executive, though the Commander could, if he wished, utter the magic formula, 'ik neem haet op mij,' and override its advice ;¹ it was legislature, issuing *placaaten* on all manner of subjects from the cattle-trade to the illicit sale of soldiers' clothing ; it was also the nucleus of the High Court of Justice. As such its form was somewhat regularised when van Riebeeck added the judicial wisdom of the 1656 constable of the fort and the two corporals to that of its ordinary members ; its scope was widened when he summoned first one 1657- and then two burgher councillors when justice was to be done on 1658. free burghers.²

The Company made its own arrangements for the cure of souls. The Classis or presbytery of Amsterdam licensed ministers and their understudies, the sick-comforters, and throughout it remained the court of ecclesiastical appeal ; but it was the Company which installed and paid the minister, gave him a pastorie to live in, kept a strict watch on his doings and, when necessary, transferred him like any other of its servants. Except when chaplains landed from the fleets, there was no minister at the Cape for the first thirteen years. The settlement was too small to warrant the expense and had to make the best of the devoted sick-comforter, Willem Wylant, who came out with van Riebeeck, and, after him, Pieter van der Staël. But the *krankbezoeker's* powers were rigidly limited. He might neither administer the sacrament nor marry nor bury ; he might indeed read prayers and other men's sermons, but did he presume to use his own words, even in emergency, he was liable to reprimand as poor Wylant found. Marriages in the early days were celebrated by the omniscient Council of Policy after the banns had been called thrice by the sick-comforter.³

At first this embryo Government had only three classes of persons to deal with : Company's servants, Bushmen and Hotten-

¹ V.R. Soc., IV. 138 ff.

² *Resolutien*, p. 110 ; Theal, IIa. 65, 88.

³ Spoelstra, *Bouwstoffen*, I. 1 ; II. 544, 594 ; *Lett. Rec.*, 1649-62 ; I. 126.

tots. The servants were a mixed party, for the Company recruited men of all classes and nations for its service ; but they were under strict discipline and, during the first five years, there were neither free burghers nor slaves to complicate the issue. At first, also, the native problem appeared to be equally simple for it was not until about 1685 that the Netherlanders recognised the distinction between Bushman and Hottentot.¹ To the early Commanders the natives were just natives, 'dull, stupid, lazy and stinking,' according to van Riebeeck, 'zwarte stinkende Honden' in the eyes and nostrils of the colonists.

The Bushmen were relics of the Stone Age.² Once upon a time they wandered undisturbed all over Southern Africa ; there may even have been a time when they held all Africa south of the Sahara, though it is doubtful whether they were the true aborigines, for in Central Africa there are (or were) dwarfs who, unlike them, knew no fire. In any case, they were gradually dispossessed by more advanced people. Pharaoh prized the dwarfs his men brought back from the south to dance before him ; the East Coast Bantu of Massoudi's day knew the *Wak-wak*, the baboons, the beings who were in the world with the other animals before the Great One brought man out of the rock. Their neighbours may be pardoned for doubting whether they were quite human, for they were little sallow folk, barely five feet high, their heads adorned with peppercorn tufts of hair and lobeless ears, their triangular, fox-like faces almost innocent of beards. Their twinkling eyes were deep-set beneath upright foreheads, their noses broad and low-rooted, their jaws projecting ; and their slender limbs and tiny feet seemed ill-fitted to bear the protuberant stomachs of the men or the pendulous breasts and fat buttocks of the women.

Unprepossessing in appearance the Bushmen were, and every man's hand was against them, for they were hunters, and between Jacob, the tender of flocks and herds, and Esau, the wanderer, there can be no peace. They wandered about in clans of three hundred souls at most, each calling itself by the name of some sacred animal and each under a chief who was little more than a war-leader. Family ties were weak ; the older men practised polygamy and the younger men sometimes had to fight for their wives ; but even the marriage tie was feeble ; parental authority practically ended when the children could shift for themselves ; and the sick and aged were abandoned when they could no longer

¹ Stow says the Strandloopers constituted a third group of natives more nearly allied to the Bushmen than to the Hottentots (*Native Races of South Africa*, p. 245).

² On the Bushmen, *vide* Stow, *Native Races of South Africa*, chapters 1-12 ; Theal, *Ia*, chapter 1.

keep up with the party. Their religion, as far as is known, was rudimentary. Fear of violating custom, the use of charms against witches, propitiation of spirits, a vague belief in immortality were common to all of them, but some believed in Kaang, the Chief of the Sky, and others, it is said, prayed to the moon and stars. Their language, full of queer clicks, was limited in vocabulary and devoid of plurals; their knowledge of numbers stopped short at three; but they made up for linguistic and mathematical shortcomings by great skill in painting and carving. Therein they rivalled the Palæolithic men who produced the marvels of Altamira. Their other artistic accomplishments were a love of story-telling, a genius for mimicry, and a capacity for dancing which seems to be indigenous to the soil of South Africa. For the rest, they had few of the comforts or amenities of life. They procured fire by friction, lived in huts or under reed wind-screens, decked themselves with ornaments of shell and ostrich egg, smoked dagga and, on occasion, made merry on a mead of fermented root-juice and honey; but they had no domestic animals, other than the dog, the first friend of man; they had neither metals nor weaving nor agriculture; their pottery was of the rudest; they relied for their food on the roots and ants' eggs which the women dug up with digging-sticks weighted at the lower end with a pierced round stone, or the game which the men brought down with their little poisoned arrows.

There is a monotony about the story of the dealings of the Europeans with the little hunters. The Iron Age and the Stone could not live side by side. To the Bushmen the cattle of the Europeans and Hottentots were merely fat lethargic game and their owners trespassers on the hunting-grounds; to the Europeans and Hottentots, the Bushmen were a nuisance and, at times, a danger. Van Riebeeck found them in Table Mountain, whence they raided farms at Wynberg as late as 1678; explorers¹⁶⁶⁰⁻ on the way north-eastward to Monomotapa killed some; another^{1668.} party killed a few near Mossel Bay; but, during the first twenty-five years, the main pre-occupation of the Dutch was with the Hottentots rather than the Bushmen.

The Hottentots were much later comers to South Africa than the Bushmen.¹ The orthodox view put forward by Stow and hallowed by Theal is that a thousand years before the landing of van Riebeeck the Hottentots lived round the Great Lakes; they then gradually trekked south-westward, possibly through a gap in the advancing Bantu, to avoid war and the tsetse fly of the

¹ On the Hottentots, *vide* Stow, *op. cit.*, chapters 13-16; Theal, *Ia*, chapter ii.; J. M. Orpen, *Reminiscences of Life in South Africa*, pp. 33 ff.

Zambesi valley, and, moving slowly down the South-West Coast, entered the Cape Peninsula and passed on eastward as far as the western border of Natal, mixing with the Bushmen as they went. Orpen, on the other hand, holds that the Hottentots really came down the East Coast, pushed on by the Bantu whose Xosa vanguard certainly mixed with them. But, whether the Hottentots came by way of the East Coast or the West, all are agreed that, when the Dutch landed, they were thinly scattered in small, loosely organised clans near the coast from Walfisch Bay to the Umtamvuna river.

Physically, they were bigger than the despised Bushmen; *khoi-khoi* they were, in their own eyes, 'men of men' compared with them. Other observers were less laudatory, for though some of the Hottentots were as tall as Europeans and could even boast of beards, all of them were of slight build with backs as hollow and hands and feet as small as the Bushmen's; their eyes were far apart, their cheeks sunken and their chins pointed, their skins a dingy olive-yellow. 'The Hottentots,' wrote an English visitor to the Cape,¹ ' . . . are a race of men distinct both from negroes and European whites, for their hair is woolly, short and frizzled, their noses flat, and their lips thick, but their skin is naturally as white as ours. . . . They besmear their faces and bodies all over with suet or other oleaginous stuff, which together with exposing their bodies to a warm sun, makes their skin of a tawny colour, and causes them so to stink that one may smell 'em at a considerable distance to windward. They adorn their hair . . . with shells, pieces of copper, etc. Both sexes are clad with the skin commonly of a sheep, . . . the hairy side outward in summer but inward in winter . . . They go bare-footed, except when they travel they wear a piece of skin fasten'd about their feet. Their weapons are javelins . . . and bows with poisoned arrows. . . . Their houses are hemispherical, made of mats supported with stakes. . . . I believe their ignorance can hardly be paralle'd.'

It is a sufficiently unflattering picture, but the Hottentots were half-way between the Copper and Iron Ages, millennia in advance of the Bushman hunters. They used copper freely and could work iron if they chose; above all, they were pastoralists whose main wealth lay in cattle. The beasts were the care of the men, but once the milk, their staple diet, was taken inside the huts, it passed into the keeping of the women. The clans were bound together by no tribal unity; each was ruled by an hereditary chief, whose rule was rarely strong, for riches counted for more than rank and the religious sanctions behind the chieftain-

¹ J. Maxwell (1708), V.R. Soc., V. 49 ff.

ship were feeble. Polygamy was practised by the wealthier men ;¹ but little care was bestowed on the sick and aged and, from a pastoral people, little could be expected. Their language was much fuller than that of the Bushmen, from whom they had, none the less, borrowed many clicks ; they were as fond of story-telling and dancing as they, but they lacked much of their bravery and all their artistic talent, for they neither carved nor painted.

The Hottentot armament was much more varied than the excellent Maxwell thought, for, besides their arrows and assegais, either hardened in fire or tipped with metal, they used clubs, carried small hide-shields and, in the case of the Namaquas, hide breastplates as well, and even trained bulls to act as bovine tanks, a screen in battle. Again, Maxwell held that they were devoid of all religious observance except for ' a custom they have in moonshiny nights of dancing in the fields, of which if you ask 'em the reason all their answer is that it is a custom of the Hottentots, and was so of their forefathers.'² Later and more competent students state that all believed in charms and witches, some in the magical powers of the python, and the Namaquas, at least, in a good being who lived in the red sky and a bad being in the black.

Few pure-blooded Hottentots survive to-day. They have disappeared by death or absorption into the ranks of the multitudinous mixed-breeds of Southern Africa ; even in van Riebeeck's time they were not numerous ; but such as they were, they constituted his native problem, cheerful, dirty, hospitable to the verge of improvidence and beyond, given to petty larceny, huge eaters of anything available and good starvers in lean times, odoriferous (all authorities are agreed upon that), grateful and true, some said, to anyone who kept faith with them, and incurably indolent. ' Their Native Inclination to Idleness and a careless Life,' laments another English visitor, ' will scarce admit of either Force or Rewards for reclaiming them from that innate Lethargick humour.'³

Van Riebeeck found three clans wandering with their sheep and cattle in and about the Cape Peninsula : Herry's Strandloopers or, to give them their full title, Goringhaikonas, a mere eighteen strong ; the Kaapmen or Goringhaikwas, some 600 warriors in all, and the Koras, Gorachouquas or tobacco-thieves, 400 fighting-men all told. Explorers and visitors soon taught him of the existence of other clans : the Chainouquas

¹ Ovington says there was no polygamy except among the chiefs who might ' entertain three wives at once ' (V.R. Soc., V. 104).

² V.R. Soc., V. 50.

³ *Ibid.*, IV. 36 ; V. 105.

and Hessequas to the east; two groups of Chochoquas, the strongest of all the local clans, under Gonnema and Oedosoia in the neighbourhood of Saldanha Bay; Little Grigriquas on this side of the Olifant's river and Great Grigriquas and Namaquas beyond.¹

After a brief experience, van Riebeeck favoured a drastic solution of the native question: the seizure of the Hottentot cattle and the shipping off of their owners as slaves to the Indies.² But his instructions stood in the way, and he strove to keep the peace and do business. At first his orders to his men were marked by a certain nervousness: do not molest them even when they steal the very copper buttons from the children's clothes; go armed but do not stray far from the fort for fear of massacre; do not trade with them privately under pain of dismissal; treat them kindly even after Herry and the 'Watermans' had killed the herdbooy, David Jansen, and stolen forty-four head of Company's cattle. This last exploit did, however, impel him to send an armed party under a corporal to False Bay to recover the cattle by force if necessary.³ It was the first such expedition, the first of many. Bickering between the local clans, however, interrupted the all-important cattle-trade; hence, exploring parties were sent inland, the one beyond False Bay, the other Malmesbury way, to barter with more distant peoples. The desire for knowledge, precious stones and the gold of Monomotapa, the expected discovery of the mythical city of Vigiti Magna and the rumoured river of Cammissa are in no wise to be ignored; but one of the prime incentives to the exploration of Africa from the South was the search for fresh meat.

At this stage, van Riebeeck's responsibilities were immeasurably increased by the appearance of free burghers and imported slaves in the infant colony. The black and white extremes of South Africa's labour problem arrived simultaneously. The Seventeen long hesitated before they issued letters of freedom to some of their servants at the Cape. Governor-General Coen's scheme for the settlement of Europeans in the tropical East Indies had not been a success; free settlers would be expensive to send out and would certainly demand slaves, a further source of expense; they might even give rise to the political complications which were afflicting the West India Company in its cosmopolitan settlement of New Amsterdam where the burghers, stimulated by immigrants from New England, were making Governor Stuyvesant's life a burden to him with their demands for autonomy.⁴

¹ Theal, IIa. 126-7; Moodie, *Records*, I. 247.

² *Journal*, 1651-62, I. 51.

³ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 9, 10; Moodie, *Records*, I. 10, 16, 36.

⁴ Keller, *Colonization*, p. 450.

1653.

1655.

1619-
1630.1647-
1664.

Generally speaking, the Company was against colonisation. That was not its aim, though it was prepared to embark upon it for good and sufficient reasons. Its main aim was necessarily profit arising from the trade monopoly. Its whole commercial policy, in common with that of all chartered companies of the day, was monopolistic; competition was simply not permitted. The massacre of Amboyna, the seizure of Malacca, the exclusion of the English from the Spice Islands by the Treaty of Breda, the closing 1667. of Java to the English and French were all stages in the strangle- 1684. hold which the Dutch Company acquired upon the spice-trade of the Indies. Coen indeed had used the Chinese as middlemen in the spice traffic, and even encouraged private venturers to trade with China and Japan on payment of duties; but, as a rule, the Company guarded the spices most rigorously and strove to destroy all rival traders whether native or European. Coen himself wiped out the people of Banda and allowed only nutmegs to be grown 1621. there and cloves in Amboyna; Ternate was ravaged; in good 1680. years crops were burnt to keep up prices in the narrow European market; native princes were even subsidised to root up redundant spice trees.

There was no native industry to be destroyed at the Cape and no spice-trade to guard, but the spirit and methods of the Dutch Indian administration were applied there in full force. The Directors meant to keep the trade monopoly, but they also wanted a supply of meat, grain and wine for their ships. So far official farming had not been very successful, and the importation of supplies was expensive. Van Riebeeck, like so many East Indian officials of his time, would have preferred industrious Chinese, and his successor, Wagenaar, blurted out that he could do more with 1662. twenty-five Celestial families than with fifty such burgher families as were then actually settled at the Cape;¹ nevertheless, the Seventeen decided to try the experiment of setting free some of its servants to grow cattle, corn and wine for the ships and possibly the Indian stations with due precautions that they did not trench upon the sacred trade monopoly.

Hence, nine free burghers, all of them married men of Dutch 1657. or German birth, were established in the Liesbeeck valley on small farms of $13\frac{1}{2}$ morgen free of land tax for twelve years.² The terms of their freedom were laid down by van Riebeeck and relaxed somewhat by a visiting commissioner, van Goens. They were bound to remain for twenty years;³ they were to take turns

¹ Theal, IIa. 160.

² *Ibid.*, IIa. 62, 64; *Lett. Desp.* 1652-62, II. 314; III. 260 ff.; *Lett. Rec.* 1649-62, II. 326; *Journal*, 1651-62, II. 48.

³ By the end of the century the term was fifteen years (*Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 268).

in manning the redoubts which the Commander had built to supplement the fort : Duynhoop overlooking the whale fishery on Woodstock beach, and Coornhoop ' in the middle of the ploughlands,' where now is Mowbray ; they were to pay one-tenth of their cattle to the Company in return for pasturage ; to sell cattle to the Company which guaranteed to take all they could sell at a fixed price ; to pay no more to the Hottentots for beasts than the Company paid and to have no further dealings with the natives ; to abstain from growing tobacco lest they hurt the Company's importation ; to grow no more vegetables than they needed for their own wants and, if there was a surplus after their own and the Company's wants had been supplied, to abstain from selling it to visiting crews for the first three days after their arrival. Purveyors of meat, corn and wine to the Company : that is what the free burghers were by intention. ' I once more recommend you,' wrote van Goens, ' to attend above all to the . . . cultivation of grain. We shall never become noblemen here until we have first become good farmers.'¹

The process of becoming noblemen at all on such terms was likely to be a long one. Even the limited market on ship-board was precarious. Ships were few and far between, perhaps twenty-five Company's vessels and a stray Englishman or Frenchman, say 5000 souls annually, each stopping for ten days or so ; besides it was not clear whether the Seventeen meant the Cape to be a place of refreshment for foreign ships at all. English ships were well received at first, but, in 1656, the Seventeen, worried by a shortage of supplies, only permitted foreigners to take in water, catch fish and buy vegetables from such folk as had gardens. As a rule, however, visiting crews could get what they wanted in the way of provisions, and once at least van Riebeeck had to placate some of them with presents to make up for the poor cattle supplied to them. Nevertheless, the free burghers were painfully restricted and, within a year of the issue of their papers of freedom, they presented an ultimatum to the Government.

= Van Riebeeck disliked the idea of private trade with the natives. He had forbidden it because the bartering of ivory, rhinoceros horns, ostrich eggs and turtles with his men distracted the Hottentots' attention from their appointed function of purveying cattle to the Company.² Van Goens had overridden him, and at once free burghers had scattered to barter cattle with the clans.³ He checked this incipient diaspora by

1654.

1658.

¹ Moodie, *Records*, I. 97.

² No. 50 of 1835, p. 10 ; Moodie, *Records*, I. 54.

³ *Journal*, 1651-62, II. 93 ; *Rambles*, p. 62.

forbidding them to go far away and persuading the Seventeen to ban the private cattle-barter altogether. He relied on official trading only and sent one expedition to traffic at Saldanha Bay ¹⁶⁵⁷⁻ and another to seek for ivory, feathers, gold, precious stones and ^{1658.} cattle among the Chainouquas beyond the Great Berg river.¹ Meanwhile, he formed a herd of Company's cattle in the Peninsula and of sheep on Robben Island, and, to make matters worse, forbade burghers to board the ships to sell their vegetables because some men had fled from the Cape as stowaways. The burghers in a body presented a list of grievances, adding that the Company's price for grain compared with the cost of labour was ^{1658.} impossible. 'Let a price be fixed,' they wrote, 'for till that is done, we will not cultivate any more ground, for we will not be slaves to the Company.'² It was a strike in bad times, the first open move towards real freedom by the burghers. Having talked out their troubles with the Commander, they departed much relieved and were rewarded by a slight increase in the price of corn and the removal of the embargo on selling to visiting crews; but their other woes remained unassuaged.

Van Riebeeck tried to meet the demand for labour by importing slaves. The domestic institution spread almost automatically from the Indies to the halfway house. A dozen slaves from Java and Madagascar were landed in 1657 and proved so useful that two ships, *Maria* and *Hasselt*, were sent into the West India Company's sphere to get more. Meanwhile, *Amersfoort*, Indiaman, came in with the 170 survivors of 250 ^{1658.} slaves she had taken from a leaky Portugee in mid-ocean, so that the demand was met before *Hasselt* returned with 185 picked up on the Slave Coast. The unwanted balance was forwarded to Batavia, and the colony essayed to absorb the rest. The first importation was not a success. The newly imported Angolese were governed generally by the statutes of Batavia issued by Governor-General van Diemen in 1642, but van Riebeeck, mindful of the warning that the world is disquieted for a servant when he reigneth, issued special regulations for their protection and bade the sick-comforter teach them the rudiments of Christianity with tobacco and brandy as prizes. The regulations were of little avail; many of the slaves fled and the burghers concluded that West African negroes were more nuisance than they were worth. Henceforward, the Cape left Angolese severely alone, since they were more dangerous than the very Hottentots, and imported from Madagascar, Delagoa Bay and the Indies. There was a

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 10; Moodie, *Records*, I. 108, 112, 119 ff.

² Moodie, *Records*, I. 151.

little private speculation, but as a rule the Company undertook the traffic. Some slaves it kept for its own use; others it hired out, and others again it sold at about £6 a head payable in wheat.¹

The flight of the Angolese served to complicate the native problem. Trouble had already begun with the Kaapmen. The colony was growing and the clansmen 'dwelt long upon our taking every day . . . more of the land which had belonged to them from all ages.' Van Goens had proposed a thorough-going scheme of segregation by cutting a canal to sever the peninsula of *De Kaap* from the Flats and Africa, but expense and van Riebeeck were against him. The Commander for his part proposed to set up a line of redoubts within which the Kaapmen's women, children and cattle should be kept while the men were sent out to barter cattle.² But for a time, nothing was done beyond telling the Kaapmen that they must keep without the line of the Liesbeeck and Salt rivers. Then van Riebeeck arrested Herry the Strandlooper and some of the Kaapmen to make the others give back the runaway slaves and the murderers of the Company's herdsman in 1653. The result was war.

1658-
1660.

This Hottentot war was a scuffling affair mixed up with the intertribal bickerings of Namaquas and Chochoquas (Saldanhars); but it had a marked influence on the military system of the little colony. The Company's troops were a cosmopolitan crew, mercenaries of Dutch or German extraction.³ Their strength varied, for Batavia was always apt to take away drafts, but usually van Riebeeck had anything from 70 to 170 men. The free-burghers were called on to supplement the garrison. From the first they had been obliged to defend the redoubts in turn. Now, in the midst of the Hottentot war, they were organised as musketeers, the nucleus of the Cape burgher infantry,⁴ and a council of war (*Krygsraad*) was created: the captain of militia, two burgher councillors, a sergeant, a corporal and a paid secretary, with a war-chest replenished with fines for dereliction of duty by able-bodied burghers, all of whom were liable to service at suitable rates of pay. The members of the *Krygsraad* were selected annually by the Council of Policy from a double list presented by the outgoing raad, an old Netherland practice which ran through Cape local government in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the war soldiers were billeted on

1659.

¹ Theal, IIa. 79, 238; Déherain, chapter 6; No. 50 of 1835, p. 11; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, pp. 24, 288; Moodie, *Records*, I. 122.

² Theal, IIa. 71; Moodie, *Records*, I. 205.

³ *Lett. Rec.*, 1649-62, II. p. 241. On the defence system, *vide* P. E. Roux, *Die Verdedigingstelsel aan die Kaap . . . 1652-1795*.

⁴ *Journal*, 1651-62, III. 14; No. 50 of 1835, p. 12.

the farms; dogs and slaves armed with spears assisted the burghers and the troops¹ and, at last, peace was made with the Kaapmen, ^{Nov.} who had to recognise that the Liesbeeck lands were lost to them ^{1660.} for ever.

To secure the lands thus won, van Riebeeck gave orders that all barter was to be conducted at the Fort and that Hottentots must keep to the road within the colonial borders. He marked out those borders with a fence of poles and a bitter-almond hedge from Salt river mouth to the mountain slopes behind Wynberg, and along the line of the Liesbeeck he built three block-houses: Kyckuyt, Keert de Koe and Houd den Bul—significant ¹⁶⁵⁹⁻ names—and, beyond it, on the edge of the sandy flats, stationed ^{1660.} a mounted guard at the Ruyterborst. A system of flag signals was arranged to give warning of impending attack and van Riebeeck sat down behind his hedge, the last comprehensive frontier the colony was to have till 1798!²

The insistent demand for beef threatened to trample down the new frontier. The Hottentots would not stay outside the hedge, the Europeans could not stay inside it. The Company must have meat, and war and indiscriminate barter for tobacco, copper and trinkets had so impoverished the local clans that there was little to be had. There was joy at headquarters when the Hessequas came in from distant Caledon; but even that was not enough; van Riebeeck had to send his men far afield. 'You must,' he told them, 'try every imaginable means to persuade them to come to the fort or at least to send some of their people with you,'³ and, regularly every year, exploring ¹⁶⁵⁷⁻ parties fared forth to find Monomotapa, Vigiti Magna and Cam- ^{1662.} missa, but also to get in touch with the Namaquas—white people, it was said, with long hair and rich in cattle, three or four weeks' trek to the northward. Danckaerts, Everaert, Cruythoff and van Meerhof all pushed on beyond the Olifants river till drought and Bushmen proved too much for them; nevertheless, the Namaquas were found, Hottentots like the rest.⁴ At the last, van Riebeeck, who had already mediated peace between the Saldanhars and Namaquas, intervened once more in high tribal politics and offered to sell the Company's protection to the Cape clans against Oedoso's Chochoquas. But nothing came of it, and, in 1662, 'little Thornback' was allowed to sail for Malacca.

Van Riebeeck sailed east with joy to make his fortune, but his ten years' work at the Cape constitute his claim to remembrance.

¹ *Journal*, 1651-62, III. 17, 23; Moodie, *Records*, I. 221 ff.

² *Lett. Rec.*, 1649-62, II. 274, 309, 340; *Journal*, 1649-62, III. 91, 138.

³ *Rambles*, p. 13; *Journal*, 1651-62, III. 6, 214.

⁴ On travels to the northward *vide* E. C. Godée-Molsbergen, *Reizen*, I. Linschoten Vereeniging).

He had found a sandy shore and a green valley ; he left behind him the little village of De Kaap, a mere huddle of houses, it is true, but an unmistakable centre of Western civilisation running back from the Zee Straat or, as men call it now, Strand Street, to Longmarket Street. To the east stood the fort ; behind the village to the south were the Company's Gardens, a sight for the weary eyes of scurvy-stricken mariners ; around lay the gardens of the burghers and officials. The Company had its own farm and orchard at Rondebosch, and, hard by, the big barn which still bears the name of Groote Schuur ; the Commander's own farm lay at Wynberg near the Bosheuvel on the southern frontier, and, on either side of the Liesbeeck river, were the farms of free burghers, the foundation members of 'white South Africa.' Bushman hunters and Hottentot tribesmen might be kept out of the Colony with fair success, but, already, within the narrow confines of the settlement, there were slaves, half-castes and detribalised natives. All the economic and social problems which exercise South Africa to-day had begun to take shape before van Riebeeck's eyes. For, in South Africa at least, there is nothing whereof it may be said 'See, this is new.' It hath been already of old time, which was before us.

Seventeen troubled years passed between van Riebeeck's departure and the arrival of the 'second founder of the Colony,' Simon van der Stel. The European settlement was tiny. There had been 46 free adults and 14 children in 1660 ; twelve years later there were 64 free men who, with the garrison, gave the Commander a force of 370 all told ;¹ but marriageable women were scarce. Van Riebeeck for this reason, and in keeping with East Indian precedents, had recommended mixed marriages, and Jan Wouter had duly wedded Catherine, a freed woman, daughter of Antonie of Bengal. Now van Meerhof, the doughty explorer, married Eva, a Hottentot. He was the first European to marry a Cape native and received promotion to the rank of surgeon as a wedding present from the Company. On his death Eva went to the bad ; but as a Christian she was buried in the Fort and a burgher took her two half-caste children to Mauritius, where one presently married a European.² There were already Bantu slaves and detribalised Hottentots in the little Colony ; now, Asiatics began to arrive, Moslems sent from India to the Cape to expiate their crimes in servitude for a term of years. Miscegenation of all these elements began ; and soon three-

1656.

1667.

1671.

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, 1652-62, III. 273 ; *Journal*, 1671-8, p. 81.

² Moodie, *Records*, I. 279, 354.

fourths of such slave children as there were, were half-breeds. The Cape Coloured Folk had emerged.

A flow back from the farms was noticeable ; even so in 1660 there were only sixteen free families in the town : ten mechanics, one grocer, one baker, and four canteen-keepers. Canteen-keeping became so popular that the number of licences had to be limited to nine for the whole settlement.¹ There was even a flow out of the Colony, for men smuggled themselves on board ship. ' It is to be lamented,' wrote van Quaelberg, ' that Your Honour's Colonies . . . do not advance . . . because the Colonists as soon as they find they are not allowed their head, always turn head and ears towards Fatherland.'²

Nevertheless, the settlement grew slowly, and the machinery of government was elaborated to meet the new needs. Van Riebeeck's four immediate successors had to be content with his humble title of Commander ; the next two, Goske and Bax, enjoyed the style of Governor, for it was war-time and the half-way house to India assumed a new importance ; but their more famous successor, van der Stel, was merely Commander till 1691, when he was rewarded for his services with the higher office. Henceforward the Cape was ruled by Governors till the hasty arrival of special commissioners in 1792 heralded the end of the Company's rule.

The free burghers were given a larger share in the business of government. Three of them were given seats on the High Court and, thus emboldened, they presented a list of grievances to a visiting commissioner ; in other words the burgher councillors, thus early, went beyond their lawful judicial functions and virtually claimed to speak on behalf of the whole body of freemen.³ Burghers were also represented on two newly created boards : the matrimonial court of two officials and two burghers before whom intending brides and bridegrooms had to appear, by no means a hardship in these early days but an intolerable grievance later on when the confines of the Colony had disappeared into the waste spaces of Africa ; and the Orphan Chamber, again two officials and two burghers under a president appointed by the Commander. No widow or widower might re-marry without satisfying this committee that the rights of their children had been safeguarded ; the committee itself invested the orphans' money and thus played a useful part as a loan bank.⁴ Half the

¹ Theal, *IIa*. 158, 179.

² Moodie, *Records*, I. 191, 300.

³ Theal, *IIa*. 224.

⁴ The Orphan Chamber was increased to six members in 1699 with an official as president and a burgher as vice-president. From 1711 onwards all wills had to be registered with it, and from 1746 executors had to register inventories of estates (Theal, *IIa*. 222-3).

members of each board retired annually and their places were filled from a double list as in the case of the Krygsraad.

This principle of selection co-optation was also applied to the Church. The first two sick-comforters were satisfactory enough, but the conduct of the third was so scandalous that the Council interpreted the appearance of a great shooting star as a direct warning and shipped him away forthwith. They were rewarded by the arrival of a fully qualified predikant, Johan van Arckel, whom they welcomed by putting the state ecclesiastical on a more satisfactory footing. A consistory was formed: the minister in the chair, deacons selected annually by the Council from a double list presented by the consistory, elders elected by the congregation and confirmed by Council, and a councillor as political commissioner to take note of the proceedings. Such was the Erastian system which held good in essentials till 1843. A wooden church was also set up in the midst of the confusion which marked the beginning of the new Castle and, though van Arckel was buried there all too soon in the year after his coming, the Cape was never afterwards without the ministrations of regular clergy.¹

The Castle was the centre of the new scheme of defence which the Company undertook on the outbreak of war with England. Pieter Dombar designed it on the most approved model of Louis XIV's great military engineer, Vauban; Commander Wagenaar laid the first stone; convicts and slaves busily collected timber at Hout Bay and shells for lime on Robben Island, till the Peace of Breda stopped the work. In 1672, however, Louis of France attacked the United Provinces, building was hastily resumed and, two years later, the garrison moved into its new quarters; but again peace hindered the work and it was only by dint of commandeering passers-by to help with the digging of the ditch that Governor Bax more or less finished it. A little later the five bastions were named after the chief titles held by the Prince of Orange: Orange, Nassau, Leerdam, Buuren and Katzenellebogen.²

From time to time during these years the Cape promised to become the centre of a scattered group of possessions in southern waters; but de Lairese's attack on Mozambique failed; the temporary seizure of St. Helena ended abruptly with the return of the English in overwhelming force; Blank's expedition to Madagascar produced only a miserable seven head of slaves and nine tons of rice, and, though the Zululand coast was twice explored, no permanent acquisition was made by the Company

¹ *Journal*, 1662-70, pp. 153, 169, 172; Theal, IIa. 149; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, I. 30.

² Theal, IIa. 244.

other than Mauritius which was re-occupied after a six years' 1664. abandonment.

Knowledge of what lay on the mainland immediately beyond the confines of the Colony increased and, with knowledge, European influence. The valleys of the Groote and Klein Berg rivers were thoroughly explored, Riebeeck's Kasteel and Vieren-twintig Rivieren named, and the Land of Waveren (Tulbagh) entered; de la Guerre and van Meerhof once more struggled on beyond the Olifants river and made contact with the Great 1663. Grigriqua Hottentots; but, in that direction, there was apparently not much hope of expansion, for *Grundel* sailed along an inhospitable shore as far north as Angra Pequena and *Bode* skirted 1669. a dry and thirsty land where no water was as far as Portuguese 1677. territory. Meanwhile, Cruse went eastward through the land of the Hessequas as far as Mossel Bay, where he heard of the 1667-1668. Attaqua clan farther on, and, next year, in the course of an attempt to reach Natal by sea, he landed at Mossel Bay, pushed on to 'George,' found the Attaquas and heard of the still more remote Outeniquas. Later in the year Cruse went back again and, to the great joy of the Hessequas, defeated some Bushmen and recovered looted Hottentot cattle.¹

Hitherto the Company's cattle-runs, the Schuur, Steenberg, Bommelshoek and Boerboomen, had all lain within the Peninsula or on Robben and Dassen Islands; but now new stations were 1666. opened at Saldanha Bay and Vishoek on the far side of False Bay, and, by 1679, Company cattle and sheep were grazing at the Tygerberg, Eerste river and Hottentots-Holland. At each post there was a handful of soldiers to frighten away the Bushmen and keep an eye on the doings of the free burghers. For the question of the food supply was still the main preoccupation of the authorities. It was on this score that they had their chief difficulties with their subjects and their neighbours.

The one industry on which the burghers and local officials desired to embark was cattle and sheep-rearing, and that was the one industry on which their lords and masters were determined they should not. Competition would mean a rise in the price of cattle bartered with the Hottentots, and the Company did not propose to pay more for its meat than it must. The burghers were still allowed to keep cattle: indeed the Company gave them cattle on credit, van Riebeeck compensated them in live-stock for their losses during the Hottentot War of 1659, and the Directors 1668. encouraged them by forbidding its officials to keep cattle or to have more land than a mere garden; but the placaat against cattle-barter with the Hottentots was re-issued sixteen times

¹ Theal, IIIa. index; Godée-Molsbergen, *Reizen*, I. II. III.

between 1658 and 1680.¹ This constant repetition of itself proves that the law was systematically disregarded.

1663.

Contact with Europeans, official and unofficial, had serious effects on the loose tribal system of the Hottentots. To put it shortly, the Hottentots began to differentiate into three classes: detribalised natives in and about the Colony, clans which remained in touch with the white men but still kept something of their tribal organisation, and clans which saved themselves by withdrawing into the interior. The Company had advertised its intentions to Christianise the natives, and in the early days Dominie van der Staël did his best: Hottentots were admitted to the reconstituted school alongside of European and slave children, and, a few years later, the salary of the predikant de Voogt was raised because 'die zwarte natie' had made such progress in knowledge of Christianity and the Catechism.² A few urban Hottentots like Herry, Eva and the interpreter Doman adopted a more or less European style of life; Willem Willems, the black sheep of the settlement, found to his cost that it was not safe to kill a Hottentot, for he was first deported to Robben Island and then, at the request of the outraged natives, to the penal settlement of Mauritius.³ But as a body the Hottentots were not readily absorbed into the ranks of civilised society. Detribalised men hung about eager for surreptitious arrack and tobacco; ⁴ the older folk begged or sold firewood; the girls went out to inefficient domestic service. So it was with them as early as 1666.

1676.

The later developments of van Riebeeck's native policy had not found favour at headquarters. The Chamber of Amsterdam had censured his treatment of the Kaapmen; his successor, Wagenaar, had ordered the Company's servants to be more tactful, and van Quaelberg had decreed that Hottentots were not to be struck nor even punished when they were guilty of misdoing.⁵ But now the Company's men felt themselves strong enough to deal decisively with the neighbouring clans. European diseases were completing the break-up of the Hottentots which loss of their cattle had begun; wherefore the Dutch claimed the Peninsula as 'justly won by the sword'; but, to regularise their position, they went through the farce of buying it and the lands adjacent to False and Saldanha Bays nominally for £1600 and actually for £9 12s. 9d. in goods.⁶ Meanwhile, the Directors had rejected Riebeeck's proposal to sell the Company's protection to one clan

1672.

¹ *Rambles*, p. 62.

² No. 50 of 1835, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14; Moodie, *Records*, I. 343, 381.

⁴ Sale of liquor to Hottentots was illegal (No. 50 of 1835, p. 13).

⁵ No. 50 of 1835, p. 13; Moodie, *Records*, I. 255, 297.

⁶ Moodie, *Records*, I. 205, 317.

against another and had bidden van Quaelberg abstain from intervention in tribal politics ; nevertheless, the Cape Government began to give brass-headed staffs to selected chiefs as a recognition ^{1673.} of their chiefdom ¹ and supported Klaas the Chainouqua against his enemies. They thereby involved themselves in serious trouble with Gonnema, the redoubtable Chochoqua. Bushmen killed three burghers in the Breede river valley, far away from the settlement, and Gonnema, as reputed overlord of the murderers, was held responsible. Then Kees, Gonnema's son, slew a party of Europeans and destroyed the post at Saldanha Bay. Commandos of soldiers and burghers took the field ; commando service was made obligatory on burghers for the first time ; ^{1674.} friendly Hottentots assisted, and the bickering went on to the great damage of the cattle-barter. At last, a general pacification was ^{1677.} made and a joint force of troops, burghers and Hottentots made a fruitless expedition against the Bushmen in the eastern borderlands.²

That commando was significant. Henceforward, the Europeans met with little serious resistance from the Hottentots ; rather the men of the two cattle-owning races worked together against the common enemy, the Bushmen. Nevertheless, the Koranas have a tradition that at this time the Gorachouquas, ' the sons of Kora,' began to trek away inland, clearing off the Bushmen as they went. The withdrawal of the Hottentots before the face of the white man had begun.³

CHAPTER III

COLONISATION, 1679-1717

The van der Stel colonising experiment—Economic conditions—Willem Adriaan van der Stel and the free burghers—European, Native and Slave—The de Chavonnes report.

Commander : Simon van der Stel, Oct. 12, 1679—June 1, 1691 ; *Governors* : S. van der Stel, June 1, 1691—Feb. 11, 1699 ; Willem Adriaan van der Stel, Feb. 11, 1699—June 3, 1707 ; [Secunde Johan Cornelis d'Ableing, acting June 1707—Feb. 1708] ; Louis van Assenburgh, Feb. 1, 1708—Dec. 27, 1711 ; [Secunde Willem Helot, acting Dec. 1711—March, 1714] ; Mauritz Pasques de Chavonnes, March 28, 1714—Sept. 8, 1724.

THE last two decades of the seventeenth century and the first two of the eighteenth are the most important in the early history of

¹ Theal, IIa. 210.

² *Journal*, 1671-6, pp. 190, 240 ff. ; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 13, 14.

³ Theal, IIa. 246.

Europeanised South Africa. The East India Company experimented once more with colonisation in its eastern possessions and made a deliberate effort to transform its refreshment station at the Cape into a genuine colony. This period of assisted immigration and close settlement covered the governorships of the van der Stels, father and son, and saw the arrival of the majority of the ancestors of the present Afrikaner folk of South Africa. The effort ceased for a variety of reasons in 1707. During the ten years which followed the cessation of immigration, various institutions which had been slowly forming in earlier years took definite shape, and, in 1717, the vital decision was taken to import slaves rather than white artisans. The Colony at the Cape, thus based definitely on servile labour, was condemned to face all the problems of a tropical dependency in a temperate climate.

1672-
1678.

1678.

Fear of the French and the precarious nature of the cattle-trade with the Hottentots were the two main motives which prompted the Seventeen to make this colonising experiment. Towards the close of the long war with Louis XIV, the authorities at the Cape had made great preparations for an expected French attack, entrusting their cherished flocks and herds to faithful Hottentot allies and employing destitute natives on the fortifications in return for their rations.¹ The French peril ended with the Peace of Nymwegen; meanwhile, owing to intertribal quarrelling, the supply of cattle had been highly intermittent and had almost entirely ceased during the war with Gonnema. The Directors were then faced with two problems: first, how could they ensure a steady food-supply at the half-way house without undue expense to themselves, for, assuredly, the Colony was too expensive to be run as a mere vegetable garden with a semi-official, semi-barbarian 'migratory farm' attached; secondly, how could they reduce the costly garrison and yet strengthen their hold on the Cape, again without undue expense, against the Frenchmen, Englishmen and Danes who were finding their way past it in increasing numbers?² They found the answer to both puzzles in an increase of free burghers, and sent out Simon van der Stel as Commander to look to it.

Simon was the son of Adriaan van der Stel of Dordrecht, once Governor of Mauritius, and of his Indian wife, Monica of the Coast.³ Born at Mauritius and educated at Amsterdam, Simon arrived at the Cape in 1679, a dark, cheerful man of medium

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 14.

² Shipping, 1662-71: 370 Dutch, 26 French, 9 English, 2 Danes. 1672-1700: 976 Dutch, 170 English, 42 Danes, 36 French.

³ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 11.

height, forty years of age and an ardent Dutch patriot. He at once, as it were, leaped the sandy Flats which cut off the Cape from 'Africa' and founded a new village in the fruitful Eerste river valley at Stellenbosch. There he gave his settlers farms in full ownership as large as they could cultivate, and the use of 1679. unoccupied ground for grazing; but the farms were to revert to the Company if they were not worked, the culture of tobacco was forbidden, and one-tenth of the grain not consumed by the growers was to be handed over to the Company at the barrier outside the Castle. So far, so good: but the new settlement was a mere skeleton, and if Simon was to extend it as he proposed along the Berg river valley under the purple shadows of the mountains of Africa, he must have immigrants. 'Our colonists,' he reported, 'consist chiefly of strong, gallant, and industrious bachelors'; but the Seventeen regretted that they saw very little chance of sending out suitable settlers, 'because people can at present earn a very good livelihood here.'¹ Even girls from the orphanages of the Netherlands refused to make the voyage, and the appointment of the Cape as a depot for East Indian prisoners of rank was cold comfort to a Commander so keen on 'our people' as was Simon.

The flood of commissioners which poured in upon the Cape during the next few years witnessed to the interest which the *heeren majores in patria* were taking in their southern dependency. First came ex-Governor-General van Goens, 1682. followed by his son, an Ordinary Councillor from Ceylon; then 1684. Councillor Extraordinary Daniel Heyns to inspect False Bay and 1699. tinker with the currency, and, finally, Ordinary Councillor and Admiral of the Fleet Wouter Valckenier to do many things that he 1700. should not have done.² But the acts of these men with their high-sounding titles could be reversed either by the Seventeen or Batavia or their successors. It was otherwise with Hendrik Adriaan van Rheede, Lord of Mydrecht and Drakenstein, for he was a High Commissioner answerable only to the mighty Seventeen.³

Van Rheede modified the system of government, central and local, laid down slave regulations, and foreshadowed reserves for 1685. the Hottentots.⁴ Simon had already somewhat improved the machinery of government to meet the needs of the growing colony. At the capital he had set up a Petty Court of two 1682. officials and two burghers appointed annually to sit weekly and relieve the High Court by hearing minor civil suits arising from the Cape district, subject to an appeal to the High Court itself.

¹ Moodie, *Records*, I. 376, 394.

² *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 3, 7, 23; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 248; *Rambles*, p. 143.

³ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I.

⁴ Van Rheede had *carte blanche* to set the Dutch East Indies in order.

At the same time he had established a court of four Heemraden at newly founded Stellenbosch.¹ These men were burghers, half retiring annually after presenting to the Council the usual double list of names of proposed successors; they were unpaid and limited to hearing petty civil cases, but their powers, though ill-defined, were none the less respected from the first. Van Rheeде now fixed the fluctuating number of seats on the Council of Policy at eight. The Council could still be expanded into a Broad Council when ships were in the Bay; sometimes, to the fury of the Governor, admirals convened Broad Councils on ship-board without consulting him, but henceforward there were never more than eight councillors chosen from among the Governor—De Edel Heer, Councillor Extraordinary of India—the Secunde, the two chief military officers, the treasurer, secretary, chief salesman, garrison book-keeper and cashier. Van Rheeде also fixed the membership of the High Court at eight officials and two senior burgher Councillors appointed annually with a reminder that relatives could not be permitted to serve together. He also appointed a Landdrost at Stellenbosch. The primary duties of this official, who would, in the ordinary course, be appointed by the Governor, were administrative; he was a salaried official posted near the frontier to look after the Company's farms, cattle-runs and other interests, but, as chairman of the court of Heemraden, he had both judicial and administrative work to do. This court was to meet monthly to settle civil suits involving not more than £10, subject to an appeal to the High Court in all but the most trivial cases; to act as a district council for the care of roads, water-supply, destruction of vermin; to levy a paid *corvée* of waggons, slaves and draught animals for public purposes; to raise a local revenue by milling corn and levying a small duty on sheep and cattle, to report applications for land and to spend up to £100 without reference to the central authorities.² Such was the basis of local government which survived the Company in the Cape by many years and later on reappeared in all essentials in the republics which arose beyond its borders.

One other important addition to the ruling powers in the Colony was made after van Rheeде's departure. This was the Independent Fiscal, who was appointed to watch the finances, regulate the administration of justice and act as public prosecutor. He was responsible only to the Seventeen, who were eager to

1689.

¹ *Journal, 1699-1732*, pp. 45, 58, 65; Moodie, *Records*, I. 390; C. G. Botha, *Early Inferior Courts of Justice* (S.A. Law Journal, 1921).

² This court, e.g., encouraged wool-growing, organised the Waveren trek and saw to the carting of fuel to the predikant. A quarrel over its power to levy *corvée* led to the definition of the Cape-Stellenbosch boundary in 1711 (Theal, IIa. 429). Its summary civil powers were increased in 1716 (*ibid.*, 437).

check the corruption and private trade which were already eating out the heart of the Company ; wherefore, since *justitia magnum emolumentum est*, he was stimulated to do his duty by the promise of one-third of the fines levied by the High Court in addition to his lordly salary of £100 per annum.¹

Meanwhile, the population increased step by step with this increasing weight of governmental machinery. The Directors succeeded in sending out a number of Dutch and German settlers ; Company's servants and soldiers took their letters of freedom at the Cape ; the van der Stels waylaid likely men till the Directors had to protest against ' this habit of disembarking and keeping artisans at the Cape who are destined for India.'² But salvation really came indirectly from France. There had long been French-speaking Walloons in the United Provinces who had fled thither from the Spanish terror at the close of the sixteenth century. These refugees were now being joined by Huguenots who abandoned France where that Most Christian King, Louis XIV, was bearing with increasing severity on those of the reformed faith. Some Huguenots betook themselves to Brandenburg, others to England or to her American colonies, but many went to the free Netherlands, especially after Louis had revoked what was left of the Edict of Nantes. In the Netherlands they were organised as branches of existing Dutch congregations ; but their numbers became an embarrassment, and the Seventeen bethought them that here lay a reservoir from which they could draw settlers for their African colony. Some of the Frenchmen knew how to make wine, brandy and vinegar, and the less said of attempts to manufacture these commodities at the Cape hitherto the better ; moreover, the young women would furnish desirable wives for Simon's gallant bachelors.

The Directors, therefore, offered such Huguenots and Piedmontese (Dalluyden) as were prepared to take the oath of allegiance, a free passage to the Cape and advances for equipment, to be repaid in kind as opportunity offered. They were to undertake to stay at the Cape for at least five years, unless by grace of the Company they were released sooner, and then they might pay their own way home if they wished. The Piedmontese refused to sail after all, but the Frenchmen began to arrive, ' industrious people, satisfied with little, and your Honours are to give them the same treatment as is laid down by us for free men of our nation.'³

¹ *Journal, 1699-1732*, p. 152 ; *Lett. Rec., 1695-1708*, p. 9.

² *Lett. Rec., 1695-1708*, pp. 183, 301.

³ C. G. Botha, *The French Refugees at the Cape*, pp. 132 ff. ; Moodie, *Records*, I. 422 ; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, II. 641 ff.

This Simon was only too pleased to do, for the Huguenots promised to 'benefit and strengthen the colony in a wonderful degree.' They were never very numerous. The total of the original parties of 1688-89, together with the families which came in during the next few years, was something under two hundred souls all told, or about one-sixth of the free burgher population of the Cape; but economically and socially their influence was out of all proportion to their numbers. They were of a better social class than most of the Dutch and German settlers who accompanied or preceded them; some of them were skilled vine and olive-dressers or artisans; they were nearly all young and married, real colonists who had no Fatherland towards which to turn their head and ears in bad times, for the Netherlands had been at best a city of refuge and *la belle France* was closed to them.

Politically, however, there was a certain risk in admitting them. The Dutch were frightened of the French, and with good reason, for Colbert was but newly dead and Louis was still acquisitive; the Huguenots in England and Brandenburg openly said they would go home if they could, and it was doubtful whether those at the Cape would resist or aid a French invading force. Men remembered how Montdevergue had planted the French lilies at Saldanha Bay, and how Commander van Quaelberg had been dismissed next year for furnishing a visiting French squadron from the Company's stores.¹ Indeed, Simon was not quite certain how far his masters meant him to keep open house for foreigners. At first he was forbidden to supply them with anything more than water, but in response to protests from foreign Powers, the Seventeen permitted their ships to buy anything they liked from burghers except wheat and fuel, which were both running low, and even to have ship's stores in case of absolute necessity. But the position was long uncertain, and as late as 1698 Simon was forbidden to give an English East India squadron any assistance and had to excuse himself for selling them a couple of sails on the plea that the English were allies and both the sails were very bad.² But the French were the Company's bugbear at this time. Simon took excessive precautions when Vaudricourt's peaceful flotilla of six ships put into Table Bay on its way to Siam, and when, a little later, he accepted a medallion from another French visitor, he was reprimanded by the Seventeen. The du Quesnes were active at Mascarenhas, and the republican *Heeren Majores* disliked medallions bearing the image and superscription of *le Grand Monarque*.

¹ Moodie, *Records*, I. 299.

² *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 70, 74.

1667

1686.

1690.

However, here were the Huguenots, and van der Stel made haste to settle them in his new 'colonies' in the Berg river valley. Already he had planted twenty-three families at Drakenstein, 1687. each on sixty morgen in full ownership on terms similar to the grants at Stellenbosch. The Frenchmen were settled mainly at Drakenstein and French Hoek hard by, but, to their dismay, they were interspersed among stout Dutch or German burghers. Some of them declared that they would rather live with their own folk as servants than tolerate such neighbours; but Simon was determined to have no French Quebec at the Cape, and so the French, Dutch and German colonies spread down the Berg river valley, to the Paarl in 1688, to Wagenmakers' Vallei in 1698, and to the Land of Waveren in 1699.¹

The bulk of the Frenchmen settled at French Hoek and Drakenstein. Difficulties soon arose. Paul Roux, the parish clerk and schoolmaster, could speak both French and Dutch, but Pierre Simond, the Frenchmen's pastor, only knew his own tongue; nevertheless, Simond was given a seat on the Stellenbosch consistory. This by no means satisfied his followers. They asked for a consistory of their own; whereat van der Stel lost his temper and railed at 'the impertinence of the French,' who were apparently 'of a mind to have their own Magistrate, Commander and Prince to be chosen from the people.' The distant Seventeen took a more statesmanlike view than the harassed Commander. They consented to a separate consistory of elders and deacons for Drakenstein, 'who, if there are any such to be found, shall be able to understand both the French and Dutch languages,' and promised to send out bilingual schoolmasters to Stellenbosch and Drakenstein specially to teach Dutch to the French children, 'in order to unite our nation by this means.' To further this amalgamation, van der Stel was bidden to 'make them live among one another.' This he was already doing, and he now arranged that Church services should be held alternately at Stellenbosch and Drakenstein.²

Amalgamation steadily took place. The Huguenots were few and scattered, and their recruitment speedily ceased. Willem

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 101, 136, 151, 159; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 1, 2, 29, 32. The system of land-tenure was developing at this time. A record of grants was kept; the cost of survey was paid by the grantee, but no grants were registered till survey had been completed. Sometimes years passed between the actual grant and registration; meanwhile, the holder had to be content with a mere notification of allotment. On Land Tenures *vide* Rec. C.C., VIII. 106; Report of Cape Surveyor-General, G. 30-1876; C. G. Botha, *Early Land Tenures at the Cape* (S.A. Law Journal, May and Aug., 1919); Walker, *Historical Atlas of South Africa*, pp. 7 ff.).

² Botha, *French Refugees*, pp. 152 ff.; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, II. 599 ff.

1700. Adriaan van der Stel, the new Governor, thought little of them, and asked for Zeelanders instead, and the Directors decided to send out no more Frenchmen. Henceforward, while the colonising experiment lasted, only Dutchmen and Germans were assisted to the Cape; but, on the whole, the Directors handled the Frenchmen at the Cape tactfully. The refugees naturally clung to their own way of life, and the older folk especially found it hard to learn Dutch; hence, when Pierre Simond retired, 1702. another bilingual minister was sent out, 'not as we take it to preach in the latter language (French), but only to be of service to the aged colonists who do not know our language . . . in order that in course of time the French language may die out . . . and, with this object in view, the schools are to give in future no other or further instruction than is necessary to let the youth learn to read and write our language.' But the Frenchmen protested; the Chamber of Amsterdam told the Governor to use his judgment, and Willem Adriaan relented sufficiently to permit the new minister, Bec, to preach in French at least every other week.¹

The policy of the Company was thus to fuse the jarring elements in the Cape population. That fusion was hastened in an unforeseen manner by the irregular conduct of the Governor, and in common opposition to the officials at De Kaap, the Frenchmen and Dutchmen of the Berg river valley learnt to know one another better.

The economic condition of the Cape was thoroughly unhealthy. The settlement had been founded as a supply depot which, for the first forty years or so of its career, failed to meet the demands made upon it. The supply depot then became a colony and found that the supply, except in the very worst years, outran the demand. The local market was small, restricted, and easily glutted; the burgher population was tiny and in many ways inexperienced; the Cape itself was remote from other parts of the civilised world; the monopolistic policy of the Company accentuated the ills to which South African farming and industry are naturally subject.

Generally speaking, the Seventeen meant well by the burghers so long as their trading monopoly was not touched and prices of supplies were not raised against them. The Company had first call on the burghers' cattle, corn and wine, and claimed a three days' start in the sale of vegetables and other minor commodities to foreigners; foreigners were few and far between, and, for the rest, the free burghers were hopelessly restricted. They might produce the goods, but to turn them into good money was not easy. Monopoly, engrossing, regrating and all the economic

¹ Botha, *op. cit.*, pp. 158, 160; *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 2; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, II. 603.

heresies of the seventeenth century were in the blood and bones of Jan Compagnie. Before ever there were free burghers at the Cape, the concession policy had been introduced when Annetje de Boerin acquired a monopoly of the milk supply. By the time of Governor Goske the practice of leasing the right to retail spirits, wine, beer, tobacco, oil, vinegar, bread and meat was well established, and the demand of the harassed burghers that they might sell their grain, wine and other products freely to anyone on payment of suitable duties was rejected. 1655. 1673. 1676.

The leases were the simplest means of controlling local trade and raising revenue; indeed, considerably more than half the Cape revenue was drawn from this source, even though the purchase price was rarely paid in full. The leases for the retail trade and the supply of such commodities as the Company chose to buy through the contractors were auctioned annually on the basis of falling bids for supply to the Company, rising bids for retail to fellow-burghers, who must buy and sell through the contractors, and liberty to fleece the stranger as God and opportunity might permit. Prices for the Company and the burghers were fixed; those chargeable to foreigners were left open, and Simon van der Stel privately advised the free burghers to demand from passers-by four or five times the usual prices. As the Cape was the first port of call for sailors and officials returning home from the Indies with their accumulated pay in their pockets, the prices asked were usually paid; but the Cape earned a bad name among men who went down to the sea in ships.¹ 1681.

During the van der Stel period, the oil and vinegar leases were dropped because the return was so small; on the other hand, the Company's salt monopoly was stiffened. The Company owned the pans and allowed anyone to collect salt provided they delivered one waggon-load in every three at the Castle; but so much damage was done by driving waggons into the pans, that fines were presently levied on burghers who collected salt without a permit.² 1705.

There was continual friction over the beer licences. The European beer lease was trifling, but that for home-brewed beer was a different matter. The Company furnished one of the burghers with land and boilers, partly on credit; but it only allowed him to sell by the cask lest the European beer licensee suffer and the families who made sugar beer be ruined. These things required nice adjustment by an anxious government; even so, there were the usual complaints of bad beer,

¹ *Let. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 69, 188; *Journal*, 1699-1732, p. 87; Theal, IIa. 257.

² *Let. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 25, 274; *Journal*, 1699-1732, p. 86.

the blame for which was thrown on the tapsters. Then the unhappy brewer died, bad harvests starved the infant industry, and the matter ended for the time being when the widow declined, with many 'irrelevant and aggravating expressions,' to pay for the boilers.¹

1700. After beer, tobacco—naturally. At first, the lessee alone had the right to buy from the Company, but later on anyone was allowed to buy at the same price. The wretched retailer lost heavily on such terms, and the old plan had to be revived, though the Company retained the right to sell wholesale in rolls over the head of the holder. With the reduction of the garrison—Marlborough and the Allies apparently had the French on the run—the value of the lease fell off, and the Company decided to sell direct to the public at a profit of fifty per cent. The sanguine expectation was defeated by the smugglers, and the Company had to instruct the landdrost to off-load its unsalable supplies on the farmers of Stellenbosch at any price payable in corn!²

1707. Beer, tobacco, oil, vinegar, these be but toys. The really important products were meat, corn and wine, and it was over the handling of them that the struggle arose between the government and some of its free burghers.³ The issue at stake was the bread and butter of the wine and wheat farmers. Wheat, the staple crop, best tells the story of an African farm of those days. Van Riebeeck had commanded his free burghers to leave cattle-bartering alone, to devote but little time to vegetables and vines, and to concentrate on ploughing. Meanwhile the Company had diligently tried to grow corn for itself, but burghers and Company's men had long failed to supply themselves adequately, let alone the shipping and the East Indian stations, and in bad times rice had had to be rushed in from Java to stave off famine. Borghorst had then ploughed up new lands at Hottentots-Holland and, to encourage the burghers, had leased the Company's farm at Rondebosch and raised the price which the Company was prepared to pay for grain.⁴

1670. Cultivation increased; the younger van Goens remitted the tithe for two years; the first small export of grain to Batavia took place, and in the following year van Rheede fixed prices, talked hopefully of a large export, and ordered all available corn to be stored at the Castle with due precautions against fire. Immigrants flowed in; Simon bade his Frenchmen grow vines by all means, but corn at all costs; new corn lands were broken; the

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 21, 46, 136, 315; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 31, 99, 109.

² *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 319, 393; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 31, 40, 79.

³ On the van der Stel controversy, *vide* L. Fouche, *The Diary of Adam Tas*.

⁴ Theal, *Ila.* 178.

Company which had long ago forbidden its officials to farm, began to give up the unnecessary and expensive task of growing its own corn; and though it tried to keep two years' supply in its magazines, found anything up to 2000 muids was available annually for despatch to Batavia.¹ Then, the supply of corn having thus outstripped the demand, Batavia declined to take any more wheat ^{1696.} because it was much too expensive and not so good as the Surat variety. The anxious Seventeen admitted that wheat at the Cape cost nearly twice as much as in Holland, but, once more to encourage the colonists, they commanded Batavia to take Cape wheat at Bengal and Surat prices and ordered van der Stel to urge his farmers on to greater efforts. Batavia took a little with a bad grace; Simon replied that his men were set on quick returns and would take no pains; and then came a run of bad ¹⁶⁹⁸⁻ seasons which forced him to import Java rice and ration the ^{1705.} burghers. Next year the drought broke with such violence that the crops were flooded out in the Berg river valley and disease appeared in what survived.²

The story of Cape wine and brandy is equally depressing. Wine had been made from 1659 onwards; but Batavia disliked it and the wine farmers scorned the suggestion of the Cape Council that they should send their wines to the East and sell them for what they would fetch on payment of freight and duty. Restriction and monopoly had infected them and they rejected the offer of qualified free trade. It was not made to them again for many a long day. Meanwhile the Cape tried its hand at brandy. It ^{1672.} was of a nature even more startling than the wine, and van Rheeде presently complained that neither wine nor brandy nor vinegar had ever been properly made at the Cape. However, as the Company wanted wine, the High Commissioner prohibited the manufacture of brandy and left Simon to put wine-making on a sound footing.³ ^{1685.} Wherefore Simon imported new cuttings and Huguenots, forbade pressing till the vines had been inspected by a committee, and himself experimented with success on the farm Constantia which van Rheeде had granted to him. Wine was exported to Ceylon, ^{1688.} and the Company began to buy from the farmers at £5 per legger ^{1694.} for export to Batavia. Alas! Batavia complained that pork-casks were not fit receptacles for the juice of the grape, and tactfully suggested that the Cape should make brandy or vinegar instead; the Fatherland itself evinced no enthusiasm,⁴

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 21, 42; *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 11; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, pp. 61-2. A muid is 2·972 bushels.

² *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 11, 18, 37, 54, 93; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, pp. 68, 86; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 2, 3, 76; *Rambles*, pp. 7, 8, 158.

³ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 19.

⁴ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 13, 46; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 32.

and some foreigners were openly rude on the score of Cape wine. 'Tis Colour'd like Rhenish,' wrote the Englishman Ovington, 'and therefore they pass it under that specious name in *India*, but the taste of it is much harder and less palatable; its operations more searching, and the strength of it more intoxicating and offensive to the Brain.'¹ Later comers gave a rather more favourable report. Maxwell could note in 1708 that Cape wines were 'not inconsiderable either for quantity, quality or variety';² the Constantia brand was already recognised as good, for the labours of Simon and the Huguenots had not been fruitless; nevertheless, the Colony had to face the fact that the only sure outlet for its fast-increasing volume of wine was the Capetown market and the ships.

That outlet was jealously guarded. Farmers might not retail their own wines, for the wine lease was the most valuable of all to the Company and the lessees; it gave the one over five-sixths of the total revenue from leases; it gave the others a privileged position at a port whose inhabitants were much given to keeping canteens. For a time the wine lease was divided between four persons who were supposed to be independent of one another and who certainly had liberty to buy and sell where and how they pleased.³

As with wine, so with brandy. The importation of foreign brandy was a Company monopoly. The retail trade was duly leased, and to protect the lessee and its own interests the Company first forbade the making of Cape brandy and then divided the lease into four parts to force the lessees to buy only from its stores. For everyone knew that Cape brandy was made; the lessees complained loudly that the folk of Stellenbosch, Drakenstein and other 'do-nothing' people smuggled it to the troops and boarding-house keepers at Capetown. It was in vain that the Fiscal was given inquisitorial powers; the illicit stills and traffic flourished; the very lessees smuggled, and for lack of foreign spirit the Company had first to remit part of the lease money and then allow the lessees to replenish stores from the ships or, in the last resort, to buy the forbidden local product. The Company clung hard to its monopoly, but the value of the lease fell with the size of the garrison; something had to be done with the flood of wine that was pouring forth at the Cape, and at last,

¹ V.R. Soc., V. 107.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53. Compare Lady Anne Barnard's defence of Cape wines (*South Africa a Century Ago*, p. 44; and *State of the Cape in 1822*, p. 109). The truth is that Cape wines varied immensely; some brands were good, others bad, and in good seasons the bad were apt to swamp the good and give the whole an unenviable reputation.

³ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 13; *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 141, 188; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 5, 6, 12, 13.

after two years' hesitation, it yielded to Willem Adriaan's importunity and allowed the burghers to make brandy and vinegar. But, perhaps prudently, it would not undertake to buy either.¹ 1707.

The Company tried to encourage minor industries, but indigo, olives, coconuts, sugar, cassava, rice and hops failed one after another; Natal millet thrived and made good native beer, but that was all, and Simon had to report that the burghers would take no trouble with any intensive kind of cultivation. Simon was unduly hard on the burghers, for climate and soil were against them, and the very seasons of the year fought against his son's attempt to establish a silk industry. The mulberry trees came into leaf at the wrong time of year and the worms, failing to realise that they were now south of the Equator, died. So it went, and the export of a few ostrich eggs to the king of Candy gave no promise of closer settlement and the intensive farming which goes therewith.²

The Cape thus failed to produce many things which the Company desired; conversely, one of the supplies which it had at first furnished in abundance was in danger of exhaustion. Van Riebeeck had found the mountain kloofs of the Peninsula full of trees and had added the oak and the fir thereto; but timber had been cut wastefully, and already in van Rheeде's time the very garrison was short of firewood.³ Van der Stel sent an expedition 120 leagues by sea to search for timber on the mythical islands of Dina and Marseveen,⁴ but he also took more practical steps nearer home. He planted oaks on the Company's lands, offered oaks to farmers and ordered every man who felled a tree to plant an acorn; he levied *corvée* through the burgher councillors for tree-planting at Wynberg and gave Stellenbosch and Drakenstein the oaks for which they are still famous. His son carried on the good work; but both father and son did it in the teeth of popular opposition. Farmers complained that there was no room for trees on little farms of 60 morgen, and that, in any case, trees harboured destructive birds, and Willem Adriaan was soon driven to drawing up regulations to protect the oaks in the streets of Stellenbosch. So long as the van der Stels ruled afforestation continued, but even they had to confess that the quick-growing local trees were useless for ship's timbers.⁵

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 19; *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 69, 95, 141, 236, 254, 319; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 414; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 36, 62, 159.

² *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 28, 153, 176; *Theal*, IIa. 126, 201, 263, 319, 362, 374.

³ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 22.

⁴ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 115; *Journal*, 1699-1732, p. 7.

⁵ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 22, 183, 209; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 10 ff.

Experiments in wool were equally disappointing. The Seventeen wanted wool, and the van der Stels did their best to get it. Simon experimented with woolly sheep alongside of his horses and cattle at Constantia; Willem Adriaan fetched rams from Europe and Persian sheep from Java and ran them at his farm, Vergelegen; under pressure of the Directors and the Governors, a few farmers sheared sheep. The samples were good, but they remained mere samples, and the vast majority of the burghers would not even try to grow wool. They preferred the fat-tailed, hairy sheep of the country, for there was always a demand for mutton at Capetown.¹

Of the three staple products, corn, wine and meat, the Company bought the first two direct from the burghers if it chose, but the last it bought through a contractor.² Since 1668 members of the Council of Policy had been forbidden to keep more cattle than would supply their own needs, but free burghers were able to buy beasts from the Company at little more than cost price and hire breeding ewes on halves. On the other hand, the Company assiduously reared cattle and sheep and, to keep down prices and to prevent contact between the burghers and the natives, reserved to itself the cattle-barter with the Hottentots. The difficulty was that cattle had far more attractions for the farmers than had general agriculture; cattle could look after themselves and walk to market; there was a sure return on those that survived the trek. Wherefore, the laws against the trade were dead-letters and a new social class began to emerge in the borderlands.

From the very first the farmer, the *boer*, had tended to become a cattle-farmer, a *veeboer*. Now, long before the end of the seventeenth century, the frontier *veeboer* was in process of becoming the *trekboer*, the semi-nomadic frontiersman *sang pur* who was to blaze the trail for civilisation far into the interior of Africa.³ The original free burghers had all kept cattle, and one of them, Remajenne, had been caught red-handed bartering with the Hottentots; twenty years later, barely one-third of the sixty-two farmer families farmed grain, and an armed party had to go to fetch back three colonists who were living with Gonnema's people and kill them if they would not come.⁴ By Simon's time the frontiersmen were inured to their way of life. Hunting was all in the day's work, for lions and leopards

1679.

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 138, 167, 388; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 331; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 13, 15; *Rambles*, chapter 20.

² Fouche, *Tas*, p. 189.

³ *Vide* L. Fouche, *Die Evolutie van die Trekboer*.

⁴ No. 50 of 1835, p. 15.

abounded, and they looked to game to give them the lean meat which they ate with their fat mutton. The boers were magnificent shots with their heavy guns, and as early as 1681 they had killed off most of the game between the Cape and the Olifants river, ten to twelve days' trek away. Well-to-do farmers had big cattle runs; the young men pushed into the valleys which run among the mountains of Africa, content to live in their trek-waggons or mere hartebeest huts of reeds, content to travel light as men must do who had to pack their waggons in pieces over Roodezand Pass into the Land of Waveren and the Breede river valley. Bread they could do without; they drank neither wine nor beer; meat, milk and honey sufficed them, with a pull of honey-beer on Sundays.

It was against such men that the authorities of the Castle launched *placaaten* forbidding barter or trekking beyond the frontiers. It is true that the Company had had to bribe the burghers to go against Gonnema with a promised share in the loot of cattle, and, at the close of the campaign, had permitted open trade with Gonnema's people. But it had soon stiffened up the rules again. No one was to pay Hottentots in sheep; no one was to give Hottentots money lest they buy tobacco and refuse to barter cattle for that desirable and jealously monopolised commodity; waggons coming to the Cape were to be searched at Keert de Koe for native wares; finally, a policeman was told off to relieve the Hottentots of their cash and force them to put their goods on the open market.¹

Van Rheede foresaw a time when the Company would be able to breed enough cattle for itself and could then safely leave the barter to the burghers;² but, as the years went by, the Company began to think of giving up cattle-raising. There were continual complaints of the leanness of its beasts; there was no reason why, with reasonable care, the burghers should not supply the meat market at a fixed price. Simon did not share that opinion; he wanted to limit the size of the colony till it was properly colonised and had no intention of throwing the cattle-trade open.³ But he was himself partly to blame if his colony was bursting its banks, for he had done much to spread knowledge of what lay beyond the frontiers. He had thrice sent expeditions beyond the Olifants in search of Namaqua copper, and undeterred by their failure, he had himself pushed on to the Koperberg at Ookiep, where he found wealth of copper in the desert and heard of the great Orange river to the north; he had sent another expedition eastward which reached the Inqua Hottentots in

¹ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 14, 15.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 17.

³ *V.R. Soc.*, V. pp. 11 ff.

the present Prince Albert district.¹ Nevertheless, he was determined to control the colonisation of southern Africa. He held that the free burghers sent up prices against the Company; bullied the natives; took cattle by force, pretending to be Company's men, and thereby risked involving Government in war with the Hottentots; exchanged bad beasts for good Company's animals as they passed the cattle-posts, and sold cattle cheap to fellow-burghers. Hence, he offered informers one-third of the cattle taken from illicit traders, ordered all those burghers who were wandering around to report themselves to the landdrost, bade the men of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein go to their homes each night, and laid down limits beyond which owners might not drive their cattle to graze under pain of confiscation and twelve months' hard labour. It was useless; the threat of penalties falling just short of death failed to stop the barter, and, in 1699, Simon handed over the colony and all its cares to his son, Willem Adriaan, with much good advice in the style of David to the youthful Solomon on the way he should go with the free burghers in general and the cattle-farmers in particular.²

Willem Adriaan van der Stel had his virtues; he was energetic, enterprising, and not lacking in courage or self-confidence; but he also had vices which his upbringing in the Company's service had not been calculated to check.³ He had greater difficulties to face than had any previous Cape Governor. The settlement was growing fast; the Dutch and Huguenots were jealous of one another; there were many undesirables in the colony: heavy droughts had followed the locust plagues of 1695; above all, the food supply had outrun the demand; times and tempers were alike bad; he himself was an unsympathetic man; his father still lived at the great house at Constantia which he had built to shelter the wife who obstinately refused to leave the Netherlands, and there gave free rein to the acquisitiveness which was the besetting sin of the van der Stels.

Willem Adriaan was also exposed to great temptations. The moral tone of the East India service was thoroughly rotten, the power of its officials each in his own sphere was almost unchecked. Inquiry had shown that Admiralty officials allowed whole cargoes to be smuggled into the Netherlands because the smugglers were their friends; twenty years later, Abraham van Riebeeck, Director-General in India, could write that 'the gentlemen in

¹ Godée-Molsbergen, *Reizen*, I. 139 ff.; Moodie, *Records*, I. 400, 429 ff.

² *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 19, 24; No. 50 of 1835, p. 16; V.R. Soc., V. pp. 11 ff.

³ Fouche, *Tas*, pp. xxiii, xxv.

the Fatherland regulate matters as they find good there ; but we act here according to our knowledge as we judge best.'¹ All these evils were reproduced on a small scale at the Cape. Salaries were small, but the higher officials had substantial allowances, and all officials were allowed various fees and a limited private trade in crockery, calico, and some other Eastern products. These privileges were abused, and the Fiscal, who was supposed to check them, looked to fees and perquisites to make ends meet. Van Rheede had to limit the amount of free board and vegetables from the Company's gardens taken by officials ; the Company had to order its servants to buy from its stores at the same prices as ordinary folk, and, to check the cluttering of ships with private wares which were off-loaded into lighters before reaching the Texel, it limited the quantity of passengers' baggage, directed the Fiscal to search ships on arrival, and commanded all its captains to sail straight to the port of the Chamber to which they were directed.²

It was the ambition of every one of the superabundant servants of the Company to make his fortune and retire. Willem Adriaan was no exception, but his opportunities at the Cape were limited. However, he was invested with autocratic powers, and he determined to make the most of such opportunities as did offer. He first bought up wine cheaply, treated it, and sold it at a great profit to the ships. This was straightforward business ; but there was no fortune in it. The only fortune to be made at the Cape lay in the supply of meat, corn and wine to the Company. Willem Adriaan and some of the higher officials, therefore, embarked on large-scale agriculture in flat defiance of the law and proceeded to corner this supply in the small Cape market which they, as the government, could regulate as they chose.

Since 1668 the Company, with the avowed intention of helping the free burghers, had forbidden its officials to hold more land than a mere vegetable garden. High Commissioner van Rheede had indeed recommended that officials be allowed to farm and had given Simon Constantia ; but the Directors had maintained the rule and only confirmed van Rheede's grant as an exception. Now, Willem Adriaan persuaded Valckenier, a mere ordinary commissioner, to grant him a considerable farm at Vergelegen, which he presently enlarged by purchase.³ Valckenier granted other farms to the Secunde, the Fiscal, the

¹ W. Cunningham, *Western Civilisation*, II. 205 ; Theal, IIA. 488.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 16, 21, 40 ; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, pp. 117, 224, 227, 242, 254, 314.

³ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. ; *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 333 ; Theal, *Historical Sketches*, pp. 179, 208.

Captain, the Predikant and even the Surveyor, and gave Father Simon the southern half of the Peninsula as a cattle-ranch. The Governor's brother Frans also held a farm near Vergelegen; in other words, the van der Stels and the officials who stood in with them owned one-third of the farming area of the colony, besides the cattle-runs which Willem Adriaan acquired beyond the Hottentots-Holland mountains. The Governor used Company's gardeners, servants, slaves and materials for the building of his house and the laying out of his farm; in time of war, with the fear of the French abroad in the land, he spent long weeks there when he should have been at the Castle; his cattle and sheep kraals were replenished by the landdrost of Stellenbosch and the master gardener, who displayed a passionate interest in the flora—or was it the fauna—beyond the mountains. Nor was he himself above compelling men to purchase his favour with slaves and sheep; Frans, his brother, 'a pest to the colony,' obliged his neighbours to do work for him from fear of government displeasure; worse still, Simon and Adriaan between them soon owned one-third of the vine-stocks in the Colony.¹

1699. Meanwhile, the Governor took steps to get a strangle-hold on the supply of meat and wine to the Company. He was handicapped at the start by two facts. First, the meat contract which van Rheeде had made with a wealthy burgher, Henning Huising, expired, and at once the free men began to slaughter for themselves without the necessary inspection.² Secondly, in the same year, the Seventeen threw the cattle-barter open to burghers, forbade members of the Council and High Court to participate or to supply the Company, ordered the sale of the Company's herds and lands, and merely retained the right to call on the burghers for draught oxen at a price.³ The first difficulty was apparently overcome when Huising, who was at that time in favour at the Castle, was given the meat contract for five years; the second by sheer suppression till, in response to repeated orders, Willem was obliged to declare the barter open. At the same time, he stationed guards of mounted men on the frontiers to keep an eye on the dealings of the burghers with the natives.⁴

1700. Evidence of abuses was soon forthcoming. A party of forty-five Europeans and as many Hottentots, equipped by well-to-do Stellenbosch burghers, journeyed on a cattle-trading expedition eastward to the Fish river. There they fell foul of a stray party of Bantu, attacked various Hottentot clans and drove off much

¹ Fouche, *Tas*, pp. 205, 337 ff., 349.

² *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 10; *Journal*, 1699-1732, p. 11.

³ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 217; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 204; *Journal*, 1695-1708, p. 25; No. 50 of 1835, p. 16.

⁴ *Lett. Desp.*, 1695-1708, pp. 191, 217.

cattle. Willem Adriaan promptly closed the cattle-trade pending the decision of the Seventeen, and held an inquiry. At first the *heeren majores* approved of his action, but at length they reopened the traffic and directed him to push his inquiry no further.¹

Willem Adriaan now closed in on the vital contracts. He induced the Directors to agree that the meat contract should be granted to four butchers who should not themselves be owners of cattle; on the other hand, after much effort, he got leave to knock down more than one of the four wine leases to the same party. Hence, Huising lost his lucrative meat contract, which^{1706.} went to four creatures of the Governor, and the whole of the wine contract fell to another dubious character who was equally dependent on him. Here, then, were the two principal contracts virtually in the hands of officials who could supply much of the wine, meat and corn required, who had the first entry to the narrow market, paid no tithe and held their subject competitors politically in the hollow of their hands. 'Already a year ago,' the Fiscal noted, 'there was folks did say that within that time there should here be no more burghers requisite.'²

The free burghers had also noted that ugly fact. Some of them risked taking action. It is not easy to determine the exact amount of truth in the charges they made against the Governor and his friends. Times were very bad, so bad that the Seventeen had just decreed that foreigners were to be given nothing but fresh water.³ Admittedly, many of the recalcitrant burghers were jealous of the van der Stel family; being human they made the very most they could of any evidence they had. Some of them were themselves unlovely characters; Huising grudged the loss of his contract; van der Heiden was the power behind the cattle-rieving expedition of 1702; but when all is said and done, many of the charges they levied were common ground between the two parties and others were partially admitted by Willem Adriaan. Together, the accusations were enough to ruin the official clique.

Adam Tas, a well-educated Stellenbosch burgher, drew up a petition on behalf of Huising, van der Heiden and other leaders. This was signed by sixty-three burghers, of whom half were French, and was smuggled away to Batavia. The Indian authorities sent one copy to Amsterdam and another to the Cape. Willem Adriaan acted promptly. He summoned the folk of

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 219; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, pp. 301, 331, 347; No. 50 of 1835, p. 16; *Journal*, 1699-1732, p. 56; *Defence of W. A. v. d. Stel*, annexure M.; Fouche, *Tas*, pp. 335 ff.

² Fouche, *Tas*, pp. xxi, 331.

³ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 260.

Capetown, who had no particular quarrel with him, to the Castle, entertained them liberally and got them to sign a glowing testimonial to his virtues as a ruler. Numbers signed, including some Asiatics and free blacks, but, to make sure, the names of certain men were added without their knowledge or consent. The landdrost, by show of arms, collected other signatures at Stellenbosch, and though many there refused to sign, the document in the end bore the names of 240 free men out of a total of 550.¹

This done, the Governor arrested Tas without a warrant, threatened to arrest all signatories of malicious petitions, arrested van der Heiden and other leaders, deported one of them to Batavia, and then rashly despatched Huising and three others to the Netherlands, where they duly made trouble for him. Meanwhile the prisoners in the Castle, thirteen in all, were tried before an irregular court of officials, most of whom were implicated in the misdemeanours complained of by the burghers, with the Governor controlling the proceedings from behind the door of the next room. Some of the prisoners at once gave satisfactory answers to the court's questions, but Tas held out for nearly a month; van der Heiden held out even longer under abominable conditions, and was only released when the Governor feared he would die on his hands; another of the accused held out for four months and a half. Willem Adriaan then talked of further arrests. This, combined with the abandonment of the annual target shooting (and free drinks), led to a riot at Stellenbosch in which the women took an active part. Thereupon the Governor appointed officers to the local militia in an irregular manner and exceeded his powers by dismissing the heemraden and nominating others.²

It was almost his last public act. The Seventeen had long been suspicious that all was not well at the Cape; in 1705 they had reminded their officials there that they must take no part in supplying meat to the Company; then had come the burghers' petition by way of Batavia, closely followed by a memorial which Huising and his fellow deportees brought with them direct from the Colony. A strong committee of inquiry issued a report, and on that report the Directors acted. Willem Adriaan and some of the other leading officials were recalled; Frans was expelled from the Company's dominions; Constantia was left to Simon, but Vergelegen was broken up and sold in four lots, since the Directors desired equality among burghers rather than semi-official model farms; servants were once more forbidden to own or lease land or

¹ Fouche, *Tas*, p. 215.

² *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 55, 62, 97 ff., 109; *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 304 ff., 317.

to trade in cattle, corn, wine and other supplies ; burghers were left free to sell cattle subject to the Company's privileges ; the wine licence was once more divided into four lots ; finally there was to be an end to assisted immigration.¹

The two outstanding facts in the van der Stel controversy were that the burghers, the 'bastards of the Company,' had tried a fall with the officials, 'the Company's legitimate children.' They had tried it on the economic battle-ground ; the demand for a share in the government of the colony only came much later ; nevertheless, they had won. Arising out of this fact was a second. The Seventeen were alarmed and decided to send no more immigrants to the Cape. The period of settlement was over and there was no more assisted immigration worth speaking of till the coming of the English settlers in 1820. Throughout the eighteenth century immigration was of the slightest ; the main additions to the seventeen hundred free burghers, men, women and children, of 1707 were due to natural increase.² Hence the importance of this handful of Europeans to the future of South Africa was far greater than their numbers warranted. They were already differentiated into three groups : the townsmen of De Kaap ; the grain and wine farmers of the Berg river valley beyond the natural barrier of the sandy Cape Flats ; the cattle-farmers who were already far away behind the mountains of Africa. Each of these classes had their peculiar interests and strongly marked characteristics ; all of them were practically marooned at the southern horn of Africa ; their characteristics became still more marked during the two generations of isolation and dispersion which followed the fall of the van der Stels.

The Colony as Willem Adriaan left it has been well described by the English visitor, Maxwell. The Dutch, he wrote, 'have settled for the Convenience of a Rendezvous for their homeward-bound East India fleet, and they have possess'd themselves of the country 60 miles from the place of their first settlement. Beside their principal town in Table Valley . . . where they have a Fort, a Hospital, a supply'd Church, with about 300 families, they have two other small towns in the country call'd Dragenstein Circa 1710.


¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. pp. 3 ff. The local officials eased the abruptness of the van der Stels' departure as much as possible, for the incoming Governor, van Assenburgh, was a relative of the family. William Adriaan and Frans sailed in April 1708, accompanied by their enemies, van der Heiden and Adam Tas. The struggle was thus transferred to Amsterdam. After a fair trial, the ex-Governor and two other officials were dismissed the Company's service.

²

	Free burgher population.	Adults.	Children.
1687.	573	342	231 (Theal, IIa. 325).
1707.	1641	803	820 (<i>Lett. Desp.</i> , 1696-1708, p. 318).

and Stellambuss. . . . There are about 120 families, and have one minister between both villages, a Dutchman who speaks French.' ¹

That was all after sixty years ; yet the little colony owed much to the energy of the van der Stels. The huddle of houses on the shore of Table Bay had become a presentable little town ; Simon, an enthusiastic gardener, and the botanist, Oldenland, had beautified the famous Gardens, divided them into four sections ' in each



CAPE COLONY, circa 1710 A. D.

of which grew abundance of the more remarkable vegetables belonging to its corresponding quarter of the world,' ² and built a pleasure-house on the site of the present Houses of Parliament. Willem Adriaan, it is true, had let the Gardens decay, but to make up for that he had laid out another garden behind the Devil's Peak at Newlands. The Castle had been strengthened. Simon closed the old sea-gate, built the existing handsome gateway, levelled the parade-ground and marked out the Keisersgracht alongside it to take the place of the old road between the Castle and the sea. He also finished the walls, erected the beautiful

¹ V.R. Soc., V. 53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Kat and the government offices which lined the central dividing wall, and built the dividing wall itself to protect the soldiers on the battlements from plunging fire from neighbouring high ground. For, though he punished a rash sergeant who blurted out that the Castle was no good, he and van Rheede knew that it was not such a strong place as it looked, and his son had to defend the main approach with ravelins. Simon also built a new reservoir and a large hospital ; his son built the Groote Kerk ; by 1710, the houses of burghers and officials were spreading along either side of the Gardens.¹

The church had expanded with the settlement and the schools with the churches. The original church of Stellenbosch had become too small and another one had been built, the burghers paying the cost of the structure and the Company furnishing the glass and iron ; but, as late as 1707, the fiery predikant le Boucq could complain that services at Drakenstein had to be held in a shanty. There was the usual elementary school at each church-place, conducted by the parish clerk ; for the rest, parents had to teach their own children or rely on wandering *meesters*, who were, as a rule, minor Company's servants on ticket of leave. Other educational facilities there were none till a certain Lambertus Slicher, who had been in turn ship's chaplain and midshipman, opened a Latin and High Dutch school in Capetown which presently failed for lack of public support.²

Church and school were rigidly controlled by Government. Special leave had to be asked for a joint meeting of the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein consistories, and when, in the groundswell of the van der Stel controversy, le Boucq challenged the right of the lay arm to interfere in spiritual matters, the support of the men of Stellenbosch did not save him from being packed off to Batavia. There had been talk of joint meetings of the three consistories as early as 1691, and, in 1710, a visiting minister proposed that they should form a local *classis* ; but d'Ailly, the minister at the Groote Kerk, was against the idea, the Directors were suspicious, and no such assembly met till 1746. On the other hand, d'Ailly and the Secunde were appointed scholarchs to examine prospective teachers in the public schools and, a little later, *meesters* were subjected to a form of licensing.³

The system of defence had also grown more elaborate. The strength of the garrison varied from 100 in peace time to 700

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 6 ff. ; *Lett. Desp.* 1696-1708, pp. 3, 22, 223-231, 237 ; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 34, 63 ; *Theal*, IIa. 240, 427, 430 ; *Spoelstra, op. cit.*, I. 137.

² *Lett. Desp.* 1696-1708, p. 101 ; *Journal*, 1699-1732, p. 129 ; *Rambles*, p. 4 ; *V.R. Soc.* IV., 165 ; *Theal*, IIa. 453.

³ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 365, 376 ; *Journal*, 1699-1732, pp. 130 ff., 155, 227 ; *Theal*, IIIa. 453 ff. ; E. G. Malherbe, *History of Education in South Africa*, pp. 35 ff. ; *Spoelstra, op. cit.*, I. 38 ; II. 608.

at the crisis of the War of the Spanish Succession, but its actual was always below its paper strength by reason of desertion, sickness, and the absence of men at the cattle-posts or on ticket of leave. Some of these last worked for the higher civil and military officials; others were *pasgangers* who paid for the privilege of working on their own account; others again were men set free to work as *knechts* or overseers of farms or as *meesters* or both, subject to recall to the colours at a moment's notice.¹

1686.

The soldiers were liable for police work, but the Capetown burghers were specially organised for that duty in a burgher watch of six companies, each of them thirty strong under a sergeant and a corporal. These took turns to patrol the town from 4 P.M. to 9 A.M. In the outer districts was the burgher militia, which was kept in touch with the Castle by an elaborate system of flag signals. In 1708 there were two companies of infantry and one of mounted 'dragoners' in the Peninsula, one infantry company at Stellenbosch, another at Drakenstein, and a combined company of dragoners for the two latter centres; in all, 380 infantry and 133 mounted men. Drakenstein and Stellenbosch each had a krygsraad under the presidency of the landdrost, but whereas in van Riebeeck's time officers had been elected by their men, now the krygsraad appointed them for life with the approval of the Council of Policy. Burghers were liable for picket duty in the Peninsula in time of war; they fell in to receive distinguished visitors; van Riebeeck's Sunday afternoon parades had long ago been made compulsory. Even boys of thirteen drilled with the rest, presented their arms for inspection twice a year, and hated it all as whole-heartedly as their elders and betters. There had been a time when the annual target-shooting at the Castle or on the Papagaaiberg at Stellenbosch had been a day of pleasure; but Batavia had cut off the free drinks at Capetown, the Council had extended the embargo to Stellenbosch, and the junketing had departed.

1685.

The commando system arose out of this general system of defence under pressure of the exigencies of native policy. Simon had realised that the Obiquas, the Bushmen, were not only distinct from the Hottentots but so hostile to them that they impeded the cattle-barter. These 'banditti' lifted cattle and, on occasion, killed the owners; they made travel unsafe beyond the borders of the Colony; but, for a time, friction died down as the little hunters withdrew behind the Drakenstein and Hottentots-Holland mountains. Then the colonists followed them up, and

1694.

¹ On the defence system, *vide* P. E. Roux, *Die Verdedigingstelsel aan die Kaap*; V.R. Soc. IV. 161 ff.; VI. 57 ff.; also *Journal, 1699-1732*, pp. 16, 31, 42, 55, 62, 98 ff., 109; *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, pp. 20, 23, 317.

Adriaan van der Stel had to send a Stellenbosch commando to Waveren in pursuit of Bushman murderers and multiply his guard 1701. posts along the eastern frontier.

For a few years thereafter the Bushmen gave little trouble, but at last they raided so heavily that the Company established new military posts at Hex river, Witzenberg and Pikenier's Kloof. It was in response to this raid that the commando took on its 1715. characteristically South African form. Service on the part of the burghers had at first been voluntary, but it had soon been made compulsory, and had naturally given rise to discord between the burghers and the regulars. Speed was essential against so nimble a foe as the Bushmen. Van Riebeeck had proved the value of mounted men against the Hottentots, and the mounted burghers felt themselves hampered by the presence of slow-moving, disciplined troops; but for a long time the forces sent against the natives were mixed parties of troops and burghers, sometimes with Hottentot auxiliaries, but always under the command of a regular officer or the landdrost. On occasion burghers had been given a free hand against the Bushmen, and now, in 1715, a purely burgher commando took the field under a burgher ensign and a *wachtmeester*, forerunner of the later field-cornet.¹ Henceforward, commando officers were sometimes elected by their followers, sometimes appointed by the Governor or landdrost; the Company supplied the ammunition; those who took part in each *straf-commando* reported the result to the Castle, and the expenses of each commando were levied on the men of the Cape and Stellenbosch districts by the *burggeraaden* and *heemraden* respectively. The meaning of it all was that the central government was leaving the defence of the frontiers to the frontiersmen to such an extent that the newly formed military 1716. posts on the extreme frontier were withdrawn.²

The relations of the Europeans with the Hottentots were peaceful on the whole. Bloodshed and cattle-lifting by Hottentots practically ceased after 1689; the tribal system of the neighbouring clans decayed visibly, but the Company still took the chiefs seriously, presented them with staffs of office, recognised successors of chiefs deceased, made no effort to bring them under its own law unless a European or his slave was concerned in the case, helped one clan against another or against the Bushmen, and even talked of giving them reserves. Detribalised Hottentots were steadily drawn into the lowest ranks of Western society; they were not enslaved but, after the fever epidemic of 1687, they began to come forward readily to work in the harvest fields. The attempt to Christianise them was kept up in a half-hearted

¹ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 15 ff.

² Theal, II*a*. 439.

1685. way ; van Rhee de laid down regulations for their admission to the school alongside of white and slave children, where they were to be examined each Christmas Day on their progress in reading, writing and the Heidelberg Catechism. But the progress was never great, and the civilising efforts of the Company soon dwindled away.¹

1713. Then came disaster, complete and overwhelming. Smallpox appeared for the first time and killed nearly one-quarter of the inhabitants of Capetown in six weeks. An unknown number of Europeans died in the countryside ; the slaves suffered heavily, for they lived in dirt ; the isolated Bushmen apparently escaped ; the Hottentots perished in hundreds. It was they who suffered most severely of all ; some of the best-known clans simply disappeared and the farmers were left to look for casual labour in vain.²

Slaves were the obvious alternative labour supply. The number owned by free burghers had increased considerably of late years. This increase was mainly due to importation, which took place even in foreign ships in spite of the Navigation Acts, for natural increase was slow and most of the imported slaves were men.³ Take it all round, slavery at the Cape was not cruel. In Capetown, skilled slaves were allowed to hire themselves out in their spare time and thus earn money with which to buy a substitute and win their own freedom.⁴ There was, of course, the crop of crime which always flourishes on servile soil ; there were the usual escapes, sometimes of groups of men who obtained arms, pillaged outlying farms, and had to be hunted down by commandos ; sometimes there was trouble with the Hottentot clans for harbouring runaways.⁵ Slave law, the product of fear, was harsh ; the whip, chains, branding and the loss of ears were the penalties for such crimes as stealing cabbages from a garden ; murderers and rapers were either broken at the wheel or hanged as high as Haman ; the High Court did not shrink from torturing slaves if necessary.⁶ On the other hand, though van Rhee de permitted owners to administer ' moderate punishment,' that is, an ordinary beating, at discretion, he forbade them to trice

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 43 ; No. 50 of 1835, p. 16 ; *Rambles*, p. 35.

² *Theal*, IIa. 431 ff.

³ From 310 in 1687 to 1107 in 1708. In addition, the Company owned about 600 slaves.

	Male Slaves.	Female Slaves.	Slave Children.
1687.	230	44	36
1708.	981	166	151 (<i>Déherain, Le Cap</i> , p. 211).

⁴ *Requesten, 1715-1806*, pp. 1, 3, 669.

⁵ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 15, 16 ; *Journal, 1699-1732*, pp. 144, 272 ; *Rambles*, p. 32.

⁶ *Journal, 1671-6*, pp. 259, 277. All 17th century punishments were fierce.

up a slave and flog him without permission of the Fiscal or Governor; burghers were punished for ill-using slaves, and the Company ordered the public sale of a slave who had accused his master of crime, as the best means of saving him from domestic vengeance.¹

Manumission was fairly common, especially as the laws governing it were for a long time vague. As early as 1656 it was recognised, on East Indian analogy, that a black who professed Christianity was the equal of a white man, for though heathens could justly be enslaved, Christians could not. In spite of this rule, the Cape authorities made repeated efforts to Christianise slaves; the scholastic venture which had ended with the flight of 1663. van Riebeeck's Angolese was revived; Isbrand Goske decreed 1677. that all slave children should be sent to school; next year, a separate school for blacks was organised under a black master; van Rheeде ordered all slave children under the age of twelve to attend this school where silver tokens 'and, to slave children in particular, sweet cakes' were offered as prizes for excellence in the Christmas Day examinations. Moreover, Goske ordered that slaves were to be married to avoid scandal and reminded owners that no half-breed children should be kept in servitude.²

Goske had to deal with a difficult social problem. Pure-blooded blacks who professed Christianity had a good claim to freedom; half-breed Christians could claim freedom by law. Already a fierce discussion had arisen in India as to whether 1664. children of unbelieving parents ought to be baptised. The quarrel spread to the Cape. There visiting chaplains had been in the habit of baptising slave children and urging owners to have them taught the true way; the ecclesiastical court at Batavia and the Amsterdam classis both upheld the custom; but the Council and community at the Cape were long divided on the point. Goske, however, ordered the Christianisation of all slaves, and the Council of Policy decided that children of European fathers and 1677. half-caste mothers must be baptised, that children of pagans could be baptised provided their parents also tried to qualify for baptism, and that steps must be taken to bring such children forward for baptism.³

The difficulty was that most of the slave children were of mixed breed. There were not many of them, it is true, but, helped out by frequent manumissions, the numbers of freedmen increased so fast that the Directors talked of marking out a 1682. reserve for them, especially as at that time they despaired of

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 41; *Journal*, 1659-1732, pp. 46, 169; No. 50 of 1835, p. 15.

² *Theal, IIa.*, 59, 154; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 14, 16.

³ *Theal, IIa.*, 150 ff.; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 14, 15; *Spaelstra, op. cit.*, I. 29.

attracting European colonists to the Cape. Van Goens the elder gave orders that no more heathen slaves should be freed except for good cause shown, and that heathen freedmen living in idleness might be re-enslaved. Then came van Rheede. He stiffened the rules considerably. Henceforward Christian, Dutch-speaking half-breeds could claim freedom as of right on attaining the full legal age of twenty-five for men and twenty-one for women; 'foreign slaves' after thirty years' service and negroes born in the colony on attaining the age of forty could offer their owners £8 6s. 8d. and ask for freedom as a favour; finally, to check the production of half-breed children, marriage between whites and full-blooded blacks was forbidden though marriage between whites and half-castes was still permissible.¹ So the law stood till, in face of trouble with runaway slaves and the low level of life with which freedmen were content, it was announced that owners must not manumit their slaves unless they gave a guarantee that the new freedmen would not become a charge on the public funds for ten years to come.²

Such was the lot of the colonists, bond and free, white, black, and multi-coloured, when in 1716 the anxious Directors began to ask themselves and the Council of Policy what was wrong with their colony at the Cape.³ Something was obviously very wrong indeed. Governor van Assenburgh, King Log following the van der Stel King Stork, had been popular enough with the burghers. True, he was a recluse and a toper, but he had left the colonists alone and had therefore been in their eyes the very model of an *edel heer*.⁴ The root of the trouble lay deeper than any matter of personality. At the end of the long wars with Louis of France, the Seventeen had looked for a speedy return to 'normalcy' and more also; they had built new and bigger ships for their Eastern trade; they had supplied the Cape with a new and vigorous Governor, de Chavonnes; in short, they had piped hopefully, but, so far, the Cape had refused to dance.

The Cape seemed to be sliding backwards after the all-too-vigorous push forward administered by the van der Stels. Half the meat contract had been given to Huising, and a rent of £2 10s. had been levied on the great cattle-runs of 3000 morgen and upwards which the burghers held on annual loan from the Company; whereupon a brand-new disease had appeared among the cattle. The wool-growing enterprise had failed, for the farmers had cheerfully bastardised the imported sheep till even

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 23, 25, 41.

² The term was raised to twenty years in 1783 (No. 50 of 1835, p. 20).

³ *V.R. Soc.*, I. 85 ff.

⁴ *Theal*, IIa. 420, 429; *Godée-Molsbergen, Van Riebeeck*, p. 245 ff.

their samples of wool became unsalable. The forestry scheme had also been abandoned. Farmers declined to plant trees, many trees were 'missing' from the Stellenbosch reserves, the timber in the Peninsula kloofs was exhausted, and, after an ineffectual attempt to get wood from the far-distant Zondereind valley, the local authorities had folded their hands. The mixed flood of wine was still pouring forth in such volume that the Council levied a tax upon it for the first time; but the fate of wheat was more chequered. In good years the Company would not take all that was offered, and farmers were reduced to turning their grain into spirits. The Council, intent on revenue, then demanded a tithe of all the grain harvested and not merely, as heretofore, of the grain brought into Capetown for sale, and, when no one would undertake to farm so unpopular a tax, demanded that its share should be delivered by the growers at the Castle. Thereupon, the annual *opgaaf* of the burghers' produce became more unreliable than ever. The crops for 1711 and 1712 were poor; smallpox paralysed all industry in 1713, and when in 1714 a bumper crop was forthcoming, all the old troubles arose with Batavia about prices and uncertain quantities. The farmers declined to send their corn to India to be sold for what it would fetch; they still wanted a quick and certain return and said they would be ruined unless the Company, their immanent Providence, took all that they produced; hence, the perplexed authorities took it at a reduced price, refused to give out any more land for wine and sheep, encouraged the burghers to concentrate on peas, beans and barley for the homeward-bound fleets, and passed a Stamp Act.¹

The new taxes on cattle-runs, wine, stamps and corn helped to swell the revenues already furnished by the transfer duty and, above all, the annually auctioned leases;² even so, revenue was, as ever, far behind expenditure. It had been so, it was so, and was to be so to the end. It is hard to count the exact cost to the Company of the Cape as a colony; the system of bookkeeping was archaic and involved; the currency was chaotic; the Cape itself was a mere branch establishment and was charged with many items—such as the cost of ships' stores, the hospital and wages to sailors—which should have been put down to general Company's expenditure; on the other hand, neither ammunition, the cost of transporting materials from Holland, nor various sums paid on behalf of the colony in India or the Netherlands were charged against it. Roughly speaking, and reckoning the florin at 1s. 8d.,

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, 1696-1708, p. 355; *Lett. Rec.*, 1695-1708, p. 250; Theal, IIa. 420, 428, 436, 446, 485.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 35; V.R. Soc., IV. 45; VI. 34.

the expenditure from 1697 to 1707 ranged from £14,350 to £18,400 and the revenue from £5500 to £6900.¹

1716. The Directors wanted to fill that gap and to promote the prosperity of their little colony; they, therefore, plied de Chavonnes and his Council with questions.² Could more people be accommodated at the Cape, and, if so, of what class? Could skilled artisans make a decent living? If no more people could be taken in under existing conditions, could not new means of subsistence be developed, such as the growing of coffee, sugar, cotton, indigo, olives, flax, silk, 'and more especially tobacco'? Would hop-growing encourage the cultivation of grain or should hops be imported for the making of beer? Would it pay better to break up the official cattle-run at Groenekloof into small quit-rent farms or go on leasing it *en bloc*? Would a tax on provisions sold to foreigners bring in revenue and silence the complaint of the colonists that foreigners knew how to get better and cheaper meat than they themselves? Finally, were European farm-hands and agriculturists likely to be cheaper than slaves; in other words, was the colony to be based on free white or on servile coloured labour?

1717. The Council sent in a gloomy report. They expected nothing in the way of experiments from the farmers, for in all the colony not more than thirty families were wealthy; the rest were mortgaged up to the eyes to the Orphan Chamber, the Poor Fund, or richer neighbours. The wind blew tobacco plants to pieces, the sun scorched what was left, and the shrivelled relics were unsaleable; there was not enough labour for cotton or flax, and folk preferred the East Indian varieties; two coffee plants had been known to struggle to maturity but neither had borne beans; wool, indigo, olives, and silk had all been tried and had duly failed; wind again damaged hops, which were no good for export, and too much beer would ruin the wine farmers; as it was, no one outside the Cape would drink the local wines unless they had to. As for mining and manufacture, there might be coal at French Hoek, but that was sixty miles away and the cost of transport would be too heavy; one councillor had ideas on the subject of silver mines, but, as the Directors had not asked for information on this head, he kept his knowledge of the local Chicova to himself; one of van der Stel's Frenchmen, Taillefer, had made wool hats, but he had died and the industry with him; the making of woollen gloves and socks had also dwindled away; there was no opening for artisans, and those who were already in the colony were mere handy men with few tools and less skill. As for Groenekloof, that had better be leased as usual.

¹ *Lett. Desp.*, pp. 255, 320; Theal, IIa. 434 ff.

² V.R. Soc., I. pp. 85 ff.

The one practical suggestion made by honourable councillors was 'that it should please our Lords and Masters to grant us free trade to Madagascar, Mauritius and surrounding islands and the East Coast of Africa, . . . a regular free traffic between this out-of-the-way place and a few other places,' a traffic which could hardly hurt the Company's monopoly and whose freights and tolls would swell the exiguous Cape revenue. Finally, on the vital issue of free *versus* slave labour, all the councillors save one condemned white labour as lazy, incompetent, intractable, liable to drunkenness and, withal, more expensive than slave labour.

One man only spoke up for free men, free industry, and therefore for a large home market.¹ This was the captain of the garrison, Dominique de Chavonnes, brother of the Governor. He insisted that the colony could carry 150 white artisans and, even if a white man cost £12 a year in wages as against £6 down for a slave, two of them could do the work of three slaves; they required less watching and speeding up; they would spend their wages to the benefit of all concerned. Further, free Europeans meant husbands for the women, a numerous body of colonists and a strong defence which would enable the Company to cut down its costly garrison. Pressure of population would force men to seek new means of subsistence, and the very lack of slaves would breed habits of industry; already the Drakenstein children were helping their fathers with good results. Slaves meant conspiracies against masters; worse still, they meant big plantations, and one of the main weaknesses of the colony was the unwieldy size of the farms. Break up the farms, said the captain, and work them properly; break up Groenekloof and give the meat contract to a round dozen competing parties; so three families might learn to live where only one at present existed.

At this crisis of its fate, the Cape Colony took the wrong turning. Captain de Chavonnes was outvoted on all points. Had his advice been taken, the western colony at least might have become a genuine white man's country, for the climate was Mediterranean; slavery was not deeply rooted; five-sixths of the slaves were men; the feckless Hottentots were dying or retiring, and could never have competed with Europeans in industry; the sturdy Bantu were still far off. As it was, the work of 1707 was completed in 1717. The colony, denied a steady recruitment of European immigrants, was condemned to slave labour and a rigidly restricted market. The history of the eighteenth century was foreshadowed in Dominique de Chavonnes' report: stagnation in the West, dispersion in the East, and intellectual and material poverty throughout.

¹ V.R. Soc., I. 97, 101.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIASPORA, 1717-78

Foreign competition—Mauritius and Delagoa Bay—Depression in the West—Dispersion in the East—Hottentot policy—Contact with the Bantu.

Governors : M. P. de Chavonnes, March 28, 1714–Sept. 8, 1724 ; [Secunde Jean de la Fontaine, acting Sept. 1724–Feb. 1727] ; Pieter Gysbert Noodt, Feb. 25, 1727–April 23, 1729 ; J. de la Fontaine [acting April 1729–March 1737], March 8, 1737–Aug. 31, 1737 ; Adriaan van Kervel, Aug. 31–Sept. 19, 1737 ; [Fiscal Daniel van den Henghel, acting Sept. 1737–April 1739] ; Hendrik Swellengrebel, April 14, 1739–Feb. 27, 1751 ; Ryk Tulbagh, Feb. 27, 1751–Aug. 11, 1771 ; Joachim van Plettenberg [acting Aug. 1771–May 1774], May 18, 1774–Feb. 14, 1785.

THE Seventeen had asked what was wrong with their Cape Colony, and Captain de Chavonnes had answered them. *Onze heeren superiores* might well have gone on to ask what was wrong with the East India Company as a whole. The truth was that the Golden Age of the Netherlands and therefore of the Company had ended about the time that van Riebeeck landed at the Cape. The United Provinces, carried forward by the national enthusiasms stirred by the long and victorious struggle with Spain, had made the most of their geographical, financial, and commercial opportunities while their continental neighbours were busied with the dreadful Thirty Years' War and the Franco-Spanish struggle which had arisen therefrom, and their potential English rivals were at each other's throats in the name of King Charles or the Long Parliament. But the Thirty Years' War ended ; Cromwell set up strong one-man rule in the British Isles ; France and Spain made peace, and the republican burgher party in the Netherlands under Jan and Cornelis de Witt clipped the wings of the House of Orange.

The Netherlands had to face growing economic and political pressure at home and abroad. The Baltic trade began to fail in face of Scandinavian and English competition ; three Anglo-Dutch commercial wars followed in quick succession ; side by side with them ran Colbert's economic war, which opened out into real war or rumours of war with the French. The Treaty of Utrecht had indeed ended the long struggle and the Netherlands found themselves on the winning side ; but the cost of their victory had been greater than that of many defeats. They had been forced to lavish their money, men and energies on troops and fortifications and to leave the naval side of the war to the English,

1648-
1659.

1652-
1674.

1668-
1713.

1713.

or rather to the British, since England and Scotland had sunk their ancient animosities sufficiently to form the strong political and economic union of Great Britain. Naval supremacy had passed from the Dutch to the British ; the financial centre of the West had abandoned Amsterdam for London with its new Bank of England ; Great Britain, an island secure from attack in a way that the United Provinces were not, was even better placed than they to take the lion's share of the commerce of the growing outer worlds of West and East which must pass up her Channel on its way to Continental Europe. The persistence of the Scots was now added to the cautious enterprise of the English, a dangerous combination ; the English had latterly reorganised their East India Company on a much stronger basis than before ; in the East they could count on the support of the Portuguese under the House of Braganza which they had helped to restore and had bound to them by the famous ' port-wine treaty ' ; the power of the French company in the Indies was also growing and was buttressed by strong naval stations in the Indian Ocean at Ile de Bourbon and, since 1715, Mauritius. 1707.
1640.
1703.

The Dutch Company by reason of its obnoxious economic policy could expect no mercy from these rivals, and now it was finding that the spice-trade to which everything else had been sacrificed was not so valuable as it had believed. Tropical goods came in so slowly and at such high prices that it was hard to make a profit ; as in Portugal, the excitements of the Indian trade had bred contempt for steady industry ; lavishness had appeared in the frugal Netherlands counterbalanced by poverty and discontent among the less successful classes ; speculation was rife ; all the weaknesses of the chartered company system were coming to light. The Company had done well enough until it took up the responsibilities of ruling on a large scale ; but from the first it had been financially unsound and had made matters worse by declaring dividends when there were no profits or even, in the later seventeenth century, when it was deeply in debt. The £250 shares rose and fell in the most amazing fashion from £1720 to £48 and then up again to £1260. *Windhandel*, men called it, but it continued so long as dividends were forthcoming, and this was always the case, anything from 37 to 71 per cent. till 1732, and thereafter up to 25 per cent. till the Company paid its last dividend fifty years later.¹

The policy of the Company showed nervousness and indecision in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,

¹ Keller, *Colonization*, pp. 408, 460 ; Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, II. 203 ff. ; V.R. Soc., IV. 44 ; Theal, IIa. 488.

notably in South-Eastern Africa. There it alternately tightened and relaxed its hold. The van der Stels had made two efforts to secure Port Natal, the best harbour eastward on the Cape side of Delagoa Bay. Simon had despatched *Centaurus* as far as the Kei river, and had twice sent *Noord* as far as Delagoa Bay. On the second occasion, the captain of *Noord* bought Port Natal from a local Bantu chieftain for £1650 on paper and for the odd £50 in actual cash ; but on the way home the vessel was wrecked, and though the survivors of the crew struggled home overland to Capetown much harassed by Bushmen, the precious document was lost. Willem Adriaan sent an expedition to renew the treaty, but the complacent chief's son now reigned at the Port and blandly replied that his father was dead, ' his skins are buried with him in the floor of his house . . . and as to what he agreed to, it was for himself, and I have nothing to say to it.'¹

1664. Farther to the east, for fear of the French, the Company had reoccupied Mauritius as a dependency of the Cape. The Mauritius Council was subordinate to that at Capetown ; appeals from its court lay either to Batavia or the Castle ; the Cape Governors, especially the younger van der Stel, used it as a penal settlement, and since the life of the little garrison and the handful of burghers was wretched, deportation thither was regarded as sentence of death. In the space of a few short years, floods wrecked the Governor's house and the magazines, fire destroyed the whole of the Company's premises, and pirates held the garrison to ransom. The island was of little profit to the Company. It produced ebony, waggon-woods, and the dodo ; but very few ships called, and its main export was ambergris ; industrial experiments failed ; Batavia would not touch Mauritian tobacco, arrack, soap or butter, and the islanders had to eke out a living by traffic with stray English ships. Simon van der Stel had long talked of abandonment, but his son was for holding on to keep out the French and to make ebony pay by supplying proper transport. On Willem Adriaan's fall, the Company abandoned the island ; a few of the families came back to the Cape, the rest went on to Batavia, and the departing officials turned dogs loose to ravage the 'game.'² Nevertheless, as Willem Adriaan had foreseen, the French snapped up the derelict island and made it their chief naval base in Eastern waters for nearly a hundred years.

Perhaps repenting of the abandonment of Mauritius, the Company made a determined effort to secure Delagoa Bay. The Portuguese Governor of Mozambique, nominally responsible to

¹ Moodie, *Records*, pp. 441, 444 ; V.R. Soc., V. 54 ; Godée-Molsbergen, *Reizen*, III.

² *Lett. Desp.* (v. d. Stel), pp. 14, 15, 58, 206, 265, 353 ; *Lett. Rec.*, pp. 24, 26, 50, 284, 414 ; *Journal*, p. 116 ; *Rambles*, chapters 15, 16.

the shadowy Viceroy at Goa, still claimed to rule all the East African coast from Cape Guardafui to Lourenço Marques ; but in reality the Moslems had recently reconquered all the forts from Magadoxo to Zanzibar, and the Portuguese only retained Pemba island and the coasts south of Cape Delgado. The Mozambique administration still bolstered up the feeble majesty of the Christian Monomotapa with a military and ecclesiastical bodyguard ; but Bantu chiefs and semi-Portuguese *prazo* holders freely challenged the Governor's authority. The very Portuguese missions were rotten. The Dominicans, for the most part Africans, Asiatics, or half-castes, were such a nuisance that the king withdrew them ^{1719.} all except the vicars of churches and the commissioners of the Inquisition, and a few years later threatened to replace even these with Jesuits and secular priests. The trade of the territory was trifling. 'Arabs,' who did what little retail trade and skilled work there was, were severely repressed, forbidden to buy baptised slaves and ordered to sell slaves only to Christians. Clearly the slave-trade was the one hope, and the Portuguese officials meant to engross it.¹

Early in the eighteenth century English adventurers, and cosmopolitan pirates from their haunt at Libertatia in Madagascar, frightened the Portuguese away from Delagoa Bay. The Dutch ¹⁷²¹⁻ East India Company thereupon occupied it and held it for ten years. ^{1730.} It was a disastrous occupation, first at Fort Lagoa, and then at its more substantial successor, Fort Lydzaamheid. The garrison, German mercenaries for the most part sent thither for their sins, had need of all the patience they could muster ; two-thirds of the original party died of fever in the first six weeks, and next year pirates drove the survivors into the bush. Relief came, and the adjacent territory was purchased from the local chiefs ; but fever raged ; some of the Germans deserted and perished miserably north of Inhambane ; others mutinied and were barbarously crushed. Trade was disappointing : a little gold, ivory, ambergris, wax and copper ; sugar and indigo did well on a small scale ; but expeditions failed to find the gold and copper mines and the rumoured mountain of iron in the interior ; the Portuguese maltreated natives who dared to traffic with the interlopers ; the natives destroyed a party of Dutchmen, in self-defence, they said, and judging from the character of the garrison that may well have been so. At last the fort was evacuated, and though Dutch ships hung about for two years to come, the East Coast was finally abandoned in 1732 to the Portuguese, the Bantu, and the pirates.²

¹ Rec. S.E.A., V. 1 ff., 145, 156, 165 ; Theal, IIIa. 317 ff.

² Theal, IIa. 461 ff. ; No. 252 of 1835, p. 101 ; *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, II.

At the beginning of the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the hold of Western civilisation on Southern Africa was feeble. The Portuguese, representatives of a decaying monarchy in Europe and a falling empire in the East, clung to the south-eastern coasts; far away to the south-west the Dutch Company's flag flew over the little depressed and isolated Cape Colony.

The Cape Colony of 1730, however, was not without elements of strength. It was more homogeneous than it had ever been before. Time, intermarriage and the stresses of the van der Stel controversy steadily welded the composite European elements into a single people; newcomers were so few that they were easily absorbed; above all, the Huguenots mingled their blood and identity with that of their Dutch and German fellow-citizens. Official policy helped forward the fusion slowly. The Drakenstein consistory had been told that henceforward all official correspondence must be in Dutch, but as late as 1724, on the death of Paul Roux, Amsterdam gave leave for the appointment of another French parish clerk, just this once, for the sake of the score or so of old folk who knew no Dutch.¹ Thereafter such a concession was unnecessary, for French simply died out. But France still lived in the surnames and personal appearance of many of the colonists, and, in so far as the clash of tongues could have that effect, French had played its part in breaking down the spoken High Dutch of the late seventeenth century into the early form of Afrikaans.²

On the other hand, growing racial homogeneity was tempered by social and economic divisions.³ Cape society became more and more sharply split up into groups as time went on, and it is this differentiation which relieves the monotony of the short

¹ Botha, *French Refugees*, pp. 149, 159; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, II. 608.

² The influence of other languages on the formation of Afrikaans has been questioned (Union Year Book, No. 8, pp. 14 ff; article by J. J. Smith).

³ There were at the Cape, in 1740, about 4000 free burghers—men, women and children—and 1500 Company's servants and soldiers with their families (Theal, IIa. 512); in 1778 there were 9867 burghers, 1122 servants and 454 soldiers (*Kaapse Argiefstukken*, 1778, p. 327). Theal states that the church registers show that 1526 men and 449 women arrived between 1652 and 1795 and left descendants:

	Dutch.	French.	German.	Various.
Men	494	74	806	152
Women	322	72	48	7

Theal notes the preponderance of Dutch women, the youthful vigour of the French, and the comparative age and physical exhaustion of many of the Germans. H. T. Colenbrander in his *Afkomst der Boeren* reckons a higher proportion of German blood in the Afrikaner people than does Theal; but he counts as German all those who came from German-Swiss cantons and parts of Germany along the Dutch border, whereas Theal notes that many of these Germans were descended from sixteenth-century Dutch refugees, and counts as Dutch all those who held attestations of membership of the Dutch Reformed Church (Theal, IIIb 427).

and simple annals of the mid-eighteenth century Cape, a monotony which could prompt Commissioner de Mist to write, in 1802, that the only changes in the polity of the Cape during the last century of Company rule had been in 'the taxes, the number of Company's servants at the Cape, and the cost of living. . . . Regulated at rare intervals, they rose step by step.'¹

In the Peninsula were the Company's servants; too many of them, some said, too much set on intriguing for pay and promotion, more intent on private trade than on the welfare of the Company, avid of fees and perquisites and precedence, contemptuous of the burgher *canaille*, corrupt themselves and breeders of corruption in others. The story of this period begins with the suspension of the Secunde Helot for diverting Company's property to his own uses; it ends—*quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*—with Fiscal Boers compounding a felony by taking money from a burgher who wanted to import firearms from a Swedish vessel. There were occasional attempts at reform. Van Imhoff visited 1743. Capetown on the way to take up the Governor-Generalship of India in the room of Valckenier who had at last been recalled for massacring the Chinese in Batavia and arbitrarily imprisoning van Imhoff and other honourable councillors. He was the new broom that was to sweep the Indies clean; in passing he tried to render conditions at the Cape more salubrious.² He found the officials eking out their meagre salaries by juggling with the currency, a chaotic numismatic museum ranging from golden ducats to stuivers, trading on their own account and digging by proxy in the gardens of two morgen or so which they had been allowed to have for twenty years past. Most of this he could not alter, but he forbade private trade and, in lieu thereof, allowed the leading officials to take fees on certain kinds of business, such as wine, trading licences, and the drawing up of official documents. So he passed on to Batavia, and in due course Governor Ryk Tulbagh, the South African Clive, had to institute a twenty-year-long anti-corruption campaign, forbidding private 1751- trade, fixing fees, and setting a good example. But Father 1771. Tulbagh died, and before long the burghers raised their voices 1779. against renewed official corruption. So it was to the end. 'If ever venality prevailed in any part of the world,' wrote a British naval officer in 1795, 'it is in the Dutch colonies.'³

'De Kaap,' or Kaapstad as men began to call it in Tulbagh's time, grew steadily. By about 1775 it consisted of some 1200 substantial houses, many of them double-storied, stuccoed and either whitewashed or painted green, flat-fronted, for the most

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 171.

² V.R. Soc., I. pp. 129 ff.

³ Rec. C.C., I. 30. Cf. J. S. Stavorinus, *Voyages*, II. 131, 275.

part flat-roofed also, with a stoep and a garden between each and the road. The Castle, the Company's offices and hospital, and Tulbagh's new burgher watch-house gave the town an air of distinction which was enhanced by the Gardens in the background. The unpaved streets were hard and served their purpose well enough; but the dust blown up by the summer south-easters was trying and cancelled much of the freshness imparted by the oak avenues on either side of the road and the stream of water which flowed down the middle. The people of the town, like the officials, looked to the passing ships for their living; boarding houses and canteens flourished in good times. Visitors were apt to complain that the men were lazy and indifferent except when there was easy money to be made; but in general they held a higher opinion of the ladies, especially the younger ones, who were proud of their knowledge of French and English, passionately fond of dancing, fairly skilled upon the piano and keenly interested in the fashions of Paris and The Hague. Old Admiral Stavorinus might depict the damsels as giddy, de Mist later on could stigmatise the younger generation as indolent and possessed of 'an intense prejudice against exerting themselves mentally'; but after all, that was only to be expected in a town where life passed placidly, except when the fleets came in, and all classes were much given to gossip over the eternal cups of tea and coffee sweetened with sugar-candy.¹

Outside the town, in the Peninsula and, still more, beyond the sandy Flats, were the wine and corn farms of the van der Stel settlement. Stellenbosch rebuilt itself after the fire of 1710, gloried in a handsome new drostdy, and diverted the Eerste river so that it no longer flooded the streets in the rainy season. Substantial farmhouses were the rule in these parts and, latterly, many of them were adorned with the famous Cape-Dutch gables²; but agriculture was still very rough and ready. The heavy wooden ploughs were dragged by eight oxen or horses and manned by four men: one to lead and one to drive the team, another to guide the plough, the fourth to scatter the seed in front; for it was mere 'under-furrowing' with but little harrowing and hardly any use of manure. That was kept for fuel in a land where timber was not too plentiful, or for the flooring of the humbler houses. The interests of these *plaas-boers* lay in their farms, each of which was a state in miniature, producing little more than was needed for the maintenance of its inhabitants, but self-sufficing in everything save luxuries, articles of manufacture, and

¹ V.R. Soc. IV. 65 ff., 85; III. 201; Theal, IIIa. 51, 97; Stavorinus, *Voyages*, III. chapter ix; A. Sparrman, *Voyage to the Cape*, I. 10.

² D. Fairbridge, *Historic Houses*.

a few raw materials. The farmers crossed the Flats as seldom as might be. Physically that barren waste was a great divider; attempts to bind the drifting sands with knot-grass and wild-olive all failed; the absence of a hard road made it impossible for men to grow wine or corn as a commercial proposition more than sixty miles, or three days' trek, from their only market in Capetown. Spiritually, too, there was a great gulf fixed between the farming centres and the capital; for the memories of the van der Stel struggle still lived, and to the farmer Capetown spelt grasping officials, payment of tithe and arrears of taxes at the barrier, and sharp practice by sophisticated townsmen. The men of the capital might look outwards to the sea; they took no stock of what happened in the outer world. Did a stranger speak of the advantages of Europe, they would ask him why he had troubled to come to Africa; did he question them on things African, they would show surprise at his ignorance.¹ Their vineyards, ploughlands and beloved oxen fulfilled the little universe that was bounded by the Flats and the Mountains of Africa.

The Peninsula and the Berg river valley together formed 'the West' as distinct from the fast-expanding 'East.' It was the West which, in the course of the eighteenth century, became thoroughly dependent on slave labour; it was the West which suffered most from the strait-jacket of the Company's economic policy. After the famous decision of the Council in 1717, importation of slaves continued steadily till the slaves outnumbered the free burghers and, until the British stopped the trade in 1807, kept the numerical advantage they had gained.² The slaves were still drawn mainly from East Africa and the Indies, though the despatch of Indian criminals to Capetown was stopped at the repeated request of the Council of Policy.³ By that time the slaves were as clearly grouped in classes as were their masters: negroes, the cheapest of all, 'faithful, patient and good servants,' who did the rough work in the fields; Malays, the real skilled workers of the Colony, and makers of the lovely Cape-Dutch gables, who ranked themselves above all other slaves and free Hottentots; half-castes or Afrikanders, a growing class, who were household slaves and often the confidants of their masters and mistresses, permanent family servants and almost members of the family.⁴

¹ V.R. Soc. IV. 11, 54; Bel. Hist. Dok., III. 49; Theal, IIIa. 51, 183.

² Burghers. Slaves of burghers.
 1756. 5,123 5,787 + 600 Company's slaves
 1793. 13,830 16,767 (Theal, IIIa. 40; Moodie, *Records*, III. 16; V.R. Soc., III. 175).

³ Theal, IIIa. 31.

⁴ V.R. Soc., III. 252; *State of the Cape . . . in 1822*, pp. 73 ff., 148; W. J. Burchell, *Travels in the Interior*, I. 31 ff.

Even the farm labourers were much better treated than the West Coast negroes who were still being shipped across the Atlantic to the West Indies; manumission was still fairly common, sometimes by will, sometimes by the marriage of a slave girl to a white man who would buy or give her her freedom, sometimes by a colonist who freed his slaves on returning to Europe.¹ Since 1722, slaves who were taken to the Netherlands became free provided the authorities approved, though slaves who smuggled themselves overseas were liable to be sent back to be prosecuted by the Fiscal. On the other hand, as the numbers of slaves increased, there was a steady stiffening of law and custom against them. The conscious effort to Christianise them died away. Europeans found it hard enough to keep in touch with Church and school themselves without educating their property into the bargain; the Company's slaves, housed in the Slave Lodge which served the purpose of a brothel for soldiers and sailors between the hours of 8 and 9 P.M., were bad workers, and their shortcomings were put down to the official schooling which they still received; above all, in spite of the laws of 1708, there was the belief that conversion must lead to manumission. Slaves had long ago been deprived of their old privilege of standing sponsor to slave children at their baptism; ² but the Council of India decreed that all slaves must be baptised, that baptised slaves might not be sold, and, borrowing a leaf from the Portuguese, that Moslems might only sell their slaves to Christians. The value of slaves, whose market was thus restricted, promptly fell; owners saw to it that the Christianisation of their slaves did not go beyond attendance at family prayers, and the slaves began to turn a ready ear to the missionaries of the Prophet. 'Some religion they must have,' a later observer noted, 'and they are not allowed to be Christians.'³

1770.

The slave laws became fiercer, the punishments less discriminate. In the year of our Lord 1732 a murderer was broken at the wheel and left dangling without the *coup de grâce* till sunset, and, alongside of him, hung another slave in like case for stealing a violin. It was a callous age as the criminal records of all Europe witness, but even Cape society shuddered when the wretched Titus of Bengal was impaled for complicity in the murder of his master.⁴ Nevertheless, Tulbagh, a humane Governor if ever there was one, codified all the fierce old slave penalties, including death for a slave who raised his hand against his

1753.

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 252; *Requesten*, pp. 2, 52, 66, 366, 669, 851.

² No. 50 of 1835, pp. 17, 18; V.R. Soc., IV. 116.

³ *State of the Cape*, pp. 74 ff., 349.

⁴ *Journal, 1699-1732*, pp. 260, 337.

master, flogging without trial at the bidding of the ministers of justice, and harsh punishments for making a noise at funerals.¹ They at least treated the dead with great respect in the mid-eighteenth century.

Slavery has been defended as one means of introducing a barbarous people to the ways of civilised society; but against these possible advantages must be set the evil effects of the domestic institution upon the slave-owners. Those evils were made manifest in the Cape of the eighteenth century. Van Imhoff did not mince his words on that score. 'A mason and a 1743. carpenter,' he wrote, 'each earns from eight to nine schellingen a day and in addition receives food and drink and withal does not do as much as a half-trained artisan in Europe. . . . I believe it would have been far better had we, when this Colony was founded, commenced with Europeans and brought them hither in such numbers that hunger and want would have forced them to work. But having imported slaves every common or ordinary European becomes a gentleman and prefers to be served than to serve. . . . We have in addition the fact that the majority of the farmers in this Colony are not farmers in the real sense of the word, but owners of plantations, and that many of them consider it a shame to work with their own hands. Such a bad example makes the farm-hands worse.'² Here was a Dominique de Chavonnes come to judgment, and nearly a hundred years later an English official could write that 'the power exercised over slaves gives to every Christian man . . . so much distinction, that pomp in rags displays its superiority even in the street.'³

The economic history of an isolated European community thus based on slave labour and oppressed by a monopolistic trading corporation was necessarily dismal. That shrewd Hollander, de Mist, summed it up well on the eve of his departure 1802. to take over the Colony from the British. 'The Colony,' he wrote, 'was fairly prosperous so long as the number of colonists was limited. . . . But this balance was gradually upset and the . . . Company did not allow the colonists sufficient freedom in trade to dispose of surplus produce. At the same time the Company encouraged increased production.' This disciple of Adam Smith and the Physiocrats noted in fairness that the Company did try to take the surplus at a fixed price and export it itself; nevertheless, he concluded that 'the balance between production and consumption is bound to be upset unless freedom of trade is allowed, and . . . a period of plenty and prosperity is often followed by a period of famine and poverty.'⁴

¹ Theal, IIIa. 34.

³ *State of the Cape*, pp. 176.

² V.R. Soc., I. 136-7.

⁴ V.R. Soc., III. 173 ff.

1717-
1719.

At the time of the Chavonnes inquiry, the Council of Policy had asked for a limited freedom of trade and the burgher councillors had echoed the request. The demand was refused. The Seventeen decided rather to develop intensive cultivation of semi-tropical products, made elaborate preparations, sent out experts, and hoped for the best. All the experiments failed. The expert condemned tobacco; olives failed at once; Persian sheep retained their identity for a decade and were then absorbed in the general ovine community of fat-tailed, hairy sheep; silk promised well, but 'the "expert" himself was not so skilful as expected'¹—'Is there anything whereof it may be said See, this is new?'—and the factory was closed down after producing six pounds of silk; indigo, a little cotton, and the hope of silver mines in the Drakenstein valley were all that remained after 1735, and, in due course, indigo and cotton were given up and the silver was not forthcoming. Meanwhile, government actually discussed the possibilities of overseas trade with the burgher councillors, but these worthies, perhaps dismayed by the Company's costly failure at Delagoa Bay, replied that the enthusiasts of 1719 had either died or changed their minds.²

1719.

The fortunes of wine, corn and meat, the staple products of the Cape, fluctuated violently. The meat supply was more and more drawn from the cattle-farmers and Hottentots beyond the mountains; but corn and wine were the hope of the West. The Directors tried to encourage the official export of wine to Europe and India, but the samples sent to Amsterdam and Batavia were unfit for use; bottled wine fared no better; the Constantia brand alone found favour, and of that there was far too little. As for wheat and cattle, a run of bad harvests drove the garrison back on rice rations, and cattle-disease obliged the Company first to forbid the sale of live beasts to foreigners and then to prohibit all sale of fresh meat and vegetables to them till the Company's own needs had been met at a fixed price. It is true that government had to capitulate and pay the high prices for meat demanded by the burghers and supply the foreigners as of grace; but the dearth and embargo of 1723 gave the Tavern of the Seas a bad name among foreigners which it only gradually lived down.³

1723.

1724.

1743.

So it went. A new form of horse-sickness appeared; twenty years later van Imhoff found that the farmers had had no sale for their wines for many years. The Directors were willing to help them by taking brandy for the ships instead of wine, if it was drinkable, and van Imhoff proposed to give them leave to export

¹ V.R. Soc., IV. 117.² Theal, IIa. 444 ff., 482 ff., 490.³ *Ibid.*, 445 ff.

their own wines to India on Company's ships, if there was room for them. The burghers would not have it so; hence, the Governor-General increased the wine-tax, promised to take as much as the Company wanted at a fixed price, and left the farmers free to sell the rest to foreigners; but, as usual, Batavia grumbled at the quality of the wine, experts failed to improve it and the Council of Policy refused to risk reciprocal free trade with the great Labourdonnais' Mauritius. Meanwhile, the grain harvests varied; sometimes drought and rust called for proclamations to check profiteering, at other times there was a fair amount of corn for export. Van Imhoff made the same arrangements for the export of wheat as for wine; but when the Company tried to reduce the prices the farmers cried out that the cost of labour would not allow it, and the locusts came for the first time in fifty years. Nevertheless, by 1750 the Cape was exporting 7500 muids of grain supplemented by peas, beans, wine, dried fruit, ivory, skins and ostrich feathers.¹ 1744. 1746.

It was little enough on which to support a colony whose population was growing fast, thanks to early and frequent marriages and a healthy climate, but whose internal power of consumption was none the less small in proportion to the amounts produced in good years. Then, as now, white South Africa was peculiarly dependent on export, and the exporting channels were sadly choked. The foreigners were the best hope for the ordinary burghers; but, though more ships came to the Cape after the Treaty of Utrecht than ever before, the number was not great. In the 'twenties and 'thirties there had been a marked increase, but by 1750 the average yearly total was down again to what it had been fifty years before, that is, some sixty-eight vessels annually, four-fifths of them Dutch, with the English second. The truth was that the Company's trade was not expanding, foreigners resented the prices demanded of them, and Table Bay was not a safe harbour. Efforts to protect the ships by building a breakwater from Mouille Point were unsuccessful, and from 1742 onwards the Company's ships put into Simons Bay during the winter months, when the north-westers raged on the other side of the Peninsula.²

The Directors then bethought themselves once more of European immigration as the cure for the present discontents of the Cape Colony. With one accord, the colonists replied that that would only make a bad business worse. Newcomers, the burgher councillors of Capetown declared, would 'merely add to the very serious state of poverty which already exists, for the reason that the major portion of the income of the inhabitants is earned 1750.

¹ V.R. Soc., I. 131; Theal, IIa. 1, 7, 8, 16, 17.

² Theal, IIa. 521 ff.

by lodging the passing seafarers,' and now even these *heeren van ses weeken* by reason of their poverty cheated the boarding-house keepers of their 16*d.* a day either by remaining on board or by pitching tents on the seashore. 'With regard to the Artizan,' they added, 'he is obliged to remain idle half the year, owing to lack of materials,' and the only remedy they could suggest was 'free freight,' that is, liberty to trade on their own account. The Stellenbosch heemraden were even more explicit. They considered that the existing population was more than enough. Parents were already anxious about their children's prospects, oppressed by debts, disappointed with the results of stock-farming and agriculture, and more and more driven to trekking because grazing was becoming sour in the low-lying parts of the district. The heemraden of newly established Swellendam were equally despondent; their folk were very scattered, the most distant six weeks' trek away from the capital; there were very few springs; the cattle found it difficult to drink at the steep banks of the rivers. In short, the Colony could barely carry its 4500 free burghers as it was; to add to the number would be disastrous.¹

This dejected community was now called on to pay 5*d.* in the £ on the value of its property on the analogy of Holland, and when this failed to cause a perceptible shrinkage in the gulf between expenditure and revenue, the Company, as a last resort, levied fresh duties on wine and brandy. Under the circumstances, the application to the Colony of the Indian sumptuary laws was a work of supererogation, all the more as, in that very year, the smallpox returned in full force. The scattered farmers and Bushmen escaped with small loss; but Capetown suffered heavily, the property market crashed, even plate and jewels became unsalable, and for months the frightened farmers refused to bring their produce into the stricken capital. As in 1713, the miserable Hottentots suffered most severely of all, and, to add to their woes, leprosy attacked them.²

These afflictions brought the Colony to the verge of ruin. The new export duty on wine and brandy sold to foreigners hampered business; Batavia still took as little Cape wine as it could; the outbreak of the Seven Years' War frightened shipping away from South African waters and drove many Cape wine-farmers into bankruptcy. But in the third year, the very war which thus promised disaster proved to be the economic salvation of the Colony for the time being. The French and English Companies were struggling for control of the trade of India; their ships flocked into Table Bay and, until peace broke out in 1763, the

¹ V.R. Soc., I. 149 ff

² Theal, III*a.* 28, 36 ff.

producers of the Cape received whatever prices they chose to ask.

The later 'sixties were again a time of depression, but in the 'seventies there were signs of better things. The Cape was already exporting a little butter and aloes and horses, small and ugly but indubitably horses. The number of ships touching at Capetown or Simonstown also rose markedly, especially the profitable foreigners, who henceforward outnumbered the Company's own vessels, with the British an easy first, then Frenchmen, Danes, and even a few Swedes and Prussians and a solitary Spaniard.¹ The burghers liked it because foreigners were fair game; the Directors were equally pleased, for, by allowing the burghers to fleece the passers-by, their own contractors were able to supply them with cheap meat. The Seventeen then decided to encourage export of general cargoes to the Netherlands as well as the wine which had gone thither regularly since 1736. The big new hospital talked of in Tulbagh's time was being built at last. Most of the materials had to be sent from the Fatherland and, then as now, the best way to keep down the cost of the outward carriage was the promise of a return cargo. Hitherto samples—the Cape ran to samples in the eighteenth century—had been expensive and unsatisfactory, always excepting wheat. There was a constant demand for that, and the French in Mauritius were buying at such high prices that the Company had to issue a special placaat to secure a small shipload of wheat, rye, barley, wine and tallow. This first cargo was well received, and during the 'seventies exports to Europe and the Indies increased; but expanding trade did not bring the burghers the prosperity they had expected. The Directors refused to allow them to ship wine on their own account to Holland; the Fiscal refused to allow them to send wheat overseas till the Company's local needs had been met, and those needs were great; the price of wheat for local supply was low; the price for export to Holland was six rix-dollars per muid less than that to Batavia, and the authorities naturally tended to send more to Europe than to the Indies. Farmers complained bitterly, for strangers at the Cape were prepared to pay them twice as much as the Company, and the price of farming necessities was rising against them. Nor was it easy for them to get what they wanted even when they could pay for it. Importations were irregular and the embargo on foreign trade reacted fatally on corn and wine prices. Cash was scarce and men fell back on barter

¹ Yearly average of	1770-9.	1780-9.	1790-3.
Dutch ships . . .	52	49	58
Foreign ships . . .	59	99	97

with all the inconvenience and loss that was thereby entailed; merchants had no real security and farmers sometimes stove in their wine-casks in the streets of Capetown to save themselves the thankless task of trekking them and their unsalable contents home again.¹

Meanwhile the East, 'the colony of dispersion,' grew rapidly behind the harassed 'colony of settlement' in the West. All the forces which had begun to make the trek-boer in the time of the van der Stels gained momentum as time went on; the children of men living in isolation grew up in isolation and learnt to love it. Geographical conditions favoured the dispersion. The mountains which rise range behind range to the high plateau of the interior were steep on the sea side, but there were plenty of passes, the descent on the far side was short, and though the land was neither rich nor well-watered, it was good enough for cattle and sheep provided their owners did not mind them scattering; the Hottentots played the part of bloodhounds, smelling out the springs and the fertile land, and moving on cheerfully for a small bribe as soon as the inevitable white man pitched his moving camp beside their hovels. Once on the plains of the interior, the Boers had little inducement to return to the coast belt. If Capetown had little attraction for the wine and grain farmers, it had less for them. They might trek in once in a way with a waggon-load of butter and soap which they were glad to sell for half its value; they must come in at least once in their lives with their prospective brides to present themselves before the hated matrimonial court; but they were out of their element in the streets of a town, and they knew it. The capital represented to them the seat of an unsympathetic and alien central government which presumed to tax them, gave them little in return, interfered with their cherished cattle-trade with the natives, and even tried to preserve the game on which they relied for so much of their food. They went to Capetown as seldom as possible and left it as soon as they had bought the brandy, coffee, and dress-lengths for the coming year.²

1713 and
1755.

There was little to stop the outward movement of the Boers once they had dragged their lumbering, tented waggons over the passes with double spans of oxen or taken them to pieces and packed them over. The Hottentots made no resistance, for the smallpox had to a great extent cleared the country of them; the Bushmen were a nuisance, but they were few and unable to make

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 176; Theal, IIIa. 97 ff.; Moodie, *Records*, III. 10 ff.; C. G. Botha, *Prices in the 18th Century* (S.A. Journal of Science, XX. 552 ff.).

² V.R. Soc., IV. 36, 149; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I. 142, 364, *et passim*.

a determined stand till the 'seventies, when they had been pushed back to the last great range of mountains which skirted the central plateau.

Law and custom alike stimulated the trek. The original free burghers had been given small freehold farms; but quite early farmers had learnt to prefer the *leenings plaatsen*—great cattle runs of 3000 morgen and upwards held on loan from the Company first for six months and then for a year at a time. Legally, the Company could resume the grant at the end of the year, but in practice it rarely did so, and when it did, it compensated the holder. If the holder died, his heirs were by law entitled only to the value of the *opstal*, the house, kraals and other improvements; but in practice, again, the prices paid for these farms clearly represented the value of the *opstal* and of the land. The loan place was thus to all intents and purposes a free grant of land for which the government made no charge at all till 1714, when it levied an annual rent or recognition of £2 10s. and the usual tithe of grain, if any were grown.¹

The cattle-farmers thus learnt to look upon the grant of one or more of these great ranches as their birthright. Where possible they held two such farms in different parts of the country, one for the summer and the other for winter grazing. And they needed them. They had passed out of the 'Mediterranean' belt, with its good summer rains, that stretches back for a hundred miles behind Capetown, and they were not yet within the sphere of the summer rains which drench the south-east coasts. They were in the Karoo lands, the dry, intermediate country, and there they learnt to move back and forth between their farms like true nomads. They were continually on the move, for there was little to anchor them to any one place. The risk that the loan place might be resumed by the Company deterred any, who were so inclined, from making improvements; their large families of sons, each of whom was by law entitled to his legitimate portion in his father's estate, made it certain that on the death of the father the *opstal* at least would be sold. The sons might then elect to live together as a family group on the paternal farm till pressure of growing flocks and families forced them to disperse; but it was much more likely that the younger sons would push outwards to find fresh farms for themselves in a land where farms were to be had for the asking—or taking. And, in advance of the cattle-farmers, went the ivory-hunters far away into the wilds for eight months at a time, as far eastward as Pondoland, and possibly Natal itself. So popular did elephant-hunting become that soon

¹ Theal, IIa. 436. On Land Tenure, *vide* p. 55 *supra* (n).

Circa
1730.

no borderland lass would look at a young fellow who had not been once at least *op jagt*.¹

1719.

The authorities did not know what to make of this steady and unwelcome expansion of the Colony in the tracks of the trek-waggons. Its traditional policy was monopoly of the cattle-trade for itself, and, for its free burghers, non-intercourse with the tribes. From time to time it tried to enforce that policy; more usually it launched *placaat* after *placaat* at the heads of its disappearing subjects, in whose eyes then and for long afterwards the law of the central government became a thing of contempt. The need for fresh meat forced the Company to depart from the rigid policy of non-intercourse which it had enunciated after the downfall of the van der Stels. Cattle-disease had appeared in 1714; there were no bids for the meat contract in 1718, and next year a commando had to be called out against the Bushmen, who were plundering border farms in revenge, they said, for injuries done to them by the cattle-barterers. Thereafter there was little trouble with the Bushmen for twenty years to come.²

1723.

Meanwhile the Company, despairing of its meat supply, gave the redoubtable van der Heiden, whose farm had recently been plundered by Bushmen, leave to barter cattle for them from distant clans of Hottentots. Presently ugly stories began to drift in, and the Drakenstein consistory accused van der Heiden and his men of atrocious conduct. The inquiry broke down for lack of evidence, but the Company revived the system of guard-posts and planted one in the Zondereind valley and another at Rietvlei on the Buffeljagt's river near Swellendam, forbade the cattle-barter under heavier penalties than before, and modified its system of land-tenure in the hope of checking the Diaspora. It doubled the rents of the loan farms and offered small farms adjoining them on *erfpacht*—that is, lease for fifteen years at a low rental with the promise of compensation for improvements on resumption.³ It

1732.

1737.

was no use; the illicit traffic and the dispersion went on apace in spite of renewed orders, following the massacre of some elephant hunters far to the eastward, that no one was to go beyond the eastern border. That prohibition had to be waived, and for the next few years there was chaos in the eastern borderlands.⁴

1737-
1744.

It was during these troubled years that the first missionary effort was made on behalf of the Hottentots. The evangelical revival was beginning to stir; Wesleyans were active in England,

¹ Fouche, *Evolutie van die Trekboer*, p. 9; Theal, IIa. 496.

² Theal, IIa. 438 ff., 505 ff.

³ *Vide* p. 55 *supra* (n).

⁴ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 17, 18; Theal, IIa. 484, 489, 491, 510; *Rambles*, p. 64.

the Moravian Brethren in Germany, and both in the British North American colonies. George Schmidt, a Moravian, now came to the far-distant Cape and set up a mission at Baviaan's Kloof in the Zondereind valley. The Council of Policy favoured him, but other classes of the community resented his intrusion. The farmers were hostile, the Dutch Reformed clergy jealous, and when Schmidt baptised five Hottentots, even the Council forbade him to do so again and lodged a complaint with the Amsterdam classis. The jealousy of the clergy was in keeping with the political and religious principles of the day; they had just prevented the Lutherans of Capetown from building a church, and now saw to it that an unlucky parish clerk whom the churchwardens accused of Moravian leanings was despatched to Batavia. Schmidt took the hint, and finding he could do nothing with the unstable Hottentots, departed.¹

Clearly the day of the evangelical missions in South Africa was not yet, but perhaps Schmidt might have been more successful had the times been quieter. They were anything but quiet. For some years past the Bushmen had done so little damage that a friendly burgher had been commissioned by the authorities to come to definite terms with them if he could. It was an isolated attempt at conciliation which duly aroused the wrath and suspicion of the frontiersmen. Nor was it successful. Bushmen and a few Hottentots heavily raided the cattle-runs round Piketberg and on the Bokkeveld; a panic ensued; farms were abandoned on all sides, and a commando, ill-supported by the burghers, had to fall back. A strong force was then called out, soldiers were stationed at temporary posts, losses were inflicted on the raiders and peace made.²

At the same time a petty European rebellion took place, a foretaste of what was to become common on the eastern frontier in later years. It arose out of a breach of the cattle-barter laws. Ten Piketbergers and some Hottentots fell foul of Namaquas near the Orange river; the Namaquas appealed to the Government, and the landdrost of Stellenbosch, at the bidding of the acting-governor, summoned the members of the expedition and other suspected parties to give an account of themselves in court. There was great excitement in all the land from Drakenstein northward at this unheard-of exercise of authority; the accused held the acting-governor to be 'a harsh unsympathetic man' and defied the landdrost. The landdrost thereupon ruled that the

¹ Theal, IIa. 518, 521; No. 50 of 1835, p. 18; J. du Plessis, *Christian Missions in South Africa*, pp. 50 ff.; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, I. 195, 204; II. 75.

² Theal, IIa. 505 ff.; No. 50 of 1835, p. 18.

Namaquas had been aggrieved, gave them back as many of their looted cattle as possible, and took them under his protection. The accused were then summoned to the High Court. This was too much, and Etienne Barbier, a deserting ex-sergeant of the garrison who pretended to great influence in Europe, accused the acting-governor and the landdrost of tyranny, corruption, and favouring Hottentots and Chinese above white men,¹ advised the farmers to pay no more taxes, and raised the standard of revolt at the Paarl. Barbier found a few supporters, but the rising failed and most of them were glad to earn pardon by joining the second and successful commando against the Bushmen. Barbier himself was taken and executed in the barbarous fashion of the day, and the authorities issued a General Placaat against intercourse with natives of all tribes and nations.²

1743. The Company now made another attempt to keep the Colony within bounds. Numbers were still small, for, when all was said and done, there were only about 400 loan places in existence. Van Imhoff suggested that 60 morgen in freehold round each homestead should be offered for sale, cash down, at rates varying from £10 8s. 4d. to £14 13s. 4d., the rest of the loan place being rented as before. It was a well-intentioned effort and van Imhoff was prepared to deal gently with the farmers since 'to some of them it was a hardship when the rent was increased from 12 to 24 rix-dollars.' Wherefore, he told the Councillors that, 'in such cases you, as honest and faithful ministers, must use your discretion and be considerate.'³ At the same time, a ferry was placed on the Berg river and a heemraden's court was set up in the lower Breede valley, and two years later a landdrost was appointed there at 'Swellendam' to rule all to the vague line 'where the power of the honourable Company ends.'⁴

1743. The State thus followed up its wandering subjects, and, in a measure, the Church did likewise. For many years there had been only three churches in the Colony: the Groote Kerk at Capetown and the churches at Stellenbosch and Drakenstein. Now, two more were built with their attendant schools: one at Roodezand (Tulbagh) at the point where the road to the interior ran out of the Roodezand Pass, and the other nearer the capital at Zwartland in the cornfields of Malmesbury; but it was Roodezand which became the church of the frontiersmen, though for many years the only permanent inhabitants were the predikant, the sick-comforter, and the sexton.⁵

¹ This was in the year in which Valckenier massacred the Chinese at Batavia.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I.; No. 50 of 1835, p. 18.

³ V.R. Soc., I. 138; *vide* p. 55, *supra* (n).

⁴ Theal, IIIa. 5, 6, 9. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 514; Spolstra, *op. cit.*, I. 200; II. 529.

For a time there was a prospect that the unwieldy Colony would be firmly held together ecclesiastically. Hitherto, in spite of proposed reforms in 1691 and 1710, each church consistory had remained isolated, but at last the predikants and representatives of all five congregations and the inevitable political commissioner met in a *Classicale Vergadering*.¹ The powers of this incipient synod were limited; nevertheless, there were official heart-searchings, and in deference to the susceptibilities of the Amsterdam Classis, the assembly took the title of *Gecombineerde Kerkvergadering*. For a time all went well, but an attempt to deal justly with a reverend gentleman of notoriously evil life (it was the period of *Tom Jones*) led to friction with the home authorities, which was made worse when the assembly dared to correspond with the Delft Classis. Amsterdam objected and the assembly desisted; but its opponents on the Council of Policy seized their chance and suppressed it. For many years to come the Cape congregations were destined to remain *disjecta membra* of the Church somnolent. 1746. 1759.

So the Church lost grip, van Imhoff's new land-tenure failed to attract the Boers, and the Diaspora continued northward and eastward. It was in vain that the Company pursued the cattle-farmers and ivory-hunters with placaaften bidding them stop and, in any case, not to shoot game without a licence. Farmers were already at the west bank of the Gamtoos river: Beutler, travelling on Company's service, found farmhouses at Mossel Bay and himself pushed on to the land of the Bantu Tembus beyond the Kei river; already to the north, Boers had established themselves in Calvinia and Little Namaqualand; a few years later Jacobus Coetsee, an elephant-hunter, first of all Europeans crossed the Orange river, and cattle-farmers were pushing down the Langekloof or through the Ghoup where Beaufort West now stands.² 1745. 1752. 1760.

Such Hottentot clans as still held together gradually withdrew before the European advance. The Great Namaquas crossed the lower Orange into what is now South-West Africa; an expedition presently found the Little Namaquas living in poverty to the south of the river. To the south of them was the Hottentot Adam Kok who had lived near Piketberg till he had rashly reported that Bushmen had been raiding the cattle-runs. The Stellenbosch landdrost had then made inquiry and bidden him clear off the Bokkeveld. This Kok did and established himself further north at the Khamiesberg, where he gathered round him half-breed Bastaards and Hottentot Grigriquas, the nucleus of 1761.

¹ Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, I. 4 ff.; Spoelstra, *op. cit.*, I. 212.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.* II.; Theal, IIIa. 18, 30, 46.

1772. the Griquas who were to play so important a part in mid-nineteenth century South African history. Presently another Hottentot chief, Wildschut, was suffered to occupy a tract of unwanted land on the outskirts of the Colony near the Khamiesberg. Meanwhile, the Koranas steadily drew away north-eastward towards the middle Orange.¹

The relations of government and burghers with these organised clans were friendly enough. There was brutality on the part of ne'er-do-well whites and coloured men in the borderlands which the Company did its best to check, but as a rule Government merely tried to keep the peace, wherein it succeeded, and to prevent the Hottentots getting guns and horses. Therein it failed. The Hottentots accompanied the elephant and game hunters, became expert shots, learnt to fight in European fashion, and presently became purveyors of ivory, ostrich feathers, and skins on their own account.²

The bulk of the Hottentots remained in the Colony. They were still nominally tribesmen, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts unless a European or his slave was concerned in the case; the courts passed heavy sentences against Europeans convicted of maltreating them; but for the rest, they were left to shift for themselves. Some lived as wanderers, others as labourers whose indolence reacted badly on their employers; arrack and brandy carried on the work of destruction which the smallpox and leprosy had begun; such claims to land and fontains as they may have had steadily passed into the hands of Europeans. Moreover, as a pure-blooded race, they began to disappear into the ranks of the coloured population. It was a slow process, but, as early as 1721, slave-owners in the outlying parts had asked that the offspring of slave fathers and Hottentot mothers might be apprenticed 'to the persons bringing them up.' Nothing was done at the time, but at length complaints were made that runaway slaves were passing themselves off as bastard Hottentots. It was therefore decreed that the children of slave fathers and Hottentot mothers who remained in the service of a farmer till the child was eighteen months old were to be apprenticed in return for their keep till they attained the age of twenty-five.³

1775. If the relations of the Europeans with the Hottentots improved, those with the Bushmen became worse. It was war to the knife between the little Stone Age men and the advance guard of Western civilisation. The Council was much exercised

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 18; Theal, IIIa. 48; J. M. Orpen, *Reminiscences*; Moodie, *Records*, III, 11.

² Sparrman, *Voyages*, II. 63; Moodie, *Records*, III. 32; Theal, IIa. 53.

³ 104.

³ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 17, 19; Theal, IIIa. 104.

by ugly stories from the Swellendam frontier ; commandos were said to be shooting Bushmen regardless of sex and age, but inquiry proved nothing definite ; then the Bushmen raided the Roggeveld and Bokkeveld, and a burgher was arrested on suspicion of inciting them to plunder. Raids took place from time to time 1754. during the next few years, each raid answered by a *straf-commando*, which as a rule killed a number of the raiders and apprenticed captured women and children. The struggle gradually became more bitter, for the Boers were pushing their way into the Ghoup and Camdebo and were thus driving their enemies into the mountains. White *knechts* were killed from time to time ; houses 1770. were besieged ; once, a family of farmers was massacred. Field-corporal Adriaan van Jaarsveld came to the front as the hammer of the Bushmen on the north-eastern border ; troops had to go up to the help of the burghers and, this time, prisoners were taken 1772. back to the Castle to be hanged or broken at the wheel or to have their ankle-sinews cut preparatory to serving life-sentences.¹

It was a horrid, inconclusive business. The white men, exasperated at raids on their cattle and the sniping of isolated fellow-burghers by a treacherous foe, hunted the Bushmen down with Hottentot trackers, and virtually enslaved their prisoners ; the Bushmen, utterly unable to adapt their style of life to changed conditions, desperately defended their hunting grounds. In the course of it the commando system was developed on broader lines. There were thirteen field-corporals, each liable to be called out with his men by the landdrost ; but to deal adequately with the Bushmen, the Council at length appointed Godlieb Opperman 1774. as field-commandant of a joint force of all the local commandos along the northern border from Piketberg eastward to the Sneeuwberg ;² 250 men with Hottentot auxiliaries scoured three hundred miles of border, lost one man, killed over 500 Bushmen, and took 239 prisoners, who were for the most part apprenticed.³ It was the biggest effort yet, but it failed of its object. One Bushman captain indeed promised to steal no more and was given presents in return ; but he was the exception ; the raids continued, the commandos turned out, and the Company supplied ammunition and injunctions to abstain from cruelty with monotonous regularity.

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 18 ; Theal, IIIa. 54 ff., 125 ; Moodie, *Records*, III. 7.

² Sparrman, *Voyages*, I. 198, 202 ; Roux, *Verdedigingstelsel*, pp. 153 ff. ; No. 50 of 1835, p. 19. For a good account *vide* du Plessis, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

³ The Stellenbosch landdrost ordered Opperman to let captured ' Bushman-Hottentot ' women go but keep the men and children till the end of the campaign, and then either release them ' or divide them in proportion among the poorest of the inhabitants there, in order to continue to serve them for a fixed and equitable term of years, in consideration of their receiving proper maintenance, for which purpose some of them must be brought hither ' (Moodie, *Records*, III. 29).

1770. Meanwhile, the trekkers had come in contact with a foe more worthy of their steel than the half-hearted Hottentot or the puny Bushman. A boundary commission reported that Boer families were moving about just within the Colony and that others were between the Gamtoos and Fish rivers far beyond the most distant loan-places, paying no rent for their farms and carrying on barter with the Xosa vanguard of the advancing Bantu along a track well-worn despite plaacaaten as old as 1737. In other words, the cattle-farmers were following their migratory farms round either side of the Great Karoo, the inhospitable Droogeveld. To keep some sort of hold on the borderers, the Council extended the eastern frontier to Bruintjes Hoogte and the Gamtoos, but, within a short two years, Willem Prinsloo, an old elephant-hunter, who had been given leave to pick a couple of farms within the new border, promptly went beyond it and planted himself at the Boschberg which we now call Somerset East. He ignored commands to come back ; friends joined him, and the frontier had to be carried up to the Bushman's and the upper Fish rivers. Then, 1775. van Jaarsveld, fresh from a campaign against the Bushmen on the Zeekoe river in the present district of Colesberg, arrived at 1776. Bruintjes Hoogte and made direct and friendly contact with the Imidange Xosas.¹

Tidings of this new development, news of incessant Bushman raids in the Sneeuwberg area, and the request of van Jaarsveld and his friends for a church and a drostdy brought Governor van Plettenberg to the frontiers.² He found the two races, black and white, fairly interlocked ; the Gunukwebes, half Xosa, half Hottentot, on the coast lands between the Bushman's and Sunday rivers, and, to the north, Boers and Xosas on the colonial side of the middle Fish. He planted a beacon near the site of Colesberg to mark the north-eastern limit of the Colony, agreed with some petty Xosa chieftains that the Fish should be the dividing line between European and Bantu, and returned home through the coast lands, naming Plettenberg's Bay *en route*.

1779. Next year, Colonel Gordon, commander of the garrison, and an Englishman, Paterson, named the Orange river, but no boundary was fixed on that side for the time being.³

So in the short space of two generations the cattle-farmers had carried Western civilisation, or as much of it as their trek-waggons could accommodate, from the valley of the Breede to the valley of the Fish. They lost much of that civilisation on the way ; the farmhouses sixty miles from Capetown were already much ruder

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 18 ; Moodie, *Records*, III. 1 ff., 14, 49 ; Theal, IIIa. 96.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. ; No. 50 of 1835, p. 19 ; Moodie, *Records*, III. 74 ; Godée-Molsbergen, *Reizen*, II. 61 ff.

³ Theal, IIIa. 111.

than those in the more settled parts of the Colony, and van Plettenberg noted that there was not a substantial homestead east of Hex River and the Gamtoos;¹ but whether the Boers lived in houses or in their waggons or hartebeest huts, they were surrounded by great herds of cattle and sheep and a train of dependants, slaves in the more westerly parts, Hottentots and even 'tame Bushmen' in the east. Cattle was their wealth; it was almost their currency as well, for money was scarce on the frontiers and both Tulbagh and van Plettenberg were fain to accept three bullocks in lieu of recognition money for a loan farm.² They lived in isolation and preferred it so; but for the slaves, wrote Captain Cook, the Cape Colony with its one man to every 5½ square miles, would be more thinly peopled than any other part of the globe.³ They had developed a passion for independence and a restiveness against all forms of government that went beyond the strictly limited powers of the landdrost and heemraden, and most of them had little idea of what that might mean, since the nearest drostdy was far away to the west at Swellendam.

The Boers had drifted away from the organised state; their contact with the organised church and the book-learning that went therewith was hardly closer. They made desperate efforts to keep touch. They did their best to come in on occasion for nachtmaal; women would travel in to the nearest church at Roodezand, six or seven weeks' trek away, for the christening of their babies; sometimes they brought their last few children in in batches. Many Boers could read or half-read, half-recite the Scriptures; they all knew their Psalms by heart and loved the hymns of Willem Sluyter; some could write, still more could sign their names; but, for the rest, literature and the affairs of the great world outside their veld were closed books to them. Hollander visitors complained that they had 'begun to lose the cohesion and cleanliness' of the home Dutch; a little later de Mist, conning masses of reports from Company's officials and others, concluded that the extreme frontiersmen, 'these half-wild Europeans,' rebellious and unreasonable in their behaviour, were suffering from 'a complete corruption of their moral sense,' a corruption bred by 'the long distances . . . from Cape Town . . .; the lack of social intercourse with civilised individuals; the monotonous life of the herdsman . . .; the daily hunt, the continual diet of meat . . .; the war . . . conducted for some years against the Bushmen and Kaffirs,' a war in which some of them had learnt to doubt whether it really were a crime

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, I. 29.

² *Theal*, IIIa. 118.

³ *Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean*, I. 41.

to kill a native. The judgment was severe. Closer observers perceived virtues in the frontiersmen, courage, self-reliance, and a natural courtesy; succeeding generations of South Africans have recognised that with all their faults they staked out the claims of Europeans to the sparsely peopled lands between the Tulbagh mountains, the Fish river and the Orange before the Bantu flood could pour in from the east; nevertheless, they had done it at great cost to themselves. The burgher Patriots of the West could complain that many of the rising generation were well on the way to becoming worse than Hottentots.¹

1779.

Circa
1775.

Such was the society which was growing up in the East, beyond the empty spaces of the Great Karoo, in the last days of Jan Compagnie. The frontiersmen were the fathers or grandfathers of the men of the Great Trek who carried the frontiers at a bound beyond the Vaal and, by the very rapidity of their dispersion, immeasurably complicated the problems of their relations with the central government, with the natives, and with each other. All that changed in the course of the nineteenth century was the scene and the scale of these problems. The problems were there long before the British stepped into the shoes of the Company.

CHAPTER V

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY,
1778-96

Decline of the Netherlands—The Cape Patriots—Van der Graaff's reforms—Nederburgh and Frykenius—Kaffir wars and rebellion in the East—The first British Occupation.

Governors: Joachim van Plettenberg, May 18, 1774—Feb. 14, 1785; Cornelis Jacob van der Graaff, Feb. 14, 1785—June 24, 1791; [Secunde Johan Isaak Rhenius, acting, June 1791—July 1792]. *Commissioners-General*: Sebastiaan Cornelis Nederburgh and Simon Hendrik Frykenius, July 3, 1792—Sept. 2, 1793; Abraham Josias Sluysken, Sept. 2, 1793—Sept. 16, 1795. *British Occupation*.

The great Dutch East India Company entered on the last stage of its decline in the 'seventies of the eighteenth century. It still made an imposing show; dividends were still forthcoming; 20,000 Netherlanders still found employment and the upper classes gained advancement in its service; but deep-seated official

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 198, 256; IV. 149; Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, p. 8; Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte* (unpublished); Stavorinus, *Voyages*, III. 444; Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I. 377 ff.

corruption sapped its vitality; expensive wars drained its resources; the English Company, victorious over the French, went from strength to strength in Indian waters and took away the China trade, trade in the tea which darkened Boston harbour in 1773. Bankruptcy crept on; van Imhoff uttered a warning, 1743-
shrewd old Stavorinus repeated it thirty years later, and in due 1779-
time the Company was faced with a deficit of £150,000 on all its stations taken together.¹

The Netherlands themselves were going downhill. Scientific farming in the England of 'Turnip Townshend' and 'Farmer George,' the corn of Southern Russia issuing from Czarina Catherine's new conquest of Odessa, hit the Dutch corn-traders hard. Growing economic inequalities at home inflamed political differences. There had been a time when the republican burgher oligarchy, the *staatsgezinde* party, had had the upper hand, but the Orangemen had rallied, restored the Prince to the offices of admiral and captain-general, made him stadtholder for life, and forced him on the East India Company as director-in-chief and 1745-
governor-general. 1749-

A reaction set in against this budding monarchy. The wind of liberalism emanating from England blew strongly in France and stirred the dry bones of Europe. A radical party arose in 1769.
England; a little later van Capellen formed the democratic Patriot party in the Netherlands and moved on towards alliance with the Gallophile burgher oligarchy. The democrats owed something to Montesquieu and a little to Benjamin Franklin's 1754-
letters on the state of affairs in British North America; but they, like the French, drew their main stock of ideas from the great English philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith, or from contemporary English radicals like Price and Priestley. There was much talk in Holland of freedom, of natural law, of the popular will; there was excitement when tidings came of the revolt of the Americans against King George who was held 1775-
to have broken the social contract between himself as ruler and 1776-
'the good people of these colonies.'²

The news of all these doings reached the distant Cape by way of the Netherlands. Netherlanders were girding against the Ancien Régime in Europe; Americans were revolting against the old colonial system on the other side of the Atlantic; why should free burghers submit to both combined in Africa? Accordingly

¹ V.R. Soc., I.; Stavorinus, *Voyages*, III. chapters vi, vii. On the last years of the Company *vide* A. L. Geyer, *Das Wirtschaftliche System . . . am Kap . . .* 1785-95.

² C. Beyers, *Die Kaapse Patriotte*; Theal, IIIa. 112 ff.

1779. a burgher meeting was summoned secretly at Capetown and four men were empowered to go to Amsterdam as representatives of the Cape burghers to lay their grievances before the mighty Seventeen.

These Cape Patriots were drawn entirely from the west ; only some 400 of the 3000 free men of the Colony signed the petition, all of them living within a day's ride of Capetown ; the cattle-farmers of Swellendam had neither part nor lot in the movement. They were screwed to the sticking-point by van Plettenberg's free use of his power of deportation. The Company had a legal right to recall free burghers to its service and send them where it chose ;¹ but, as Charles I had learnt to his cost and Edmund Burke had noted in connection with the British Parliament's undoubted right to tax Americans, what matters is ' not what a lawyer tells me I may do but what right and justice tell me I ought to do.' Times were very bad at the Cape ; nerves were frayed ; the air was charged with the electricity of revolution ; yet van Plettenberg deported eighteen men in eight years, whereas Father Tulbagh had been content with ten in more than twice that time. The eighteenth deportee was admittedly a black sheep ; but the order of his going was abominable and, to make matters worse, he was acquitted by the Batavian court and died at sea on the way home. This Afrikander John Wilkes promptly became a popular hero and men began to ask how much longer they were to submit to a vague and arbitrarily administered law. True, the principle had long ago been laid down that the Courts were to be guided by local *placaaten* in the first instance, and, if these failed, they were to have recourse to the Statutes of India and, in the last resort, to the Roman-Dutch law of the Netherlands.² So far, so good ; but the *placaaten* were in fearful confusion ; the judges were for the most part amateurs, and the risk that obsolete laws might be raised from the dead was very great.

The Cape Patriots, therefore, asked that the laws be written down ; in other words, like the French Revolutionists later on, they demanded a written constitution. They went further ; they demanded a share in the making and administering of the laws and a fuller share in the interpretation of them. It was a new development in Cape politics. Hitherto burgher uprisings had taken place on economic grounds ; but now the men of the capital and the old colony of settlement demanded seven seats on

¹ Simon van der Stel was ordered to pack off lazy and unmarried fellows to the Indies to serve as soldiers at 9 florins a month (*Journal, 1699-1732, p. 91*).

² *Resolutien, Feb. 12, 1715* ; J. L. W. Stock, *The New Statutes of India* (S.A. Law Journal, 1915).

the Council of Policy when matters affecting the burghers were to be discussed. Two of these seats were to be vacated annually and filled by men freely nominated by the burgher councillors and approved of by the Governor ; the burgher councillors as a body were to have the right to report to the Seventeen on the state of the Colony. Similarly, the petitioners demanded half the seats on the High Court and the right of appeal to Amsterdam instead of corrupt Batavia.

These were the most epoch-making demands. The rest were a very mixed collection of grievances, big and little : relief from the burden of attendance at the matrimonial court, a fixed scale of official fees, reduction of farm rents, a better price for wine, more churches in the hinterland, liberty to flog slaves without reference to the Fiscal, leave to send a few cargoes to the Netherlands, free-trade with the Indies and slaving in Madagascar, an end to the keeping of shops or doing of business by freed Chinese and Javanese prisoners since these men received goods stolen by slaves, an end also to the right of foreigners to live at the Cape or to buy or hire houses or to drive a ' burgher trade ' or to ride inland or to become burghers unless they had first been in the Company's service. Thus were natural rights interpreted in Capetown when the American Declaration of Independence and *The Wealth of Nations* were hardly three years old.

The Patriots accompanied their demands with an unvarnished account of the state of the Colony. They said little against van Plettenberg, for, in spite of his extravagance, he was a just man and popular withal ; but they vigorously attacked the Fiscal Boers and certain other highly placed personages. The Seventeen, therefore, ordered the officials to reply. This they did after a long delay. Van Plettenberg stated his case moderately, pointing out that the vast bulk of the burghers had taken no part in the agitation and that the Colony was prosperous enough. This was true, for war had again come to the rescue and Capetown was full ^{1781.} of French soldiers and army contractors. It was equally true that most of the burghers wanted to live on the labour of slaves and Hottentots and the proceeds of their traffic with foreign crews. But these arguments, as van Plettenberg well knew, did not go to the root of the matter. He therefore proposed remedies. He would not hear of burghers on the Council of Policy, but he recommended that they be given half the seats on the High Court, that the laws be defined, that officials be paid decent salaries in lieu of fees and perquisites, and that a limited private trade be permitted. Finally, he offered to make way for a newcomer who would have a better hope than he of instituting these reforms satisfactorily.

Most of the other officials contented themselves with remarking that the abuses complained of were of long standing, but Fiscal Boers carried the war into the enemy's country. In spite of the precedents of a hundred years, he refused to acknowledge that the burgher councillors had any right to speak for the free men or any powers other than the limited share in the administration of justice given them by van Riebeeck; he held that free trade would leave the Company and the Colony itself denuded of supplies since export prices were so tempting, and added drily that the smuggling trade gave the burghers all the free trade they could desire. Grenville had noted the same fact in North America with unfortunate results.

However, temporary economic salvation had come to the Cape, not for the last time, by war and, with it, a check to mutual recriminations. The War of American Independence had gradually opened out into a world war of the old style between Great Britain and the Bourbon Powers, and the Netherlands had been drawn in on the side of France and Spain. The republican party and their democratic allies had gained the upper hand at The Hague, and Great Britain, preferring the smiting of an open enemy to the blows of a neutral friend, had ended the hundred years *entente* with the United Provinces. At once the Cape was dragged out of the political backwater in which it had lain for so long. With Warren Hastings fighting for the life of 'John Company' against Indian princes and their French allies, it became a question whether France or Great Britain would occupy the halfway house to India. In the year of Yorktown, Commodore Johnstone and Admiral Suffren, bound on the same errand, came upon one another unexpectedly at Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands; Suffren emerged least battered from the indecisive battle, and when Johnstone neared the Cape, he found the Frenchmen in possession. Johnstone solaced himself by seizing some richly laden Dutch Indiamen in Saldanha Bay and sheered off to India.¹

The Frenchmen virtually occupied Capetown for three years. There was a great coming and going of troops: the regiment of Pondicherry; the regiment of Luxembourg in Dutch pay and, when that sailed east, the regiment Van Waldener. House property, slaves, horses rose 50 to 100 per cent. in value; the demand for produce was so great that the Company had to fix maximum prices to protect itself and its allies; Capetown blossomed forth as 'Little Paris,' with marked effect on the morals of the rising generation. Indeed, that stout Dutch patriot,

¹ All were taken except one, *Middelburg*, which was gallantly blown up by Abraham de Smidt, one of its officers.

de Mist, afterwards complained that loyal Netherlanders and fair-minded foreigners alike spoke disparagingly of conditions in the Colony, and that justly. For the French had 'entirely corrupted the standard of living at the Cape, and extravagance and indulgence in an unbroken round of amusements and diversions have come to be regarded as necessities. . . . It will be the work of years to transform the citizens of Capetown once again into *Netherlanders*.' ¹

The prosperity was fictitious: The shipping returns told that. Far more ships than ever before put into Table Bay; but the vast and increasing majority of them were foreigners. The British had reasserted their old naval supremacy and were busily sweeping Dutch shipping off the seven seas. The Company paid its last dividend in 1782, and in the same year issued inconvertible paper money at the Cape.² True, it promised to redeem it as soon as possible; but meanwhile the paper-flood rose and with it prices. Then came rumours of peace. Luxembourg departed; 1783. Van Waldener sailed eastwards almost as soon as it had come; drought set in in the west and did not break till 1787; Pondicherry departed when Holland at last made peace with 1784. Great Britain; the trading-houses which had sprung up in Capetown during the war boom wilted visibly; the agitation against the authorities revived. Men remembered that the Fiscal, Boers, had stopped the local manufacture of coarse cloth and blankets during the war for fear of damaging the industries of Holland and the pocket of the Independent Fiscal; the demand for a coasting trade grew louder; the Patriot representatives passed on a good deal of the revolutionary French philosophy they had picked up at Amsterdam, and the American version came with 1784. the first ship flying the new American Stars and Stripes to touch at the Cape.³

Meanwhile, the Seventeen had approved of the officials' replies to the original burgher petition and tardily proposed minor 1783. reforms. These in no wise satisfied the Patriots, but Boers and other hated officials had departed, a new Governor was expected, and they at first proposed to await his coming. The news that an unpopular man was to become Fiscal and an attempt to arrest a burgher forced their hand. A group of Patriots drew up a new list of grievances and secured the written approval of over four 1784. hundred men and women, and when the new Governor, van der Jan. Graaff, arrived to assuage the grievances of the Colony and to 1785. make Capetown more easily defensible, his programme of reform failed to find favour with them. They forthwith commissioned

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 201.

² *Ibid.*, p. 282.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 170; Beyers, *op. cit.*

four representatives to lay their petition before the States General.

The Cape Patriots had appealed from the Company to the Sovereign. The appeal failed. The delegates quarrelled among themselves; the Seventeen made haste to propose further reforms; the States General considered that these would meet the case and van der Graaff was left in peace to carry them out and indulge his taste for fortification to the full.

1785-
1786. Van der Graaff gave the burghers six seats on the High Court but, as the Seventeen had recommended, he limited the right to sit on that board and on the Council of Policy to members of the Established Church; he set up a Commission of the High Court, three officials and three burghers, to care for the roads, fix prices and suggest new forms of taxation; he carried out his predecessor's intention by appointing a badly needed landdrost near the eastern frontier at Graaff Reinet. He also relaxed the restrictions on trade and industry somewhat, opened a depot for grain at Mossel Bay and another for timber farther east at Plettenberg's Bay, with a military guard at each, and permitted burghers to send wine on their own account to Holland on Company's ships. Finally, the Company gave up exporting European goods and threw open all its trade, save that with China and Japan, to Dutch subjects.¹

1788.
1789.

The long-deferred boon of 'free trade' was more apparent than real. Trade was burdened with heavy customs duties; it must be carried on in Cape ships, one-third of whose crews must be Cape colonists, and the Cape was noted for the fact that it supplied no sailors to the Company's own ships; there was little to export from a colony which had had to ward off famine by importing rice from Java and flour from Europe. Above all, the boon was granted too late. The financial condition of the Company at the end of the War of American Independence was deplorable. The States General had to come to the rescue, but the Company's debts more than tripled in the course of seven years and they showed no signs of stopping. Of all its liabilities overseas, the Cape was the most grievous. The rising tide of foreigners which flowed into Table Bay and out again had swelled the proceeds of the wine and liquor licences; stricter collection of the grain tithe increased the revenues for a time; but official staffs were overblown and expensive from the Governor with his sixty carriage horses and yearly allowances of 18,000 florins downwards; there was gross mismanagement at the cattle-posts, and open frauds at the giant hospital where the sick multiplied

1786.
1783-
1790.

¹ Theal, III*a*. 171, 174, 192.

miraculously for the benefit of the staff; van der Graaff's fortifications sent expenditure up from £25,000 to £120,000 a year.¹ After all, what could be expected since the Governor himself was an engineer officer and 'the engineers who drew up the plans are also in every case the Contractors (*visum teneatis!*), and, being to a large extent residents there, they behave as though the Cape were an African Maastricht or Luxembourg'²?

In short, the Colony was costing the embarrassed Directors more than all their other East Indian stations combined. They, therefore, took up the axe and ended the fool's paradise at the Cape. Van der Graaff was recalled; the fortification works were closed down and the new military posts withdrawn from the Swellendam district; most of the Swiss and South German mercenaries, the best customers in the Colony next to the Company, sailed away; in other words, some 1500 officials, 14,000 burghers, and 17,000 slaves were practically left to their own devices. So the miserable Colony awaited the special Commissioners who were on their way to save, if it might be, the sinking fortunes of the Company in the East. 1791.

Commissioners Nederburgh and Frykenius came with powers to carry out some at least of the reforms which van Plettenberg had advocated. The whole of their policy was, however, coloured by the fact that Nederburgh, for one, was convinced that the Company must go bankrupt sooner or later, and was determined that it should be later rather than sooner. They found 'the large majority of the settlers financially ruined' and the grain farmers only sowing enough for their own needs; they were soon faced with 'open rebellion . . . against the authority of the Government to collect their taxes.'³ July 1792.

The times were dangerous. Van Capellen was long since dead; the Prussians had invaded the Netherlands and crushed the Patriot party; with the appointment of a new Fiscal at the Cape, the local version of the Patriot movement had sunk underground. The leading merchants and most of the civil and military officials at the Cape were good Orangemen, for, since the Orange restoration, the Prince had made all appointments on the recommendation of the Seventeen. But revolutionary France was seeking to thrust Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity upon an unwilling Europe by force of arms, and numbers of the burghers and common soldiers at the Cape were pro-French and anti-Orange. They called themselves Nationals like the Frenchmen, 1787. 1788.

¹ V.R. Soc. III. 180; A. L. Geyer, *Das Wirtschaftliche System*, pp. 9 ff.; Theal, IIIa. 123, 183.

² V.R. Soc., III. 263.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 178.

professed undying loyalty to the Republic of the free Netherlands and an equally undying hatred for 'Jan Compagnie'; and, though they talked little of Equality or Fraternity, as was only natural in a mixed society which de Mist afterwards noted resembled that of San Domingo rather than of the United States, they spoke much of 'Liberty, liberty,' which they inevitably interpreted in their own way. The Commissioners found revenue sadly in arrears and the burghers firmly determined to refuse payment of a collateral succession duty.¹

The burgher councillors demanded to be heard as representatives of the people; the Commissioners took as narrow a view of their functions as Fiscal Boers had done and refused to recognise them as such; but on finding that there were only eighteen days' supply of corn in Capetown and no more likely to come in till the burgher councillors were heard, they gave way. After discussion, the Commissioners reformed the Capetown police and cut down the powers of the Independent Fiscal, who was henceforward to be merely Fiscal and subject like any other official to the local government. But their main work was financial. They gave the officials reasonable salaries and allowed them to retain their statutory fees; but they cut off nearly all their perquisites, and by rigidly limiting other expenses reduced the outgoings by nearly fifty per cent. They then tried to bridge the gulf which still yawned between revenue and expenditure by raising new taxes. Customs duties, ever the resort of political financiers in distress, came first: a £2 duty on every slave imported and a five per cent. *ad valorem* duty on all other goods exported or imported in other than Company ships. Then came an increase of the transfer duty, a carriage and waggon tax, a £2 anchorage fee for non-Company vessels, twelve shillings on every legger of brandy brought into town, five per cent. *ad valorem* on the goods and chattels of all higher officials who left the Colony and failed to return within three years, a share of the percentages charged by the official auctioneers through whose hands so much of the business of the Cape passed in those days, an increase of the stamp duties, and, *horribile dictu*, the demand for a stamp on auction receipts payable by the purchaser. The Commissioners even leased the Gardens and the Company's country seat at Rustenburg and farmed out the salt-pans. And still revenues fell short of expenditure by nearly half.²

Nederburgh and Frykenius were, however, not merely content to tax; they were anxious to help the Colony provided the Company's interests were not damaged thereby. They proposed that the Company should have a call on as much grain as it

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 196, 274.

² V.R. Soc., III. 180; Theal, IIIa. 206.

wanted at a slightly enhanced price and that the farmers should have liberty to export the rest to Holland or India in Dutch ships ; they threw open the whale fishery to Dutch subjects ; they opened Table Bay, Mossel Bay and Plettenberg Bay to trade with any part of the Dutch Indies provided the ships used were Dutch-built and bought their return cargoes from the Company ; they allowed Cape burghers to go to Madagascar and the East Indies for slaves. But the Navigation Acts were still as the law of the Medes and Persians ; the Commissioners were determined that the trade of the Dutch empire should be carried on solely by Dutchmen, for Dutchmen, and in Dutch ships ; they therefore forbade foreign ships to land any goods at the Cape. Finally they experimented with the paper currency. The paper had soon fallen markedly in value, but the importation of silver and the cancellation of some of the "notes" had more or less restored it to par except where large payments had to be made to foreigners. Now Nederburgh and Frykenius established a Loan Bank, financed it with new paper, and with the knowledge that the Netherlands and its ally, Great Britain, were at war with Republican France, sailed for Java, leaving Sluysken and a skeleton garrison to hold the discontented Colony as best they might.

Some few of the colonists tried to take advantage of the new opportunities offered them : S. V. van Reenen took over the Spanish sheep which Colonel Gordon had recently imported and ran them for some time with success ; J. A. Kirsten tried to improve the breed of cattle and horses with New England stock ; a few likely bays and islands on the Namaqua-Damaraland coast were annexed for the benefit of the whale-fishers. But it was all on a small scale, a mere flicker of light and hope in the economic darkness. The townsmen had learnt to rely on foreign ships ; they could hardly have done otherwise, for, roughly speaking, two foreigners called for every Dutch ship that put into Table Bay ; they were furious at the embargo on foreign imports, and to make matters worse, now that war had come, few ships came near the Cape at all. In town and country, men raged against the auction and transfer duties ; they found the purchasing power of the paper money falling, and, resting as it did ' entirely upon the good opinion of the people,' it fell still further ; they sank deeper and deeper into debt to the new Loan Bank. And, far away in Holland, the famous East India Company, ten millions to the bad and its credit gone, solemnly declared the bankruptcy which Nederburgh had foreseen. What wonder that men in the western Colony were in a mood to welcome any change that would bring them *novae tabulae* ? ¹

¹ V.R. Soc., III. 177, 283 ; Theal, IIIa. 207 ff., 228, 237.

In the background, the cattle-farmers of Swellendam and Graaff Reinet drifted steadily towards rebellion, for they and therefore their rulers were in touch with a native problem of a much more searching nature than any that the decrepit Hottentots or the exasperating Bushmen had ever presented to them, a problem with which the decrepit government at Capetown was utterly unfitted to deal. In short, the frontiersmen had made full contact with the advance-guard of the Bantu.

To-day Bantu tribes are scattered over all Africa south of a line drawn from the Gulf of Guinea to the East Coast and north-east of another drawn from Swakopmund to Knysna.¹ They are in no sense aboriginal to Southern Africa. In many parts of what is now the Union, their occupation is very little older than that of the Europeans; in the western half of the Cape Colony, in so far as it has taken place at all, it is more recent than theirs. It is commonly held that there are two main types of Bantu: the light-skinned Nilotic peoples who are said to have come from North-East Africa, and the black-skinned folk from the forests of the Congo. Be that as it may, the Bantu gradually moved into Southern Africa by way of the Great Lakes. From very early times, the debased Bakalahari and Balala lived on the eastern edge of the Kalahari desert where the Leghoya or Bataung came in upon them at the close of the sixteenth century and either slew them, drove them into the desert, or enslaved them unto this day. Farther east the Makalanga apparently led the way into the coast lands behind Sofala as early as the ninth century A.D.; certainly they established the so-called Empire of Monomotapa there in the course of the fifteenth century. At the close of the sixteenth century, the fierce Abambo and Amazimba rushed down upon Monomotapa and poured on into what is now Natal. They were followed by the Barotse and, in the course of the first half of the eighteenth century, by the Bavenda and Bakwena who conquered what are now the Transvaal and Free State as far south as the Caledon, while the Batlapin and Barolong drove the Leghoya into the north-eastern Free State. The invading Batlapin settled round Old Lithakao between the Molopo and Kuruman rivers, the Barolong on the banks of the Harts. Meanwhile, Ovaherero and Damaras had found their way into the central parts of the present South-West Africa Protectorate.

Circa
1570.

Circa
1750.

Circa
1775.

¹ On the Bantu in Southern Africa, *vide* Theal, Ia. 5 ff.; IIIa. 64 ff.; Stow, *Native Races*, pp. 256 ff., chapters xxi-xxvi; J. Maclean, *Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs*; C. Brownlee, *Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History*; D. Kidd, *The Essential Kafir and Kafir Socialism*; M. S. Evans, *Black and White in South-East Africa*; Molema, *The Bantu, Past and Present*.

Thus there were, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, three main groups of Bantu in the hinterland of the fast-expanding Cape Colony. To the north, and as yet beyond the ken of the colonists, were the plateau tribes: Ovaherero and Damaras, blacker, smaller and duller than the rest, and behind them the far superior Ovambo; ¹ Batlapin much mixed with Bakalahari and Balala and even with Hottentots and Bushmen; Bechuana and, further east, Bataung. To the north-east in the centre of the Bantu ring were the highlanders, Barotse, Bavenda and Bakwena, big men whose colour ranged from copper to black, with crisply curling hair and small beards, some with the flat noses of the forest dwellers, others with aquiline noses which spoke of East Coast Semitic influences. To the east were the coast tribes. It was these who were in contact with the Europeans on the banks of the Fish river. Circa
1610.

Either the Abambo or wrecks of tribes driven before them or both had broken up on the Tugela river early in the seventeenth century. They all kept the snake as their *siboko* or totem, but each tribe took the name of its chief or some other hero, prefixed it with the word Ama (people) and so became the Ama-Xosa, -Tembu, -Pondo, -Swazi and so on. A few of them pushed over the Drakensberg into the north-eastern Free State and became Basia and Baputi; but the bulk of them either stayed where they were or pushed slowly down the coast belt towards the Colony.

The Xosas came first, with the Tembus hard on their heels. They killed or chased away the Bushmen—all invaders did that— Circa
1623. but the Xosas especially mixed freely with the Hottentots and borrowed much of their clicking speech, and perhaps something of their fickleness. Soon the main body of the Xosas were on the Umzimvubu river, but some of them and even some of the Tembu were already beyond it to the west. In Simon van der Stel's time the Xosas crossed the Kei and sent out hunting parties beyond 1702. the Fish, where they met European and Hottentot cattle-traders from Stellenbosch. Soon the Company included Kaffirs in the list of tribes with whom the burghers might have no intercourse, and, as was to be expected, intercourse between white and black Circa
1750. became closer. But for a long time that intercourse was a mere matter of hunting and cattle-barter; the two main streams of migration had not yet met. Meanwhile, in Tulbagh's day, the Circa
1775. great Xosa chief Palo ruled in the Amatola mountains, sent his men into the lands between the Kei and the Fish and, in due time, died. The Xosa clans to the east of the Kei then passed to his 'great son,' Galeka, while those between the Kei and the Fish

¹ Stow, *Native Races*, pp. 256 ff.

followed another son, Rarabe.¹ Among the clans owing allegiance to Rarabe were the half-Xosa, half-Hottentot Gunukwebes who were already established on the western side of the Fish river.

1778.

Van Plettenberg had arranged with some petty Xosa chieftains that the Fish should be the dividing line between white and black, and the Council of Policy had ratified the 'treaty.'² This comprehensive segregation policy had not the slightest chance of success: the expansive traditions of the trek-boers was against it on the one hand, the whole social and political system of the Bantu on the other.


Bantu tribal customs vary infinitely, and it is hard, in our present state of knowledge, to generalise; nevertheless there are certain principles which are common to all tribesmen. The Bantu were in every way more advanced than the Bushmen and Hottentots. Their tribal system, based on religious sanctions, was strong. Each tribe looked to a great or paramount chief. In time of war, the power of the chief was as great as that of the President of the U.S.A.; in time of peace, its extent depended largely on his own force of character and the strength of the tribal custom interpreted by the great indunas or councillors without whose advice he was not supposed to act.³ And behind the great indunas sat the tribal council, a veritable African Witenagemot.

Beneath the paramount chiefs were lesser chiefs. These men were usually his sons or other relatives, for the Bantu had great respect for the blood royal. New clans were continually being formed within the tribe. Great chiefs, like all others who could afford to do so, practised polygamy. The first wife of such a chief was the 'wife of the right hand,' the second the 'wife of the

¹ This genealogy of the Ama-Xosa chiefs is based on Theal, IIIa. 93:

Palo, d. 1775 *ca.*

(Eastern Xosa or Galekas) | (Western Xosa: Rarabes or Gaikas)



² Theal, IIIa. 112.

³ The military despotisms of the Zulus under Chaka and his successors, and of the kindred Matabele under Umzilikasi and Lobengula were no more typical of the Bantu system of rule than the Napoleonic empires were typical of the European states of their day.

left hand,' and so on. But there was also a 'great wife,' married as a rule for political reasons and destined, if all went well, to be the mother of the heir to the throne. As the great wife was often married late in life, it frequently chanced that the heir succeeded his father as a child under the regency of an uncle or an elder half-brother, a fact which by no means added to the tranquillity of the tribe during the regency and still less when the time came for the regent to hand over his authority to the rightful owner. The sons of the right and left hands, meanwhile, were given men and cattle with which to found new clans within the tribe.

Hence, it was rarely easy for Europeans to know precisely where authority lay. They might make a treaty with a chief, as did van Plettenberg, and then find that the paramount chief or other minor chiefs were not bound by it; they might make another with a great chief and then discover that it was 'for himself' and in no wise for his successor; they might even find that a treaty with a great chief could not be enforced upon his subordinate chieftains. The history of the dealings of the Dutch and British with the Xosas and, still more, with the Basuto confederacy later on is full of these difficulties. From the Bantu point of view, however, the frequency with which clans could be formed within the tribe and the readiness with which fugitives could be adopted into the clans served as a check upon tyranny. If a chief 'ate up' his men too greedily by confiscating their cattle and other goods in the name of justice, that 'great source of gain,' he might wake up to find them gone over to a milder rival. But only a grinding tyranny would drive warriors away from their lawful chief, for loyalty and patience were and are the cardinal virtues of the Bantu tribesman.

Bantu rule was not and is not, except in rare cases, merely capricious. The tribes had and, in so far as their tribal systems survive, have a well-defined system of courts and customary law. Some of the northern tribes used the ordeal by red-hot iron or emetics; too often the guilty were simply 'smelt out' by the witch-doctor; but a man was held to be innocent until he had been proved guilty, and in many cases an appeal was allowed to the chief paramount.

Punishments were two: death or a fine payable in cattle, for tribes who lived in mud and thatch huts could hardly have attained to the refinement of imprisonment. Death and the confiscation of goods was the inevitable penalty of witchcraft, for that was a sin against both Church and State. At the back of Bantu religion was the idea of a Great One, Umkulunkulu, who had brought men and all things living out of the earth—or was it out of the split reed? But Umkulunkulu was a shadowy

personage, a kind of Father Adam rather than God the Creator.¹ The foreground was filled with ancestral spirits with whom touch must be kept, and, still more, with evil spirits and goblins who must at all costs be placated. It was with these spirits that the witches were supposed to be in league, to the great hurt of man and beast and crops ; it was the duty of the chief's witch-doctor to smell out the witches ; it was the temptation of the chief to indicate privately the over-wealthy tribesman who was to be smelt out. Nevertheless, smelling-out was always done decently and in order ; it was at least part of the law of the land, and the Bantu were not unique in that their law did not always square with essential justice.

The tribal law was carried in the memories of the indunas and other ' elder statesmen,' for writing the Bantu had none. Perhaps for that reason, they prized the spoken word. A chief must depend to a certain extent on his eloquence for carrying his council with him ; he would take care to supplement his own gift of tongues with the services of a *mbongo* or official praiser ; his men well understood and valued the long debates which, in other lands, have formed the basis of parliaments ; the very women were less impatient of male verbosity than their more civilised sisters elsewhere have been wont. Indeed, it fell to the women to enrich the musical language of the tribe ; for, to avoid mentioning the names of their husbands' male relatives, they had perforce to invent new words. To-day, the Zulu women, members of the most conservative tribe in the Union, have a private language of about 5000 words.²

Economically, the Bantu were and are cattle-farmers practising agriculture as a side line. The hoeing of the gardens, the tending of the mealies, Kaffir corn and pumpkins, and the making of the beer fell to the women, who were thus an asset rather than a liability ; but the care of the cattle was the man's privilege. Horned cattle were the wealth and pride of the Bantu, the central facts in their lives. The beasts were sacred. It was the sacrifice of an ox in the centre of the cattle-kraal round which the huts were usually grouped that put the living in touch with the irritable dead ; the skinned ox, one for the tribe, the other for the enemy, that lived longest foretold success or failure in a coming campaign ; it was with cattle that fines or compensation for injuries were liquidated : the tail hairs of a selected beast were a sovereign remedy against sickness ; cattle were the chief prize in war and the medium through which ' reparations ' were paid ; it

¹ Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, pp. 96 ff. ; Stow, *Native Races*, p. 3.

² Verbal information from J. B. Lindley, Esq., son of Daniel Lindley, the missionary to the Zulus and friend of the trekkers.

was *lobola*, the cattle given by the bridegroom to the father of the bride, that gave women a dignified position in society and, what is more, 'begot the children.' Without the cattle the children would have been illegitimate.¹

Nevertheless, the Bantu system was and is based on land-holding. 'The patrimony of a chief is not cattle. It is land and men.'² In theory, the 'great place,' the kraal of the paramount chief, was the centre of the tribal state; around it were grouped the lesser kraals, and around all lay the tribal lands. The frontiers of those lands were not precisely defined. A chief might, if necessary, point to certain landmarks well within the lands claimed by his neighbours, who would certainly do the same; in other words, he and they would admit that there were belts of debatable land between the ground actually used by one tribe and another. So long as there was plenty of room this land would be left empty; but, if not, men of both tribes would settle there side by side under the rule of their own chiefs. Sovereignty was personal rather than territorial, but, if strife did arise between the interlocking tribes, the one that was defeated lost claim to the debatable lands, and a tribe whose royal family was wiped out in war even lost its right to its fully occupied land.

War, *ultima ratio regum*, was the surest way by which the tribal lands could pass from one tribe to another. The land did not belong to the chief; it was hardly 'owned' in the European sense by the tribe itself; certainly the chief could neither sell it nor cede it. It was precisely on this vital matter of landholding that European and Bantu ideas differed most fundamentally: the European based on contract and the personal, private ownership of a wedge of the universe cutting the earth's superficies and stretching 'from Hell to Heaven'; the Bantu ignorant of contract,³ holding fast to status and regarding the actual soil as of less importance than the beings that lived upon and above it. Every member of a tribe, simply because he had been either born or adopted into the blood-fellowship of that tribe, was freely entitled to the use of air, water, grass, timber and the game upon the tribal lands provided he gave the chief the haunch of buck or the tusk of the elephant which custom demanded. All that Bantu chiefs meant to do or could have meant to do when they 'ceded' land by treaty or otherwise to colonists, missionaries or other chiefs was to give these men the same privileges over land as their own tribesmen in return for the payment of a few cattle,

¹ Some tribes pay *lobola* in other articles. To-day, in the decay of the tribal system, men even pay money for their wives.

² So Sandile the Gaika told Sir George Grey. Desp. 517. Grey to S. of S., Feb. 22, 1855.

³ Except debt, which never dies. (Evans, *Black and White*, p. 69.)

sheep, or even muskets as a recognition that the bargain had been made. In the chief's eyes the newcomers thereby became his vassals.

Such a conflict of ideas was bound to lead to trouble when white men came into contact with Bantu. The chief might think that he was granting the use of certain territories; the Europeans naturally held that he was selling them the fee-simple of the land. Even the one kind of land which could, in Bantu law, be held upon individual tenure tended to complicate the issue still further. A tribesman, who, by permission of his chief, broke in a piece of hitherto unused soil, had a perpetual claim to the use of that land. Once the crop was reaped, all might drive their cattle into the stubble, but, as soon as the new seed was sown, all must keep off it. Interrupted occupation made no difference; that piece of land was earmarked for the use of the original holder and of his sons' sons after him.¹ Such a practice might work well enough among scattered tribes; it could not fail to lead to friction when Europeans occupied apparently waste land as farms and then found themselves faced by the Bantu claimants returning out of a far country.

In short, there were in 1779 on either side of an ill-defined and totally unpoliced border, white men and black, at very different levels of civilisation it is true, but both rough and ready agriculturalists, both essentially cattle-farmers, both migratory and both greedy of land. The land and not the cattle is the key to the problem of the frontiers from that day to this. In any case, while the border officials were preparing for a big commando for the extirpation of the Bushmen, news reached them that a Kaffir war had broken out upon the eastern frontier.²

1779.

It was the first war in a century of such wars. Who fired the first shot no man can say, nor what caused the firing. The number of Europeans in the eastern borderlands had increased steadily since Willem Prinsloo had established himself at the Boschberg a few years previously; soon frontiersmen were complaining to van Plettenberg that the Kaffirs were stealing their cattle; now, in 1779, Gunukwebe, Imidange and other Xosa clans spread themselves over the parts that are now Albany and Somerset East and the fighting duly began. Some say Prinsloo was to blame for shooting an Imidange and seizing cattle in revenge for the theft of a sheep; others that his son, Marthinus, had gone with an illicit cattle-trading party beyond the Keiskamma and killed one of Rarabe's men; others again that farmers had driven a Xosa signatory of the van Plettenberg treaty back

¹ The chief might give it to another.

² No. 50 of 1835, p. 19; Moodie, *Records*, III. 78 ff.

beyond the Fish river with unnecessary violence ;¹ but, from whatever cause, though Rarabe himself was peaceably inclined, Xosas killed some Hottentots and laid hands on European cattle.

The Xosas were organised for war on the usual Bantu lines. They had little of the fierce military discipline which afterwards distinguished the Zulus and Matabele ; but they were organised in regiments ; those who had killed their man wore the crane's feathers in their head-ring ; all were well practised in sham fights and equipped with the ox-hide shield, knobkerry and assegai. Unlike some of the tribes of the inland plateau, they did not use the bow or the iron battle-axe ; nevertheless, they were dangerous antagonists to a handful of undisciplined farmers armed with clumsy flint-locks.

The first war, a prolonged series of skirmishes, ended in favour of the colonists. Josua Joubert and his friends took it on themselves to form a commando, killed many Kaffirs, and shared the captured cattle among themselves ; whereupon the Council of Policy reluctantly allowed the local officials to take action and itself appointed Adriaan van Jaarsveld field-commandant. Van Jaarsveld drove the Xosas back across the Fish, not without one bad display of treachery against the Imidange ; the commando 1781. shared the 5300 captured cattle, and for a time the eastern border had peace.²

During the 'eighties, times were good in the east. There was drought in the west, but the cattle-farmers were blessed with abundant rains and Capetown's demand for fresh meat was insatiable. The long-promised landdrost was sent to Graaff 1786. Reiniet, closely followed by a sick-comforter, the forerunner of the predikant, von Manger, who arrived in 1792 ;³ but from the first it was clear that the control which the central authority hoped to exercise in the east was very limited, for it even told Swellendam that it could give no help in the collection of district taxes,⁴ and in Graaff Reiniet it merely organised a krygsraad and two mounted companies of burgher 'dragonders' and furnished the usual ammunition and good advice. But the instructions given to landdrost Woeke showed what was going on along the eastern frontier. He was, of course, to prevent the occupation of Algoa Bay by a foreign Power and collect the recognition money for the cattle-runs, but he was also to keep the peace with the tribes, check Kaffir robberies, recall all burghers to the colonial side of the Fish and put an end to the practice of going into Kaffirland.⁵

¹ Theal, IIIa. 128.

² No. 50 of 1835, p. 20 ; Moodie, *Records*, III. 89 ff.

³ Theal, IIIa. 151, 174.

⁴ Geyer, *Das Wirtschaftliche System*, pp. 23 ff.

⁵ No. 50 of 1835, p. 20.

It was the same old story: proclamations and no police to enforce them. The Company set up no military posts in Graaff Reinet and never sent the frontier guard which Woeke demanded. So the Boers went freely into Kaffirland bartering cattle, and Xosas worked for them on the farms far to the westward in Swellendam district.

March
1789.

Rarabe was now dead, and his son Ndhambi ruled in the name of his little grandson Gaika; wherefore the Xosas who had crossed the Kei before Rarabe held that they owed allegiance to no one but the distant paramount, Galeka. Then Ndhambi led his men across the lower Fish on to the Zuurveld, drove the Boers out and captured many of their cattle. Woeke promptly called out a commando, but van der Graaff, anxious to avoid the risks and expenses of war, censured him for so doing and sent H. C. Maynier as secretary to Graaff Reinet to co-operate with the retiring secretary, J. J. Wagener, in coming to terms with the invaders, if necessary by buying up any claims they might have against the colonists.¹ The two secretaries, both of whom held views on the virtues of the 'noble savage' which Rousseau had made fashionable in philosophic circles, shared to the full the opinions entertained by Western officialdom on the shortcomings of the frontiersmen. They made a virtue of necessity and told the Xosas they might remain on the Zuurveld *quamdiu se bene gesserint* and 'without prejudice to the ownership of Europeans.'²

Aug.
1789.

For the next year or two the philosophic Maynier practically superseded the incompetent Woeke. He was the new French Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity personified. Those ideas had percolated to the frontier farms; but the interpretation set upon them by the Boers was very different from that held by Maynier. They dwelt more on Liberty than anything else, liberty to do as they chose, while he, like any Frenchman, set more store on Equality and Fraternity for men of all classes, creeds and colours. That, to the Boers, was wild, alien to all their traditions and contrary to the teaching contained in the most freely thumbed portions of their Bibles. Maynier tried to set up 'the rule of law' on the frontier, where, as on all frontiers, very little existed; he tried to do justice to all men, but he lacked the police which were necessary to safeguard liberty. All he could do was to prevent the frontiersmen from taking their own line. He would not let them 'correct,' *videlicet* beat, their Hottentot servants without official leave, regardless of the fact that isolated farmers must sometimes travel hundreds of miles to the drostdy to get it; he would not allow unauthorised commandos to go into Kaffirland and would then only sanction a *wachtmeester's* party in place of a

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 20.

² Theal, IIIa. 181.

general levy of frontiersmen. Worse still, the Boers complained that their new predikant interfered with them instead of confining himself to his clerical duties. True, they had asked for a landdrost and a predikant, but they had not thought that that would bring them a Maynier and a von Manger.¹

Meanwhile the bulk of the Cape garrison was withdrawn, the posts in Swellendam were abandoned, and the Company's new grain store at Mossel Bay was closed to the farmers of Swellendam who had borrowed money wherewith to buy ploughs and oxen on the strength of the Company's offer to take their produce.² Discontent and troubles accumulated along the whole frontier. In the north, the Bushmen drove numbers of farmers off their farms; the three landdrosts were summoned to Capetown to concert measures against them, and, when Woeke failed to appear, he was suspended. The others agreed with the military command on a great campaign against the Bushmen and offered a reward of £3 for every Bushman, Hottentot or Bastaard robber of any sex or age delivered alive at Robben Island, there to serve the Company in chains *ad vitam*. The Graaff Reineters turned out too late, but van der Walt of the Koude Bokkeveld and Afrikaner, the Hottentot freebooter of the Hantam, did yeoman service; over 600 Bushmen were killed and a few taken alive, and, at the end of 1792, van der Walt was given two farms on the Nieuwveld, provided he occupied them, and was empowered to call out commandos whenever he thought fit.³

Indecisive bickering with the Bushmen was still going on in the north when hostilities broke out again with the Kaffirs in the east. To the fury of the frontiersmen, Maynier had been appointed landdrost in Woeke's place; there was a severe drought which afflicted black and white impartially; the Xosas were short of grain and those on the Zuurveld had eaten or lost most of their cattle; some thirty Boer families had gone in beyond the Fish in search of pasture; west of the Fish, Ndhlabi, egged on thereto by the white ne'er-do-wells, Coenraad Buis, Christoffel Botha and Coenraad Bezuidenhout, was fighting the Xosa clans for the remnants of their cattle, and the Xosas stole colonial stock in revenge. Reports also reached Capetown of violent conduct by cattle-barterers, cruelty to Xosa farm-hands, and the trading of guns to the natives. It was the dreary story of nomansland all the world over, and it presently had the usual sequel. A burgher, Lindeque, raised a commando on his own account, got help from Ndhlabi, seized Xosa cattle and shared the booty with his ally. Thereupon, the Xosas, including some of the

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 207, 497; IV. 283 ff.

² Rec. C.C., I. 173.

³ No. 50 of 1835, p. 21; Theal, IIIa. 212 ff.

Ndhlambis, swarmed across the Fish, cleared nearly all the farms between the Kowie and Zwartkops rivers, slew some of the fugitive farmers and their Hottentot retainers, and seized a great spoil of cattle, sheep and horses.¹

Aug.
1793.

Most of the raiders retired to safety beyond the Fish, Ndhlambi was only too willing to let the rest come over with their plunder, and the chiefs promised Maynier to respect the Fish boundary. But they declined to give up their loot; plundering went on; the central government sent a Swellendam commando to the front, and Maynier, taking this as a slur upon his conduct, took the field himself with a small and very unwilling Graaff Reinet commando. There were wild rumours in Swellendam that the Hottentots meant to rise and massacre the farmers; nevertheless, the Swellendamers joined Maynier and the combined force pushed eastward into Kaffirland as far as the Buffalo river. It effected nothing decisive; most of the cattle it captured had to be either eaten or abandoned on the way home, and an attempt to clear the Zuurveld ended in failure. Maynier then tried to come to terms with the Xosas. He was hampered by a burgher, Hendrik van Rensburg, who raised a private commando; but him he dissuaded and at last made peace more or less on the basis of the *status quo*.

The frontiersmen were vastly displeased. They had certainly exaggerated the losses inflicted on them by the Kaffirs at the first onset, for the discrepancies between the losses reported and the previous *opgaaf* were too great to be explained by the customary underestimate for taxing purposes; but their losses had undoubtedly been serious; they had taken comparatively few cattle from their enemies; the Zuurveld was lost and some of them had been reduced to covering their nakedness with sheepskins. Moreover they knew that the officials at Capetown saw the chief cause of the war in their conduct; for the Council of Policy had issued a fearsome placaat recapitulating the placaaften of 1677, 1727, 1739, 1770, 1774, 1786 and the General Placaat of 1739 against the cattle-barter and intercourse with the tribes, forbidding anyone to go beyond Baviaan's river or the Tarka district, prohibiting the sale of arms to natives or the ill-treatment of Hottentots, who were, in future, not to be separated from their families, and ordering the wagtmeesters to arrest all offenders and report them to the Fiscal. In face of this, it was small comfort to the frontiersmen that natives found in arms might be handed over to the landdrost to be dealt with as vagabonds; for so long as Maynier was landdrost they had little hope that this law would be administered as they desired. Worse still, Commissioner

¹ Theal, III. 225 ff.

Sluysken not only refused to recall Maynier at the request of a frontier deputation but reaffirmed the Fish river frontier and forbade either colonists or Kaffirs to cross its magic waters, the one without a landdrost's pass, the other without a copper token.¹

At last, the eastern borderers determined to submit no longer to a company which neither defended them nor permitted them to defend themselves in the usual fashion of frontiersmen and diligent students of the more warlike portions of the Old Testament. They would pay neither rent nor taxes to such a government; they meant to go into Kaffirland in search of missing cattle; they would see to it that their Hottentots got none of the teaching which they heard the Moravians were once more giving to those in the west at Schmidt's old mission station; above all, they would have their own locally elected officials. Hence, van Jaarsveld and J. C. Trichardt with a party of forty men mounted the tricolour cockade and drove Maynier out of his drostdy. Sluysken sent down Commissioners, but they too were expelled and the Graaff Reinet rebels chose their own provisional landdrost and heemraden. They went through the farce of asking Sluysken to confirm the elections, but what they had really done was to set up a local republic. Four days later Swellendam followed their example and summoned a National Assembly.²

In that same week, nine British warships with troops on board cast anchor in Simon's Bay. Their coming had not been entirely unexpected, for half Europe was at war with the French Republic, the Netherlands were in the thick of it on the side of the Allies, and the halfway house to India could not hope to remain unscathed. Either France or Great Britain would try to secure it as they had done in the last great war; that was certain, for the French, entrenched at the Cape as well as at Mauritius and Réunion, could grievously harry English East Indiamen. Great Britain could not afford that, all the more as her interests in India had grown vastly since 1783. Moreover the Netherlands had secretly bound herself to both the great antagonists. The Patriots had made an insurance treaty with France; the restored House of Orange had then made a reinsurance treaty whereunder the British were to defend the Republic and its possessions against the French.³

The British now came in terms of this latter treaty. There had been talk of some such friendly occupation at the beginning

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 167, 174; V.R. Soc., III. 256; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 21, 22.

² Rec. C.C., I. 172, 209, 479.

³ Blok, *Geschiedenis*, VI. 501, 529.

Jan.
1795.

of the French war, but no move had been made till Pichegru's invading troops had been welcomed by the republican party in the Netherlands. Then the British expedition had slipped away southward in three divisions.¹

The first two divisions entered Simon's Bay together. The commanders, Elphinstone and Craig, held a letter signed by the Prince of Orange bidding Sluysken admit them peaceably.² It was a letter which the princely refugee at Kew had signed as soon as he had been assured that the Cape would be given back to him as soon as peace and independence, to wit, himself, had been restored to the Netherlands. The British commanders hoped that it would prove an 'Open Sesame.' They had no desire to fight, for they could put less than 1600 men into the field; they had neither cavalry nor guns; the country between Simonstown and Capetown was sandy and difficult, and a direct attack on the capital by sea was out of the question in the teeth of winter north-westers and the batteries.

The Castle was the centre of an elaborate system of defence: the Chavonnes battery begun at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession; Fort Knokke, the Sea Lines and *couvreface* Imhoff built during the War of the Austrian Succession; the New Battery at Salt River, the French Lines from Knokke up the slopes of the Devil's Peak, an unfinished line of redoubts in support, the massive Amsterdam Battery and smaller batteries at Rogge Bay, Mouille Point, Camps Bay and Kloof Nek, fruit of the energy of the French army of occupation and van der Graaff's engineering zeal. Sluysken himself had hurriedly constructed two batteries at Simon's Bay and three at Hout Bay.³

The Peninsula bristled with guns, but 3000 men would hardly suffice to man the defences, and Sluysken's motley array numbered less than half that total. He had the National Battalion, 571 strong, mercenaries of the usual type; 430 much more reliable gunners, for the most part Dutchmen, supplemented by a few hastily-enrolled Malays, a few odds and ends from the depots of the Meuron and Wurtemberg regiments, besides Hottentot and half-caste Pandours and the Pennists drawn from the ranks of the civil service. Behind this first line stood the burgher militia, organised on the customary district basis. The Cape could supply four companies of infantry and two of dragoons, Stellenbosch five mounted companies and Swellendam three, and Graaff Reinet three mounted companies more; in all, 3000 men on

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 1 ff., 35.

² *Ibid.*, I. 27 ff.; Blok, *Geschiedenis*, VII. 31 ff. Many posts besides the Cape were occupied by the British, one or two peaceably.

³ Roux, *Verdedigingstelsel*, pp. 9 ff.; E. A. Walker, *Historical Atlas*, p. 13.

paper and, under existing political circumstances, likely to remain largely on paper.¹

The British commanders did not expect much resistance from such a heterogeneous force, especially as they had reasonable hopes that the mercenaries, 'mostly kidnapped Germans,' ill-paid and ill-led, would have no stomach for a fight and might even be induced to change sides.² They themselves were short of money, bread and spirits, and were anxious for a speedy settlement which would free them from their crowded, scurvy-ridden ships. But there lay the difficulty. Sluysken played for time. His senior officers, from the Commandant Gordon downwards, were more inclined to become 'Great Britainers' than yield to the Nationals;³ he and they were willing enough to admit the newcomers; but the latest news from home had hinted that Holland might change sides in the great war; the orders of a dethroned prince were not convincing, and the Francophiles of Capetown were being reinforced daily by burghers from the country, 'totally undisciplined . . . extremely turbulent.'⁴ In vain did the British offer good terms and depict all and more than all the horrors of French republicanism. Sluysken heard definitely that the new Batavian Republic was about to ally with France. He, therefore, abandoned distant Simonstown and occupied 'the uncommonly strong post at Museburg.'

Craig landed his men in leisurely fashion, and then decided to attack under cover of the ships' guns in spite of the non-arrival of General Clarke and the main body, in spite also of the Dutch batteries and 1500 burghers, many of whom were on horseback and 'armed with guns that kill at a great distance.'⁵ The warships stood in, the redcoats advanced, the Company's mercenaries fled, and the key of the Peninsula passed into Craig's hands. Aug. 7,
1795.

A troubled month followed, during which British detachments were worsted at Retreat and the Steenberg; but the burghers began to dribble away homewards and, at the end of the month, Clarke arrived with 5000 men and guns. The British at once made a double move. The warships threatened Capetown, while the troops attacked the Company's forces on Wynberg Hill. Again the mercenaries bolted and, though the rest stood to it for a time, they too had to fall back and the 500 remaining burghers dispersed with cries of 'Treachery.'

In view of the Franco-Batavian alliance of May, Clarke had

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 20; Roux, *op. cit.*; Theal, IIIa. 124 ff. From first to last, 1690 burghers turned out. None came from Graaff Reinet.

² Rec. C.C., I. 36, 62, 82, 110, 183, 230.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 45, 53, 60; II. 191.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 101.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 161.

Sept. 16,
1795. orders to take the Cape in King George's name. This fact governed the capitulation signed at Rustenburg.¹ The Dutch troops surrendered as prisoners of war. Some of the officers were allowed to sail for Holland with Sluysken, who was presently acquitted of all blame for his curious mode of defence, and a fair number of mercenaries enlisted with the British for service in India. The colonists for their part were promised free internal trade for the first time, overseas trade on the best possible terms, no alteration of laws or customs, and, in view of the parlous condition of the Colony, reduction of taxation where possible. The new rulers also undertook to maintain the value of the paper money on the understanding that 'the Lands and Houses the property of . . . the Company in this settlement shall continue the security' for such portion as was not lent on private mortgage. That the said property was and always had been totally inadequate to the task was only discovered by the British two years later. 'Jan Compagnie' had remained true to type to the end.² However, disillusionment was still in the future, and as soon as the men of the Cape, Stellenbosch and Swellendam districts had taken the oath of allegiance to George III for so long a time as he should hold the Colony, Clarke and Elphinstone sailed for India, leaving Craig to hold the Cape with 2900 men. But the new Government's writ did not run in Graaff Reinet for nearly a year to come.

Nov. 15,
1795.

The Nationals of Graaff Reinet were not disposed to recognise Craig's Government unconditionally. King George might indeed become 'protector' and supplier of ammunition in place of the Company; they would still send their cattle to Cape-town—a hint that the halfway house to India could not do without them—they would obey all reasonable orders and laws, they would even accept a landdrost nominated by Craig, but their own elected heemraden must be recognised.³ Craig was determined to be master. He sent the expelled landdrost, Bresler, back to his post with the predikant, von Manger, who, the frontiersmen said, had deserted them 'in a subtle manner'; but the National officials refused to make way or to take the oath of allegiance. Stirred up by Woyer, an ardent Jacobin, they rallied round Marthinus Prinsloo of the Boschberg as 'Protector of the Voice of the People.' The representatives of the central Government therefore withdrew and Craig prepared to use force. The quieter and more settled burghers of the northern wards were in favour of submission, but the men of Bruintjes Hoogte, Zwartkops river and the Zuurveld held out

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 127 ff., 153; Eybers, p. 3.


² Rec. C.C., I. 130.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 480.

CAPE COLONY


1710-98

Scale of Miles



Colonial Frontier, 1798

District Boundaries, 1798



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Aug. 17,
1796.

and even talked of expelling the landdrost of Swellendam. The position was serious, for the French had a strong squadron in the Indian Ocean, and a Batavian squadron under Lucas was on its way to recapture the Cape. Lucas's ships were, however, captured in Saldanha Bay, and Graaff Reinet submitted. Craig recalled his troops and promised an amnesty to all save the elusive Woyer, who had gone to seek help of the French in the East Indies. But he refused to suffer elected heemraden or to allow farmers to enter Kaffirland in search of stolen cattle or to permit them to occupy the vacant land beyond the Fish as far as the Koonap 'or, if it could be, unto the Kat.'¹

Thus did the British discover that the halfway house to India had a hinterland with problems of its own.

CHAPTER VI

THE OFFICIAL OCCUPATIONS, 1795-1823

The First British Occupation—The Batavians—The Second British Occupation—Missions, Slaves, Hottentots and Bantu—The 1820 Settlers and the Commission of Inquiry.

Secretaries of State for War and Colonies : H. Dundas, July 1794-March 1801; Lord Hobart, 1801-May 1804. *Batavian Council for the Asiatic Possessions* : Feb. 1803-Jan. 1806. *Secretaries of State* : Viscount Castlereagh, July 1805-Feb. 1806; W. Windham, 1806-March 1807; Castlereagh, 1807-Oct. 1809; Earl of Liverpool, 1809-June 1812; Earl Bathurst, 1812-April 1827.

Commanders : Admiral Sir G. K. Elphinstone, Majors-General A. Clarke and J. H. Craig, Sept. 16-Nov. 15, 1795. *Commandant* : Craig, Nov. 1795-May 5, 1797. *Governors* : Earl Macartney, May 5, 1797-Nov. 20, 1798; Major-General F. Dundas, acting Nov. 1798-Dec. 9, 1799; Sir G. Yonge, Dec. 1799-April 20, 1801; Dundas, acting April 1801-Feb. 20, 1803. *Commissioner-General* : J. A. de Mist, Feb. 21, 1803-Sept. 25, 1804; *Governor* : Lieut.-General J. W. Janssens, March 1, 1803-Jan. 18, 1806. *Governors* : Major-General D. Baird, acting Jan. 10, 1806-Jan. 17, 1807; Lieut.-General H. G. Grey, acting Jan.-May 1807; Earl of Caledon, May 22, 1807-July 4, 1811; Grey, acting July-Sept. 1811; Lieut.-General Sir J. F. Cradock, Sept. 6, 1811-April 6, 1814; Lieut.-General Lord C. H. Somerset, April 6, 1814-March 5, 1826 (Major-General Sir R. S. Donkin, acting Jan. 1820-Dec. 1, 1821).

FIRST BRITISH OCCUPATION, Sept. 1795-Feb. 1803

BY occupying the Castle at Capetown the British had made themselves responsible for the governance of some 16,000 Europeans,

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 208, 234, 431, 480, 502.

17,000 slaves, and an indeterminate number of Hottentots and Bushmen.¹ The quality of the British administration was on the whole good for the time and circumstances. The Governors, especially Macartney, were upright if somewhat stiff in manner, and, like the rest of their class, suspicious of anything that smacked of 'French principles.' Yonge indeed had his faults, but he was at least a man of ideas ranging from experimental farming to vaccination. Government was naturally paternal in the manner of the Roman father. There were occasional deportations, sometimes with and sometimes without sentence of the High Court, but always for 'Jacobinism,' incitement to rebellion or correspondence with the French. Worse things were being done in England and much worse in Ireland, for Great Britain was fighting for her life among the ruins of the European Coalitions. Even so, the Secretary of State curtly told Yonge that deportation 'is a power not to be recurred to for offences cognizable in the Courts.'²

Just, on the whole, the Government might be, popular it was not outside the ranks of Orange society in the capital, in spite of the charm of Lady Anne Barnard, the accomplished wife of Macartney's secretary and hostess at the Castle, whose power of 'placing herself in sympathy with those whom she addressed' was invaluable to a temporary administration;³ in spite, too, of Yonge's innovation of a state ball for 'all the Principal Gentlemen and Ladies which opened at nine o'clock and lasted till four in the morning.'⁴ Some of the higher Dutch officials retained their posts; the first appointments after the Occupation were of colonists; colonists throughout supplied the rank and file of the civil service, but the higher posts were filled, as occasion offered, with Englishmen.⁵ The Government was expensive. The British taxpayer paid for the squadron and the garrison and made up any deficiencies in revenue, but the Colony had to pay the twelve chief officials £26,000 in sterling—almost as much as the total revenue for 1796 in paper—a real grievance to the public and to the remaining officials who had to put up with the depreciating cartoon-money. But apart from the fact that revenue rose markedly during the first five years without extra taxation, it may well be doubted whether the British officials cost the Colony more than the Company's men with their perquisites, houses, farms, horses,

¹ De Mist reckoned 13,830 Europeans in 1793; Barrow gave 20,000, including 5000 in Capetown, in 1798 (V.R. Soc., III. 175).

² Rec. C.C., III. 201, 353. On the First British Occupation *vide South Africa a Century Ago*; D. Fairbridge, *Lady Anne Barnard at the Cape* (1924); *Bel. Hist. Dok.* III. 13 ff.; V.R. Soc. III.

³ *South Africa a Century Ago*, p. xxiii.

⁴ Rec. C.C., III. 40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I. 184, 199, 297, 319; II. 85; III. 489.

servants, household allowances and fees of office. This last nuisance Macartney stopped. Officials were put upon regular salaries. Only the Fiscal as Public Prosecutor and, after something of a struggle, the Judge of the new Vice-Admiralty Court were allowed to draw the fees customary to their offices.¹ Except in the purlieu of Government House in Yonge's time, the administration was purer than it had ever been before, and Yonge, a hoary old jobber more sinned against by his associates than sinning, was speedily recalled in disgrace, to the surprise and delight of the colonists.²

In spite of the recommendations of the Fiscal, W. S. van Ryneveld, a staunch Orangeman, few changes were made in the law or constitution. Craig replaced the Commission of the High Court by a Burgher Senate of six burghers selected by the Governor in the usual fashion from a fourfold list presented by the board as vacancies occurred, to do all that its predecessor had done save in judicial matters. After much opposition from the Judges, he and Macartney abolished the practice of torturing slaves and Hottentots on suspicion, and of breaking at the wheel and the more barbarous forms of capital punishment hitherto used in the Colony. Macartney made a few other necessary changes. He and the Lieutenant-Governor took the place of the Court at Batavia as the Court of Civil Appeal; a Vice-Admiralty Court, independent of the Colonial Government, was established; the unwieldy High Court was cut down from thirteen members to eight, and all the judges were paid; the civil powers of the landdrosts' courts were extended, especially in far-distant Graaff Reinet. On the other hand, whether Yonge liked it or not, Roman-Dutch law, on the analogy of French law in newly conquered Martinique, was applied even to British-born subjects by special order of the Secretary of State.³

The administration was in a better position than the Company to further the prosperity of the Colony, for it was a government and nothing but a government. In terms of the Capitulation, all monopolies were cancelled, restrictions on the sale of goods to the ships and on internal trade were swept away, coasting trade was permitted even eastward into the sphere of the English East India Company, and by a most unusual arrangement goods from any part of the British dominions were admitted duty-free. Perhaps this last was an oversight rather than a policy; at any rate the privilege was subsequently limited to goods from the newly United Kingdom.⁴ Arrears of land rents were remitted up

July
1802.

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 177, 217; II. 35, 291, 294, 433 ff.; III. 42.

² *Ibid.*, III. 395 ff., 441, 484 ff.; IV. 107, 221 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 298, 302, 320 ff., 373; II. 6; III. 329, 481.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 1, 77, 116; III. 421, 463, 483; IV. 106.

to the beginning of the Occupation and no new taxes were levied till after Yonge's arrival. Some of his taxes caused no complaint, but his game licences and the increased brandy duty raised a storm which did not abate till he had been recalled and the obnoxious imposts cancelled by his successor.¹ Signs of the times and of closer connection with the rest of the civilised world were the opening of a post-office for the ocean mail and the granting of a monopoly for printing. It was a monopoly of which Government speedily repented, for it was almost immediately bought out. Henceforward the *Government Gazette* was produced in the Castle under the watchful eye of Mr. Secretary John Barrow.²

Commerce hung fire at first, since neutral ships, on which the Colony was wont to rely in time of war, were discouraged lest they smuggle enemy goods; but British ships soon began to call, and the local speculators were made happy.³ Even Macartney made a venture. Yielding to the persuasion of the Burgher Senate, he imported three ship-loads of mixed goods at government expense; but private merchants refused to buy at the repeated auctions, the small Cape market was already glutted, and his successor, Yonge, was left to foot the bill.⁴ In other directions private enterprise made but small headway. There was a little milling, a few attempts at forestry, a slight development in whaling once Craig had taken possession of Angra Pequena and Walfisch Bay in the interests of the fishers; but agriculture remained the chief industry, and a large garrison and squadron held out to the farmers hopes of a prosperity tempered only by the fact that Government, in self-defence in so small a market, fixed the price payable to its contractors for supplies. As it was, 'every other article of life (the three excepted—wine, bread and butcher's meat) is extraordinarily dear . . . and every assistance of labour three times as much' as in London.⁵ But both farmers and administration were unlucky. Craig found the magazines full of corn and the farmers burdened with an unsalable harvest. He therefore sent away all the corn he could to help to meet the shortage in Great Britain, and was rewarded by a run of bad seasons which went far to ruin the grandiose schemes of Yonge and his master-gardener, Duckitt, for the encouragement of scientific farming and cattle-breeding, and

¹ Rec. C.C., II. 96, 111; III. 47, 195.

² *Ibid.*, III. 198; IV. 80.

³ Like the excellent Mr. Trail of Simonstown 'who buys up everything the moment the ships come in, and then puts his own price on the goods. N.B.—By his office he is debarred from what he practises' (*South Africa a Century Ago*, p. 24).

⁴ Rec. C.C., II. 283, 286, 319, 420, 497; III. 28, 87, 94, 100, 105, 334.

⁵ *S.A. a Century Ago*, p. 7.

forced successive governors to import wheat and rice on whatever terms they could.¹

1803. Closely connected with the problem of supply was that of the paper money. The British found it at 30 per cent. discount : some 614,000 rix dollars ostensibly secured on unrealisable government buildings and a few farms, and 677,000 issued on private mortgage by the Loan Bank. Craig long resisted temptation till the impossibility of paying his troops forced him to issue fresh paper. Macartney tried to check the vagaries of the exchanges by importing silver Spanish dollars (4s. 8d.) and copper *dubbeltjes*, pence which passed for twopence. Dundas, urged on by the Burgher Senate, set the printing-press to work once more, partly to furnish capital to the bank and partly to finance the purchase of corn and rice. Most of this last issue was cancelled as the supplies were sold to the public, and, later on, property was handed over to the Batavians to balance the remainder and part also of Craig's small issue. Nevertheless, the British had found 1,291,000 Rd. in circulation, and they left 1,786,000.²

1797. Such reforms and mistakes as the British made affected principally the western districts. The problem of the frontier districts remained. It was a problem with which a government experienced only in the conditions of the extreme south-west corner of the Colony was ill-fitted to cope. The West was one thing, the East quite another, and the British had little enough to guide them towards a solution of the questions it presented. So far from having a frontier policy, the Company had never even had a boundary on all sides of the Colony since 1660. Latterly, it had left the Boers to settle their differences with the Bushmen in the customary frontier fashion so long as they reported each *straf commando* after the event. Now, in the north-eastern districts Bushmen sometimes served as cattle-herds, but as a rule they were still being shot or chased away, except in the parts about Tarka, where they were numerous enough to make the scattered farmers withdraw.³

1775. The Hottentots presented a less dangerous but more complicated problem. Of recent years, they had been gradually recognised as humble dependants of European society. Children of slave fathers and Hottentot mothers had been specially provided for as serfs of the owners of the slaves ; field commandants and *veld wachmeesters* had been ordered to make a return to the

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 271, 328, 331 ; II. 62, 418, 428 ; III. 102, 330, 375, 390, 430, 446, 475 ; IV. 45, 118, 142 ff.

² *Ibid.*, I. 276, 405 ; II. 70, 91, 116, 189 ff. ; III. 26, 31, 323, 393 ; IV. 135.

³ *Ibid.*, II. 97.

landdrosts of all Hottentots to check the practice of runaway slaves passing themselves off as Hottentots, for already it was 1781. difficult to distinguish one class of coloured man from another ; a Hottentot corps had been raised during the War of American Independence, and though it had been disbanded provisionally on the arrival of the French troops, all Hottentots and Bastards, except those in the Graaff Reinet district, had been 1793. called on later to assist in the defence of the Colony ; Bastards who were not in the service of colonists had to enrol, make *opgaaf* 1787. and pay taxes like ordinary burghers. Nevertheless, the pure-blooded Hottentots were still regarded as free men living in the Colony but not of it.

Their tribal system was now far gone in decay ; only two petty *kaptijns* and their clans still held land ; the rest, and that 1795. for the most part in the East, were either vagrants or miserably paid or unpaid farm-labourers.¹ As such their treatment varied with the nature of their masters. Many hard things have been said of the Boers' treatment of the Hottentots, and the placaten of the Company show that there was fire beneath the smoke ; but the reforming de Mist could write that ' if a half of what is written 1803. is ignored, a fourth considered doubtful, and the rest modified by reforms, it will be seen that the Hottentots are even more favourably situated than the peasant farmers of Meierij.'² It may be possible to accept de Mist's dictum without envying the men of Meierij ; nevertheless, the fact remains that, whereas the Hottentots had once occupied grazing lands and fontains, now they held none. Such organised tribes as survived were leaving the Colony. The Koranas were seeking refuge round the junction of the Vaal and Harts rivers ; the Bastards and Griquas were either holding on with Adam Kok at Pella on the Lower Orange or following his son, Cornelis, from the Khamiesberg to the middle Orange valley ; the Namaquas were drifting northwards into what is now the South-West Africa protectorate. The Orange River valley to the northward of the Colony thus swarmed with half-breeds, Hottentots, runaway slaves and outlaws, a menace to the border farmers. Notable among them was the Namaqua, Afrikaner, who raided Europeans and Griquas impartially from his impregnable island in the middle of the great river. As for the Kaffirs on the Eastern Frontier, they were a new factor, and beyond proclaiming the Fish as the boundary between white and black and decreeing a policy of non-intercourse, the Company had done nothing at all.

¹ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 19 ff., 127, 147 ; Rec. C.C., IV. 90 ; VIII. 301 ; Moodie, *Records*, III. 40.

² V.R. Soc., III. 254-6.

The problem of the borderlands was one, but for many years to come the most pressing difficulties were to arise on the Eastern Frontier. There the Company had done little for its European subjects. It had indeed supplied them with ammunition, registered their loan-places, taxed them when they came to Capetown, and, latterly, marooned a landdrost and predikant among the mud hovels of Graaff Reinet. It had never defended them; at the most it had hampered them when they had tried to take the law into their own hands. The upshot had been rebellion.

The British on finding that there was a border problem faced it as best they could. Craig had already dealt in his own way with the three main issues of frontier politics: local government, land, and relations with the tribes. Now Macartney took up the task. Afrikaner was out in the north; the Bushmen were raiding the Bokkeveld and Tarka; Xosas were ensconced on the banks of the Bushmans river well to the west of the Zuurveld, and some of the Bruintjes Hoogte men were already on the Koonap. As far as Afrikaner was concerned, Macartney was fain to let ill alone, but for the Bushmen he prescribed humane treatment by the commandos, but, if necessary, expulsion to the Kalahari. Meanwhile he distributed breeding cattle to those nearest at hand, cattle which were either eaten by their new owners or stolen by less favoured neighbours.¹ He then sent Bresler, Barrow and a handful of dragoons to Graaff Reinet with orders to remit rent for six years to those Tarka and Zuurveld farmers who should reoccupy their farms at once, to bring the Boers back from the Koonap and, generally, to confirm a comprehensive boundary on all sides of the Colony.² Farmers living to the northward of the new line were not to be disturbed, for no Kaffirs lay in that direction as far as was known. So Bresler enforced as far as he was able the old policy of non-intercourse upon the Europeans; but with the Kaffirs he was less successful. The Rarabe-Xosa clans on the Zuurveld refused to go back behind the Fish for fear of Gaika, and Gaika, their nominal lord, dwelling in the Tyumie valley beyond the Fish, politely washed his hands of them, saying they were no subjects of his.

Bresler's partial settlement could not stand. A scare of foreign intervention, it is true, ended with the capture at Delagoa Bay of a brig carrying guns and ammunition from Batavia; the presence of officials and the novelty of dragoons had a calming effect on the frontier. But at the New Year of 1799 all went amiss. Macartney, 'the old lord,' departed, fire destroyed many of the naval and military stores at Capetown, and the veteran troops sailed to India to fight Tippoo Sahib and his French allies.

¹ Rec. C.C., II. 99.

² *Ibid.*, II. 95 ff.

1797.

July
1798.

May
1797.

The battalions of youngsters sent in exchange were so weak that the English residents of the capital had to form a volunteer corps to assist the garrison, and the naval squadron, in which sporadic mutinies had occurred from time to time, was much reduced. All this news and more also reached the frontiers. Matters were brought to a head by the arrest of van Jaarsveld, a leading National, for forgery. He was rescued by his friends who blockaded the drostdy and joined hands with some British deserters and Coenraad Buis, a ruffianly outlaw of considerable ability and great physical strength, who had married widely into Gaika's tribe. Relying on his promise of Kaffir help and the hope of raising eastern Swellendam, the rebels demanded the release of van Jaarsveld, the reversal of Buis's outlawry, liberty for farmers to graze their cattle each night beyond the Fish, and permission for field cornets to reclaim runaway slaves and Hottentots from beyond the border. Government, they said moreover, must communicate with the Kaffirs in future through trusty burghers and not through Hottentot messengers.¹

Tidings of the rising reached the Castle in time to offset the good news that the French frigate *Prudente* had been captured with volunteers on board bound for Algoa Bay. General Vandeleur's dragoons rode post-haste to Graaff Reinet, infantry and Hottentots followed more leisurely by sea. They found the bulk of the Graaff Reineters peaceable and a few even ready to help them, but their main recruitment came from the Hottentots, who, seeing their fellows in arms, thought it was a war between them and their white masters. One hundred joined the Hottentot Corps, and a mixed crowd of men, women and children fled from the farms to tag along behind the troops as they marched to the Boschberg. There van Jaarsveld, disappointed of his expected aid, was arrested, and a few days later Prinsloo surrendered with over one hundred followers. Most of these were sent home, but eighteen, much to their surprise, were despatched to the Castle with van Jaarsveld and his son.²

The rebellion was over and Vandeleur marched his men down towards Algoa Bay through the Zuurveld. Ndhambi, fleeing from his nephew, Gaika, had just come into that troubled land, rallied all the local clans except the Gunukwebes and driven out the farmers. Vandeleur hoped to get through unmolested, but he was unexpectedly attacked by the Gunukwebes and only reached his camp near the Bay with serious loss. There most of the remaining rebels surrendered, and Vandeleur called out Swellendam and Graaff Reinet commandos to deal with the Kaffirs and the

¹ Rec. C.C. II. 148 ff., 333 ff., 349 ff., 364 ff.

² *Ibid.*, II. 493; III. 49.

handful of Boers and British deserters who had joined them under Buis. Hardly had he done so, when he heard that Afrikaner had looted the Hantam, and when he himself tried to disarm some of his newly joined Hottentots, they fled with their arms, formed bands under Stuurman, Trompetter and Boesak, and joined the Xosas. Well might Vandeleur write that either the Boers and British together must drive the Kaffirs from the Zuurveld or the British must build a fort and watch the Boers and the natives fight it out.¹ Three generations of fluctuating British policy were foreshadowed in that one sentence.

Dundas, the acting Governor, took a middle line. The official view, both Dutch and English, was that the Boers had brought most of their troubles on themselves by virtually enslaving the Hottentots and driving an illicit cattle-trade with the Kaffirs. 'There must,' wrote Dundas, 'be justice for all or there will be trouble.' To secure that justice he appeared on the frontier at the head of a strong Stellenbosch-Swellendam commando, garrisoned Fort Frederick on Algoa Bay, the nucleus of Port Elizabeth, and appointed Maynier as Resident Commissioner over Swellendam and Graaff Reinet. But it was, as he himself frankly admitted, 'a withdrawal from war' rather than a peace. The Xosas remained upon the Zuurveld.²

Back once more in Capetown, Dundas pressed on with the trial of van Jaarsveld and his friends. Four were released, twelve were variously sentenced, and van Jaarsveld and Prinsloo were condemned to death, sentences which were, however, referred to Downing Street.³ Meanwhile, in Graaff Reinet, the Boers were thoroughly discontented. Thanks to war and desertion they were short of Hottentot servants, they were plagued by locusts, and the game on which many of them depended was scarce. Here was fruitful soil for disaffection against a government which used Hottentot troops, punished farmers when they rebelled, and put its trust in Maynier. Poor Maynier's health was failing and his attempts to make friends with Gaika were thwarted by Buis. He outraged frontier opinion by issuing regulations for the registration and better treatment of Hottentot servants, by using the church at Graaff Reinet, the one adequate building, as a barracks for the Hottentot Corps on weekdays and as a church for Hottentots and slaves on Sundays, by enforcing the law of non-intercourse with the Kaffirs, and by refusing to allow anything larger than a field cornet's party to go in to make reprisals for stolen cattle.⁴

¹ Rec. C.C., II. 384, 399, 458; III. 48 ff.

² *Ibid.*, II. 497; III. 3, 8, 16, 49, 52, 56-7.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 91, 213 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV. 283 ff.; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 27 ff.

Maynier's position was indeed impossible. He was trying to enforce the rule of law without the police, the magistrates and the circuit courts which could alone give that general security which is the foundation of all law. At last the men of the Zuurveld, Brintjes Hoogte and Zwartkops laid siege to the drostdy, and even men who had hitherto loyally turned out on commando joined them. In face of this, Dundas withdrew the Commissioner and sent up the troops. They found the farms deserted from Algoa Bay to Graaff Reinet, bands of Hottentots plundering as they chose, and the rebels ready to disperse on the promise of pardon. Dundas therefore tried persuasion as well as force. He allowed Vanderkemp, the first of the newly arrived L.M.S. missionaries, to lead such Hottentots as would follow him from Graaff Reinet to a temporary location on the Zwartkops river, a recognition of the fact that the root of the Hottentot trouble was lack of land. He then called out the commandos once more to deal with the Hottentot bands and the Xosas. The surly burghers responded but poorly, skirmished for two months, took 13,000 cattle and dispersed. Dundas, knowing that the Cape was about to be restored to the Batavian Republic, hurried to the frontier. He was anxious to hand the Colony over in good order, but it can hardly be said that he succeeded. Maynier induced a few small groups of Hottentots to settle alongside the Hottentot Corps at Rietvlei, near Capetown, but that was all. And already the Batavians were waiting to receive the keys of the Castle. Dundas therefore called out a commando from all the districts outside the Cape itself to cover the withdrawal of his troops. So the Great Commando took the field to find the Hottentots and Kaffirs quarrelling over the spoil. All sides were weary of fighting, and at last an arrangement was patched up whereby each of the three parties, white, black, and brown, agreed not to molest the others.¹

Oct.
1801.Aug.
1802.Feb. 20,
1803.

Next day, in terms of the Treaty of Amiens, the British handed over the Castle and all that it stood for to the representatives of the Batavian Republic.²

THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC, February 1803–January 1806

The Dutch East India Company had come to an end in 1798, and after some preliminary experiments, the task of ruling its territories had been entrusted to a Council for the Asiatic Possessions. De Mist, a member of this Council, was now instructed to instal Janssens as Governor at the Cape.³

¹ Rec. C.C., IV. 98 ff.

² *Ibid.*, V. 156.

³ V.R. Soc., III. 289–90. *Vide* J. P. Van der Merwe, *Die Kaap onder die Bataafse Republiek*.

The period of direct rule by the Batavian Republic is one of the most tantalising in South African history. Looking back at it over the space of a full hundred years, some regard it as the dawn of a golden age, a dawn all too soon overcast by the second coming of the British. It may be so; but, since de Mist, a determined though mild revolutionary of the *Aufklärung*, resigned after eighteen months' service partly because he was not prepared to abandon reforms which he admitted were far in advance of public opinion, it is permissible to suggest that the dawn would in any case have been overcast by clouds arising in the interior.¹

For what could the Colony make of a man who indeed reprobated 'all so-called revolutionary measures' but yet held 'that this is perhaps the most important . . . outcome of periods of anarchy . . . that at such times, as if by an electric shock, the whole order of things is changed, and sweeping reforms which have been needed for many years are immediately instituted.' However, the period of Batavian liberalism in a High Tory colony was a mere interlude, for, within four months of its inception, the republic as a dependent ally of France was once more at war with Great Britain.²

The Batavian representatives were well received in the West by all save the Orange officials. None the less, most of these were suffered to retain their posts, while Duckitt, the enterprising master-gardener, and such other English residents as chose to stay on in the Colony were assured of a welcome. De Mist declared liberty of trade with all Batavian possessions, and then installed Janssens as Governor at a more modest salary than his predecessors, with an executive Council of four salaried officials and a secretary to assist him. He also radically reformed the High Court. This now became a body of seven professional lawyers, independent of the executive, with an attorney-general as public prosecutor in place of the corrupt Fiscal.³

April
1803.

Having reorganised the central Government, de Mist and Janssens proceeded to gain first-hand knowledge of the outlying districts. The Governor set out upon his travels first.⁴ He might reckon on a good reception from the frontiersmen, for de Mist had released the van Jaarsveld prisoners⁵ and he himself came as the representative of those Netherlands to which the Boers had always professed loyalty. He found the 150 Waldecker mercenaries at Fort Frederick surveying the customary scene of

¹ Van der Merwe, p. 374; Theal, *Ib.* 126.

² V.R. Soc., III. 170-1.

³ Van der Merwe, pp. 81 ff.

⁴ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 206 ff.

⁵ Dundas had risked a reprimand by declining to carry out his orders to execute the two leaders. Van Jaarsveld, however, died in prison.

confusion. The Hottentot bands under Stuurman and Boesak were still at large ; but they were weary of the whole business, disgusted with their Xosa allies and anxious to have land of their own. Janssens, therefore, agreed to offset their past sufferings against the harm they had done and gave them reserves. He also fulfilled Dundas's intentions by establishing Vanderkemp with his congregation at Bethelsdorp near Fort Frederick, and to ensure the good treatment of farm servants, banished two farmers from the frontier for their harsh dealings with their labourers and carried Maynier's registration policy a step further by ordering that Hottentots might only enter service under contract on definite terms recorded by competent officials.¹ Under this growing rule of law, most of the Hottentots took service, and not only ceased to be a peril to the Colony, but in due course became a reinforcement to it against the Kaffirs.

Janssens had less success with the Xosas. Gaika indeed cheerfully acknowledged the Fish once more as the boundary, and even gave up some of the European renegades at his kraal,² but the western clans refused to retire from the Zuurveld, the future Albany. All Janssens could do was to repeat the well-worn injunctions against intercourse with the tribes and to set out northwards to inspect the Bushmen. Tidings of the renewed French wars brought him hurrying back to the Castle before he could reach them.

De Mist was even less successful in his dealings with the Kaffirs. In the course of a ceremonious and comprehensive tour of the Colony,³ he found all quiet except on the Zuurveld, where the bickering chiefs defied the tiny garrison at Fort Frederick and declined even to meet him. The lesson was not lost. He made up his mind that the central Government must be more fully represented on all the frontiers. Taking up one of Macartney's schemes, he set up a new drostdy at Uitenhage on the Zwartkops river, in touch with the troubled Zuurveld and the sea. On his return to Capetown, he formed a sixth magistracy, Tulbagh, out of the north-western portion of the huge Stellenbosch district,⁴ extended its border to Zak river, and put all the drostdies in touch with the capital by means of a weekly post.

De Mist then laid down the lines on which local government was to be reorganised. Much of his work was little more than bringing up to date powers that were already supposed to be exercised ; nevertheless, it was destined to form the groundwork of the future Trekker republics. The landdrost was to represent

¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 207, 218 ff., 235 ff. ; Proclamation, May 9, 1803 ; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 23, 164.

² *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 233, 249.

³ Godée-Molsbergen, *Reizen*, II. 167.

⁴ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 121 ; Placaaten, 916 C, pp. 419, 506 (Cape Archives).

the administrative authority of the central government in his district ; he was still to exercise quasi-judicial powers by taking criminal depositions, meting out summary punishment to slaves and settling petty criminal charges out of court. In civil cases, however, he was to be assisted by six unpaid heemraden in the usual fashion. The most notable part of de Mist's instructions related to still humbler officials. The *veld wachtmeester* had accumulated civil in addition to his military duties. All these duties were now regularised and his name changed to *veld kornet*. The landdrost was to recommend and the Governor to appoint one such official in each of the wards, six hours' ride in diameter, into which the district was to be divided. It was to be the business of the field cornets to keep the peace, settle petty quarrels, take the census, publish new laws, and generally act as guides, philosophers and friends to the people of their wards. They were to be men-of-all-work like the Tudor justices of the peace, rewarded with prestige, freedom from taxation, a free farm or a small salary, and power according to the strength of their characters and their opportunities.¹

De Mist also did what he could to encourage the scientific agriculture which Duckitt, Yonge's master-gardener, had begun, by giving a board of commissioners the Groote Post at Groenekloof and a supply of new paper money wherewith to buy merino rams. The Spanish rams duly arrived and bred mightily, but, in spite of the samples of cloth woven from Cape wool in the Netherlands, the vast majority of the farmers clung to their fat-tailed, hairy sheep. The day of the great Cape wool industry was still far off ; nor could official encouragement improve the quality of the Cape wines—always excepting the Constantia—or induce the olive to bear its fruit out of due season.

The efforts of the Batavians to raise the level of civilisation at the Cape were hampered throughout by lack of money and skilled labour. The financial difficulty could be surmounted in a measure by means of the printing-press, and de Mist struck off new notes to pay the troops and to finance his agricultural experiments, his new drostdies and the rebuilding of Stellenbosch after a devastating fire. But this meant that the 1,786,000 Rd. rose to 2,086,000, and the 4s. rixdollar fell to 3s. 4d. in English silver. As for labour, de Mist and Janssens both believed that it was not yet too late to substitute freemen for slaves as the basis of society. Given a steady flow of white immigrants and no further importation of slaves, in due time the existing slaves might be segregated in reserves and the rest of the Colony settled with Europeans. But, like their predecessors, they found the

Dec.
1803.

¹ Ordonantie, Oct. 22, 1805.

public insistent, and Janssens, who was much more pliable than de Mist, admitted cargoes of black ivory ; while as for the European immigrants, it would be hard to say whether they themselves or the enthusiastic Hollander, van Hogendorp, and his immigration agents were most to blame for the failure of the settlement which was to have been at Plettenberg's Bay and whose remnants were actually dissipated at Hout Bay.¹

Other measures they carried through of a still more revolutionary nature. The Dutch Reformed clergy of the day might be apathetic, but visitors noted 'the high pre-eminence' they held over the laity. The quarterly *Nachtmaal* (Communion) was an event, all shops closing for the week-end on the Friday evening. And the ministers were jealous of their rights. Anglican clergy might be given the use of the *Groote Kerk* on occasion ; Moslems might worship in private rooms ; the Lutherans might even have their own church in Capetown ; but, recently, there had been much bickering over the spiritual future of children born of 'mixed' Reformed and Lutheran marriages, and the congregation of the *Groote Kerk* was as obstinately determined that the Lutherans should not build a spire to their conventicle as the Lutherans were to build it.² De Mist and Janssens continued to pay the *predikants* of the established church, but they reduced their number at Capetown, promised the 'equal protection of the law . . . to all communities worshipping a Supreme Being for the promotion of virtue and good morals,'³ and even permitted Roman Catholic priests to celebrate Mass in the Castle. At this stage de Mist resigned, for he must leave the Governor a free hand to prepare for the defence of the Peninsula and, besides, his electric shocks were inducing a storm in the Colony which was by no means allayed when landdrosts and *heemraden* were allowed to solemnise civil marriages *à la française*, and the new Board of Education met to organise public schools free from clerical control, a system horrifying to a generation whose whole conception of education was closely bound up with the Church and religion.⁴

Janssens held on with the shadow of war coming ever nearer. His best troops were taken away to Batavia and he had to fall back on Hottentots and Malay gunners. But his real help in time of trouble would be the burghers. He reorganised the militia, divided the men liable to personal service into three classes according to age, and ordered those who might not be

¹ Theal, *History*, I. 117 ; Rec. C.C., VI. 136 ff. ; Van der Merwe, p. 279.

² *State of the Cape*, pp. 61 ff. ; Theal, *History*, III. 14, 233

³ Kerken Orde, *Kaapsche Courant*, Aug. 10, 1805, onwards ; Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis van die Hervormde Kerk*, I. 8.

⁴ Malherbe, *History of Education*, chapter iii.

Sept.
1804.

Oct.
1805.

called up by their field cornets to supply transport and food to the others.¹ So he awaited the arrival of the British.

July
1805.

The British soon came. Calder checked the Franco-Spanish fleet off Ferrol, ended Napoleon's Boulogne scheme and gave Castlereagh his opportunity. A fleet of sixty-one ships under Sir Home Popham set out with Major-General Baird and 6700 troops on board. Trafalgar, Ulm and Austerlitz were lost and won as they sailed southward, the map of Old Europe was rolled up and Pitt lay dying; but Great Britain was at least making sure of the key to India. In spite of the summer south-easters, a landing was effected near Blaauwberg and Janssens' two thousand mixed levies were sent flying, the Waldeckers leading the way. Half the defeated force fell back on Capetown, where it surrendered under the Capitulation of Papendorp, while Janssens with the remainder retired to the Hottentots-Holland Pass beyond the Flats. There he dismissed the burghers and held out till, weakened by desertions and fearing to be cut off from the interior, he surrendered with the honours of war.²

Jan.
1806.

Jan. 10.

Jan. 19.

So, in March, Janssens followed de Mist to the Netherlands, commending the colonists to Baird's care. 'Give no credit,' he wrote, '. . . to Mr. Barrow nor to the enemies of the inhabitants. They have their faults, but these are more than compensated by good qualities. Through lenity . . . they may be conducted to any good.'³

SECOND BRITISH OCCUPATION, 1806-1823

The British found themselves responsible for a larger colony than that which they had taken over in 1795,⁴ a colony whose problems had advanced a further stage towards complexity, especially the problems of the frontiers and, as the end of the Trade drew near, of the slaves. The British officials themselves were men of much the same type as those of the First Occupation, a little less fearful of Jacobinism since Napoleon had put the Revolution into uniform, a good deal more war-hardened, and fully as hostile to all things French. Some of them were able men, notably the Governors and a few of the army officers; but the rank and file were mediocre and all were Tories with the virtues and failings of their kind, men who regarded the bluff country gentleman of the England of the Corn and Game Laws and the Justices of the Peace as the political and social ideal. At the capital they were welcomed by the Orangemen who con-


¹ *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III. 202 ff.; Ordonantie, Oct. 25, 1805.

² *Rec. C.C.*, V. 261 ff., 299.

³ *Theal, Ib.* 150.

⁴ Europeans, 25,757. Slaves, 29,545. Hottentots, 20,000 (Van der Merwe, p. 372).

tinued to fill such high posts as were not given to born-subjects of King George; the Batavian officials, who for the most part retained their posts, soon learnt to hob-nob with them at the African Coffee House on the Heerengracht; but the average townsman still preferred 'French insincerity and politesse' to the stiffness of these shy English and the Anglo-Indians who now came to the Cape to nurse their livers. Nevertheless, many of the British officials and merchants, more especially



Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

THE BRITISH OCCUPATIONS, 1795 and 1806.

the adaptable Scots and Irish, found favour with the Cape ladies of marriageable age, though their own womenkind were still slow to bestow their smiles on the young men of the country.¹ Of course, Capetown was not the Colony, and the key to much that follows is that the British officials sometimes forgot the distinction. But the early Governors were popular enough. After all, they shared the views of most of their subjects on such matters as personal dignity, the significance of land-owning, and the respect due from the lower classes.

The departure of Janssens ended the Batavian Liberal experi-

¹ *South Africa a Century Ago* (1910), p. 190; *State of the Cape*, pp. 154, 171.

ment at the Cape, and British Liberalism still lay in the future. The new officials could be trusted to give a conservative administration suited to the tastes of a conservative community; necessarily so at first, for until the Cape was formally ceded to Great Britain under the general peace settlement of 1814,¹ the situation was governed by the terms of the Capitulation which secured the colonists their existing laws, privileges and forms of worship. Even so, few radical changes were made till 1825, when a Commission of Inquiry set to work in earnest. The Earl of Caledon, the first civil Governor, put the new government on a more regular footing. It was war-time; the Cape had been taken by force of arms; the ruling class in Great Britain,

1807-
1808.

¹ Under the treaty of August 13, 1814, Great Britain restored to the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Holland and Belgium) the rich East Indies and all other Dutch colonies taken by her during the Napoleonic wars, except the Cape and British Guiana (Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice). She also agreed to pay up to £6,000,000 in consideration thereof. Of this sum, £1,000,000 was to be paid to Sweden, £2,000,000 to the Netherlands for the fortification of the Belgian border against France, and up to £3,000,000 to help to consolidate the position of the Dutch King in his enlarged kingdom (Hertslet, *Treaties*, I. 359, 365).

Holland had been at war with Great Britain, with one short interval of European peace, from 1795 till 1813. The Prince of Orange had been restored as King by the Allies in December 1813, and had undertaken to recoup them for their expense on his behalf. Great Britain proposed to keep Guiana, where she had sunk much capital, and the Cape, which safeguarded her increasing interests in India. During the later stages of the war, however, she had given Sweden French Guadeloupe in exchange for commercial privileges. At the peace settlement, the Allies decided that all the French colonies should be given back except Mauritius, St. Lucia and Tobago. Sweden was offered various Dutch West Indian islands in lieu of Guadeloupe, but she demanded Guiana. Finally, she compounded for £1,000,000 of British money. The Netherlands thus escaped the possible loss of further colonies. Little was said about the Cape during the negotiations, the main dispute centring round Guiana. The Dutch 'colonials,' headed by van Nagell, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, demanded the restoration of all the Dutch colonies, including those ceded under the Treaty of Amiens (1802). This request was refused. Napoleon's comment on the conduct of Great Britain is illuminating. 'I,' he said, 'would have stipulated that I alone could sail and trade in the eastern seas. It is ridiculous of them to leave Batavia (Java) to the Dutch and L'Ile de Bourbon (Réunion) to the French.'

The second item of £2,000,000 naturally failed to please the Dutch 'colonials,' who had no desire to be saddled with Belgium.

As for the third item, the other Allies agreed to waive their claims on the King of the Netherlands for expenses in favour of Russia. The Emperor Alexander had to be reconciled to the Western settlement. He had a large army in France and no money at St. Petersburg. Under the Anglo-Russian-Dutch treaty of May 19, 1815 (Hertslet, IV. 371), the meaning of the third additional clause in the treaty of 1814 was elucidated. Russia some time previously had floated a loan in Holland through Hope and Co. of Amsterdam. Interest was in arrears and likely to remain so. The Netherlands Government now undertook to make itself responsible for part of the capital and arrears of interest, and Great Britain promised to do the same up to £3,000,000. Thus Dutch bondholders in the Russian loan unexpectedly stood to benefit, and British ministers were able to show the Cape and Guiana as an offset to the £6,000,000 which Parliament was asked to vote at the end of two decades of war. Great Britain paid 6 per cent. interest and 1 per cent. sinking fund on behalf of Russia till 1906, when the debt was cleared off. (*Vide* Hertslet, I. and IV.; Leyds, *First Annexation of the Transvaal*, pp. 15 sqq.; Heeres, *De Overgang der Kaapkolonie*; Theal, *History*, I. 216 sqq.; *Journal of Royal Institute of International Affairs*, May 1926, p. 147.)

Pitt's Liberal Canada Act of 1791 notwithstanding, was still in full reaction against what it conceived to have been the fatal results of the undue political privileges granted to the late North American Colonies, a reaction stimulated by horror of the things done in the name of liberty in revolutionary France. Hence, the form of administration at the Cape, as in other newly acquired dependencies with mixed populations, was autocratic. Subject only to the control of the Secretary of State, three months' sail away in London, the Governor legislated, made appointments, suspended or dismissed all officials other than the President of the High Court, heard criminal appeals with the help of two assessors and, subject to a further appeal in certain cases to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sat with the Lieutenant-Governor as a court of civil appeal. Moreover, he could and, in Caledon's case, did dispute the control of the troops with the General.¹ Wherefore, H.M. Government appointed no more civilian Governors till it sent out Sir George Grey in 1854.

The High Court reverted to its pre-Batavian amateur condition, the Fiscal once more became public prosecutor, and the independent Vice-Admiralty Court was revived. One valuable judicial innovation was, however, made. After an illuminating visit to the eastern frontier, Caledon at last instituted circuit courts of two judges who, armed with the full civil powers of the High Court and all its criminal powers save that of passing the death sentence, were to sit twice yearly with open doors. Changes in the actual law were few. Open doors in all Courts, a modicum of English procedure, permission for British settlers married before their arrival in the Colony to make their wills in English style, a proclamation foreshadowing the use of English as the official language—that was practically all. The Roman-Dutch law adapted to local requirements still held good, however much true-born Englishmen like the excellent Dr. Halloran might protest.²

The machinery of local justice and administration remained almost unchanged, though its scope was widened. In Capetown the Burgher Senate still served as a kind of town council and adviser to the Government; a deputy-fiscal dispensed justice at Simonstown, the naval base; the rest of the Cape district was put under a new landdrost's court, and eight new magistracies were created, for the most part on the frontiers. All landdrosts' courts were given minor criminal jurisdiction for the first time, but, though they could still act as matrimonial

¹ Rec. C.C., VI. 6 ff., 115, 362; VII. 296, 369, 435, 493; Eybers, *Select Documents*, p. 102.

² Rec. C.C., VI. 32, 331; IX. 211, 239; XIV. 452, 458; *Cape Times*, April 15, 1914, on Dr. Halloran, a most engaging scoundrel; Eybers, *Select Documents*, p. 103.

1806. courts, they were forbidden to perform the actual marriage ceremony.¹

As in the days of the First Occupation the civil establishment was top-heavy and expensive. The Governor once more drew his £10,000 a year in sterling, and Somerset had no fewer than four official residences at a time when revenue was practically stationary and the purchasing power of the paper money falling. The economic condition of the Colony did not warrant this expenditure. The end of the war, as on similar and later occasions, was celebrated by wholesale speculation and importation on a scale far beyond the countervailing exporting power of the Colony. As an export, the wine of the western districts held pride of place, but the preference given to it in the British market merely resulted in the production of more wine of a worse quality, in spite of the efforts of an overworked wine-taster.² Hides and skins ranked next, drawn mainly from beyond the northern borders. Whaling prospered somewhat, and Somerset did much to further agriculture by taking the Groote Post under his own control and by laying out the Somerset Farm at the Boschberg. He was a pretty judge of a horse and, thanks to his energy, the Cape was soon sending excellent mounts to Mauritius and India. Wool was still in its infancy and all Caledon's cajolements and the experiments of a few enterprising farmers, Dutch and English, failed to reconcile the bulk of the stock farmers to the Spanish rams. Cattle rearing and general farming, helped by Duckitt's new ploughs and harrows, remained the hope of the Colony. The presence of four or five thousand troops and a large squadron offered a good market for produce, though there was still a risk that in good years part of the harvest would be left on the farmers' hands and in bad years the certainty that overseas flour and rice would have to be rushed in at any price.³ Many of the troops were withdrawn at the end of the great war, but for some time to come the troops and ships watching Napoleon at St. Helena kept up the demand.

1824. Many social improvements were effected during the years of seeming prosperity. Hottentot runners supplemented the weekly post-riders, a monthly mail made the voyage to and from England, if all went well, in a hundred days, and the first South African lighthouse was built at Green Point in the year that H.M. Observatory was founded. The Old Somerset Hospital and the Weeshuis (Orphanage) at Capetown and a leper asylum near Caledon ministered to the sick and the helpless; the new Commercial

¹ Rec. C.C., V. 407; VI. 469.

² *Ibid.*, VIII. 241; XI. 274; XIII. 350; XVII. 116, 129, 132; XIX. 389; XX. 114 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, VI. 73, 472; XII. 43; XIV. 289.

Exchange at Capetown at least served as a place for public meetings and the dances of which, even in those days, the town-folk were never tired. The householders provided the two main streets of the capital with oil-lamps at night, and the Burgher Senate, duly financed with new paper dollars, laid down iron pipes with real taps and levied a water rate to meet the cost. Government took over Dr. Andrew Smith's museum and gave a grant to a public library which was soon enriched with 1818. the Dessinian Collection.¹

A caustic observer noted that van Dessin had been unable to bequeath the other thing needful, 'a collection of readers.'² Attempts had been made for some time past to remedy the defect. De Mist and Janssens had tried to provide free education, but, in face of poverty, lack of teachers and popular suspicion, had accomplished little outside Capetown. Cradock encouraged the existing schools at the capital and the drostdies and, building on the foundations laid by the Batavians, formed a Bible and 1813. School Committee to raise subscriptions for free schools.³ But, apart from the Tot Nut van't Algemeen school founded under the Batavians and a classical school under the Colonial chaplain at Capetown, there was 'no good school in the Colony beyond mere English and Writing.' Hence Thomas Pringle, the poet and assistant public librarian, bade his friend, John Fairbairn, bring with him from Scotland 'a copy of Euclid, some of Gray's 1822. arithmetic, a few of the more elementary books in Geography, French, Latin and Greek, Mother's Catechism, a pair of small globes, and a good atlas' wherewith to furnish a 'classical and commercial academy.'⁴ Meanwhile, Somerset had taken the matter in hand with his usual energy. He projected a system of state schools wherein Scottish schoolmasters should give a good English education free of charge, religious instruction in Dutch, and Latin extra. These schools may not have done all that was expected of them—no school ever did that—and some of Somerset's Scots were undeniable failures; nevertheless, the rest set education in South Africa more firmly on its feet than ever before.⁵

As with the schools, so with the Church. The Dutch Reformed

¹ Rec. C.C., VI. 39, 506; IX. 301, 323, 357, 362; X. 372; XIII. 210; XV. 231; XXI. 500; XXII. 227. J. N. van Dessin was a German who settled at the Cape and, in 1761, bequeathed his library and a fund for its increase to the Colony (*State of the Cape*, p. 151).

² *State of the Cape*, p. 152.

³ Rec. C.C., IX. 69, 216; X. 82; Malherbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 ff.

⁴ Pringle to Fairbairn, Nov. 24 and Dec. 1822 (Jardine Collection).

⁵ Rec. C.C., XIII. 168; XIV. 97, 129; XV. 354; Malherbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 ff. The Scottish schoolmasters were J. Rose-Innes, W. Robertson, A. Brown, W. Dawson, J. Rattray and R. Blair.

Church had fallen on evil days. De Mist had found it impossible to fill vacancies; there were no means of training predikants locally; under the new dispensation Hollanders were neither available nor desired. Somerset once more fell back on Scotland. Some of his clerical recruits went to Holland to learn a little Dutch before coming to the Cape—their first sermons used to be a treasured memory in the older towns of the Colony—others came to the Cape direct.¹ The subsequent rapid multiplication of congregations and the number of districts which bear the names of these men to-day bear witness to the work they did.

1822.

The clerical element in the population grew steadily. The Lutherans still had their congregation in Capetown; the Church of England held services in the Groote Kerk, in its own church at Simonstown, and in the Wesleyan chapel at Grahamstown; after some difficulty with Somerset, the Wesleyans made good their footing in Capetown and were soon strongly represented in newly settled Albany; and even the Roman Catholic priests, expelled in 1806, were allowed to resume their ministrations in the capital.²

1820.

The main recruitment of the clergy came through the missionary societies. The Wesleyan movement, the Evangelical revival in Great Britain, and the Lutheran revival in Germany had put new life into Protestantism throughout Western Europe. This 'mickle stirring' had even affected the far-distant Cape. In the year of the great French Revolution, van Lier, predikant at the Groote Kerk, had formed a group of 'serious people.' This group survived his early death and formed the nucleus of the South African Society, a welcome support to the incoming evangelical missionaries.³

The missionary stream had begun to flow in the last days of the Company, but, until 1816, only two important societies entered the field: the Moravian Brethren and the London Missionary Society. The Moravians had arrived first. They reoccupied Schmidt's old station at Genadendal. There these plain, sensible German mechanics, unhampered by the 'enthusiasm' which staid critics reprobated in the L.M.S. men, laboured with their wives and families among the semi-civilised Hottentots and half-breeds of the settled western Colony. At first they had been suspect of their European neighbours and

1792.

¹ Rec. C.C., XIII. 168, 360, 391; XIV. 37, 95, 129, 292, 452; XV. 292. The ministers were Andrew Murray, A. Smith, H. Sutherland, C. Fraser, G. Morgan and W. R. Thomson.

² Rec. C.C., XIII. 20, 358, 365 (Catholics); XIII. 175, and *State of the Cape*, pp. 63 ff. (Anglicans); XI. 62; XIV. 31, 38, 192 (Wesleyans).

³ Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, pp. 61 ff.

had found it prudent to withdraw to Capetown during the upheaval of 1795; but they had soon gone back to their posts, there to win golden opinions as a civilising agency from British and Batavian officials. Presently they were given new stations at Mamre in the West, where they were equally successful, and 1807. Enon near the Eastern Frontier, where, under much more difficult 1816. conditions, their success was markedly less.¹

Germany, Holland, Denmark and, later on, France did much to swell the missionary flood, but Great Britain did so much more that the Parisian press regarded the whole business as an imperialist plot on the part of *perfidie Albion*. 'The Missionary Society,' afterwards called the L.M.S., was founded expressly 1794. to preach the Gospel as interpreted by the Independents to the heathen. Its first emissaries to the Cape went two by two, 1799. Dutch and English together, to the wildest parts, to Gaika's kraal and to the Bushmen on the Zak River.² The Hollander, Vanderkemp, ex-captain of horse, doctor of medicine and boon companion of de Mist, was the most influential of these early missionaries. He failed at Gaika's but he founded Bethelsdorp, 1803. and though the site was a poor one and he himself perhaps 'too much absorbed in the idea of conversion' to make a good missionary,³ his influence was such that, for long years after his death, the Coast Kaffirs regarded all missionaries as 'Jankanna's children' and Bethelsdorp became the Zion of the Hottentots.

The L.M.S. missions spread rapidly to the Eastern Frontier and beyond the Orange to the Griquas, and by 1816 they had twenty men at work. They were now joined by the Wesleyans and the Glasgow Society in the East, while within the colonial 1816- borders the Dutch and English clergy formed the Bible and 1823. Tract Society, the S.A. Society, founded in 1799, busied itself among the coloured folk of many of the dorps, and the pioneers of the Church Missionary Society, fruit of the famous conversation in Wilberforce's rooms, found their first and truly urgent call no further from Capetown than Wynberg.⁴

The coming of the missionaries did more than stimulate religious life in the Colony. It interested the organised, semi-educated, evangelically-minded and entirely vocal middle class which was rising to wealth and influence on the wave of the Industrial Revolution, in the peoples of the colonies and above

¹ No. 584 of 1830, p. 12, and No. 50 of 1835, pp. 23-7; Du Plessis, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 424.

² Rec. C.C., III. 336 ff.; IV. 366; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, pp. 22 ff.

³ Lichtenstein, *Travels*, I. 239. For a good summing up of Vanderkemp's strength and weakness, *vide* Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, pp. 39 ff.

⁴ *State of the Cape*, p. 64; Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*.

all in the 'aborigines.' Henceforward, to an increasing degree, native policies had to be carried out under watchful eyes at home and in the colonies themselves. Liberalism, driven out of the State by the British Tories, began to return through the Church and, in due time, caused a revolution in the old Cape Colony.

With the abolition of the slave trade, the first stage in this revolution, the missionaries as such had little to do. England's share in that traffic had long been challenged. While yet it was only on a small scale, English clergymen had exclaimed against the horrors of the Middle Passage and of slavery itself. English Quakers followed with protests; Pennsylvanian Quakers took active steps to end slave-owning in their own ranks; the trend of English literature, especially of poetry, began to run strongly in the same direction.¹ And then the lawyers came to the help of the writers. Lord Mansfield, in *Somerset's case*, declared that the 'domestic institution' could not live on English ground save under the shelter of a special statute. He thereby set free 14,000 negroes who were living in England with their masters.

Inspired by this famous judgment, Granville Sharp began his crusade against the Trade, formed the Anti-Slavery Committee and found allies in Thomas Clarkson and, above all, William Wilberforce, the friend of the young Prime Minister, William Pitt. The reforming Pitt declared in favour of abolition, but could do nothing more than help to carry a private bill which limited the number of slaves who might be carried on a ship of a given tonnage. Then the French Revolution and the rebellion of the hastily enfranchised slaves in Hayti came to strengthen the hands of the 'West Indian' party in Parliament. In spite of the cautious resolution of Denmark to give up the traffic ten years hence, the hopes of the Abolitionists were ended for many years to come.

Abolition would be a serious matter for British shipping, for unless international action were taken, the abandoned trade would simply serve to enrich her rivals. It would certainly damage her slave-owning colonies, and among them the Cape. Slaves at the Cape somewhat outnumbered the Europeans and, in the West particularly, formed the mass of the labouring class. During the First British Occupation, except for illicit traffic in Yonge's time, slaves were landed under permits granted as a rule at the request of the Burgher Senate. The Batavian Republic had contemplated the gradual abolition of slavery and its representatives at the Cape had opposed the traffic on

¹ On Abolition *vide* R. Coupland, *Wilberforce*.

Circa
1680.

1776.

1773.

1787.

1792.

Circa
1795.

principle ; but even they had had to give way to popular pressure and permit a limited importation. Baird was in like case,¹ but before the tale of slaves for whom he issued licences was completed, the British Slave Trade was legally a thing of the past. The Abolitionists had begun to press again ; Fox, in office at last, had threatened to wreck the Ministry of All the Talents if the Abolition Bill were not carried, and carried it was, just as the U.S.A. Congress also decreed the end of the traffic. But, whereas the Stars and Stripes remained the flag most abused by slavers till Lincoln's day, the British, having command of the sea, implemented their promise. At first the penalty for breach of the Act was a fine ; then it was changed to fourteen years' transportation ; finally it became a hanging matter, and with that the British slavers went out of business.

Undismayed by the pious resolution *et preterea nihil* passed against the Trade by the eight Great Powers at the Congress of Vienna, the British frigates began their long war against the slavers. Some of the rescued slaves were apprenticed for fourteen years as Prize Negroes at Capetown ; for a time also Spanish and Portuguese ships 'in distress' ran slaves ashore at Table Bay and reckoned on revictualling at the Cape, and were duly wroth when they were warned off.² The addition to the labour force of the Colony from both these sources cannot have been great, for with the stoppage of the Trade, the free burgher population rapidly outstripped the servile. The price of slaves rose and with it the amount of care bestowed upon them. Domestic slaves have usually been tolerably well treated in all times and places, and the Cape was no exception to the rule. Even predial slavery was not and never had been so harsh at the Cape as in the West Indies, especially in the settled and comparatively well-governed western districts where the vast majority of the slaves dwelt. Somerset waxed almost lyrical over the happy lot of the Cape slave, the less exuberant Cradock admitted that it was better than in any other part of the world he had seen,³ and, later on, the Commissioners of Inquiry found that most of the complaints of ill-usage came from the country districts and that many were groundless. There were, of course, frequent desertions to the Kaffirs or the banditti of the Orange valley, the usual crop of slave crimes: murder, arson, and rape, and once a revolt of over 300 slaves organised by two Irishmen in the Malmesbury district ;⁴ but on the whole the system worked

¹ Rec. C.C., I. 29 ; II. 39 ; III. 79 ff., 121, 126, 372, 377 ; V. 403-4 ; VI. 49 ; Cory, *op. cit.*, III. 7.

² *Ibid.*, IX. 129 ; XIII. 26 ; XIV. 485 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, IX. 451 ; XVIII. 310 ; XXI. 448 ; XXIX. 457 ; Report of Registrar of Slaves, 1826 ; V.R. Soc., III. 252.

⁴ Rec. C.C., VI. 392, 408 ff. ; VII. 7.

peaceably. Government was benevolent. Craig and Macartney abolished torture and the wheel; Janssens ordered good treatment, and Caledon bade the circuit judges see that it was given; Cradock encouraged owners to Christianise their slaves¹ and limited the lashes that might legally be given to a figure that must have moved the British Tommies and men-of-war's men to envy; and Somerset opened schools for slave children and ordered a registration of slaves similar to that of the Hottentots. But avowedly nothing was done to weaken the owners' rights over their human property.² That was reserved for a later and more eventful time.

1801-
1815.

1808-
1809.

The growing power of the British philanthropists was soon to be dedicated to other peoples who were not slaves but who none the less merited attention. Official knowledge of what lay beyond the frontiers of the Colony had increased greatly since 1795. Truter and Somerville, Lichtenstein and van der Graaff and Burchell had all travelled northward of the Orange to the Griquas of Klaarwater and the Batlapin of Lithakao. More immediately important were the official tours of Colonel Collins who went north-eastward to inspect the Bushmen and then travelled along the upper Orange and so down to Hints's kraal beyond the Kei.³

1817.

Collins recommended leniency towards the Bushmen. The little hunters had ceased to offer serious resistance to the advancing Europeans. Some still hung about in the northern Karoo, others lived as they did for many years thereafter in the arid plains of Great Bushman Land south of the middle Orange, others were moving away northward to be cut down by the Griquas or to find a refuge in the Kalahari desert. There was little slaughter by Europeans after 1810, though as late as 1823 commandos took the field in Tarka and the Sneeuwberg. The traffic in prisoners and children abandoned by their starving parents still went on, a traffic which Somerset tried to regularise by insisting that they should be officially apprenticed under written contracts. Such of these apprentices as remained with their masters became good cattle-herds; kindly Boers confessed that no good had come of all the bloodshed and were prepared to wink at a little stealing so long as their Bushmen brought back their cattle in good condition; Andries Stockenstrom, landdrost of Graaff Reinet, vouched for the fact that

¹ Cradock repealed the law of 1770 which limited the right to sell Christian slaves (Eybers, p. 18).

² Rec. C.C., VIII. 500; IX. 131; XI. 102.

³ *Ibid.*, VI. 340 ff.; VII. 20 ff.

many a Boer was on good terms with the Stone Age men and occasionally gave them sheep.¹

The L.M.S. missionaries at Tooverberg and Hephzibah also had fair success with the Bushmen, but the experience of Zak River and Bethelsdorp proved that the Hottentots and half-breeds were much more amenable than they to civilised ways. Unfortunately the L.M.S. stations had from the first been viewed askance by the officials, men of a class which had little sympathy with vagrants or landless men either in Holland or in England. Yonge had suspected the first missionaries of being Jacobins in sheep's clothing: de Mist had regarded the S.A. Society as an interloper; Janssens had bidden missionaries keep well beyond the borders; now Collins recommended the break-up of Bethelsdorp, since it was 'designed for the benefit of the Hottentots rather than that of the Colony.'² The 'almost universal' charge levelled against the mission stations by officials and colonists was that they drained off labour at a time when the stoppage of the Slave Trade threatened a labour shortage.³ It is hard to say how far this charge was justified, but it was one which was diligently pressed upon Caledon. He tried to meet the demand and at the same time to protect the Hottentots. He abolished the remains of the tribal system, put the Hottentots under colonial law, bade them find fixed abodes and not move beyond the district boundaries without a pass from the landdrost, strengthened the old laws providing for written contracts, and after his visit to the Eastern Frontier specially instructed the circuit judges to receive Hottentot complaints. Cradock further directed that Hottentot children born while their parents were in service and maintained by the master to the age of eight were to be apprenticed to that master for ten years to come.⁴ The intention was to provide a supply of labour and to encourage farmers to look after whole families of dependants, but it only needed Somerset's permission to landdrosts to *inboek* orphans to reduce the Hottentots to the level of serfs at the disposal of the local officials.⁵ Hardly any of them held land; it was even

Nov.

1809.

1811.

1812.

1819.

¹ Rec. C.C., VIII. 306; XI. 365; Thompson, *Travels*, I. 74, 395, 404; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 119, 133; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, p. 4.

² Rec. C.C., III. 114 ff., 336 ff., 391; VII. 109; No. 50 of 1835, p. 163; Proclamation, Feb. 21, 1805; Leyds, *First Annexation*, p. 24.

³ Rec. C.C., IX. 350. The charge was natural. The mission stations were practically the only native reserves within the Colony. Like the present-day reserves they harboured ineffectives; squatters who preferred to live as best they might; casual workers who preferred an occasional shilling a day to perhaps six shillings a month, and a few independent transport-riders, wood-cutters and so on. An inquiry in 1825 showed that three-fourths of the inmates of Bethelsdorp went out to work, as do so many men from the reserves to-day. (Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, p. 153.)

⁴ Rec. C.C., VII. 211; VIII. 385.

⁵ *Ibid.*, XII. 249.

doubtful whether they could legally do so; did they wander about, they were liable to be treated as vagrants by the nearest field cornet. There was nothing for it but to go beyond the borders, as some did, or to choose between the farms and the mission stations. As for the protection of the law, the Hottentot who ran the gauntlet to the far-distant drostdy was kept in the dark gaol till his case came on before heemraden of the same class as the accused, and then had to face the prospect of punishment if he failed to prove his charge.¹ Granted that some check had to be put on frivolous charges, the situation was still unsatisfactory.

1812. The new circuit court promised some relief, and James Read, Vanderkemp's colleague and an over-credulous person, brought a heavy tale of charges against the frontier farmers. The circuit court duly dealt therewith. Many charges were undoubtedly baseless; many never came into court at all; many could have been paralleled from the annals of the domestic system of industry or of the factory system which was taking its place in England. Of seventeen Boers charged with murder, one was convicted of assault, two cases were postponed and three referred to Capetown; of the fifteen charged with violence, seven were found guilty and the cases of two held over for lack of evidence. But there is another side to the story of this Black Circuit. The charges were difficult to prove, for they covered many years and a wide area; 'Jankanna' had just died, and the difficulty, at all times great, of persuading servants to give evidence against their masters was thereby doubled; a good many charges of illegal detention of wages, cattle and children were established; the violence actually proved was bad, and the sentences passed did not err on the side of severity.²

The general effect of the Black Circuit was unhappy. Hundreds of Europeans had been put to inconvenience and even risk by having to travel to court at the close of a Kaffir war; those against whom the charges had broken down were naturally indignant at the mere suspicion; all resented the novel experience of being haled to court at the instance of a parcel of Hottentots and missionaries. Their growing suspicion and dislike was henceforward focussed on Bethelsdorp.

The L.M.S. in South Africa fared badly in the years that followed the Black Circuit. It received scant sympathy from

¹ Rec. C.C., IV. 92 ff.; VIII. 301, 308, 380.

² *Ibid.*, IX. 328 ff.; Coupland, *Wilberforce*, pp. 381 ff.; Theal, *History*, I. 200-4; Cory, *Rise of South Africa*, I. 211 ff.; *History of the L.M.S.*, I. 513.

Somerset, who disliked Nonconformists and believed in work for dependent people whether in England or at the Cape. He encouraged the local officials to be strict, disbanded the Hottentot Corps partly because he disliked coloured troops and partly because he thought the men and their wives ought to be at work, and approved of the closing down of more than one mission station beyond the borders.¹ His coolness towards the Society was not altogether unmerited. Its members were widely scattered, independent in every sense of the word, and so jealous of control that even the best of them could protest against anything so 'papal' as a Superintendent. Some of its men had more zeal than knowledge, for, the precedent of St. Paul notwithstanding, the idea that a missionary should be a well-educated man was by no means generally accepted.² One or two of them had more knowledge than character; but Somerset's main objection to the extra-colonial stations rested less on the possible short-comings of the missionaries than on the difficulties and dangers of their position. In short, he shared Janssens' fears that these stations might prove Caves of Adullam lacking the Davids essential to their tranquillity.

The danger was especially acute in the stony, sun-baked wastes beyond the northern border. Most of the Namaquas had disappeared beyond the lower Orange to conquer the Hereros with their guns; but the six hundred miles of the Orange valley still swarmed with Hottentots, Bastaards (half-castes), Bushmen and even a few stray Xosas. In this pandemonium there was one growing focus of ordered civilisation. William Anderson of the L.M.S. had induced the mixed crowd of Bastaards and Hottentots which had followed Barend Barends and the brothers, Adam and Cornelis Kok, out of the Colony to settle round Klaarwater in what is now Griqualand West. There his unruly protégés had hunted out the luckless Bushmen for a hundred miles around. Another missionary, John Campbell, had then renamed the Bastaards 'Griquas' and their village 'Griquatown,' appointed Barends and Adam Kok captains, and furnished them with code, law courts and coinage complete. Presently, Andries Waterboer, the ablest of all these semi-civilised chieftains, came up from the Colony and became captain of this 'Hottentot Republic under the patriarchal government of missionaries.'³

¹ Rec. C.C., XI. 5, 157, 167, 380; XII. 243; XV. 223; J. Philip, *Researches*, II. pp. 165, 280; Moffat, *Missionary Labours*, p. 61.

² Du Plessis, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

³ No. 50 of 1835, pp. 126, 129, 133, 211-12; No. 252 of 1835, p. 115; No. 538 of 1836, pp. 608 ff.; Stow, *Native Races*, chapters xvii-xx; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 184 ff.; Chase, *Natal Papers*, II. 250.

1818.

The dauntless Waterboer waged war on the Orange river banditti with mixed success, while Somerset, anxious for the security of the northern border, appointed a deputy-landdrost at Beaufort West with a reserve hard by under the control of a D.R. Church minister, and a periodical fair to canalise the trade in hides and skins with the hunting Griquas.¹ The Directors of the L.M.S., for their part, alarmed at the ill reports which reached them from the Colony, determined on an inquiry. They sent John Campbell to bring back a report, and with him Dr. John Philip to remain as superintendent of all their stations in South Africa.² So there landed at Capetown the man who, by reason of his force of character and length of service, became one of the most outstanding political figures in the South Africa of his day.

Feb.
1819.

John Philip was the son of a Kirkcaldy weaver, born in 1775, trained at Hoxton and called as Independent minister to Aberdeen. He was stiff in opinions, given to hyperbole, and fully endowed with that love of disputation which Benjamin Franklin noted as the characteristic of lawyers, university men and Scots; nevertheless, successive Governors were destined to turn to him as an adviser in the matter of Native policy, though most of them quarrelled with him before the end. He was well received by Somerset, made friends with some of the leading Cape officials, and then set out on his travels with Campbell.³ Together they reformed the most serious abuses in their Society, though they did not visit the stations beyond the northern border, since the Governor had forbidden them to station new men there. But Philip made up his mind that the L.M.S. should keep its footing in Griqualand, for that was 'the neck of the bottle' through which the Gospel must pass on its way to Central Africa. He told Somerset that the weakness of the missionaries' position was that they could not expel vagrants. To remedy this defect of power, if only in a measure, Somerset appointed Melville as resident at the court of Waterboer of Griquatown, where Anderson was struggling for control against Buis, who, having helped to wreck the station at Tooverberg, had transferred his undoubted abilities still further beyond the pale of the law. It was the first vague extension of British authority beyond the Orange.⁴

1822.

Satisfied that the extra-colonial stations were not to be closed after all, Philip turned his attention to the Hottentots within the

¹ Rec. C.C., XI. 254; XII. 62, 81 ff., 112.

² *Ibid.*, XII. 55.

³ *Ibid.*, XII. 243; XIII. 185.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XI. 229, 254; XII. 34, 162, 247; No. 66 of 1835, p. 219; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 186.

Colony. As a convinced segregationist, he was opposed to the indiscriminate mixing of races which must follow from the complete dispersion of the Hottentots on the farms. He held that they would never become civilised until they stood on a legal equality with Europeans and, as the economic basis of that equality was land, he began to press the authorities for additional grants to the mission stations. He did so with very limited success, but he did convince Bird, the Colonial Secretary at Capetown, that Cuyler, landdrost of Uitenhage, was levying forced labour at miserable wages on the Bethelsdorpers.¹ Bird offered him an ordinance protecting these people. 'Yes,' said Philip, 'with the royal seal upon it.'² But this Somerset could not give. Philip therefore ^{1822.} sent home his first comprehensive report on the L.M.S. stations, made clear to the philanthropic public of Great Britain the distinction between the slave and the Hottentot problems, and got into touch with Wilberforce and Fowell Buxton, who were girding up their loins for the struggle which was to end slavery within the British Empire.

Trade, finance, slaves and Hottentots all drew attention to the affairs of the Cape. The arrival of a considerable body of British citizens on the Eastern Frontier redoubled the interest of those who remained at home. Conditions on that frontier were precarious. Since the failure of the Great Commando, the Xosas ^{1803.} claimed all from the Fish to the Sunday river as theirs by right of conquest and of occupation, and had even ventured westward of the Gamtoos for a time. The Europeans claimed all as far as the Fish and treated Gaika as paramount chief of the western Xosas, however stoutly he and they might deny the fact. The indefatigable Collins was sent to report. He visited Hintsa, paramount ^{1809.} chief of all the Xosas, at his kraal beyond the Kei, met the poverty-stricken Gaika in the upper valley of the Keiskamma, and recommended that the only way to secure the peace of the Frontier was to carry the border across the empty lands to the Koonap, appoint more magistrates to check intercourse with the tribes, drive Ndhambi and his allies from the Zuurveld and settle that area with a dense European population.³

The clearing of the Zuurveld was carried out by Cradock. A large force of troops and burghers swept 20,000 Ndhambis and Gunukwebes beyond the Fish, and, to hold the frontier, Cradock ^{March} built a double line of block-houses, garrisoned them with troops ^{1812.} and burghers, placed a deputy landdrost behind each wing of the line at the new villages of Cradock and Grahamstown, and offered

¹ Philip, *Researches*, II. 403 ff.

² Philip, *Narrative* (unpublished, circa 1845); Macmillan, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

³ Rec. C.C., VII. 101-3, 136.

quit-rent farms of 2000 morgen, two-thirds the usual size of a farm, near each military post.¹

1815. Cradock's was the most decisive step yet taken to establish the rule of law on the Eastern Frontier. That rule was displeasing to some of the frontiersmen. To the men or sons of the men who had taken part in the disturbances of 1795-1803, landdrosts, heemraden and field cornets were all very well, but High Court judges backed by troops, and often Hottentot troops at that, were anathema. The memories of the Black Circuit were still fresh when the Slachter's Nek rebellion took place. Frederick Bezuidenhout of Baviaan's river on the extreme frontier, by the space of two years, defied the summons of the courts to answer a charge of cruelty to a Hottentot servant. An officer and a dozen Hottentots were sent to fetch him. He fired on them and was killed. His brother, Johannes, and his friends swore to avenge him, to drive the British and the Hottentots from the borderlands and to found a republic there. Twice they summoned Gaika to their aid, offering him the Zuurveld and other advantages in exchange for the Kat river lands, and when H. F. Prinsloo, son of old Marthinus the firebrand of the Boschberg, the only influential man of their party, was arrested, they essayed to rescue him and then tried to raise the countryside. They failed, and most of them surrendered to the troops and their fellow-burghers at Slachter's Nek. A few fled towards Kaffirland, but Johannes was killed and the rest were captured. A special commission of the High Court presently banished thirty-two of the prisoners from the Eastern Frontier and sentenced six others to death. Of these, Somerset reprieved one, but the rest were publicly hanged under more than usually distressing circumstances at Van Aardt's farm.²

In later times the event became a symbol of British oppression like the so-called 'Bloody Massacre' of Boston and Peterloo. The execution of white men for rebellion undoubtedly shocked frontier opinion; but the rising in all its details save its conclusion was nothing new on that frontier, and the nature of the unreformed English criminal law before 1821 and the stern penalties prescribed by Roman-Dutch law long afterwards may serve to modify harsh judgments on the conduct of the authorities. The really significant fact is that the great mass of the frontiersmen either gave the rebels no support or actively helped the authorities. Given security the average frontier Boer of 1815 was law-abiding enough in most respects.

1813. Unluckily, Cradock's settlement failed to bring security. He had to send a strong force to the Kat to recover stolen cattle, but

¹ Rec. C.C., VIII. 374, 427, 480, 501.

² *Ibid.*, XI. 2 ff., 71; Leibbrandt, *Slachter's Nek Rebellion*, 1815.

thefts continued and Somerset tried to come to terms with Gaika and his famous son, Macomo. Still treating Gaika as paramount chief of the western Xosas, he arranged a reprisal system on a principle well understood in Kaffir law, whereby owners accompanied by small bodies of troops might trace the spoor of stolen cattle to the kraal at which it ended and there either retake their cattle or recoup themselves at the expense of the kraal. Somerset still further relaxed the system of non-intercourse by permitting a Kaffir fair twice yearly at Grahams-^{1817.}town.¹ Hardly had this arrangement been concluded than the garrison was reduced, the invaluable dragoons were taken away, and Somerset was forced to raise a Hottentot and half-breed corps (Cape Corps).² Robberies increased, and then Dushane, son of Ndhlabi, who had hitherto supported Gaika, went over to his father and the prophet, Makana, who were seeking to unite the Western Xosas. Together, the new allies overthrew Gaika on the bloody field of Amalinde. Gaika called on the Governor for help.^{1818.} Troops and burghers crossed the Fish and returned with many of Ndhlabi's cattle. Ndhlabi retaliated by harrying the^{April} borderlands and boldly attacking Grahamstown in broad daylight.^{1819.} He was beaten off, and after some delay due to drought and horse-sickness, the Colonial forces broke his power, advanced to the Kei and returned with all and more than all the cattle that he had lifted from the Colony. Somerset once more met Gaika, obliged the other chieftains (Ndhlabi being in hiding) to recognise him^{Oct.} as paramount, and made a verbal treaty which proved a fruitful^{1819.} seed-plot for dragons' teeth. All the country between the Fish and the Keiskamma, save only the ill-defined Tyumie valley, which Gaika retained, was declared neutral territory. Save for Fort Willshire on the Keiskamma, the land was to be kept empty of all, both black and white, by military patrols.³

But troops, magistrates, two rivers in place of one, and a vacuum between would never make the frontier secure unless they were backed by a dense white population. There had been talk from time to time of assisted immigration: Orangemen from the Netherlands or evicted Highlanders like those who were even then clearing the ground for the Winnipeg of the future; but nothing was done till the end of the Napoleonic wars turned men's thoughts towards immigration as a cure for unemployment. The first efforts affecting South Africa were private. Benjamin Moodie brought out 300 young Scots under indenture with good success; ^{1817.} but another party failed, and the boys from the Refuge of the

¹ Rec. C.C., XI. 296 ff., 313; XII. 121; XIII. 69.

² *Ibid.*, XI. 380.

³ *Ibid.*, XII. 193, 203, 308, 320, 337 ff.

1813. Destitute were a nuisance.¹ All these schemes affected only the Western districts. Meanwhile, Cradock's Zuurveld settlement was dwindling away. Indeed, his whole quit-rent policy, of which that scheme had been the forerunner, had failed so far to answer its purpose of fixing the slowly drifting Boers to their farms. Cradock's scheme was to give out no more Crown lands on the old loan-place tenure. In future grants were to be of the usual 3000 morgen on quit-rents varying with the value of the land, while every inducement was to be held out to farmers to convert their existing loan-places into quit-rent holdings. So would they become 'real landholders.'² A Tory Governor could hold out no higher inducement, but the colonists refused to be converted and the Zuurveld settlers gradually moved away to the north-eastern borders where the land was better, Bushmen were available to take the place of the all too scarce Hottentot servants, and Kaffirs were non-existent.³

March 1820-
May 1821. What wonder then that Somerset, in reply to Downing Street's inquiries, painted a highly coloured picture of the joys of the Zuurveld? Parliament voted £50,000 to pay the passages of 57 parties each organised under a leader, in many cases half-pay officers, and entitled to 100 acres per man on quit-rent payable after a term of years. These 1820 settlers were accompanied by others who travelled at their own charges. Altogether, nearly 5000 British landed, a notable addition to the scanty population of the Colony.⁴

May 1820. Somerset was away in England when the first transports arrived. The actual planting of the settlement therefore fell to Donkin, the acting Governor. He interpreted Bathurst's instructions that each nationality should be given land to itself so liberally that he drafted the Irish and some of the English to an impossible site near Clanwilliam. But he soon sent the bulk of them to join the other settlers and their thirty-eight Dutch neighbours on the Zuurveld, and himself speedily followed them thither. He found them working with a zeal that was not always according to knowledge; but the farmers among them were grumbling at the smallness of their holdings and the artisans were anxious to be off to the towns. Most of their grievances he could not remedy, but he remitted the cost of their transport up-country, appointed a provisional landdrost with wide powers at Bathurst, proclaimed the new district under the name of Albany,

¹ Rec. C.C., VIII. 219; IX. 183; X. 206, 242; XI. 189, 275, 358, 430; XII. 22, 172, 295 ff., 315, 325; XIII. 28.

² *Ibid.*, IX. 204 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, XV. 85 ff., 328 ff. Between 1814 and 1821, only 410 out of 2206 loan-places were converted. (*State of the Cape*, p. 361.)

⁴ *Ibid.*, XI. 363, 404, 425 ff.; Cory, *op. cit.*, II. 1 ff.; *State of the Cape*, pp. 178 ff.

and christened the little port on Algoa Bay, which might now expect to grow rapidly, Port Elizabeth, in memory of his dead wife.¹ A year later he visited Albany once more. Blight had destroyed the first wheat crop and many of the artisans were gone, but the rest were holding on. He appointed a landdrost to cope with the Kaffirs, who were becoming a nuisance and, in an attempt to check the traders who, in defiance of orders, were already pushing into Kaffirland, permitted a fair at Fort Willshire, which soon became something like a permanent market. He still further weakened the policy of non-intercourse by inducing Gaika to allow the formation of an ex-officers' settlement at Fredericksburg in the neutral territory, a trespass from the Colonial side which was soon balanced by the return of Macomo to the upper waters of the Kat.² June 1821.

Somerset returned furious with Donkin for having meddled with his frontier policy and dismayed to find the whole Colony sinking into an economic decline. Napoleon was dead and the St. Helena demand had died with him; a run of bad seasons had set in; the post-war boom had collapsed and his cherished Albany settlement was visibly wilting. The settlers were heavily in debt to the Government for rations; townsmen were giving up the attempt to learn South African farming; the rest were grumbling like any Boers that they were forbidden to keep predial slaves and railing at the Somerset Farm as a subsidised state competitor. Some of the Governor's measures made matters worse. He appointed as landdrost a new and unpopular man—any man would have been unpopular under the circumstances—removed the seat of local government and the troops from Bathurst to Grahamstown, and abandoned Fredericksburg. On the other hand, he issued title-deeds to the settlers for largely increased land grants at a very low quit-rent and hoped for the best. But floods swept the country-side and forced many of the destitute settlers to fall back on relief funds raised in the Colony, Great Britain and India.³ Dec. 1821. Oct. 1823.

It was the darkest hour before the dawn, but the Albany men could not know that. They sent up a cry of complaint against Somerset and all his works which swelled the chorus of accusation arising from public and private enemies in London and Capetown. But already that chorus, the financial débâcle at the Cape, and the evangelical pressure of Wilberforce and Philip had impelled the Commons to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to investigate not

¹ Rec. C.C., XIII. 224, 297; XV. 73.

² *Ibid.*, XIV. 15, 56, 121; Proclamations, 1820-21, p. 29; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 202, 204.

³ Rec. C.C., XIII. 135; XIV. 13, 25, 95, 288, 309; XV. 2 ff., 106, 128, 285 ff., 348, 395.

July 12,
1823.

only the affairs of Mauritius and Ceylon, but of the Cape also. Hence, Major W. Colebrooke and J. T. Bigge landed at Capetown and ushered in the period of political, constitutional and economic reform which led up to the Great Trek.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERIOD OF CHANGE, 1823-37

Reforms : currency ; a free press ; the official language ; the Charters of Justice ; the Legislative Council and municipal institutions—Slave emancipation and the abolition of the Colour Bar—The broadening out of South African History : the *Mfecane* ; Delagoa Bay and Port Natal ; the Griquas ; the Eastern Frontier—D'Urban and Philip : the Waterboer Treaty ; the Kaffir War of 1834-35 ; D'Urban's general South African settlement and its failure.

Secretaries of State for War and Colonies : Earl Bathurst, June 1812-April 1827 ; Viscount Goderich, April-Sept. 1827 ; W. Huskisson, 1827-May 1828 ; Sir G. Murray, 1828-Nov. 1830 ; Viscount Goderich, 1830-March 1833 ; E. G. Stanley, 1833-June 1834 ; T. Spring Rice, June-Nov. 1834 ; Duke of Wellington, Nov. 1834 ; Earl of Aberdeen, Dec. 1834-April 1835 ; Charles Grant (Lord Glenelg, May 1835), 1835-Feb. 1839.

Governors of the Cape Colony : Lord Charles Somerset, left on leave March 5, 1826, resigned April 1827 ; Major-General R. Bourke, acting March 1826-Sept. 9, 1828 ; Lieut.-General Sir G. Lowry Cole, 1828-Aug. 10, 1833 ; Lieut.-Colonel T. F. Wade, acting 1833-Jan. 16, 1834 ; Major-General Sir Benjamin D'Urban, 1834-Jan. 20, 1838.

FROM 1823 onwards the fortunes of the thinly peopled, straggling Cape Colony were governed by two factors : poverty and the increasing interest taken in its affairs by the Imperial Government and certain sections of the British public. The arrival of the Commission of Inquiry was an earnest of the one, the task to which the Commissioners immediately addressed themselves was a witness to the other.

That task was the restoration of the finances. This restoration was part of a general imperial policy. The Bank of England had recently resumed specie payments and H.M. Government proposed to make British silver current throughout the Empire. The Cape was a case for special treatment.¹ The purchasing power of its paper rix-dollar had fallen from 3s. 6d. to 1s. 6¼d. ; the total of 2,086,275 Rd. left behind by the Batavians had been

1806-
1823.

¹ Rec. C.C., XXII. 141 ff. ; No. 438 of 1826. For the reports of the Commissioners on various matters, *vide* Rec. C.C. (index) and Blue Books No. 406 of 1826-7 ; 282 of 1827 ; 300 of 1829 ; 584 of 1830.

swelled in response to the exigencies of the troops, the public works department and the Burgher Senate to 3,587,056 (nominally £269,029) of which 484,851 were forged notes. Loan Bank mortgages notwithstanding, the word of the Government was the real security for it all. Efforts to prevent the operation of Gresham's Law had been abandoned when Somerset permitted the export of bullion. Jew brokers had then bought up the Spanish dollars imported to pay the troops and either exported them or sold them at an ever-increasing premium to merchants for remittance to London. During the post-war boom the demand for coin or drafts had been great; but it was clear that the amount of paper in circulation was excessive, as country business was mainly a matter of barter and town business of drafts on the Loan Bank which had become a bank of discount and deposit.¹

The 4s. paper rix-dollar was now fixed at 1s. 6d. in silver, the average value for the past three years. £56,000 in silver and copper were provided to be paid out to the garrison, which, as the biggest spender in the Colony, could be trusted to put the new money into circulation, and the Commissariat was authorised to issue bills on London against this silver or paper at a steadily reduced discount. With this silver, 1,237,000 Rd. were soon bought in and cancelled; in other words, Great Britain lent the Colony over £92,000 without interest. The balance of the paper was replaced by new notes of English denominations exchangeable at par for the Treasury bills which now formed the security.²

The process of wiping out the paper money continued for nearly twenty years and, however much it may have been to the advantage of the Colony to have got rid of it, there is no doubt that the arrangement of 1825 hit creditors hard at the time, especially as the bank, having been too free with credit, suddenly stopped paying interest on deposits.³ To make matters worse, the revenues of the Colony during the decade preceding the Great Trek were less than those of the ten years following the battle of Waterloo; the real value of land revenue fell with the fall of the rix-dollar; the adoption of English methods of business reduced the proceeds of the lucrative auction duty, and heavier taxes and quit-rents failed to fill the gap. Expenditure far exceeded revenue and Lord Charles was driven to borrow from the Orphan Chamber, the Loan Bank, the Commissariat and the East India Company. At last he helped himself to an Imperial

¹ Rec. C.C., VI. 358, 372; XI. 107; XIX. 391; XXII. 123 ff.; *State of the Cape*, pp. 32, 305, 346.

² *Ibid.*, XXI. 476; XXIV. 348 ff.; XXXV. 100; Theal, *Ib.* 341; Eybers, p. 25.

³ Rec. C.C., XXIII. 106 ff., 118 ff., 230.

loan earmarked for the repair of damage done by storm in the Western districts, a loan which had not been needed after all. It was the last straw. The first British railway boom collapsed, local banks failed in Great Britain, and the South American markets crashed in spite of Spanish-American independence and the Monroe Doctrine. The Imperial Government did indeed cancel the ration debt of the Albany Settlers and take over the Cape Corps reduced to 250 mounted men, but it stopped all public works and, after Somerset's retirement, began to retrench official salaries from the Governor's lordly £10,000 a year downwards.¹ Henceforward, until 1843, the Colony had to face the fact that an inelastic revenue and a heavy debt put public works, assisted immigration, the proper staffing of magistracies and the policing of the frontiers out of the question. Public poverty and private discontent explain much that follows.

Somerset's financial policy had brought him into disfavour in Downing Street, and the outcry against him in the Colony and in London, some of it justifiable and some of it not, waxed louder. He did not fall without a struggle. He stood for a system, the High Toryism which, during the Peterloo troubles, had passed the famous Six Acts against seditious libels and open-air public meetings. The Young Tories were coming to the front, but the Acts were still in force in England when Somerset warned the Albany men that he would suffer neither the one nor the other. Now he instituted proceedings against some of his enemies in the High Court.² These measures brought him into conflict with Dr. Philip and the advocates of a free press.³

Apart from small presses in far distant mission stations, the only active press in the Colony was that in the Castle from which emanated the jejune columns of the *Government Gazette*. Thomas Pringle and the Rev. Abraham Faure then asked leave to produce a monthly magazine alternately in English and Dutch 'to enlighten South Africa,'⁴ and George Greig, a printer, proposed to issue an apparently innocuous periodical 'rigidly excluding personal controversy, and all discussion of . . . the policy or administration of the Colonial Government.' Somerset opposed both schemes, for there was a vigour in journalism in the days of Cobbett most unsettling to administrations; but Greig found that, though there was a law against unlicensed magazines, there was none against publishing a newspaper. He promptly issued

¹ Rec. C.C., XXII. 219, 499; XXIII. 243, 414, 419; XXVIII. 133; XXXI. 179; XXXII. 19; XXXIV. 51; XXXV. 21.

² *Ibid.*, XIV. 376; XX. 170 ff., 183 ff., 377 ff., 389.

³ On the Press *vide* Meurant, *Sixty Years Ago*, passim, and Lloyd, *The Birth of Printing in South Africa*.

⁴ Pringle to Fairbairn, Nov. 24, 1822.

the first number of the *S.A. Commercial Advertiser* edited by Pringle and Fairbairn and printed on a wooden missionary press borrowed from Dr. Philip.¹ Meanwhile, Bathurst gave leave for a magazine which should eschew politics and personalities, and Pringle's *Journal* appeared, to be followed by Faure's *Tydschrift*.
 Jan. 1824.
 March-April.
 May.

Immediately, there were wigs on the green. Pringle was too outspoken on the plight of the 1820 settlers and had to abandon the *Journal*, while the Governor used all his social influence to ruin that 'seminary of sedition,' the Classical and Commercial Academy, where he and Fairbairn were supposed to teach 'the most disgusting principles of republicanism,'² and even threatened to proclaim their Literary and Scientific Society an illegal assembly. Greig was told that he must cease reporting the Governor's libel actions and submit to a censorship for going beyond the limits of his prospectus and, when he refused, was given a month in which to leave the Colony. He therefore published the *Facts* relating to the suppression of his paper and sailed to London, while the Governor bought up his type and press at a valuation and entrusted them to one, Bridekirk, who brought out the *S.A. Chronicle* till that estimable organ of Government opinion perished of inanition in the following year.³

By annexing Greig's press, the Governor widened the growing breach between himself and Philip. The Doctor was already suspicious of Somerset's policy towards the natives and the Albany settlers. He now concluded that he was hostile to all missions and not merely those beyond the borders. Somerset, for his part, erroneously believed that Philip was behind the press agitation and, by censuring him, ranged the L.M.S. side by side with the settlers and the advocates of a free press. In spite of 'the stupendous power of the Beauforts,' Greig won a qualified victory in London with the help of Joseph Hume, Brougham, Lushington the philanthropist, and the editors of the *Times* and *Chronicle*. Bathurst gave him leave to publish within the four corners of his prospectus, and the *Advertiser* appeared once more, under the guidance [of Fairbairn fresh from a gubernatorial scolding for having launched the new organ without leave and without excuse.⁴
 Aug. 1825.

But Somerset's days were numbered and, with them, the days of the existing system of government at the Cape. Bathurst,

¹ Rec. C.C., XXI. 6.

² Pringle to Fairbairn, March 1825.

³ Rec. C.C., XVIII. 288, 347; XXIV. 11.

⁴ Greig to Fairbairn, Jan. 25, 1825; Rec. C.C., XXIX. 235, 241; No. 470 of 1827. On Philip's relations with the settlers *vide* Macmillan, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 ff.

May 4,
1825.

torn between a desire to quell the uproar against him and an unwholesome dread of the twenty-two loyal Commons who sat under the banner of the Beauforts, may have agreed to the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry in the hope that it would whitewash the Governor. If so, he was disappointed, and now Brougham was talking of impeaching Somerset.¹ The Liverpool Ministry, ageing towards dissolution, wanted nothing less. Bathurst therefore decided to set up an official Council of Advice at the Cape similar to that which had just been established at Sydney. This Council was to pass ordinances with more formality than had hitherto been the practice and to advise His Excellency on all matters save those of urgency; but the Governor could still act against its advice provided he justified himself to the Secretary of State. The Council met forthwith.²

Feb.
1826.

July
1828.

The Commissioners of Inquiry gave the Council their blessing and further advised the creation of a similar Council for the Eastern districts, to be followed, once the Colony was more settled and slavery abolished, by representative assemblies in both provinces. They thus fired the first round in the long-sustained but unsuccessful battle for Separation. There was much to be said for the scheme. Grahamstown was 600 miles distant from the capital; the weekly post, carried on horseback in heavy leather bags, might make the journey in seven days; travellers could ride the 75 miles from Grahamstown to Port Elizabeth and finish their journey in an 80-ton coasting schooner. Distance, the hope of developing an eastern trade with Mauritius, and the need for an authority competent to deal with Kaffirs and local officials all pointed towards Separation. But a Ministry which had just tried to unite the Two Canadas could hardly divide the Cape Colony. On the other hand, it wished to cover Somerset's retreat. Bourke was therefore sent out, nominally as Lieutenant-Governor of the East but really as acting Governor of the whole Colony, and Somerset departed to end his days in comparative peace in the Brighton of George IV. The need for a resident authority on the frontier was met a little later by a compromise, and Andries Stockenstrom, landdrost of Graaff Reinet, was appointed Commissioner-General at Grahamstown to supervise

¹ Rec. C.C., XXVIII. p. 411; *London Times*, Jan. 19, 1826.

² Rec. C.C., XX. 6 ff.; XXI. 184; Kilpin, *When Downing Street Ruled*. The members were the Chief Justice, Colonial Secretary, General Commanding, Auditor and Receiver. They probably met in a building which used to stand in the north-east corner of the Parliament gardens. They could discuss such points as the Governor raised, record in the minutes other points which they would have liked to discuss, and revise or confirm the Governor's emergency actions. Kilpin notes that the decision to set up this Council was taken before the report of the Commissioners reached London.

and report to the Governor on the affairs of the Eastern districts, including Beaufort West.¹

From a constitutional point of view, the year 1828 is the *annus mirabilis* of Cape history, for in it the freedom of the press was fully won and the judicial and local administrative systems were revolutionised. Somerset, in England, had been strong enough to have the *Advertiser* suppressed once more. Greig had refused to make terms with the acting governor Bourke, 'this blundering, insidious, two-faced Irish hypocrite,'² who none the less favoured a free press; leading Cape citizens paid Fairbairn's expenses to London, and at last Murray gave leave for a press ordinance based on the law of England. Printers and publishers who were prepared to deposit £300 as personal surety and a like amount guaranteed by friends, might publish newspapers on *id.* stamped sheets paid for in advance at the Capetown Stamp Office, subject to the law of libel as interpreted by the Judges.³ The *Advertiser* reappeared in triumph and was soon followed by a covey of news-sheets. Some of these died young, but others, like Christoffel Brand's *Zuid Afrikaan* and Meurant's *Grahamstown Journal*, were destined to long and influential careers.

The press might be printed in both English and Dutch but, between 1823 and 1828, the official language of the Colony became English. Some knowledge of English had long been necessary for aspirants to the public service; a large British immigration was expected, and the Scottish predikants and schoolmasters introduced a strong leaven of English into the country districts. On the other hand, High Dutch was not the spoken language of the country and the days of Afrikaans as a literary language were far distant. Important notices in the *Gazette* were still issued bilingually and, in the towns, the new policy inconvenienced few save elderly lawyers and civil servants, but, in the country districts, it bore hardly on Afrikaner litigants and witnesses.⁴

The adoption of English as the language of the Courts synchronised with the issue of the First Charter of Justice. The Commissioners of Inquiry condemned the old legal system. The heads of the Executive were the Court of Appeal; they worked slowly; they were guided by English law and, not being as a

¹ Rec. C.C., XXII. 462, 495; XXVII, 342 ff.; XXXIV. 133.

² Greig to Fairbairn, March 29, 1827.

³ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1829, and Greig to Under-Secretary for the Colonies (Dec. 31, 1828).

⁴ Rec. C.C., IX. 39; XIV. 184-5, 297, 371-3, 452; XXXI. 66; XXXII. 261, 282; XXXIII. 85; XXXIV. 117, 177-8, 238, 250; Eybers, p. 23.

rule supplied with detailed judgments, they often overturned the decisions of the High Court. Latterly, appeals had become little more than private interviews with His Excellency. The judges of the High Court were often part-time amateurs exposed, like the landdrosts and heemraden, to all kinds of social pressure. Naturally, their judgments carried little weight.¹

1827-
1834.

The existing judicial system was therefore swept away lock, stock and barrel. The new machinery of justice was set up by the Charter of 1828 and expanded and modified by accompanying proclamations and a Second Charter. It consisted of a Supreme Court staffed by members of the bars of the United Kingdom or of the Colony itself holding office *quamdiu se bene gesserint* and subject only to temporary suspension by the Governor. Two judges formed the quorum in civil cases, but a single judge tried criminal cases and conducted the circuit court twice annually. The Chief Justice took over the duties of the Vice-Admiralty Court, the Attorney-General those of the Fiscal, and, in 1834, the Master those of the Orphan Chamber. A jury of nine or, on circuit, where so many good men and true might not be forthcoming, six only sat beside my lord the King's Justice to hear criminal cases. Civil appeals from the circuit courts lay to the Supreme Court and from it again in serious cases to the Privy Council.²

At the district centres, the courts of the landdrosts and heemraden made way for those of resident magistrates. These officials were armed with minor civil jurisdiction subject in certain cases to an appeal to the Supreme Court or the circuit court, summary criminal powers, and authority to act, with their clerks of the peace, as matrimonial officers. The powers actually given them were less than those named in the Charter, for the salaries were so low that men of ability were not, as a rule, attracted.³ The field cornets lost their petty judicial powers beyond the mere conduct of inquests and preliminary examinations, while the new

¹ Rec. C.C., XXVIII. 1 ff.

² *Ibid.*, XXXII. 274 ff.; Eybers, pp. 107 ff. A Chief Justice and three Puisne Judges were appointed in 1828, three to form the quorum (Sir John Wylde, C.J. (1828-55), W. Menzies, G. Kekewich and W. W. Burton). The Second Charter reduced the number of Puisne Judges to two (Burton had already gone to New South Wales) and reduced the quorum to two, rendered members of the Cape bar eligible for appointment to the bench, limited the appeal to the Privy Council to cases involving £500 instead of £1000, transferred the patronage of the Supreme Court from the Chief Justice to the Governor, bade the Chief Justice take his turn on circuit, and, to enable him to do so, omitted him from the new Legislative Council, which he only joined as President in 1853.

³ Rec. C.C., XXXIV. 208, 248 ff., 527; Eybers, p. 109. The Resident Magistrate could hear civil suits involving not more than £10 and terminate those involving less than £2. He could award one month's imprisonment, a private whipping, and a fine up to £5.

justices of the peace who supplemented them were little more than ornamental. The administrative duties of the landdrosts passed to civil commissioners and, at the same time, the Burgher Senate handed over its property to the superintendent of police and its revenues to the Government collector of taxes.¹ There was thereafter no semblance of municipal government in the Colony till 1837, nor in Capetown till 1840.

The Commissioners of Inquiry recommended that English law be introduced throughout as opportunity offered. Their advice was only partially taken. As in Quebec, criminal law became largely English. No punishment repugnant to the spirit of that law was to be permitted, a great gain to the Colony in view of the criminal law reforms from 1821 onwards and the harsh nature of some of the penalties still prescribed by the Roman-Dutch law; the jury also brought the English law of evidence in its wake; but apart from issuing instructions to the judges to frame the rules of court as far as possible in accordance with those at Westminster and to follow the spirit of English law in submitting ordinances amending colonial laws to the Governor, the British Government was content to allow the Roman-Dutch civil law to remain the law of the Colony.²

The effect of these reforms was to give the Colony greater efficiency at the price of almost all popular share in the work of government. On the other hand, the Dutch Reformed Church had already begun to gain a measure of corporate liberty. De Mist had talked of reviving the experimental Synod of 1746-59, but it was only in Somerset's time that such a body met. Twelve ^{Nov.} ministers and ten elders, under the watchful eye of two political ^{1824.} commissioners, then organised the Church into three presbyteries and, in view of the difficulty of ensuring a supply of future predikants, seriously debated union with the Scottish Kirk.³ The resolutions of the Synod were subject to disallowance by His Majesty and remained so till 1843, but the political commissioners ¹⁸²⁶⁻ were withdrawn from the local church consistories. As a further ^{1828.} sign of approaching ecclesiastical liberty and in keeping with Catholic emancipation in the United Kingdom, full civil privileges were granted to Roman Catholics with the exception of a few ^{1830.}

¹ Rec. C.C., XXXII. 262, 269; XXXIII. 432; XXXIV. 144, 176 ff., 262.

² *Ibid.*, XX. 13; XXVII. 502; Wessels, *History of the Roman-Dutch Law*, chapters xxxiii., xxxv.; Botha, *Early Influence of the English Law* (S.A. Law Journal, Nov. 1923); Walker, *De Villiers and his Times*, chapter v. The Legislative Council was empowered to alter the Charter of Justice in 1844.

³ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 8-13; Rec. C.C., XIX. 186, 495. The Scottish element in the D.R. Church was very strong. Of the twenty-five ministers in 1837, thirteen were Scots (*vide* Proceedings of the Synod at Capetown, Oct. 1837). The question of union with the Scottish Kirk was debated again in 1918.

religious orders, and priests were even paid Government salaries like the clergy of so many other churches in the Colony.¹

1825. The example of the Church, the recent advent of many politically-minded English and Scots, the inclusion of non-officials in the legislature of New South Wales, the assemblies foreshadowed by the Commissioners of Inquiry, and the rising clamour for Parliamentary reform in Great Britain itself gave rise to a demand for representative institutions. The focus of that agitation was the editorial offices of the *Commercial Advertiser*.²

1826. Two of the Burgher Senators resigned as a protest against the Government's slave policy; the citizens of Capetown asked leave to elect their successors, and when that was refused, petitioned Parliament for a representative assembly.³ That also was refused by a ministry which was having endless trouble in persuading elected legislatures in the West Indies to improve the condition of the slaves and was not minded to set up another such body in the slave-owning Cape Colony. Moreover, the Colony was extensive, poor, badly supplied with means of communication and peopled by a sparse, racially divided and, for the most part, politically inexperienced European population outnumbered by slaves and coloured folk, to say nothing of the Bantu upon the borders. There were not, wrote Bourke, enough men capable of forming a good Assembly in the whole country.⁴ Indeed official Britain regarded the English colonists very coolly. There was little of that sentimental regard for colonists as such which marked the early years of the twentieth century. Rather the reverse. As for the Dutch, the reports of eighteenth-century Hollander officials had not been flattering nor had subsequent observers of divers nationalities seriously modified their verdict. The main source on which British opinion relied was the *Travels* of John Barrow, once Macartney's secretary and now a power at the Admiralty and soon to be the founder of the Royal Geographical Society and a baronet to boot. His conclusions, hostile to the frontier Boers especially, were supplemented in 1828 by Philip's *Researches*, which had little good to say of either Dutch or British settlers.

The Cape could hardly expect to be treated differently from the small mixed colonies which formed so large a proportion of the British Empire of the day. Nor was it so treated till the Imperial Government had freed the slaves and given civil liberty to the Hottentots. The whole issue of representative institutions was governed by these two factors. Nevertheless, to make up for the

¹ Rec. C.C., XXXI. 204; Eybers, p. 29.

² *Vide S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Jan. 9, 13, and April 24, 1830.

³ Rec. C.C., XXVII. 208.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XXVIII. 454; Eybers, p. 30.

elimination of the popular share in government by the impending reforms of 1828, two nominated burghers were given seats on the Council of Advice.¹

No one was satisfied with the concession, for the Council had 1827. little power as against a Secretary of State who disallowed ordinances or insisted that laws must be passed before a given date, or against a Governor who blandly announced that he had issued an ordinance himself to save time. Fairbairn, allied with Christoffel Brand, raised the cry of 'No taxation without consent' and bade the Colonists take the U.S.A. as their model.² He could and did point to many signs of progress: the rebuilding of houses and the building of churches in Capetown; ³ the foundation of the first Colonial fire and insurance company and of the 1831. Good Hope Savings Bank; the free press and the opening of the 1829. South African College. *Enterprise*, the first steamship to enter 1825. Table Bay, had come and gone, the earnest of greater things to come, and a good road over Sir Lowry Pass had at last linked 1830. Capetown with the south-western districts. The rapid formation of Dutch Reformed Church congregations in the west pointed towards revival,⁴ and in the east the tide had clearly turned. Somerset had visited the Frontier, planted the Koonap lands with Boers, scrapped the Somerset Farm to the great joy of the settlers, 1825. removed the unpopular landdrost to another centre where the public proved more appreciative, and permitted direct trade with England from Port Elizabeth and Port Frances (Alfred).⁵ The settlers' debts to Government were cancelled, and before long Albany was firmly established on the backs of its cattle and sheep. *Circa* 1830. There were farmhouses everywhere; the newcomers were intermarrying with the Dutch; Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, like Graaff Reinet, were already thriving little towns.

Fairbairn had hoped much from the support of the British settlers, but an Albany petition for an Assembly was rejected and 1830- a Capetown petition to the King shared a like fate, Cole remarking 1831. that an Assembly would fall into the hands of 'demagogues and briefless barristers,' a palpable hit at Fairbairn and his ally, Brand.⁶ Then the reformers split on the rock of slavery. Fairbairn had long been interested in native affairs, an interest accentuated by the fact that he attended Philip's church, accom-

¹ Rec. C.C., XXXI. 443; XXXII. 6.

² *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Aug. 21 and Oct. 2, 1830; Jan. 22, 1831.

³ St. Andrew's (Presbyterian), 1827; Burg Street Wesleyan Church, 1829; St. George's Cathedral, 1830-4; Bree Street Dutch Reformed Church, 1833.

⁴ Colesberg (Tooverberg) and Somerset East, 1825; Pamponkraal (Durbanville) and Clanwilliam, 1826; Wynberg and Glen Lynden, 1829; an increase from ten churches in 1810 to twenty in 1829.

⁵ Rec. C.C., XX. 403.

⁶ C.O. 1444, Cole to S. of S., April 16, 1831.

1830-
1831.

panied him on a short visit to the Eastern Frontier, and married his daughter. And Philip had made up his mind to procure an Act of the Imperial Parliament safeguarding the rights of all races and classes in the Colony. Brand, on the other hand, came of slave-owning stock. He founded the *Zuid Afrikaan* in opposition to the *Advertiser*, and suggested as a compromise that H.M. Government should grant the Colony an Assembly which would then co-operate with it in the abolition of slavery.¹ The cleavage of opinion began to run on racial lines. Matters came to a head when some farmers near Capetown threatened to rebel against fresh slave regulations and the *Zuid Afrikaan* talked of the 'rights of Dutch burghers' and 'the length of a Boer rifle.' This was too much for Fairbairn. 'We dislike the despotism of one,' he retorted, 'but we think the despotism of fifty Koeberg farmers fifty thousand times worse,' and he wrote no more in favour of representative institutions.² He even approved when Cole, fearing 'the new feeling' against the British Government, issued a proclamation against public meetings and improper petitions and claimed power to deport.³

May
1832.Sept.
1832.

1833.

Jan. 16,
1834.

But a change was clearly coming now that the great Reform Bill had become law in England. Cole allowed 2000 people, mostly slave-owners, to meet in Capetown and petition for an Assembly; the Secretary of State made him cancel his recent proclamation, since British subjects might only be deported after trial or by Act of Parliament;⁴ the Reformed Parliament met; slave emancipation was carried; Cole departed; letters patent were issued providing for a nominated Legislative Council at the Cape, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban arrived to put the new constitution into force.

Under the new letters patent the Executive Council consisted of the Governor and the four leading officials. The Legislative Council included the same officials, the Auditor, and from five to seven nominated citizens. It might still only debate such matters as the Governor laid before it; nevertheless, its powers were much greater than those of the Council of Advice, for its consent was necessary for legislation, and its laws could only be set aside if the King-in-Council failed to approve of them within two years. Five citizens, all Westerners, took their seats beside the officials for the first time on April 2, 1834.⁵ At first they sat in secret,

¹ *Zuid Afrikaan*, July 15, 22, 1831; Macmillan, *op. cit.*, pp. 182, 187.

² *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, May 16, 29, June 30, July 11, 1832.

³ C.O. 1445, Cole to S. of S., June 19, 1832, and Ordinance, June 6, 1832.

⁴ C.O. 1320, Goderich to Cole, Nov. 25, 1832.

⁵ Governor, General Officer Commanding, Colonial Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor-General and P. L. Cloete, J. B. Ebdon, M. van Breda, C. S. Pillans and J. J. du Toit.

but in response to popular demand they soon admitted reporters and friends of members to the gallery.

D'Urban came to do much more than institute a legislature. He was the new broom of Whiggish Liberalism which was to sweep clean. He was to carry retrenchment still further, consider the possibility of municipal institutions, emancipate the slaves and evolve a satisfactory native policy. Retrenchment was a comparatively simple though necessarily a painful matter. D'Urban himself drew only £5000 a year, for he was the first Governor who had no high family connections; other salaries were reduced in proportion; offices were in some cases combined to the advantage of the exchequer and the detriment of the public service. The problem of local government was not so easy of solution. It had, in a measure, been simplified by the disappearance of the Commissioner-Generalship of the East.¹ 1833. Stockenstrom had displayed his unrivalled capacity for quarrelling with Governors and fellow-officials and, with a perspicacity rare among Government servants, had offered to resign on the ground that there was not sufficient work to be done. On the other hand, a demand for elective heemraden had arisen and the *Grahamstown Journal* pressed for Separation and a 'resident authority' in the East.² H.M. Government declined to accede to either request, but it bade D'Urban consider the scheme of municipal government drafted by the magistrate of Grahamstown. In face of this proposal and of the new Legislative Council in being, the agitation for a separate Assembly for the East, which in truth had little genuine support at that time outside the offices of the *Grahamstown Journal*, died away. But, not for the last time in South Africa's history, violence destroyed the immediate prospects of reform. A serious Kaffir war delayed the grant of municipal institutions, and it was only in 1836 that the necessary statute was passed. Thereafter, towns were permitted, with the approval of the Governor, to elect boards of commissioners to sit for three years under the chairmanship of the local magistrates with power to levy rates and to take charge of their own affairs. The day of mayors, mace-bearers and full-blown city councillors was still far off; but the boards of commissioners were the foundations of that genuine local government on which the Cape Parliament was destined to rest.³ 1834-1835.

The main cause of the delay in granting municipal institutions was typical of the difficulties which finally overwhelmed the well-

¹ Stockenstrom, *Autobiography*, I. 430.

² *Grahamstown Journal*, July 25, 1833.

³ Ordinance, Aug. 15, 1836; Eybers, p. 78.

1828.

intentioned but lethargic D'Urban. Not only was he threatened by trouble on the frontiers, but he had to reorganise the government of a Colony which was in the throes of a social revolution. That revolution had begun before his coming with the grant of civil liberty to Hottentots and 'other free persons of colour.' It was his business to carry it a step further by freeing the slaves.

The slave and Hottentot problems were intimately connected, for the Hottentots were the alternative labour supply to the slaves. The average Colonial official and farmer still looked on the Hottentots as a labour force which ought not to be drained off to the thirty mission stations within or just beyond the borders. The missionaries denied that they were so drawn off, pointed to the fact that most of the inmates of Bethelsdorp, *fons et origo mali*, went out to work, and urged that, given equal opportunity, Hottentots and Kaffirs were potentially equal to Europeans, but for the present stood in need of special protection.¹

This missionary point of view varied in intensity from Society to Society. It was held most uncompromisingly by the L.M.S. and by none more strongly than Philip. His reasoned policy for the regulation of the relations of white and black in all Southern Africa and his support of the Government during the Kaffir war prove that he was no enemy of the Europeans; but he had a high opinion of the capabilities of the Hottentots and Griquas if only they could be given land on which to develop civilisation under missionary or official control and be shielded from the drink pressed upon them by Europeans. Had not Collins as long ago as 1809 fulminated against the tot system of payment? ² At first he had contented himself with championing the Hottentots in the overcrowded reserves at Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, but later he took the whole race under his ægis. If the abolition of the Slave Trade had been followed by the class legislation of 1809-19, what might not Emancipation lead to? The root weakness of the Pass Laws was that the Hottentots outside the mission stations were practically at the mercy of the local officials, themselves farmers, and their friends. As landless men, bound by the pass system to work where they dwelt, they had no opportunity of improving their lot and thereby adding to the prosperity of the Colony. 'The abettors of the present system,' wrote Philip, a disciple of Adam Smith, 'seem never to have contemplated the aborigines of the Colony as consumers.'³

1826-
1828.

It was clear that slave emancipation was coming. Philip therefore sailed for England, petitioned the Secretary of State and published his *Researches*. At times his statements were as wrong

¹ Macmillan, *op. cit.*, pp. 139, 153.² Rec. C.C., VII. 111.³ No. 538 of 1836, pp. 723 ff.; Macmillan, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

in point of detail as they were more often exaggerated in form, and he was presently successfully sued for libel in Capetown; but his attack on the system was irresistible. Murray, with the general support of the Commons, bade Bourke give general freedom and equality before the law to all classes in the Colony. But the necessary action had already been taken at Capetown. Stockenstrom had prepared a report on which the philanthropically minded acting-Governor had based the famous 50th Ordinance. This measure cancelled the restrictive Hottentot laws of 1809-19 and gave Hottentots, Bushmen and free coloured persons full right to own land if they could get it.¹ All that remained for Philip and Buxton to do was to secure the addition of a clause forbidding any alteration therein without the consent of the King-in-Council. It was the King's seal which Philip had vainly demanded in 1822. July
1828.

The civil rights of the free coloured folk at the Cape were thus specially entrenched. After the Hottentots, the slaves, the servile section of that folk. Post-war problems and the High Tory reaction in England had pushed the question of emancipation into the background, but once the younger Tories led by Canning had risen to power, the Anti-Slavery Committee was formed and Buxton began to play Joshua to Wilberforce's Moses. He moved for the immediate emancipation of slave children and the gradual abolition of slavery as a thing 'repugnant to the British constitution and Christianity.' Canning shelved the motion by inviting the nineteen slave-owning colonies, all of them in the West Indies save Mauritius and the Cape, to propose means for improving the condition of their slaves. Members of the Jamaica Assembly promptly talked of secession. Buxton tried again, still moderately advocating a term of apprenticeship for the liberated slaves and compensation for the owners. This time Canning passed the Trinidad Ordinance prescribing various reforms in the hope that the other West Indian islands which, unlike Trinidad, had legislatures of their own would adopt them. They declined to move and, for two years more, nothing was done—except at the Cape.² 1822.
1823.
1824.

The Cape Government had continued its policy of caring for the slaves and, latterly, had even taken steps to limit the extension of slavery. The 1820 settlers were forbidden to keep predial slaves, a rule which they resented as a slur on their characters but a rule which was none the less partially enforced in the Dutch Koonap settlement. Somerset also issued detailed regulations 1825.

¹ No. 50 of 1835, p. 169; Eybers, p. 26.

² On Slave Emancipation *vide* Coupland, *Wilberforce*; Cory, *op. cit.*, III. pp. 27 ff.

March
1823.
June
1826.

for the care of slaves and the education of their children, permitted slaves to own property, and allowed the evidence of baptised slaves to rank in Court beside that of *Christen mense*.¹ The only seriously dissatisfied person was Bathurst, who was suspicious that the Governor should have gone forward on his own account. He therefore obliged Bourke to adapt the Trinidad Ordinance to local conditions. The 19th Ordinance thus provided a registrar and guardian of slaves, but omitted the prohibition against carrying the whip in the fields as unnecessary and the punishment record book as impossible since many owners could not write. Unluckily times were bad, the value of slaves was falling as the restrictions on their use accumulated, and Somerset's Ordinance of 1823 had been followed by a small slave rising in the Bokkeveld (Worcester district). It was now alleged that the Ordinance had been the cause of the rising. Bourke could hardly get the 19th Ordinance proclaimed in Capetown and Stellenbosch; the president and two members of the Burgher Senate resigned and a Capetown meeting petitioned for a representative assembly.²

1826.
1830.
1832.

Slave-owners, seeing that emancipation was only a question of time, naturally tried to arrange for it in the way that would suit them best. There had long been talk of freeing female slaves, and Somerset had favoured the idea provided compensation were given; for slaves, 'the only property of note,' were heavily mortgaged. The folk of Graaff Reinet, where Mantatis were beginning to supply the demand for labour, then proposed the automatic emancipation of female children at birth, a proposal which would have left the adult slaves and, with them, the 'domestic institution' untouched for an indefinite period, while, in Capetown, a few enthusiasts and a government grant maintained a slave redemption society.³ So the matter dragged on till the Cape became liable to all the omitted regulations of the Trinidad Ordinance. The men of the capital told Cole they could not and would not keep punishment record books; at the first inspection of the same, Stellenbosch broke into riot, the *Zuid Afrikaan* organised a petition in favour of the emancipation of female children in exchange for the grant of representative institutions, Graaff Reinet asked Government for some £8000 annually for ten or twelve years towards that end, and, following on further regulations, the Koeberg farmers hinted broadly at rebellion.

¹ Rec. C.C., XIII. 136; XIV. 469; XV. 336; XVI. 493; XIX. 161-5; XXI. 295; XXIII. 70.

² *Ibid.*, XX. 66; XXIV. 309; XXVI. 468; XXVII. 89 ff., 184, 208, 303, 389.

³ A. F. Hattersley, article in *History*, Oct. 1925. The influence of this society was trifling.

The slave-owners used their fears of emancipation to the best of their ability as a lever with which to extort an Assembly ; but their fears were none the less genuine. Five Orders in Council and fourteen slave proclamations had been launched at their heads since 1823. Most of these had remained dead letters,¹ but in so far as they were operative, they made slave-owning a harassing undertaking, and now Buxton was forcing the pace in 1830 England. Parliamentary reform was near, and with the decline of the sugar trade the power of the ' West Indian party ' was not what it had been. Mass meetings condemned gradual emancipation as ' utterly wild and visionary,' and the Commons by a large majority accepted the principle of emancipation. The Whigs took office and at once freed the Crown slaves ; whereupon the privately owned slaves in Jamaica, thinking that the boon was universal and that their masters were withholding it from them, sacked some plantations. Though they harmed no white man, they were sternly repressed and Parliament voted compensation to the owners. But at the general election of 1832 many members pledged themselves to emancipation, Committees of both Houses decided that it could be effected safely, and in the day of his strength Buxton once more became moderate and thereby lost the support of his extremists. Under pressure, ministers made emancipation a Government measure ; Whiteley's pamphlet on Jamaica with a preface by Pringle, now secretary of the Anti-Slavery Committee, sold in thousands ; popular petitions were widely signed and the Bill passed the vital second reading. A few days later Wilberforce died.² July 6, 1833.

Between August and December 1834 eight hundred thousand slaves would be set free throughout the British Empire. The news of this impending event, ' one of the greatest events in the history of the world,' was received quietly in the Cape Colony. After all, the ex-slaves were to be apprenticed to their former masters for four years from December 1 and Parliament was dealing more gently with owners than it had dealt with those who had invested in the rotten boroughs. These had just been swept away without compensation, but £20,000,000 had been voted to recompense slave-owners for their losses. Many Cape Colonists, headed by Fairbairn, held that the British taxpayer must pay up the full value of the slaves ; but that was to ignore the fact, which Macaulay had already pointed out, that the colonial publics and, where these existed, colonial legislatures had been eager for slaves and must share the burden of emancipation. In any case, the prospect of some compensation money was welcome at a time

¹ Rec. C.C., XXXV. 352 ; *vide* also No. 335 of 1829 ; 8 of 1830 ; 230 of 1831.

² Eybers, p. 38 ; Coupland, *Wilberforce*, p. 516.

when the Cape wine market was in a bad way and men were at last anxious to buy woolled sheep.¹

Like other slave-owners, the Cape Colonists looked round for an alternative supply of labour. Mauritius and other colonies afterwards found it in indentured Indian coolies ; but the Cape hoped to secure it through a vagrancy law. The cry for such a law had gone up for some time past, especially in the East. Vagrancy had increased since the passing of the 50th Ordinance, for of all the drifting peoples of the border districts the Hottentots were the most migratory. Crime had apparently diminished ; but this may have been because it was more difficult to trace it among free men than among pass-bound farm labourers. Most of the Hottentots, after a first taste of liberty and dop in the villages, had returned to work on the farms ; but some 9000, perhaps a quarter of their total number, were still wandering about, ' eating up ' their more industrious relations or robbing the farmers.² The root trouble was still the same. Outside the mission reserves, the Hottentots were practically a landless folk. Cole and Stockenstrom, like Dundas and Janssens before them, had recognised this fact when they established nearly

1829. 3000 half-breeds, Hottentots and Kaffirs, round the L.M.S. station at Philipton and the Glasgow mission at Balfour in the Kat River Settlement.³ Some, like Robert Godlonton in his first contributions to the *Grahamstown Journal*, spoke well of a policy which made possible the moral and material prosperity of these people ;⁴ but others complained that the Hottentots were becoming lazy and insolent, that they were intriguing with the Kaffirs and that wages were being forced up. Cole had wished to make the Hottentots work, and Wade, the acting-Governor, now promised ' a sufficiency of labourers ' and issued a draft vagrancy law.⁵

Jan. 1834.

This measure was narrowly passed by the new Legislative Council soon after D'Urban's arrival. It empowered any official to send suspects to the public works till they either gave surety that they would wander no more or went out to service under contract. The Chief Justice held that the law could not stand against the 50th Ordinance ; the Moravians cried out that it would throw them back to the beginning ; Boyce, the leading Wesleyan and rival of Philip, admitted the existence of vagrancy, but urged that police and magistrates were the proper cure and not serfdom ;

¹ *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Feb. 9, May 22 and Aug. 14, 1832.

² Boyce, *Notes*, pp. 119-27 ; No. 538 of 1836, pp. 153, 288. Robbing included searching for roots, fruit, honey and game, in immemorial Hottentot fashion, on farms without the owners' leave (Macmillan, *op. cit.*, p. 33).

³ No. 252 of 1835, pp. 52 ff.

⁴ *Grahamstown Journal*, June 8, 1832 ; Macmillan, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

⁵ Meurant, *op. cit.*, p. 93 ; No. 252 of 1835, p. 77 ; Chase, *Natal Papers*, I. 44.

Philip roused the missions to protest, and told the Governor that if there must be a vagrancy law, it must be accompanied by grants of land where vagrants could work under the guidance of picked men armed with magisterial powers and assisted by schoolmasters and missionaries. The land could be bought, if necessary, from the Kaffirs between the Fish and the Keiskamma, and, he added, 'allow *no one* to erect a canteen among them.' Philip was ahead of his time, but he carried his point to this extent—that the revised draft made it possible for Hottentots to acquire small holdings. D'Urban, however, this time suspended the Ordinance in spite of a petition in its favour from the half-breeds of Balfour. It was promptly disallowed in London.¹

Emancipation, then, would find both Hottentots and ex-slaves, in other words, the coloured folk, unchecked by a vagrancy law. Fairbairn urged that part at least of the slave compensation money be paid out in the Colony, the Governor himself set to work as chairman of the committee which was to apportion the expected funds, and, in due course, some 39,000 slaves embarked upon their four years' apprenticeship. Three weeks later the Xosas came over the Eastern Frontier.

Thus was still another of D'Urban's reforms ruined by war. The slave compensation lists, compiled in the midst of the confusion, were not completed till June 1836. Then came the news that instead of the £2,824,224 assessed in the final lists only £1,247,401 would be forthcoming, and that payable in London partly in cash and partly in 3½ per cent. stock which was somewhat below par and likely to go still lower. It was soon known, moreover, that £12,000, the cost of the valuation, would be deducted. Gladstone in the Commons sneered at the smallness of the compensation. So did the Colonists. Many of them had to face the foreclosing of their mortgages, and even the slave-owners who escaped that fate were hard hit. Townsman could cash their claims through the banks, but the countrymen were at the mercy of speculators who bought up the vouchers at a heavy discount. Some of the farmers trekked without claiming their money, for when the claims expired an unclaimed balance of £5900 remained.²

¹ No. 538 of 1836, pp. 723 ff.; *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, May 31, July 17, Aug. 9, 1834. The way in which the vagrancy law must have worked is well illustrated by C. L. Stretch, afterwards Gaika commissioner. He noted that at the New Year of 1835 a field cornet had arrested thirty Hottentots with their sheep and cattle and marched them into Fort Beaufort, because they would not work. The field cornet thought the Vagrancy bill had become law (C. L. Stretch, Kingwilliamstown, July 4, 1835). D'Urban also discharged two or three field cornets for prematurely enforcing the Vagrancy law (Macmillan, *op. cit.*, p. 244).

² *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Jan. 4, 1837; Cory, III, 44; Chase, *op. cit.*, I, 43.

D'Urban's governorship has rightly been dwelt on at some length in all South African histories, because during it the Great Trek began. But it should be memorable also for another reason, for it saw the first attempt to face as a whole the problems created by the tribes and the Europeans beyond the borders.

Sir Benjamin's attempted reorganisation of the Colony was hampered and even in large measure destroyed by the expansive tendencies of the Colonists and the increasing confusion among the tribes. Confusion is perhaps too mild a word. For some ten years before D'Urban's arrival, pandemonium had raged among the Bantu of South-eastern Africa. The storm-centre lay between the Mkusi and Tugela rivers. There, Chaka the Zulu had succeeded his overlord, Dingiswayo, King of the Abatetwa, who had already armed his impis, celibate, beef-fed and fiercely disciplined, with the big ox-hide shield and the broad stabbing-assegai, and had taught them to fight in crescent formation with the 'bull's head' in the centre, 'horns' on either flank and the reserve in the rear. Chaka still further stiffened the discipline, did away with circumcision and appointed, not the hereditary sub-chiefs but whom he chose as captains of the regiments. He first drove the neighbouring Angoni and Shangaans northwards to carry desolation through the Eastern coastlands behind the helpless Portuguese settlements as far as Lake Nyassa, and then stabbed his way through and through Natal. He even crossed the Drakensberg mountains, but the main devastation there was wrought by others. Umsilikazi, son of Matshabane the Zulu and leader of one of Chaka's impis, fled with his men, laying waste the southern and western Transvaal, and came to a halt in what is now the Marico district. The wrecks of the Bechuana found refuge from him in the Kalahari desert. These Bechuana had, in many cases, been already smitten by the Mantatis, a mixed horde set in motion under their terrible queen, Mnatatisi, and her son, Sikonyela, by other tribes flying from Chaka. The Mantatis had traversed Basutoland while their enemies, the Hlubis from Natal, raided west of the Caledon River. They had been turned back from the Colony by the flooded Orange and had then swept the northern Free State and the south-western Transvaal. The Bangwaketze of Kanye headed them off southward and they had sacked Old Lithakao; but outside Kuruman (New Lithakao), they had been broken by the Griquas and Batlapin led by the L.M.S. missionaries, Moffat and Melville.¹ The Mantati horde had then dissolved. One large section, the Makololo, cut their way to the middle Zambesi, where

¹ Another account gives Tsuane the Bafokeng as the leader of the horde that was broken at Lithakao (*Bas. Rec.*, I. 517).

Circa
1824-
1834.

1823.

Livingstone found them later on ; others, including Sikonyela's immediate followers, straggled back to the banks of the Caledon ; others again drifted into the Colony to take service in the north-eastern districts.¹

Behind this whirling mass of tribesmen a few scattered European settlements clung to the south-east coast. Neglected by the great reforming minister Pombal, pillaged by its own officials who appropriated Government gunpowder to their own use and cornered the trade in slaves and beads which, apart from a little ivory at Inhambane, was the only trade worth having, Portuguese East Africa slid steadily downhill during the latter half of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The Moslems, the real traders of the country, lived a harassed life, alternately driven out and allowed to creep back unarmed ; the Jesuits had been suppressed and the Dominicans withdrawn to the ruins which still bore the name of Goa ; a few secular priests had taken their places, and Christianity had simply died out among the Bantu. The inland trading and mission stations disappeared and, south of Cape Delgado, some 1300 Europeans and Christian half-castes were all that Portugal had to show for three centuries of occupation. 1750-1777.
Circa 1800.

The Governor of Mozambique, independent now of Goa, still nominally ruled the coast and the lower reaches of that great river, the river Zambesi ; but in truth his authority ended with the range of the guns of the forts at each station wherein a few white, half-caste and negro soldiers overlooked a huddle of huts, a church and the fever-sodden hinterland. Their occupation of Delagoa Bay was intermittent. A party from Mozambique had stayed there for a few weeks by leave of the local chiefs ; a little later a wrecked crew of Dutch sailors lived there for two years and never saw a Portuguese ; for a time, William Bolt, late of the English East India Company, held his own in the name of Maria Theresa's Asiatic Company of Trieste, but in the end the Austrian government withdrew the charter and the Portuguese drove Bolt away. The Portuguese then made a serious attempt to occupy the north shore and built a fort at Espirito Santo (Lourenço Marques), but the French destroyed the station.

However, a handful of Portuguese officials ventured back again and looked for a living to the slave-trade and traffic, in defiance of their own navigation laws, with the English and American whalers who put into the Bay despite the whaling

¹ Bird, *Annals of Natal*, I. 60 ff. ; 124-53 ; 166 ff. ; Chase, *op. cit.*, I. 20 ; Isaacs, *Travels*, I. 334 ; Owen, *Narrative*, II. 390 ; Gardiner, *Narrative*, p. 313 ; Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 340 ; Thompson, *Travels*, I. chap. xvii. ; A. Smith, *Report* (1836), p. 22 ; Theal, *History*, I. chap. xiv.

1823. monopoly granted by His Most Faithful Majesty to an overstaffed and official-ridden Portuguese company. Captain W. F. Owen, R.N., then appeared and was told by the captain of the fort of Espirito Santo that the natives were none of his subjects. He therefore made treaties with some of the chiefs, securing the western and southern shores of Delagoa Bay and Inyaka and Elephant Islands for King George.¹

In vain did Owen tell his country, somewhat in the style of the immortal Mrs. Jellyby, that Delagoa Bay 'opens all the interior of Africa to her commerce where millions of people are ready to receive clothing (and blankets and woollens are much more valued by them than cottons) and civilisation from her.' H.M. Government took no steps to make good the gallant captain's claims. So Delagoa Bay was left to the Portuguese, the mosquitoes and the tribes.² To the tribes especially, for while Owen was yet at the Bay and the captain of Espirito Santo was diligently preparing flags to be hoisted on every point of vantage as soon as his top-sails should be safely below the horizon, the Angoni were slaughtering the tribes around and selling the spoils to the Portuguese. Presently Manikusa the Shangaan came to drive the Angoni northward, to sack most of the Portuguese posts south of the Zambesi, to destroy the fort of Espirito Santo and to make himself master of Gazaland.

1833-
1836.

1824.

On the other hand it seemed likely that the port which was destined to become the most determined rival of Delagoa Bay would be incorporated in the British Empire. Two Englishmen, Farewell and King, were given leave by Somerset to trade with Natal. They bought a block of land round Port Natal, 100 miles by 30, from Chaka, who claimed the whole of Natal as his. There they were joined by a few other English traders and ivory-hunters who lived, like the Portuguese further north, on sufferance of the native monarch, some of them ruling little groups of natives who had fled to them for protection and all, on occasion, helping the Zulus with their guns.³ They made touch with the Cape Colony overland, but Farewell was killed on the way back, and, in the same year, the seizure and sale of their little ship *Elizabeth and Susan* by the customs officers at Port Elizabeth was a forcible reminder that Port Natal was not regarded as a British possession.⁴ Nor was it, even from a commercial point of view, till 1842.

1828.

However, further unattached Englishmen drifted in; Portuguese half-castes traded with the Natives, and American whalers

¹ Rec. S.E.A., IX. 17 ff., 117 ff.; C. 1361 of 1875, pp. 14 ff.

² Rec. S.E.A., II. 472-3, 477.

³ Bird, *Annals of Natal*, I. 71 ff.; 86, 93, 193; Chase, *Natal Papers*, I. 25; Isaacs, *Travels*, p. 311; No. 252 of 1835, p. 25.

⁴ Bird, I. 101; Cory, *op. cit.*, II. 366.

talked of establishing themselves at the Port. On the other hand the report that Chaka meant to attack the coast Kaffirs from behind suggested to the Cape Government that Natal was a point of strategic importance to themselves, and two more scares that the Zulus were about to attack the English at the Port indicated the need for offering them protection, even though Dingaan, Chaka's successor, on the latter occasion, withdrew all his people to the east of the Tugela.¹ Some time previously, the Secretary of State had suggested the extension of Cape criminal law over the Natal English in keeping with the recent extension of New South Wales law over British subjects in New Zealand. Later, in response to pressure from the Cape, Goderich bade Cole send an official to control the traders, but the salary offered was too low, and an appointment which might have had important effects on the course of the Trek that was to come was never made.² D'Urban, however, on his arrival, was petitioned by Cape merchants, the explorer Dr. Andrew Smith who had recently visited Dingaan, and Captain Allan Gardiner, a naval officer turned Anglican missionary, to set up a government backed by a hundred troops at the Port. H.M. Government refused on the score of expense.³

Port Natal and Delagoa Bay were far away in the background. A Cape Governor was inevitably more concerned with what lay immediately beyond the colonial frontiers. Much that concerned him already lay there, for the Colony was throwing out an ever-thickening fringe of skirmishers: missionaries, traders, trek-boers and ne'er-do-wells. The missionary flood ran strongly. The L.M.S. men established themselves on both sides of the Orange and of the Eastern Frontier, beyond which the Moravians also ventured; the Wesleyans stretched their line of outposts through Kaffirland to the far-distant Pondos; the Glasgow men and, presently, the Berlin Society went to the Xosas; the Rhenish and Paris Evangelicals arrived, the one to work within the Colony, the other to go first to Bechuanaland and then to the Basuto.⁴

The L.M.S. men and the Paris Evangelicals were thus pushing along the first stages of the 'Missionaries Road' which led to

¹ Bird, I. 195 ff.; No. 252 of 1835, pp. 57-9; Chase, *op. cit.*, I. 34-5.

² C.O. 1317, S. of S. to Gov., Nov. 29, 1829; C.O. 1318, April 20, 1831; C.O. 1332, May 25, 1832. ³ Bird, I. 252, 272; No. 252 of 1835, pp. 93, 102.

⁴ L.M.S. at Hankey, Kingwilliamstown, Knapp's Hope and Philipton (1825-29); Moravians at Shiloh (1828); Wesleyans at Mount Coke, Butterworth, Old Morley, Clarkebury and Buntingville (1825-30); Glasgow Society at Old Lovedale, Balfour, Pirie and Burnshill (1824-30); Berlin Society at Bethal (Stutterheim, 1836); Rhenish Society among the coloured folk in various villages throughout the Colony (1829 onwards); Paris Evangelicals to Motito (1832), Morija (1833) and Thaba Bosigo (1837); U.S.A. Zulu Mission to Zululand and Mosega (1835); Church of England to Ungungundhlovu (1837-38) (*vide* J. du Plessis, *Christian Missions*).

1827.

Central Africa. Across that road, just beyond the Orange, lay Griqualand. History was rapidly in the making there. Soon after Andries Waterboer had come to Griquatown to wage war on the banditti, Barend Barends had wandered away to be despoiled by the Matabele, Cornelis Kok had gone north to Campbell, and Adam Kok, armed with a grant from Philip, had established himself at the abandoned Bushman mission station of Philippolis.¹ There were thus three little Griqua states: Griquatown and Campbell on the lower Vaal and Philippolis further to the east. Such civilisation as the Griquas had—and they had far more than had their poverty-stricken descendants at the time of the Diamond Fields dispute a generation later—they had either brought with them from the Colony or they owed to the missionaries. The question was, how long could they and their superficial civilisation stand against the pressure which was being brought to bear from the south?

1824.

The tide of European migration, which had for so long swayed to and fro upon the Zuurveld, had swerved north-eastward. The Colonial frontier had been carried up to the Orange from Ramah to Stormberg Spruit opposite Philippolis in the wake of the advancing cattle-farmers. A year later, Boer cattle were grazing among the Griqua herds beyond the river; by 1833 at the latest, many Boers were living in Adam Kok's country on land sold or leased to them by Griquas in defiance of missionary-Griqua law. These Boers still regarded themselves as members of the Colony, paid their taxes at Colesberg and drove their cattle in dry seasons to Zevenfontein (Beersheba) on the Basuto border, and many of them were asking for the annexation of 'Transorangia' to the Colony.²

That prospective annexation was beginning to interest Boers within the Colony itself, for conditions were changing in the eastern parts and many of them disliked the change. From the general point of view of the Colony, the changes were all for the better. Population was denser than it had been when Somerset had made his verbal treaty with Gaika. A fairly solid block of British were living in Albany, and of Dutch on the Koonap, with scattered farms in between. Graaff Reinet, thanks largely to the energy of Stockenstrom, could show 300 well-built houses, and Port Elizabeth 1200 inhabitants and two churches, while the 3700 citizens of Grahamstown, 'City of the Saints,' could boast four churches and a newspaper. Flocks and herds had improved in quantity and quality, since three of the half-pay officers to

¹ Chase, *Natal Papers*, II. 250 ff.

² No. 425 of 1837, pp. 143 ff.; No. 252 of 1835, p. 77; Cole to Hay, Nov. 15, 1833.

whom the wool industry in New South Wales and the Colony owe so much, had established merino sheep in Albany.¹ It was, indeed, already the stock argument of loyal Easterners in favour of Separation or at the very least the removal of the capital eastward that theirs was the richest and most progressive part of the Colony. But the ugly fact stared the cattle-farmers in the face that land was less easy to get than it had been. The Kaffirs barred the way eastward, and even when Cole offered free grants of land at Kat river, orders came from Downing Street that only British and Hottentots were eligible.² And much worse was to come. Notice was given that, in accordance with the so-called Ripon Scheme, Crown lands would no more be granted freely but sold at auction.³ From the Government's point of view, the new policy would prevent the squandering of the greatest public asset and provide sorely needed revenue; from the point of view of the Boers, it meant that they and their sons would have to pay for what they had learnt to look on as the birthright of Afrikaners. Landless men petitioned for leave to occupy land between the Vet and Sand rivers in the northern Free State; three *commissie treks* went forth to spy out the land: one to the dry and thirsty *Dorsteland* in the present South-West Africa, another to the Zoutpansberg, the third and best known under Piet Uys through Kaffirland to Natal. They came back with the news that to the north and east there was fine land well-nigh bare of inhabitants, to be had for the taking. Gerrit Maritz and Piet Retief thereupon began to beat up an organised trek in the Eastern districts.⁴

On the Eastern Frontier itself, cattle-farming was still the staple industry and cattle-stealing was still the custom of the Kaffirs. It would be a weariness and vexation of spirit to detail the raids and counter-raids of the years preceding D'Urban's Kaffir war. In Somerset's time, the point of friction had been near Macomo's kraal on the Kat river. Macomo robbed, and the failure of the Baviaan's river Boers to recover their cattle emboldened him. The relaxation of the restrictions on trade with the Kaffirs in Albany had led to quarrels ending sometimes in bloodshed, and in spite of the increase of the frontier guard, cattle were stolen, sold in Albany and then restolen. According to local officials the colonial losses were heavy, and as a rule

¹ Lieuts. R. Daniell, C. Griffith and T. White (Cory, II. 427).

² No. 252 of 1835, p. 57.

³ C.O. 1319, S. of S. to Gov., Jan. 10, 1832.

⁴ Bird, I. 231, 252, 504; Preller, *Voortrekkeremense*, I. 275 ff. Fairbairn in the *Commercial Advertiser* (June 21, 1834) writes as if the trek was actually in progress, and notes that when it had been spoken of some months earlier 'it was fiercely denied . . . as a calumny on the Boers.'

recoveries comparatively small; but as the later history of the Basuto border suggests, both in Sovereignty and early Free State days, men who claim compensation always 'stand upon their biggest foot.' The losses were certainly not all on one side. Troops and burghers twice read Macomo a lesson, and a little later another force crossed the Keiskamma. Probably the colonists took as many cattle as they lost; it is possible that they took more, for they rated colonial cattle higher and higher in terms of Kaffir beasts as the quality of their own improved; ¹ but what the Kaffirs objected to was that they took land.

In describing frontier affairs, it is easy to lay too much stress upon cattle. Cattle-stealing and reprisals were a perpetual harassment and at times a *casus belli*; but land was the fundamental factor in the problem of the Kaffir as of the Griqua frontier. On both sides of the Eastern Frontier were peoples who to a greater or lesser degree were agriculturists, both wasteful of land and both relying mainly on their cattle. And cattle all the world over demand wide pastures. The struggle for the Zuurveld, where both races had been newcomers, had been settled in favour of the white men by Cradock's campaign. The contest had thereby been transferred to the lands between the Fish and the Keiskamma. Gaika had virtually given away this Neutral Territory by a verbal treaty which was no treaty in the eyes of clans who by no means universally regarded him as paramount. There was some show of right for what he had done in the northern half where he himself lived, but the Gunukwebe clans claimed the southern half as theirs. The territory had been steadily occupied from both sides, sometimes by mutual consent, sometimes without. The abortive settlement of Fredericksburg had been more than balanced by Macomo's return to the Kat; then Somerset had planted the Koonap lands with farmers' in return for military service and allowed the Gunukwebe chiefs, Pato, Kama and Kobe, to graze their cattle in their old lands; ² Bourke had allowed them to reoccupy those lands in what was now called the Ceded Territory, and other chiefs had crept back on sufferance, notably Tyali to the Mancazana next to his brother, Macomo. Meanwhile, Somerset had recognised that Ndhlabi and Dushane were independent of Gaika and had allowed them to come back from the lands east of the Buffalo, where they had been lurking since 1819, to die in peace on the further bank of the Keiskamma.

The restlessness of the Xosas was partly due to the pressure

¹ No. 538 of 1836, p. 283; No. 50 of 1835, pp. 183, 190 ff.; Cory, III. 331; Theal, IIb. 3.

² No. 252 of 1835, p. 139; No. 538 of 1836, p. 52; Rec. C.C., XXV. 230; Cory, II. 215; No. 50 of 1835, p. 177.

1823-
1825.

1812.

1819.

1821.

1825.

1824.

1828.

exerted by the Zulus on the tribes piled up in their rear. Tembus were pushed into the Colony and were duly pushed back by the Colonial Government, and in response to an alarm that Chaka was coming, troops, burghers and friendly Kaffirs marched as far as the Bashee. There they overthrew a fierce horde of Amangwane (Fetcani) under the impression that they were Zulus. Chaka duly raided Pondoland and was presently murdered, while the wrecks of the Amangwane became Fingos, 'the dogs' of the Xosas. Then Macomo, regent for the young chief Sandile since Gaika was now dead, drove stray Tembus into the Tarka district. Cole took strong measures. He chased Macomo out, carried the frontier up to the hills west of the Tyumie and a line drawn thence to the Kat below Fort Beaufort, established the Kat River Settlement on Macomo's lands and warned the other chiefs in the Ceded Territory that they were there on sufferance. At this there was excitement in all Kaffirland as far as Hintsas's kraal beyond the Kei; but, undismayed, Cole stationed troops at Gwalana Post to overawe the Gunukwebes, though under the guidance of the Wesleyan, William Shaw, they had given Albany but little trouble, and proceeded to grant small farms on the Kat river. Twice there- after Macomo was allowed to come back from the dry eastern lands to the valleys west of the Tyumie; twice he was expelled, and with him, as a rule, his brother, Tyali; finally the site of Old Lovedale mission station was annexed to the Colony. Well might Macomo, with all his sins heavy upon him, ask on the eve of the war, 'When shall I and my people be able to get rest?' It was a question that was beginning to trouble other chiefs, for already the men of Albany, Graaff Reinet and Somerset were driving their herds far into Kaffirland because of the drought, and Louis Trichardt, the future Voortrekker, had long been established with a group of Boer families on the Indwe beyond the Kei.²

The Colonial Government was struggling to maintain an impossible system. Police, closer settlement, control of both Europeans and tribesmen by magistrates would alone bring peace with security, and most of these were still to seek. The constant changes in Somerset's reprisal system tell the story. Somerset had allowed patrols of troops and aggrieved farmers to take back their own cattle or, if they could not find them, an equivalent in Kaffir stock; Bourke would allow no patrols to enter Kaffirland unless the stolen cattle were in sight; Cole let them go in and recover lifted cattle, but not to take Kaffir beasts in lieu thereof.

¹ No. 252 of 1835, pp. 21 ff.; 35, 42 ff.; 52 ff.; Proclamation, Aug. 2, 1830.

² No. 538 of 1836, p. 555; Campbell to D'Urban, June 27, 1834; Cory, IV. 3.

1830. Cole's system was as liable to abuse on this as on any other frontier in recorded history, and the traders who swarmed into Kaffirland as soon as permission to enter had been given, made matters worse in spite of Wade's efforts to check the sale of gunpowder.¹

Jan. 1834. Such was the situation that faced D'Urban on his arrival. He was under orders to find a substitute for the commando system, 'that fearful scourge' to the natives, as Stanley called it, though the experienced Stockenstrom begged leave to doubt whether it was so black as it was painted and Cole found it so unpopular among the northern farmers at least that he had to stiffen up the rules of service.² D'Urban was also empowered to devote £600 to the payment of 'prudent and intelligent men' who should act as agents to the most suitable border chiefs and induce them to control their men.

Stanley's plan was a tentative and parsimonious adaptation of Indian methods of government to South Africa. A more comprehensive and ambitious policy was put forward by Philip. Philip had been thoroughly alarmed at what he had seen on a trek through Griqualand in 1832. He had at once urged Cole to annex the Griqua states to the Colony and secure the lands of the Griquas to them on the same lines as at the Kat River Settlement. So would the half-Europeanised Griquas, who lived in compact villages and not on scattered farms like the Boers, but who yet fought in Boer fashion, become 'a wall of iron' shielding the Colony from the terrors of the Bantu north and keeping the Colonists to the south within the colonial borders. Failing annexation, he recommended that Waterboer, who was well under missionary control, be made commandant of all the Griquas and, in return for a small salary, be called upon to keep the peace from the Caledon to the Atlantic.³

Philip spoke with a less certain voice about the Kaffirs. He knew less about them and was less interested in them than in the Griquas; but he did tell D'Urban that he would not object to his annexing Kaffirland 'even from the Keiskamma to Delagoa Bay' provided he civilised the tribes on their lands 'on the plan adopted by the ancient Romans.'⁴ What is certain is that D'Urban, who had come without any very clear-cut policy or marked leanings towards 'philanthropy,' soon fell under Philip's influence and, until he went a-warring into Kaffirland, was largely guided by him in his native policy. Philip had already advised

¹ No. 538 of 1836, p. 283; Ordinances 49 of 1826 and 99 of 1833; No. 252 of 1835, pp. 34, 75 ff., 83.

² No. 252 of 1835, pp. 60, 64, 66.

³ No. 538 of 1836, pp. 608, 625-6, 633; No. 425 of 1837, pp. 143 ff.

⁴ No. 538 of 1836, p. 693.

Wade to settle Hottentots as another wall of iron along the Eastern Frontier and to treat certain Kaffir chiefs as Government officials, hold them responsible for cattle thefts and for dealings with the tribes behind them, and support them, for a time at least, with troops. He now urged D'Urban to put Stanley's 'Indian' policy into force as strongly as possible.¹ D'Urban decided to safeguard the northern border first. He repeated the old orders that no one was to go beyond the frontiers without leave, and added that in no wise must slaves, who were so soon to be freed, be taken across them. Then, ten days before the outbreak of the Kaffir war, he signed a treaty with Andries Dec. 1834
Waterboer under which the Griqua chief was to receive a small salary and some guns, admit the Rev. Peter Wright as Resident to Griquatown and keep order in the valley of the Orange from Kheis to Ramah.²

The sudden outbreak of the Kaffir war prevented similar arrangements being made on the east. Moravians, Wesleyans and L.M.S. men for some time past had dilated on the peaceful prospects there; but D'Urban, Philip and Colonel Somerset, in command of the frontier troops, believed that prompt action was necessary. There was no immediate fear of a crisis, said Somerset, but 'Come quickly'; and he got leave for Macomo and Tyali to return to their valleys pending a general settlement whose character should be determined by their behaviour. Between May and July, Macomo returned a number of cattle, but his behaviour was less reassuring in August when he and Tyali retailed their woes at a meeting of the Ndhambi clans at Burnshill, where the young men mustered armed with guns. The Kat river Hottentots were restive on the score of the proposed vagrancy law; there followed much coming and going across the border; traders were molested and Hintsa, head of the Galeka Xosas, left Butterworth to join Trichardt near the White Kei. With D'Urban's approval Philip visited the border tribes, telling them that the Governor was coming to set up a new frontier system and redress grievances. Doubtless he led the chiefs to overrate his influence with the Governor and let them see that he thought the patrols and the occupation of the Ceded Territory were among those grievances, for he had urged D'Urban to allow selected chiefs to settle in the territory under treaty, there to be civilised by missionaries and well-paid residents; but it was noted that cattle thefts diminished Oct.-Nov. 1834
markedly while he was on the frontier. So he waited till he could wait no longer for a Governor who never came, and even before

¹ *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Feb. 22, 1834.

² No. 252 of 1835, pp. 115-16.

Dec. 21,
1834. he had set out for Capetown, Somerset, anxious to recover outstanding cattle before D'Urban's arrival, whipped up his patrols.¹ Scuffles ensued; royal blood was shed; Macomo and Tyali, possibly thinking that they were now beyond the pale, called up their warriors to leave their gardens unreaped, and, at the head of 12,000 men, poured into the Colony.

The Xosas ravaged the country for two weeks from Algoa Bay to Somerset East. Retief, however, checked them in the Winterberg; Somerset held out in Grahamstown; the Hottentots remained quiet; Colonel Harry Smith raced overland from Capetown to Grahamstown to take command; reinforcements and, at last, the Governor arrived. The counter-attack was pushed beyond the Kei, for Hintsa and, the authorities had reason to believe, Trichardt also had egged on the Gaika Xosas to war and were acting as 'bush' to the captured colonial cattle and horses. Smith obliged Hintsa to promise a large indemnity in cattle, proclaimed all the land between the Keiskamma and the Kei British territory and announced that all hostile tribes would be driven beyond the Kei into Hintsa's country 'for ever.' Next day, Hintsa, while trying to escape, was shot by George Southey in self-defence; Macomo was sent to Robben Island, and Kreli, Hintsa's son, was installed as great chief by D'Urban subject to his late father's liabilities. D'Urban then dismissed the burghers.²

June
1835. Smith fixed his headquarters at Kingwilliamstown and built forts in the new province of Queen Adelaide but, try as he would, he could not 'exterminate' the Kaffirs. They refused to be sent beyond the Kei and even raided the Colony. So, yielding to the logic of facts and the remonstrances of the missionaries who were solidly against depriving the tribes of their lands, D'Urban radically modified his policy. He called out the burghers again after the sowing, got into touch with the chiefs through the Wesleyans, Boyce and Shepstone, and made peace with the Xosas. This time the chiefs were promised reserves in Queen Adelaide provided they gave up their arms, became British subjects under the laws of the Colony, held themselves responsible for cattle thefts, accepted missionaries and Government agents and forbore to enter the Colony in arms or without a pass.³ This was in many ways the very policy Philip had recommended, but there was this difference: D'Urban still proposed to settle Europeans round the forts and along a broad belt of land across

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¹ No. 252 of 1835, pp. 117, 119; No. 538 of 1836, pp. 550-6; No. 503 of 1837, pp. 75, 212; Boyce, *Notes*, p. 13.

² No. 252 of 1835, p. 132; No. 279 of 1836, pp. 11, 41, 48 ff., 51.

³ No. 279 of 1836, pp. 95 ff.; No. 538 of 1836, pp. 496, 629; Boyce, *Notes*, App. II; No. 503 of 1837, p. 253.

Queen Adelaide and to give out all the Ceded Territory in farms, except where it was occupied by Hottentots and Gunukwebes and the 17,000 Fingos whom he was bringing out of Kaffirland to a reserve round Fort Peddie with the cattle which their Xosa masters had left in their charge.¹ In this way, helped by a superintending agent at Grahamstown, he hoped to substitute colonial law for tribal custom and to introduce the Kaffirs to industry and civilisation, religion and morality 'by the power of legal coercion, . . . humane persuasion and example' behind the presumably defensible barrier of the Kei.²

D'Urban rounded off his conquests by annexing the troubled area north of the Stormberg mountains as far as the Kraai river, where some 150 Boer families were living as members of the Colony *in partibus*.³ But, as the forces of law and order closed in, Louis Trichardt, hearing that there was a warrant out against him, slipped away northwards across the Orange. He was soon joined by van Rensburg's party.⁴ The Great Trek had begun, a warning that the affairs of the Colony were passing beyond the control of a mere Colonial Governor. Nevertheless, back once more in Capetown, D'Urban sought to pick up the threads which the Kaffir war had torn from his grasp. He pushed on with his examination of the claims for slave compensation; he found time to consider the question of the chiefs beyond the Orange and the relations of the Colony to the Englishmen settled on the south-east coast of Africa. During the war, Moshesh, chief of the Basuto, had plundered the Xosas and, though he had lost most of his booty, he was evidently a potentate to be reckoned with. D'Urban asked Dr. A. Smith to come to terms with him and those like him. Smith visited all the chiefs on either side of the Caledon and then crossed the Vaal to the kraals of Umsilikazi the Tabele. He gave these rulers medals and reported that since they now looked on themselves as 'white men under the white King,' it would be well to enter into treaties with them. Accordingly, a treaty of friendship was concluded with the Matabele at their king's request.⁵

Nor was far-distant Port Natal forgotten. Gardiner had already gone thither, and though he had failed for the moment to establish his mission in Dingaan's country, he had been welcomed by the settlers at the Port. Being a man of education and energy, he soon took the lead among them. He made a treaty with Dingaan under which he had to promise to send back Zulu refugees in future to their lord, but he secured the promise of the much-

¹ No. 279 of 1836, p. 16; No. 424 of 1851, p. 20.

² No. 279 of 1836, p. 102.

³ No. 503 of 1837, p. 6.

⁴ Cory, IV. 4.

⁵ No. 503 of 1837, pp. 347-50.

ceded southern half of Natal. In that territory, now named the District of Victoria in honour of the young princess on whom the hopes of all good Englishmen were set, Gardiner organised the settlement at the Port as the township of Durban and asked Sir Benjamin to take over the country.¹ D'Urban supported the request, for he appreciated the importance of a base in the rear of the Xosas. During the war which had just ended he had sent embassies to secure the goodwill of the Tembus and Pondos who lay between Natal and the Xosas. Moreover, American missionaries had entered Zululand and it needed no German Emperor to tell the world that 'the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Empire.'²

Thus far D'Urban's settlement within and without the borders of the Colony. He was immensely popular, especially in the eastern districts, partly by reason of his frontier settlement and partly because, without encouraging the Separatist agitation which had been revived in Grahamstown, he had told Glenelg that the capital ought to be removed to Uitenhage or, failing that, a Lieutenant-Governor must be appointed in spite of the risk of friction with the Governor.³ The annexation of Queen Adelaide in May had held out the hope of compensation in land to the frontiersmen who had suffered most from the Kaffir inroad and the wastage of the ensuing campaign. That had been the hope of the Easterners, official and unofficial, throughout the war, and it was to that point of view that D'Urban had conformed. His September policy had caused something of a chill which even affected the perfervid columns of the *Grahamstown Journal*; nevertheless, land would still be available and the Governor was besieged with requests for farms in the Ceded Territory, Queen Adelaide and the Stormberg area.⁴

The frontiersmen's attitude was natural. 'Seven thousand of His Majesty's subjects were, in one week, driven to utter destitution'; one hundred Europeans and Hottentots had been killed, 455 farms had been burnt and many thousands of horses, cattle and sheep carried off, and, of the cattle taken or retaken, most had been eaten by the troops and commandos during nine months of war, and now many burghers were too impoverished to buy the remnant at auction even with two months' credit. The total colonial losses amounted to perhaps £300,000. Of

¹ Bird, I. 273, 307-12; Chase, *op. cit.*, I. 42. Chaka and Dingaan had cheerfully ceded the whole or part of Natal successively to Farewell, Isaacs and Collis, a Grahamstown trader. For treaty of May, 1835, *vide* Eybers, p. 143.

² Bird, I. 198 ff., 252; No. 503 of 1837, p. 14.

³ No. 279 of 1836, p. 58.

⁴ *Grahamstown Journal*, Sept. 25, Oct. 8, 1835; Chase, *op. cit.*, II. 298; *Speeches . . . of the late John Mitford Bowker* (1864), p. 264.

course, in proportion to their wealth, the Kaffir losses were much more severe: scores of warriors slain, kraals and gardens destroyed freely and 60,000 head of cattle taken, besides nearly all their goats and the cattle stolen by the Fingos and Basuto. Incidentally, the campaign had cost the British taxpayer £154,000 over and above the usual £96,000 for the expenses of the garrison.¹

The Kaffirs had struck first and must pay the forfeit of war. But to make the settlement a real one was not an easy matter. For one thing, the Colony had burst its bounds. Trichardt and van Rensburg were well on their way to the Zoutpansberg and other parties were drifting about just within the borders. In spite of the legend which afterwards grew up that thefts had been almost unknown during the D'Urban regime, there was the natural confusion which follows war in the annexed territories and the parts adjacent. Harry Smith, however, gradually got it under by dint of martial law and 'Smith law,' by dint also of retaining the Hottentots long after their term of service had expired. He had long ago lost caste with the 'settler party,' but the Hottentot soldiery were willing to stay as long as he was there to lead them, his native police recovered considerable numbers of stolen cattle, he himself liked the tribesmen and was liked by them in return. Even Macomo was well-disposed in spite of his frank determination to recover his Kat river lands some day, and Tyali restored stolen beasts and saw to it that the thief was thrashed.²

But everything depended on Smith, and the question was, How long could he hold his own? D'Urban was short of men and money and knew that he was responsible to Secretaries of State who, however rapidly they might succeed one another, were all agreed that respect for the inalienable rights of Natives to their lands was 'the only policy which it becomes this country to observe.'³ Doubts were soon raised as to the wisdom of the settlement. Was it wise to bring thousands of savages under colonial law? Was it of any real advantage to push the frontier a hundred miles farther away from the base at Grahamstown? Even though D'Urban proposed to make a new base at Kingwilliamstown, and the banks of the Kei were less bushy than those of the Fish, the line to be defended was fully as long and more distant from the main mass of the Colony.

Then there were the missionaries. Most of them held that the war had been forced upon the Colony, and all of them had

¹ No. 279 of 1836, pp. 15 ff., 86 ff.; No. 503 of 1837, pp. 43, 69. The official estimate of 4000 warriors slain was an exaggeration. (Cf. Stockenström, No. 1334 of 1851, p. 13.)

² Various letters from C. L. Stretch, afterwards Gaika commissioner, July 1835-Nov. 1836.

³ No. 252 of 1835, p. 117.

supported the Government in its conduct of the actual war up to the May 'extermination' proclamation. Philip had called on the mission Hottentots to assist; both he and Fairbairn insisted as strongly as did Boyce, no great admirer of them and their works, that 'we must be masters'; they even approved of strong measures against 'good king Hintsá' and did not object to the annexation of Queen Adelaide.¹ Leading missionaries were even numbered among the prophets. 'Our power,' wrote Boyce, 'will advance, and that within a few years, as far as the Tropics'; and Philip added that 'an able Governor might in twelve years influence the continent of Africa as far as the Tropics . . . for good, make every tribe to know its limits.' But D'Urban's 'extermination' policy of May set them all against him.² That policy was simply Cradock's *refoulement* on a grand scale. It would only relieve the pressure on the Fish-Keiskamma border and allow Colonists to settle along the Kei with the certainty of future trouble with the Kaffirs crowded together on the lands of the unwilling Galekas. If so, was the frontier to be pushed back again to the Bashee or 'if it could be,' to the Umzimvubu?

The Philip party was up in arms at once against D'Urban's original policy. Their protests were laid before Glenelg, who, as the son of Charles Grant, a leading light of the famous Clapham Sect, was philanthropically inclined. On receipt of D'Urban's despatch announcing that policy, he replied coldly forbidding him to give away land or to build forts as his annexation might have to be abandoned. D'Urban then maintained a masterly silence for several months, when he announced his second modified policy but still left Glenelg to gather that much land was to be granted to Europeans.³

The Secretary of State, however, had more to rely upon than L.M.S. reports. The Commons had appointed an Aborigines Committee to consider the relations of European subjects of the King with 'aborigines' in all parts of the Empire. The Committee sat at once for a month and heard much from Andries Stockenstrom. He was, in their eyes, the expert witness, the man from the spot, a colonist born, an official and a landowner on the frontier of twenty-five years' standing, a man who had led commandos and was destined to get into trouble for what he was alleged to have done on one of them. His evidence was damaging to the old reprisals system and to some of the colonists. Like Harry Smith and other frontier officials after him, he held that farmers were partly to blame for their own losses in that they did

¹ Boyce, *Notes*, p. 21 and Appendix I.; No. 538 of 1836, p. 554; *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Jan. 7, 24, and May 23, 1835.

² No. 538 of 1836, pp. 57, 496, 631; Boyce, *Notes*, pp. 5, 32.

³ No. 503 of 1837, p. 1; No. 279 of 1836, pp. 86 ff.

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not look after their cattle on a frontier innocent of fences, and added that there were men on the frontier, as on most frontiers, to whom 'peace would be a losing game.' He censured some of Philip's statements about local officials and farmers, and advised that the Bushmen be placed in missionary reserves, the Hottentots settled if possible alongside of Europeans as had been the original intention at the Kat River Settlement, and 'new colonies' for Europeans founded, if required, among the Kaffirs on land secured from the tribes by treaty. Such land could be sold to settlers and the proceeds devoted to the civilisation of the Kaffirs in the reserves that remained to them. In other words, he recommended a policy of partial segregation.¹

In face of this information and still, apparently, in ignorance of D'Urban's September policy which would leave the Xosas in Queen Adelaide as British subjects, Glenelg wrote his well-known despatch excusing the Kaffirs for their attack in the light of their past wrongs, warning D'Urban that a Lieutenant-Governor was coming and bidding him 'prepare the public mind' for the abandonment of the new province. But he explicitly stated that he was giving these orders on the assumption that his unofficial information was correct and that, if the Governor knew of facts to the contrary, it would be his duty to inform him and to suspend any part of these instructions he saw fit until he should receive 'further directions.'² What followed is almost incredible. Even allowing for the fact that D'Urban interpreted this long and confusing despatch as orders to withdraw and necessarily required time to collect data in support of his apologia, it is hard to understand why he did not write some sort of defence of his policy till June 1836, nor post it till the following December.³ He thereby probably set up a record even for the leisurely official tradition of those days.

Rumour was soon abroad that Queen Adelaide was to be given up. London merchants cancelled sailings; in the Colony, both Dutch and English protested against any tampering with D'Urban's modified settlement, and A. H. Potgieter and the Liebenbergs definitely trekked. Meanwhile, Stockenstrom was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province, excluding Beaufort West, and the Aborigines Committee met once more. It heard, among others, Wade and Dundas, ex-colonial officials, Shaw, the Wesleyan missionary, and Philip and his followers, James Read and his half-breed son, Stoffles, a Hottentot from

¹ No. 538 of 1836, pp. 183 ff., 248; No. 503 of 1837, p. 285.

² No. 279 of 1836, pp. 59 ff.

³ No. 503 of 1837, pp. 54 ff.; Cory, III. 314. There were 254 enclosures to D'Urban's despatch.

Kat river, and Jan Tzatsoe, a young Kaffrarian chief.¹ The evidence of the first three taken as a whole gave a balanced account of frontier conditions; that of the last five was hostile to the colonists. But on the head of policy, Philip repeated his advice to keep Queen Adelaide and secure the Kaffirs their land therein. Unfortunately he did not press the point, and the Committee listened to Stockenstrom and the general body of philanthropists who were for wholesale abandonment and a treaty system.

So the Committee adjourned to draft its massive report, while Philip and his samples of South African humanity became the lions of the philanthropic season amid such enthusiasm that the *Times* uttered a warning that all their assertions must not be taken at face value. The general conclusion of the Committee was that the care of aborigines must devolve, not on colonial legislatures but on imperial officials who were to regulate labour contracts and the sale of firearms and spirits; then, with an eye on New Zealand, that British subjects going beyond the borders and acquiring land did so at their own risk and that in any case no new territory was to be annexed without a preliminary Act of Parliament; finally, that, as a general rule, treaties with tribes were to be discouraged because of the disparity of the parties but that, in view of its peculiar circumstances, the Cape should enter into 'a federal union' with the tribes upon its borders.²

These conclusions coincided with Glenelg's own opinions. He 'warmly concurred' in the findings of the court of inquiry which exonerated all concerned in the death of 'good King Hintsa' and naturally approved of Dr. Smith's dealings with the northern tribes and of the Matabele treaty.³ But he declined to annex Natal and merely ordered Gardiner to proceed thither as magistrate under the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act which Parliament had just passed on the half-hearted recommendation of the Aborigines Committee.⁴ So Gardiner was duly appointed with much the same shadowy powers as had been conferred five years before upon Magistrate Busby in New Zealand.

By that time, Queen Adelaide was a bitter memory. In spite of the protests of the Easterners, Stockenstrom landed at Capetown as Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province. D'Urban had expected that he would bring him fresh instructions but, since Glenelg was still waiting for the expected official report from the Cape, Stockenstrom brought nothing beyond a hint

¹ No. 538 of 1836, *vide* index.

³ No. 503 of 1837, pp. 269, 351.

² No. 425 of 1837, pp. 76 ff.

⁴ Eybers, p. 146; Bird, I. 313.

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that the Stormberg area might possibly be retained as a native reserve. The two men therefore agreed to carry on with D'Urban's modified policy till further orders ; but, no sooner had Stockenstrom proceeded to the East to take over from Smith, than D'Urban cancelled the martial law which Smith and Stockenstrom agreed was the sole means by which Queen Adelaide could be maintained.¹ Aug. 1836.

Stockenstrom had a very mixed reception in the East. The settlers showed their feelings as boldly as they dared, but the army officers gave him a good reception to atone for Grahams-town's chilly welcome and the Boers declined to join in the outcry against him which, they said, was due to the fact that he was Dutch.² Nevertheless, at this stage, Gerrit Maritz set off with a large party of trekkers, and Smith reported that many other Boers were waiting just beyond the borders to see if Queen Adelaide was to be abandoned before trekking too, Boers who, according to Retief, would return if they were assured of security in their old homes.³ No such security was given. Stockenstrom began to concentrate the troops from the forts along the vulnerable Fish frontier. D'Urban tried to stop him, for his idea now was to make the southern part of the old Ceded Territory a kind of Somerset Nomansland. Then, on receipt of another letter from London which conveyed no fresh orders for lack of information on which to base them, but which showed that Glenelg still favoured withdrawal, D'Urban suddenly threw Queen Adelaide to the winds and ordered instant evacuation.⁴ Oct. 1836.

Stockenstrom therefore released the Kaffir chiefs from their allegiance and made treaties with them. The colonial frontier of 1829 was maintained, for he had long ago pointed out that farmers could not be expected to go back to the old line of 1819. Beyond Cole's line in the Ceded Territory, the tribes were still to be British subjects and must respect the Fingos at Fort Peddie ; but they were to be ruled by their chiefs ; the troops were not to 'scour the bush' ; cattle were to be watched in future by armed herdsmen. Powerless government agents were stationed with leading chiefs ; elaborate rules of a diplomatic nature were drawn up for the recovery of cattle ; patrols were forbidden to enter Kaffirland on the one hand and armed Kaffirs to enter the Colony on the other, and Europeans who ventured into Kaffirland were warned that they did so at their own risk and rendered themselves liable to expulsion by the chiefs.⁵ Dec. 1836.

¹ Eybers, p. 39 ; C.O. 1447, Gov. to S. of S., Aug. 23 and Dec. 2, 1836.

² Stretch, June 14, 1836. Stockenstrom was of Swedish descent.

³ Preller, *Piet Retief*, pp. 50-1.

⁴ No. 503, p. 44.

⁵ No. 503 of 1837, p. 3 ; No. 424 of 1851, p. 2 ; *Cape Govt. Gazette*, June 9, 1837.

Thus was Queen Adelaide Province left to God, the missionaries, the new government agents and the tribes by what Glenelg afterwards called 'this premature abandonment,' the prospect of which had moved Fairbairn and Mrs. John Philip to dismay.¹

Stockenstrom carried out the abandonment under a running fire of criticism from the Grahamstown men and petitions to Parliament for an inquiry and compensation for their war losses.² Friction increased between the Governor and himself. He was jealous and quarrelsome, D'Urban incurably dilatory. D'Urban could only approach the Eastern officials through him, and he must write to Downing Street through Capetown, where the Governor stored up his despatches for months at a time and then sent them on in bales to the unhappy Glenelg. He also fell foul of Retief, the leading Boer official on the frontier. Retief complained that the new frontier system was impossible and asked for security and sympathetic government.³ Stockenstrom, suspicious of Retief's pre-war activities and the nature of the security demanded, would only promise 'strict justice' in stiff and ever stiffer tones. He had given orders that Retief should not be disturbed in his field cornetcy but, at last, Retief decided to trek, and challenged authority by publishing his reasons for so doing. Stockenstrom, much to D'Urban's annoyance, promptly dismissed him for disturbing the public mind.⁴

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1837.

So the months passed gloomily and confusedly. It is true that, after the first 'eating-up' of opponents by the Gaika chiefs in the turmoil of the abandonment, the agents were able to report growing peace, very few thefts of European cattle, and the recovery of stolen beasts by Botman and the redoubtable Macomo. On the other hand, these very chiefs and Stockenstrom soon had to complain that D'Urban's pass-law against extra-colonial Kaffirs was useless for lack of magistrates and police to enforce it; attempts to hold Umhela, great chief of the Ndhlabhis, responsible for a raid by his followers on the Peddie Fingos, failed; some of Stockenstrom's own cattle were taken; the Fingos drifted to and fro; Englishmen in some cases sold their farms and withdrew westward from the frontier since they did not know how to trek; while Boers sold their places, turned their paper money into good sovereigns and, with their flocks and herds, great still in spite of all, set out northward.⁵

¹ Mrs. Philip to Philip, Dec. 1836.

² *Grahamstown Journal*, Jan. 28, May 5 and Sept. 8, 1836.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1836; Preller, *Piet Retief*, pp. 42 ff.

⁴ Stretch to Fairbairn, Feb. 17, 1837; No. 424 of 1851, p. 23; Eybers, p. 143, and Cory, III. 396, for Retief's Manifesto.

⁵ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 9, 15; Cory, III. 403.

The year of Queen Victoria's accession, 1837, was the great year of the Trek. Retief, Uys and Jacobs all moved off in that year. By September, some 2000 souls, 'the flower of the frontiersmen,' as D'Urban called them, had crossed the Orange river.

British Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter VII.:

- (a) Cape of Good Hope. *Report of Protectors of Slaves*, 335 of 1829; *Orders in Council consolidating Slave Laws*, 8 of 1830; *Measures for helping Slaves*, 230 of 1831; *Papers re . . . Native Inhabitants*, 50 and 252 of 1835; *Reports of the Select Committee on . . . the Aborigines*, 538 of 1836 and 425 of 1837; *Correspondence re . . . the death of Hintsa*, 279 of 1836; *Despatches re . . . the late Kaffir War*, 503 of 1837; *Correspondence re . . . the Kaffir Tribes*, 1837-45, 424 of 1851.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GREAT TREK, 1835-48

The causes of the Great Trek—The overthrow of the Matabele and Zulus and the foundation of the republics, 1836-40—Occupation of Natal by the British—Transorangia, the Eastern Frontier and the annexation of Natal—Gradual extension of British control north of the Orange: the Touwfontein system, the War of the Axe, British Kaffraria and the Orange River Sovereignty.

Secretaries of State for War and Colonies: Lord Glenelg, retired Feb. 1839; Marquis of Normanby, Feb.-Sept. 1839; Lord John Russell, 1839-Sept. 1841; Lord Stanley (Earl of Derby), 1841-Dec. 1845; W. E. Gladstone, 1845-July 1846; Earl Grey, 1846-Feb. 1852.

Governors of the Cape Colony: Sir B. D'Urban, retired Jan. 20, 1838; Major-General Sir G. T. Napier, Jan. 22, 1838-March 18, 1844; Lieut.-General Sir P. T. Maitland, March 18, 1844-Jan. 27, 1847. *High Commissioners and Governors*: Sir H. Pottinger, Jan. 27-Dec. 1, 1847; Major-General Sir H. G. W. Smith, Dec. 1, 1847-March 31, 1852.

Natal. *Commandants-General*: A. W. J. Pretorius, Nov. 1838-July 1842; G. Rudolph, 1842-1843. *Special Commissioner*: Henry Cloete, May 10, 1843-May 1844. *Lieutenant-Governor*: M. West, Dec. 4, 1845-Aug. 1, 1849.

British Kaffraria. *Chief Commissioner*: Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Mackinnon, Dec. 1847-Oct. 1852.

Orange River Sovereignty. *Resident*: Major H. D. Warden, March 8, 1848-July 23, 1852.

THE rapid invasion of lands beyond the Orange and the Vaal by the trekkers extended the old problems of the Eastern Frontier over a large part of South-eastern Africa and immeasurably intensified the difficulties of the Cape Governors. Legally the situation was governed by the principle *Nemo potest exuere*

patriam. British subjects the Boers were and, like the English traders of Port Natal, British subjects they must remain unless they chose to submit to the jurisdiction of the chiefs in whose territories they settled. H.M. Government would not recognise their independence. But in practice, once beyond the frontiers they were out of Government's control except through the Punishment Act, which was almost useless for lack of any means of bringing criminals to the Colony for trial.¹ The extension of full British sovereignty over the country occupied by the trekkers was the logical conclusion to which officials like Stockenstrom and missionaries like Boyce pointed; but though Great Britain, under philanthropic guidance, regarded herself as the trustee for the Natives against both the Boers and 'the most degraded of the English,' she was none the less 'deeply persuaded of the inexpediency of engaging in any scheme of colonisation.'²

The Governors of the Colony, short of troops and money, were thus left to struggle with a political situation which was *de facto* radically different from any that had gone before, whatever the position might be *de jure*. Hitherto, the story of European South Africa had been that of the Cape Colony. Now, Boer Republics were set up and, alongside of them, Bantu and Griqua states. Presently, H.M. Government reluctantly annexed Natal partly for reasons connected with native policy and the peace of the Eastern Frontier, and partly in the commercial interests of the Cape. But that was not enough. Difficulties increased in Transorangia, and the War of the Axe with the Xosas ruined what still remained of the Treaty System. The Governor of the Cape became High Commissioner, a recognition of the new order, and a year later Sir Harry Smith boldly annexed large blocks of territory south of the Orange to the Colony and proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty over all, white, black and coloured, between that river and the Vaal. It was a belated attempt to control the trek.

From one point of view the Great Trek was merely an acceleration of a process which had been going on as long as men could remember: the steady drift of Europeans and half-castes out beyond the proclaimed frontiers of the Colony. The trek spirit was inborn in the Boer frontiersmen of the 'thirties. From the end of the seventeenth century the cattle-farmers had followed their migratory farms eastward till in 1779 they had been checked

¹ Bird, I. 389; Chase, *Natal Papers*, I. 50, 119.

² *Spectator*, May 17, 1834; C.O. 1323, S. of S. to Gov., March 29, 1836. Besides, the Cape Attorney-General held that the Government was legally and practically helpless to stop the Trek (Eybers, p. 145).

by the Kaffirs along the Fish. There, a generation of young Boers had grown up all looking forward to farms of their own and fretting against the Government restrictions which forbade them to go to the Koonap or, 'if it could be, unto the Kat.' The great effort of 1812 which had cleared the Zuurveld had been followed by a revolution in land tenure. Henceforward new farms were to be obtained only at variable quit-rents, and, as the second generation grew to manhood, the 1820 settlers came crowding into the Zuurveld. The Ceded Territory had offered some relief, but the main tide of migration had already turned north-eastward, when woolled sheep followed the Settlers in and Government decided to auction Crown lands. With a third generation of lads soon to be provided for and drought following drought in grim succession, what could cattle-farmers do but look around for a way of escape from changing conditions which promised to make the old style of life, the *lekker leven*, impossible? Farmers began to drift across the Orange and a big trek was talked of, but it was only organised after the return of the commissie treks, which told the Boers that there were fine and almost vacant lands where to-day are the Free State and Transvaal cattle and mealie farms and the fertile valleys of Natal.¹ A large and steady emigration would, humanly speaking, have taken place had emancipation, the Xosas and Stockenstrom never afflicted the frontiersmen for, as Retief told Dingaan, the Colony was too small and the Boers were becoming landless.² The Kaffir war cut right across the projected trek, and it was not till the fighting was finished that the first two organised parties crossed the Orange. Even so, Trichardt had been living beyond the borders for six years past and had very special seasons for his final departure, and the movement remained on a small scale till the latter half of 1836; then, helped on by a severe drought, the abrogation of martial law and the fading of all hope of land in Queen Adelaide, the Great Trek began in good earnest.³

1832.

1834.

Sept.
1835.

¹ Bird, *Annals*, I. 231; Preller, *Voortrekkeremense*, I. 269 ff.; Cloete, *Great Trek*, p. 62; Cory, III. 401.

² Preller, *Piet Retief*, p. 167.

³ Causes of the Trek: (a) Trekker authorities. J. N. Boshof (Bird, I. 504 ff.); P. Retief (Preller, *Piet Retief*; Chase, *Natal Papers*, I. 100); P. Uys (Preller, *Voortrekkeremense*, I.; Theal, *Hist. Sketches*, pp. 280 ff.); J. H. Hatting (Preller, *Voort.*, I.); Anna Steenkamp (Bird, I. 459; Preller, *Voort.*, II.); W. J. Pretorius (Bird, I. 230); Sarel Cilliers (Bird, I. 238 ff.); D. P. Bezuidenhout (Preller, *Voort.*, III.; Bird, I. 367); Louis Trichardt (Preller, *Dagboek*, and *Voort.*, II.); F. P. van Gass and L. C. de Klerk (Preller, *Voort.*, I.); Erasmus Smit (*ibid.*, II.); A. H. Potgieter, A. H. Stander, I. J. Breytenbach and A. B. and B. Oosthuizen (*ibid.*, III.); Natal Volksraad (Bird, I. 691).

(b) Non-trekker authorities. H. Cloete, *Great Trek*; Chase, *Natal Papers*, II.; Backhouse and Walker (Bird, I. 614); Cory, III. 222 ff., 255, 260, quotes various English contemporaries; Napier (Bird, I. 394, 606; Chase, II. 48); Charters (Chase, I. 44); Stockenstrom (Bird, I. 498; No. 424 of 1851, p. 22).

The Great Trek was however more than a matter of mere belly-need. It was unprecedented in South African history by reason of its organisation, its size and its spirit. The pre-trek Boers and some of the scattered groups which drifted out of the Colony alongside the trek parties meant to take the Colony with them as their fathers had done before them. Not so the trekkers of the Trek. Many of them were sons or grandsons of the men of Graaff Reinet in whom republican ideas had stirred in 1795, and all had grievances. They moved off inspired by feelings towards H.M. Government ranging from bitter hatred to a mild but firm determination to have nothing more to do with it. 'We quit this Colony,' wrote Retief, 'under the full assurance that the English Government . . . will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference.'¹

Apart from the general desire for land, the motives of the trekkers varied almost from family to family. There was the new system of land tenure administered by a haphazard Lands Department. Complaints were frequent of high and unequal quit-rents, of favouritism in the allocation of farms, of delay in the issue of title-deeds after survey, of the possibility that titles would be withdrawn and fresh fees charged. There was profound dissatisfaction with the nature of the Government. Officials representing the central power had never been popular on the Frontier even when checked by local heemraden, and now the heemraden were no more. All the evils, wrote the Natal Volksraad in 1842, arose from the lack of representative government. Perhaps that was an afterthought; nevertheless, as soon as the trekkers could organise their own states, the first thing they did was to revive the courts of the landdrosts and heemraden and restore the field cornets to all their old powers and more also. Nor was there enough even of this purely official government near the Frontiers. Not only were many of the field cornets incompetent to perform such duties as remained to them but the magistrates were too few to permit of the farmers complying with the law. Again, Government set limits to the powder trade and forbade reprisals, but it did not protect. Uys is said to have trekked because the mountains near his home were full of Kaffirs armed with muskets, though his enthusiasm for Natal and his indignation that his wife should have been haled to court, there to answer a charge brought against her by a Hottentot, also explain his action. What though Mrs. Uys was acquitted, there was the delay and expense of the journey to the far-distant magistracy, a difficulty which gave a farmer the choice between marching errant servants to court for punishment with all the risk

¹ Cory, *op. cit.*, III. 397.

attendant on leaving the homestead unguarded, or of taking the law into his own hands at the risk of incurring the penalty of the law. On all sides the cry went up that there was no security on the Frontier.

There were also financial grievances. Government held that it had done its duty when it had paid and paid heavily for defence and supplies ; but two years after the close of the Kaffir war requisition notes were still unhonoured and changing hands cheaply. Moreover the colonists, both Dutch and English, had expected that, since there were to be no land grants, Government, the universal provider, would make good their war losses. This Glenelg declined to do, in spite of the plea of D'Urban and Napier that it would be worth while checking the Trek at the cost of a bad precedent. Some trekkers, like Uys, complained that they ought to have been let off the payment of taxes for a year or two ; one, J. N. Boshof, mentions the redemption of the paper money as a grievance.¹

The loss due to this redemption can hardly have been felt generally, as the Boers did much of their trade by barter and Boshof, a townsman, is the only man who has recorded it. Much more serious were the losses occasioned by emancipation. Nearly all the trekkers who have left records mention this, as a rule carefully explaining that it was not emancipation as such but the way in which it was carried out that hurt them. This emphasis is strange at first sight, since nearly all the trekkers came from districts which had contained a trifling slave population. It is true that, where other labour was scarce, that of even a few slaves would be valued, and yet the owner might not feel it worth while to try to recover compensation on so small a number ; but the insistence in their public statements on the compensation grievance suggests that the trekkers were specially anxious to refute the charge that they were inveterate slavers who were leaving the Colony because they were not allowed to keep slaves. Nevertheless, the pecuniary losses were not the only cause of offence. The 'vexatious laws' which had preceded emancipation and emancipation itself were also felt as real grievances. Anna Steenkamp spoke for many when she deprecated not so much the freedom of the slaves as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians. Trichardt told the sympathetic Portuguese that one of his three reasons for trekking was that the slaves had been set free (his own had run away from him back to the Colony and freedom) ; W. J. Pretorius sets emancipation down as 'a chief incentive.' Undoubtedly the social revolution brought about by emancipation so soon after the

¹ Cp. also Cloete, *Great Trek*, p. 33.

passing of the 50th Ordinance had shocked the Boers' pride of race.

Closely connected with emancipation was the withholding of a vagrancy law. The trekkers complained that thieves abounded, servants were out of control, always changing their employment and liable to run off to the magistrate with tales of ill-usage which led to court cases where the farmer (or his wife), ignorant probably of English and certainly of the ways of lawyers, was at a disadvantage. 'We are resolved,' wrote Retief in his famous manifesto, ' . . . that we will uphold the just principles of liberty ; but whilst we will take care that no one shall be held in a state of slavery, it is our determination to maintain such regulations as may suppress crime and preserve proper relations between master and servant.'¹ There would at least be none of that 'ungodly equality' between white and black, ex-master and ex-slave, of which Anna Steenkamp complained.² If any one cause, other than economic pressure, can be named as the cause *par excellence* of the Great Trek, it is fear of that equality.

There was, of course, the usual crop of wild rumours which had always accompanied any big movement on the frontier, a crop sown, according to Stockenstrom, by speculators eager to buy farms cheaply.³ Such things have happened. All the land, it was said, was to be given to Hottentots ; Government was going to encourage mixed marriages and incite blacks to behave as the equals of whites in church ; the Boers were to be forced to become Roman Catholics and pressed into military service, this last canard the result of D'Urban's attempt to revise the commando lists. Over and above all, embittering every other grievance real and imaginary, was the feeling that their case was going by default in Capetown and in London. 'A flood of unjustifiable odium' was being poured upon them by 'interested persons,' notably by members of the L.M.S., and when a good Governor came to make a good settlement, he was recalled and there was apparently no means of letting the King know their side of the case. So Retief and Uys wrote on behalf of their less articulate followers to D'Urban, who perhaps read their last lament with an uneasy conscience.

Had there been no land available outside the Colony there might have been a rebellion even against a government which, as the beam at van Aardt's still silently witnessed, took rebellion seriously. As it was, the Boers trekked. Once the movement had begun, it gathered speed by its own momentum. The knowledge that there was no legal bar, once martial law had been

¹ Cory, III. 396 ; Macmillan, *Cape Coloured Question*, pp. 78 ff.

² Preller, *Voortrekkermense*, II. 4.

³ Bird, I. 499.

abrogated, decided many; others went because the leading man in their district went or because their neighbours trekked and they feared isolation. Some moved off to help their comrades after the early disasters in Natal; others when victories like Blood river showed them that they could safely do so; others again when Napier, D'Urban's successor, showed that he meant to uphold the treaty system. Nor was 'enthusiasm' wanting. 'We rather withdrew,' wrote Anna Steenkamp, 'in order thus to preserve our doctrines in purity.' 'They fancy they are under a divine impulse,' wrote one observer; 'the women seem more bent on it than the men.'¹ From the start, petticoat influence was strong among the trekkers.

The parties, drawn almost entirely from the frontier districts, marched as a rule under the leading local official, like Retief, or the family patriarch, like Jacobus Uys.² Fairbairn went too far when he said that they abandoned nothing of value.³ There were, indeed, no Groot Constantias in the east and families rarely occupied the same farm for two generations, but many of the houses were substantial. He was on firmer ground when he said that their wants were few and 'even the luxury of bread is not universal amongst them.' Game was plentiful; the creaking, tilted waggon with its straining team of oxen could carry wife and children and 'the family pot,' while beside the waggon padded cattle and sheep in herds surprisingly great considering the drought and the wastage of the war.⁴ Ammunition presented few difficulties to those who had hard money, and the Boers readily changed the paper proceeds of their farms at the rate of 23s. for each English sovereign. Some farms were simply abandoned, but many were sold at reasonable prices, considering that the absence of title-deeds in many cases diminished their value.⁵ Prices naturally fell when numbers of farms were thrown on the market; nevertheless, the proverbial exchange of a farm, which had originally been a free grant, for a waggon and span of oxen was not always a bad bargain at a time when waggons and oxen were in great demand.

Once they had crossed the drifts of the middle Orange into

¹ A. B. to Fairbairn, Oct. 7, 1836.

² The leaders and localities of the principal parties were (1835-37): Trichardt and van Rensburg (Albany and extra-Colonial); A. H. Potgieter (Tarka); Cilliers and Liebenberg (Colesberg); Maritz (Graaff Reinet); Retief (Winterberg); Uys (Uitenhage); Jacobs (Beaufort West).

³ *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Aug. 27, 1836.

⁴ 113 folk from Tarka took £60,000 worth (Chase, II. 106). 29 small parties or families from Tarka took 6156 cattle and 96,000 sheep (Cory, III. 404). At Vecktkop, 57 people lost 96 horses, 4671 cattle and 50,745 sheep to the Matabele (Chase, I. 134).

⁵ Cory, III. 403; *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Aug. 27, 1836.

Philippolis, the trekkers had before them a huge parallelogram of grasslands: the present Free State, half Bechuanaland and two-thirds of the Transvaal. To the west the grass faded away into the Kalahari Desert; on the east it was bounded by mountains; on the north by mountains again and the deadly tsetse fly of the Limpopo valley. Just beyond the Orange were pre-Trek Boers who by no means welcomed the new arrivals, and Griquas centring round the L.M.S. stations. Abram Kok reigned at Philippolis itself in the room of Adam II, deceased, and away to the west, beyond the lower Vaal, Waterboer ruled at Griquatown and Cornelis Kok at Campbell. Eastwards on either side of the Caledon river lay Bantu and half-breed clans with their missionaries. The Berliners cared for the Koranas at Bethanie, but on the western bank of the Caledon the Wesleyans held most of the field. They were at Imparani among Sikonyela's Batlokua, at Merumetsu with Taaibosch's Koranas, with Baatje's half-breeds at Platberg, and with the Barolong of Moroko and Tawane at Thaba Nchu. The Paris Evangelicals were with Lepui's Batlapin at Bethulie and with the Bataung at Mekuatleng; but their main field was among the Basuto to the east of the Caledon at Morija and, after 1837, at Thaba Bosigo, Moshesh's capital. All these Caledon chiefs, big and little, were *amici* of the Colony, 'white men under the white King.'

On the western side of the grasslands the L.M.S. men had long been with the Batlapin at Robert Moffat's Kuruman. More recently American Zulu missionaries had settled at Mosega with the Matabele. Umsilikazi's kraals lay north of the Vaal grouped round Kapain and Mosega.¹ Around them lay a waste of Matabele making, and beyond, on the edge of the Kalahari, lurked the remnants of Gasiyitsiwe's Bangwaketse, Secheli's Bakwena and, further north at Shoshong, Sekhomi's Bamangwato. In the mountains of the north-eastern and eastern Transvaal lay the Batlou at Makapans Poort, the Maguamba in the Zoutpansberg, the Bapedi, kinsmen of the Basuto, in the Lulu Mountains, and the Swazis on the crest of the Lebombo. To the south-east of the Lebombo and of their continuation, the Drakensberg, was a hot, unhealthy plain tailing off into the narrow tropical coast strip of Zululand and Natal. In what is now Portuguese East Africa Manikusa did what he chose, while the Portuguese cautiously reoccupied the posts on the lower Zambesi and the coast which his Shangaans had recently sacked. To the south, from the border of Swaziland to the Umzimvubu river, were lands densely peopled only where Dingaan's Zulus lived between the Mkusi and

¹ Harris, *Wild Sports*, pp. 84 ff.; A. Smith, *Report* (1836), p. 22.

the Tugela rivers and a few clans huddled in the foothills of the Drakensberg mountains or round the English hunters at Port Natal. Between the Umzimvubu and the colonial frontier were the Pondos and the other coast tribes of Kaffirland.

The only human enemies the trekkers had to fear in all this vast land were the Griquas, equipped like themselves with guns and horses, and the military monarchies of the Matabele and the Zulus. The country was, however, admirably adapted to the Boer style of fighting, except in the wooded valleys in parts of Natal and Zululand. The enemy could be seen far off on the great plains, and there was usually time to form laager as in 1836. Potgieter's fight with the Matabele at Vechtkop, waggon locked to waggon by the trek-chains in a great ring and the space between the wheels filled with thorn bush. Or, if the men were out unhampered by waggons and families, there was room to ride up within range, fire, retire to load and then fire again with the heavy roers (elephant guns) which 'kill at a great distance,' till the enemy gave way as at the rout of the Matabele in the Marico battle. Sometimes, as at the crowning mercy of Blood River against the Zulus, the two tactics could be combined.¹ A very few decisive battles were enough to make the trekkers masters of open country which had been cleared of most of its inhabitants by either death or displacement during the *Mfecane*.²

The first two trek parties fared ill.³ Trichardt and van 1835-
1839
Nsburg journeyed together to the Zoutpansberg. There they separated, van Nsburg's people to be wiped out by hostile tribes in the lower Limpopo valley, and Trichardt's, sadly reduced by fever, to stumble on to Delagoa Bay, whence most of the survivors were brought by sea to Natal in 1839. The later parties followed in their tracks. A. H. Potgieter, Carel Cilliers and the Liebenbergs crossed the Orange together, and, with the Potgieters went a boy of ten, Paul Kruger, future President of the South African Republic. Potgieter, most restless of all the trekkers, went north naming many of the Free State rivers, and secured a cession of all the land between the Vet and Vaal rivers from a petty Bataung chief, Makwana, who merely stipulated for a small reserve at Coal Spruit. At the Zoutpansberg he found Trichardt and thence turned homewards. On the way he learnt that the Matabele, who resented the presence of armed bands in their country in place of the hunters and the men of God who had always asked the King for 'the road,' had destroyed the Lieben-

¹ Compare the cavalry charge from the hollow square at Ulundi (Zulu War, 1879).

² *Mfecane* = the crushing.

³ Preller, *Dagboek*, and *Voort.*, II. 1 ff.; Chase, I. 70.

bergs on the northern bank of the Vaal. He himself was glad to beat the Matabele off at Vechtkop at the price of losing his cattle.¹ Moroko, the Barolong chief, and his Wesleyan missionary, Archbell, helped him back to Thaba Nchu, and there he was joined by a new party of trekkers led by Gerrit Maritz. Oct.
1836.

Of the four things needful to the formation of a republic, Potgieter had done one: he had secured the necessary land. But it still remained for the trekkers to frame government machinery, determine their relations with their non-European neighbours and win recognition of their independence from H.M. Government. The combined parties faced the problem of government. It was not an easy task. Unlike the emigrants drawn from all the strata of old-established societies, who had gone to North America in the seventeenth century or to Australasia and the eastern Cape Colony in the nineteenth, the trekkers were, with hardly an exception, men of one class only. They were cattle-farmers, of all civilised men the least accustomed to common action and the restraints of the law. They lacked political experience; there were few among them who were competent to carry on public business; they were self-reliant to a fault; their leaders were jealous of each other; they had, as yet, no sure abiding place in the great plains. And they must build their state from bedrock upwards. Their first constitution was of such a rudimentary nature that it has since been disputed whether it can be called a constitution at all. At Thaba Nchu 'Het Volk' (the People) elected Maritz, a man of some education and legal experience, as landdrost, and six other men to act with him as bench, legislature and council of war, and to administer such laws as might be agreed upon by a general meeting of all the men of the trek party.² Potgieter and Maritz then led their fighting men and a few Griquas, Koranas and Barolong against the Matabele. They read them a sharp lesson at Mosega, regained the captured waggons and cattle and returned home with the American missionaries to establish themselves in Makwana's cession at their new town of Winburg, the centre of the first of the Trekker Republics. Dec.
1836.

Piet Retief then rode in with 108 followers. He was by far the ablest and most statesmanlike of the Voortrekkers and, helped by the quarrels of Potgieter and Maritz, he soon established his ascendancy. The Nine Articles were drawn up to adapt the Thaba Nchu constitution to the new conditions.³ Maritz Jan.
1837.

¹ Chase, I. 71 ff., 134; R.20/38 (Pretoria Archives); Bird, I. 238 ff.; Preller, *Voort.*, III.

² R.9/36 (Pretoria Archives).

³ Preller, *Piet Retief*, p. 96; Chase, I. 87; R.10/37 (Pretoria Archives); *Zuid Afrikaan*, Nov. 10, 1837.

remained President of the Volksraad and landdrost of that body, when it should sit, like the House of Lords, in a judicial capacity ; but Retief was elected Commandant-General and Governor with an elected Council of Policy to assist him. Retief's governorship and the Council of Policy, which was probably the Volksraad in another form, were the nearest approach to a civil as distinct from a military executive that the trekkers were to have for many years. Thus entrenched as head of the state, Retief organised the church. For lack of a fully ordained minister and in spite of the furious opposition of Potgieter, who would have preferred the ministrations of the Wesleyan, 'Aardspiel' of Thaba Nchu, he appointed the ex-mission teacher, Erasmus Smit, to conduct services.¹ He then turned to deal with the pressing matter of native policy. He bade his commandants shed no innocent blood on patrol nor take Bushman children as apprentices without their parents' consent, and made treaties with neighbouring chiefs, notably with Moroko, the good friend of the trekkers, and with Sikonyela and Moshesh. None of these treaties survive, possibly because they were verbal ; but, on the analogy of treaties concluded soon afterwards, they must have provided for peace and amity and leave for the white man to occupy land, probably in return for a consideration.²

At this stage, Jacobus Uys and his famous son, Piet, arrived from Uitenhage, closely followed by Jacobs and his neighbours from Beaufort West. From four to five hundred fighting-men were now assembled with perhaps a thousand waggons, and Retief felt strong enough to deal decisively with the Matabele. But fear of the Griquas and, more certainly, quarrels among the leaders ruined his plans. Potgieter, who wished to trek north of the Vaal as far away as possible from British influence and find a port on the East Coast, finally parted company with Maritz. Uys with 170 followers formally repudiated Retief's authority and proposed to found a state in Natal at his leisure on U.S.A. principles.³ Retief himself decided to go to the Promised Land of Natal, the point of contact with the outer world and the vantage ground from which to bargain for independence and friendly relations with the British. So he rode down to Port Natal with a few friends to get into touch with Dingaan, while Potgieter and Uys with 135 men and a few of Tawane's Barolong defeated the Matabele in a nine days' running fight along the Marico river without the loss of a man. Umsilikazi, who had been roughly handled a little before by the Zulus, withdrew northwards beyond

¹ Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, pp. 19-20.

² Chase, I. 88, 110 ; Moodie, *Battles and Adventures*, I. 525 ; Cloete, *Great Trek*,

p. 94.

³ Chase, I. 103, 110 ; Preller, *Retief*, p. 117 ; Theal, *Hist. Sketches*, pp. 283 ff

Oct.
1837.

Nov.
1837.

the Limpopo into what is now Matabeleland, and Potgieter claimed all the lands that had been subject to him from the Vaal to the Zoutpansberg, and the Kalahari to Rhenoster Poort.¹ The trekkers were thus potential masters of all the open grasslands from the Griqua borders to the edge of the tsetse belt. They hoped soon to be masters of Natal also.

Fairbairn was right in the long run when he wrote that the departure of the cattle-farmers would be no loss to the Colony as sheep-farmers would take their places.² That was the oft-repeated story of the U.S.A. frontier with friction but ultimate economic gain at each stage. Besides, the invasion of the interior opened up new markets for colonial traders. But, at the moment, the loss to the Colony was serious. The withdrawal of the most readily commandeerable burghers weakened the frontier at the very time that the weight of the Trek, thrust into a seething mass of tribes, might well drive dispossessed natives over the colonial border. That danger, already a preoccupation, now became a nightmare to colonial Governors. D'Urban tried to kill the Trek by kindness, pressing for payment of compensation for war losses and requisitions, hastening the issue of land titles, offering land in Queen Adelaide and the Stormberg area while it remained to him, appointing new magistrates on the frontier furnished with bilingual instructions, and stationing more troops in the Winterberg. But without martial law he could not stop the movement, and now, with reports before him of the Mosega fight, the harrying of natives and the seizure of Bushman children by stray Boers and, finally, Retief's proposed journey to Natal, he frankly told Glenelg that the position was impossible. Was he or was he not to recognise the independence of the emigrants? ³ Glenelg replied that he must rely on that broken reed, the Punishment Act, and ask the chiefs to send guilty parties back to the Colony with proofs. As for Natal, 'that is a foreign land . . . and the Government has neither the right nor the intention to interfere.' And, he added, after perusing D'Urban's fiery though belated explanation of his Kaffir policy, the Governor must retire as soon as he could be relieved.⁴

D'Urban therefore handed over his peck of troubles to Sir George Napier. Most of his comprehensive programme of reforms had been accomplished; the Legislative Council, the revised Charter of Justice, retrenchment, emancipation and the beginnings of municipal government witnessed to that. But a satisfactory

¹ Chase, I. 132; Bird, I. 325; II. 203; R.49/39 (Pretoria Archives).

² *S.A. Comm. Adv.*, Aug. 27, 1836.

³ Eybers, p. 145; *Basutoland Records*, I. 15; C.O. 1447, D'Urban to S. of S., July 1837.

⁴ Bird, I. 327; No. 503 of 1837, p. 278.

native policy had not been evolved. There is much South African political history summed up in D'Urban's four years of office.

So far from being solved the native question was immensely complicated by the Trek. It was this fact which had to be faced by Napier, a Peninsular veteran like D'Urban but, unlike him, a convinced negrophilist avowedly prepared to make the best of the treaty system and to send on Stockenstrom's letters promptly to Downing Street.¹ Soon after landing he visited the Eastern Frontier (few Governors were to omit that formality for many years to come) and found some of the clans stealing extensively and the drought, which helped to explain the prevalence of theft, making the tracing of the spoor and, therefore, recovery difficult. He condemned the bush of the lower Fish river as a boundary, demanded the reinforcements which D'Urban had asked for in vain, tried to move the Fingos back further into the Colony away from the Xosas who still hankered after the cattle stolen by their 'dogs' during the late war, threatened Macomo and the emigrant Tembus with reprisals if they did not behave themselves and, on the advice of Stockenstrom, made defensive alliances with the friendly Gunukwebes in the Ceded Territory.² At the same time he was robbed of Stockenstrom's services. To the unbounded joy of the Easterners, the Lieutenant-Governor lost a libel action which he had brought against one of his critics and sailed for England, leaving Colonel John Hare, an honest man of no great ability, to act in his stead.

Sept.
1838.

Napier, meanwhile, tried to stop the Trek and persuade the trekkers to return home. He enlisted the help of the border officials and of the D.R. Church clergy who disapproved of a movement which was taking so many of their flocks beyond the reach of civilisation, pressed for compensation for war losses and security of land tenure, and even had a hurried and unavailing interview with a Boer deputation on the northern border. All he could do was to issue a warning that no ex-slaves might be taken beyond the frontiers as the day of complete freedom was due in December, and send a field cornet, Gideon Joubert, to bring back smuggled apprentices into the Colony. Joubert returned with 40, having left over 100 behind at their own request, two of whom at least were sent back presently by sea from Natal to receive their freedom.³

From the time of Napier's visit to the northern border till the middle of 1842, Transorangia was left to take care of itself and

¹ No. 424 of 1851, p. 25; J. Philip to Fairbairn, Nov. 1, 1837.

² No. 424 of 1851, pp. 30 ff., 39.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35; Bird, I. 415; Chase, II. 17, 43.

Natal became the storm centre of South African politics. Gardiner had taken up his duties as magistrate at the Port and persuaded Dingaan to cede the southern half of Natal to the Crown,¹ June 1837. waive his claim to runaway subjects and receive an Anglican missionary, the Reverend F. Owen, at his kraal of Ungungundhlovu. On the other hand, Gardiner was powerless to check gun-runners for he had no prison and no police and, now, the majority of the English defied him, repudiated the Royal claim to Natal and declared their independence. They welcomed Retief Oct.-Nov. 1837 to the Port and sent one or two of their number with him to interview Dingaan. From him Retief received the promise of land, presumably the whole of Natal, provided he recovered Zulu cattle stolen by Sikonyela and, added the King, 'if possible, the thief as well.'² So Retief rode homewards to be met by his own followers and those of Maritz pouring down the passes of the Drakensberg and forming laager among the rolling hills of northern Natal. He recovered the Zulu cattle and then, in spite of more than one warning and the entreaties of Maritz, rode off to Dingaan's kraal with 70 followers, an English interpreter and 30 Hottentot attendants.³

Retief and his men rode into a death-trap. For some time past Dingaan had been growing uneasy at the news of the doings of these white men armed with guns, which he coveted, and mounted on the 'hornless cattle,' which he had never seen. Retief himself had told him how they had routed his deadly enemy, Umsilikazi, at no loss to themselves, and the King had plagued his missionary to teach him 'what he really wanted to know, the use of firearms.' Now the Boers had come 'like an army from the direction of Umsilikazi' to build houses in his country, their leader was actually at his kraal with just such a commando as had harried the Matabele at Mosega, and the rest of them were scattered unsuspecting among their tents. It was a chance not to be missed. After a day or two of negotiation, during which he called up reinforcements, Dingaan signed a deed giving Natal to Retief and his followers and, having thus enticed Feb. 1838. them all into his kraal unarmed, slew them and the Hottentots without the gate.⁴

¹ Chase, I. 96; Eybers, p. 149.

² Bird, I. 318 ff., 326, 333, 360; Chase, I. 96 ff., 130; Preller, *Retief*, pp. 170-1; Eybers, p. 150.

³ Bird, I. 369, 401; *V.R. Soc.* VII. 157-8; Preller, *Retief*, p. 209; Chase, I. 132.

⁴ On the Retief massacre, *vide* Owen's Diary (*V.R. Soc.* VII.); Preller, *Retief*; Bird, I. 233, 241, 307, 325, 369, 402, 436, 462, 493, 516, 519; Chase, I. 130; II. 3; Moodie, *Battles*, I. 422. Also articles by J. du Plessis (*Het Zoeklicht*, Aug. 1923); W. Blommaert (*Die Burger*, July 14, 21, and *Die Huisgenoot*, Sept. 1923); Sir G. Cory (*Cape Times*, July 12, 1923). *Vide* Cory, *Rise of S.A.*, IV. 45 ff., for discussion of the story that one Hottentot escaped.

At first Dingaan thought of making a clean sweep of the white men in his country, but after some hesitation he let the English and American missionaries get away. On the other hand he at once sent his impis to fall upon the Boer laagers. The slaughter at Weenen followed; but the other laagers stood firm, Potgieter and Uys came down from the High Veld and joint action was arranged with the English. Disaster ensued. Neither of the Boer leaders would serve under the other or under Maritz; Uys was trapped by the Zulus and killed; Potgieter, who had never liked the Natal adventure, rode back to Winburg; the first English expedition effected little, the second was destroyed, and the Zulus, storming down to Port Natal, drove the survivors and the missionaries on shipboard.¹

April
1838.

The fortunes of the trekkers were now at their lowest ebb. A. W. J. Pretorius had, however, brought back good reports of Natal to the eastern districts, and the very news of the disasters prompted many to go to the rescue. But the news also led to British intervention. From the first, Napier had wished to send troops to Port Natal to keep order and help to check the Trek. As the confused rumours of strife between Boers and Natives in various parts of the hinterland drifted in, he became more insistent and at last wrung a grudging consent from Glenelg on condition that there was no 'colonisation.' He promptly sent Major Charters with 100 men to the Port to restore peace and prevent the importation of warlike stores or the formation of an independent government in Natal; and, since he realised that there was no hope of inducing the trekkers to return to the Colony, he urged Glenelg to set up a government there subordinate to that of the Cape.²

Dec.
1838.

The troops occupied Port Natal, but they were too late to stop further fighting. Pretorius had arrived shortly before to find Maritz dead and his successor, Landman, possessed of the Port with the consent of the few remaining English.³ In spite of Charters' efforts to stop him, he marched into Zululand and overthrew Dingaan's impis at Blood River.⁴ A few days later he occupied the smoking ruins of Ungungundhlovu and found the deed of cession in Retief's wallet.

Dec. 16.

The victory of Blood River cleared the way for the organisation of the most elaborate Trekker republic yet attempted. The outward and visible signs of the new state were the foundation

Jan.
1839.

¹ Bird, I. 234, 242, 370, 399; Chase, II. 8; Moodie, *Battles*, I. 500. The Zulus killed 361 Boer emigrants and about 200 coloured servants; also 13 Englishmen and a number of their native followers (Preller, *Voort.*, II. 51; Bird, I. 355).

² Bird, I. 389, 394, 414; Chase, II. 43, 49 ff.

³ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 133, 156-7.

⁴ Bird, I. 234, 243, 433, 438, 492.

of the church and town of Pietermaritzburg. The Republic itself was a continuation of that founded at Thaba Nchu and Winburg, for six of the seven members of the Winburg Raad had entered Natal, and instructions had been drawn up based on existing regulations.¹ These instructions, with additional rules to meet new circumstances, were now put into force. A Volksraad of twenty-four members, two from each field cornetcy, elected annually on adult white male suffrage, served as legislature, court of appeal and, in many respects, executive as well.² At first it met at irregular intervals and then quarterly, while a committee (Commissie Raad) of five carried on between the sessions subject to the ratification of its acts at the next full meeting.³ As at Thaba Nchu, the Volksraad was checked by Het Publiek, that is, such of the electorate as could attend.⁴ Apart from the Krygsraad (Council of War) there was no executive, for the Natal constitution marked a reaction against the centralising policy of Retief. There was no Governor and nothing but a passing reference to a Council of Policy. The Volksraad elected a President at each session, but he was a mere chairman and, though Pretorius as Head Commandant sat in the Volksraad, he had no vote and his office was presently abolished except in time of war.⁵ Subject to review by the Volksraad, landdrosts courts administered justice at the capital and at the new villages of Congella and Weenen,⁶ and at each of these villages a church consistory was organised, though there was no fully qualified minister in Natal except the devoted American missionary, Daniel Lindley.⁷ In each ward there were field cornets with the usual powers.

Meanwhile Captain Jervis, Charters' successor, failed to exercise his authority under the Punishment Act over the Natalians, but, however much Pretorius might try to keep the fact in the background, he did succeed in mediating peace between the Boers and Dingaan.⁸ Dingaan acknowledged the Boer claim to Natal and promised to surrender all firearms, horses and cattle taken from the trekkers. Normanby therefore ordered Napier to withdraw the troops. But in spite of the Natalians' threats to harass the troops 'like the Carlists,' Napier held on as long as he could.⁹ The Trek was proceeding faster than ever; the Pondo, Faku, was quarrelling with a Baca chief, Ncapaai, on the southern border of Natal; Dingaan was

¹ On the Natal constitution see *Voortrekker Wetgewing (Notulen of the Natal Volksraad*, edited by Preller).

² *Nat. Not.*, pp. 46, 49, 77, 226, 264.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 245.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 244.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 40, 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. xiii, 7, 14, 20, 44, 69, 188; Chase, II. 102.

⁷ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 12, 27, 31, 34, 78, 92, 174.

⁸ Bird, I. 494, 520; Chase, II. 92; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 1-5 (footnotes).

⁹ Bird, I. 523, 534; *Nat. Not.*, p. 26.

Oct.
1838.

March
1840.

Oct.
1839-
April
1840

May
1839.

not fulfilling his side of the treaty ; the Natal Volksraad, less moderate than Pretorius, demanded that Dingaan give up the southern half of Zululand and St. Lucia Bay and remove his people therefrom, a local repetition of D'Urban's abortive 'extermination' policy ; Pretorius himself was in treaty with Panda, Dingaan's brother and rival.¹ At last Napier could hold on no longer. The troops sailed, wishing the Natalians good luck, the Republicans hoisted their new flag, and, at that very moment, Russell, now Secretary of State, sat down to write under strong commercial pressure, that since the trekkers would not come home and might look to Holland for aid, he was prepared to consider the annexation of Natal, provided it entailed neither heavy expense nor injustice to the natives.² Napier's comments on receiving that letter are not recorded.

Pretorius made the most of his opportunity. He ended the Zulu menace by playing off one half of the Zulu monarchy against the other. A campaign in which Panda's men did the fighting ended with the flight and death of Dingaan in Swaziland. This victory at Magongo was marred by the judicial murder of two of Dingaan's envoys and by quarrels over the distribution of the captured cattle and apprentices after the battle, but the results were decisive. Panda was recognised as Prince of the Zulus ruling that part of his dominions which lay between the Tugela and the Black Umvulosi, including St. Lucia Bay, as a vassal of the Republic and was held responsible for the huge tale of cattle due from the defaulting Dingaan.³

Secure at home, Pretorius pressed on with the negotiations which he had begun some time since for closer union with the other Boer republics. There was as yet no semblance of European rule between the Orange and the Vet, but, north of the Vet, Winburg claimed the allegiance of the trekkers and, north again beyond the Vaal, Potgieter had founded Potchefstroom.⁴ The three republics federated loosely. Natal, as much the most important and populous state, was senior partner. Potgieter remained Chief Commandant north of the Drakensberg, but he had to report his doings to Pretorius as Commandant-General. Similarly the Winburg-Potchefstroom Raad became a mere adjunct Raad bound to submit its resolutions twice yearly to the legislature at Pietermaritzburg, but entitled to send members to sit there when matters of common concern were to be discussed.⁵

¹ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 2, 15 ; Bird, I. 536, 540, 553 ff.

² C.O. 2079, Dec. 23, 1839 ; Chase, II. 111, 115, 131, 134-7 ; Bird, I. 562 ; Stuart, *Hollandsche Afrikanen*, p. 99.

³ Bird, I. 375, 562, 576, 583, 595, 627 ; Chase, II. 120 ff. ; *Nat. Not.*, p. 45.

⁴ Otherwise called Mooi River Dorp or Vryburg. For boundaries claimed, *vide* Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, p. 307 ; also R.49/39 (Pretoria Archives).

⁵ Bird, I. 388 ; II. 203 ; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 73, 77, 82, 101 ff., 111, 145, 150 ff.

Dec.
1839.

Feb.
1840.

Nov.
1838.

Oct.
1840.

Pretorius, heir to Retief's policy, had thus achieved two of the 1840. dead leader's aims: the acquisition of a port and something like the union of all the territories occupied by the trekkers. The question of independence remained to be settled. He therefore offered to send delegates to Capetown to treat for independence and the privileges of British subjects.¹ The auguries were good. Napier indeed had orders from Russell to reoccupy Port Natal or some commanding position hard by in view of the 'deplorable calamities' attendant on the Magongo campaign. But he was in no hurry to carry out those orders. The reoccupation of the Port must now mean a struggle, and he had no wish to fight; the Natalians seemed to be settling down; the native refugees pouring into Natal away from Panda were docile; since Natal was to be treated commercially as a foreign country and could easily endanger the peace of the Eastern Frontier by pressing on the Kaffir tribes, it would be well to have a friendly alliance with the Republicans. He commented drily that it might be hard to give the Natalians the privileges without the liabilities of British subjects, but he was at least prepared to discuss the matter.²

The condition of the Eastern Frontier as pictured by Napier in Capetown was such as to make him think kindly of any possible allies. His veteran Highlanders had been withdrawn; Sandile's Gaikas were restive at the prolonged uproar behind them in Natal; English and Dutch farmers in the Winterberg, Koonap and Mancazana lands threatened to trek unless the frontier system were changed, and so numerous were the reports of thefts and of murders of armed herdsmen by Kaffirs that he concluded that the Stockenstrom treaty system had broken down.³ Oct. 1840.

It is easy to condemn the Stockenstrom system. It is much harder to arrive at any just conclusion as to its potential value as a policy. The complete system was never tried. Stockenstrom's policy had been to make treaties with all chiefs capable of maintaining a settled government with whom the Colony was likely to come into contact, and then to trust to time, peace and commercial intercourse to civilise and Christianise their followers and perhaps ultimately secure their willing incorporation in the Queen's dominions. Elsewhere, he proposed to extend British rule over all areas occupied by British subjects or by natives who lacked strong rulers of their own; in other words, to control the Trek. This ambitious scheme was not attempted. Even in its narrower application to the Eastern Frontier the system never had

¹ Bird, I. 611; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 65, 88; Eybers, p. 159.

² Bird, I. 605 ff., 622. This was before the days of Dominion status.

³ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 46, 54, 58-62; Chase II. 142-7.

a chance.¹ It was set up at the end of a wasting war in a drought-stricken land with the trekkers pouring out of the frontier districts, and Stockenstrom himself so harassed by his enemies and his own brooding nature that he could never give it his undivided attention.

The general aim of this part of the system was to do away with reprisals by patrols set in motion by the mere *ipse dixit* of a farmer, and to provide for the legal punishment of thieves when taken or, if neither thief nor stolen stock could be secured, to hold the chief and clan responsible for proved losses—a principle well understood in Bantu law. Many of the chiefs at first carried out the terms as long as they saw that the Government was in earnest and itself prepared to hold scrupulously to the treaties. Unfortunately, the force which Stockenstrom held to be essential for the support of the system was not provided, and the fear of causing a fresh war displayed by the authorities encouraged those who might wish to defy the law.

Towards the close of 1838 Napier had asked for reinforcements to check cattle-stealing. Stockenstrom's departure unsettled the tribes who saw in it the prelude of a change, Napier himself broke the treaties by entering Kaffirland with a bodyguard of 100 men,² Macomo became a nuisance, and the emigrant Tembus in the north stole to recoup themselves, as they alleged, for their losses at the hands of trekkers. With the arrival of the first reinforcements, Hare attacked the Tembus at Shiloh, recovered stolen cattle, and overawed Macomo.³ Thereafter, for a time, Napier received official reports of peace such as even Colonel Somerset in all his long experience had never known; the Kaffir police, hated by the frontiersmen, reproached by their fellows, ill-paid by Government but supported as a rule by the chiefs, recovered cattle properly reclaimable under the treaties as well as others which could not legally be reclaimed; some chiefs did justice to Europeans who condescended to sue according to Kaffir law, and even Tyali fined a man for horse-stealing. But frontier officials went far to destroy the whole system by demanding the restoration of beasts which could not properly be claimed under the treaties. This 'Not Reclaimable List,' based on reports from the military posts and the newspapers of which the agents with the tribes knew nothing, grew and grew. Henceforward every hoof lost, stolen or strayed was laid to the charge of the chiefs who, on the Kat river border, were quite unable to comply with the continual demands. 'Our people,' the chiefs

April
1839.

1840.

¹ Memorandum on the Treaty System by Stockenstrom.

² No. 424 of 1851, pp. 39, 53; Stretch to Philip, July 22, 1839.

³ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 45 ff.

admitted, 'steal oxen and cows, but the Government steals with the pen.' Tyali gave up attending the quarterly meetings for settlement, and the cry of the frontiersmen for a radical revision of the treaties grew louder.¹

Napier hurried to the frontier in the expectation of war, armed with a drastic revision of the treaties drawn up by Judge Menzies, who had never forgiven Stockenstrom for trying to limit the powers of the Supreme Court in 1828.² But once he was actually on the frontier, he learnt to take Grahamstown alarms more calmly.³ He found out for himself what Stockenstrom was finding now that he had returned to his exposed farm in the middle of the area from which the despairing Dutch and English memorials had recently emanated. Thefts there were, but not such as to justify recourse to arms. Better face a loss of some £4000 annually than risk a war which might, and, when it came, did cost a round £1,000,000. Any radical change of system must mean war, for the Kaffirs were getting guns from traders and, now that the fighting Boers had trekked, held themselves more than a match for the settlers. The Boers away from the immediate border-lands, thankful that they had not been called out for four years past, openly said that they would not leave valuable farms again to fight in the bush for the sake of men who had got frontier farms either for nothing or at a very low price and then left their beasts to wander at will day and night. Some even muttered that they 'would rather see all the Englishmen's throats cut than go on commando and face the guns with which they have supplied the enemy.'⁴ Above all, there

¹ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 35, 49; Stretch to Philip, July 23, 1839, and to Government Secretary, Oct. 28, 1839; Memorandum by Stretch, 1846; No. 424 of 1851, p. 54.

² Stockenstrom to Fairbairn, May 11, 1838.

³ Napier told Stretch, the Gaika agent, that if all he had heard in Capetown had been true, he would have declared martial law and hanged him! (Stretch's Memo.)

⁴ The Commando system had not worked well in the war of 1834-35. It worked still worse in the war of 1846-47 and practically broke down in that of 1850-53. Napier's comments on the proposed changes in the Treaty system in 1840 illuminate both sides of the question: 'I am fully aware of the *whole* of this case, but I must observe that Mr. Hart, by his own admission, was in the habit of turning out his cattle to graze for *three and four months* at a time night and day totally left to themselves, being only counted once in that period, and his cattle might have *strayed* into Caffreland, and did so, I believe. At the same time I think it was very unjust that when he pointed out his stolen cattle in Caffreland he was refused permission to recover them. . . . All that Mr. Menzies says about passes would be strongly opposed by Missionaries and others as against the grand principle of *constant intercourse* between the civilised and savage man. . . . I think the learned Judge views that part of the question, more as regards the preservation of property by preventing Caffres entering the Colony than in respect of Civilisation. In short he takes a lawyer's view of the question, but I may be wrong' (Napier's notes to Menzies' MSS.; No. 424 of 1851, pp. 65, 67, 85; Stockenstrom to Fairbairn, Oct. 29, 1840.)

was the question of policy. Was the search for a *modus vivendi* with the 'Caffer Nation' to be continued in the hope of civilising them at long last, or was it to be a matter of rolling them up between 'ten regiments and the republicans of Natal' and then being content to 'civilise the remnants into our herdsmen'?¹

There was no doubt what one section of frontier opinion desired. Albany was full of men who said that the tribes must be cleared out of the Ceded Territory; Hare himself at his first meeting with the chiefs had blurted out that their proper boundary was the Umzimvubu, and there were even men who held that all Kaffirland must be annexed, since it was already ringed round by Europeans.² But Napier knew well enough that Fingos, Hottentots and ex-slaves were responsible for much of the stealing, and that a return to the D'Urban system would not cure this evil. He therefore contented himself with modifying the treaties in detail. He began to pay half-compensation for irreclaimable losses *sub rosa*, allowed small unarmed parties to enter Kaffirland and take additional cattle for their pains, relieved herdsmen of the duty of going armed and thus serving as targets for Kaffirs and others desiring stock or a gun, and warned the chiefs that they must give up murderers. To all of which the chiefs agreed once they were satisfied that 'there was nothing behind it,'² and, during the early months of 1841, there was a distinct lull in the depredations.³

Meanwhile a crisis had arisen in the danger zone of eastern Kaffirland which ruined whatever slender chance the Natalians had ever had of winning Napier's support for their independence. That chance had steadily grown fainter, but both Napier and Russell were still prepared to offer the Boers a civil government of their own provided they eschewed slavery and allowed H.M. Government to control the troops.⁴ The Natalians, however, had been troubled by cattle-stealing on their southern border and claimed to have traced the spoor to the kraals of Ncapaai the Baca. Pretorius was sent with a commando, which, in excess of its instructions and against the wishes of some of its own members, fell on Ncapaai without warning and carried off 3000 cattle and 17 child apprentices. Pretorius managed to quell the ensuing storm in the Volksraad, but the conduct of the commando brought renewed British intervention a step nearer. Faku the Pondo had recently moved across to the east side of the Umzimvubu and was now the near neighbour both of Ncapaai, with whom he

¹ Stockenstrom to Fairbairn, Oct. 29, 1840.

² No. 424 of 1851, p. 89.

³ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 70, 81, 84; Chase, II. 157, 169; Cory, IV. 353 ff.; Stretch to Fairbairn, Dec. 2 and 7, 1840.

⁴ Bird, I. 612, 618, 621.

was at war, and of the Republic. He professed to fear that the Boers would attack him next and, on the advice of his Wesleyan missionary, appealed to Napier. Napier regarded Ncapaai as a public nuisance but Faku was the *amicus* of the Colony. He therefore sent Captain Smith with 150 men to the Umgazi river to protect Faku and overawe the coast tribes on the one hand and the Boers on the other.¹ Jan. 1841.

The Boers now sent Napier their precise proposals, but Smith was on the march and the Governor replied that, pending further instructions, he would not discuss the matter of independence.² Those instructions arrived piecemeal; first to promise protection to such tribes beyond the Colonial borders as asked for it, to place agents with them but in no wise to annex and, then, to offer the Natalians the commercial privileges of British subjects provided they admitted the troops. Even so Napier made no move till he heard that the Natal Volksraad had, after one or two previous attempts to relieve the Republic of the Bantu who were steadily pouring in from Zululand, decided to draft superfluous natives into the lands between the Umtamvuna and the Umzimvubu. Part of these lands were claimed by Faku, and whether they were claimed justly or not, they were hard by his country, and the arrival of strangers there might cause the repercussions on the Kaffirland tribes which a Cape Governor must dread above all things.³ Napier was also convinced that the isolated and bickering Natalians were not to be trusted even with a subordinate government of their own; he was influenced perhaps by Grahamstown meetings which dilated on the coal, lead, indigo, cotton and tobacco of Natal, all the more exploitable now that Dingaan was gone. In any case, he ordered Smith to advance. Rains delayed the march, but at length the troops reoccupied Port Natal.⁴ Dec. 1841. May 1842.

Smith dug himself in near the Berea and Pretorius mobilised his men, declaring that the Republic was in alliance with Holland; for one Smellekamp, supercargo of the brig *Brazilia*, which had recently been sent to Natal by a Dutch merchant, Ohrig, had posed as a Netherland delegate.⁵ Neither Winburg nor Potchefstroom moved officially, but Jan Mocke came down from behind the mountains with 300 Modder river Boers, the Natalians seized some of Smith's oxen, and, when Smith tried to break up the Boer

¹ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 76, 86; Bird, I. 249, 622, 631-5, 646; Chase, II. 159; Cloete, *Lectures*, p. 137.

² Bird, I., pp. 627, 630, 634.

³ *Ibid.*, I. 640 ff.; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 110, 135-9.

⁴ Bird, I. 658, 660, 687; Moodie, *Battles*, I. 458; Chase, II. 183.

⁵ Bird, II. 34; Chase, II. 206; Cloete, *op. cit.*, pp. 144, 212; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 198-202; Stuart, *Holl. Afrik.*, pp. 166 ff.

camp at Congella, Pretorius beat him and laid siege to his fort.¹ Dick King, however, swam the bay and rode overland for help to Grahamstown, and Colonel J. Cloete duly arrived by sea with a relieving force.

June
1842.

Hardly had the news of the relief reached Capetown than orders came from Stanley, the new Secretary of State, to abandon Port Natal with all speed since H.M. Government could not follow its restless subjects all round the world. Was it not enough that Her Majesty had just been compelled by her loving subjects to annex New Zealand? But Napier flatly though confidentially refused to budge now that shots had been exchanged² and Cloete pressed the Natalians to return to their allegiance.

The republicans were in a miserable position. Most of them were poor; Mocke's men had withdrawn and, with them, all hope of help from the High Veld; the moderates feared to submit lest this occupation prove as shortlived as the last; but against that fear was the dread of Panda (and already, in the confusion, three Boers had been killed by Zulus) and the certainty that the British would march on Maritzburg. Pretorius, Landman and J. N. Boshof, the future President of the Free State and now Voorsitter of the Natal Volksraad, threw their weight on the side of peace, if only to give the seventeenth-century Holland of their imagination time to intervene. Accordingly the Rump of the Volksraad submitted, an amnesty was granted to all save four men specially named, two of whom had seized Government stores, and all, white and black alike, were secured in the tenure of their lands pending a final settlement. Pretorius then made way for Rudolph as Commandant-General; the Volksraad continued to function feebly at the capital; at the Port, Smith sequestered the customs, the Republic began to go to pieces and Stanley, much against his will, bade Napier stand fast till further orders.³

July
1842.

Oct.
1842.

The British had thus intervened decisively in the affairs of the trekkers at the vital point, Port Natal. It was, however, questionable whether they could stop short there or whether they must not go on to deal with the problems raised by the Trek in all South-Eastern Africa. Napier held that many difficulties might have been avoided had Government from the first controlled an emigration which it could not prevent, and Stanley's instructions pointed to general intervention.⁴ Stanley decreed that all trekkers who returned to the Colony should be amnestied—a useless favour, since there were no farms there for most of them

¹ Bird, II. 14 ff.; Chase, II. 233, 240.

² Bird, I. 700, 705; II. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, II. 65, 68, 87, 103; Chase, II. 237.

⁴ C.O. 1550, Napier to S. of S., July 25 and Aug. 23, 1842; Bird, I. 700.

to return to ; otherwise, communications with the Colony were to be cut off and, if the trekkers attacked the tribes, the tribes were to be protected and their assailants treated as rebels.

Presuming that these far-reaching instructions could be carried out, there was much more likelihood that they would have to be applied beyond the Orange and the Drakensberg than elsewhere. The situation there was much less clearly defined than in Natal. The area was larger, communications were more difficult, and the European inhabitants were more turbulent. Natal had attracted the main body of the emigrants, steady-going folk who intended to settle¹ ; but the plains of the interior had been given over to the less civilised trekkers and the usual trans-frontier flotsam and jetsam.

This was especially true of the lawless lands between the borders of the Colony and the republic of Winburg.

The two most important native powers in that part were the Griquas at Philippolis and the Basuto to the east of the Caledon. The Griquas had just finished a civil war.² Adam II had died, 1835. and Abram, his successor, had fallen foul of the L.M.S. missionaries. They and Waterboer of Griquatown had supported young Adam, while Abram had been helped by Cornelis Kok of Campbell. During the strife Adam and Waterboer had divided the whole of the wide area claimed by the Griquas along the Ramah-David's Graf-Platberg line, a line which was to play a great part in the 1838. future Diamond Fields dispute.³ Adam finally made good his claims, and his country became the storm-centre for the next 1841. five years.

Adam's neighbour, Moshesh, the Basuto Chief of the Mountain, was, however, destined ultimately to play a much greater part in South African history than any of the Griqua chieftains.⁴ He had begun life humbly with a mere hundred followers at Butabute in northern Basutoland. Mantati attacks had driven him to seek refuge on the flat-topped mountain of Thaba Bosigo farther south. There he had taken the lead in spite of the fact that his father, Mokatshane, still lived, and there he had rallied broken tribes, Baputi, Bamaru, and Hlubis, the core of the Basuto confederacy. He had beaten off Zulus, Fingos, Waterboer's Griquas, and Matabele in quick succession, and had watched with quiet satisfaction the withdrawal of the Hlubis southward of the Drakensberg

¹ Cloete, *Lectures*, p. 121.

² On the Griquas, *vide* Orpen, *Reminiscences* ; Lindley, *Adamantia* ; Stow, *op. cit.*

³ Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, p. 30.

⁴ On early history of Basuto, *vide* *Bas. Rec.*, I. 1 ff. ; III. 1 ff. ; Lagden, *Basutos*, I.

and the destruction of Dingaan. He had welcomed Boer hunters, Dr. Smith with his medals, and, above all, the Paris Evangelicals. No mere warrior, but a born diplomatist, he was wise enough to rely on the missionaries' advice without falling under their control. He now began to play off the Boers against each other and against the Colonial Government with consummate skill. It was a game he was fated to play for thirty years, first in the hope of enlarging his borders and then of saving his land and people. To-day the Basuto are his monument.

Moshesh's claims were wide. Northward they embraced a large belt of territory right across to the Vaal on the ground that the remains of the tribes which occupied it before the *Mfecane* were now under his rule in Basutoland awaiting an opportunity to reoccupy it. From the point of view of Bantu law the claim was not so extravagant as it appeared to Europeans. Westward he claimed the valley of the Caledon, the key to the history of the relations between the Basuto and their neighbours; for there the rains from the eastern mountains were sufficient to enable corn to be grown without irrigation from the fountains on which the rest of the future Free State depended.¹ The bulk of the Basuto lived under Moshesh or his sub-chiefs to the east of the Caledon, but, before either Boers or missionaries appeared, some had begun to reoccupy lands forty miles to the west which they or their fathers had cultivated before the slaughtering.

1833.

Meanwhile, a number of Bantu, half-breed and Hottentot clans, refugees from the lower Vaal, had arrived there under the guidance of Wesleyan missionaries. They had asked leave of Moshesh and Sikonyela, his rival, the two well-established chiefs of the district, to settle in the Caledon valley, and their missionaries had gone through the form of buying large areas of land round their stations at Thaba Nchu and elsewhere with a maximum expenditure of legal language and a minimum expenditure of anything else.² They then held that the lands belonged to their Society, and that their protégés, Moroko and the rest, were independent chiefs. Moshesh and, of course, the Paris Evangelicals held that the so-called purchase price was merely a payment to secure the usual tribal privileges for the newcomers, who were now vassals ruling their own people alongside the Basuto sub-chiefs. And according to Bantu law, they were right.

As with the missionaries, so with the Boers. Moshesh held

¹ Orpen, *op. cit.*, p. 173; No. 1646 of 1853, p. 49.

² *Bas. Rec.*, I. 5.

that he had merely given them leave to graze their cattle until they were ready to move on. Now, alarmed at the number of farmers who were coming into the lands between the Orange and the lower Caledon, he reminded them of this fact. But, for the moment, the matter was not urgent as the bulk of the 1842. Boers were still in Philippolis, where some 700 of them had leased farms from Griquas who found them useful as purveyors of arms and brandy. To the north-west one, Fourie, was trying to make good his claim to a huge area between the Modder 1839. and the Vaal round Van Wyk's Vlei which he had bought for a few score sheep and a horse from a Bushman. In the midst of the Europeans, half-castes and Bantu thus jostling one another, the missionaries raised the cry that Boers, unattached to the organised parties of Winburg or Potchefstroom, were hunting Bushman children.¹

The situation in Griqualand was indeed impossible. The Boers complained that their coloured neighbours stole their cattle; they held their farms on no certain tenure, and when Adam Kok let his people lease farms he claimed jurisdiction over the lessees. Were they, white men, subject to Griqua law? Why were the Griquas, emigrants from the Colony like themselves, regarded as independent and they not? Finally, where precisely were the Griqua and Basuto borders?

The Cape Government was step by step forced to give an answer to all these questions. Philip made a long tour of the 1842. northern L.M.S. stations, interviewed Adam and Moshesh and came to the conclusion that the Boers were trying to secure Basutoland because of its freedom from horse-sickness. If they did that, they would drive a wedge between the Colony and Natal, which was about to become British. Philip's influence with Napier was not inconsiderable, though the Governor took a more kindly view of the character of the Boers than he did. On his advice, therefore, Napier told Stanley that the Queen's rule must be extended over black and white alike north of the Orange or, failing that, treaties made with the big chiefs, Adam and Moshesh.²

At this stage, to the great annoyance of Michiel Oberholster, leader of the pre-Trek Boers, Mocke returned with his Three 1842. Hundred from Natal, declaring that there was only a truce of six months there, and that when the Hollanders came the fighting would begin. Adam promptly demanded British protection,

¹ Chase, II. 255; Kok to Montagu, June 25, 1844; C.O. 1551, Maitland to S. of S., Aug. 1, 1845; C. 508 of 1872, p. 56; *Bas. Rec.*, I. 36 ff.

² *Bas. Rec.*, I. 44-5; Chase, II. 255; C.O. 1550, Gov. to S. of S., Sept. 15, 1842.

and Mocke, alarmed that some of his followers should have been attacked by natives on their way through Natal and angry that two of them should now have been taken to Colesberg for trial on a charge of murder, went into laager, saying that the missionaries meant to set the tribes on him. He presently emerged and rode down to Alleman's Drift on the Orange to proclaim a republic north of the river; but he was met there by Judge Menzies, who, acting on a hint given by Moshesh and believing that Mocke would 'exterminate' such tribes and Boers as would not swear allegiance to the new republic, proclaimed British sovereignty over all Africa south of the 25th degree and eastward of the 22nd degree of East Longitude to the Indian Ocean, always excepting the dominions of Portugal and native rulers.¹ Mocke subsided, but to Menzies' disgust, Napier disallowed his annexation, adding however that 'colonisation' was the only true solution after all.²

Napier's position was perplexing. He had few troops; the Natalians were buying powder in Colesberg and talking of removing their capital to Weenen out of reach from the sea and within touch of the newly formed Committee of Public Safety at Winburg; field cornets in the north-eastern districts of the Colony had actually called out their men to help their comrades north of the Vaal if they should be attacked by natives. He therefore sent Hare to make a demonstration in force on the south bank of the Orange.³ Hare marched his thousand up and marched them down again without making much impression on the recalcitrants and, throughout that year, confusion redoubled in Transorangia. Griquas and Basuto staked claims in all directions, Napier asked for cavalry to protect the Griquas lest they be driven into the Colony, and the missionaries clamoured for treaties for all their protégés. Stanley clearly favoured the idea, but drew the line at the minor chiefs. Napier therefore signed 'Waterboer treaties' with Adam Kok and Moshesh only.⁴ Both chiefs were to keep order in their dominions in return for a subsidy and send back European criminals to the Colony for trial. The boundaries were badly drawn. Adam's were fixed only along the Orange from Ramah to Bethulie and his wide claims northward to the Modder and eastward into Basuto territory were left untouched. Moshesh was also dissatisfied. His boundary

Feb.
1843.

Nov.-
Dec.
1843.

¹ Bird, II. 56, 114; *Bas. Rec.*, I. 50; Chase, II. 258; C.O. 1374, Menzies to Napier, Oct. 16 and 23, 1842; C.O. 1550, Gov. to S. of S., Nov. 7, 1842.

² Chase, II. 265; C.O. 1550, Napier to S. of S., Nov. 11 and Dec. 13, 1842.

³ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 233-4; C.O. 1361, Hare to Napier, Dec. 5, 1842; Chase, II. 266, 271.

⁴ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 214 ff.; *Bas. Rec.*, I. 55.

gave him some of Sikonyela's lands and the whole of the area between the Orange and Caledon which contained many Boers, but it also cut in half the lands of Moroko and the other small chiefs, and thus excluded a large strip of good land which he claimed as his own. The whole arrangement was a *pis aller*. It might have answered in 1834, but now, beyond putting the Boers under native jurisdiction, it ignored all questions of finance, police and, above all, land tenure. Already Mocke had gained the upper hand, and Oberholster had first thrown himself on the mercy of the Civil Commissioner of Colesberg and, finding no comfort there, had appealed with nearly 300 of his followers to be included in the settlement which was to be made in Natal.¹ Oberholster appealed in vain; nevertheless H.M. Government was being irresistibly drawn across the Orange. Short of 'building a fort' in the Colony and leaving the Boers and the tribes to fight it out, that was the only possible solution.

Stanley had at last faced that fact in Natal and had reinforced the Cape garrison; whereupon Napier made a naval demonstration off the coast and sent Henry Cloete to Port Natal as Special Commissioner to effect a settlement. Cloete was empowered to consult the Natalians on the form of their future local government, but to countenance no colour bar, no encroachment on native lands and no slavery. He found his task a hard one. The Netherlands Government had disowned Smellekamp, but the Boer mind was still dazzled by hopes of Hollander support; for the pertinacious supercargo had reappeared at the Port in May, bringing with him a minister and a schoolmaster, and only the fact that their papers were out of order enabled Smith to head them off to Delagoa Bay.²

Cloete went up to Pietermaritzburg. He found official salaries in arrears thanks partly to Smith's lien upon the customs, even town burghers defying the landdrost, Zietsman, and a solitary half-breed policeman surveying the confusion.³ Pretorius, Boshof and the harassed landdrost were ready to admit to him what they had already confessed privately to Smith, that the republic had been a failure, but the opposition headed by Commandant-General Rudolph played for time; the ubiquitous Mocke rode in from Winburg with Jan Kock, Snyman and 600 followers to strengthen Rudolph's hands, and the ladies of the town gave Cloete their frank opinion of him and all his works. Mocke failed to secure the election of a new Volksraad

¹ Bird, II. 182, 329, 349; Eybers, p. 260.

² Bird, II. 154 ff., 169 ff., 214, 239, 256, 331; Stuart, *Holl. Afrik.*, pp. 169 ff.

³ Bird, II. 178 ff.; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 234, 270.

and withdrew, tumultuously declaring his independence of Natal; eight additional members representing the Adjunct Raad were given seats, but on learning that Cloete's powers stopped short at the Drakensberg, they too departed taking a few of the Natalians with them. The Volksraad then submitted on the terms offered and the Special Commissioner, having secured the cession of St. Lucia Bay from Panda, settled down among the moribund republican institutions to deal with the land claims and the rising tide of Zulu refugees.¹

July
1843.

Before Cloete had finished his task Napier had made way for Sir Peregrine Maitland, an Irish veteran of the Peninsula, sixty-seven years of age, shrewd enough but liable to be swayed by the advisers of the moment. Maitland was in a better position than his predecessor in that the Colony had at last paid off its debts and was showing signs of prosperity. But the trekkers were restive all along the line from Griqualand to Natal, and long delays were taking place in the final settlement of the fate of the dying republic. In any case independence and the all-important colour bar were gone and Cloete's plans held out little hope of the security, the land and the labour that the Boers desired.² The trekkers began to leave Natal, while Maitland recognised Faku the Pondo as ruler of all from the Umzimkulu to the Umtata and from the mountains to the sea, thereby flanking Natal with yet another Treaty State and threatening the Xosas and Tembus with a native ally of the Colony from the rear.³ Nearly a year passed before he was able formally to annex Natal as a district of the Cape. British Natal was to be much smaller than the republic, for it was bounded by the Umzimkulu on the south and the Tugela and Buffalo rivers on the north; the suzerainty over Panda was tacitly dropped; a few officials were appointed, and Cloete was left to administer the law of the Cape Colony in the single-judge court at Maritzburg subject to appeals to Capetown and, in criminal cases, to the check of a jury.⁴

March
1844.

Oct.
1844.

Aug.
1845.

Many of the Boers who abandoned Natal, and among them Pretorius, crossed the Vaal to Potchefstroom, where Potgieter still was. There they accepted a revised constitution, the famous Thirty-three Articles, and severed the connection

¹ Bird, II. 149, 218, 256, 265, 299; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 242-4; Chase, II. 282.

² On Land, *vide* Bird, II. 106, 113, 123, 150, 277, 404, 436, 463. On Locations, *vide ibid.*, II. 199, 213, 282, 422, 454.

³ No. 424 of 1851, p. 235.

⁴ Eybers, pp. 182-6, 227; Bird, II. 394, 465. Martin West, C.C. of Albany, as Lieutenant-Governor; D. Moodie, Secretary; W. Harding, Crown Prosecutor; H. Cloete, Recorder; Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the Natives.

between Winburg-Potchefstroom and Natal. To the west they April claimed a boundary running north from the Aughrabies Falls 1844. on the lower Orange, and to the east they tried to get into touch with Smellekamp at Delagoa Bay. A small party got through with some loss and presently Potgieter followed; but the coast belt was deadly for man and beast, the country behind Sofala was no better, and the trekkers realised that, having lost Port Natal and St. Lucia Bay, they were cut off from the sea.¹

Meanwhile, in Transorangia, Adam Kok exercised his jurisdiction under the recent treaty for the first time by sending a European charged with murder to Colesberg.² Mocke threatened Jan. war, and for the sake of peace the prisoner was released; but 1844. Oberholster declared that he would have no one in Griqualand who refused the oath of allegiance to the Queen, and joined with the chiefs in complaining that the trekkers were trying to frighten all opponents out of the country. Winburg had indeed claimed authority as far south as the Orange, thus ignoring Kok's claims and Napier's treaties, and Jan Kock was busily pressing its pretensions. Potgieter himself then tried to make a treaty of his own with Adam whereby Boers and Griquas should live side by side under their respective rulers, who should decide 'mixed' cases jointly. Adam, fearing to be the earthen pot beside the pot of iron, refused and asked for a British garrison. Maitland promised an inquiry, but before anything could be done Adam 'upset the apple-cart.' A Boer, Krynauw, had two peccant blacks flogged by the redoubtable commandant Kock; Adam tried to arrest Krynauw; Krynauw's friends came to the rescue, and the whole of Philippolis was given over to mutual cattle-rieving and skirmishing. The Boers declared themselves under the Winburg Raad; even the pacific Oberholster was defiant, and Maitland, risking a Colesberg rising, sent up dragoons who scattered the Boers at Zwartkopjes. Kock and Mocke fled, May 1845. Oberholster's people took the oath of allegiance,³ and Maitland, thus encouraged, determined to attempt a general settlement which he hoped could later be extended to the 25th latitude.

The basis of any such settlement must be a fair allocation of the land between white, coloured and black. Maitland convened all the Transorangian chiefs at Touwfontein and proposed that each should have the lands he claimed divided into two parts, the one an inalienable reserve, the other an area in which lands could 1845.

¹ Eybers, p. 349; Preller, *Voortrekkerense*, III. 172; *Die Natalier*, June 7, 1844; Cory, IV. 193; Lion-Cachet, *De Worstelstryd der Transvalers*, pp. 292 ff.

² Despatches, 48 of June and 101 of July 1844.

³ C.O. 1384, Enclosures 1a. ff. to No. 83, Feb. 17, 1845; C.C. of Colesberg, March 20 and 29, 1845; Cory, *op. cit.*, IV. 299 ff.

be leased to Europeans. The chiefs were to remain nominally sovereign over the whole, but in practice a British Resident would control the Europeans, send serious cases to the Colony for trial and judge mixed cases jointly with the chiefs. Half the quit-rents of leased land were to go to the chiefs and half to pay the expenses of the Resident, who was in addition to have the right to call on each chief for a given number of men for the maintenance of the peace. Such were the mutual jealousies of the chiefs and their missionaries that only Adam Kok, who was well under L.M.S. control, accepted the scheme fully. Moshesh indeed accepted it in principle and his Bataung vassal, Molitsane, who was living at Mekuatleng till the time should come for him to reoccupy his ancestral lands to the north of Basutoland, asked that it should be applied to him. But Moshesh was only willing to have the undisputed portion of his frontier marked out; the rest must wait. Maitland therefore had to be content with recognising Kok's lands between the Orange and the Riet as inalienable and establishing Major Warden as Resident at Bloemfontein, an ex-Griqua farm in the alienable portion between the Riet and Modder rivers.¹

H.M. Government had thus planted one foot beyond the Orange. The other must needs follow, for the Touwfontein arrangement was admittedly 'the germ of future conflicts.'² The germ promised to develop rapidly. Moshesh contemptuously offered the Boers a small wedge of unwanted land between the Orange and the Caledon, and meanwhile pushed his outposts into the disputed lands to the west of the latter river to make room for scattered members of his clans who, hearing of peace and prosperity in Basutoland, were flocking to him from all sides; Fourie was in difficulties at Van Wyk's Vlei; Jan Kock was terrorising the venerable landdrost of Winburg.³ Maitland made one more effort to establish order. Warden told the assembled chiefs at Platberg that a commission was coming to hear their complaints and received their promise to keep the peace till it should come. The commission never came, for, while Warden yet spake, the War of the Axe broke out on the Eastern Frontier.

March
1846.

There had been a period of tranquillity on the Eastern Frontier during the early months of 1841, but thereafter the troubles had begun again. The Stockenstrom system steadily crumbled away. There were faults on both sides. Hare, who wanted to coerce 'prudently and justly and judiciously,'⁴ destroyed all confidence

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, I. 88, 92, 119; C.O. 1551, Gov. to S. of S., Aug. 1, 1845; Eybers, p. 261.

² C.O. 1333, S. of S. to Gov., Nov. 6, 1845.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, I. 101 ff.

⁴ No. 424 of 1851, p. 183. Stretch's Memo. of 1846.

in the Government by making such wide claims that some of the chiefs complained that Government only kept that half of the treaties that suited them best, and that chiefs who kept the whole found themselves worse off than their backsliding colleagues. Panics and protests were the order of the day among the frontiersmen. Occasional murders were followed by demands for the annexation of Kaffirland, the periodical thefts of cattle by demands for the revival of the D'Urban system. Such outbursts were expected and duly discounted by the Capetown authorities. After all, all save one of the victims of murder before 1840 had been Hottentot herdsmen slain before Napier had relieved them of the dangerous duty of carrying a gun; of the ten Europeans found dead during the five years preceding September 1843, four only had, with any probability, been killed by 'foreign' Kaffirs, and one of those four had been killed on his way home from a gun-runner's haunt. The rest had been slain by Xosas or Fingos resident in the Colony, men who had ensconced themselves in inaccessible corners of farms or had been invited to squat on the farms by the owners in defiance of the pass laws and the wishes of the chiefs.¹ For wool was booming and there was a shortage of labour. Some of the thefts with which the tribes were automatically charged were the work of these same people or of gangs of Europeans who stole horses in the Colony and sold them in Kaffirland. Nevertheless, though Tyali was now dead, the Kaffirs stole and the native police were either frightened of their kinsmen or implicated in the thefts. Even Napier began to despair, and, with Sandile's permission, expelled Tola from the Ceded Territory, posted troops once more at Fort Willshire on the Keiskamma and, by arrangement with the local chiefs, began to build a fort between that river and the Fish. But he shrank from a full return to the D'Urban system, for that meant war.² As it was the pacific Kama, believing that war must come, went north for a season to seek protection from Moshesh.

The root of the trouble on the Kaffir side of the frontier was that the power of the great chiefs was waning. Sometimes the drunken Sandile tried to carry out the treaties and sometimes he did not, and, since losing the regency, Macomo had set himself against him and had usurped power for himself and the councillors. Yet when all is said and done, property on the frontier had doubled in value and doubled and doubled again since the inauguration of the treaty system and, though wool explains this appreciation, wool would have been non-existent without a great measure of

¹ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 61, 85, 186, 196, 202, 267, 424; Stretch's Memo.; S.A. Comm. Adv., Jan. 27 and 31, 1844; Cory, IV. 355 ff.

² No. 424 of 1851, pp. 87, 134, 156 ff., 181, 228.

Sept.
1844.

security; ¹ there had been little work for the garrison which enriched Grahamstown and the small balance of beasts properly due by the tribes under the treaties had been cleared off. On the other hand the irreclaimable list was a long one, many border farms stood empty because they were not safe, a farmer named de Lange had recently been killed in a scuffle with thieves in the Colony, and nothing but a show of force had induced the chiefs to give up some of the miscreants. ²

It was under these circumstances that Maitland unexpectedly arrived on the frontier. Stanley had already talked of modifying the treaties but, as usual, he had left him to use his own judgment. ³ Maitland, possibly well primed by Menzies before leaving Capetown, much more certainly impressed after his arrival on the frontier by the missionaries' picture of the growing demoralisation of the Xosas, and undoubtedly influenced by the clamour in Grahamstown, suddenly revolutionised the frontier system. He first induced the Gunukwebes and other clans in the Ceded Territory to accept new treaties. He gilded the pill by promising them annual presents, but he insisted that the chiefs must hand thieves over for trial in the Colony, make good the loss of beasts traced to their kraals, restore untraced beasts which the owner might recognise in their territories and pay him for his loss of time and other expenses. They must also once more recognise the Keiskamma as the colonial boundary, occupy the Ceded Territory only on good behaviour, and allow patrols to enter and the Governor to build forts therein. He then induced the Tembus to accept the new treaties, lined up his dragoons and imposed similar terms on the sulky Gaikas, and made alliances with Faku the Pondo and Kreli the Xosa chief paramount, in the hope that they would protect travellers along the mission-road to Natal, prevent the landing of goods unlicensed by the Colony on their coasts and overawe the frontier tribes from the rear. ⁴ So, having ordered the completion of Napier's Post Victoria in the Ceded Territory and informally obtained leave from Sandile to build another fort at Block Drift on the Tyumie just within Kaffirland itself, he retired to the capital.

Oct.
1844.

Several months of peace followed Maitland's settlement, but it was a delusive peace. The partial return to the pre-Stockenstrom regime had been hailed with wild rejoicings in the frontier towns, for, men said, the end of the wedge was now in and Kaffirland

¹ No. 424 of 1851, p. 35; Stretch's Memo.

² *Ibid.*, p. 226; but it is doubtful whether they were the real murderers (Cory, *op. cit.*, IV. 376).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 232 ff.

must soon fall.¹ Sandile, on the other hand, had agreed to the forts in the hope that if stealing was once stopped, the colonists would have no excuse for taking his lands. The other chiefs, however, had left Maitland's presence convinced that he was a man of war—'Did you not,' they asked, 'see the swords of the dragoons?'—convinced too that some of the missionaries meant to do by force what they had failed to do by persuasion, 'steal their people and be magistrates and chiefs themselves.' Patrols and forts had come again, loss of lands would surely follow, and the Xosa chiefs on both sides of the Kei allied with one another and the Tembus for a defensive war lest they 'be broke up as the Hottentots were.' The signal for that war was to be the firing of the first Kaffir hut by the troops.²

Sandile held out against his followers for a time; but no one paid any attention to the wrecks of the treaty system; the dragoons rode off to Zwartkopjes; possibly, as Maitland believed, Boers from beyond the Orange stirred up the Gaikas, and cattle and horse thieving began again. In the latter part of 1845 the war-party among the Gaikas gained the upper-hand, set aside the regent of one clan because he dealt too hardly with thieves, killed a missionary in mistake for Theophilus Shepstone, agent to the Gunukwebes, and molested another missionary and a trader. Six months before the outbreak, Stretch, the Gaika Commissioner, warned Maitland that war was coming; but the warning was not taken and, in the midst of the growing excitement, military surveyors at Block Drift, mistaking their orders, began to survey the Kaffirland bank of the Tyumie. Sandile protested and began to beat up his neighbours; troops were hurried up on the colonial side and a clamour arose in the Colony against Hare for his weakness in abandoning Block Drift; Macomo pointedly asked if he might avoid the coming war by retiring into the Colony. Then, followers of the dispossessed Tola rescued a comrade accused of having stolen an axe, and slew a Hottentot on British soil; the chiefs concerned refused to give up the murderers, and Maitland set out for the frontier with troops and burghers.³

This time the colonial forces struck first.⁴ Indeed, Hare struck too soon. He sent a mixed and totally inadequate force straight into Kaffirland. In passing the troops fired Sandile's deserted huts. At this, the prearranged signal, the Gaikas flew at them, destroyed half their unwieldy waggon train near Burnshill and,

¹ Stretch to Fairbairn, Nov. 7, 1844, and *Memo.* 1846; Cory, *op. cit.*, IV. 378; *Speeches . . . of the late J. M. Bowker* (1864), pp. 116 ff.

² Stretch, Nov. 7, 1844, and *Memo.* Stretch had warned the Governor of this as early as 1840 (No. 424 of 1851, p. 51).

³ Cory, *op. cit.*, IV. 408 ff.; Stretch's diary and *Memo.*, 1846.

⁴ On the War of the Axe, *vide* No. 27 of 1847 and 912 and 969 of 1848, *passim*.

March
1846.

backed by most of the Tembus, poured into the Colony. They found the colonists safely in laager, but they did immense damage to property, and so elated were they that, almost for the first time in these wars, they marched in the open in broad daylight till the cavalry taught them caution on the banks of the Gwanga. All the Fingos and a handful of the Xosas and Tembus supported the Colonial Government, and Maitland soon had 14,000 men in the field, by far the largest force yet assembled on the frontier. Drought hampered the transport and an attack on the wooded Amatola Mountains effected little; but Stockenstrom, who led the burghers of the Eastern districts, forced Kreli, who was once more playing 'the bush' to captured cattle behind the Kei, to promise to disgorge the colonial cattle and hold himself responsible for the doings of all the Xosa clans, a return to the days when Gaika had been similarly burdened with the sins of the Zuurveld Kaffirs. Drought forced Maitland to dismiss the burghers in September. Many of them parted with the regulars on bad terms owing to the high-handed acts of some of the officers, mutual contempt for each other's methods of fighting and continual quarrels over transport; Stockenstrom, *more suo*, quarrelled with the Governor for interfering in his dealings with Kreli and, even when fresh troops arrived, no transport was forthcoming till Maitland departed from the time-honoured requisitioning and paid £2 a day for each waggon and span. Nevertheless, at the end of the year, all save three of the clans west of the Kei were registering as British subjects and busily planting their gardens in their new locations against the next fighting season.

Jan.
1847.

A force then crossed the Kei to compel Kreli to carry out his promises; Maitland made way for Sir Harry Pottinger, an East India Company man, and, since Hare was dead, Lieut.-General Berkeley took command of the troops. Pottinger did what he could to organise the conquered territory, using the mouth of the Buffalo as the base for the advanced posts; but he was hampered by traders who supplied the enemy with ammunition, by scandalous corruption among the organisers of the largely imaginary Hottentot levies which drew on the Commissariat, and by apathy on the part of the Colonists generally. After all, campaigning was a weary business, native policy was in the hands of the imperial officials and not theirs, and Maitland had announced that no farms would be given out in Kaffirland at the end of it all.¹ Even when the war blazed up again after the harvest and Sandile was proclaimed a rebel, very few burghers

¹ No. 424 of 1851, pp. 32, 57, 85, 100 ff.; No. 912 of 1848, pp. 26, 51, 79, 82, 87; No. 969 of 1848, pp. 3, 39, 56; Despatch 154 of 1847 (Cape).

responded to the bait of all the cattle they could capture. But the work was done somehow, and, when Sir Harry Smith arrived as Governor, all was quiet west of the Kei. Dec. 1847.

Smith, a dapper little man, 'electric in his every movement . . . very determined but very impulsive and theatrical,' was not the man to do anything by halves. He knew that he had behind him an Imperial Government averse to following its restless subjects round the world, for it was still 'the hungry Forties,' when the Chancellor of the Exchequer 'sat by the pool of a bottomless deficit fishing for a Budget'; but he himself had spent many years in South Africa; he knew and liked the Colonists, Dutch and English, and they him; he was a first-class soldier, 'the hero of Aliwal,' fresh from his Sikh triumphs and bursting as ever with vigour and good intentions. He sprang ashore and sounded the double, and for twelve breathless months all South Africa doubled.¹

Smith's first care was for the Eastern Frontier. Everyone was agreed that the Ceded Territory and 'British Kaffirland' beyond the Keiskamma must be annexed. The only question was, On what terms? Earl Grey wanted to control the chiefs in the Ceded Territory by a European officer who should command their forces and draft Kaffir 'Sepoys' as hostages to the western districts; Maitland had proposed to settle Hottentots as a 'wall of iron' along the west bank of the Keiskamma; Pottinger would have settled Europeans among the Hottentots on the lines originally proposed for the Kat River Settlement in 1829. As for 'British Kaffirland,' Maitland would have kept the Amatolas empty and ruled the tribes through European officials; Pottinger meant the chiefs to rule under European guidance,² but so far no one in authority had publicly proposed to settle Europeans beyond the Keiskamma. Smith, however, revived D'Urban's later policy, and this time there was no Philip to say him nay. Philip still lived, but he was an old man, broken by private sorrows, robbed by death of his ally Buxton, and, in his retirement, inclined to blame the Gaikas for the war.

Smith hastened to the frontier and annexed the Ceded Territory as the District of Victoria East. In the northern half he placed the Fingos under the Rev. H. Calderwood as magistrate. The rest of the land was soon sold and guarded by military villages along the Tyumie. He then annexed the land between the Keiskamma and the Kei as British Kaffraria, offered the chiefs Dec. 1847.

¹ Vide *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, pp. 579 ff.

² No. 27 of 1847, pp. 158, 195; No. 912 of 1848, pp. 1 ff., 10.

their choice between the staffs of peace and war (a sergeant's pike and a tent-pole surmounted by a door-knob respectively), and received their submission. A few days later he announced his terms to the boom of an exploding powder waggon and the fluttering of torn-up paper. 'There go the treaties. Do you hear? No more treaties.'¹ Henceforward the tribes would hold the reserves allotted to them from the Queen or her representative, the High Commissioner, as Great Chief. They would still rule their people, but there would be magistrates to set aside their judgments if they were 'inconsistent with justice and humanity.' Kingwilliamstown was to be the capital; the port of East London was annexed to the Cape Colony to avoid difficulties over the customs; round each of the forts and mission stations farms were offered to Europeans and, beyond the Kei, Krelie was obliged to recognise the Queen's sovereignty over the main road to the mission stations of Butterworth and Clarkebury. So ended the long-sustained attempt to maintain territorial segregation along the line of a river, and so began the attempt to rule black and white as inhabitants of one country.

Dec.
1847.

The bare outlines of this settlement were hardly sketched before Smith hurried northwards. He had already annexed the Stormberg area up to the Kraai river and the huge, unorganised territory that lay along the Orange from Ramah to the Atlantic.² He now splashed through the Orange with sixty Cape Mounted Riflemen panting in his tracks to conciliate the Boers, 'his children.' He came as something more than a mere Colonial Governor, for H.M. Government had realised at last that its colony at the Cape had become South Africa, and had created the office of High Commissioner 'for the settling and adjustment of the affairs of the territories . . . adjacent or contiguous to the . . . frontier.'³ Pottinger was the first to hold the office, but Smith was the first to use the powers conferred by it. He found Warden seated at Bloemfontein surrounded by confusion. There was the usual friction between Europeans and Griquas in Philippolis and the scuffling had begun to spread to the Basuto borderlands. The French missionaries had just occupied Koes-

Oct.
1846.

¹ No. 969 of 1848, pp. 24 ff., 57. Smith was picturesque in everything he did. 'You dare to make war,' he cried to the assembled chiefs. 'You dare to attack waggons. . . . Do you see that waggon, I say? Now hear my word—Fire.' (The waggon is blown up. Their astonishment was *excessive*.) 'Ah, do you see the waggon now? And you would and shall be blown up with it if you ever again attempt to touch another; so be good and believe your father as you used to call me. . . . You *shall* be good and I *will* have peace that my people may plough' (No. 969 of 1848, pp. 51, 52).

² No. 969 of 1848, p. 22; No. 457 of 1850, p. 31; No. 1350 of 1851, p. 4.

³ No. 912 of 1848, p. 5.

berg to the south to strengthen the hold there of a petty Basuto clan, and already they were surrounded by Boers. A few stray white men had joined Sikonyela's people who, in defiance of their Platberg promise, had wantonly attacked a Basuto outpost in pursuance of their old feud with that tribe.¹ Smith bullied Adam Kok into abandoning his jurisdiction over Griquas outside his inalienable reserve in return for a small pension, but he failed to overawe Moshesh and hurried on northwards. He found the Winburg Republic falling to pieces. The disaster to Hare's baggage train at Burnshill had inspired Jan Kock to threaten the Philippolis Griquas;² but Warden and his multi-coloured posse comitatus had chased him across the Vaal. Thereafter the heemraden had never met at Winburg again, and, now, two rival landdrosts were competing for the remnants of authority. But again Smith would wait for no man and posted on towards Natal.

He was anxious to reach Natal without delay, for the Boers were drifting steadily out of the territory to join Pretorius at Potchefstroom or Potgieter at his newly founded town of Andries-Ohrigstad on the road to Delagoa Bay. Whether any of them would remain in Natal depended on a satisfactory settlement of the two closely allied questions of land tenure and native policy. The Volksraad had promised two farms and one town erf to each married man, and one farm and an erf to each 'young man' who had entered the country before the end of 1839. Later comers as a rule had had to be content with one farm, but Cloete had found leading Boers claiming many farms, Pretorius ten and Rudolph no less than forty, and had had difficulty in inducing the rank and file to register their claims at all.³ Acting on his report the new Natal Government decided to survey farms of 6000 acres at a quit-rent of £4 for all who had occupied their places during the twelve months preceding Cloete's arrival, but of 2000 acres only for all others. Most of the trekkers would not hear of it. It was not always easy to prove occupation, for the vital twelve months had been a time of confusion; a farm to be a farm must be 6000 acres irrespective of the quality of the ground; delay in the issue of title-deeds and an upset price of 4s. per acre for Crown lands increased the bitterness.⁴ To add to the general discontent, Zulu refugees were still pouring into a country bereft now of the colour bar, and the Boers complained

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, I. 139 ff.; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 169.

² No. 969 of 1848, pp. 61-2; No. 1360 of 1851, pp. 81 ff.; C.O. 1452, Gov. to S. of S., July 30, 1846.

³ Bird, II. 191, 279, 453.

⁴ *Die Kaapsche Grensblad*, Oct. 30, 1847.

that the land commission which was demarcating native reserves had included some of their widely scattered farms therein. In any case they said that they could not live among so many natives.

1846-1847. Some of the Natalians had set up the short-lived Klip River Republic to the west of the Buffalo, and next year Pretorius had gone to Grahamstown to interview Pottinger on behalf of the rest. The harassed High Commissioner, in the thick of a Kaffir war and his own interminable correspondence, had declined to see them, and now his successor met Pretorius and most of the Natal Boers trekking over the Drakensberg northwards in the greatest misery.¹ Smith promised 6000 acres at once to all who were entitled to them, and 6000 to others who would occupy the farms within six months and undertake not to sell or mortgage them within seven years. Some accepted the terms, others presently returned from the High Veld to Natal, where they provided a border guard and a stable population for the Klip River Division; but most of them followed Pretorius to Potchefstroom, while the Klip River republicans, finding themselves still on English ground, moved across the Buffalo.


1848. One other matter Smith settled while on Natal soil. It is not easy to decide how far he had crossed the Orange with any clear intention of annexing the country to the north of it. He himself said later on that he had come intending even to withdraw the British Resident from Bloemfontein, but that the treaty with Adam, the prayers of the chiefs and his warm reception by the Boers decided him to annex. Oberholster certainly welcomed him; Snyman told him that he could answer for 900 men and, though the Winburgers were divided, influential men told him privately that they wanted the Queen's sovereignty but could not say so openly for fear of one another. Lieutenant-Governor West and Theophilus Shepstone laid before him the not very convincing evidence they had collected on the subject of Transvaal slavery perhaps in the hope that he would annex that territory, and Smith did go so far as to ask Pretorius to test the feeling of the Transvaalers. Then, thinking he was on firm ground, he proclaimed the sovereignty of Her Majesty over all, white, coloured and black, between the Orange, the Vaal and the Drakensberg.²

Feb.
1848.

Pretorius was furious, for he had understood that Smith had wished him to sound the Winburg Boers as well. He therefore refused Smith's cheerful offer of a commissionership in the new

¹ No. 980 of 1848, pp. 184 ff. 196, 212.


² No. 969 of 1848, pp. 56, 63; No. 1646 of 1853, p. 22; Eybers, pp. 270 ff.



SOUTH-EASTERN AFRICA

1835-57

Scale of Miles



- British Colonies 1835-46.....
- Annexations to the Cape Colony, 1847-54.....
- British Kaffraria.....
- Orange Free State.....
- Transvaal (boundaries undefined).....
- Bantu and Griqua States.....

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Orange River Sovereignty and rallied his men. Potgieter refused to help, but, relying on friends in Winburg, Pretorius crossed the Vaal and gently turned Warden out of Bloemfontein. Smith at once marched north with a strong force, scattered the Boers at Boomplaats, proclaimed the Sovereignty once more, set a price on Pretorius's head, offered Potgieter the rejected commissioner-ship, and hastened back to Capetown leaving Warden once more in charge.¹

Thus Smith carried Maitland's Touwfontein policy to its logical conclusion and, in his person, H.M. Government planted both feet on the farther side of the Orange river.

British Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter VIII. :

- (a) Cape of Good Hope. *Despatches re . . . the late Kaffir War*, 503 of 1837; *Correspondence re . . . the Kaffir Tribes*, 27 (or 786) of 1847; 912 and 969 of 1848; 387 of 1849; 424 of 1851; *Further Correspondence*, C 508 of 1872; *Correspondence re . . . the Orange River Sovereignty*, 1360 of 1851; 1646 of 1853.
- (b) Natal. *Correspondence re . . . the Settlement of Natal*, 980 of 1848; 1059 of 1849.

¹ No. 1059 of 1849, pp. 43, 61.

CHAPTER IX

PARLIAMENT AND VOLKSRAAD, 1837-57

Constitutional development in Cape Colony : finance and trade ; municipal institutions ; ecclesiastical liberty ; education ; road boards ; the anti-convict agitation ; parliament and divisional councils—Balkanisation : interaction of the Transvaal, Basutoland, the Eastern Frontier and the O.R. Sovereignty ; the Sand River Convention ; the Bloemfontein Convention ; the Republican Grondwets ; Crown Colony rule in Natal.

Secretaries of State for War and Colonies : (1837-52, see p. 202) ; Sir John Pakington, Feb.-Dec. 1852 ; Duke of Newcastle, 1852-June, 1854. *Secretary for Colonies* : Sir G. Grey, 1854-Jan. 1855 ; S. Herbert, Feb. 1855 ; Lord John Russell, Feb.-July 1855 ; Sir W. Molesworth, July-Oct. 1855 ; H. Labouchere, 1855-Feb. 1858.

High Commissioners and Governors of Cape Colony : (see p. 202) ; Lieut.-General Sir G. Cathcart, March 31, 1852-May 26, 1854 ; C. H. Darling, acting May-Dec. 5, 1854 ; Sir George Grey, Dec. 5, 1854-Aug. 15, 1861.

Lieutenant-Governors of Natal : (see p. 202) ; B. C. C. Pine, April 19, 1850-March 3, 1855 ; John Scott, Nov. 1856-Dec. 31, 1864.

Chief Commissioners of British Kaffraria : (see p. 202) ; John Maclean, Oct. 1852, became *Lieutenant-Governor*, Oct. 26, 1860-Dec. 1864.

Residents of the O.R. Sovereignty : Major H. D. Warden, March 8, 1848-July 23, 1852 ; H. Green, July 1852-March 11, 1854. *Orange Free State* : Provisional Government of Seven, March-May 1854 ; *Presidents* : J. P. Hoffman, May 15, 1854-Feb. 1855 ; J. N. Boshof, Feb. 1855-June 1859.

Transvaal (South African Republic) : Local Commandants-General ; then *President* M. W. Pretorius, Jan. 5, 1857-Sept. 1860.

HARRY SMITH'S bold but belated attempt to control the Great Trek failed to stir either Downing Street or Westminster to enthusiasm. Earl Grey indeed had only reconciled himself to the retention of Natal by the thought that its natives would otherwise be exterminated ; he now accepted the O.R. Sovereignty as an accomplished fact which would pay for itself,¹ and footed the bill of £1,000,000 for the War of the Axe with the remark that, as the Cape was so soon to have a Parliament of its own, it must not expect Great Britain to pay for any more of its wars. Manchesterthum was rising to its zenith and the old colonial system based on reciprocal privileges and duties was gone or going with the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts. However rapidly Colonial Secretaries might follow one another, their views and those of the British public coincided on the subject of colonies. Even Protectionists regarded colonies coldly. 'These wretched

¹ No. 969 of 1848, pp. 66-8.

colonies,' wrote Disraeli, 'will all be independent in a few years and are a millstone round our necks.'

But ministers and people were inspired by more generous motives than those of the counting-house. They had no desire for unwilling subjects; they held as of faith, Macaulay still being in the flesh, that the attainment of British parliamentary institutions was the political end of man. As for South Africa, all Great Britain really required was the naval base in the Cape Peninsula. The rest was a burden to be borne cheerfully as long as was necessary but not a moment longer. Even Sir George Grey could argue that since Great Britain might one day have to leave South Africa it behoved her to set the country in order by federating it so that the parting might take place with mutual regrets.¹ It was no coincidence, therefore, that the years which saw self-government achieved in the Two Canadas and the way paved for it in the Antipodes by the Australian Colonies Act and the federation of New Zealand, should also have seen the Transvaalers recognised as independent, the Cape granted a parliamentary constitution,¹⁸⁵²⁻ the O.R. Sovereignty transformed into the Orange Free State,^{1856.} Natal cut off from the old Colony as a separate Crown Colony like British Kaffraria, and the cause of Separation taken up vigorously in the Eastern Province.

The Kaffir war of 1834-5 and the confusion which followed it, the beginnings of municipal government, and the desire to give the new Legislative Council a fair chance had checked the agitation for elective institutions in the Cape Colony. But the Council was not popular in any sense of the word. Its members had to be reappointed with the advent of each new Governor; it only gained the right to alter the Charters of Justice in 1844; it was frankly told by Napier that important matters were decided elsewhere.² Christoffel Brand in the *Zuid Afrikaan* and Robert Godlonton, now editor of the *Grahamstown Journal*, talked of an assembly from time to time, Godlonton adding also a demand for Separation; Russell pleaded in the Commons for 'free and popular institutions'; but Napier, like Sydenham in Canada, had held that free local government was the first need; the Whig Melbourne Ministry fell, and it was not until the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1842 had embodied the principles of the 50th Ordinance by ignoring colour distinctions in questions of employment and breach of contract that Fairbairn was willing to go forward once more. Meanwhile Capetown and Grahams-town meetings petitioned for an Assembly and found a ^{1841.}

¹ No. 1428 of 1852, p. 259; 216, April 1860, pp. 4 ff.

² Theal, *History*, II. 214; C.O. 1326, S. of S. to Gov., Aug. 8, 1838, and C.O. 1332, Jan. 4, 1844.

powerful advocate in J. C. Chase, who argued that slavery being gone and municipal councils established, there was no reason why the boon should be withheld.¹

1842.

Stanley, Secretary of State to the Tory Peel, thought otherwise and, in reply to the petitions, urged all the old objections and added some new ones: the site of the capital (ever a bone of contention in South Africa), the difficulty of manning such an Assembly and devising a satisfactory non-elective portion of the legislature, the fear, justified by the event, that control would fall into the hands of the townsmen. Above all, what of the coloured franchise and Separation?²

Stanley's letter and a quarrel for official precedence between Judge Menzies and Lieutenant-Governor Hare awoke the dozing dogs of Separatism and gave Godlonton his party. The Legislative Council was purely Western till 1847, when William Cock was appointed, and the only official communication the East had with Capetown was through the Lieutenant-Governor. His powers were dwindling. Governors acted over his head and relied on the weekly mail to and from Grahamstown to keep them posted with frontier affairs, while the Legislative Council talked of dropping him from the estimates. At this the East demanded a constitution similar to that of Natal; but Maitland objected that the West would then let its share of the burden of Kaffir wars fall on the shoulders of the British taxpayer. On the eve of the War of the Axe, the office of Lieutenant-Governor was on the point of being extinguished,³ and when, at the end of that struggle, the buffer province of British Kaffraria was directly annexed to the Crown, it became unnecessary and was allowed to lapse.

1847.

Nov.
1846.

By this time, Russell's Whigs were in again and Earl Grey decided to risk giving the Cape parliamentary institutions.⁴ The Colony was in a much healthier condition than it had been ten years before. Then all had been gloom with the trekkers pouring out and the slave apprentices flocking into the towns and dorps, there to breed the measles and smallpox which slew them and the Europeans by scores. Now the tide had turned. D'Urban's economy campaign and the simplification of the fiscal system had borne good fruit; the strict collection of taxes by the Colonial Secretary, John Montagu, had enabled the Colony to wipe off its

1838-
1839.

¹ Chase, *Cape of Good Hope and Algoa Bay, passim*; Eybers, p. 42; R. Kilpin, *Pioneers of Parliament* (Fairbairn, Brand, Porter, Godlonton and Saul Solomon) (*Cape Argus*, March 19-April 23, 1921).

² C.O. 1330, S. of S. to Gov., April 15 and 21, 1842.

³ *G.T. Journal*, Dec. 11, 1845; C.O. 1452, Maitland to S. of S., Oct. 16, 1846.

⁴ No. 912 of 1848, p. 4; No. 400 of 1846, for applications for representative government.

public debt and, helped by a substantial remission of the claim, to repay H.M. Government its advances towards the liquidation of the paper-money.

Customs revenue rose with expanding trade; the trekkers opened up new markets in the interior; slave compensation money and warlike stores for the Kaffir war swelled the imports, and exports moved upwards in sympathy. It is true that wine lost first place on the list, for the British preference had been steadily reduced since 1825 and bad wine killed the demand for good; but faced with a failing market and a labour shortage, many of the Western farmers, like their fellows in the East, fell back on wool. Merino sheep had been acclimatised in Albany on a small scale just before the war of 1834; now Angoras were introduced, and in the 'fifties wool outstripped in value all other Cape exports put together.¹ Hides and skins bulked large; guano was exported from Ichaboe Island off the Namaqualand coast; and the first Cape copper was worked at van der Stel's Koperberg in Namaqualand. Joint-stock companies and kindred financial institutions² reflected the growing prosperity, and eighteen new local banks were opened in the Colony with such success that the old Loan Bank had to close its doors. Coasting trade sprang up vigorously with Natal and, following on Maitland's Pondo treaty, with Port St. John's; for a time a regular steam mail service of fifty days was maintained with England; new jetties and lighthouses were built at Capetown and Port Elizabeth, and determined attempts were made to attract shipping to Port Frances (Alfred).³ Capetown, now partly lit by gas, rebuilt its Groote Kerk and built a Roman Catholic cathedral, a military hospital, and a magnetic observatory for the great astronomer, Sir John Herschel. In the country districts churches and villages sprang up in all directions.

The cause of self-government whose economic foundations were thus being laid was helped forward by the development of local liberties and responsibilities; for, as in mediæval England, Cape parliamentary institutions grew up from below and, in the old Colony alone of all South African states, the principle was recognised that local powers must be paid for by the people who enjoyed them. The Kaffir war of 1834 had delayed the grant of municipal institutions, but at length Beaufort West, first of all

Jan.
1837.

¹ ' . . . Wool is making gentlemen of people who only brought a spade and a check shirt to Africa, and the number of carriages in Grahamstown would surprise you . . . ' (Stretch to Fairbairn, Nov. 19, 1845).

² *E.g.* Capetown Board of Executors (1838) and Old Colonial Mutual Assurance Society (1845) and Grahamstown Fire and Life Assurance (1845).

³ Lighthouses at Mouille Point (1842), Roman Rock lightship (1845), Cape Agulhas and Cape Recife (1849-51).

the towns in the Colony, elected a board of commissioners. Its example was speedily followed by other towns, especially in the East, and, in 1840, by Capetown itself, which also replaced its Dogberries by police patterned on Sir Robert Peel's famous 'peelers.'

1843. After the towns, the Churches. The old laws regulating the relations of the Dutch Reformed Church to the state were abrogated, the political commissioners were withdrawn and the Synod was empowered to regulate all the internal concerns of the church without regard to the Governor's approval. The Synod was to meet in Capetown every five years, a Synodical Commission was to act for it during the intervals, and the five presbyteries into which the church was now organised were to meet annually at Capetown, Tulbagh, Swellendam, Graaff Reinet and Grahamstown. Ministers were still to be paid by the state, and the courts could deal with matters arising out of the actions of the Synod or any subordinate body; nevertheless, the most powerful ecclesiastical body in the Colony had achieved self-government.¹

1848. The Anglican Church also won new strength and freedom. Hitherto it had been controlled by an ecclesiastical board of the two Archbishops and the Bishop of London, but now Robert Gray was appointed Bishop of Capetown. He brought many clergy with him, put new life into the thirteen existing Anglican congregations, founded the Diocesan College (Bishop's) for boys at Rondebosch, and Zonnebloem for the sons of chiefs hard by, and fairly launched the Church of England on its missionary career in southern Africa. So greatly did his work prosper that his immense diocese of the Colony, Natal and St. Helena was divided. Dr. John Armstrong became Bishop of Grahamstown and Dr. John Colenso Bishop of Natal. Similar energy was displayed by the Roman Catholics. A Vicar-Apostolic, P. R. Griffith, was appointed, 1838. ten years later, A. Devereux became Vicar-Apostolic for the Eastern Province. Thus did the Anglicans and Roman Catholics accept Godlonton's principle of Separation.²

1848. Mission societies, Moravian, L.M.S., Wesleyan, Rhenish, Berlin, Paris and the S.A. Mission Society, flourished in and around the Colony.³ All of them except the Moravians concentrated almost entirely on book learning, but such was their energy that coloured and native children were in many ways better supplied with education of a sort than Europeans, many of whom in the more outlying parts, then and for long afterwards, attended the mission schools. There were good private schools in Capetown like the S.A. College and the Tot Nut van't

¹ Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, I. 14.

² *Life of Robert Gray*, chap. iv., vi.

³ Du Plessis, *Christian Missions*.

Algemeen, but the twenty-four 'Somerset' schools in the principal villages were going downhill. They were nominally supervised by the Bible and School Committee over which von Manger, the erstwhile 'subtle' predikant of Graaff Reinet, presided in his dotage, while in each district centre the local predikant and a powerless schoolboard elected by subscribers watched the Scottish schoolmasters depart, the state subsidy diminish and the country folk complain that the schools did not give the kind of schooling they desired, especially in the matter of the medium of instruction. For the rest, there was an elementary school at each church-place and, on the farms, itinerant teachers often of very doubtful quality and character.

Following on a report which had been prepared for D'Urban by the Colonial Secretary, John Bell, Napier asked Herschel to make further recommendations. This he did with the help of Fairbairn, and the Herschel System duly came into force. Two classes of schools were recognised at first: the English ^{1839.} medium, classical schools which charged a small fee to all who could not secure a Government nomination, and the second-class schools, where education was free and Dutch was used as the medium if required. Local boards of subscribers were called on to provide buildings and were permitted to supplement the meagre state salaries to teachers. In keeping with the educational reforms effected in that year in Great Britain, the keystone of the system was inspection carried out by Rose-Innes, one of the original Scots, who was for many years the Education Department of the Colony *in propria persona*. Two difficulties remained: the supply of competent teachers was scanty, and philanthropists demanded that coloured children should be admitted. To meet the lack of teachers, a lack accentuated by the breakdown of a private Normal Seminary, recourse was once more had to Scotland, and Innes defeated the philanthropists by demanding that all scholars must be 'decently clothed and of good deportment,' an elastic description which served its purpose. On the other hand, grants were given to ¹⁸⁴¹⁻ Mission schools and to third-class schools in the country ^{1843.} districts.¹

The primary material needs of the Colony, however, were magistrates, roads, and labour. The first were easily supplied as times improved. Stockenstrom, besides infusing an unwonted energy into the rank and file of Eastern officialdom, had made

¹ Malherbe, *History of Education*, chapters iv., v.; Theal, *Ib.* 210 ff. In 1838, the Government spent £2000 on education. This rose to £7900 in 1850. Cory (IV. 211) notes that, in some places, coloured children were admitted to the Government schools with the approval of their European neighbours.

1840. a beginning by appointing more magistrates; Napier carried on the work, and it only remained for Harry Smith, in his usual dashing style, to create ten new magistracies and two civil commissionerships at a blow.¹ Roads and labour presented greater difficulties. They were two sides of the same problem. Such hard roads as had been built since 1806, like the Queen's Road from Grahamstown to Beaufort, were the work of soldiers or of convicts or of both. Either method was slow and costly, and other labour was difficult to get, as the farmers feared any drain on the already inadequate supply.

1830-1839. Since the slump of Somerset's day immigration had shrunk to the eighteenth-century scale. A few British officials remained in the Colony on their retirement; some soldiers took their discharge there; a few families ventured to land; prize negroes and St. Helenas helped to swell the ranks of the coloured population; but the promising work of the Children's Friend Society, which sent out lads as apprentices, was cut short by credulous philanthropists carried away by the mendacious reports of one of the apprentices, 'the boy Trubshaw.'² The Legislative Council then considered the question of imported labour. It discussed the rival merits of English navvies, St. Helenas, and Ghoorkas, while Earl Grey for his part offered military convicts who should finish their term on Robben Island and be liberated in Capetown. Napier persuaded him to give up the idea, and, when Stanley proposed to send out a few boy convicts, William Porter, the new Attorney-General, said Downing Street should be warned to 'commit no nuisance here.' But since the need for labour and roads was pressing, Montagu, Porter, and the Surveyor-General, Michell, framed the 'Montagu Plan.' Trunk roads were to be built by a central board of three officials and three nominated citizens financed by a state grant, rates, and loans raised on the security of the tolls. Divisional road boards of the Civil Commissioner and four elected members were to build branch roads in the same way. The firstfruits of the new policy were soon seen in the roads over the Montagu (Cradock's) Pass, Michell's Pass and Bain's Kloof, all built by convicts or free labourers imported at Government expense; for nearly 4300 labourers, mechanics, and domestic servants were sent out, and more would have been sent had

1841. 1843. 1848-1853. 1844-1847.

¹ At Port Elizabeth, Colesberg, Cradock and Clanwilliam (1837), Wynberg, Malmesbury, Paarl and Caledon (1839), Tulbagh, Piketberg, Simonstown, Riversdale, Mossel Bay, Richmond, Bathurst, Fort Beaufort, Stockenström (Kat River), Fort Peddie (Victoria East) (1848). Districts were defined in 1839 as the areas under magistrates, Divisions as those under civil commissioners. Sometimes the two areas coincided. Theal, *History*, II. 163; Proclamation, Feb. 5, 1839; No. 387 of 1849, p. 10.

² No. 323 of 1840.

not Harry Smith's unlucky military villages swallowed up the funds.¹

Earl Grey was thus justified in proposing and enthusiasts at the Cape in demanding free and popular institutions. The Reformers had found a powerful ally in Porter. He had won Fairbairn's confidence by refusing to follow the Governor in voting against a usury bill, Brand's by his respect for the Roman-Dutch law and his opposition to Stanley's convict proposals, and popular affection by announcing in court that 'Her Majesty sent me here to prosecute, not to persecute.' Grey had ordered Pottinger to report on the situation, but it was only after the War of the Axe that Harry Smith, breathless from his gallop to the Tugela and back, asked Porter to draft a scheme. Porter's 1848. draft provided for an upper house, which was in effect a continuation of the existing Legislative Council, and an elected House of Assembly. Chief Justice Wylde alone stood out for some elective seats in the Council: Porter himself, who always hankered after a seat in the lower house, proposed that officials should be allowed to stand for election without being held responsible to Parliament for their official acts; but all were agreed that the franchise must be low enough to admit some of Fairbairn's coloured friends to the voters' roll. Separation they set aside, since the Cape Peninsula alone outweighed the whole Eastern Province in wealth, and they decided that the capital must remain at Capetown, where dwelt one in five of the population of the entire Colony.²

Smith sent the draft to London with his blessing and granted the right of free public meeting.³ All seemed to be going well 1849. when a storm arose which very nearly wrecked the hopes of the Reformers and threatened to split the Colony on racial lines. Like other European Powers, Great Britain had long been accustomed to send her more grievous criminals overseas as an alternative to hanging them at home. Since 1788 she had sent them to Australia, but, with the exception of Western Australia and Van Diemen's Land, that country had been closed to this particular type of assisted emigrant in 1840. There was much to be said for the practice of transportation. Convicts were useful on public works, and ticket-of-leave men had a better chance of

¹ Road Report of Sept. 4, 1843; Ordinance 22 of 1843; No. 969 of 1848, p. 36. Population rose from about 54,000 Europeans and 66,000 others in 1830 to 140,000 and 210,000 in 1854 when the Cape Parliament first met.

² On the formation of the Cape Parliament, *vide* Kilpin, *When Downing Street Ruled*; No. 400 of 1846; 1137 and 1234 of 1850; 1362 of 1851; 1427, 1581 and 1636 of 1852; 1640 of 1852-3; 57 of 1852 and *Correspondence relative to the Constitution Ordinance*, 1853.

³ Eybers, p. 44.

making good in a new country than in the old ; but the Cape Colony preferred to rely on its somewhat inadequate local supply of convicts and had no mind to see possible bushrangers let loose among the native and coloured population in a land of scattered farms. Hence, when Grey proposed to send convicts to Capetown provided colonial opinion approved, it was soon made abundantly clear that opinion did not approve. Nevertheless, Capetown heard that convicts, mostly Irishmen captured in 'Widow McCormack's potato-patch rebellion' of 1848, were coming in the *Neptune*. Neither convicts nor Irishmen, the Attorney-General always excepted, were popular in Capetown in those days, any more than they were in the U.S.A. ; a mass meeting of 5000 formed the Anti-Convict League ; petitions to the Queen were widely signed and thousands pledged themselves to boycott all who had any dealings with the invaders.¹

So far opinion in East and West was at one, and Godlonton vied with Fairbairn and Brand, old emancipation quarrels forgotten, in denouncing the Secretary of State. But when Smith announced that he could not set aside his orders, a dangerous division took place. In spite of the Governor's promise that not a convict should land till he had received Downing Street's reply to his remonstrances, four nominated Councillors and many field cornets resigned. To save the legislature from extinction Smith appointed new members ;² whereupon a mob surrounded the Council Chamber, hustled the new Councillors as they came out and, later in the day, smashed the windows of the house of one and destroyed the mill of another. Brand, bitter at his financial failure as an editor and back once more at the Bar, and Fairbairn, who had all that intolerance to opposition which mars the virtues of a certain type of Lowland Scot, now lost all sense of proportion. They cut Porter for two years to come because he would not say that the Governor could set aside his instructions and, when the *Neptune* entered Simons Bay, they tried to boycott the Government. The boycott was never complete, but it led to rioting, in the course of which Fairbairn was assaulted in his own house, and prevented any further session of the Legislative Council for that year. Meanwhile Smith kept his head and his word ; not a convict landed and the *Neptune* sailed for Van Diemen's Land. But she left intense mutual bitterness behind her.

At the same time, Porter's draft was returned with the approval of the Privy Council save that the upper house was to be elective and officials were not to stand for election to the

¹ On the anti-Convict agitation, *vide* No. 217 of 1849 ; 16, 104 and 1138 of 1850 ; and Kilpin, *When Downing Street Ruled*.

² All Westerners : P. L. Cloete, A. de Smidt and J. Letterstedt.

Nov.
1848.

March
1849.

Feb.
1850.

Assembly. Details were to be filled in locally and, to secure as representative a Council as possible, Smith invited the municipal councils and divisional road boards to put forward names for his consideration. He then chose the four highest on the lists: three from the West, Brand, Fairbairn and F. W. Reitz, father of the future Free State President, and one from the East, Stockenstrom. One Easterner, William Cock, had stuck to his guns throughout and, to equalise the representation of East and West, Smith chose Godlonton who had received fewest votes of all. The four Popular Members who had headed the 1850. poll came determined to act as a party and to discuss nothing but the constitution, the one topic on which they were all agreed other than a common hostility to Godlonton, who had washed his hands of the anti-convict agitation in its later stages. Their main points were that the qualifications necessary for membership of the upper house must be reduced and the lower house be given full control of finance. In other words they demanded responsible government and, when the Council passed on to other business, they marched out in a body after Stockenstrom, 'the Flying Dutchman,' had read his 'eleven reasons for dissent.' The Capetown municipality then asked them and J. Wicht, the fifth at the polls, to draft a rival constitution. This Fairbairn took to London; but Grey refused to treat him as a representative, Stockenstrom, who followed him to Downing Street, spoilt his case by a violent letter to Russell, and poor Fairbairn returned home to face financial worries and waning popularity. Nor were matters mended when Brand was passed over for the seat on the Bench rendered vacant by the death of Menzies.

Porter now drew up the 'Attorney-General's Draft' which really formed the framework of the constitution of 1853. This the Rump Council debated till the Eighth Kaffir War called the 1851. Governor to the frontier. The conservative Montagu, who then acted for Smith at the capital, filled up the vacancies on the Council with four Westerners of his own way of thinking and, frightened at the rumour of a coloured rising in the West in sympathy with the Hottentot rebellion in the East, doubled the financial qualification for the franchise to exclude coloured voters. Worse still, the Liberal Russell ministry fell, and the Feb.-
Tory Derby came in with Pakington at the Colonial Office; March
Montagu sailed for England and Smith made way for Cathcart. 1852.
Nothing further could be done till the Whigs were in once more. Then Newcastle hastened to despatch the Order in Council Dec.
which was to give the Cape its Parliament. The Legislative 1852.
Council, with a life of ten years, was to be purely elective, eight

members being returned for the Western Province as a single constituency and seven for the Eastern. Four members for each province were to retire every five years unless the Council were dissolved with the lower house. In the House of Assembly of forty-six members, the West had a majority of two, all sitting for five years unless the house were dissolved either with or without the Council. The Governor was to summon Parliament annually at any place he chose to name, but further than that H.M. Government was not prepared to go in the direction of Separation. Finally, in spite of Montagu, the low franchise advocated by Porter and the Popular Members was adopted and, since all Her Majesty's subjects 'without distinction of class or colour, should be united by one bond of loyalty and a common interest,' all adult male British subjects were to be entitled to the franchise on fulfilling the conditions. Thus was the policy of legal equality based on civilisation rather than the colour of the skin, the policy foreshadowed by the 50th Ordinance, carried to its logical conclusion in the old Colony.¹

Cathcart having gone to his death in the Crimea, the first Cape Parliament was opened by Lieutenant-Governor Darling just after the abandonment of Smith's Orange River Sovereignty. The Reformers promptly quarrelled. Brand defeated Fairbairn for the Speakership which the latter had regarded as his reversion, and Fairbairn, as leader of the House, attacked Saul Solomon, who had learnt journalism and negrophilism at his feet in the offices of the *Commercial Advertiser*, for delay in issuing the estimates in his capacity as Government printer. The powers of officials in Parliament were rigidly restricted, to Porter's disgust, and the two Houses competed for control of money bills. All, however, united in passing a Bill to secure freedom of speech and, in the ensuing session, legislators settled down to business. Reitz and Wicht, two of the Popular Members of 1850, moved in favour of responsible government in the Council, and John Paterson of Port Elizabeth raised that issue in the Assembly. Paterson had mistaken his ground. Petitions poured in from the East against 'the plunder of the Colony' by the Dutch West and the question was shelved. Instead, elective Divisional Councils were instituted to take over the work of the road boards and school committees, and to offer the rural areas

¹ Eybers, pp. 45 ff. Legislative Councillors had to be at least 30 years old and possessed of £2000 in land or £4000 in movables. The Chief Justice presided over the Council. In the Assembly, Capetown had 4 seats and each of the nine Western divisions 2, Grahamstown 2 and the nine Eastern divisions 2 each. The franchise was occupation for twelve months of premises worth £25 per annum or a salary of £50 or, with board and lodging, £25. This franchise remained unchanged till 1892, when it was raised and an education test added to keep out 'blanket Kaffirs' (*vide* p. 438, *infra*).

June
1854.

1855.

that education in local government which the municipal councils were providing for the towns.

The Easterners had at first looked to institutions such as these as an alternative to Separation ; but now they were by no means satisfied with the councils nor with the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor to command the troops and to exercise a limited control over the Eastern civil commissioners.¹ Godlonton had come up to the first session of the Legislative Council with a complete '1820 programme': Separation, a franchise high enough to exclude natives, a vagrancy law, a modified commando system, an increased tariff, and economy in the public service. It was natural that the Easterners should desire Separation. Their part of the Colony was growing in wealth as the trade with the interior developed, for Port Elizabeth waggons could reach the Orange drifts two weeks ahead of those of Capetown : they felt themselves as much entitled as any Republicans or Natalians to a government which would look after their special interests ; they moreover hoped to enlarge their borders in due time by absorbing British Kaffraria and the empty spaces of Nomansland that lay beyond beneath the shadow of the foot-hills of the Quathlamba mountains. They and the Western Conservatives were strong enough to defeat responsible government, but they failed repeatedly to carry Separation or the removal of the capital eastward, or even to prevent expenditure on western railways. Colesberg and Graaff Reinet, two of the wealthiest districts in the East, were opposed to Grahamstown rule ; the Hottentots expected more liberal treatment from the more distant West and petitioned against it ; and gradually the agitation died away.² Good times, the genial influence of Grey, the new Governor, the removal of the best argument in favour of Separation by the self-immolation of the Xosas in the famous cattle-killing, and Godlonton's departure for a time to England induced all parties to give the parliamentary system a fair trial in an undivided Colony.

Had Harry Smith's work stood, the Cape, the largest, most stable, and now the most politically advanced state in South Africa, must have influenced the troubled communities beyond its borders more profoundly than it actually did ; but long before the Cape Parliament was in working order, Smith's hastily constructed edifice had fallen to pieces.

Europeans beyond the Colonial frontiers were stretched in

¹ Eybers, pp. 57, 83 ; Theal, *History*, III. 141.

² *Vide* Separation pamphlets (575, e. 908, S.A. Public Library, Capetown) ; *Cape Argus*, June 27, and *Grahamstown Journal*, May 16, 1857.

a thin line from Philippolis to Durban round a solid mass of Bantu in Kaffraria and Basutoland, while the far end of the line in Natal was hemmed in between the Zulus on the one hand and the coast Kaffirs on the other. Beyond the line to the north, the Transvaalers were scattered like skirmishers among the tribes. The line was weakest at the centre in the O.R. Sovereignty. At Bloemfontein, Warden ruled with the assistance of a Legislative Council of officials and two burghers nominated for each of the districts of Bloemfontein, Winburg, Caledon River and Vaal River.¹ Civil commissioners who were also magistrates sat at each district centre, and beneath them were commandants and field cornets elected by the burghers.

Warden's authority was limited. The Europeans were under his direct rule, but the tribes were subject to him only in so far as concerned 'international' affairs or anything tending to disturb the general peace. It was a local modification of the Indian 'subsidiary' system, and Warden had to make the best of it. His main task was the definition of boundaries. To the west, along the lower Vaal, he gave the Bushmen and Koranas reserves round the Berlin mission at Pniel² and ignored the claims of the Griquas, Waterboer and Cornelis Kok, to sovereign powers east of that river. He left Adam of Philippolis to shift for himself, but towards the Basuto he took a disastrously 'strong' line. Harry Smith had won Moshesh's support for the Sovereignty by telling him that he was a great chief and an ally and that arrangements would be made whereby Europeans would encroach no more. That was what a boundary meant to Moshesh: a line beyond which newcomers should not settle without his leave, while, in lands where whites and blacks were already living side by side, each race should remain under the rule of its own chiefs. He had therefore given back looted cattle to his old enemy, Sikonyela, and recognised his right to a strip of land which the Napier treaty had cut off; but he declined to accept a line in the Caledon area (between the Caledon and Orange) as soon as he realised that this meant the loss of jurisdiction over his tribesmen living beyond it. He was, moreover, slow to remove his people from Sikonyela's country, and scuffling broke out. Sikonyela, Taaibosch's Koranas, and a crowd of mounted coloured vagabonds under Jan Bloem raided the Basuto, and especially their dependants, Molitsani's Bataung, in the corn-lands to the west of the Caledon. They did so once at least with the aid of white men acting under the orders of the magistrate of Winburg, who desired to clear the country for farms.³

¹ No. 1360 of 1851, pp. 3 ff.; Eybers, p. 275.

² C. 508 of 1872, pp. 53 ff.

³ No. 1360 of 1851, p. 24; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 170; *Bas. Rec.*, I. 210 ff.

As Philip's influence declined, Cape officials had departed from the old rule of regarding Adam Kok and Moshesh as the only Transorangian chiefs who need be taken seriously. They had begun to listen to the claims of the Wesleyans on behalf of the minor Caledon chiefs, partly because Moroko and Taaibosch were willing to set aside land for Europeans and partly because they overrated their strength and thought they might be a useful check on the growing power of the Basuto. Warden, an honest but easily influenced man, fell in with the Wesleyan view completely.¹ He summoned a conference of chiefs, who agreed to restore cattle mutually. Moshesh performed his share of the bargain fairly well, but Sikonyela merely attacked Molitsane once more. Warden then decided to use the petty chiefs to humble Moshesh. He recognised them as independent rulers, and told Moshesh that, if he would agree to the boundaries he was about to propose, he would call off Taaibosch and Sikonyela, but if not, he would fall upon him with Europeans and his native allies. Letsie, Moshesh's eldest son, agreed on behalf of his father ^{Circa 1845.} 1849. 'as a dog consents to walk with him who drags him with a reim.'

The Warden Line cut off over a hundred Basuto villages. Some of them had only recently been occupied, but others were of old standing, and with them were cut off a great wedge of good land in the Caledon area and nearly all the corn-lands to the west of the Caledon for the benefit of Europeans or the minor chiefs. Moshesh reluctantly assented to this arrangement, and Warden was left to maintain the Sovereignty with a corporal's guard of regulars in the Queen's Fort at Bloemfontein, burghers who were already doubtful of the advantage of holding their farms on condition that they turned out to keep the peace among Her Majesty's native allies, and the said native allies themselves.² But he had thrown away the support of the one chief whose friendship was worth having.

The precarious life of the O.R. Sovereignty thus depended on the complacency of Moshesh, the willingness of its own burghers to maintain it and of the Transvaalers to let it alone, and, in the last resort, the ability of the High Commissioner to support it with troops drawn from the restive Eastern Frontier. Presently all these conditions failed it and it fell.

The connection between the Sovereignty and the Transvaal was close, for many men on either side of the Vaal held that the old union of Winburg with Potchefstroom should be restored. North of the river, cattle-farmers and ivory-hunters were scattered over 100,000 square miles of country. They were still nominally

¹ No. 1646 of 1853, p. 51.

² No. 1360 of 1851, p. 51; No. 969 of 1848, p. 66.

British subjects, but as the nearest of them were 750 miles from Capetown they were practically independent. Their quality was different from that of the Cape and even of the Sovereignty men. Not only were they mixed with runaways, deserters and all who for one reason or another were 'agin the Government,' but such of them as were genuine trekkers had spent twelve years in the wilderness and were, by a process of sifting, the irreconcilables of the trek, the die-hards who had moved across the Vaal after every crisis in Natal or in the Sovereignty. They were grouped loosely in two main divisions. At Potchefstroom and Magaliesberg (Rustenburg) in the south-west, Andries Pretorius had taken the lead; in the east, Hendrik Potgieter had his headquarters at Andries-Ohrigstad, in touch with the lawless folk of Buffels Rivier (Utrecht) on the Natal border and with 'Portugal' on the East Coast.

1845.

Potgieter had moved away from Potchefstroom soon after the adoption of the Thirty-three Articles to get out of reach of the Punishment Act, sole fragment of British authority in the North, and to open up trade with the indefatigable Smellekamp. At Delagoa Bay he had made a treaty with the Portuguese, who claimed all Africa north of the 26th degree, whereby the Boers were to be allowed to settle as an independent people provided they made arrangements with the natives.¹ This Potgieter did by acquiring what was practically a personal gift of land from Sekwati the Bapedi chief in the Lulu Mountains.² There he founded the town of Andries-Ohrigstad. There was no constitution at first; Potgieter was Head Commandant and that was enough. Nevertheless the Ohrigstaders claimed to be rulers of the whole Transvaal³—were they not the oldest inhabitants?—and even before the trek from Potchefstroom and again immediately after their arrival in the east, some of them had petitioned that Potgieter should be chief executive officer, Head Commandant for life and full member of the Volksraad with powers to conclude treaties, summon the Volksraad and give orders to all commandants in Africa.

1846.

The arrival of a strong contingent from Natal led by J. J. Burger, ex-secretary of the Natal Raad, destroyed this incipient monarchy. The Volksraad party, prompted by Smellekamp, first got a written cession of the land on which the republic stood from the representative of a minor son of the Swazi king as a counterblast to Sekwati's gift to Potgieter, and then drew up a constitution more or less on Natal lines.⁴ Above all they

¹ Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, I. 43; Stuart, *Holl. Afrik.*, pp. 181-3.

² Buis to A.-Ohrigstad Volksraad, May 15, 1846 (Pretoria Archives).

³ Theal, II. 443.

⁴ R. 116 and 117/46 (Pretoria Archives); Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, Bylage II.; T. 1/25, p. 1 (Pretoria Archives).

desired no executive officer at all during the Volksraad recess. Potgieter's party was stronger in the country, but his opponents had the majority in the legislature and were also possessed of a cannon. Chaos reigned. The Volksraad party practically impeached Potgieter; the Dictator tried to prevent the meeting of the Volksraad and, when it met, fourteen of his followers announced that they, as *Het Volk*, had abolished it. Some burghers talked of abandoning the country, but Smellekamp mediated peace of a sort, and upheld the supremacy of the Volksraad.¹ Pretorius also tried to intervene, but he and Potgieter quarrelled so violently that no help was forthcoming from Ohrigstad during the Boomplaats campaign. At last, 'the man on the farm,' anxious for peace, made his voice heard in Cromwellian fashion in favour of 'a man and a responsible body.' Six members from Ohrigstad met fourteen from other parts of the Transvaal at *Derde Poort*; the Potgieter faction stayed away and, with Pretorius in the chair, the assembly decided that a united Volksraad for the whole of the Transvaal should meet thrice yearly and a *Commissie Raad* carry on during the intervals, all subject to the Thirty-three Articles. As a sop to Cerberus, the Head Commandantship for life was given to Potgieter; but he sulked away northward with his friends to the *Zoutpansberg* and founded a new town at *Schoemansdal*.²

The first Transvaal Volksraad, twelve members from Ohrigstad and twelve from other parts, duly met at *Krugerspost*. It abolished Potgieter's office, fixed the capital at Ohrigstad and then transferred it to *Lydenburg* since the original village was being abandoned because of the fever and the unsuitability of its land for cattle.³ This was no solution of the constitutional difficulty; some executive there must be and the cry was raised in the west for Pretorius as *Commandant-General*. In spite of the opposition of the majority of *Het Volk*, Pretorius took office provisionally till the Volksraad could meet. The *Lydenburgers* then turned out in full force, stirred up by one, H. T. *Buhrmann*, a *Hollander* friend of Smellekamp, who had impressed them so much with the coat-of-arms and the French of his passport that some thought he was a Prince of the House of Orange.⁴ Under this influence the Volksraad decided that there should be four *Commandants-General*: W. F. *Joubert* in *Lydenburg*, Potgieter

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 44, *Bylage VI.* and p. ix.; R. 112, a/46 (*Pretoria Archives*).

² Volksraad Minutes (*Pretoria Archives*); Preller, *Voortrekhermense*, III. 177; Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 188 ff.

³ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. viii.; Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 188; Volksraad Minutes, T. 2/25, pp. 42, 98, 113; R. 178-9/49.

⁴ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 45; Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 191 ff.; Prince Hendrik of Nassau had visited *Capetown* in 1838.

Jan. 1851. in Zoutpansberg, and Pretorius in Potchefstroom and Magaliesberg where the village of Rustenburg was about to be founded, while the burghers of Marico on the western border might choose between him and J. A. Enslin, who, however, soon relieved the situation by dying.

There was a risk that the turbulent Transvaalers might attack the O.R. Sovereignty where they had many sympathisers, but they contented themselves with turning back hunting parties from the British South which were following in Livingstone's footsteps to Lake Ngami. The Resident in the Sovereignty thereupon urged that British rule should be extended over all Her Majesty's subjects to the north, and the Cape Executive Council actually agreed with Harry Smith that the Punishment Act ought to be extended to the Equator.¹

July 1851. Events nearer home soon called for Smith's undivided attention. Part of his Kaffrarian settlement was working well, part not so well. The Fingos under Calderwood in Victoria East throve amazingly and promised to become a stabilising force on the frontier; for Calderwood was experimenting along the lines on which the Cape native policy was to develop later: small quit-rents to keep the Fingos on their lands, expenditure of the money thus raised on the reserves and not on general colonial purposes, punishment of vagrants not belonging to the reserves, and rule by headmen under European control.²

Beyond the Keiskamma, the results were less satisfactory. The Kaffrarian chiefs were indeed building the roads which would conquer their country and were eagerly competing for the good-conduct prizes which Smith offered in the hope of sharpening their appetites for Glengarry bonnets, moleskin trousers and other delights of Victorian civilisation.³ But some of the ways of the new Great Chief perplexed the tribesmen. Why was lobola, the basis of their family life, the giving of the sacred cattle which begat the children of the wife for whom they were given, condemned as 'the sin of buying wives'? Why was witch-hunting forbidden? Were the white men in league with the witches who wrought all evil? Other things infuriated them. Magistrates, unable to apply either unsuitable colonial law or unrecognised native custom, ruled by martial law and their own good sense or, as Stockenstrom unkindly put it, 'by deprivation of law and domineering' backed by a few troops and untrustworthy Kaffir police.⁴ The root weakness of the settlement was that too much was expected of the chiefs and too little given in exchange for their

¹ No. 1360 of 1851, pp. 28, 34, 69.

³ No. 457 of 1850, p. 7.

² No. 457 of 1850, *passim*.

⁴ No. 55 of 1852, p. 169.

loss of power, while, in their midst, was the warlike prophet Umlanjeni and, beyond the Kei, the independent Krelis to point the moral. To the west were the Hottentots inspired by 'a dogged feeling . . . that they are an oppressed and ill-used race, that the word of God in the Bible tells them so' and, in the background, the Anti-Convict Agitation seeming to promise the Kaffirs that the Colonists would not support their own Government.¹ To the north was the resentful Moshesh.

Sandile the Gaika and most of the other chiefs refused to meet Oct. Smith. He promptly deposed Sandile, set up the experienced ^{1850.} Charles Brownlee as chief in his stead and hurried back to his constitution-building at Capetown. The Gaikas refused to recognise Brownlee so long as their real chief lived and their restlessness soon called Smith forth again with every available man of his weak garrison. He set up Sutu, great-widow of Gaika, in place of Brownlee, outlawed Sandile and sent troops to rout him out. On Christmas Eve the column was roughly handled in the Boomah Pass and, on the morrow, the Gaikas wiped out three of Smith's costly military villages. In all directions the tribes sprang to arms. Gaikas and emigrant Tembus were aided and abetted by Krelis's Galekas; some of the Hottentots from Theopolis, Kat river and Shiloh obeyed Willem Uithaalter's summons to strike for the independence of the Hottentot nation;² the Kaffir police and even some of the coloured Cape Mounted Riflemen went over to the enemy. Luckily half the Tembus retired to the Bashee; the Ndhlabi Xosas, the Fingos, the Genadendal Hottentots and the Kat River half-breeds turned out on the side of the Colony and, in far distant Zululand, Panda, anxious to give his young men a chance of 'washing their spears,' offered to sweep Kaffraria clean, an offer which called forth a panic in Natal and an impatient refusal from Smith.

Smith struggled on; but the Colonial burghers responded badly to his call; native levies from Natal failed to materialise and the first overseas reinforcements could not reach him before May 1851.³ By that time serious trouble had arisen in the Sovereignty. Warden had found that the dog at the end of his reim could bite. Sikonyela harried Molitsani till the Bataung chief in desperation attacked a Wesleyan station. The Resident, who already had Smith's orders to punish Sikonyela, called up Moroko and his other allies, induced Sikonyela to promise 300

¹ No. 1428 of 1852, p. 72; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 61.

² No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 35, 43, 56. On the Kaffir war of 1850-53, *vide* No. 457 and 1288 of 1850; 383, 424, 635, 1334, 1352, 1360 and 1380 of 1851; 1428 of 1852; 1635 of 1853.

³ No. 1334 of 1851, p. 126; No. 1352 of 1851, p. 15; No. 1380 of 1851, p. 52; No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 12, 55, 81, 246-9.

cattle which he never paid and then, taking him with him, fell on the Bataung and seized much cattle.¹ Molitsani's people promptly recompensed themselves at the expense of Moroko ; but Moshesh and Molitsani, anxious as ever to stand well with the High Commissioner, restrained their warriors and gave Moroko back 2500 beasts. This they did after the outbreak of the Kaffir war had tied Smith's hands, a proof of good faith which was ill-requited by Warden.

In the course of a scuffle with Poshuli, Moshesh's brother, in the newly-annexed Caledon lands, Warden crossed over on to colonial soil and thereby risked involving the Sovereignty and the Basuto in the Kaffir war ; Sikonyela and Taaibosch continued to harass the Basuto, who retaliated on the unhappy Moroko ; and Smith bade Warden treat Moroko as Great Chief of the Sovereignty, a frank absurdity. Against the advice of friendly Boers, Warden called out his forces to humble Moshesh and drive Molitsani out of the corn-lands altogether ; but the burghers, weary of these native bickerings, only turned out in small numbers and the Resident's bands were defeated at Viervoet as they broke off to drive the cattle. Warden retired to Bloemfontein with the Platberg half-breeds and Moroko's Barolong, and, relying on a few regulars and Zulus from Natal, prepared to stand on the defensive till the Kaffir war ended, while Moshesh occupied the deserted lands of Moroko and the half-breeds up to the line he had always claimed and left his men free to raid the farms of those burghers who had obeyed Warden's summons.²

Soon a Boer deputation was openly bargaining with Moshesh to leave their farms alone ; both the burghers and he called on Pretorius to intervene ;³ Pretorius's krygsraad and Het Volk bade him ride south ; Earl Grey, on sending further reinforcements, warned Smith that if the Sovereignty men would not support their own Government, the Queen's rule would be withdrawn after its authority had been vindicated and the allies safeguarded ; and the Kaffir war dragged on its weary length.⁴ The Western burghers were not called up ; those of the East hung back, and Smith was forced to rely on friendly natives, volunteers and irregulars till the troops poured in.⁵ The loss of *Birkenhead* notwithstanding, Smith at last had eleven battalions in the field and cleared the mountainous Waterkloof to the south of the Kat River Settlement.

But the restoration of peace in South Africa was not to rest

¹ No. 1360 of 1851, p. 74 ; No. 1646 of 1853, p. 51.

² No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 113, 126, 173 ; No. 1646 of 1853, p. 51.

³ No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 175-6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 175, 243 ; No. 1646 of 1853, pp. 25, 80.

⁵ No. 1635 of 1853, pp. 66, 72.

June
1851.

March
1852.

with Sir Harry. His authority was virtually divided. Two commissioners, Major W. S. Hogge and C. M. Owen, had already arrived at Bloemfontein to deal with the situation north of the Orange. They found the Sovereignty revenues barely meeting civil expenses, the Natal Zulus out of hand, Fingos rationed and supplied with powder by Warden worrying the Basuto, and the Legislative Council insistent that there must be compensation for losses, withdrawal of the Queen's sovereignty over the tribes, and annexation of the rest of the country to the Cape, which was soon to have its own Parliament and with whose interests those of the Sovereignty were identical.¹

The commissioners were, however, thinking in terms of *divide et impera* rather than of annexation. Pretorius must be headed off. The Transvaalers were out of reach in any case and it was time the fact was recognised. Pretorius had not responded to the call of the disaffected Sovereignty Boers, and the Rev. Andrew Murray, who had gone up from Bloemfontein at Warden's request, found him anxious for a settlement and angry that ruffians like the notorious van der Kolff should be using his name in their raids on the farms of Sovereignty loyalists.² Smith withdrew the sentence of outlawry on Pretorius, who met the commissioners at Sand River. There, in spite of the threats and prayers of the Winburgers not to desert them, representatives of Potchefstroom, Magaliesberg and Lydenburg signed the Sand River Convention. According to these 'Minutes of a meeting,' H.M. Government at last guaranteed 'the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal' freedom to manage their own affairs without let or hindrance and promised to abstain from encroachment on their territory north of the river provided they did not encroach upon what lay to the south of it. Both parties agreed to facilitate mutual trade, extradition of criminals and free movement across the boundaries; the Transvaalers undertook to abstain from slavery, and H.M. Government assured them of an open gunpowder market and disclaimed 'all alliances whatever and with whomsoever of the coloured nations to the north of the Vaal river.'³

So the Transvaalers won recognition of their independence after many years and Harry Smith sailed home broken-hearted, knowing that, in spite of his warnings that abandonment would mean a native rising from Zululand to Lake Ngami, the 'ultimate abandonment' of the Sovereignty was a settled point of Grey's

¹ No. 1380 of 1851, p. 67; No. 1646 of 1853, p. 14. On the Abandonment of the O.R. Sovereignty, *vide* No. 1428 of 1852; 1646 of 1853; 1758 of 1854.

² No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 153, 176, 194-5.

³ No. 1646 of 1853, pp. 31, 36; Eybers, pp. 357 ff.

policy.¹ Grey proposed to withdraw since so many of the natives and apparently of the Boers as well were opposed to the Queen's authority ; but Hogge and Owen, conceiving that abandonment would be a breach of faith to all concerned, did their best to reduce the Sovereignty to order. They dismissed one or two of the least satisfactory of the officials, severely snubbed Cameron of Thaba Nchu, the most vociferous of the Wesleyans, condemned the Warden line and promised the Basuto a new boundary provided they kept within it and restored stolen cattle and horses. Moshesh agreed but failed to induce his people to disgorge ; for Sikonyela was still raiding them and the magistrate of Winburg said it would be a pity to check him.² At last Moshesh took that duty upon himself, overran Sikonyela's country and then gave him good terms as a vassal.

At this stage, Hogge, the stronger-minded of the two commissioners, died and left Owen to meet a conference of elected delegates at Bloemfontein alone. All the delegates asked for rule by a virtual Volksraad supported by an Imperial garrison and power for field cornets to effect reprisals, while half demanded also that the disputes with Moshesh be settled and that no further part be taken in intertribal quarrels. Pretorius arrived at Bloemfontein and was well received ; the cry went up that Moshesh must be brought to his senses and Warden took the opportunity to give Baatje's half-breeds ammunition at the very time that Moshesh was beginning to restore stock.³ Owen dismissed him and appointed a commissariat officer, Green, as Resident, while Cathcart, the new High Commissioner, set up an executive council.

On hearing that the Bloemfontein delegates had demanded such wide powers, Cathcart commented drily that the Sovereignty men had better be given independence and have done with it. In any case, he was inclined towards abandonment on any reasonable terms.⁴ He was soon in a position to consider those terms. On his arrival on the eastern frontier, he had dismissed the useless levies, raised mounted European police, the first in South Africa, and called on the Cape burghers to turn out under threat of withdrawing the troops, a threat which he softened by offering them a share in the captured cattle. They came, took nearly 10,000 of Kreli's cattle in a few days, practically finished the war, and left the High Commissioner free to march north to the Sovereignty with 2500 troops 'not necessarily for war but for the establishment of peace.'⁵

¹ No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 202, 244-5, 253 ff.

² No. 1646 of 1853, pp. 10, 17, 52, 85 ; Orpen, *op. cit.*, pp. 156, 235.

³ No. 1646 of 1853, pp. 57 ff., 63.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 70, 106.

⁵ No. 1635 of 1853, pp. 104, 120, 156, 162, 167, 185.

July
1852.

Oct.
1852.

In reply to the usual demands for redress of grievances and compensation, Cathcart promised that these would be forthcoming, and hinted for the first time publicly that the Queen's authority might be withdrawn. He was amazed at the length of the list of stolen cattle, and, suspecting that all losses from whatever cause had been put down to the Basuto, obliged Green to cut it down.¹ Pressure by Green and Owen, however, coupled with the unexpectedly great cost of the expedition, impelled him to demand 1000 horses and 10,000 cattle within three days. After all, huge herds swarmed round Thaba Bosigo, a like amount of cattle had easily been taken from Kreli, and he could not know that the cattle were not all Moshesh's own, and that, if the fine was to be paid within the time, it would have to be paid by Moshesh himself without much chance of recovering the quotas due from his subordinate chiefs afterwards. Moshesh came and asked for six days, but Cathcart was adamant. 'Do not,' said the diplomatic chieftain, 'talk of war. . . . A dog when beaten will show his teeth. . . . I will go at once and do my best, and perhaps God will help me.' On the appointed day 3500 cattle were produced, but Cathcart could not be satisfied with these. He marched straight on Thaba Bosigo to collect the balance and met with a severe check at the Bera.²

Dec.
1852.

Moshesh was evidently surprised at Cathcart's advance, for he had discounted his threats, since 'words never kill a man,' and had meant to make terms on the verge of war, 'as H.M. Government was merciful.'³ He now gave a diplomatic opening through which, to the general dismay, Cathcart retired. The High Commissioner had taken enough cattle to meet the bill he had presented; Moshesh delivered up some thieves immediately after the battle, and successfully restrained the cattle-thieves on his borders;⁴ there was some justification at the moment for the assertion that peace reigned. In any case, Cathcart assured Moshesh that he was still the good ally of the Queen, left 300 men at Bloemfontein, and hastened back to Kaffraria, there to overawe Kreli and the Kaffrarian chiefs into accepting the terms that he dictated to them. Thus, at the end of a war which had cost the British taxpayer £2,000,000, some 2200 regulars were marking time in the Cape Colony and nearly 2500 in British Kaffraria, Moshesh was noising it abroad that he had beaten the British, and H.M. Government had decided to withdraw from the Sovereignty.⁵

A few far-sighted men might lament the unnecessary

¹ No. 1646, p. 93; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 92-3; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 156, 164, 239 ff.

² No. 1646 of 1853, pp. 94 ff.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 497.

⁴ No. 1635 of 1853, p. 224; No. 1646 of 1835, p. 105.

⁵ No. 1646, p. 118; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 271.

balkanisation of South Africa to which this decision gave rise ; but the facts as they appeared to the Imperial Government pointed unwaveringly towards abandonment. Of all Great Britain's colonial investments, the South African were the most weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable. In time of peace the colonists seemed to regard the considerable garrison as a milch cow ; in time of war, with imperial troops and money flooding the country, they enjoyed a hectic prosperity except on the actual scene of operations. During those wars, each apparently more expensive and less conclusive than the last, traders sold guns and powder to the enemy at war prices ; the produce and transport markets boomed, and, for lack of proper support from the colonists, Governors were forced to rely on volunteers, native levies, and irregulars who were all that the name implied.¹ To this indictment the colonists could reply that native policy was controlled by the Imperial Government, which must therefore pay, and that British Kaffraria was no concern of theirs ; but the Imperial authorities could still retort that they had taken over British Kaffraria to protect the frontier ; that on the frontier itself farmers were much to blame for their own losses in that they encouraged Kaffirs to squat on their farms as labourers, and then seemed ' to expect troops to do duty virtually not only as police, but as herdsmen and shepherds ' ;² and that, as for the Sovereignty, they had done their best to prevent British subjects from going thither, and had only followed them up most reluctantly to secure the peace of South Africa at the wish, as they had been led to believe, of Europeans and natives alike.

Most unsatisfactory of all was the fact that the only people who seemed to benefit by the eternal wars were land speculators who bought up the confiscated Kaffir lands. Land-grabbing on a great scale was not confined to the British colonies, as the forty farms of Commandant Rudolph in republican Natal sufficiently prove ; but that was no consolation at a time when speculators were busy in Victoria East, in Natal, and, above all, in the Sovereignty. There, in a land which was popularly supposed in London to be fit only for antelopes, whose inhabitants could not or would not keep merino sheep, where timber for cantonments was lacking, and military stores had to be trekked up from Port Elizabeth six weeks away, H.M. Government was being asked to spend annually on troops an amount equivalent to £10 per head of population, and this on a people many of whom sympathised with the independent Transvaalers and they with them. And for

¹ *Further Papers re . . . Kaffir Tribes, July 1855*, p. 9 ; No. 1428 of 1852, pp. 252, 256 ; No. 1635, pp. 56, 64, *et passim*.

² No. 1635, pp. 154-5 ; No. 1758 of 1854, p. 20.

what? Missions which were said to be buying rice Christians and whose officials were as much shopkeepers as ministers of the Gospel—clearly the Evangelical Revival was losing its grip on the English governing class in the 'fifties—and to provide shopkeepers with customers and landjobbers with security. And among the worst of the latter class were some of the officials themselves, from Resident Green with his 160,000 acres downwards.¹

This description of the Sovereignty was neither just nor complete. It was as unfair to label all those who cried out for the maintenance of British rule as speculators as it was to say that the trekkers had trekked solely because they wanted free land and servile labour. But there was truth in the description, and, in any case, the British Government had had enough of it. The European horizon had been darkening for some time past, in spite of the Great Exhibition which was to have ushered in an era of peace and plenty; Louis Napoleon's assurance from his imperial throne that 'L'Empire c'est la paix' failed to carry conviction, and a Burmese war had hardly ended before a Russo-Turkish crisis arose which was destined to culminate in the exhausting Crimean campaign. Sir George Clerk, therefore, arrived at Bloemfontein to 'adjust' the affairs of the Sovereignty. Newcastle had told him that retention was still an open question, but Clerk clearly showed from the first that he had come to abandon the country. Ninety-five delegates, three-fourths of whom were Dutch, met him at Bloemfontein. They declared that there must be no abandonment before outstanding land questions with Adam Kok had been settled, the Basuto line fixed, all native treaties cancelled, compensation paid, a guarantee given that neither the Queen's allies nor the Transvaalers would be allowed to make trouble over land claims, and full absolution granted from British allegiance.²

Clerk was not disposed to treat these demands over-sympathetically. Though Cathcart had never been shown the mass of evidence collected for Hogge and Owen in support of Moshesh's claims, he held that the Warden Line in the Caledon area was unjust to the Basuto.³ Since the Berea battle, Moshesh had

¹ No. 1635 of 1853, p. 222; *Further Papers* . . . , July, 1855, pp. 6-9; No. 1758 of 1854, pp. 23, 35, 40, 50, 72; Desp. 517, Grey to S. of S., June 26, 1855. Clerk noted one claimant who asked him to define his estate of 60,000 acres which the late 'proprietor' said had been given him by Harry Smith. The claimant was not quite certain where this estate was, but, added Clerk, 'its name very appropriately was "the Hope"' (No. 1758, p. 50).

² No. 1758 of 1854, pp. 20 ff., 44 ff.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 30; Orpen, pp. 156, 241. The full case for the Basuto was first published in 1883 in Theal's *Basutoland Records*, vols. I., II., III.; vols. IV., V., VI., were prepared but never published. They are in the Cape Archives with a valuable bundle of semi-official and private letters marked *Miscellaneous Basutoland Records*.

1851.
Feb.
1854-
March
1856.
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1853.

restrained the cattle thieves along his borders. Not so others. Sikonyela, Taaibosch, and Fingos under the special protection of the magistrate of Winburg,¹ raided Basuto cattle within sight of Thaba Bosigo; Sikonyela, Taaibosch and a few Europeans destroyed the Bataung reserve on Coal Spruit which Potgieter had recognised when he had received the cession of Winburg;² a little later they attacked Witsi, an independent chief on the northern Basuto border. At last Moshesh could endure it no longer and fell on the disturbers of the peace. He slew Taaibosch, drove Sikonyela into exile and occupied their lands.³ Of all their stations, the Wesleyans retained only Thaba Nchu and Platberg.

Oct.
1853.

Nov.
1853.

The Sovereignty delegates met once more, and this time asked for a constitution under the Crown similar to that which had just been granted to the Cape Colony. Clerk, however, passed on to discuss the boundary question with Moshesh and some of the burghers. The chief made his usual statement of his past relations with Europeans and offered to compromise in the Caledon area, where his claims were weakest. The burghers rejected this, and Moshesh, learning from private conversation that they were not anxious for a definite boundary at all, claimed the whole Napier Line of 1843. Clerk, finding that the Boers did indeed desire no definite boundary and that they were prepared to revert to the pre-annexation relations with the Basuto, simply dropped the matter.⁴

Jan.
1854.

Meanwhile the party which favoured independence grew in strength. Powers of attorney to be signed by those in favour of it were drafted by Coqui, a Belgian-Jewish storekeeper of Harrismith; helpers came in from the Transvaal, and Clerk was able to summon a congress of the 'well-disposed' and dismiss the rump of the original 'obstructionist' delegation. The obstructionists sent two of their number to plead their cause in London; they even 'discovered' gold at Smithfield—were not men's minds still fired by the thought of the gold of California and of Ballarat?—anything to give the Cape Parliament, which was to meet in June, time to express its opinion. It was of no avail. Clerk distributed some £50,000 of compensation money and signed the Bloemfontein Convention.⁵

Feb.
1854.

That instrument, though more precise than the Convention

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 29; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 289.

² *Bas. Rec.*, II. 18, 44, 50, 75; Orpen, *op. cit.*, pp. 255, 258-9. Theal calls the white men renegades; Orpen says that one of them was a member of the legislature.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 55, 76; Orpen, p. 291.

⁴ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 94, 281, 434; Orpen, *History of the Basutus*, p. 111; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 297 ff.

⁵ No. 1758 of 1854, pp. 10 ff., 24, 27, 35, 54; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 286; Eybers, pp. 281 ff.

with the Transvaalers, followed much the same lines. The 'well-disposed' tried to induce Clerk to promise that H.M. Government would make no more treaties with chiefs 'to the northward of the Orange River,' but all the Commissioner would concede was that it now had no treaties with such chiefs, always excepting Adam Kok, and had 'no wish or intention to enter hereafter into any treaties which may be injurious or prejudicial to the interests of the Orange River Government.'

The meaning of this last clause was soon made plain. The D'Urban-Waterboer treaty had already lapsed on the death of 1852. Andries Waterboer¹ and even Adam Kok's position was not really assured. He had been anxious for some time past that, in terms of Harry Smith's promise, farmers should quit his inalienable reserve as their leases expired, but his secretary had allowed Griquas to sell farms and now the Convention bound him to give 'every facility' for such sales. Clerk and Green both tried to talk him over and, when he refused to give these facilities, left him stranded. Nor did they tell him of their understanding with the 'well-disposed' whereunder all Griqua lands sold to Europeans were to come under Free State rule.² Moshesh remained. Clerk had already told him that the Warden Line was 'a dead horse,' but he never told him that his Napier treaty had been abrogated and, when Moshesh came to Bloemfontein to bid him farewell, he avoided all mention of the boundary and March rode away towards the Colony with the garrison of the Queen's 1854. Fort.³

Sir George Clerk thus left Moshesh under the impression that he was entitled to all he had held or claimed before the days of Warden, and the Free Staters believing that they were free to act in the matter of boundaries as in the days before 1843 when, as Pretorius put it, there being no law there could be no transgression. He had handed over the reins of government and £3000 wherewith to 'soothe bitter recollections' to J. P. Hoffman and a committee of six, who found themselves rulers of some 15,000 Europeans, many of whom still regarded themselves as British subjects,⁴ and all of whom were cut off from the outer world and outnumbered twelve to one by the Basuto.

For the moment the Free Staters' troubles came from within rather than from without. Some progress had been made under

¹ No. 1758 of 1854, p. 2.

² *Desp. to Sec. of State*, XXIV. (1859-62), pp. 240-1; A. 118-61 (Cape), pp. 1-17.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 99; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 312-19.

⁴ Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 398; J. Burnet to Travers, Nov. 19, 1860 (*Miscel. Basuto Records*, Cape Archives); No. 216, April 1860, pp. 17, 18.

Warden. The D.R. Church of the Colony had at last followed the trekkers up in the footsteps of Harry Smith; Andrew Murray the younger had been installed at Bloemfontein; soon ministers, consistories and schools had appeared at most of the other villages, and the Sovereignty and Natal clergy had formed the Transgariep Ring of the Church of the Colony.¹ At the capital the foundations of an Anglican cathedral had been laid, and a newspaper, *The Friend of the Sovereignty*, established under Grahamstown auspices to further the march of civilisation north of the Orange and to boom real estate. Bloemfontein and Smithfield were as English as Grahamstown itself, but they and the other towns were tiny, some 200 one-storied houses all told, while in the countryside the farms were widely scattered; 8,000,000 acres of land remained to the Crown and, of the rest, 13,000,000 were native reserves and 11,000,000 alienated, in large proportion to absentee speculators. Two hundred such farms lay in a line between Winburg and Harrismith broken only by the homesteads of three farmers who went into Natal annually for the winter pasture, and all along the Basuto line there were vacant farms whose very limits had never been defined.²

The departure of the troops caused depression in the dorps, but, outside, the price of land actually rose, for sheep-farmers were expected from the Colony and Moshesh had shown himself eager for a settlement. In such a land, lions roamed freely among the swarming game and the scattered herds. The republic was indeed almost entirely a pastoral state, dependent for corn on the Caledon valley tribes and on its European neighbours north and south. Traders from the Colony ventured up sure only of a market for their gunpowder, while Transvaalers came south with meal, tobacco and dried fruits to be bartered for sheep and wool. Hard cash was scarce and becoming scarcer, for the balance of trade was against the country; recorded crime was rare, for there were no police, and where there is no arm of the law there is certainly no transgression. Besides, the tastes and upbringing of the bulk of the inhabitants did not incline them that way.³

From the political point of view the most serious weakness of the new state was its inexperience in the ways of settled government. The southern half of the Republic had had no government at all till 1848; towards the end, the rule of Winburg in the north had been merely nominal, and six troubled years of Sovereignty rule had not inured the burghers to the yoke of

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 33, 41.

² No. 1758 of 1854, pp. 23-7; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 97; Stuart, *Holl. Afrik.*, p. 184.

³ No. 1758 of 1854, p. 54; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 165; *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, p. 20.

1848.

1850.

Circa

1854.

authority, even self-imposed. Hoffman's committee made way as soon as possible for a Volksraad which drew up the most elaborate republican constitution yet attempted in South Africa. The members rejected a ready-made constitution presented by an energetic Hollander schoolmaster; they declined to regard the Law of Moses as adequate for the occasion in spite of the eloquence of its champion who had recently been anointed 'King of the Free State' by another religious enthusiast; when South African experience failed them they fell back on a summary of the U.S.A. constitution.¹ A Volksraad of twenty-nine was to be the 'highest legislative power.' Members were to be elected on an adult European male suffrage which was open to all after six months' residence, and half were to retire every two years. For the first time since Retief's short-lived governorship and Council of Policy, a real civil executive appeared. The State President was to be elected by universal suffrage, to hold office for five years unless he were removed by a three-fourths majority of the Volksraad, to sit in that assembly but not to vote, to remit sentences and to declare peace and war subject to ratification by the Volksraad. His Executive Council was to consist of two officials and three Volksraad members, his Krygsraad of commandants and field cornets elected by the burghers, all of whom were as usual liable for service in the field. In time of war the commandants would elect a Commandant-General, but a permanent officer of that kind, *fons et origo* of so many troubles beyond the Vaal, the fathers of the constitution would not have. Landdrosts appointed by the Volksraad were to administer the districts and sit with heemraden and, in criminal cases, a jury of nine to dispense justice according to 'Het Roomsche Hollandsche regt'; three landdrosts were to form the circuit court; the D.R. Church was to be the State Church, and liberty of conscience and freedom of the press were to be assured. So the constituent Volksraad dispersed, leaving Hoffman to act as President. He was duly elected and installed as first head of the Orange Free State.²

May-
Sept.
1854.

The Free State might be weak, but the Transvaal was politically almost without form and void. The Sand River

¹ Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 308, 340.

² Eybers, *op. cit.*, gives the Constitution as amended in 1866, pp. 285 ff.; *vide* also Theal, *History*, IV. 3 ff., 25. The landdrost of Bloemfontein and the State Secretary sat on the Executive Council. In 1857 the secretary was given a seat in the Volksraad. The first Circuit Court was very inexperienced. There were no attorneys nor advocates available, so three men, two of them English, did their best with the rules of the Cape Supreme Court, van der Linden, Grotius, Justinian, Blackstone, the Cape Statutes, the Notary's Manual and the Executor's Guide (J. M. Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 383. Orpen was one of the gallant three). Later in 1854 the President and Executive Council were appointed to act as court of appeal. Municipal Boards were set up in 1856 (Eybers, p. 311).

Convention had done nothing but recognise the obvious fact that the 25,000 Boer men, women and children 'beyond the Vaal River' were independent. The constitution remained to be made.

It would have to be a constitution suited to a primitive society. The 5000 Boer families, and family life was the universal rule among the strapping men who married their fair-haired wives young and bred mightily, were grouped in and around three or four dorps or scattered thinly over the intervening spaces. Potchefstroom could boast of 100 houses, 700 inhabitants and a Kerkstraat two miles long; but Schoemansdal, the base for the ivory traffic in the north, was fully as large and richer and contemptuous of its rival as is the way of hunters with farmers at all times.¹ Lydenburg was much smaller than either and Ohrigstad was almost deserted. Town and farm houses were rude. Pretorius himself was content with a three-roomed clay house with a thatched roof among whose rafters he kept his private papers and the state archives, till the achievement of independence encouraged him to import English workmen from Natal to set an example in the building of town houses at least. But however humble the dwellings might be, each village had a substantial church built by common effort even though there was no minister to fill the pulpit.²

The folk were ignorant of the affairs of the outer world; three months' schooling at the hands of an itinerant teacher completed the education of a child, as the young Paul Kruger found; but three schoolmasters had arrived from Holland in 1850, and great things were expected of them even though they threw up their hands at the local rendering of Dutch and, themselves, spoke too fast to be easily understood of the people.³ The Boers to a man—and woman—were fond of great discussions, politely inquisitive to strangers and ready to sit for hours in the study of the embarrassed minister who presently arrived from the Netherlands because they had never seen a predikant before. Their hospitality was proverbial and on it they depended for keeping in touch with one another in a country where men might trek eastward from Potchefstroom for three days before reaching a civilised habitation. Families intermarried much and it was customary for a farmer to pack his family into the waggon and set off on a solemn round of visits to relations for two or three months each year. Such book-learning as they had came

¹ Stuart, *Holl. Afrik.*, pp. 205-7; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 49, civ, cvi; Engelenburg, '*N Onbekende Paul Kruger*', p. 32.

² Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 ff.; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 61.

³ Engelenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 37, 72, lxxxix ff.; Stuart, p. 210; Carter, *Narrative of the Boer War*, p. 53.

to them from the daily singing of Psalms and readings in the Bible, especially in the books of Exodus and Joshua. Therein was a story which they and their fathers had enacted, coming up out of the Land of Egypt, out of the House of Bondage—and their contempt for the burghers of the Cape who had remained among the fleshpots was deep—led with manifold signs and wonders through the wilderness and, at times, punished by Jehovah till at last they had entered into the Promised Land to possess it. So closely did some of them follow the historical parallel that Andrew Murray found the *Jeruzalemgangers* of 1849. Marico ready to trek down the river Nyl which should guide them to Zion.¹

Life in the Transvaal of those days was very simple. Skilled workmen were rare; the hard money the trekkers had brought with them from the Colony was fast returning whence it had come or dribbling away to Natal, where they bought many of the supplies that could not be procured locally. Trade with the tribes and the Free Staters was by barter; slaughter cattle were sent down to the Cape itself, and it was on cattle that the Boers really relied. Land was plentiful, much of it good arable land, Hollander observers noted, if only the farmers would work instead of leaving the fields to badly paid Kaffirs who were always running away, and the gardens to their wives. Tobacco there was; oranges and peaches flourished in the southwest; game was to be had for the shooting; but when all was said and done, the Transvaal was essentially a republic of cattle-farmers.²

At Sand River, Pharaoh had promised to trouble the people no more, but the Promised Land was, in one respect, unhappily like the land of Egypt. It had its plagues: wild beasts, wild men, the malaria which haunted the whole country north of the Witwatersrand and slew men by scores in the Magaliesberg, and, above all, the trekkers' own dissensions, Andries Pretorius was finding that a man's most inveterate foes are those of his own household. Some of the Winburg men had crossed the Vaal after Sand River, but the rest taunted him with having deserted them, and Potgieter appeared in arms with his Zoutpansbergers at a great meeting of the people at Rustenburg and accused him of usurping power. The assemblage nearly came to blows, but at last the two champions were publicly reconciled, Potgieter recognised the supremacy of the Volksraad, and the Convention March 1852. was ratified.³

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 40, lxxxii; Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

² Engelbrecht, I. xiv, cxlvi ff.; Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-8.

³ Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 199 ff.; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 48, lxxxix, xc, xci; Engelenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8.

The personal, political and religious feuds which divided the Transvaalers roughly coincided with geographical divisions. Generally speaking, Pretorius and the men of the south-west held by the Natal constitution and Retief's policy of a single republic with a strong central government, a port in the direction of Zululand and ecclesiastical independence; but nearly all the eastern Transvaalers subscribed to the Thirty-three Articles and desired local republics and incorporation with the Cape Synod. At one time it seemed that death would ease the tension, for Potgieter and Pretorius both died in the same year; but the Volksraad appointed Marthinus Pretorius and Piet Potgieter to succeed their respective fathers, and the drift towards hereditary succession was hardly weakened when young Potgieter was killed next year; for Stephanus Schoeman secured the succession by marrying his widow and duly became Commandant-General of Zoutpansberg and heir also to the Potgieter feud with the house of Pretorius.

All these rancours beat upon Marthinus Pretorius, 'a gentle (almost too gentle) man of sound understanding though little developed,' according to one staunch supporter.¹ He essayed to carry out his father's policy. He first negotiated with the Portuguese for a road to Inhambane, but the fly defeated him; then, holding that Panda was still a vassal, a belief which the Zulu king apparently shared at times, he journeyed to Zululand in vain to seek an outlet at St. Lucia Bay. He had little hope that the British Government would accede to his late father's request that Natal should be restored to him, but he was determined to secure as much territory in that direction as he could. The Natalians who had crossed over into Zululand in 1848 were now organising the little republic of Utrecht on land ceded to them by Panda along the Blood river and a hunting track to the Pongola. The boundary of Utrecht to the north-west faded away into lands which had nominally formed part of the Orange River Sovereignty between the Free State Klip river and the Likwa spruit, headwaters of the Vaal. Pretorius claimed the southern branch, the Klip, as his frontier and was soon appealing to Sir George Grey to define his boundaries down to the sea since the unruly folk of Utrecht were said to be asking for Potchefstroom rule. But Utrecht really sympathised with neighbouring Lydenburg, which had just secured from the Swazis a wedge of land thrust between Zululand and Swaziland far down toward the Indian Ocean,² and Pretorius made but little headway with its people.

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. ciii.

² Desp. 517, Grey to S. of S., July 25, 1855; Volksraad resolution, July 21, 1855 (Soutter papers, Pretoria Archives)

He was equally unsuccessful in the Free State, where he claimed authority as the son of Andries. He had supporters in Winburg who wished to renew their old connection with Potchefstroom, disliked quit-rents and desired the free and easy polity which still held good north of the Vaal; there were also men in the Smithfield district who looked to him to settle their land disputes with Moshesh by force. His friends prepared the way and he came down to Winburg to upset the 'cripple government' of Hoffman before it was firmly established.¹ Rains and the vigilance of the landdrost of Winburg foiled him and his rival was glad to get rid of him at the price of half the money Clerk had left to 'soothe bitter recollections.' 1854.

Pretorius now wisely decided to set his own house in order. The Transvaal Volksraad met quarterly. It was nominally supreme, but it debated in public, asked the opinion of any burghers who might be present before passing any law and was always liable to be interrupted by the tumultuary assemblage of Het Volk in arms. There was no central executive at all and the relations of the Volksraad with the Commandants-General and their Krygsraads were quite undefined. Moreover Lydenburg, with a smaller population than Potchefstroom-Rustenburg, had a majority in the legislature, which was also the court of appeal from the judgments of the landdrosts and heemraden who dispensed the 'Hollandsche Wet,' that is, van der Linden and the law of the old Colony as they remembered it. Crime was rare as in the Free State and for the same reasons; but there were no means of keeping order other than the commandos on which all were bound to serve; revenue was precarious and drawn only from a small land tax and traders' licences till burgher rights and a farm were offered for £15 down to Europeans of good character, a qualification not too rigidly insisted upon.² 1855.

The utter need for some constitutional reform was emphasised at the very moment that Marthinus Pretorius took office by the controversies which raged round the question of the relations of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Transvaal with the parent church of the Colony. The issue was of great importance to the Transvaalers, who believed that Harry Smith had threatened to conquer them with the 'spiritual sword' of the colonial clergy and were also averse to the legal equality with whites permitted to the blacks in the colonial churches. They felt that they

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. cxxxiii; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 387, 403 ff. Both Hoffman and his secretary were lame.

² Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 214, 216; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 74, cii ff. Stuart (p. 265) describes the execution of the first death-sentence in the republic. The condemned man took solemn leave of all and was then hanged by a friend.

owed their Mother Church little.¹ The Cape clergy had dis-
 1837. countenanced the Trek; nay, more, the Synod had solemnly
 warned those about to trek that they would be going forth into
 the wilderness as a Chosen People lacking the guidance of an Aaron
 or a Moses and without the divine assurance of a Canaan, but
 none the less answerable to God and the Church for virtually
 denying their children baptism and other ghostly comforts. It
 begged them to bear the cross which God had laid upon them
 and to hearken to the rulers to whom God had entrusted the
 temporal sword.² Partly because they hoped to induce the
 trekkers to return home before they became mere nomads,
 partly because they found real difficulty in recruiting their own
 ranks, the clergy had left them for many years to the ministra-
 tions of Erasmus Smit, Archbell the Wesleyan of Thaba Nchu
 and, above all, the American missionary, Daniel Lindley of Natal.
 1843- It was only after the annexations that they made any real
 1848. attempt to help the Natalians or the Sovereignty men. In the
 eyes of the Transvaalers the clergy followed the flag. For some
 1847 time past, however, either Murray or Synodical Commissions
 onwards. from the Cape had visited them, baptising children of all ages
 by the score and performing the other duties of their office.
 Meanwhile, the Transvaalers from the first had been unremitting
 in their efforts to obtain a minister of their own either from the
 Cape or the Netherlands. At length, after several disappoint-
 ments and believing that their desire would never be fulfilled
 without submission to the Cape Synod, the Volksraad accepted
 1852. the offer of a minister on those terms; but before the decision
 of the Transvaal General Church Assembly had been given, a
 minister, the Rev. Dirk van der Hoff, arrived from Holland.
 1853. Yielding to the prayers of the dying Andries Pretorius and the
 unanimous wish of the General Assembly, van der Hoff reluctantly
 agreed that there should be no incorporation with the Cape
 Synod.³

Nov. This resolution was ratified and aroused the fierce resentment
 1853. of the Lydenburgers, who favoured incorporation and disapproved
 of a Pretorius policy on principle. Smellekamp, an object of
 suspicion to the Pretorius party because of his conduct in Natal

¹ Engelbrecht, I. 32. The basis for this belief seems to be Harry Smith's reference, at the end of his well-known description of the charm and weaknesses of the Boers' character, to 'that want of mutual confidence, which I hope will be speedily removed by the measures in progress, aided by the ministers of the Gospel' (March 1849, *vide* C. 1360 of 1851, p. 2; also *Verslag der Handelingen van de Algemeene Kerkvergadering . . . April 1859*, p. 40).

² *Die Herdelyke Herinneringen* of the Cape Synod of Oct. 1837; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 18.

³ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 18-23, 29, 33-4, 51 ff., 63, 67, lxxx, and Bylage XXXV.

in the early days and his more recent attempts to form a mercantile monopoly in the republic, was supported by Buhrmann and two of the three Hollander schoolmasters.¹ Their party attacked van der Hoff at the General Assembly; the harassed 1854. predikant lost his head, and the upshot was a triangular duel between the Volksraad, the Krygsraad, and a Lydenburg Commissie Raad for the last word. In the end, Smellekamp and his schoolmaster friends had to leave the republic, Smellekamp to become provisional landdrost at Bloemfontein and a further source of friction between the Potchefstroomers and the 'cripple government' of the Free State, while Lydenburg seceded from the new Transvaal Church organisation and drew up a constitution on the lines of the Thirty-three Articles of 1844, which it forbore to promulgate for the time being.²

Ecclesiastical strife had thus revealed the weaknesses of the Transvaal's polity. Van der Hoff had already been asked to supervise the drafting of regulations for the now independent Church. Pretorius essayed a like duty on behalf of the State. In the absence of his Lydenburg rivals, he persuaded the Volksraad at Pienaar's River to appoint a committee to draft a constitution.³ Lydenburg was offered two seats thereon, but Sept. 1855. the lead was taken by Paul Kruger of Rustenburg, a young man of thirty who had yet been a field cornet for thirteen years past and an active warrior in several native wars.⁴ Besides their own experience and their knowledge of the Free State constitution, the committee drew upon a French edition of the U.S.A. constitution owned by Jacobus Stuart, a Hollander promoter of a land bank and colonisation company, who acted as secretary.⁵ Lydenburg and Zoutpansberg repudiated these doings at Pienaar's River; nevertheless, the committee drew up a report which formed the basis of the famous Rustenburg Grondwet.

The Volksraad was to be 'the highest authority'; Het Volk was still to be sovereign, though, significantly enough, no rules were laid down for the constitutional exercise of such

¹ Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 197, 255; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 71, xci, cv, cxxix and Bylage XXXV.

² Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 73 ff., cii, cv, cxxix, and Bylage XLIII.

³ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 94, 107 ff.; Ad. T. 2/25, p. 495 (Pretoria Archives).

⁴ Engelenburg, 'N Onbekende Paul Kruger', pp. 21 ff.

⁵ Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 200, 251, 263; Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 98. It would be interesting to trace the influence of the U.S.A. constitution on the republican Grondwets. Grout, one of the American missionaries in Zululand, gave the Natalians a copy of 'de Wetboek' of the U.S.A. in 1840 (*Nat. Notulen*, p. 58); J. M. Orpen used a summary at Bloemfontein in 1854; now Stuart produced his French version. With so rigid a constitution before them it is curious that the republicans should have drawn up such extremely flexible instruments for themselves, especially in the Transvaal, where, to the end, it was a matter of hot debate whether or no the Volksraad could alter the Grondwet by a mere resolution.

powers, and a President and Executive Council and a High Court distinct from the legislature were at last provided for. Het Volk duly elected Pretorius President and Joubert of Lydenburg Vice-President, an office presently abolished; but in view of Zoutpansberg's protests, the constitution was suspended for a year.¹ The Volksraad met again in May 1856, at the new village of Pretoria, made a few alterations in the draft, and named Pretoria the capital of the 'South African Republic,' which was, if possible, to include the Free State and stretch from ocean to ocean north of the Vaal.² Pretorius toured his districts beating up support, and a special Volksraad and Het Volk met at Potchefstroom.

Dec.
1856.

There, the original draft was substantially adopted. The burghers were to elect a Volksraad of twenty-four, all members of the State Church, half of whom should retire annually. All laws were to be advertised three months in advance and then to be decided by a three-fourths majority after debate by members only. The Volksraad was to appoint all civil officials on the recommendation of the Executive Council and to ratify or reject all treaties, though a wide discretion was prudently left to the Krygsraad in times of emergency. The President, a burgher of at least five years' standing, was to be elected every five years and endowed with much the same powers and limitations as in the Free State, and was to be assisted by the State Secretary, two Volksraad nominees, and a Commandant-General elected by the burghers as Executive Council. Appeals from the local courts were to be heard by the new High Court of three landdrosts and, in criminal cases, by a jury of twelve. The Dutch Reformed Church was to be specially safeguarded, no equality between white and black was to be tolerated in either church or state, and additional revenue was promised from a state monopoly of gunpowder, a tax on farms which was to be doubled in the case of absentee owners, transfer and market dues, and the fines of justice. Finally Pretoria was named the capital, and Potchefstroom was solaced with the title of chief town, which indeed it was.³

Jan. 5,
1857.

Pretorius was inevitably elected President, the new Vierkleur flag was hoisted, and the new officials took office, all save Schoeman of Zoutpansberg, Commandant-General elect. He had already taken up an independent attitude by making a treaty with 'Portugal' on his own account. He now rejected the proffered

1855.

¹ R. 930/55 (Pretoria Archives); Volksraad Minutes, Nov. 5-11, 1855.

² Ad. T. 2/25 (Pretoria Archives); Engelbrecht, I. 96. The Volksraad had adopted the title 'South African Republic to the north of the Vaal River' in 1853 (Eybers, p. 361).

³ R. 1268/57 (Pretoria Archives); for Rustenburg Grondwet, 1858, *vide* Eybers, p. 362.

post and the Grondwet, and thereby implicitly declared the independence of Zoutpansberg. Lydenburg went even further. It proclaimed its independence, and offered land and burgher rights free of charge to all desirable immigrants.¹

The creation of British Kaffraria, Transvaal independence, the new Cape parliamentary constitution all pointed towards a self-contained government for Natal; the abandonment of the Sovereignty severed Natal's connection by land with other British territory and made its status as a detached district of the Cape anomalous and inconvenient.

Most of the Boers had gone except in the northern parts, and very few British had come to take their places. A few Germans had taken to market-gardening near Durban; J. C. Byrne had inaugurated a 'Gibbon Wakefield' immigration scheme, under the stimulus of which villages had sprung up at Pinetown, Verulam, Richmond and, in the north, Ladysmith. But speculators undersold Byrne,² the Australian goldfields drew away 1849-1850 many of his people and, a full ten years after the annexation, the Europeans numbered no more than 8000 in the midst of some 150,000 Bantu. Nevertheless, they were a vigorous little com- 1856. munity. Religious sects proliferated, each of them providing elementary education; associations of all kinds blossomed forth; the Natal Bank appeared, and soon six newspapers catered for the 1850. needs of the public. The lives of most of these journals were short, but the *Witness* of Pietermaritzburg and the *Mercury* of Durban 1846-1852. still more than survive. Industries were trifling. For a time, a little cotton was available for export, but both cotton and coffee failed in face of fly and lack of labour during the rush of the picking season. Sugar, introduced from Mauritius, promised well, given 1847. more capital and labour;³ beginnings were made with fruit and various tropical products, but for years to come the principal Natal export was the ivory of the interior. Imports, swollen by the goods of the Byrne immigrants and the needs of the garrison, largely exceeded exports; but as the Government relied mainly on customs, helped out by a native hut tax, the 1849. revenue officials made no complaint.

Government, local and central, became steadily more elaborate and less subordinated to the authorities at Capetown. Maritzburg had the honour of electing the first board of commissioners 1846. on Cape lines; it and Durban then became full-blown municipalities, 1854. and for some years county councils were formed till lack of men

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 67, 98 ff.

² *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 74, 212 ff.

³ Holden, *History of Natal*, chapter xi.

to man them compelled their abolition.¹ Local justice was in the hands of chief magistrates in the principal towns and of assistants in the smaller, and, until he made way for Walter Harding, Henry Cloete as Recorder administered what was essentially the Cape law at the capital.² Lieutenant-Governors changed with bewildering rapidity, but the powers of the office grew steadily. First the council of officials was permitted to pass local ordinances,³ whereupon an agitation for an Assembly was set on foot, culminating in a petition of the Klip River Boers for independence.⁴ That proposal could in nowise be entertained, but the abolition of appeals to Capetown, the opening of direct trade with England, and the approval of Lieutenant-Governor Pine and High Commissioner Grey paved the way for the Royal Charter which created Natal a Crown Colony. Legislation was entrusted to a council of four officials and twelve members elected every four years by ballot (the first experiment of its kind in South Africa, to say nothing of Great Britain itself). The Crown retained considerable powers of veto; a modest civil list was reserved; the low franchise took no account of colour, and, to the annoyance of elected members, £5000 annually were earmarked for the benefit of the natives.⁵ So the Natal Legislative Council met for the first time, and whereas twenty years before there had been but one civilised government in South Africa, there were now virtually eight: three colonial and five republican. Balkanisation could hardly go further unless the Eastern Province was to achieve its heart's desire of Separation.

British Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter IX.:

- (a) Cape of Good Hope. *Correspondence re . . . the Kaffir Tribes*, 912 and 969 of 1848; 387 of 1849; 457 and 1288 of 1850; 383, 424, 1334, 1352 and 1380 of 1851; 1428 of 1852; 1635 of 1853; *Further Papers re . . . Kaffir Tribes*, July 1855; *Report of Select Committee on . . . the Kaffir Tribes*, 635 of 1852; *Correspondence re . . . Orange River Sovereignty*, 1360 of 1851; 1646 of 1853; 1758 of 1854; *Further Correspondence re . . . the Cape*, C. 508 of 1872; *Report on . . . the Children's Friend Society*, 323 of 1840; *Applications for Representative Government*, 400 of 1846; *Correspondence re . . . Representative Government*, 1137 and 1234 of 1850; 1362 of 1851; 1427, 1581 and 1636 of 1852; 1640 of 1853; *Correspondence re . . . Parliamentary Government*, June, 1857; *Papers re . . . Transport of Convicts*, 217 of 1849; 16, 104 and 1138 of 1850.

¹ Eybers, *op. cit.*, pp. 218, 220. The County Councils lasted from 1854 to 1857.

² The jury system was introduced in 1852 (Eybers, p. 238).

³ Eybers, p. 186.

⁴ *Desp.* 517, Grey to S. of S., March 10, 1855.

⁵ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 34 ff., 218; Eybers, p. 188.

CHAPTER X

MOSHESH AND WATERBOER, 1854-71

Sir George Grey—Native policy: Natal; the Republics; Grey's native and federation policies—Good times: the Cape Colony, British Kaffraria; Natal and the Indian coolies; the Republics—Bad times: ecclesiastical quarrels; annexation of British Kaffraria and constitutional deadlock in Cape Colony; deadlock in Natal; failure of Pretorius's attempts to unite the Republics; civil war in the Transvaal—Bantu pressure: Transkei; Namaqua-Damaraland; Zoutpansberg; Lydenburg; Zululand; Basutoland—The Basuto wars; Wodehouse's settlement; peace in Namaqua-Damaraland and the Zoutpansberg—The Griqualand West dispute.

Secretaries of State for the Colonies: Sir G. Grey, June 1854–Jan. 1855; S. Herbert, Feb. 1855; Lord John Russell, Feb.–July 1855; Sir W. Molesworth, July–Oct. 1855; H. Labouchere, Oct. 1855–Feb. 1858; Lord Stanley, Feb.–June 1858; Sir E. Bulwer-Lytton, June 1858–June 1859; Duke of Newcastle, June 1859–April 1861; E. Cardwell, April 1861–June 1866; Earl of Carnarvon, June 1866–March 1867; Duke of Buckingham, March 1867–Dec. 1868; Earl Granville, Dec. 1868–July 1870; Earl of Kimberley, July 1870–Feb. 1874.

High Commissioners and Governors of the Cape Colony: Sir George Grey, Dec. 5, 1854–Aug. 15, 1861; Lieut.-General R. H. Wynyard, acting Aug. 20, 1859–July 4, 1860, and Aug. 15, 1861–Jan. 15, 1862; Sir Philip E. Wodehouse, Jan. 15, 1862–May 20, 1870; Lieut.-General C. C. Hay, acting May 20–Dec. 31, 1870; Sir Henry Barkly, Dec. 31, 1870–March 31, 1877.

Lieutenant-Governors of Natal: B. C. C. Pine, March 22, 1853–March 3, 1855; John Scott, Nov. 1856–Dec. 31, 1864; Lieut.-Colonel John Maclean, Dec. 1864–July 26, 1865; R. W. Keate, May 1867–July 19, 1872.

Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria: John Maclean, Oct. 1852; became *Lieutenant-Governor*, Oct. 26, 1860–Dec. 1864; *Governor's Deputy*: R. Graham, Dec. 1864–April 17, 1866.

Presidents of the Orange Free State: J. P. Hoffman, May 15, 1854–Feb. 1855; J. N. Boshof, Aug. 27, 1855–June 1859; M. W. Pretorius, Feb. 1860–April 1863; J. H. Brand, Feb. 1864–July 1888.

Presidents of the South African Republic: M. W. Pretorius, Jan. 5, 1857–Sept. 1860; S. Schoeman, acting Oct. 9, 1860–Jan. 20, 1863; also W. C. J. van Rensburg, rival, acting April 1862–Oct. 24, 1863, and then President, Oct. 1863–Jan. 1864; M. W. Pretorius, May 10, 1864–Nov. 1871.

THE political condition of South Africa in the middle 'fifties is best described in the words of Sir George Grey's famous despatch, Nov. 19, which is still the classic statement of the advantages of closer 1858. union and the dangers of disruption in such a country.¹ The burden of his letter is that whatever boundaries and constitutions

¹ No. 216, April 1860, pp. 4–10.

the various states might choose to have, the native question, one and indivisible, governed the whole situation and that, if the European states could not come together in peace, they would surely meet one another in war. After tracing the steps by which 'the dismemberment of South Africa, as far as it was then intended to carry it, became complete,' he noted the absurdity of separating the Cape Colonists from the Republicans.

'They have,' he wrote, 'the same sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and frequently the same feelings regarding the native races, although marked and rapid changes in public opinion, in relation to this subject, are taking place, as also in reference to the increasing use of the English language and the adoption of English customs. . . . The only bond of union which at present holds together these states, European and native, is the High Commissioner. . . . A slight failure of temper or judgment on his part might, at any time, bring on a native war, a general rising of the natives, or a European rebellion. The defects of the system thus described appear to be that the country must be always at war in some direction. . . . Every such war forces all the other states into a position of an armed neutrality or of interference. For if a state is successful in the war it is waging, a native race will be broken up, and none can tell what territories its dispersed hordes may fall upon. Nor can the other states be assured that the coloured tribes generally will not sympathise in the war, and that a general rising may not take place. Ever since South Africa has been broken up in the manner above detailed, large portions of it have always been in a state of constant anxiety and apprehension from these causes. The smallness and weakness of the states, the knowledge that they are isolated bodies . . . has encouraged the natives to resist and dare them, whilst the nature of the existing treaties and the utter abandonment of the natives by Great Britain, to whom they had hitherto looked up, has led the natives to combine for their mutual protection, and thus to acquire a sense of strength and boldness such as they have not hitherto shown. . . . Again such petty states must be constant foci of intrigue and internal commotions, revolutions, or intestine wars. The affairs which occupy their legislatures are so small that they can raise no class of statesmen to take enlarged and liberal views. They can only inadequately provide for the education or religious instruction of their people. They can possess no able bar, no learned Judges, can have no efficient administration of justice. Trade and commerce must, therefore, necessarily languish. Their revenues will be so small that they cannot efficiently provide for their protection. Hence a new incentive is given to the surrounding native races to attack them. Life and property thus become insecure and a general lawlessness follows. . . . South Africa . . . appears to be drifting, by not very slow degrees, into disorder and barbarism. . . .'

The picture which Grey drew was intentionally dark, for he was trying to persuade a cautious Secretary of State to give him a

free hand ; but essentially the picture was true. The experience of four years of South African politics led him to go to all lengths to federate the British colonies and the Free State as the link between the Cape and Natal, a policy wherein he necessarily found a rival in Pretorius, who also desired to secure that republic. Grey failed, and the measure of the results of his failure is the dismal history of the 'sixties in South Africa. Pretorius did indeed succeed in forming the South African Republic at the cost of a civil war but he failed to unite it with the Free State, and the whole of South Africa sank under a wave of economic depression at a time when, from the Zoutpansberg to the Transkei and from Natal to Namaqua-Damaraland, the tide began to run strongly against the white man. The Bantu, whose numbers were increasing and whose tribal system was still in large measure unshaken, were learning European methods of warfare ; many of them had guns as good as those of their opponents, for as yet breech-loaders were only beginning to find their way into South Africa and that great civiliser, the machine-gun, was not.¹ In the field the two races were never so evenly matched as in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, and lack of discipline was by no means the monopoly of the barbarian. It was under these circumstances that the Transvaal had gradually to abandon the Zoutpansberg district, and the Free State, the central state in the South African system, became involved in a deadly struggle with the Basuto, a struggle which, as Grey foretold, drew in all other European communities and ended with the extension by Great Britain of that authority over Basutoland which had been withdrawn from the O.R. Sovereignty. 1867-
1870.
1865-
1869.

The very fact that Grey had arrived in South Africa at the end of the year in which Pretorius made his first abortive attempt to unite all the trekker states in one republic, shows that the political disruption was not complete before the reaction had set in against it. Federation was in the air. The German states had attempted to form a liberal federal Empire ; Earl Grey had proposed the federal solution to the Australian colonies ; the Aborigines Committee had recommended ' a federal arrangement ' between the Colony and the border tribes ; the trekker republics had actually been federated for a time ; the *Zuid Afrikaan* had talked of an independent federal South African republic while the Transvaal was still nominally British soil,² and Saul Solomon had Dec.
1854.
1848.
1847.
1837.
1840-
1844.

¹ Sir George Grey had one of the earliest breech-loading rifles in South Africa (Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 72). In 1865, many of the Free Staters used Confederate American breech-loaders against the Basuto, and at least one breech-loading field gun.

² *Zuid Afrikaan*, April 22, 1850.

1854. put federation in the forefront of his programme at the first parliamentary elections in Capetown.¹ Now Grey had come, fresh from the federation of New Zealand, to point to that policy as the one means by which South Africa might become 'a real power which may hereafter bless and influence large portions of this vast continent.'² It was the hope of Philip uttered by a man who was in a far better position than he to carry it out.

Unlike the elderly Peninsular veterans who had preceded him, Grey was a man of forty-two, the son of a soldier who had himself been a soldier and had since served as civilian Governor of South Australia during its early struggle for existence and of New Zealand in the midst of its difficulties with the Maoris. He was thus trained as no other Governor had been trained to deal with the fundamental problems of South Africa. He was prepared to take his duties very seriously. As he was never tired of explaining to the seven Secretaries of State who succeeded each other during his first five years of office, he was no ordinary Governor, but Her Majesty's High Commissioner, responsible for the peace of South Africa.³ The British colonies might be his first care but he could not shut his eyes to what was going on beyond the Orange or even 'beyond the Vaal river.'

If federation was the goal and the need for a common native policy the main incentive to attain it, the divergent native policies of the various colonies and still more of the republics were the principal obstacles. Within the Colony itself the rule had long been *fusionnement*, civil and political equality between white, coloured and black. The course pursued in Natal had been quite different. The British administration had found itself faced by 100,000 Bantu within the Colony and more coming across the Tugela daily.⁴ This influx, which had gone on steadily under the Republic, was in the main what happened everywhere after the Zulus or other military tribes had been defeated: the survivors of dispossessed tribes returned to their old homes as soon as they could. But something had had to be done if they were not to overrun the country altogether. The Republicans had attempted to segregate surplus natives *en bloc*; Major Smith had hinted at reserves under magisterial and missionary control; Cloete had developed this idea still further, and a Land Commission, which included Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's Diplomatic Agent, set aside eight reserves of some 1,168,000 acres in all.⁵

¹ Kilpin, *Pioneers of Parliament*.

² *Correspondence* . . . 1855-7 (Cape), pp. 55 ff.

³ No. 216, April 1860, pp. 19, 25; Desp. 517, Grey to S. of S., April 9, 1855.

⁴ No. 980 of 1848, *passim*.

⁵ No. 980 of 1848, pp. 131 ff.

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It also proposed to station agents in each with 'model mechanical schools,' means for training the natives in agriculture, and native police under European officers to keep order; but except for the police, this civilising plan had to be abandoned for lack of funds.¹

Since civilisation was out of the question, Shepstone had to be content with mere control. Here his early training on a Xosa mission station stood him in good stead. He shepherded 80,000 Bantu, docile from fear of Panda, into their reserves with only one show of force against a noted firebrand and, having no magistrates to help him, he artificially revived the tribal system by appointing chiefs to such clans as lacked them.² Nearly 50,000 natives however remained on Crown lands or on the farms. The question of law then arose. As British subjects the Bantu were amenable to the Roman-Dutch law, which was so clearly inapplicable that the Land Commission had taken the notable step of recommending the recognition of native custom. But it was only after a long struggle with Judge Cloete, a struggle in which Porter, Attorney-General of the Cape, was called in as mediator, that Shepstone had his way.³ Henceforward, racial differentiation distinguished Natal native policy from that of the Cape. Bantu were to be subject to native law in so far as it was not repugnant to the dictates of humanity, law administered by their own chiefs assisted by European 'Native Magistrates' with an appeal to the Great Chief, the Lieutenant-Governor and his Executive Council. The administration of native law by Europeans marked a revolution in South African native policy, and the combination of judicial and executive functions in the hands of the Diplomatic Agent led the natives more than ever to look to Shepstone, 'Somtseu,' as the eyes and ears and mouth of the Great Chief.

June
1849.

Native law and the reserves were intensely unpopular with nearly all the colonists and officials of Natal from Lieutenant-Governor Pine downwards. Earl Grey disapproved of unwieldy reserves of perhaps 400,000 acres, and Shepstone himself admitted that the existing system was so defective that it would be better to scrap them and concentrate their inmates in the empty lands between the Umtamvuna and Umkomanzi. But few paid heed to Shepstone's explanation that the reserves were unsatisfactory because they were too rugged, unfurnished with magistrates and liable to lopping and paring by an administration anxious to satisfy claimants to farms.⁴ The old cries which had been raised so often in the Cape against the mission stations were soon heard:

¹ No. 1697 of 1853, pp. 22ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24 ff.

³ Eybers, p. 235; Brookes, *Native Policy*, p. 49ff.

⁴ No. 1292 of 1850, pp. 49, 198; No. 1697 of 1853, pp. 8, 22, 113, 116.

the reserves drained off labour, it was dangerous to mass natives thus in the heart of the colony. Even the collection of hut tax for general revenue purposes failed to make the reserves acceptable and, to allay excitement, a commission was appointed. It was composed mainly of big landowners, English and Dutch, who were avowedly interested only in land and labour; it eulogised the departed republican régime and condemned the work of the Land Commission, but the only results of its labours were to kill the wilder schemes for breaking up the reserves and to change the 'Native Magistrates' into 'Assistant Magistrates' and the 'Diplomatic Agent' into the 'Secretary for Native Affairs.'¹

Meanwhile Shepstone, who was perhaps already cherishing the vision of all Kaffirland, Basutoland, Swaziland and as much other native territory as might be to the north grouped round Natal, once more took up the republican idea of segregation *en bloc*. Zulus were still pouring in from Panda's country. Panda was a milder ruler than either of his predecessors. He encouraged traders, countenanced Hanoverian and Norwegian missionaries, and relaxed the bonds of discipline; but he maintained the military system and was hard put to it to give his young men an opportunity of 'washing their spears.' The Swazis had at one time furnished an outlet for superfluous energy, but since then the Zulus had driven Langalibalele's Hlubis into Natal and had caused a panic by talking of a march through the colony to attack the coast Kaffirs. On the Kaffirland side of Natal lay the Amaxolo and other small clans who asked in vain to be taken over by Shepstone, and there also was Faku the Pondo. He was so disgusted at being held responsible for the cattle thefts perpetrated by uncontrollable Bushmen living in his treaty state that he ceded part of the northern area to Natal.² This cession was never ratified by the High Commissioner; nevertheless, Shepstone, whose original scheme for settling this part of Nomansland with Europeans had been set aside by H.M. Government on the score of expense, now proposed to lead in 50,000 Natal Zulus whom he himself would rule there as chief. Preparations for this great trek were on foot when Grey arrived at Capetown.³

If Natal's native policy was diverging from that of the Cape, the policy of the republics had been radically different from the first. The root of that policy lay in the frontier districts of the old Colony. There the Boers had held even more strongly than

¹ Report of Natal Native Commission, 1852-3.

² A. 118-61 (Cape), pp. 25-9.

³ *Correspondence re Adjacent Territories, 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 13, 63-8.

the townsmen and local officials that the natives were children of Ham, definitely inferior to *Christen mense*, divinely appointed hewers of wood and drawers of water. Retief outlined the future policy of the trekker states when he promised that there should be no slavery, warned his men against seizing the children of unwilling Bushmen as apprentices, but proposed 'to maintain such regulations as will suppress crime and preserve proper relations between master and servant.' With independent chiefs like Moshesh, Dingaen, and the rest in the early days, the Boer leaders had made treaties of friendship combined sometimes with grants of land, their aim being to have some title-deed to show and to occupy the open country without being flooded out by the tribes.¹ Over such chiefs they claimed no authority; but in Natal, where the trekker native policy first had a chance of being developed fully, Panda was a vassal of the republic for the southern half of Zululand. He was bidden keep his people beyond the Tugela and was even obliged to ask leave before raiding Sapusa the Swazi. His dependence was emphasised when the Volksraad declared that only a joint raid was permissible in which the Republic was to have two-thirds of the proceeds.²

The difficulties of republican Natal had, however, been mainly internal. Some 6000 Europeans found themselves face to face with perhaps 20,000 Bantu whose numbers were rapidly increasing.³ Native captains in the Republic were ordered to report the arrival of 'foreign' natives under pain of death, and the newcomers themselves were forbidden to build a hut on or near a Boer farm. As for the Zulus already in the country, the principle of the Plakker's Wet (squatter's law) was laid down again and again. So that labour might be shared evenly, no one save the Commandant-General might have more than five native families living on his farm, and even the apprentices captured at the battle which ended Dingaen's power were shared equally.⁴ To check 1840. vagrancy and cattle thefts all free blacks were obliged to carry passes and to contract for service within a fortnight of leaving their last place, but not to contract for more than a year at any one time. No coloured person might bear firearms without a monthly permit from his master on whom fell the penalties for contravention of the rule up to confiscation and deportation for the third offence.⁵ The system was laxly administered and still the refugees came in. Commandants were therefore empowered

¹ E.g. T. 1/1200 (Pretoria Archives).

² *Nat. Not.*, pp. 135, 188, 195.

³ Natal Native Commission, 1852; Report I. 8; Proceedings, I. 58 ff.

⁴ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 37, 50, 59, 246; Bird, *op. cit.*, I. 627; Cloete, *Great Trek*, p. 55; R. 55/40 (Pretoria Archives).

⁵ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 35, 38, 50, 59, 163-4.

to expel clans, and the Volksraad determined on a policy of territorial segregation for surplus natives, that is, for those who were not wanted on the farms.¹ It was this policy which had given Napier final cause to reoccupy Port Natal.

1842.

The policy of the Transvaalers followed much the same lines. Potgieter had claimed all the lands and peoples that the Matabele had ruled, and dealt as overlord with the few clans living in that area and those who came back into it.² He gave reserves near Potchefstroom to the Barolong, Tawane and Matlabe, who had followed him from Thaba Nchu and then, as the country filled up with Boers, moved Tawane to Likhatlong. He settled various tribes returning from the desert in their old homes: Bakwena at Kolobeng, Bakatla at Mosega and Bangwaketse at Kanye. But over the Batlapin to the south at Kuruman he made no claims, for they had never been subject to Umsilikazi, and to the north he never had any authority over the Bamangwato of Shoshong, while his successor at Potchefstroom was glad to make a treaty with Umsilikazi, who undertook not to raid tribes under Boer suzerainty and kept his promise.³ Similarly, in Lydenburg and the Zoutpansberg, Potgieter claimed Sekwati's Bapedi in the Lulu Mountains and some of the Maguamba clans as vassals, and gave them locations; but the Swazis and the Batlou remained independent, while as for Matshangana below the Lebombo Mountains, he was a potentate to be placated for the sake of the elephant-hunting on which Schoemansdal depended.

1846.

The general principles on which the Transvaalers ruled their dependent clans were to leave actual administration in the hands of the chiefs and headmen, to give them locations which they could not alienate but which they only held on good behaviour (insecurity of tenure was the radical weakness of this policy from the native point of view); to forbid them to have guns, horses and waggons or to make alliances among themselves, and to exact the labour tax, that is, labour 'at suitable wages when called upon.' Specially favoured chiefs were, however, exempted from the labour tax and given 'burgher rights' which entailed payment of taxes in money and service with the republican forces in time of war. Natives not under a recognised chief were to enter into labour contracts before a field cornet and were to have no liquor without their master's consent.⁴

¹ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 13, 36, 57, 110, 135-9, 163, 204, 246, 255, 261.

² Stuart, *Holl. Afrik.*, pp. 119, 213-4; R. 49/39 (Pretoria Archives).

³ C. 3841 of 1884, pp. 114-5.

⁴ Volksraad Minutes, Sept. 19, 1853; Andries-Ohrigstad Volksraad Minutes, April 13, 1846; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, chap. ii.; Chapman, *Travels*, p. 15. These rules were published in 1853, based on old custom, and elaborated in 1858 (Lokale Wetten, pp. 97 ff.).

The native policy of the Transvaalers was never carried out systematically. The country was huge, the central government weak and the borderlands, where the contact with the tribes was naturally closest, sprinkled with missionaries and scallywags, the best and the worst of non-trekker humanity. It had been so on the frontiers of the old Colony; it was so now along the Basuto border and in Buffels Rivier, between Natal and Zululand; it was so in the undefined western border of the Transvaal, where ran the Missionaries' Road to the Zambesi. Robert Moffat's Kuruman was displacing Griquatown as the hunters' base, and up the Road came traders, hunters and missionaries to dispute with the republicans the control of the 'Suez Canal of the interior.'¹ Meanwhile, in the Zoutpansberg, some Europeans lived as savagely as the tribes; the half-breed sons of the notorious Coenraad Buis ruled Baramapulana clans in the mountains which were fast filling with natives fleeing from the Matabele, and João Albasini combined the offices of trader, chief of a Knobnose clan, blackbirder, Portuguese consul and general mischief-maker. These men and others sent out elephant-hunting parties of blacks from Schoemansdal, and naturally the blacks became good shots and kept their guns.²

As a body the trekkers were no more hostile to missionaries as such than their fathers had been in the old Colony.³ It is true that their attitude to all churches but their own was one of suspicion; the Rustenburg General Assembly decreed that none ^{1853.} but the Dutch Reformed Church should be tolerated;⁴ the Grondwet discouraged all churches which did not hold by the ¹⁸⁵⁶⁻ Heidelberg Catechism and excluded Roman Catholics. But on ¹⁸⁵⁷⁻ this score their bark was worse than their bite. It was the same with the missionaries. The Nine Articles forbade any intercourse ^{1837.} with 'allen den Sendelings genootscap van Engelant,'⁵ but as the relations of the trekkers with 'Aardspiel,' the Wesleyan of Thaba Nchu, were as good as with the American, Daniel Lindley, it would seem that their hostility was really directed against the L.M.S. men.⁶ The Magaliesbergers welcomed Moravians and Hanoverians; as late as 1852, the Marico burghers were on good terms with even the L.M.S. men, Inglis and Edwards,

¹ Chapman, *Travels*, chapter i.

² Hofmeyr, *Twintig Jaren*, pp. 1 ff.; A.-Ohrigstad Volksraad Minutes, Oct. 7, 1848; R. 155 a/48; Volksraad Minutes, May 15 and 30, 1851, and June 15, 1852 (Pretoria Archives).

³ On Natal republicans' attitude to missionaries, *vide Nat. Not.*, pp. 9, 11, 13, 25, 54, 58, 81, 90-1, 104, 110, 200, 210.

⁴ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 70.

⁵ R 10/37 (Pretoria Archives).

⁶ Engelbrecht, I. 19-23; Shaw, *Story of my Mission*, p. 504; Chase, *Natal Papers*, II. 3.

and had no objection to the Gospel being preached to natives, though some of them would have felt happier if only the missionaries would have consented to teach that the Boers were a superior race.¹

On the other hand, the first Dutch Reformed missionaries to the Zoutpansberg found themselves very unpopular, and from the first the Transvaalers, like Somerset before them, objected to unauthorised missionaries going to the border tribes.² The Boers' point of view was intelligible enough. They themselves were scattered abroad among the tribes; Dr. Philip's invective was still a tradition with them, and the average missionary, especially of the L.M.S., was by no means a meek and patient evangelist. Many missionaries were men whose zeal and devotion had to make up for defective education and knowledge of men and affairs; some were impatient of control, apt to accept native reports at their face value and inclined to take the lead in the tribe with which they were living; all of them felt that, as isolated guardians of a liberal tradition which was assuredly not valued by their white neighbours, they must speak out. And the more the missionaries spoke, the more the Boers feared that they would teach their flocks doctrines subversive of the Boer patriarchal system. They might—who knows?—even give the natives guns.

The Transvaalers had long claimed a western line which included the Missionaries' Road and the Bechuana tribes along it. They renewed that claim and thereby doubly threatened the missionaries. Many of the missionaries combined trade with religion. They were poor men and must make ends meet, and from the commercial point of view alone it was essential for them that the Road should be kept open. The Transvaalers' claim was challenged by David Livingstone, the most outstanding of all the notable men who have served the L.M.S. in Africa. Livingstone served his apprenticeship at Kuruman and Mabotsa, settled at Kolobeng among Sechele's Bakwena, and was soon in trouble with the Boers for giving the natives guns. He was, however, much away discovering Lake Ngami and getting into touch with Sekeletu's Makololo on the middle Zambesi,³ while the lands between the upper waters of the Marico and the Molopo, where his station was, became the centre of long-continued disputes. Tawane, the Barolong of Likhatlong, Potgieter's friend, had died and had been succeeded by Montsioa. Montsioa was joined by J. Ludorf, a Wesleyan from Thaba Nchu, and soon complained that Boers were demanding labour tax and taking his fontains, on

1849
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¹ Moffat, *Lives*, p. 33; Volksraad Minutes, Aug. 9, 1853; Stuart, *op. cit.* p. 394; Livingstone, L.M.S. Kolobeng, May 26, 1849.

² Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 26; Eybers, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

³ Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, *passim*.

which, as in Philippolis, the life of the country depended. Pretorius therefore agreed upon a new boundary. A few months later, in the absence of Ludorf but in the presence of Edwards of Mabotsa, Montsioa with the other 'Molopo' chiefs recognised that the country belonged to the Transvaal as successor of Umsilikazi; but whereas the other chiefs had to submit to labour tax, 1852. Montsioa was given burgher rights.¹

The Sand River Convention defined no boundaries, and Livingstone, back at Kolobeng once more, insisted that the Road 1852. was outside the limits of the Republic. The matter was serious, for Pretorius declared the road closed and ordered all traders to go north through Potchefstroom to facilitate the collection of dues and regulate the passage of guns.² Then grave trouble arose with the tribes. They had been stirred by the news of Warden's check by the Basuto at Viervoet. Sekwati's Bapedi in Lydenburg, kinsmen of the Basuto, had raided cattle heavily and a commando had failed to crush them.³ Now, on the western border, Moselele's Bakatla went a-raiding and fled to Secheli with the spoil. That chief had for some time past been seeking to copy Moshesh's example by gathering clans around him, and he now refused to give up Moselele. A strong commando, after due warning, attacked Kolobeng, drove Secheli out and took away some captured women and children as apprentices, while Montsioa, who had shirked his burgher duties, fled to the south-west and Ludorf retired to Thaba Nchu.⁴

Livingstone was away at the time of the attack, but his anger at the damage done to his property, whether by Boers or others, gave the affair a great publicity,⁵ especially as his fame as an explorer was growing; for, in the course of the next few years, May he made those journeys to Loanda and thence down the Zambesi, 1853- July past the Victoria Falls, to Quilimane which revealed to the 1856.

¹ Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, p. 223.

² No. 1758 of 1854, p. 6.

³ Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*, p. 68.

⁴ Chapman, *Travels*, chapter v.; Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, p. 118; Volksraad Minutes, Oct. 4, 1851; T. 1/25, p. 278 (Pretoria Archives).

⁵ No. 1646 of 1853, p. 126; Livingstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 113 ff.; du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, pp. 252, 443 ff.

Considerable controversy has raged over this matter. The Boer patrol found Livingstone's house already broken open, probably by Secheli to get guns, etc., or by stray white men with whom the district abounded. They admittedly broke open a shed and took away guns and smith's tools. On the other hand, Livingstone accused them of wholesale looting and destruction. J. S. Moffat, who had just come to the country as a missionary, reported that he afterwards saw some of Livingstone's furniture in Boer farmhouses, when the good wives said he must not be too hard upon the patrol for taking the stuff as they were only youngsters. It would seem that the wanton damage charge can be dismissed but, as for the looting, can any lads on active service be blamed for helping themselves to the contents of an empty house standing upon the veld in such a country? The most exemplary youths do queer things on active service, as all the world should know by now.

civilised world something of what lay in the centre of the Dark Continent. Relieved of his presence the Transvaalers sought to put their relations with the natives on a more satisfactory footing. Zoutpansberg and Potchefstroom both signed treaties with the Matabele safeguarding the ivory traffic, and the Volksraad laid down general rules for the whole Transvaal, forbidding the sale of arms to natives under pain of death and, to avoid all cause of offence, prohibiting barter with the tribes, as on the Eastern Frontier in the old days.¹ These regulations, themselves a codification of existing customs, were expanded later, but in the absence of police they remained *une chose pour vivre* in the border lands.

The first act of Marthinus Pretorius towards the natives was friendly. He gave back his location to the defaulting Montsioa, though that chief and most of his people hesitated for a long time to return to it. There was, however, need for strong measures in the north. Makapan beat up the Bamapela and other clans in the Waterberg, slew a certain Hermanus Potgieter against whom he had just cause of complaint, and went on the war-path. The Zoutpansberg and Rustenburg Boers formed laager; Pretorius called out a commando, and a few helpers came even from the Sovereignty. Piet Potgieter, son of the old *Voortrekker*, was killed in the attack, and horse sickness dispersed the force, but not before some of Makapan's people had been smoked to death in their caverns and many others shot as they ran in the open. It was a stern lesson, and until they began to fight among themselves the Transvaalers had little further trouble with the natives.²

They had, however, to face attacks from another quarter. It was popularly believed that they were slavers. The charge was not unnatural. They had migrated from a slave-owning society; some of them had objected to emancipation; the Natal Volksraad had indignantly repelled the charge on its own account, but had admitted that Potgieter, to whom most of the members were hostile, might have practised slavery in times past, though, if so, it was outside their knowledge.³ The Slave Trade Commissioners acquitted the Boers as a body, but declared that slavery did exist in the Zoutpansberg, where Boers were in touch with Albasini and the Portuguese.⁴ Portugal had forbidden

¹ R. 483/53 (Pretoria Archives); Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, pp. 535-6; Volksraad Minutes, March 1853.

² *Ibid.*, May 31, 1853; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, p. 397. Orpen (pp. 436 ff.) says that comparatively few were killed.

³ Bird, I. 623, 631, 655; *Nat. Not.*, p. 119.

⁴ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 183 ff.; Hofmeyr, *Twintig Jaar*, p. 27; A.-Ohrigstad Volksraad Minutes, Dec. 15, 1847.

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slavery, but in spite of Lisbon and a British 'sentimental 1836. squadron' off the coast, Mozambique had suspended the royal decree on the grounds of 'absolute necessity' and cherished its trade in guns and ivory, black and white.¹ The trekkers as a body were certainly neither slavers nor slave-owners.² Apart from lack of desire and the knowledge that slaving was the surest way of calling forth British intervention, there was no need. Like those British colonists who, deprived of their slaves, fell back on indentured coolies, the trekkers found an alternative supply. The 'labour tax' provided workers in the fields, apprenticeship the servants in the house and stables.

The apprenticeship system had only been abolished in England 1813. itself in face of the protests of many of the workmen concerned; it was a system of old standing in the Cape Colony and was still at work there; it had existed among the trekkers from the first on terms strictly defined by law. The laws seem to have been observed in republican Natal. There apprentices had to be *ingeboekt* (registered) before an official; indentures were not allowed to change hands; apprentices might not be exported, and when the harbour-master at Port Natal let two sail for Capetown he was suspended; importation was confined to members of the *Maatschappij*, and then only by leave of the Volksraad.³ All these rules were transferred to the Transvaal and were there restated.⁴ Nevertheless, after the attack on Secheli, Livingstone 1851. and other L.M.S. men accused the Boers of practising virtual slavery, and, some of them added, 'if some Power do not interfere . . . the ruin and slavery of the native tribes will inevitably follow.'⁵

In vain did the Potchefstroomers banish Edwards of Mabotsa Nov. and his colleague, Inglis, for repeating the charges and the 1852. veiled appeal to Great Britain.⁶ Substantially the charges were true. Traffic in indentures, and therefore in apprentices, did go on; the repetition of the law against it four times in quick 1851-1858. succession tells its own tale; apprentices were traced from Lydenburg through Winburg to the north-eastern Colony itself; a Free State commission partially unearthed a nest of black-birders in Utrecht trading children from the Swazis and selling 1855. them in northern Natal, and it would have unearthed more had not some of the commissioners closed down the inquiry just as it was becoming interesting and returned home (with a black

¹ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 186 ff.; Theal, *History*, V. 387 ff.

² Eybers, p. 356. Slavery was forbidden, e.g., in 1845, 1852 and 1857.

³ Bird, I. 622, 632, 655; *Nat. Not.*, pp. 33, 42, 57, 86, 125, 130, 231; Chase, *Natal Papers*, I. 186.

⁴ Lydenburg Volksraad Minutes, May 9, 1851 (Pretoria Archives).

⁵ No. 1646 of 1853, p. 116.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff.

apprentice bought on the scene of their labours) to be duly censured by the Volksraad.¹ Who then were these apprentices? Starving children, it was said, abandoned after a battle like Magongo or the fight with Secheli; children willingly exchanged for goods by their parents; prisoners in inter-tribal fights who would otherwise have been killed, or Balala, the hereditary helots of the Bechuana.² Maybe, said the critics, but the supply of orphans on the frontiers was singularly abundant and steady. The annals of Bushmanland in the 'twenties and, in spite of Retief's orders, of Transorangia in later days, are full of complaints about the hunting of Bushmen children by stray Boers; and the same thing went on under the Sovereignty, sometimes with and sometimes without official cognizance.³ Potgieter reported to the Natal Volksraad a bad case of blackbirding beyond the Vaal on the very eve of the second occupation of Port Natal by the British;⁴ in the 'fifties there were men in the northern Transvaal like Hermanus Potgieter who 'stuck the ramrod' where it could be seen as a signal to a kraal to bring out apprentices;⁵ Pretorius was much exercised at the doings of western borderers, and a little later President Boshof of the Free State told Sir George Grey that Pretorius dealt in apprentices contrary to the Conventions and asked him to cut off the powder supplies to Potchefstroom, also contrary to the Conventions; while, by the same post, Pretorius reported that Schoeman of the Zoutpansberg had leanings towards slavery and made the same request.⁶

Grey probably discounted the reports written by these rival correspondents who were on the verge of war with one another, but, on the matter of 'virtual slavery,' his conclusion was just. It did go on in the Free State in spite of the efforts of the authorities and the better-class inhabitants to stop it.⁷ As to what might go on in the Transvaal, Grey did not at this stage express an opinion.

¹ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 126 ff., 186 ff., 199.

² Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Freeman, *Tour*, pp. 260, 274; Livingstone, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

³ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, p. 126; No. 2352 of 1857, pp. 56, 102; Orpen, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

⁴ *Nat. Not.*, pp. 206-8.

⁵ Orpen, *op. cit.*, pp. 426 ff., *q.v.* for further references.

⁶ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, p. 126; Volksraad Minutes, June 1, 1853; No. 2352 of 1857, pp. 71, 94 ff.

⁷ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, p. 126. Some years later, the Transvaal President, M. W. Pretorius, asked the landdrost of Zoutpansberg to buy him half-a-dozen little Kaffirs at a time when the Swazis were raiding (Aug. 16, 1864); a few months later, Umswaas, the King of the Swazis, sent three little orphans to the landdrost for 'his ally,' the President. These were duly inboeked to Pretorius, who gave two white blankets for recompense (*tot vergoeding*)—*vide* Lydenburg Landdrost's *Dagboek* and *Contraktboek*, May 12, 1865, and File T1/15 (Pretoria Archives).

Grey's logical conclusion also could not be evaded. Either the Republics must show that they could make their people obey their own laws or they could not expect to be treated as governments. Even Labouchere agreed that habitual disregard of the slavery clauses would give good ground for modifying the Conventions which galled the High Commissioner so severely, and remarked that Great Britain had not renounced *à tout jamais* the right to make treaties with the tribes specified in those documents, but had merely indicated the 'general inclination' of its policy. Nevertheless, he warned Grey that he must avoid making such treaties and not even intervene as arbitrator unless both parties invited him to do so.¹

At first, Grey had neither the wish nor the leisure to intervene north of the Orange. It took him a year's hard fighting to stop 1854-
Shepstone's great trek into Nomansland, for he held it useless 1855.
to draw off 50,000 Zulus from Natal to make room for 50,000 more and, besides, such warlike immigrants were likely to prove ill-neighbours to the coast tribes.² He also had to find a definite policy for British Kaffraria at a time when the feeble Free State threatened to collapse on his northern border.

Grey soon discovered that the common factor in all his problems in British Kaffraria, Kaffirland and the Free State was Moshesh. Moshesh was, indeed, becoming more and more the common factor in all the politics of dismembered South Africa in whose midst he sat watchful on his flat-topped mountain. He was at the height of his intellectual and political powers, no mere savage but a great man, as Theal stoutly avers, using diplomacy as a weapon from choice, war from necessity, and both to perfection. More than one of his sons had received his education in Capetown; one of his wives kept house in European fashion and dispensed tea and home-made sponge cake to distinguished visitors; while the chief himself, fresh from his daily tub and arrayed in the uniform of a French general and the long blue cloak which his native valet so assiduously brushed, was fit to take his place at public banquets beside Special Commissioners and Presidents and to embrace the embarrassed Warden in the streets of Bloemfontein.³ His successes at Viervoet and Berea had set the tribes cattle-rieving from Lydenburg to the Molopo; he had recently absorbed the lands of Sikonyela and Taaibosch; south of the Orange he had taken Morosi, the Baputi chief of Quthing, as his vassal; he was in touch with Krel

¹ No. 2352 of 1857, pp. 53, 101.

² *Correspondence* . . . 1855-7 (*Cape*), pp. 13, 52, 57, 63, 177, 200.

³ Orpen, *op. cit.*, pp. 326, 356, 366; *Bas. Rec.*, II, 105.

beyond the Kei and was negotiating with the Pondo Faku for the cession of much-sought-after Nomansland. He now unwittingly produced a constitutional crisis in the Free State.

The native policy of the Europeans in that area had at first been an attempt to make good a footing and, under the Sovereignty, to mark out tribal boundaries and play the smaller tribes off against the Basuto. The withdrawal of the Queen's authority had left the chiefs once more completely independent in their own lands, whatever those might be, and the republican government supreme over the rest of the country.

1854-
1855.

Hoffman, the first President, a philanthropically minded man, owed his election mainly to the fact that he alone of all the candidates was on the spot but also to the knowledge of the burghers that he had influence with Moshesh.¹ Apart from the harassment caused him by Pretorius, his main concern was with the native areas which chequered his state. He first pacified the Bushmen and Koranas in the Pniel reserves who had quarrelled so violently that the Berlin Missionaries had to leave, and recognised the sovereign rights of Nicholas Waterboer of Griquatown over a block of land on the Free State side of the lower Vaal.² He then turned to Moshesh. That chief was conciliatory, earning merit with his missionaries by checking the liquor traffic and with the Bloemfontein authorities by keeping his immediate followers quiet; but some of his dependent chiefs along the Smithfield and Winburg-Harrismith borders did much as they chose. There was also the question of the boundary itself for whose determination Clerk, before his departure, had provided a joint Free State-Basuto Commission.³

Hoffman visited Moshesh, but virtually shelved the boundary issue, and a little later told Letsie, Moshesh's son, in the presence of a large crowd, that it was impossible at the moment to go into all the claims for cattle presented by the Smithfield officials. Letsie, on hearing a test case, at once paid up in full with compensation added; whereupon local field cornets asked for a month in which to collect evidence, a month which one of them used to stir up so much trouble that Hoffman called out a commando before the fraud was discovered.⁴ The commando was then disbanded and the borderers realised that there were going to be no strong measures while Hoffman was in the saddle. His opponents therefore laid hold of the fact that he had sent Moshesh, quite openly, a small keg of powder to recompense him for the

¹ Orpen, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

² Lindley, *Adamantia*, p. 82; Theal, IV. 15-24.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 99, 112, 121, 133.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 115, 118, 128, 126-32; Orpen, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-61.

salutes fired in his honour during the recent visit to Thaba Bosigo; they stirred up public opinion against him and, at last, Volksraad members trained the guns of the Queen's Fort on his house. Convinced by this infallible artillery that he was not wanted, the unhappy President resigned.¹ Feb. 1855.

Grey decided that so precarious a government must not be embarrassed lest it collapse. He therefore refrained from sending up the British Agent whom Moshesh had been led to expect at Thaba Bosigo and even withdrew the Agent from Bloemfontein to Aliwal North on the colonial border.² But claim and counter-claim against the Basuto ran on and matters became so strained between Moshesh and the new President, Boshof, the 'moderate' of republican Natal, that Grey went up to the Free State. He persuaded the two parties to accept the Smithfield Treaty, which, without naming any boundary, apparently took that 'dead horse,' the Warden line, for granted and provided for mutual passes, cattle tracing and expulsion of trespassers.³ He also had the satisfaction of hearing that Boshof had accepted the Vetberg line which Adam Kok had just laid down between the dominions of Waterboer east of the Vaal and the lands of Cornelis Kok, and he himself solaced Adam, who was gloomily watching his original reserve of Philippolis pass piecemeal into European hands, with an annual grant.⁴ Oct. 1855.

Poor Adam might lie heavy on Grey's conscience, but the frontier affairs of the Colony were his first and gravest concern. He was faced there with the settlement which Cathcart had made at the close of the late war.⁵ Cathcart had given the lands of the rebel Hottentots at Theopolis and Kat River to Europeans, established Europeans at Queenstown on the lands of Mapassas's Tembus along the White Kei, transferred the bleak Bontebok Flats from British Kaffraria to the Colony and given the loyal Fingos further lands round Ockraal and Lesseytown. The Europeans were grouped together as far as possible and held their farms on perpetual quit-rents as a check to land speculation. Thus Cathcart proposed that the old Ceded Territory and its northward prolongation in Queenstown should form a buffer between the Colony and British Kaffraria filled with a mixed population of Europeans, Hottentots and loyal Bantu. His policy in British Kaffraria was different. 'Military control,' he 1853.

¹ Orpen, *op. cit.*, pp. 456 ff.; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 120, 139.

² *Bas. Rec.*, II. 142; Desp. 517, April 9, 1855 (Cape Archives).

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 159, 165.

⁴ C. 459 of 1871, p. 48; *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 71, 124.

⁵ On Cathcart's settlement, *vide* No. 1635 of 1853, especially pp. 222 ff., and *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July 1855*, pp. 2 ff., 27; *Minutes . . . on Frontier Settlement (Cape)*, June 1853.

wrote, 'and not colonisation induced me to retain Kaffraria as a separate government instead of annexing it to the Cape Colony or abandoning it.'¹ He did indeed make tiny European settlements beside the forts at Kingwilliamstown and three or four places in the Royal Reserve round the Amatolas from which hostile Kaffirs were excluded; he also settled selected Fingos in the Reserve in villages of twenty souls and upwards, each man paying a quit-rent for his garden and erf; but for the rest he tried to carry out the policy which Harry Smith had decided on during the disillusionment of the war of 1850-53.² He held that it was useless to 'exterminate' the tribes and pile them up behind the Kei, that the colonial clamour for native land was unjust, and that the only policy to pursue was to leave the Kaffirs to be ruled in their reserves by their own chiefs under European guidance and to rely on time, European influence and that 'innate sense of justice and truth . . . perhaps the only virtue they can appreciate and for which they have . . . a religious respect' to break down evil customs.³ Hence, he even gave the Gaikas a reserve of their own, albeit surrounded by the territories of more dependable tribes.

The essence of the Cathcart settlement was time and the difficulty was to make sure of the time. The Kaffrarian chiefs were still British subjects; but the Chief Commissioner and his subordinates were once more mere diplomatic agents without power, the country was a huge native reserve, and from having had too little power the chiefs had been suddenly given too much. Grey found the troops vainly trying to keep the Kaffirs out of the wooded Amatolas, Pato's men and the Gaikas intermarrying and beer-drinking with the Fingo 'dogs,' and the Fingos, an object of suspicion to the frontiersmen, in a high state of excitement.⁴ Behind them lay the independent Kreli, paramount chief of all the Xosas, in touch with Moshesh⁵ and with the Tembus who lay in a long line from the Indwe to the Umtata river; behind them were the Pondos, those of Ndamazi, Faku's son, to the west of the Umzimvubu and those of Faku himself, still in alliance with the Queen, to the east of that river. To the north of Pondoland were Bacas, Pandomisis, Xesibes, Amaxolo and the other little tribes of the Natal border.

Grey's first care was for defence. He had five weak battalions, one of which was in Natal, and the mixed European and Hottentot Cape Mounted Rifles, besides Mounted Police paid by the Colony. He persuaded the Cape Parliament to give £10,000 annually

¹ *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July, 1855*, p. 28.

² No. 1635 of 1853, pp. 14, 15.

³ *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July, 1855*, pp. 3, 16, 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 35, 39; *Desp.* 517, May 30, 1855.

⁵ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 144.

towards the cost of the garrison, to increase the police to some 550 and to raise volunteer regiments.¹ Then, relying on his New Zealand experience and the Imperial grant which was to help British Kaffraria through the most critical part of its history, he began to carry out that policy which he hoped would civilise Kaffirland as far as the Natal border.²

Generally speaking, that policy was the abandonment of segregation *en bloc*. Europeans and natives were to be regarded henceforth as 'inhabitants of one country'; the power of the chiefs was to be supplanted by that of magistrates and the country settled as far as possible with Europeans; in other words, instead of being a black barrier against Kreli, British Kaffraria was to become a chequerboard of black and white. It was Harry Smith's pre-war policy without the 'exorbitant fines and official domineering' which Cathcart had censured.³ Helped by the horse-sickness and cattle disease which were sweeping off the prospective fines of justice, Grey induced the chiefs to accept salaries instead of fines, which meant in practice that the chiefs continued to hear the civil suits of their people, but having no particular interest in criminal cases, left them to the Agents. As in the days of Harry Smith, the law lay largely at the magistrates' discretion, for colonial law could not be applied and native custom was not recognised. A hut tax, fines of justice and the Imperial grant went far towards making British Kaffraria self-supporting; good wages were offered for the making of the roads which would be as useful in war as in peace, and Grey helped forward industrial schools within and without the province and built the Grey Hospital at Kingwilliamstown to wean the tribes from witchfinding.⁴

It was not so easy to strengthen the European population in Kaffraria, perhaps a thousand all told. Cathcart had failed to get Swiss mountaineers for the Amatola area; Grey failed to get enrolled pensioners with families and was obliged to accept the offer of German Legionaries, for whose settlement he persuaded the Cape Parliament to vote a subsidy on condition that a fair number of families came with the men.⁵ He was not in 1856. a position to pick and choose. Not only had he to carry out his new policy against the wishes of the Kaffrarian Commissioner and most of his subordinates but there was the constant threat

¹ No. 389 of 1858, No. 173; *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, p. 8.

² *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July, 1855*, p. 38; No. 2202 of 1857, p. 61. The Imperial grant was £40,000 till 1858, then £20,000, and so progressively less till it disappeared in 1864. Grey had had a similar grant in New Zealand.

³ *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July, 1855*, pp. 16, 36 ff., 57 ff.

⁴ No. 2096 of 1856, pp. 3, 5, 7, 8, 14 ff., 34.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13; No. 2022 of 1857, pp. 33 ff., 59; *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July, 1855*, pp. 27, 72; Desp. 517, Grey to S. of S., March 10, 1855.

that war might come.¹ Neither the Colonists nor the Kaffirs regarded Cathcart's peace as anything more than a truce, and though Moshesh stood aside and let the Free State deal justly with Witsi, a noted raider in the Harrismith area,² he adopted the chastened chieftain into his tribe and ignored the Smithfield Treaty. In response to a scare that Krelu was coming, Grey rushed every available man to the Eastern Frontier and called on Mauritius for aid, while Moshesh claimed a line far down towards the junction of the Orange and the Caledon where Poshuli and other minor chiefs had driven the Boers into laager.³ Luckily for Grey, the Crimean War ended and he soon had ten good battalions ; but, as if to remind him of his liabilities, Natal had trouble with some of its clans and was seriously alarmed at a Zulu civil war fought out on the banks of the Tugela.⁴

So the Old Year closed in panic and the New Year dawned in madness. Prophets had arisen among the Xosas and the Tembus telling of visions of strange men from beyond the ocean, enemies of the English, who bade the tribes abandon witchcraft, sow no crops, and slay and eat fat cattle ; for on the appointed day signs would appear in the sky, a whirlwind sweep the white men into the sea, and the dead heroes of the Kaffir nation arise from the earth followed by cattle and corn such as eye had never beheld. The Ndhambis and the Galekas, Sandile's Gaikas and most of the Tembus slew and slew and, as the messengers of Moshesh came south, the madness mounted higher. For Moshesh was behind the cattle-killing.⁵ He believed that war was coming between his Basuto and the Free Staters and, if war was to come, he proposed to prevent the Cape Colonists from helping the republicans by giving them something to occupy them on their own borders. He sent back to the Free State more than the tale of cattle demanded, but his people doggedly refused to give up the horses, the beasts of war, and, at that very moment, The Day dawned on the banks of the Keiskamma. The sun ran its appointed course, no wind stirred, the heroes came not, the very Xosas were not massed to follow their lead into the white man's land. Night fell, and when the chiefs called upon their warriors, they were answered by the wail of a starving people. Grey was ready with troops and food, but the mortality was frightful. No one knows how many died east of the Kei. In British

¹ No. 2096 of 1856, pp. 11, 22 ff. ; *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape)*, pp. 96, 105 ; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 184.

² No. 2202 of 1857, p. 20.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 178, 191.

⁴ Theal, IIIb. 233.

⁵ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 184, 229-31, 241, 247, 264 ; No. 2202 of 1857, pp. 38-9 ; No. 2352 of 1857, No. 84, 86, 88, 94, 95.

April
1856.

Dec.
1856.

Feb.
1857.

Kaffraria itself the Bantu were reduced by death or dispersion from nearly 105,000 to 37,000 souls.

The Fingos and some of the other clans had abstained from the cattle-killing, but the Xosas and Tembus of the Ciskei were 'broke up as the Hottentots were' by their own folly. Grey made the most of his opportunity. He let Sandile keep part of his reserve under strict magisterial control, confiscated the lands of the other chiefs who had tried to drive their people to war, swept the wrecks of Krel's Galekas beyond the Bashee and began to plant the confiscated reserves with the German Legionaries. These warriors brought few women and children with them; they were neither so numerous nor so German as he had expected; there were far too many young officers of the Black and Tan variety; but Grey made the best of them, kept them on full pay and therefore under the salutary restraint of military law, imported wives, principally Irish, to help to keep them in order, and, against the wishes of Downing Street, contracted with a Hamburg emigration firm to send out 4000 German peasants.¹ Nor was this enough. He induced the Cape Colony to vote money to assist the immigrants who were to build railways and other public works and proposed to settle Europeans and loyal natives in the Transkei, which the Cape Police was keeping clear of Kaffirs, and in the long strip of Nomansland beyond, thereby cutting off Moshesh from the coast tribes and linking British Kaffraria with Natal.²

The cattle-killing had happened only just in time to relieve ^{1857.} the situation, for two events occurred which reminded men that no state can live to itself alone, especially in South Africa, the half-way house to the East. In August came the news of the Indian Mutiny and, without waiting for orders, Grey began to send away sorely needed troops and guns. Meanwhile, in April, Pretorius had invaded the Free State in pursuance of his policy of uniting all the trekker republics. The rejection of the Grondwet by Lydenburg and Zoutpansberg had not daunted him even when Schoeman of Zoutpansberg threatened to challenge him to single combat—and God defend the right.³ The Zoutpansberg was declared in a state of blockade and Pretorius rode off with a few friends to attempt a Napoleonic *coup d'état* in the Free State. Winburg supporters joined him, and at Bloemfontein he claimed authority as the successor of Andries Pretorius and summoned Moshesh to a conference. The stroke miscarried; Boshof ordered him out of the country and he went

¹ No. 389 of 1858, *passim*; No. 2202, pp. 45-6.

² No. 2352 of 1857, No. 45; *Desp. to Sec. of State*, XXIII. 260, 267.

³ Engelenburg, 'N *Onbekende Kruger*, p. 25.

by way of Natal, leaving his Free State friends to face charges of sedition. To stop the trials and still further make good his authority, he presently invaded the Free State in force, relying on his six field pieces, the knowledge that the cannon which Boshof had ordered had not yet arrived and the hope that half Boshof's men would come over to him at the first shot. The opposing armies faced one another on the Rhenoster river, but the shot was never fired. Kruger, Commandant of Rustenburg, played his usual moderating part and the rival Presidents made peace. Each recognised the independence of the other; Pretorius abandoned his claim to Winburg; the Free State Unionists were fined, a penalty which was subsequently 'mitigated,' and some of the more extreme of them followed Pretorius back across the Vaal, to the unfeigned relief of Boshof.¹

In spite of this rebuff, Pretorius made good progress in the Transvaal. Lydenburg refused to hearken, but Zoutpansberg listened to the arguments of Kruger, acting on behalf of his President, and accepted the Grondwet.² The firstfruits of union were soon gathered. The Bamapela rose once more, but this time they were put down decisively by Schoeman, now Commandant-General of the South African Republic, and Kruger, who earned in this campaign a great reputation for courage. The lesson was not entirely thrown away. Lydenburg, which was steadily losing control of Sekwati's Bapedi, joined forces with Utrecht.

The northern republics were thus clearly moving towards union but the Free State was more than ever divided. The 'English party,' incensed at the irregular execution of one of their number, joined the opposition, and the wretched Boshof resigned. Under pressure, he resumed office, but his prestige was gone and Moshesh naturally became defiant. Moshesh had checked the border cattle-rieving to appease Grey for the part he had played in the Xosa cattle-killing;³ but now the trouble began again and the chief sent large hunting-parties into the belt of farms which he claimed. Boshof, with some wild idea of playing Jan Letelle off against him just as the Natalians had played Panda off against Dingaan, took over that public danger of the Smithfield border as a Free State subject.⁴ Letelle scorned Moshesh as his inferior by birth and harried his people; Moshesh found a legitimate excuse for reprisals in Letelle's depredations; and so war broke out. The burghers struck in at Thaba Bosigo,

¹ No. 2352 of 1857, No. 34; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 264, 281; Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, I. cxlix.; on this period of Transvaal history, *vide* Theal, IVb. and Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*.

² Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 100, and *Ampetelike Briewe*, pp. 21 ff.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 285 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II. 291 ff., 310; III. 123.

Feb.
1858.

May
1858.

1857.

the key of Basutoland. They had reckoned without their host. The Basuto poured into the Free State and the commandos dispersed while, in the west, the Bushmen and Koranas broke loose and Batlapin from beyond the Vaal raided both republics.¹ May
1858.

A joint Free State-Transvaal force beat the Batlapin back, took much spoil and obliged the Batlapin Mahura, who had sheltered his kinsfolk, to promise further reparations; but the ill-success of the Basuto campaign strengthened the party in the Free State which held that their republic could not stand by itself. The most convinced of all was Boshof, who, at the first reverse, called on Grey and Pretorius to come to the rescue.² Pretorius and Kruger arrived first, proposing to attack Moshesh unless he accepted their terms; but, in reply to petitions for union, they said they must await the arrival of the High Commissioner who, in terms of his instructions, had warned them that union would mean the modification of the Conventions.³ June
1858.

Grey soon came, but had to hurry back to the Colony immediately to expedite the despatch of further troops to India, including a thousand of the most unruly of the Legionaries whom he now sent to be shot respectably on the plains of Hindustan.⁴ The British immigrants and such of the Hamburg Germans as the Secretary of State had permitted to sail were arriving and the Cape Police had been increased to 1000 strong,⁵ but Grey returned to his work of mediation with his powers to enforce his decision sadly weakened. Moshesh was boasting truly enough that he had not yet begun to fight; but he none the less feared a union of the two republics, and Grey was able to induce him to sign the First Treaty of Aliwal North. By that treaty mutual claims for compensation were expunged and the Warden Line was confirmed with an extension in the Basuto's favour between the Caledon and Orange, a line which the High Commissioner himself marked out.⁶ Oct.
1858.

At this stage Bulwer Lytton, the new Secretary of State, 1858-
1859. bade Grey report on the possibility of federating the three British colonies with a view to releasing the bulk of the Imperial garrison, and asked what the 'permanent line of policy' towards the republics should be.⁷ Grey saw his chance. He had found a strong body of opinion in the Free State in favour of federation with the Cape; federation would force the Cape to share the

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 326-61; Engelbrecht, *Amptelike Briewe*, pp. 35 ff.

² *Ibid.*, II. 353, 362, 371.

³ No. 2352 of 1857, No. 206; *Bas. Rec.*, II. 395. Text of proposed Transvaal, O.F.S. and Basuto treaty in Soutter's MSS. (Pretoria Archives).

⁴ No. 389 of 1858, No. 27; No. 216 of 1860, p. 23.

⁵ No. 357 of 1860, p. 4; No. 389 of 1858, No. 23-33.

⁶ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 475 ff.

⁷ No. 216 of 1860, pp. 31 ff.

customs duties and thus show that 'prudent liberality' towards the Free State he had so often urged; Boshof would be able to borrow lawfully the Cape burghers and field guns which he had already requested for use against the Basuto.¹ Moreover, British Kaffraria could not be annexed to the Cape without an Act of the Colonial legislature which would hardly be forthcoming; but it could form a province of a self-governing federation, the Eastern Province and Natal could be given an otherwise unattainable autonomy and, if all the southern states united, the Transvaal republics must soon come to terms.² He therefore recommended a permissive Act of the Imperial Parliament empowering the colonies to take the necessary steps. He had already hinted at some such developments and had been ordered to do nothing without further instructions; but, on receipt of a formal request from Bloemfontein to appoint a commission to discuss preliminaries, he raised the question in the Cape Parliament. His hopes were speedily ended. Lytton declared that Great Britain would not resume 'sovereignty in any shape or form' over the Free State, censured him for mootting the matter and presently dismissed him.³

July
1859.

From the Colonial Office point of view and especially from that of Carnarvon, Under-Secretary and Mayor of the Palace to the sickly Lytton, there was nothing else to be done. This 'dangerous man,' with his revolutionary ideas that each part of the Empire might on occasion function as if it were the whole, had overstepped the ordinary duties of a Governor and embarrassed the Imperial Government. He had more than once given ministers the choice between ratifying his actions or of recalling him, and now ministers had taken the latter course. So, to the regret of all save possibly Pretorius, Grey sailed home.

Aug.
1859.

Nearly a year later he came again. A change of ministry had taken place and Newcastle sent him back to Capetown, but only on condition that no more was heard of federation.⁴

July
1860.

If Colonial Office policy had not wrecked Grey's plans, the question still remains whether South Africa was in a fit condition to be even loosely united. Great distances, mutual ignorance, local prejudices and poor means of communication were all against success, but recent advances and the prospect of more to come might have led a less sanguine man than Grey to hope

¹ No. 216 of 1860, pp. 1 ff.; No. 2202 of 1857, p. 38; No. 2352 of 1857, pp. 21, 28; *Further Papers re Kaffir Tribes, July, 1855*, p. 62.

² No. 357 of 1860, No. 86.

³ No. 216 of 1860, pp. 4 ff., 15, 33 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

that material obstacles at least would soon be removed. World conditions, and especially those in Great Britain, were favourable; the advancing Industrial Revolution, the gold of California and Ballarat, war prices in Europe and presently in North America, and the absence of serious manufacturing competition from the Continent all gave easy money and long credit to England and her colonies and even to the republics beyond their borders. The development of banking in South Africa tells the story. In 1856 there were seventeen local banks in the Colony, two in the Free State, and one in Natal, but as yet the Transvaal was innocent of the higher forms of finance. Six years later there were twenty-eight in the Colony; the two 'imperial' banks, the London and South African and the Standard, had arrived, and the latter had defined its policy by absorbing the local bank at Port Elizabeth and opening branches in the Free State and in Natal.

The trade of the Colony flourished. The cattle and horse 1854-
sicknesses, smallpox, the drought and oidium in the vines were 1859.
forgotten as soon as sulphur had checked the disease in the
Western vineyards. The copper boom had indeed been followed 1854-
by the inevitable slump, but copper was now on a firm basis, and 1855.
wool, the basis of colonial prosperity, was doing well and had
been reinforced by mohair in the East. The Colony had even
anticipated self-governing Canada by taking control of its own
tariff policy and, in keeping with the principles of Free Trade, 1855.
abolishing the British preference. The revenues benefited
accordingly, and though expenditure on immigration, new magis-
tracies, and a third Judge for the Supreme Court more than kept
pace, no one cared so long as Grey refrained from demanding
additional taxation.

Population was increasing rapidly,¹ and overseas communica-
tions were improved by the building of lighthouses, the beginning
of a breakwater which was to make Table Bay safe during the
winter months, and the running of a monthly mail service of forty-
two days by the Union Line to Devonport. The Colony had
issued its famous 'three-cornered Capes' in Cathcart's time;
now Capetown was given a local penny post, and soon the privilege 1860-
was extended to the whole Colony. Moreover, the capital was 1864.
linked by telegraph to the naval base at Simonstown, a company
began a line to Kaffraria, and the wires followed the railways
as they crept inland. The original railway scheme was for 1857.

¹ Europeans in 1854 = 140,000 and in 1856, in spite of heavy emigration, 210,000. Non-Europeans, 181,000 and 315,000. Nearly 9000 immigrants came in under the Act of 1857 between 1858 and 1862, besides more than 1000 who paid their own passages and some 700 poor children sent from Holland and 1300 Germans from Hamburg.

trunk lines from Capetown and Port Elizabeth, but such were the jealousies of Port Elizabeth and Port Frances, of Grahamstown and Graaff Reinet, that the East got no railway at all. However, 1859-1864. a London company began the main line from Capetown to Wellington by way of Stellenbosch and another company carried a branch to Wynberg.

Nor was the advance merely utilitarian. Grey encouraged the construction of the present S.A. Public Library buildings to house a museum and the existing collection of books which he enriched with his own priceless library. The Grey Institute at Port Elizabeth, grants to mission schools, the formation of the Board of Examiners, forerunner of the examining University of 1873, the creation of elective school management boards in towns, dorps, and field cornetcies,¹ and the opening of the long-awaited Theological Seminary of the D.R. Church at Stellenbosch witnessed to the prosperity of the Colony and to Grey's interest in education.

Having helped the Colony forward, Greymade British Kaffraria as far as it could be made from the European point of view. At the end of his term the little province was still overwhelmingly a native area, but he had settled some 2700 Germans and 3200 other Europeans either in the villages or on small, rich farms held on military tenure. The curtailing of the imperial grant, orders to use land revenues to reimburse H.M. Government for its outlay, and the fall in the value of land following on this check to immigration had hampered him.² Nevertheless imports and exports rose, especially in the year of the cattle-killing, when hides went out and guns and other supplies came in; the dwindling imperial grant helped to fill the gap in the revenues, and, so far had the Colony advanced that, sorely against Grey's will, East London was at last handed over to Kaffraria and a Crown Colony constitution was set up, with a Lieutenant-Governor, judge, and jury complete.³

Natal was exuberant. First wool displaced ivory at the head of the list of exports, and coffee and cotton made good a modest footing; but soon sugar became king in the tropical coast-belt and in the Legislative Council. And with sugar came Indian coolies.

Planters had long complained that they could not get labour. The Bantu were slow to leave their reserves, in spite of the light hut-tax, and were undependable and heavy-handed when they came. But they were better than nothing; hence the attempt

¹ Eybers, p. 87.

² *Desp. to Sec. of State*, XXIII. pp. 274, 445.

³ A. 2-63 (Cape), p. 7.

1859-
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to break up the reserves. No one had yet asked seriously for the indentured coolies who, as substitutes for the emancipated slaves, were working such wonders in Mauritius and some of the West Indian islands; but now the cry was raised for them, especially as the proposed importation of destitute children from England came to nothing. Grey refused to allow Natal to have convicts, and a new law to prevent natives squatting on Crown lands or farmers keeping more than three Bantu families on any one farm was not—indeed, in the absence of police, could not be—carried out.¹ On the other hand, Grey approved of indentured Indians, and, after some correspondence with the Colonial Office and the East India Company, which demanded a passage home for time-expired coolies and higher pay than the proffered six shillings a month, the Natal Council empowered the Lieutenant-General to make preliminary arrangements.² 1856.

At first the Indian Government refused³ and the newly-made Legislative Council at Pietermaritzburg tried to induce its Bantu to work by raising the hut-tax on natives who were not working for Europeans from 7s. to 11s. annually⁴ and by enforcing *isibalo*, the paid *corvée* on the public works. One land company even imported a few Chinese and had to send them home again. At last India agreed to allow a few coolies to go as an experiment, and, in spite of some opposition in Natal, two ordinances were hurriedly passed permitting public and private importation of British Indians.⁵ Extra customs duties were levied to cover the cost and the first shipload of coolies was landed. The coolies, including a statutory proportion of women, were imported at the public expense and allotted to masters for three years under indenture. Masters were to pay them 10s. per month for the first year with food and lodging, rising to 12s. in the third year, and to repay Government for its outlay. At the end of his term the coolie had to re-indenture for a further year either with his old master or another and he might re-indenture for two; alternatively, he could compound at the rate of £2 10s. for each of these years. At the end of five years the coolie was free to live and work how and where he could, and men who so lived for five years were to be entitled either to a free passage home or to Crown land to the value of the passage. 1857-1858. 1859. Nov. 1860.

The first cargoes were disappointing; there were too few women and those of a bad type; many of the men were so unfit that they had to be repatriated; the scheme cost more than had

¹ *Correspondence* . . . 1855-7 (*Cape*), p. 50; Natal Ord. 2 of 1855.

² *Correspondence* . . . 1855-7 (*Cape*), pp. 30, 203 ff.; Ord. 3 of 1856.

³ *Selected Documents* (*Natal Leg. Council*), 1857, No. 5.

⁴ Ord. 6 of 1857.

⁵ Ord. 14 and 15 of 1859.

been anticipated. However, subsequent importations were more
 1863. satisfactory, and though Natal was soon faced with a deficit and
 the diversion of funds from public works to coolie importation,
 legislative councillors held that that was a light matter since the
 coming of the Indians benefited the exchequer and kept down the
 price of Kaffir labour.¹ Indeed, a loan of £100,000 was raised to
 1864. finance a 'Gibbon Wakefield' scheme of importation which should
 bring in 2000 coolies annually and pay for itself in the long run ;
 1865. the term of indenture was definitely fixed at five years, and rules
 much more stringent than those in force in Mauritius and the
 West Indies were laid down for dealing with defaulting labourers.
 And already there were nearly 6500 Indians at work helping to
 lay the foundations of Natal's prosperity.²

Signs of hope and confidence multiplied in the Garden Colony.
 1859- A company built a railway from the Point to Durban, the first
 1860. to be completed in South Africa, nearly two miles long ; the
 telegraph was run from the port to the capital ; roads and bridges
 were constructed to cope with the up-country traffic. With full
 Crown Colony status and the prospects of a trade boom, the
 machinery of government was reconstructed on a more ambitious
 1857. scale. A Supreme Court of three judges was set up ;³ new
 magistracies were formed and official salaries lavishly increased.
 But European subjects to rule were more difficult to acquire.
 Settlers rejected farms on easy terms and military tenure and,
 though a few Hollanders settled in New Guelderland, assisted
 passages to friends and relatives of colonists only produced 2100
 newcomers in eleven years. The 8000 Europeans of 1856 barely
 rose to 16,000 in a decade, and masses of Crown lands passed into
 the hands of speculators who allowed the native occupants and
 new arrivals to squat at anything from 5s. to 28s. a hut annually.
 1866. Soon there remained some 4,000,000 acres of Crown and Reserve
 lands, while of the 7,500,000 alienated a mere 38,000 were under
 cultivation.⁴ Natal thus came perilously near to being, in the
 unkind words of John X. Merriman, 'a white forwarding agency
 in a native territory.'

In the intervals of trouble with Transvaalers and Basuto, the
 Free State progressed quietly. New magistracies were set up ;
 new villages were founded, in many cases in the small native
 reserves which were being bought up ; the Dutch Reformed
 ministers were reinforced and there were soon Separatists at

¹ *Report of Emigration Commissioners (Natal), 1861 ; Votes and Proceedings (Natal), 1863, pp. 2, 17 ; Natal Govt. Gazette, 1864, pp. 279-80 ; 1866, pp. 467-70 ; Selected Documents (Natal Leg. Council), 1864, No. 18.*

² Natal Ord. 16 of 1864 ; Ord. 25 of 1865 ; Leg. Council 1 of 1872, p. 5.

³ Eybers, p. 242.

⁴ *Correspondence . . . 1855-7 (Cape), p. 34.*

Reddersburg, Wesleyans and Anglicans in several of the dorps and an Anglican bishop at the capital. Each church had its elementary school and Grey gave £3000 of his Kaffrarian grant towards the building of the Grey College at Bloemfontein and paid for the roof himself. As for the Transvaal, it lacked officials and police, its revenue was small and in arrear and its political union was precarious; but it had acquired a printing press, a coat-of-arms and Pretoria as a capital. One or two new drostdies and three Reformed ministers at work were more substantial signs of progress; Berlin and Hamburg missionaries were coming in and a Dutch Reformed Church missionary from the Colony reached the far and inhospitable Zoutpansberg.¹

The first warning that this golden age would not last for ever was the drought. Then the Lancashire cotton mills closed; the Yorkshire cloth weavers demanded long-staple wools instead of 'Cape shorts'; at the end of the American Civil War the American wool market collapsed, and a run on the banks took place in Great Britain. Long before this last calamity, English manufacturers and merchants and the banks had begun to shorten credit; South African importers found themselves overstocked; immigration to the Cape ceased; the exodus to New Zealand and the U.S.A. began, and men began to trek to the republics to escape drought and taxation. The S.A. Republic had long since paid its civil servants in 'good-fors'; the Free State now began to issue paper money, and in the following year the Cape nearly resorted to the same desperate expedient; the Standard Bank, for the only time in its long career, declared no dividend, and the Suez Canal, with all its dreaded effects on the half-way house to India, was known to be approaching completion.² As the dismal 'sixties wore on everyone in the States and Colonies, faced with falling trade and revenue, became depressed and quarrelsome, from the High Commissioner downwards. These facts go far to explain the ecclesiastical disruption of the time, the constitutional deadlocks in the Colony and in Natal, the political extinction of British Kaffraria, and the growing confusion in the republics which, in the Transvaal, culminated in civil war.

¹ New O.F.S. villages at Kroonstad and Boshof (1856), Bethulie and Bethlehem (1860), Jacobsdal and Reddersburg (1861), Edenburg (1862), Rouxville (1863). Landdrosts at Boshof, Kroonstad, Bethulie, Jacobsdal, Philippolis (1858-62). There had been 5 magistrates in 1854; there were 10 in 1862.

New S.A. Republican Landdrosts at Marthinuswesselsstroom (Wakkerstroom) and Utrecht (1859) and a new village at Nazareth (Middelburg), midway between Potchefstroom and Lydenburg (1859).

² C. 3114 of 1882, p. 216; Amphlett, *History of the Standard Bank*, p. 202. Shopkeepers in the colonial towns freely issued token coinage 'made in Birmingham' for lack of silver change.

Churches organised on a Presbyterian basis are essentially republican in form, as James I was quick to point out. In the nineteenth century they showed themselves to be fissile in character. Twenty years after the Great Disruption of the Scottish Kirk a somewhat similar disaster overtook the D.R. Church in South Africa. Liberal doctrines flowing from the universities of Germany to those of the Netherlands, where so many of the South African predikants received their training, caused heartsearchings among clergy and laity alike. Combined with doctrinal difficulties were questions of policy. Were ministers to be appointed as hitherto by the Cape Government or to be 'called' by the congregations, as the Liberals desired?—a question to which Saul Solomon, a Congregationalist, added another: Were they to be paid by the state? Again, were ministers and elders from beyond the colonial borders to be permitted to sit in the Cape Synod, which enjoyed its privileges under an Ordinance issued in 1843, when the Cape had been the only recognised European state in South Africa?

1853. A section of the Transvaalers had already answered this last question in their own way by refusing to be incorporated in the Cape Synod.¹ However, a minister sent by the Netherlands Society arrived at Lydenburg and took up the local cause of union with that Synod, while the Rev. D. Postma of the Zwolle Separatists came to Rustenburg and there found many disciples, including the popular commandant, Paul Kruger. Like the Free State and the north-eastern Colony, Rustenburg was full of Doppers, the 'Auld Lights' of the Reformed Church, who were distinguished from their fellows by extreme simplicity of faith and worship, and sometimes by the old-fashioned cut of their clothes. The great point of difference was that whereas the Doppers used hymns in private worship, they held that only the Psalms should be sung in church, as they were part of Holy Scripture and the hymns were not. Some of the Colonial clergy had quarrelled with them on this score, but so far van der Hoff, the minister at Potchefstroom, had avoided doing so, and hoped that Postma would be prepared to work with him.

Jan. 1859. The issue was tested at two General Assemblies. At Pretoria, Postma refused to use the hymns and, next day, fifteen men, headed by Kruger, gave notice that they had left the Hervormde Kerk and proposed to form a free Reformed Church. Van der Hoff was conciliatory, and all three Transvaal ministers, besides clergy from the Free State and the Colony, attended the General Assembly at Potchefstroom. It was then agreed to exclude Liberals by insisting that no minister should be installed in the

¹ On the rise of the Separatists, *vide* Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, I. 114 ff.

Transvaal until his credentials had been passed by the Cape Synod, to leave it to each minister to decide whether or no the hymns should be used, and to give Postma the church at Rustenburg provided the other ministers might visit their supporters in the town occasionally. But after the meeting Postma and his followers refused to rejoin their old church unless the hymns were abandoned, declined to have their headquarters invaded by rival clergy, and pronounced against union with the Cape Synod. The Dopper Kerk thus went its own way, and in due time, as ministers were forthcoming, formed congregations in the Free State and the Colony.¹

The political results of this disruption in the politically divided Transvaal were not so serious as was expected at the time. Meanwhile, the orthodox church of the Transvaal once more discussed incorporation with the Cape Synod, a policy which van der Hoff had originally favoured.² The prospects of this union were ruined once for all by the action of the Liberals in the Cape Synod of 1862. That assembly first decided that ministers should continue to be appointed by Government and then censured one of its members for heterodox opinions. To check the power of the Orthodox party, the Liberals appealed to the Supreme Court, which *inter alia* decided that extra-colonial clergy had no right to sit in the Synod. The Cape clergy were thus left alone to carry on a long series of lawsuits which led them more than once to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Rev. T. F. Burgers, the Liberal protagonist and future President of the Transvaal, won on points of law, but orthodoxy triumphed in the end. Ecclesiastical controversy, which found an outlet in the orthodox *Volksvriend*, edited by J. H. Hofmeyr, the future leader of the Afrikaner Bond, engendered religious zeal; the foundation of the Free Protestant Church on a Unitarian basis split the Liberals; the opening of the Theological Seminary and stringent tests for clerical aspirants cut off Liberal recruits, and the Synod of 1870 was strong enough to readmit Burgers and his friends to its ranks.³

Outside the Colony the decision of the Cape Court had been decisive. The Transvaal Synod had decided to stand by itself; a Free State Synod assembled at Smithfield; Lydenburg-Utrecht at first joined the Synod of Natal, but on the arrival of Lion Cachet,

¹ By 1873 the Christelijk Afgeschiedene Gereformeerde Kerk numbered some 5000 members in 6 congregations in the Transvaal, 5 in the O.F.S., and 7 in the Cape Colony, with a Theological Seminary at Burgersdorp C.C. (1869), transferred to Potchefstroom (1905) (McCarter, *Geschiedenis der Ned. Geref. Kerk in Z.A.*).

² Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, II. 5 ff.

³ Hofmeyr, *Life of J. H. Hofmeyr*, pp. 60 ff.; *Report of the Case of . . . Burgers . . . v. The Synodical Commission*, 1865.

a bitter opponent of Pretorius, as predikant of Utrecht, they formed a separate Synod of their own. The constitutional disruption of the D.R. Church in South Africa was thus completed.¹

1863.

The Church of England underwent a somewhat similar experience.² Bishop Colenso of Natal, champion of Zulu rights, mathematician and Biblical critic, applied his arithmetic to Exodus with disastrous results. Taking his stand on the fact that he and the other South African bishops had been appointed by letters patent, he refused to submit to the sentence of deprivation passed upon him by the court of the Bishop of Capetown. The Privy Council upheld him, declaring that colonial churches had no legal connection with 'the Church of England as by law established' and were merely voluntary associations in which no one, in the absence of a definite agreement, had power to enforce obedience on another. The Bishop of Capetown and his brethren³ then consecrated a Bishop of Pietermaritzburg 'in the Church of the Province of South Africa,' while Colenso, strong in the support of half his late flock and the judgment of the courts, held the property till legislation cut the knot.⁴

The experiences of the two most influential churches in South Africa gave a great impetus to the cause of Voluntaryism and, still more, pointed the way to political self-government. But the Cape had a long way to travel before reaching that goal. The agitation of the 'fifties had died down; Brand was in the Speaker's chair; Fairbairn pronounced responsible government premature; Solomon, who had ousted him from the leadership of the Assembly, merely joined Porter in advocating that officials should be allowed to stand for election as full members of Parliament.⁵ Yet a parliamentary system which falls short of responsible government makes heavy demands on the tact and forbearance of all concerned. Criticism may easily degenerate into obstruction; deadlocks between the Houses or one or both of them and the executive are hard to avoid. Such a system cost Charles I his head and Great Britain her American Colonies; but, in the Cape Colony, so long as Grey ruled and good times continued and no fresh taxation was demanded, all went well. During Grey's absence, J. C. Molteno, a stout Westerner who combined business and landholding on a large scale at Beaufort West with a contempt for British military officialdom contracted during the War of the Axe, moved in favour of responsible government.⁶ The motion

¹ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, II, 18, 34 ff., and Bylage.

² H.C., 454.

³ *I.e.*, the Bishops of Grahamstown, St. Helena, and Bloemfontein. The new bishop was Dr. W. K. Macrorie.

⁴ Eybers, p. 197.

⁵ Kilpin, *Pioneers of Parliament*.

⁶ Molteno, *Life of Sir J. C. Molteno*, I, 26 ff., 71.

1860.

was withdrawn but, next year, Grey being gone for good, the Easterners revived their agitation for Separation in a more serious form than ever. Hitherto they had demanded separate governments for each province and a federal authority over both ; but now, alarmed at a threatened export tax on wool and further expenditure on western railways and the Table Bay breakwater, they insisted on Separation pure and simple.¹ 1860-1861.

The issues of self-government and separatism were thus both before the country when Sir Philip Wodehouse arrived as Governor. Sir Philip was a man of fifty-one, upright and able but with a colonial experience limited to the purely official dependencies of Ceylon, Honduras and Guiana. It would have been hard for any man to live up to Grey's standard of popularity and Wodehouse was unlucky. He came with the drought and the drought only departed with him ; he was faced with a growing deficit ; he could not hope to be loved, if only because he had to restore the finances, in other words, to tax. He proposed to have much closer consultation among officials than heretofore, so that the executive might show a united front to the Houses, to avoid military expenditure, incorporate British Kaffraria in the Colony, station an agent in Basutoland, give the Eastern Province its own Court and hold parliamentary sessions alternately at Capetown and Grahamstown. As for self-government, Newcastle, the Secretary of State, was not opposed to it in principle but declined to consider it so long as the Imperial Government paid for the troops.² Wodehouse was more downright. He regarded a self-governing colony as a contradiction in terms.³ Jan. 1862.

Here was material for misunderstanding in plenty, and the Cape constitution creaked and groaned on its way to deadlock. The Cape Parliament as a rule divided on provincial lines. The Westerners, on the whole, opposed Separation and Annexation lest they lose their predominance and be saddled with the expense caused by the withdrawal of the troops from Kaffraria. These views were shared by many Dutch Easterners,⁴ but the 1820 Party from Albany and Port Elizabeth wished to absorb Kaffraria into a separate Eastern Province and pointed to their swelling customs revenue as a proof that they could stand alone. The Kaffrarians on the other hand had no desire to be ruled from Grahamstown. They hoped rather to remain a distinct colony enlarged by the annexation of Nomansland and the empty

¹ *Grahamstown Journal*, Sept. 25 and Dec. 22, 1860; Jan. 12, 1861; *Report of Separation Debate (Assembly)*, pp. 2, 27.

² A. 2-63 (Cape), pp. 3 ff., 15.

³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 3, 15 ff.

⁴ A. 2-63 (Cape), p. 15; *Cape Argus*, June 27, 1857; *Grahamstown Journal*, Aug. 24, 1861.

Transkei and protected by the troops from Kreli's Galekas on the other side of the Bashee.

The affairs of British Kaffraria and independent Kaffirland had caused Grey and other Cape officials much anxiety. Before his recall, Grey had settled Fingos at Butterworth and Tembus at Idutywa in the Transkei;¹ thereafter Wynyard, the acting Governor, Maclean, Lieutenant-Governor of British Kaffraria, Sir Walter Currie, chief of the police, and Warner the Tembu agent, all converts to Grey's policy, tried to carry out his policy of interspersing whites and blacks in the lands beyond the Keiskamma. The disbanded Legionaries were drifting away up-country; Tembus and Peddie Fingos were desirous of moving eastward out of European control; there was a risk that the Free Staters under Pretorius might push down through Kaffirland and find a harbour at Port St. John's to the grievous damage of colonial customs revenues. Wynyard asked leave to plant Europeans in the Transkei even if it did mean expense, and then Grey came back determined, since all hope of solving the native problem by federation was gone, to push his native policy through Kaffirland into Natal itself.²

1860.

March
1861.

Grey prepared to drive Kreli's Galekas back behind the Umtata river and then, having induced Natal to modify its wide claims on Nomansland, told Adam Kok that he might find a substitute there for his dwindling Philippolis reserve.³ Faku the Pondo, weary of the pomps and responsibilities of his unwieldy Treaty State, offered to cede the northern half to the Queen; the bickering chiefs to the north of the 'Pondo Line' were willing to receive British magistrates; and if Kok could be thrust into Nomansland, he and his mounted Griquas would serve as 'a wall of iron' between the coast tribes and the Basuto. Thus far Grey, who sailed for New Zealand with a warning of woe to come if his policy were not followed out.

1862.

At first, Wodehouse proposed to follow it. The Secretary of State had approved of it all except the annexation of Nomansland and, in particular, had given him leave to colonise the Transkei and annex it to British Kaffraria provided no extra military expenditure were entailed thereby.⁴ To satisfy himself on that score, Wodehouse visited Kingwilliamstown. There he speedily abandoned Grey's plans. Finding that Kreli was averse to going eastward from fear of the Pondos, he left him where he was and

¹ *Native Affairs Blue-book (Cape)*, I. No. 6 ff. for Grey's native policy.

² *Desp. to Sec. of State*, XXIV. pp. 84-5, 88, 98-100, 217-23.

³ A. 118-61 (Cape), pp. 20 ff., 34; *Desp. to Sec. of State*, XXIV. pp. 231 ff.; *Native Affairs Blue-book (Cape)*, I. pp. 4 ff.

⁴ *Governor's Corresp.*, XXV. pp. 31, 57, 67, 72, 229, 272. On the affairs of Nomansland and Kreli, *vide* G. 53-62 (Cape), *passim*.

declined for the moment to accede to the Kaffrarians' demands for land in the Transkei because he believed the Cape would refuse to maintain its police there and would thus throw an additional burden on the troops. What is more, he made up his mind that British Kaffraria was far too small and poverty-stricken to keep its head above water much longer. The Imperial grant was growing small by degrees and beautifully less; the Port Elizabeth firms which controlled the trade of East London paid duty at their own port and sent all the goods intended for Kaffraria overland to avoid payment of dues at East London; the Kingwilliamstown administration 'made up of officers with high-sounding names and the smallest salaries' certainly could not pay for police of their own. He stopped all public works and hurried back to Capetown to press annexation on the Cape Parliament.¹

That body refused to hear of it. With an unhelpful impartiality it rejected equal representation for the two Provinces, alternate sessions and Separation, and threw out Molteno's motion for responsible government and most of the executive's proposals for new taxation.² But more money had to be found; the slump was upon the Colony; public works were being closed down; London would have nothing to do with its projected railway construction even with government and district guarantees; Grey's immigrants were flocking out of the country and Wodehouse had to borrow on an empty treasury as in the days of Somerset. 1862-
1863.

The Governor hoped for better things in 1864. Many new men had been returned at the Assembly general election and crops were slightly better, but the general situation was so serious that the most determined obstructionist must see that something had to be done. The deficit was large; the stoppage of the Imperial grant had reduced Kaffraria to helplessness; all public works other than relief works had been stopped in the Colony, and the Kaffirs, under pressure of drought, were robbing on the Eastern Frontier. He summoned Parliament to Grahamstown. Western absenteeism and Eastern gratitude, evoked by the establishment of the two-judge court at Grahamstown which Smith and Cathcart had recommended and the promise that the garrison would be brought back thither from Kingwilliamstown, enabled him to carry most of his money bills at last³ and to make proposals for the settlement of the Transkei. 1864.

Wodehouse proposed to raise irregular police, paid by H.M. Government for five years, to keep order in British Kaffraria, and to give out farms beyond the Kei. His offer led to no response, for the terms were not regarded as favourable; but the event

¹ A. 2-63 (Cape), pp. 4, 8, 10, 16.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 11 ff.

³ No. 3436 of 1865, p. 4.

which really decided the future of the Transkei and therefore of Kaffraria had occurred during the late session. The police had reported that Kreli meant to attack sooner or later and urged that he be driven beyond the Umtata forthwith so that Europeans advancing to the Bashee might still have a buffer belt of territory between them and the tribes. Wodehouse had begun to move up troops before he learnt that the scare had no foundation. He had realised more than that: first, that there was no logical end to such a policy until the tribes had been pushed back to the Natal border, and, secondly, that the occupation of the Transkei would entail extra expense. Nevertheless, he made one more effort. He offered farms in part of the Transkei on easier terms, and, to relieve the congestion in Bomvanaland, allowed Kreli to come westward into the coastal strip (Galekaland). It was too late. The war scare had forced Downing Street to a decision. Orders came from London to abandon the Transkei altogether and, in Kaffraria, J. G. Sprigg, a member of the East London divisional council, took the lead of a small but growing party which was prepared to face absorption by the Cape provided the enlarged Colony received self-government.¹

1865.

The end came in 1865. The session of that year was the longest and most stormy hitherto in the annals of the Cape Parliament, for not only was it known that the Imperial Government was considering a reduction of the Cape garrison but, over the heads of the members, hung a Kaffrarian Annexation Act passed at Westminster to be made use of if they failed to pass an Act of their own. The Governor gilded the pill by proffering an increase in the membership of both Houses which would still preserve Western predominance, and even held out hopes that the lands of the emigrant Tembus on the Indwe river might become available for European settlement. In vain was the snare of the fowler spread in the sight of such experienced politicians as Solomon and Molteno. They obstructed vigorously, carried a vote of censure on the Governor's native policy and forced Wodehouse to tack his Annexation and Representation bills together.² The joint measure was carried and the session ended with the very relief work closing for lack of funds and Eastern farmers taking the law into their own hands against the thieving Kaffirs on the frontier. British Kaffraria was formally annexed to the Colony and the Kaffrarian members came up for the session of 1866 faced with such public poverty that even the sanguine

April
1866.

¹ No. 3436 of 1865, pp. 1, 6 ff., 13, 23 ff.

² The Legislative Council was increased from 15 to 21, giving the West a majority of one; the Assembly from 46 to 66 including 4 for Kaffraria, giving the West a majority of two (Eybers, p. 59).

Molteno did not venture to raise the question of responsible government.

Wodehouse, weakened by the resignation of his Attorney-General, Porter, met the enlarged Cape Parliament. Trade was dead ; there was the usual deficit, and expenditure was increasing as the sheep-farmers and copper-miners spread further afield.¹ It was in vain that he pleaded for fresh taxation. Molteno, who was already competing with Solomon for the leadership of the Assembly, accused the executive of holding up Crown lands, demanded retrenchment, voted only six months' supplies and forced him to borrow once more on an empty treasury.

Next year, Wodehouse duly came forward with proposals for retrenchment and, *inter alia*, a tax on wool, and announced that the Imperial Government at last proposed to put into force at the Cape the Newcastle-Cardwell scheme for the concentration of regiments in Great Britain.² Colonies like Canada, N.S. Wales and especially New Zealand, where British ministers were weary of finding troops to fight Maori wars undertaken by ministers responsible to the local parliament, were being asked to pay for such Imperial troops as they wanted, and Grey, once more Governor of New Zealand, was actually sending the regiments home. Carnarvon proposed to begin a gradual withdrawal from the Cape in 1868 and to charge more than the mere £10,000 a year voted in Grey's time for the remainder. Meanwhile, the Assembly refused to hear of the tax on wool but sacrificed half a dozen magistrates on the altar of economy. Wodehouse, to achieve the same end and to secure some form of government that would work, proposed to abolish the unpopular Legislative Council, to reduce the size of the Assembly and to add a proportion of official members to it.³ The recent reform of the self-governing constitution of Jamaica in this fashion following on trouble with the negroes served as a precedent ; but the bill had to be withdrawn, the alternative, responsible government, was thrown out, and Parliament adjourned, while, outside the House, drought drove in the coloured labourers from the fields to die of low fever in the towns.

The following session was quiet. Crops were better, there were rumours of gold and diamonds far to the north, and in response to Wodehouse's representations that the position of the Cape in face of the tribes was different from that of other colonies, the British Government had given up any idea of withdrawing troops for that year ; but the price of wool had fallen, and a dismal year closed

¹ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 7 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 10 ; Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Granville*, II. pp. 21 ff.

³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 10 ff.

1869. with an Assembly general election. The new House rejected the Governor's retrenchment scheme and declined to have either an excise on wine and spirits or an income tax; a deadlock on finance ensued between the two Houses and between both and the executive, and the Assembly declared that the Cape police could no longer be maintained in Basutoland and censured the general policy of the Governor.¹

The constitution could march no further. Wodehouse therefore dissolved the Assembly and appealed to the country to choose between his 'Jamaica' constitution and, presumably, responsible government. He and many others held that a colony which had just annexed British Kaffraria with its swarming Bantu and might soon have to take over Basutoland was to be classed with Jamaica rather than with Canada or the Australian colonies. The majority of the electorate thought otherwise. Twenty-two sitting members indeed lost their seats, but Porter and Solomon were in for Capetown to counsel a cautious advance, and Molteno and Sprigg were there to force the pace or, if that were impossible, to obstruct.² The drought had broken at last with such force as to burst the dam and sweep away houses in Beaufort West, Molteno's citadel; there was promise of a good harvest and men were beginning to take the talk of diamonds on the Vaal seriously; but there was a debt of over £1,420,000, two-thirds of which was due to Great Britain for advances to meet past deficits, the profit-producing garrison was at last being slowly cut down, and the dreaded Suez Canal, open at last, was diverting traffic from the Cape ports. In the face of all this, Molteno shrank once more from proposing responsible government; but the Assembly threw out the Governor's constitution, rejected most of the money bills³ and, in reply to a request for more police to keep order in Basutoland, resolved that the handful already there must be withdrawn. Wodehouse prorogued Parliament in despair.

1870.
May
1870.

The course of politics was much the same in Natal as in the Cape Colony. Natal suffered last from the depression which steadily engulfed South Africa. Her sugar was in good demand, her cotton enjoyed a brief boom during the American Civil War and, with three-fourths of her revenue drawn from customs and natives and no expenses for defence, the little colony was able to make a brave show. But at length insects in the cotton, high

¹ C. 18 of 1870, pp. 3, 33, 40; C. 459 of 1871, pp. 9, 12.

² The most notable of the new members was John X. Merriman. He was destined to sit with the break of only half a session till 1924.

³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 14, 25, 35. The Assembly, rather than face direct taxation, relied on transfer duties, stamps, licences, succession, banknote, house and customs duties, borrowing and consolidation of the public debt.

freights, reviving American competition, the collapse of the world market and the stoppage of the coolie supply by the Indian government ¹ spread ruin and involved the elected members of the legislature in a prolonged dispute with the officials. 1866.

The official caste at Pietermaritzburg, 'prejudiced against the Dutch, the Cape Colony, responsible government, soldiers, non-official Natalians, and all outsiders,' was completely out of touch with the rest of the colony.² As soon as bad times came the elected members tried to reduce official salaries; but they were divided among themselves, the coast planters and importers seeking simply to control the existing system, the up-country members, many of them Dutch, demanding responsible government. The agitation for control of the finances, and for a poll-tax on natives to meet the deficit, increased. Granville refused on the ground that so long as the Imperial Government supplied the defences it must control policy; but he had to admit two non-official members to the executive council and see nearly all the old members returned at a general election pledged to their previous policy.³ 1869.

The republics meanwhile sank deeper and deeper into confusion and impotence. It is impossible to separate the history of the Transvaal from that of the Free State during this period, for not only was Pretorius President or would-be President of both from 1860 till 1863, but Moshesh formed a compelling connecting link between them both and the other South African communities.

The failure of Grey's federation scheme had given a great impetus to that of Pretorius. Boshof resigned the presidency of the Free State and retired to Natal, and at the end of the year Pretorius was elected in his stead by a great majority. He crossed the Vaal, pacified the rebellious men of Kroonstad by dismissing their landdrost and took office at Bloemfontein. A small Free State plebiscite decided in favour of union with the Transvaal, and Lydenburg-Utrecht after long negotiations threw in its lot with the S.A. Republic.⁴ Republican unity seemed to be within reach at last. April 1859. Feb. 1860. April 1860.

Pretorius found the Free Staters a jealous folk and, like all farmers, averse to paying direct taxes. With a fair share of the customs duties levied at the ports he might have made ends meet, but that was denied to him in spite of a personal visit to

¹ *Leg. Council (Natal)*, 1 of 1872, p. 5.

² Martineau, *Life of Sir Bartle Frere*, II. 238.

³ *Selected Documents (Natal Leg. Council)*, 1865 onwards.

⁴ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. 101; Eybers, p. 420. On this period of Transvaal history, 1860-9, *vide* Theal, IV., and Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*.

Capetown. He was helped, however, by the recent state purchase of the Pniel reserves, and he himself bought up most of the Bethulie reserve where Lepui had quarrelled with his French missionary. Moshesh was a more serious problem. To relieve the friction on the border, Grey had offered a refuge in Nomansland to Lehana, son of the late Sikonyela, and to Jan Letelle, the cattle-relieving vassal of the Free State. Letelle had declined to move, for he found too good a market for stolen Basuto stock where he was ; but Lehana had gone, only to be frightened home again by Nehemiah Moshesh who had been hurriedly sent by his father to make a footing south of the Quathlamba mountains lest Letelle should build up a rival Basutoland there.¹ Moshesh, alarmed at the prospective union of the republics, repeatedly asked for an alliance with the Queen,² but he refused to stop his dependants taking Free State cattle till their Government should keep Letelle in order, and Pretorius's attempt to arrange a joint court to deal with border cattle thieves was cut short by a hurried summons from beyond the Vaal.³

The union of the Transvaal was as yet on paper only. The Zoutpansberg was out of reach ; even in Potchefstroom men feared that union with the Free State would endanger the Conventions ; Lydenburg made its jealousy for Pretorius felt during the first session of the united Volksraad. Pretorius had been given six months' leave to effect union with the Free State, but now the Volksraad decreed that he could exercise no authority in the Transvaal while he was absent and dismissed his State Secretary. He appeared to plead the cause of union but, when the Raad decided that no one could be President of both republics at once, he resigned his Transvaal presidency and left Grobbelaar to act as deputy. Grobbelaar and Schoeman of the Zoutpansberg then summoned Het Volk, declared the Volksraad defunct, reinstated the Secretary, appointed a committee to supervise the election of a new Raad and gave Pretorius a year's leave in which to effect union.

Pretorius resumed his interrupted negotiations with Moshesh. That chief was the focus of a diplomatic confusion from Harri-smith to the Pondo line. Jealousies among his many sons prevented him sending reinforcements to Nehemiah Moshesh, who still kept the Basuto flag flying in coveted Nomansland ; but Adam Kok had not yet agreed to settle in that territory on Grey's terms and Moshesh still cherished hopes of acquiring it. On his western frontier, he agreed to an inconclusive settlement with Pretorius at the expense of Moroko of Thaba Nchu and then

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 517, 526 ff., 530 ff.

² *Ibid.*, II. 544, 567, 602-4.

³ *Ibid.*, II. 508, 547, 559.

watched the harassed President dash north once more to the Transvaal.¹

There Schoeman had taken Grobbelaar's place as acting-president and, though a 'revolutionist,' had summoned the old Volksraad and prosecuted the pro-Pretorius committee for sedition. A packed court passed sentence, but Kruger, determined as ever to uphold the lawful government, called out a commando against him. It was all Pretorius could do to have the sentences set aside, disband the rival commandos and arrange for the election of a new Volksraad.

So, back once more to Bloemfontein to find Grey, the one man feared of Moshesh, gone from South Africa, the Caledon farmers beginning to laager, and Moshesh himself refusing to recognise the recent boundary arrangements or to withdraw his people from the Winburg farms, and trying also to persuade Adam Kok, who had just sold Philippolis to the Free State, to go into Nomansland as a Basuto vassal.² To make matters worse the two republics quarrelled over their mutual boundary, the Transvaal claiming the Klip river as the true upper waters of the Vaal and the Free State the Likwa spruit.

Such was the confusion that greeted Wodehouse on his arrival at Capetown. The High Commissioner talked of sending a commission of inquiry to Basutoland and even of modifying the Convention if raids by Free State subjects on friendly natives caused a war on his vulnerable northern border ;³ but in the event he did not even send the proposed Resident to Thaba Bosigo. For the situation began to improve. Poshuli, Moshesh's brother, beat Letelle and reduced him from a public danger to a mere nuisance ; Pretorius bought out the remains of the Beersheba mission reserve, raised a few police and, with the support of the main body of his burghers, resisted the demands of the frontiersmen in the Smithfield area to be led against the Basuto. Pretorius also pressed on the work of a commission which presently reported that Letelle in league with certain Free Staters and colonial traders was responsible for the cattle-stealing in those parts and that the Basuto had suffered more than he.⁴ Thereafter Smithfield enjoyed comparative peace and the storm-centre shifted northward to the Winburg-Harrismith borders where the Basuto were settled thickly beyond the Warden line. Moshesh played with the Free State Government while its President hastened to Capetown to enlist the services of the High Commissioner. Pretorius failed to induce Wodehouse to arbitrate the Vaal boundary dispute, but he secured his promise to arbitrate the Basuto line if Moshesh also

Jan.
1862.

July
1862.

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, II. 559, 577, 582.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 129.

² *Ibid.*, II. 598, 601 ; III. 168 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III. 113 ff., 124, 125, 131, 136.

invited him to do so. Moshesh forbore to reply definitely and watched troubles in both republics accumulating on Pretorius's shoulders.¹

Oct.
1862.

In the Transvaal two rival governments faced one another. Schoeman, supported by Potchefstroom and Zoutpansberg, refused to recognise C. J. van Rensburg, the acting President set up by the new Volksraad. Kruger with his Rustenburgers and the men of Lydenburg chased Schoeman out of Pretoria, bombarded him in Potchefstroom just as Pretorius entered the town, and drove him and the would-be President across the Vaal. Thence Schoeman doubled on the pursuing Kruger and reoccupied Potchefstroom, while Pretorius sought to end the comic opera civil war by securing a special court to hear the various charges of sedition. No Free State nor Natal judge would intervene in the affairs of such a state; wherefore three landdrosts and a jury passed sentence of banishment on the rebel leaders, and Schoeman, repudiating the authority of the court, dug himself in at Pretoria.

Jan.
1863.

Moshesh naturally made the most of his opportunity. Christianity extraordinary was rising to a frenzy among his people; crowded assemblies discussed the best means of expelling the white men from the good corn lands for which both races had scrambled these twenty-five years, and Moshesh sent his men in to occupy the belt of farms which he had always claimed fifteen miles beyond the Warden line. Luckily, Adam Kok moved off to Nomansland to be robbed *en route* by Poshuli and, on arrival, by Nehemiah whom Moshesh now reinforced.² Moshesh was thus staking out his claims in all directions and turning a deaf ear to the Free State embassies which waited on him. At last Pretorius abandoned the Free State in despair. A handful of burghers had actually elected van Rensburg President and Kruger Commandant-General; the presidency of the Transvaal was slipping out of his grasp and, to make sure of it, he crossed the Vaal and resigned the Free State presidency. Moshesh promptly refused once more to recall his raiders till Letelle was disposed of, and when the Free State in desperation talked once more of federation or even annexation to the Cape and called on Wodehouse for help, he pushed his old claims to their extreme limit and claimed a line to the Vaal cutting off half the Winburg and Harrismith districts.³

Dec.
1863.

In the Transvaal a new presidential election resulted in the return of van Rensburg. The Pretorius party at once declared that voting papers had been tampered with and J. Viljoen of Marico occupied Potchefstroom with his *Volksleger* in Pretorius's

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 173 ff., 184.

² *Ibid.*, III. 178 ff., 194, 214.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 184 ff., 198, 208, 234 ff.; 23719 of 1869, p. 84.

name. Kruger called out his *Staatsleger*, only to be driven across the Vaal, while Viljoen and Schoeman occupied Potchefstroom and marched on his stronghold of Rustenburg. Kruger, with his back to the wall, considered that the flourishing of rifles as a means of conducting political controversy had gone far enough. He shot to kill and ended the civil war. Pretorius ^{Jan. 1864.} agreed with the triumphant Commandant-General that there should be a fresh election. This time he was satisfactorily elected; fines and banishments were cancelled; captured property was restored mutually and the prospect of something like a stable government in the Transvaal was at last attained.¹

Meanwhile the Free State had found its man in J. H. Brand, ^{Feb. 1864.} son of the venerable Speaker of the Cape. In his twenty-five years of office Brand was destined to make the republic. His first act was to renew the appeal to the High Commissioner for help, for Moshesh was denying the very existence of the Treaty of Aliwal North.² Wodehouse hastened up and awarded the Basuto a small accession of territory, but otherwise reaffirmed the Warden Line. He marked out the northern and western lines himself with great care, wrote Moshesh a stiff letter bidding him adhere to the boundary laid down, and returned to Capetown pursued by Brand's thanks and the hatred of Moshesh's younger sons, Molapo and Masupha, who saw their hopes of expansion westward cut off.³ Letsie, the eldest son, alone was pleased for that very reason, but it remained to be seen whether Moshesh would withdraw his people behind the line.

So far from withdrawing, the native tribes were extending their ¹⁸⁶⁴⁻ borders throughout South Africa. Krel's Galekas were trooping ^{1865.} into the Transkei; the emigrant Tembus indeed occupied the new lands to the east of the Indwe which Wodehouse offered them, but they still held on to their old lands to the west; Sandile's Gaikas refused to budge from the remains of their Cathcart reserve, and the 40,000 Fingos, who cheerfully trekked into the heart of the Transkeian territories (Fingoland), left others to hold the lands they had hitherto occupied within the colonial borders.⁴ European authority was represented among these tribes by agents whose only power was to send back British subjects to the Colony for trial, while behind the border tribes lay the Pondos and the tangle of little clans on the Natal border. To the north, sole barrier between them all and the Basuto, were Adam Kok's Griquas.

¹ Theal, IV. 143 ff.; Engelbrecht, *Amptelike Brieve*, pp. 80 ff.

² *Bas. Rec.*, III. 250 ff., 263 ff. ³ *Ibid.*, III. 305 ff., 310 ff.

⁴ *Native Affairs Blue-book (Cape)*, II. No. 34; *Desp. to S. of S.*, XXVI., No. 99 of 1865.

There was also confusion along the northern border of the Colony. Over the uninviting plains of Great Bushmanland and Little Namaqualand, which Harry Smith had annexed to the Colony in 1847, and beyond the Orange on the fringe of the Kalahari desert moved Bushmen, Hottentots, Koranas, a few stray Xosas, and, since in rainy seasons there was grass along the so-called rivers, poverty-stricken trek-boers from the Colony. Beyond the lower Orange was a land whose coast belt was uninhabitable desert but whose inland plateau bore grass. The southern half of this plateau was Great Namaqualand, and into it Hottentots had drifted from the Colony. They were civilised enough to have guns and horses, and they and their leader Jonker Afrikaner had conquered Damaraland beyond the Swakop river and despoiled the Bantu Hereros and Damaras of their cattle. To the north of Damaraland were the Bantu Ovambo, near the boundary claimed by the Portuguese of Angola. At first the L.M.S. had laboured among these peoples, but in the 'forties the Rhenish missionaries had taken over the work and set up their headquarters at Otyimbingue, the centre of the feather and ivory traffic. Under their guidance the Hereros prospered so much that they too acquired guns, rallied round a certain Kamaherero, and struck for freedom with the help of a few Hottentots and European traders. Christian Afrikaner, Jonker's successor, was killed; his successor, Jan Jonker, was badly beaten, and such was the turmoil that several of the mission stations were sacked and most of the Europeans forced to leave the country.¹

Circa
1840.

Sept.
1865.

On the other side of the Kalahari, in the lands through which ran the Missionaries' Road, the Boer republics were threatened with trouble. Nicholas Waterboer of Griquatown and Mahura the Batlapin chief of Taungs both laid claim to territory which the Free State and Transvaal regarded as legitimately theirs. In the northern Transvaal such authority as Potgieter had exercised over the Baramapulana in the Zoutpansberg was gone; in the east, Secocoeni, son of Sekwati, and his Bapedi were still vassals; but close by were the independent Swazis, and below the Lebombo range was Umzila, son of Manikusa the Shangaan, master of the coast belt in spite of the Portuguese and the enemy of the Swazis and the Zoutpansberg clans.

The authority of the S.A. Republic in the Zoutpansberg, which had never been more than nominal, was represented by the landdrost and predikant of Schoemansdal and by Albasini, who had recently added to his multifarious duties those of superintendent of the natives, and apparently interpreted those

¹ Theal, V. 96 ff., 315 ff.; du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, chapters xxi., xxxiv.; G. 50-77 (Cape), *Palgrave's Report* . . . 1876.

duties to include stirring up such trouble that the ivory traffic should be diverted from Schoemansdal to Delagoa Bay.¹ For some time past the mountain clans and stray Europeans had been scuffling, but no serious trouble arose till a runaway subject drew Umzila into the quarrel. He demanded the fugitive back on pain of closing Gazaland to elephant-hunters; Albasini for reasons of his own defied the landdrost and, when Pretorius tried to still the rising storm, sent his Knobnoses on the warpath. They behaved abominably; white ruffians behaved even worse; the Baramapulana rose in arms and the Dutch Reformed mission at Goedgedacht had to be abandoned. July
1865.

At the same moment the Transvaal's troubles with the Zulus reached their climax. The Zulus were as bitterly divided among themselves as the Transvaalers, Cetewayo's Usutu against the Umbulazi, who followed his younger brothers. Panda, old and fat, had talked of dividing his people among all his sons, and Grey had encouraged him to do so; but he had been dissuaded by Shepstone and Pretorius, the one because he hoped thus to further his schemes for acquiring an undivided Zululand, the other because there was more hope of getting a road to St. Lucia Bay from one chief than from many. Then two of the sons of Panda fled to the Republic, and Cetewayo offered land in exchange for them. 1861. The Transvaalers gave them up on condition that there should be no shedding of blood, acknowledged Cetewayo sole heir, and received a strip of land, the so-called Blood River Territory, bounded by a line from Rorke's Drift on the Tugela to the Pongola river.²


It was commonly believed at Potchefstroom that the road to St. Lucia Bay had also been won, and enthusiastic friends in Holland even projected a Belgian colony at the port, but the belief was ill-founded.³ Shepstone in person then recognised Cetewayo as heir to Panda. He refused, however, to give up fugitives who had fled to Natal soil, and the Zulu prince massed his impis on the border. The Natal garrison and volunteers turned out, and Grey sent up reinforcements from the Colony;⁴ but the crisis passed, Panda ratified the Blood River cession, and three years later a Transvaal-Zulu commission beacons off the line. Unluckily, part of the purchase price escaped to Natal; Cetewayo mobilised once more, and, though his father reluctantly acknowledged his own share in the cession, demanded his land back. The Utrecht farmers went into laager

¹ Ba-Mangwato, *To Ophir Direct*, p. 25; *S.A.R. Staats Courant*, Dec. 4, 1864; Theal, IV. 148, 163, 211 ff.; Hofmeyr, *Twintig Jaren*; Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, chap. xviii., xix.

² A. 102-61 (Cape), pp. 1 ff.; A. 122-61, pp. 8, 13; Theal, IV. 151 ff.

³ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. clx, clxxvi.


⁴ A. 122-61 (Cape), pp. 8 ff.; 16 ff.



BASUTOLAND and KAFFIRLAND

1854-71

Scale of Miles



- British Colonies as in 1854*
- The Warden Line, 1849*
- Annexations by the Orange Free State, 1866*
- Basuto Territory annexed by Cape Colony, 1871*

Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

and Kruger gathered a large commando at Wakkerstroom.¹ There he heard tidings of the great Free State-Basuto war.

During the months following Wodehouse's arbitration Moshesh had withdrawn nearly all his people behind the new line, and the Free Staters lined up on the border ready to occupy the country as soon as the Basuto should be gone. The tribesmen were 'desperately wound up' at the idea of parting with land, and most of the chiefs clamoured for war lest the Free State treat them as the Transvaal had treated its natives; but Moshesh himself declared he would never fight about a line which the Queen's representative had marked out.² He was, however, prepared to fight if a good *casus belli* could be found and, like his contemporary, Bismarck, he was ready to manœuvre his foe into taking the first step. His nephew Lesoana (Ramanela) supplied the opening. He remained beyond the border sowing corn in the Harrismith area; presently he raided Witsi's Hoek, while far away on the Smithfield border other Basuto raided cattle.³ Moshesh then told Brand that he knew that the two republics were leagued with Moroko for his destruction and asked for time in which to gather his crops from beyond the line. It was the old trick which the Tembus were playing at that very moment on Wodehouse, but time was given and reparations demanded for Lesoana's misdeeds. Once the harvest was in, Moshesh determined to fight for his full claims. The one cloud on his horizon was that Kok and Lehana had driven Nehemiah out of Nomansland, but on the other hand the Transkei was being flooded out with Bantu, and in the north the Transvaalers were held on two fronts. Lesoana tempted a commando to attack him; Moperi, Moshesh's brother, came to the rescue and Brand was forced to declare war.⁴ The Iron Chancellor could hardly have set the stage more skilfully than did Moshesh.

Both sides were more or less equally well equipped for a short war; the Basuto could stand on the defensive on interior lines; they had guns and even home-made cannon; ⁵ there were white men at Thaba Bosigo to keep the guns in order; horses and food were plentiful and the mountains afforded a continual refuge. But they had no open powder market as had the Free State; Moshesh was nearly eighty years of age, failing physically and mentally, much influenced by prophets and 'killed by his sons,' who were jealous of each other, and above all of that 'stupid sensualist' Letsie, who, like Cetewayo, aspired to the throne of an

¹ Theal, IV, 155; Engelbrecht, *Ampelike Briewe*, pp. 99 ff.

² *Bas. Rec.*, III. 312-17, 320, 322.

³ *Ibid.*, III. 324 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III. 314, 346 ff., 357.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III. xlvi, xlvii, 182, 316.

undivided kingdom. In the Free State the war had united all parties, but the burghers were outnumbered by five to one, they could not keep the field for any length of time, and they could expect but little aid from the Transvaal and only illicit assistance from the Colony.

The war began badly for the Republic. Wepener failed to storm Moperi's town and had to stand aside while that chief and Poshuli invaded the Free State, and Lesoana seized Transvaal waggons on the Natal border and, on the plea that Free Staters owned farms in northern Natal, raided cattle on British soil.¹ But the commandos soon began to gain ground; Wepener carried Poshuli's Vechtkop and Letsie's Matsieng, and at once the Free State showed that its policy was to be *refoulement* on a great scale such as D'Urban had attempted against the Xosas and the Natal Volksraad had desired at the expense of the Zulus, the clearing of the country and the breaking up of the Basuto confederacy. Wepener annexed all the grass lands between the Caledon and the Orange, thereby promising to open up a corridor between the Colony and the remains of Basutoland down which the Republic might reach Port St. John's in Pondoland, and Fick claimed all Basutoland up to the Caledon river and stormed the Berea.²

Wodehouse was faced with the prospect of the general war which had so long haunted Grey's imagination. The Transvaalers had promised to intervene as soon as they could, and all Natal was clamouring for war with the Basuto; the soldiers from professional zeal, the Boers from a desire to help their friends, the Natal Zulus with an eye on the cattle of the despised Basuto, Shepstone in the hope of adding Basutoland to the native state of his dreams, and the Legislative Council in the expectation of retrieving a desperate commercial situation by 'a large Imperial expenditure' on troops and supplies.³ Wodehouse felt that the time was coming when he must get the control over Basutoland that he had desired since 1862 in the interests of the peace of South Africa and, in particular, of the Cape; but for the moment his chief aim was to limit the scope of the fighting. He therefore contented himself with demanding reparations for Lesoana's raid on Natal. Moshesh was apologetic; Molapo, Lesoana's immediate superior, sent in a few cattle and there the matter rested for the moment.⁴

Meanwhile, the Free Staters twice tried to storm Thaba Bosigo. They failed, and, on the death of Wepener in the second

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 363 ff., 373, 377, 417.

² *Ibid.*, 423, 439, 490. On the Basuto War, *vide* 23719 (4140) of 1869; C. 18 and C. 99 of 1870; O.F.S. Blue-book of 1866.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 427 ff.; Memo. by R. Southey, Aug. 6, 1865 (*Misc. Bas. Rec.*).

⁴ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 442 ff.

attack, settled down to besiege the key of Basutoland. Brand offered impossible terms which Moshesh rejected; the chief told the High Commissioner that he had given his country into the hands of the Queen; the siege was raised, the commandos dispersed and small parties were left to patrol the Caledon.¹ Presently Pretorius and Kruger joined Fick's patrol with some 1200 men, mostly on foot. Together they routed a force of the enemy in the open, and then scattered gathering booty; but to the disgust of the Free Staters, Kruger, like D'Urban in the war of 1835, refused to permit them to 'recognise' recovered stock and treated the whole as prize of war.² Thereafter, Pretorius could keep his men together no longer. So the Transvaalers withdrew, this time on horseback, with 75 per cent. of the booty, leaving bad blood behind them and Lesoana unpunished,³ and Pretorius hurried north with Kruger to try the effect of moral suasion on the laagered farmers, the white undesirables and the hostile tribes of the Zoutpansberg.

Wodehouse watched the growing chaos with deepening anxiety. He was indeed relieved of all serious care for the cattle claim of Natal, by discovering that the claim had been overstated by 150 per cent. and already partly paid by Molapo;⁴ but Cape colonists, as in the war of 1858, and Natalians had already joined in the fighting; Herschel Fingos, Kok, Lehana, and Tembus had all taken part on one side or the other; Morosi's people were flocking into the Wittebergen Reserve, the danger spot on the northern colonial frontier; and now Brand, for lack of men and money, was calling for volunteers to be paid in captured cattle and farms in the Conquered Territory. In the nature of the case, these volunteers must be mainly British subjects; therefore, Wodehouse warned the President that if he recruited British subjects, he would cut off the powder supplies. He also offered his mediation and pressed the Secretary of State for leave to accede to the petitions of Moshesh, Letsie and Morosi that he should annex Basutoland.⁵

The Volksraad declined the proffered mediation and, against its President's wishes, ejected the Paris missionaries from the Conquered Territory.⁶ Brand then revolutionised the whole

¹ 23719, p. 13; *Bas. Rec.*, III. 443, 448, 450, 493.

² Information from Mr. Page of Bloemfontein, who served on the patrol. Also *Bas. Rec.*, III. 487 ff., 507; Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*, p. 120.

³ Burnet to Wodehouse, Oct. 28, 1865 (*Miscel. Bas. Rec.*, *Cape Archives*). The author of *Memoirs of Paul Kruger* (I. 110) says the Transvaalers departed because Brand would not promise them farms in the Conquered Territory under Free State law.

⁴ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 517, 587, 591.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III. 540; 23719, pp. 13, 65.

⁶ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 613 ff.

situation. He made a desperate effort to save his waning popularity and to end the war, raised 2000 men and defeated Molapo.¹ Nehemiah then deserted his father and Molapo agreed to the Treaty of Impanani, whereby he promised to hold Leribe, the northern part of Basutoland, as a vassal of the republic; the commandos began to destroy the crops and, to save his food supply, Moshesh himself signed the Treaty of Thaba Bosigo, confirming the Free State's annexations and promising compensation.²

The treaties were a mere ruse to gain time, and they in no wise stilled the tumult. The Basuto showed no signs of leaving the annexed lands; the French missionaries complained of their expulsion, as Brand had known they would; the High Commissioner held the Free State responsible for the balance of the debt legitimately due to Natal, and Pretorius, angry at his exclusion from the Treaty of Thaba Bosigo, made his own peace with Moshesh³ and tried to beat up sufficient force to restore order in the Zoutpansberg.

There was need, for after the wild doings of the white ruffians and Albasini's Knobnoses, Wodehouse had instituted an inquiry into allegations of Transvaal slavery.⁴ The specific charges rested on inconclusive evidence, and Wodehouse had let the matter drop when Pretorius promised to punish the disturbers of the peace. But the guilty were still unpunished. In spite of martial law and a declaration that the state was in danger, only 200 men had been forthcoming; next year only half the burghers called up appeared, and now Kruger had to march north to Schoemansdal with a mere 500 of the 2000 men he had demanded. There a court of three landdrosts sentenced two local heroes, who were promptly rescued by the mob, and Kruger, hearing that the tribes were rising behind him, fell back to Potgietersrust and dismissed his commando. He was followed by most of the inhabitants of Schoemansdal; the landdrost and predikant moved to Marabastad, and the mountaineers presently burnt the deserted village.

Meanwhile, farms had been allotted in the Conquered Territory, but the native crops were ripening there and Moshesh repudiated his treaty on the ground that Brand had not set aside the locations promised to his people. The commandos went in to destroy the crops and, to save them, some of the chiefs asked to be taken over as Free State subjects. Letsie was taken over; Moperi was settled as a vassal in Witsi's Hoek; Molitsani was promised a location near Kroonstad, and the Free State took up arms to

¹ Coleman to Poulteney, July 7, 1865, and Burnet to Wodehouse, Jan. 19 and March 5, 1866 (*Miscel. Bas. Rec.*).

² *Bas. Rec.*, III. 643, 649; Eybers, p. 320.

³ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 661; Theal, IV. 230.

⁴ C. 4141 and 23886 of 1866.

March
1866.

April
1866.

Feb.
1867.

1865.

June
1867.

March
1867.

enforce the treaties of 1866.¹ This time it was guerilla warfare, July 1867. for the burghers were weary ; there was no money ; the chiefs kept to their mountain tops watchful to raid and, if their mountains were stormed, reoccupied them as soon as the enemy was gone ; Moperi and Molapo sat still growing corn for the rest, and Moshesh and Letsie pestered the High Commissioner to hand them over to Natal since he could not take them himself, or, failing that, to cut off powder supplies equally. Wodehouse, for his part, warned Brand that if his state was to absorb so much of Basutoland, the Convention might have to be reconsidered.²

The Duke of Buckingham was averse to annexation, but since 1861 at latest officials and others connected with the Colonial Office had swung round to the view that Great Britain's withdrawal south of the Orange in 1854 had been a mistake.³ Buckingham therefore gave way to Wodehouse's importunity and told him that he might negotiate with Moshesh for annexation to Natal provided that colony were willing and a Basuto boundary could be fixed.⁴ The Makwaisberg had just fallen and Basuto refugees were pouring into the inflammable Wittebergen Reserve. Wodehouse therefore cut off all powder supplies and offered to mediate. Brand protested, for his men had carried the Tandjesberg and part of the Kieme, but the High Commissioner, in excess of his instructions, annexed Basutoland *sans phrase* and sent up March 1868. the Cape Police.⁵

Some of the arguments which Wodehouse used to justify his action were as legalistic as some of those which Brand, always the advocate, used to condemn it ; but there was much to be said on grounds of policy for what he had done. Brand might protest that the Free State was not exhausted and that the Basuto, short of powder, were ' on the run ' ; but the fact remained that as in 1866 Thaba Bosigo still stood ; the burghers could not hold the country they had overrun ; in spite of cannibalism in parts of the Lesuto there was plenty of food elsewhere and the Conquered Territory itself was full of standing corn and tribesmen.⁶ Moreover, as even ex-President Hoffman admitted, the land left to the Basuto by the treaties was much too limited if the tribes were to

¹ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 756, 790.

² *Ibid.*, 786, 799 ff.

³ *Vide* Newcastle's comments on Sir G. Grey's despatch of Feb. 9, 1861 (C.O. 48/407) and T. F. Elliott's note on Wodehouse's despatch of July 10, 1865 (*ibid.*). Sir Charles Adderley now told Buckingham that ' since our mistaken abandonment of the Orange has thrown between us and a foreign power a weak debatable land and isolated Natal, we should take these Basutos' offer and so tend towards one South African British Government including Natal ' (C.O. 48/436 ; Adderley's comment on despatch No. 41, May 5, 1867).

⁴ *Bas. Rec.*, III. 769, 813, 834.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 813, 839, 894.

⁶ 23719, p. 47 ; *Bas. Rec.*, III. 841, 848 ff.

be left intact,¹ and if, as Brand proposed, they were to be broken up, that could hardly be done without sending a swarm of broken and desperate men pouring into Natal or the Colony, or, worst of all, into independent Kaffirland. Colonial Governors in times past, including Wodehouse himself, had had experience of the effects of uprooting tribes. Wodehouse was under no illusions. He knew that the chiefs were playing double, for Molapo and Moperi had defied the Free State and asked for British protection, but he believed he could control them and that the bankrupt republic could not. He therefore proposed to annex Basutoland and give out a belt of frontier farms in the Conquered Territory with British title, the proceeds of which should go to the Free State.²

The Volksraad preferred 'the fat acres' to the money or the proposed British 'wall of iron' along the border and, against the wishes of those many members who were prepared to trust Wodehouse's good sense, sent a deputation to London.³ The High Commissioner was in such difficulties that he offered to resign. The French missionaries and their friends in England and France demanded full restitution; Natal intrigued for the control of Basutoland provided the territory could be made to pay its own expenses and offer land for European settlement as in Natal itself; the Cape Parliament registered its disapproval of his policy, and the Secretary of State chided him for having exceeded his instructions. Buckingham, however, politely repelled the Free State deputation and bade Wodehouse make a settlement.⁴

Wodehouse wished to keep Basutoland as a native reserve under the High Commissioner as Moshesh also desired, for he had no mind to entrust it to the Cape Colony which was about to become self-governing, and still less to Natal whose elected members, as the new Lieutenant-Governor reminded him, had a habit of taxing their own natives and would look askance at any measures intended for the benefit of the Basuto. However, he met Keate, Shepstone and the chiefs at Thaba Bosigo and told Moshesh that Natal would take care of him.⁵ Moshesh and Letsie at once cried out that they wished to be under the Queen and not to 'go into prison'; but Wodehouse departed, disregarding the demands of Nehemiah for Nomansland and leaving Shepstone to play for the goodwill of Molapo. Soon Masupha was raiding the pro-Free State Moroko, and Morosi the Herschel Fingos; Europeans from all quarters were helping themselves to cattle,

¹ Burnet to Wodehouse, April 16, 1866 (*Miscel. Bas. Rec.*).

² C. 18 of 1870, pp. 6 ff.

³ 23719, pp. 44, 69, 78.

⁴ 23719, pp. 58, 59, 90, 101; C. 18 and C. 99 of 1870, *passim*.

⁵ 23719, pp. 53, 56.

and the majority in the Natal legislature was demanding that their colony be freed from the control of the High Commissioner and permitted to take charge of all natives in south-eastern Africa.¹

Buckingham, in despair, gave Wodehouse *carte blanche*. Wodehouse needed it, for he was faced with confusion all along the northern border of the Colony. In Damaraland, Afrikaner had made an effort to regain his old supremacy. He was driven off from Otyimbingue, but he sacked mission stations, drove the traders to their ships and burnt the fishing station at Walfisch Bay. The Guano Islands, annexed by Great Britain between 1861 and 1866, were out of his reach, but Wodehouse sent up a gunboat and from Bismarck's new North German Confederation came an inquiry whether or no H.M. Government was prepared to safeguard the lives and property of the Rhenish missionaries. Meanwhile, the Hereros decisively defeated Afrikaner, and then the trouble spread to colonial soil. There the Koranas harried the trek-boers and half-breeds of Great Bushmanland, and all that a special magistrate and a few police could do towards restoring order was to apprentice some of the surviving Bushmen.²

In the Zoutpansberg most of the farmers were in laager. Pretorius called for volunteers. He obtained fifty-three, sent Schoeman with them to the ashes of Schoemansdal, and when Makapan rose in their rear and they fell back to Marabastad, threatened to abandon the whole district. Mapela then rebelled and the devoted Kruger failed to carry his mountain with 800 men collected under pressure of martial law; powder ran short and, on a rumour that the Shangaans were coming, the force dispersed.³ Pretorius as a last resort went up to Potgietersrust in person and prosecuted Albasini and the landdrost. Many black stories came out in the evidence, but the charges broke down on exceptions and the President had to return to Pretoria to be censured by his Volksraad for 'the wrong course of treatment of the native tribes which had hitherto been peaceable subjects.'⁴

Native troubles were not all. Complications among the Europeans themselves were looming on the horizon. Gold and diamonds had recently been discovered at three points on the Missionaries' Road, and Pretorius had made an abortive attempt to annex the mineral areas to the west and a corridor down to the sea at Delagoa Bay on the east. But at last the chaos promised to abate at its centre. Brand was sorely troubled by

¹ C. S. Orpen to Halse, Nov. 25, 1868; Keate to Wodehouse, June 1868, and Surmon's diary (*Miscel. Bas. Rec.*); 23719, p. 127.

² Theal, V. 98, 321 ff., 345; du Plessis, *Christian Missions*, pp. 336 ff.; G. 50-77 (Cape); Engelbrecht, *Amptelike Briewe*, pp. 131 ff.; C. 4265 of 1884, pp. 8 ff.

³ Theal, IV. 224 ff.; Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*, pp. 134 ff.

⁴ *Cape Argus*, April 17, 1869, quoting S.A.R. Volksraad Committee.

defaulting officials and the gilt had worn off the Basuto reparations. The farmers in the Conquered Territory complained of incessant raids ; those outside it grumbled that the bulk of it was passing into the hands of speculators and had brought down the price of real estate elsewhere, and at last Brand agreed to sign the Second Treaty of Aliwal North.¹

Feb.
1869.

That treaty reaffirmed the Bloemfontein Convention, made provision for the inclusion of Molapo's Leribe once more in Basutoland and fixed the limits of the remainder along the present lines, thereby cutting off the projected corridor to Port St. John's. Wodehouse broke the news to the chiefs, who had expected to recover the whole of the Conquered Territory and were averse to control and hut tax, and passed on to allot reserves to the petty chiefs of Nomansland and negotiate in vain with the Pondos for the cession of Port St. John's in the interests of colonial trade. The Free State Volksraad ratified the treaty with only one dissident, and he an Englishman, who wanted to let the Conquered Territory go altogether in exchange for £50,000 which would give meaning to the paper-money. Members remarked that they had not expected such good terms and reported that their constituents were well satisfied.² After all, honours were easy and the long-debated corn lands had been evenly shared between white and black. Pressure by Natal negrophilists and admirers of the Shepstone policy in London delayed the ratification by the Imperial Government, but at last that was forthcoming, and three months later the aged Chief of the Mountain died.³ But he had lived long enough to save his people from being 'broke up as the Hottentots were.'

May
1869.

March
1870.

J. H. Bowker, the Governor's Agent, thus had to rely on Letsie, the new chief paramount, to keep the jealous chiefs in order. Molapo withdrew to Leribe with his people as British subjects after taking vengeance on Lesoana who had cost him so much ; Morosi retired on the same footing to Quthing ; at the end of the year, after the successful collection of the hut tax through the chiefs, the simple regulations drawn up by Wodehouse to define the relative powers of the chiefs and magistrates were put into force and peace reigned once more on the troubled upper waters of the Orange.⁴

Downstream also a precarious peace had been established. In the northern Colony a mixed force captured two of the unruly

¹ C. S. Orpen to Halse, Nov. 25, 1868 (*Miscel. Bas. Rec.*) ; *Bas. Rec.*, V. 57 ff. ; C. 18, pp. 6-17 ; Eybers, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

² C. 18 of 1870, p. 27 ; *Bas. Rec.*, V. 183-91.

³ C. 18 of 1870, pp. 3, 41, 61 ff. ; C. 99 of 1870, p. 3 ; *Bas. Rec.*, V. 236, 262, 268.

⁴ *Desp. to S. of S.*, XXVII., No. 62 of 1870 and 49 of 1871 ; *Bas. Rec.*, V. 553 ff. Basutoland was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1871 (Eybers, p. 61).

Korana chieftains and sent them to the Capetown breakwater. There followed further apprenticing of Bushmen, but no one would take the farms offered on military tenure in such a country and a special magistrate was left alone to keep order with a few police. 1869. In Damaraland, Dr. Hahn, the leading Rhenish missionary, helped by traders, Wodehouse and colonial half-breeds newly settled at Rehoboth, brought the exhausted combatants to terms. The fallen Afrikaner was glad to find rest under the watchful eye of a missionary on a farm at Windhuk granted him by Kamaherero.¹ Finally, in the far north, Mapela made peace with Schoeman, but the real pacification of the Zoutpansberg was made by the Shangaans and Swazis, who fell upon the clans in quick succession. In spite of this peace of attrition, Potgietersrust was abandoned because of the fever, and, of all the Zoutpansberg, Marabastad alone remained to the S.A. Republic. May 1870.

In that same month Wodehouse departed with the dignity and composure which had marked his every action throughout a longer and more trying term of office than had fallen to any Governor of the Cape for many years. The most outstanding political fact of his term was that the authority of the Queen had been extended once more beyond the upper waters of the Orange river. And already a cry was going up in the colonies for a further extension of that authority over the wastes of Griqualand West which lay beyond the middle reaches along the road to the north.

When all South Africa had sunk into the financial depths, a diamond was picked up near Hopetown in the Colony.² This find was soon overshadowed by the discovery of gold further north. The mineral wealth of the Transvaal had been known almost from the first, but in spite of the Volksraad's offer of £5000 reward for the discovery of a really rich mine of gold and its attempts to get German smelters for the copper and iron which must otherwise be imported from Natal, nothing had come of it all.³ Transport difficulties and, to a certain extent, popular prejudice against miners stood in the way of any mineral developments. Then, Henry Hartley, an Albany hunter, found ancient gold workings in Mashonaland and his fellow traveller, Carl Mauch, a geologist, reported gold there and at Tati on the southern border of Matabeleland.⁴

At once the Missionaries' Road and Delagoa Bay, the port

¹ Theal, V. 100, 324; G. 50-77 (Cape), p. ii.

² On the Diamond Fields, *vide* Gardner F. Williams, *The Diamond Fields of South Africa*.

³ Engelbrecht, *op. cit.*, I. civ, clxviii.

⁴ Ba-Mangwato, *To Ophir Direct*, pp. 1 ff.; *Transvaal Argus*, Dec. 3, 1867.

nearest to the goldfields, acquired a new significance. The Portuguese had gingerly reoccupied most of their forts on the East Coast after their destruction by the Shangaans in the 'thirties, but their hold on them was almost as precarious as that on the *prazos* of the lower Zambesi, where a few Portuguese or half-caste *capitans môr* ruled their native serfs in defiance of a royal decree abolishing the prazo system. The gradual settlement of the hinterland had somewhat stimulated their trade, notably in slaves, ivory and guns,¹ and they had hoisted their flag once more over the ruins of Zumbo, 250 miles up the Zambesi, down which Livingstone had recently voyaged to their great discomfiture. Great Britain, on the other hand, mindful of Owen's annexations of 1823, had hoisted the Union Jack on Inyaka Island on behalf of Natal. A month later, Umzila, son of Matshangana, had nominally ceded all Gazaland to Portugal in exchange for nominal help in a private quarrel.²

1862.

Nov.—
Dec.
1861.

The Transvaal took a keen interest in Delagoa Bay, its natural port. Lourenço Marques (Espírito Santo) was in those days a small and pestilential village; nevertheless, Alexander McCorkindale, a Scot from Natal, meant to make it the base of a company which should settle immigrants in the eastern Transvaal and supply that state with gunpowder and banking facilities. This latter-day John Law had his Mississippi in the Maputa river, up which he proposed to convey goods in barges and thus circumvent the deadly fly; he succeeded in planting a few brother Scots in New Scotland on the Swazi border, brought a cargo of powder to Durban where it remained for lack of money to pay the carriage up-country, and presently died at Inyaka full of confidence in the soundness of his schemes.³

1864.

1871.

The Missionaries' Road had likewise been in dispute before ever the gold and diamonds were discovered. David Arnot, a clever and unscrupulous attorney of Colesberg, determined, like Philip and Livingstone and afterwards Rhodes, that the British Government should advance along it to the control of the interior. He also meant to feather his nest with the proceeds of the land along that road as he preferred British title to any other; but, to do his memory justice, he cared almost as much for the winning of the game, won as he afterwards boasted without a card in his hand, as for the land itself and later on the diamonds.

Arnot began his long-sustained game of poker with the Imperial and Republican Governments in 1862. Of all the Griqua states which had bulked so large in the politics of South Africa hitherto,

¹ Trade had been permitted to foreigners in 1853 (*Rec. S.E.A.*, IX. 126).

² *Rec. S.E.A.*, IX. 115, 138.

³ Theal, IV. 161; *Transvaal Advocate and Commercial Advertiser*, June 7, 1871.

only Griquatown remained. There reigned Nicholas Waterboer. His sovereignty to the west of the lower Vaal was undisputed, and the Free State also recognised it over a wedge of land to the east of that river bounded by the Orange and the Vetberg line, 1855. which Adam Kok had laid down between his lands and those of Cornelis Kok of Campbell, and the well-known line from Ramah on the Orange to David's Graf which had long marked the western limit of Philippolis. Cornelis had made over all his lands and 1857. claims on both sides of the Vaal to Adam. Adam had then proposed to sell the remains of his Philippolis reserve to the Free State and had been swindled by his agent, who sold not only them but 'the Dec. lands of the late Cornelis Kok' admittedly not knowing where 1861. these were.¹ Adam had indeed given his agent a receipt for the purchase money but, before moving off to Nomansland, he had, on Arnot's advice, publicly denied that he had sold anything more than Philippolis.² Arnot then transferred his services to Dec. Waterboer and claimed Cornelis's lands on his behalf. 1862.

Arnot's claims when fully developed covered the whole of what is now Griqualand West with the southern line along the Orange from Ramah to Kheis fixed by the D'Urban Treaty; the 1834. eastern line from Ramah through David's Graf to Platberg on the Vaal agreed upon by Andries Waterboer and Adam Kok during 1838. their war with Cornelis and Abram Kok; and a western line laid down in the Griqua-Batlapin treaty which had been ratified by 1842. Mahura in 1864 but whose existence was denied by the other Batlapin chiefs.³ In support of these boundaries he held that Cornelis Kok had been a vassal of the two Waterboers; that the Vetberg line had been a mere private arrangement among the Griqua chiefs; that, by recognising Waterboer's sovereignty to the south of that line, the Free State had recognised Cornelis's and, therefore, Waterboer's to the north of it; and finally that Warden had issued Sovereignty land titles to the north of the line *ultra vires* and had ceased to do so when Waterboer protested.⁴

The dispute was very complicated, for the Griquas had always been a roving folk, the whole area was very thinly peopled, and in Cornelis's lands to the east of the Vaal, where the famous Dry Diggings were presently discovered, farms were held on titles issued by both the Waterboers, Cornelis Kok, the Orange River Sovereignty and the Free State. The Cape Archives which would

¹ G. 21-71 (Cape), pp. 42, 49, 67.

² C. 459 of 1871, pp. 44, 74; *Colesberg Advertiser*, Dec. 23, 1862. On the Diamond Fields dispute, *vide* C. 459 of 1871; C. 508 of 1872; Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book; G. 21-71; G. 15 and 33-72 (Cape).

³ C. 1348 of 1875 *passim*; Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, pp. 27 ff., 30; G. 21, pp. 91 ff.

⁴ There were, in 1870, thirty-three farms with Sovereignty and 110 with O.F.S. title between the Vetberg line and the Vaal.

have supplied the evidence to upset Arnot's case were so confused as to be almost inaccessible, but even without them Brand's position was very strong. His legal mind indeed led him into weakening a good case by claiming that the whole of the land between the Orange and the Vaal had fallen to the Free State on the abandonment of 1854, a claim which would have entitled the republic to five-sixths of Basutoland and all the Philippolis reserve which it had just bought; none the less, he could show that it was the height of chicane to claim that Nicholas Waterboer, ruler of a few hundred Griquas living in squalor since the game on which their fathers had depended had moved northward, was the real sovereign of a vast area in which lived many Koranas, Batlapin and Europeans, in most parts of which his subjects had never lived, and over much of which neither he nor his father had exercised authority for many years if they had ever done so.¹ Moreover, the lands to the east of the Vaal had formed part of the Sovereignty in which both Warden and Harry Smith had merely recognised the proprietary rights of Cornelis Kok; out of it Warden had carved the Pniel reserves in which his magistrates had exercised jurisdiction; and in it the Berlin missionaries were actually living under Free State law even though the nearest landdrost was far away at Jacobsdal.²

Thus, as far as the lands to the east of the Vaal were concerned, Brand's case rested on equity, commonsense and the acts of the Sovereignty Government. He therefore declined to discuss them with Arnot. But his claims to the Campbell Lands to the west rested solely on Adam Kok's highly questionable deed of sale. These he was willing to exchange for Waterboer's lands south of the Vetberg line or to submit them to arbitration. Wodehouse was willing to arbitrate,³ but Arnot turned aside from Brand to join issue with Pretorius, who had demanded the war indemnity promised by Mahura in 1858. As agent for Mahura, Arnot refused to pay and counter-claimed a line for the Batlapin from Platberg on the Vaal up the Makwassie spruit to the sources of the Harts and the Molopo, a line which cut deeply into long-settled parts of the Transvaal.⁴

Arnot had thus made claims which, if achieved, would drive both republics far back from the Road. Neither Government

¹ In 1834 D'Urban sent a map to London with the Waterboer Treaty of that year, showing Waterboer's territory virtually as Arnot now claimed it. Apparently no use was made of this fact by either party to the dispute (D'Urban to Spring Rice, Dec. 26, 1834; Orpen, *Reminiscences*, pp. 149, 230). For the actual condition of the Griquas in 1870, *vide* Lindley, *Adamantia*, p. 215.

² For Brand's case, *vide* G. 21-71, pp. 103 ff.; C. 459 of 1871, pp. 48 ff.; C. 1348 of 1875 *passim*, also G. 15-72 (Cape), p. 32; C. 732 of 1873, pp. 11, 18.

³ G. 21-71, p. 17.

⁴ Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, p. 81.

perhaps took him very seriously at first but, when the Basuto wars and the troubles in the Zoutpansberg afflicted them, Arnot stated his full claims to Griqualand West and, in spite of Brand's warning, induced a few Albany men to settle in 'Albania' just 1867. south of the Vetberg line.¹

In the course of 1868 diamonds were found on the north bank of the Vaal near its junction with the Harts in land claimed by the Transvaal, Waterboer and Mahura. But the gold of Tati threw these River Diggings into the shade. Pretorius decided to gain control of the Road and the gold in the interests of his bankrupt republic and to push down to the sea at Delagoa Bay. He had already stationed a landdrost at Nylstroom in the new district of the Waterberg, and he now asked the dying Umsilikazi and Matsheng, the Mangwato of Shoshong, to become his vassals. Without waiting for their replies he foolishly annexed a wide April 1868. area to the north and west of his state, including Tati but prudently excluding the Matabele, and a strip a mile wide on either side of the Maputa river to the sea.²

Pretorius's anxiety to secure this new-found wealth was very natural, for the finances of both republics were desperate and, of the two, the Transvaal's were the worse. On the eve of the Basuto wars the Free State had expelled the Standard Bank, which was squeezing the Bloemfontein Bank and thus threatening the Government with 'foreign' control. The bank withdrew, 1865. taking much of the loose capital of the state with it, and thereby obliged the Volksraad to issue paper money to the local bank, which promptly trebled its own note issue. At the end of the wars £126,000 in paper were in circulation; the £5 'blueback' was worth £3; trade with the colonies was by barter only and credit to seek, and £650,000 of private debts were owing to banks and individuals in the south. The Transvaal possessed a public debt 1869. of £74,000 notes at 75 per cent. discount, a revenue which in the absence of anything like an adequate civil service just met expenditure, and the knowledge that its President had recently failed to float a loan of £300. Many of its burghers, too, were in debt to creditors at the coast, and the Standard Bank had not even troubled to open a branch north of the Vaal. In neither republic would the burghers face direct taxation; in many cases they could not, and nearly all the debts, public and private, were secured upon land. In short, the republics were passing into pawn to the British colonies.³

¹ Arnot and Orpen, *The Land Question*, pp. 307 ff.

² C. 1361 of 1875, p. 33.

³ C. 3114 of 1882, p. 216; Amphlett, *Standard Bank*, chapter iv.; Carter, *Narrative*, p. 28, quoting *S.A.R. Staats Courant*, March 9, 1868.

Pretorius's hasty annexations loosed a storm. Portugal protested, Wodehouse protested, Umsilikazi probably never received Pretorius's message ; but Matsheng refused, and on the advice of his missionary, John Mackenzie of the L.M.S., asked for British protection ; Ludorf complained once more that the Boers were taking Montsioa's fountains and made the same request ;¹ philanthropic creditors in the colonies inveighed against Transvaal slavery and demanded that both republics be annexed in the commercial interests of South Africa² and, when Wodehouse turned a deaf ear, the majority in the Natal legislature offered to take action themselves if they were only relieved of the veto of a supine High Commissioner.³

Buckingham, who had reluctantly assented to the annexation of Basutoland, was in no mind to annex anything else except in face of 'overruling necessity'⁴ and Pretorius quieted the storm by withdrawing his claims. He knew that he had not a leg to stand on, and he could hope for no support from the Free State, for the internal troubles of the Transvaal and the behaviour of its burghers during the Basuto wars had killed the Unionist party there. But he found Portugal anxious for support against Great Britain in the Delagoa Bay controversy, and was thus able to conclude a commercial treaty specially safeguarding the Mozambique trade in slaves and guns and defining the eastern borders of Gazaland in such a way as to fix those of the Transvaal by implication along the Lebombo mountains. He even went so far to please his new allies as to give full civil liberty to Roman Catholics in the Republic.⁵

Pretorius still hoped to gain control of the central section of the Road and the River Diggings between the Vaal and Harts rivers. The western border of his republic had always been vague. Such authority as the Pretoria Government had exercised over the tribes in the region of the Molopo and Harts had lapsed during the civil war, and Batlapin and Koranas were actually in occupation of the diamondiferous area. But, as there were also a few Boers between the Vaal and Harts, Pretorius discussed matters with the local chiefs. He found the Koranas ready to accept his rule, but he failed to induce Mahura to recognise the Harts as the western boundary of the Transvaal in return for a reduction in the number of the cattle which he admittedly owed as a war indemnity. Mahura preferred to pay in cattle ; he threw over Arnot as soon as he discovered that he was claiming for Waterboer part of the land between the Vaal and Harts which he

¹ Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, p. 154.

² 23719 of 1869, pp. 93, 127.

³ *S.A.R. Staats Courant (Supplement)*, Aug. 2, 1871, for the 1869 treaty.

⁴ C. 4141 of 1869 *passim*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Aug.
1868.

July
1869.

Feb.
1869.

himself claimed, and appointed Theodor Doms his agent. In Doms's hands the negotiations with Pretorius soon broke down.¹

At this stage the famous diamond, 'The Star of South Africa,' was found somewhere in much-debated Griqualand and changed hands first for £11,000 and then for £25,000. The Free State hurriedly beacons off the Vetberg Line, and Pretorius, who had just been re-elected President of the northern republic, felt secure enough to take steps to make sure of his share of the Diggings and the Road along which the gold rush was fairly setting in. Australians were coming up from Natal; representatives of London companies were at Tati and far to the north on the Mazoë, and gold had been found in the eastern Transvaal itself. He therefore proclaimed the new district of Bloemhof along the Harts river, extended the field cornetcy of Zeerust to cut the Road north of Kuruman and, a little later, threw his republic open to prospectors and appointed a Natalian as gold commissioner to see that the state received its due share of the value produced.²

Nov.-
Dec.
1869.

June
1870.

Meanwhile the diamonds had overshadowed the gold. At the New Year of 1870 there was a rush from all parts of the country to Klipdrift and Hebron in the disputed lands between the Vaal and Harts, and presently another to the old Pniel reserve on the Free State side of the Vaal. The diggers were an orderly crowd enough. Many of them had brought their wives and families and treated the whole business as a prolonged and possibly lucrative picnic, but their very presence made the settlement of outstanding questions of jurisdiction imperative. Brand induced Waterboer to submit the question of the Campbell Lands to Wodehouse, but to the great misfortune of all concerned the High Commissioner, a stiff man but a just, was on the point of leaving South Africa and could do nothing. Hardly was he gone than Pretorius upset the apple-cart and brought intervention from the south within the bounds of possibility. At the end of the Volksraad session he rushed through a diamond monopoly for 21 years to three friends. Burghers and diggers alike cried out against the scandal and the President drew back. It was too late. The diggers proclaimed a free republic at Klipdrift and Stafford Parker, an ex-able-bodied seaman of H.M. Navy, joined the ranks of South African presidents.³

June
1870.

The first attempt at a general settlement of the disputed area on either side of the Vaal was now made. The Free State agreed to claim no land between the Vaal and Harts and the two republics


Aug.
1870.

¹ Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, pp. 89, 109 ff., 116 ff., 279 ff.


² *Ibid.*, p. 276; Gardner Williams, *Diamond Fields*, p. 123; Glanville, *South African Gold-Fields*.

³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 31 ff.

GRIQUALAND WEST and the KEATE AWARD AREA



- Cape Colony
- Line of Keate Award
- Undisputed Territories of Waterboer
- Territories claimed by Waterboer
- Territory of the South African Republic - boundaries undefined
- Trade routes



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met their respective native rivals at Nooitgedacht. The conference failed. Pretorius could make no headway with the Batlapin and Barolong chiefs; Brand declined to submit the whole of Waterboer's claim to the High Commissioner; whereupon Waterboer departed and asked to be taken over as a British subject.¹ Pretorius then visited the Diggers' Republic and promised wide powers of self-government. It was of no avail. His authority was gone and Doms was busy offering concessions in the name of his Bantu protégés. Brand meanwhile proclaimed Free State sovereignty over the Campbell Lands and sent O. J. Aug. Truter, an ex-policeman of the goldfields of Bendigo and Ballarat,² 1870. to uphold the authority of his republic at Pniel.

Unluckily for Brand, a week or two later a stone was picked up on the farm Dorstfontein (Dutoitspan), far to the south of Pniel, in what had been Cornelis Kok's land right on the Ramah-Platberg Line claimed by Waterboer. A stampede took place to these Dry Diggings, henceforward the storm-centre of South Africa, and in the Colony petitions headed by the name of 'Moral Bob' Godlonton poured in upon the acting High Commissioner, Hay, urging that the Cape as the strongest and most stable state in South Africa must take over the Diamond Fields in view of the numbers of Colonists at the Diggings, the great sums of money there invested and the danger to the peace of South Africa arising from the presumed absence of any adequate authority.³

The appeal was well timed. President Parker still ruled at Klipdrift, and the memory of a decade of confusion from Namaqualand to the Zoutpansberg was still fresh. Hay, moreover, was in the hands of his officials, many of whom honestly believed in Waterboer's claims and nearly all of whom were his advocates. At their head was Richard Southey, Colonial Secretary since 1864, a rigid-minded man, secretive as Shepstone himself, upright according to his lights, but a firm believer in official rule, an early imperialist who desired to see the Queen's representatives ruling Africa to the Zambesi, and an implacable foe to the republics, which he, once more like Shepstone, was quite prepared to bridle with the help of the tribes.⁴ Under his direction Hay warned Brand not to beacon off the Vetberg Line prematurely, protested against Truter's exercise of authority over British subjects, and bade Pretorius refrain from encroaching on tribes 'in alliance' with Her Majesty.⁵

¹ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 36, 88 ff., 92; Leyds' *First Annexation of the Transvaal*, p. 120; G. 21, pp. 28 ff.

² C. 459 of 1871, pp. 37, 92; G. 21-71, p. 18.

³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 62, 65.

⁴ Wilmot, *Life of . . . Southey*, pp. 196 ff., 313; Froude, *Two Lectures*, p. 26; Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

⁵ G. 21-71, pp. 4-7; C. 459 of 1871, pp. 38, 44.

Poor Pretorius, never a diplomatist, was becoming more and more deeply involved in his controversy with the astute advisers of his Bantu rivals for the debatable lands. Their claims were now fully developed. He was not much worried by the Batlapin Jantje and Mankoroane, successor of Mahura, for at Nooitgedacht they had merely claimed lands to the west of the Harts well beyond the diamond area. On the other hand, Doms claimed lands for the Barolong on both sides of the Harts bounded to the east by the Vaal, Schoonspruit, and the sources of the Marico and Molopo, on the strength of an alleged treaty whereby Potgieter had promised these lands of their ancestor, Tao, to Moroko and Tawane, the father of Montsioa. After the meeting, Montsioa's friend, Ludorf, had shown Pretorius another alleged treaty in which the elder Pretorius recognised the independence of Montsioa to the west of the Harts.¹ Pretorius jumped at this apparent chance of disposing of Montsioa's claims to the River Diggings, and henceforward made this 'treaty' the basis of his claims thereto. He met the chiefs once more; all agreed to refer the boundary disputes and the question of Montsioa's independence to the High Commissioner, and the Volksraad added a request that the court should also determine the right of H.M. Government to interfere in matters north of the Vaal not affecting its own subjects.²

1837.
1851.
Nov.
1870.

Hay did not appoint the arbitrators, as Sir Henry Barkly, the new High Commissioner, was expected daily; but he sent John Campbell to Klipdrift with magisterial powers under the Punishment Act over British subjects in all the territory claimed by Waterboer. A few days later Barkly arrived at Capetown to find the impartial position occupied by Grey and Wodehouse destroyed by Hay's action, and Brand awaiting him in person with a proposal to refer the Campbell Lands to foreign arbitration.³ Brand's proposal was a foretaste of troubles to come, for it was a proposal to which Barkly could not accede unless he was prepared to admit the intervention of other Powers in a sphere over which Great Britain had long exercised the hegemony, an intervention which might ultimately lead to the migration of the state system of the Continent, rapidly changing as the Franco-German war swept on, to the soil of South Africa.

At Klipdrift President Parker had readily made way for the magistrate. In spite of a commission from Waterboer, which added greatly to the gaiety of the assembled multitudes at the Diggings, Campbell confined his authority at first to the north bank of the river; but, following on a rush to Cawood's Hope,

¹ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 58 ff.; Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, pp. 150 ff., 183;
² *Ibid.*, p. 165. ³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 96, 100.

Dec.
1870.

he extended it to the Free State side. Brand replied by creating Feb. Truter landdrost of Pniel.¹ At the end of the month Barkly 1871. arrived on the scene. He persuaded Pretorius and the other claimants to the lands north of the Vaal to submit their dispute to the ultimate arbitration of Keate, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, who had been accepted as arbitrator by Pretorius in an abortive attempt to settle the Blood River controversy with the 1869. Zulus, and had given great satisfaction to the Transvaalers by deciding the Klip river boundary dispute with the Free State in 1870. their favour.² He also arranged for joint administration pending the award, and tried to persuade Brand to accept the same terms. The most Brand would concede was the purchase of the Campbell Lands or their exchange for Albania, and, failing that, submission to foreign arbitration, since the Imperial Government was really a party to the cause. At this very moment divided control led to a defiance of Truter's authority; Brand sent up a commando with guns to maintain order, and Barkly despatched Cape Police April to Klipdrift with the threat that he would repel force by force.³ 1871.

Meanwhile diamonds had been found on the farm Bultfontein, next to Dorstfontein. Brand now offered to submit even the question of the ownership of land east of the Vaal to foreign arbitration, but Barkly refused to discuss the matter until the commando had withdrawn, and then confessed to the Earl of Kimberley that he had gone too far in support of Waterboer and the diggers to draw back.⁴ The noble Earl was, however, as unwilling as any of his predecessors to extend Great Britain's responsibilities in South Africa, and, though he was apprehensive of possible aggression by 'Dutch Boers and English immigrants' against natives, and even of the imposition of 'republican slavery' upon the Griquas, he had forbidden Barkly to annex anything that the Cape was not prepared to rule unaided.⁵

Definite steps might, however, have to be taken, for difficulties were arising between the diggers and the absentee proprietors of the diamondiferous farms at the Dry Diggings.⁶ Profiting by the fact that the land grants made no state reservation of mineral rights, the proprietors proposed to reap the fruits of their enterprise to the best of their ability in the matter of licence fees. The diggers replied by rushing Dorstfontein. They presently withdrew and then rich finds were made on the adjacent farm of May Vooruitzigt. Brand promptly transferred Truter from deserted 1871.

¹ C. 459 of 1871, p. 132.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 149 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 154, 161, 181.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 65 ff., 102.

⁶ Dorstfontein had been bought for £2600, Bultfontein for £2000, Vooruitzigt presently for £6000. This last was at least certain wealth to the owner of the farm, De Beer.

Pniel to the Dry Diggings, and the Volksraad divided the 10s. monthly licence fees between the state, the proprietors, and the elected Diggers' Committees of six in each camp, which, under the chairmanship of the government inspector, were to deal with disputed claims and other matters directly affecting the diggers.¹ So the committees made the local law and Truter saw that they kept it, no hard matter, since he was tactful and times were good—so good, indeed, that a stone was found at Colesberg Kopje also on the farm Vooruitzigt. The Kopje promptly became the 'New Rush' and, in due time, the famous Kimberley Mine.

Even before this last startling development, Barkly had made up his mind to annex Griqualand West if he possibly could. He had received permission to annex the lawful possessions of such chiefs as desired to be taken over, provided the Cape would first undertake to incorporate such territory.² Southey therefore moved in the Assembly that Waterboer's lands be annexed. In face of determined opposition on various grounds, he carried his motion by a single vote with the amendment that nothing but what really belonged to that chief should be annexed with him. He assured the members that nothing more was intended and, at the end of the session, had the satisfaction of seeing both Houses agree without a division that the Governor should be empowered to take the necessary steps to maintain order and collect revenue in those territories pending a final settlement.³

In face of the first resolution Brand once more demanded foreign arbitration and sent a representative to plead his case in Downing Street and, at the close of the Bloemhof Arbitration Court which had inquired into the Transvaal claims, Pretorius made the same request. Pretorius had good cause to feel uneasy. The treaty of 1851 on which he had relied had proved to be a forgery; he and his State Attorney, Klein, had handled their case with extraordinary stupidity; Arnot and Ludorf had risen to the height of the occasion; the members of the court had failed to agree and the issue had been referred to Keate.⁴ Barkly, on the other hand, frankly told Kimberley that it was useless to pretend that he was now acting in Waterboer's name at the Diggings and added that if the Free State was allowed to absorb the richest of the Diamond Fields, it would soon outrival either of the Cape provinces in wealth and would be less likely than formerly to enter a South African confederation on terms dictated by the old Colony.⁵

¹ C. 459 of 1871, p. 184.

² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

³ C. 508 of 1872, pp. 3-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 16. Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, p. 133 *et passim*;
C. 459 of 1871, p. 190.

⁵ C. 508 of 1872, pp. 4, 12.

June
1871.

July
1871.

July
1871.

Then came the award. Keate decided fairly on the evidence before him and gave the Barolong a line from the sources of the Marico down Maquassi Spruit and the Vaal to Platberg, and thence a boundary corresponding to that which Arnot claimed as the northern and western limits of Griqualand West.¹ This gave Barkly something definite to go on and, ten days later, he annexed Griqualand West itself and, on the morrow, proclaimed the Keate Award Line. He presently received Kimberley's letter trusting to his discretion in spite of the fact that the resolution of the Cape Parliament did not fully meet the conditions laid down; but already the Cape police had hoisted the Union Jack on the Diamond Fields.²

Oct.
1871.

British Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter X.:

- (i) Cape of Good Hope. *Further Papers re . . . Kaffir Tribes*, 1635 of 1853; Blue-book of July, 1855; 2202 and 2352 of 1857; *German Immigration*, 389 of 1858; *Recall of Sir George Grey*, 216 and 357 of 1860; *Orange River Sovereignty*, 1646 of 1853; 1758 of 1854; *Correspondence re . . . British Kaffraria*, 3436 of 1865; *Despatches re . . . Moshesh*, 23719 (or 4140) of 1869; *Further Papers re . . . the Treaty of Aliwal North*, C. 18 and C. 99 of 1870; *Affairs of the Cape*, C. 459 of 1871; C. 508 of 1872; C. 732 of 1873; *Griqualand West*, C. 1348 of 1875.
- (ii) Natal. *Correspondence re . . . Settlement*, 980 of 1848; 1059 of 1849; 1292 of 1850; 1697 of 1853; *Report of Native Commission of 1852-3*; *Judgment re . . . Bishop of Natal*, H. C. 454.
- (iii) S.A. Republic. *Kidnapping*, 4141 of 1869; *Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book*, 1871; *Transvaal Royal Commission*, C. 3114 of 1882; *London Convention*, C. 3841 and C. 3947 of 1884; *Correspondence re . . . Delagoa Bay*, C. 1361 of 1875.

CHAPTER XI

'MY CONFEDERATION POLICY,' 1871-81

Political and economic effects of the diamonds: self-government in Cape Colony; Griqualand West; Natal; the Republics—Origins of the confederation policy: economic change; external pressure; native troubles; the Griqualand West and Keate Award problems—Wolseley and Froude; the London Conference; the annexation of the Transvaal—Sir Bartle Frere—The Basuto war and the Pretoria Convention.

Secretaries of State for the Colonies: Earl of Kimberley, July 1870–Feb. 1874; Earl of Carnarvon, Feb. 1874–Jan. 1878; Sir M. Hicks

¹ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 26, 90; C. 3947 of 1884, pp. 11 ff.; C. 508 of 1872, p. 26.

² C. 508 of 1872, pp. 8, 33 ff., 49.

Beach, Jan. 1878–April 1880; Earl of Kimberley, April 1880–Dec. 1882.

High Commissioners and Governors of Cape Colony: Sir Henry Barkly, Dec. 31, 1870–March 31, 1877; Sir Bartle Frere, March 31, 1877–Sept. 15, 1880; Major-General H. H. Clifford, acting Sept. 15–27, 1880; Sir G. C. Strahan, acting Sept. 27, 1880–Jan. 22, 1881; Sir Hercules Robinson, Jan. 22, 1881–May 1, 1889.

High Commissioners for South-East Africa: Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, June 28, 1879–April 27, 1880; Major-General Sir G. Pomeroy Colley, July 2, 1880–Feb. 27, 1881; Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, acting Feb.–Aug. 8, 1881.

Prime Ministers of Cape Colony: J. C. Molteno, Dec. 1, 1872–Feb. 5, 1878; J. G. Sprigg, Feb. 6, 1878–May 8, 1881; T. C. Scanlen, May 9, 1881–May 12, 1884.

Lieutenant-Governors of Natal: R. W. Keate, May 24, 1867–July 19, 1872; A. Musgrave, July 1872–April 30, 1873; Sir Benjamin Pine, July 1873–April 1, 1875; *Administrator*: Sir Garnet Wolseley, April–Sept. 3, 1875; *Lieutenant-Governor*: Sir Henry E. Bulwer, Sept. 1875–April 20, 1880; Sir G. P. Colley, July 1880–Feb. 27, 1881.

Griqualand West: *Triumvirate*, Oct. 1871–Jan. 9, 1873; *Administrator*, R. Southey, Jan.–July 17, 1873, then *Lieutenant-Governor* till Aug. 3, 1875. *Administrator*, Col. (Sir) Owen Lanyon, Aug. 1875–Feb. 1879; thereafter, acting Administrators till Oct. 1880.

President of the Orange Free State: J. H. Brand, Feb. 2, 1864–July 16, 1888; (F. K. Hohne, acting President and then Committee of Three, Aug. 1872–June 16, 1873).

Presidents of the South African Republic: M. W. Pretorius, May 10, 1864–Nov. 1871; Rev. T. F. Bürgers, July 1872–April 12, 1877; *Administrators*: Sir Theophilus Shepstone, April 1877–Jan. 1879; Sir Owen Lanyon, acting March 1879–June 5, 1880, then Administrator till Aug. 1881; *Triumvirate*, S. J. P. Kruger, M. W. Pretorius, and P. J. Joubert, Aug. 1881–May 1883.

THE immediate effect of the annexation of Griqualand West and the proclamation of the Keate Line was to embitter the relations of the Imperial Government with the poverty-stricken republics and to throw the Free State back upon the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay. The Keate Award cut off many unoccupied farms, but it also deprived the Transvaal of the village of Bloemhof and of large and well-established parts of the Marico and Potchefstroom districts. As soon as the award was known the Volksraad altered the Grondwet to permit of a non-burgher standing for the presidency, obliged the unhappy Pretorius, who had after all written to thank Barkly for the arbitration, to resign with some of his chief officials, and promised to uphold the public and private rights of burghers in the lost lands.¹ Many burghers in both republics clamoured for Brand as president of a joint republic and a bold push for Delagoa Bay even at the price of the Conventions; but that cautious statesman met his own Volksraad behind closed doors and quieted them with the assurance that

¹ C. 508 of 1872, pp. 50, 67; C. 732 of 1873, pp. 2, 31; Eybers, p. 434.

war would be a disaster for all South Africa and that once the truth was known in Great Britain, as it surely would be made known by Englishmen in South Africa, '*alles sal reg kom.*'¹

The Transvaalers therefore had to seek for another President who should be more versed in diplomacy and the ways of the world than Pretorius. They found him, as they believed, in Burgers, the Liberal predikant of Hanover.² Him they installed, while Brand remained at Bloemfontein to carry on a long and irritating correspondence with the officials of the Diamond Fields and Capetown on the precise position of the three beacons, Ramah, David's Graf and Platberg, which should decide on which side of the line the rich Dry Diggings actually fell.³ After long negotiations he agreed with the High Commissioner on a scheme of foreign arbitration, but he fell ill at the last moment and was incapacitated for nearly a year; the acting President and, thereafter, the Triumvirate which succeeded him, reopened questions which had been disposed of; Barkly was obviously not anxious to have foreign arbitration, the promising scheme collapsed, and the Diamond Fields remained a festering sore in the body politic for three long years to come.

July
1872.Aug.
1872.1873-
1876.

Economically, and in the long run politically, the gold and diamond discoveries brought good as well as evil. Certainly they brought opportunities of a fuller if more dangerous life than had hitherto been possible in agricultural South Africa. Combined with the breaking of the long drought and the eagerness of capitalists to invest in new countries during the depression in Europe, they provided money for the all-important railways and other public works and helped to loosen the constitutional deadlocks in both the coast colonies.

The economic and political prospects of the Cape Colony had brightened rapidly throughout Hay's seven months of office. The Anglican Church of the Province of South Africa pointed the way to self-government by meeting in Synod for the first time, and the Imperial Government made up its mind that if the Colonists would not be governed, they must take up the responsibility of governing.⁴ It had therefore sent Barkly, experienced in the ways of the Victoria Parliament, to institute responsible government at the Cape and, thereafter, to meet the wishes of the

May-
Dec.
1870.

¹ C. 508 of 1872, p. 49; C. 732 of 1873, pp. 16 ff. Many Englishmen did roundly condemn the annexation of the Diamond Fields, e.g. John X. Merriman, Captain Lindley, T. H. Bowker, Robert Moffat of Kuruman, J. S. Moffat of Inyati and, presently, James Froude (C. 732, p. 51; C. 3841 of 1884, p. 115).

² C. 732 of 1873, p. 84.

³ C. 508 of 1872, pp. 25, 28; C. 732 of 1873, p. 128; G. 15 and 33 of 1872 (Cape), *passim*; Lindley, *Adamantia*, chapter xvi; Dower, *Early Annals of Kokstad* (1902), p. 82.

⁴ C. 459 of 1871, p. 14.

Eastern Separationists by devising some such scheme of federal devolution in the Colony as had recommended itself to Grey and Wodehouse.

The confidence of the Western Liberals in the capacity of the Colony to rule itself grew with the growing revenues; the determination of Sprigg's Kaffrarians and the Midlanders not to fall under Grahamstown domination hardened, but the opposition to responsible government from within the Colony was very strong. The Easterners were certain that their province could stand by itself now that goods were pouring through their ports to the fast developing interior, and feared more than ever to be at the mercy of a Western majority which might drain the East of money wherewith to pay for public works in the West and would undoubtedly know little, and probably care less, about the Kaffirs, who outnumbered Europeans in the frontier districts by two to one and were fast piling up once more beyond the border. They were sure of the support of the leading officials from Southey downwards and of the Western Conservatives who, besides holding all the old objections to popular government as such, pointed to the horrors of 'Reconstruction' at the hands of carpet-baggers and coloured voters in the conquered Southern States of the American Union, and insisted that the Basuto had asked to be taken over by the Queen and not by Molteno, that Griqualand must be annexed first to give the diggers a voice in their own constitutional future and that, in any case, no change was necessary. Now that better times were come, they believed the existing system would work as well as it had done in the palmy days of Grey.¹

1871.

Nevertheless, Molteno attempted to carry responsible government. The Assembly duly passed the bill which Porter drafted on his motion; but the conservative Council threw it out and the passage of a bill for the annexation of Basutoland² strengthened the hands of the opposition by increasing the proportion of blacks to whites in the Colony. Similarly, very little public interest was taken in the work of a committee which discussed the possibility of 'federation,' that is, of devolution on a provincial basis; its half-hearted report fell stillborn,³ and Barkly's annexations had killed the hope of the larger scheme of South African confederation which a few far-sighted men had endeavoured to launch.

April
1872.

These very failures, however, left the issue of self-government with a clear field and, during the recess, the responsible government party gained ground. Parliament reassembled, rejoicing in a revenue double that of 1866, and this time the responsible

¹ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 168 ff.² Eybers, p. 61.³ C. 459 of 1871, p. 194; C. 732 of 1873, pp. 22, 43, 97.

government bill was brought forward as a Government measure. It passed both Houses side by side with another bill which at last equalised the representation of the two Provinces in the Assembly; in spite of hostile petitions the royal assent was given, and an Eastern request for Separation was rejected by the Queen. Barkly, faced with the task of finding a Prime Minister,¹ invited first Southey and then Porter. Both declined to serve; Solomon would only work on practically level terms with Molteno, and the Governor finally invited the Lion of Beaufort to form a Ministry. Molteno prudently included Conservative and Kaffrarian elements in what was really a federal cabinet and set to work to remodel the Colony as far as might be after his heart's desire.² Dec. 1872.

One of Molteno's first acts was to introduce the Seven Circles Bill for the reform of the Legislative Council on the lines laid down for the Assembly by Wodehouse in 1867. The proposal was to divide the whole Colony into seven circles, each returning three members, as a means of obliterating the sharp distinction between East and West, and frankly to increase the power of the rural voters against the carpet-baggers of Capetown, Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown. The Council threw out the bill but, after a general election, passed it, and thus cleared the way for the passage in the following year of that hardy annual, Solomon's Voluntary Bill, which followed Natal's example by withdrawing state aid from the churches in the Colony.³ Other reforms were effected. The Colony acquired a coat-of-arms as the outward and visible sign of its new status; the appointment of J. H. de Villiers, a colonial born, as Chief Justice in a Colony which since 1828 had received its Chief Justices from overseas in itself testified to the new powers of the Cape. New magistracies were set up; and the examining University of the Cape of Good Hope took the place of the Board of Examiners as the coping stone of a system of education which had recently been strengthened by the foundation of the Victoria College at Stellenbosch and was now extended by that of a seminary for girls at Wellington. 1874.

With a rising revenue and expanding trade the Colony was well able to bear the financial burdens entailed by these developments. Failures there were, of silk, flax and cotton; dorthesia too ravaged the orange and lemon orchards and phylloxera the

¹ C. 732 of 1873, pp. 21 ff., 61, 71 ff., 81, 86; Eybers, p. 63.

² C. 732 of 1873, p. 141; Molteno, *Life of . . . Molteno*, I. 188; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 56; Westerners: J. C. Molteno, Premier and Colonial Secretary, Dr. T. White, M.L.C., Treasurer, J. H. de Villiers, Attorney-General; Kaffrians: C. Abercrombie Smith (Conservative), Crown Lands and Public Works, Charles Brownlee, Native Affairs.

³ Eybers, p. 64, and Act 5 of 1875.

vineyards of the West till the Californian ladybird and the grafting of vines on American stocks overcame both pests. Wool remained the great export, with mohair steadily gaining ground, and a boom in ostriches following on the first artificial hatching of chicks enabled prudent farmers to wipe off mortgages and all to indulge in the novelty of fencing before the inevitable slump weeded out the foolish and the unlucky. As in the good times of the 'twenties and 'fifties the state assisted immigrants. British, Belgian and German navvies were set to work upon the railway embankments, where, in the course of a 52½ hour week, they showed the coloured folk and natives how to shift earth and, in too many cases, less solid substances also; while German peasants made parts of the sandy Cape Flats to blossom if not as the rose, at least as do the pumpkin and potato. Population increased rapidly.¹

All was not so well in Griqualand West. For some time after the annexation, New Rush alone yielded stones to the value of £50,000 monthly; claims thirty feet each way were selling for £4000; iron churches, houses and canteens were springing from the bare veld, and Dutoitspan with its newspapers had already become the commercial base for the far North. But clouds had soon begun to gather. Though the Diggers' Committees still sat, real power was in the hands of a triumvirate of officials, two of whom were stranded at Klipdrift. The colour bar whereunder, in republican times, no non-European might own a claim or deal in diamonds or be seen upon the streets after nine in the evening, had gone. It had never been strictly enforced, but its loss was felt at a time when New Rush had begun to attract men—and women—from all parts of the world who debauched the native labourers and drove a thriving trade in illicit diamond buying and even in the proceeds of organised robberies.²

All the troubles which the Free State had been spared closed in upon the new administration. A mass meeting protested against the neglect of the Committees by the Triumvirs and burnt some canteens. Matters went from bad to worse. The diggings at the three earlier centres had deepened so dangerously that they were almost unworkable, and though a determined display of pickhandles in the hands of the more prudent section of the diggers saved New Rush by ensuring that one-fourth of each claim should be set aside as a road along which the yellow and blue ground could be carted to be sifted outside Tom Tiddler's

¹ Population rose from 181,592 Europeans and 314,789 others in 1865 to 236,783 and 484,201 in 1875.

² C. 508 of 1872, pp. 31 ff.; C. 732 of 1873, p. 100.

eight acres, salvation was only for a time. These roads began to fall. So did the price of stones, by 60 per cent. in the course of six months. On the other hand working expenses and water rose and disappointed men began to haunt the camps in a dangerous mood.

Meanwhile, opposition and very plain speaking on the value of Waterboer's rights in the Cape Assembly forced Southey to withdraw his Griqualand West Annexation Bill and, to celebrate their escape from Capetown rule, the diggers burnt some more canteens and rioted for two happy days. The Triumvirs hastened to Dutoitspan, imposed a colour bar, provided police and detectives and promised lashes to coloured diamond thieves. Barkly cancelled the colour bar but confirmed most of the other regulations and, since the Cape Parliament had gone back on its virtual promise to take the Diamond Fields over, sent Southey north to administer the country till Crown Colony rule could be established.

July
1872.

Jan.
1873.

Her Majesty's other South African Crown Colony of Natal was prospering once more. As the gold and diamond diggings developed the demand for retrenchment died away; but a supplementary charter which clearly defined the duties of the executive and legislature respectively and put the chief official salaries on a reserved list, did nothing to check the clamour for responsible government, a clamour which was swelled by the confidence bred of better times, the example of the Cape and the addition of new elected members to the Legislative Council.² The British ministry, however, could not give way to a demand which was often accompanied by a request for a larger garrison, and that at a time when fewer Europeans were entering the colony than were leaving it for the gold and diamond fields, like the two cotton planters from Umkomanzi, Herbert Rhodes and his delicate younger brother, Cecil John.³ Moreover, as the white men streamed out, the Bantu labourers followed them and the coast planters began to press once more for Indian coolies.

1873.

The annexation of Basutoland by the Cape and even the loss of the Diamond Fields were by no means unmixed evils for the Free State. The one relieved it of its native problem, the other of an industrial problem of a most difficult kind. Helped by the Kimberley market and the discovery of small diamond fields of its own at Koffyfontein and Jagersfontein, the republic became a farmers' and transport riders' paradise and, for thirty years to come, almost achieved the alleged happiness of having no history. Even before the interruption of the Basuto wars, Brand

1870.

¹ C. 732 of 1873, pp. 51, 101 ff., 108, 112, 118, 124.

² Eybers, p. 198.

³ The European population of Natal increased from about 16,000 in 1865 to 18,000 in 1875.

had carried through important reforms defining more precisely the composition and duties of the Volksraad and guarding against that hasty alteration of the Grondwet which was such a danger in the S.A. Republic.¹ Lack of funds and his own illness had hitherto prevented him from setting up a professional High Court on the Cape model, but now he made a beginning by appointing F. W. Reitz, son of the Popular Member of 1850, Chief Justice.² New magistracies, the foundation of proper government offices at the capital, a memorial to the fallen in the Basuto wars, improvements in education marked by signs of real vigour and the formation of a normal department at the Grey College, the gradual extinction of the paper-money, the arrival of the Oriental Bank, and the steady growth of population all pointed to the quiet but increasing prosperity of the Free State.³

The Transvaal benefited less from the opening of the diamond diggings than the other states of South Africa; nevertheless, population there was increasing⁴ and with it the prospect of more settled conditions; and the election of the liberal Burgers as President was a sign that the acute ecclesiastical disputes of the past were dying down, a process helped on by the arrival of further orthodox ministers.⁵ Burgers himself was full of confidence. Already he envisaged an independent South African federal republic with his state, cast for the leading rôle, rejoicing in 'equal rights for all civilised men' and in Delagoa Bay as its harbour 'free from the trammels of British ports and influence.' He induced the Volksraad to adopt a new flag and coat-of-arms, borrowed £66,000 at a high rate from the Cape Commercial Bank, the one bank in the republic, wherewith to buy up the debased paper, and dilated on the possibilities of Tati and of the newly mined gold of Eersteling in the Transvaal itself. When a small rush took place to the alluvial goldfields of Lydenburg, he visited the Australians and Scots at 'Mac-a-Mac' and 'New Caledonia,' appointed a gold commissioner, gave the diggers two seats in the Volksraad and struck sovereigns bearing his own image and superscription from the nuggets with which they presented

¹ The O.F.S. Grondwet could only be altered by a three-fourths majority in two successive sessions of the Volksraad. Burgher rights were given to those born in the State and to Europeans resident for one year who owned land worth £150, or residents of three years' standing. Youths of 18 with burgher rights could vote for commandants and field cornets; burghers of 21 born in the state and others who had a small property qualification had the Presidential and Volksraad franchise (Eybers, pp. 286 ff.).

² Eybers, p. 326. The High Court was completed in 1876 by the appointment of James Buchanan, ex-State Attorney of the S.A.R., and Melius de Villiers as judges.

³ European population increased from about 15,000 in 1854 to 27,000 in 1873.

⁴ European population rose from about 25,000 in 1854 to 40,000 in 1875.

⁵ Engelbrecht, *Geschiedenis*, II.

1864-
1866.

1874.

1872.

1873.

him, thereby giving great offence to the straiter sect of his burghers.¹

The South African states were thus developing more or less rapidly and were certainly being drawn into closer contact with each other and with 'old Europe.' Financially, the record of the Standard Bank tells the story.² This most successful of the 'imperial' banks had swallowed up many of the local banks in the Cape Colony during the bad times, acquired half the coin in 1870. South Africa, and prospered so that it had become banker to the Cape Government. It had then established itself in Griqualand 1875. West, and though the absorption of its chief rival, the London and S.A. Bank, and the invasion of the Transvaal were still to come, 1877. it had already carried the financial unification of South Africa far in advance of the political.

As with money, so with goods. The opening of the Cape- 1870. town docks was followed by improvements at Port Nolloth, Port Elizabeth and East London; the Union Line and its new competitor, the Castle Line, soon supplied a weekly mail service with a run to England of 25 days and the promise of bigger ships; the Cape Government bought the telegraph line to Kingwilliamstown and began to extend it, provided a daily post 1872. to Grahamstown and arranged with the Free State for joint road and bridge building across the Orange. Natal, for its part, had 1874. already begun to build roads and bridges and had bought the 1867. Durban-Maritzburg telegraph. It now made expensive efforts to cope with the sand bar at Durban. The attempt was unavailing at the time, but one barrier to trade Natal could remove. It lowered its customs duties and so began the long rivalry with the Cape ports for the up-country traffic on which it was becoming more and more dependent.³

Then came the railways, the links of iron which were destined to bind all South Africa together economically and politically. The Cape bought out the private companies in the West and at Port Elizabeth, reduced the gauge to 3 feet 6 inches, and pushed on with both of these railways and a new line from East London 1873- toward the Diamond Fields. Natal followed suit and projected 1874. a railway which should tap the trade of the interior, thereby inevitably promising to come into conflict with one of Burgers's most cherished schemes for the Transvaal, a Delagoa Bay railway.

Under pressure of changing conditions a few far-sighted men,

¹ Aylward, *Transvaal of To-day*, pp. 54, 126; Carter, *Narrative*, p. 562; Haggard, *Cetewayo*, p. 83.

² Amphlett, *Standard Bank*, chapters ii. iii.

³ Theal, V. 355.

other than Imperial officials, were already thinking in terms of closer union. All the arguments in favour of that step which Grey had advanced still held good, all the evils which he had foretold if it were not effected were coming to pass. De Villiers, a member of the Cape Federation Committee, and J. H. Hofmeyr, a prominent journalist, had urged that solution in 1871; de Villiers had since kept touch with Brand and other leading Free Staters who agreed with Grey that no section of the Europeans could stand by itself in the face of natives and were ready to consider closer union once the Griqualand West dispute was settled;¹ Burgers was 'an ardent federalist,' albeit his scheme left no room for the British connection; in the Eastern Province and in Natal men regarded federation as good business and a means of achieving local self-government.

1859-1871. The attitude of the Imperial authorities had also changed since Grey's time. The foreign affairs which preoccupied them forced the federal solution upon their notice: the federated German Empire based on the Zollverein, Italian unity, the Civil War fought essentially to maintain the federal U.S.A. Disraeli and Carnarvon had seen the turn of the tide within the Empire in Canadian federation; Kimberley and Barkly had considered a permissive act for South Africa and, even after the annexations of 1871, had discussed the chances of a Natal candidate for the Transvaal presidency pledged to that policy; Disraeli had come forward as the champion of an imperialism based on a common customs tariff, mutual defence and 'some representative council at the metropolis' to keep the parts of the Empire in touch with the centre and with each other.²

June 1872. Foreign pressure might be expected to drive the scattered South African communities together, especially as the revolution in the balance of power in Europe might make it more difficult for Great Britain to fight their battles for them. Berlin and not Paris was now the political centre of the Continent, and German 'colonials' were already taking a keen interest in the Transvaal and what is now Southern Rhodesia. The British monopoly of the outer world was passing; the fate of Delagoa Bay had

¹ Hofmeyr, *Life of J. H. Hofmeyr*, p. 133; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 51 ff., 126, C. 508 of 1872, p. 20; C. 732 of 1873, pp. 42 ff.

² C. 459 of 1871, pp. 12, 46, 170; Wilmot, *Southey*, p. 408; Buckle, *Disraeli*, VI, 410. One current of Colonial Office opinion is shown in the following minute by a permanent official. 'One great solution of the South African problem is the confederation of all these states. . . . A great blow will be struck at this possible solution . . . if the power of any of these small states was increased by the addition to it of Griqualand West. . . . Once having annexed, the feeling here will be very strong against any relinquishment. . . . A great stumbling-block will be thrown in the way of the first working of responsible government at the Cape by any difficulty of this kind from Griqualand West' (C.O. 48/463; Minutes on No. 107 of Oct. 3, 1872).

recently been left in the hands of the French President ;¹ Prussia 1868. had asked pointed questions about Namaqua-Damaraland ; and, however incredulous Kimberley might be of German activities in southern Africa, Barkly was satisfied that captured French mitrailleuses and attendant German officers had appeared in 1873. Pretoria.² Now, Disraeli took office with Carnarvon as Colonial Jan. Secretary and announced a vigorous colonial policy which must 1874. mean, among other things, the confederation of South Africa.

Downing Street desired a confederation which would enable it to withdraw its garrison from all South Africa save the Cape Peninsula and Natal. Garrisons had either gone or were steadily going from New Zealand, Canada and the Australian colonies, and the South African force had been reduced from 5 battalions to 2½, the Cape Mounted Rifles disbanded, and fair warning 1867-1870. given that part of the cost of future wars would be charged to the colonies concerned.³ But a mere matter of a few battalions would not have moved Carnarvon to press his confederation policy so strongly as he did. He was brought to the pitch of vigorous action by the need for ending the muddle in Griqualand West and still more for facing that fundamental issue of all South African life and politics—the native question.

All over South Africa the tribes were increasing in numbers, the various European states were becoming responsible for their governance, and the native policies of those states were drifting further apart as they themselves were being drawn closer together. In the Cape Colony the coloured folk were on an absolute civil and legal equality with the whites. The position of the Bantu was the same unless specially modified, and those modifications were fewer in the early 'seventies than was afterwards the case. Even in the Ciskei (British Kaffraria) the ordinary law of the Colony prevailed, though some recognition was given to native laws of marriage and inheritance, and in native cases the magistrates as a rule used commonsense and native custom.⁴

The position was markedly different in Basutoland. The Cape Parliament had been induced to annex that territory⁵ in 1871. the belief that it would pay its own way, that if the Cape did not take it Natal would, and that a self-governing colony ought to control the native territories on its borders. The ordinary law of the Colony did not apply to it. Under regulations issued by Dec. Barkly,⁶ the Governor legislated by proclamations which had the 1871.

¹ C. 1361 of 1875, p. 1.

² Wilmot, *Southey*, p. 257.

³ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 14, 35.

⁴ Acts 16 of 1860 ; 18 of 1864 ; *Report of Native Affairs Commission (Cape)*, 1883, p. 18.

⁵ C. 459 of 1871, pp. 47, 67 ; Eybers, p. 61.

⁶ *Native Affairs Blue-book (Cape)*, III., No. 9

force of law unless they were repealed by Parliament, to which they must be presented within fourteen days. All men were equal before the law, but the sale of guns to natives without a permit and of liquor under any circumstances was forbidden. Magistrates sat in open court exercising full civil and criminal jurisdiction short of the death penalty, with an appeal to the Chief Magistrate at Maseru and, in certain cases, to the Governor himself. Legally the chiefs retained only minor civil jurisdiction subject to an appeal to the magistrates, but in practice they heard nearly all civil cases and saw their verdicts enforced by public opinion. Beyond the issue of a handbook on Basuto customs no official recognition was given to native law ; and the Basuto retaliated by regarding as null and void such of the regulations as conflicted with that law and custom.

Apart from a handful of Cape Police and Basuto constables, the strength of the Government lay in the character of the magistrates, the mutual jealousies of the clans and the fact that the chiefs were financially interested in the collection of the 10s. hut tax. But definite attempts to civilise the tribesmen were left to the Paris missionaries, who as ever wisely preserved as much as they could of tribal custom as the foundation of their work, and to the Anglican and Roman Catholic fathers who now worked beside them. By 1872, fully 3000 Basuto could read their own language and a few English as well, while the anti-European Ethiopian movement had already shown itself for a moment.

All remained quiet in Basutoland for some years to come but, in the early 'seventies, there was confusion in the Transkeian territories from the Cape to the Natal frontier. British authority was still represented by mere diplomatic agents with some of the chiefs, but the Cape was steadily being drawn, as every civilised community must be, into the concerns of the barbarians on its borders. The Tembu chiefs drew small salaries from Capetown, and Gangaliswe, the strongest of them, drew rents also from Europeans settled on the Slang and Umtata rivers. Gangaliswe, worsted by Kreli's Galekas, offered his country to the Queen but, when peace had been restored by Charles Brownlee, he withdrew his offer under pressure of his followers. Next year 1872. J. M. Orpen was sent as resident to the Gatberg (Maclear) in 1873. Nomansland or Griqualand East. There Adam Kok was still holding his own ; but the little clans settled by Wodehouse were quarrelling, Nehemiah Moshesh still hankered after the Matatiele lands, and the Pandomisis and other clans to the north of the Pondo line and the Xesibes to the south of it near the Natal border had asked for British protection. Orpen restored something like order with the help of Kok and other friendly chiefs and

agreed to take the Pandomisis over. The two Pondo chiefs protested and repudiated the Pondo line, but when the Pandomisis resisted his control, Orpen subdued them, Shepstone fashion, with the help of his allies and fined them according to Bantu custom. It was a beginning of European authority in Nomansland.¹

The native policy of the Republics was, as ever, radically different from that of the Cape. In neither republic was any equality admitted between black and white, and in neither could a native even own land on individual title. In the Transvaal, more than elsewhere, natives were frankly viewed solely as a source of labour. There the principle of the *plakkers wet* was maintained in theory, limiting the number of native families which might squat on any one farm; an attempt was made for the first 1870. time to collect a hut tax through the headmen; ² the authorities used the vagrancy law as a means of diverting part of the flood of good labour which drifted through on its way to the Diamond Fields and, when the natives took to travelling in alarmingly large bodies, raised the price of passes for foreign Kaffirs fivefold. 1874. Whether or no that law was ever enforced does not alter the fact that its existence pointed to possible complications with Griqualand West on the score of labour supply.³

The problems of the Transvaal borderlands showed no signs of becoming simpler. The writ of the republic still ran in those parts of the Keate Award Area which were actually occupied by farmers but, outside, land sharks stirred up the clans against one another, Burgers made treaties with little chiefs who claimed to be paramount and received cessions of the usual kind from them, while the Kimberley authorities supported the stronger chiefs who refused to recognise these treaties. At length Burgers repudiated the Keate Award and proclaimed his cessions. Barkly March 1874. retorted by declaring Mankoroane the Batlapin as paramount chief and suggesting a joint commission to beacon off the Keate line.⁴

In the Zoutpansberg, so far had the authority of the republic fallen, farmers were paying tribute to the chiefs for their lands. Secocoeni was building up a little Basutoland in the Lulu mountains of northern Lydenburg, while the Bushveld fever and lack of transport for their wheat drove the neighbouring farmers back to the High Veld and sheep.⁵ The Swazis were still well

¹ G. 27-74 (Cape); G. 21-75 (Cape), pp. 68, 135 ff.

² Law 9 of 1870.

³ Haggard, *Cetewayo*, p. 91; C. 1748 of 1877, p. 3.

⁴ Burgers made treaties with Massouw the Korana (1872) and Moshette the (Ba)rolong and Botlasitsi the (Ba)tlapin (1873).

⁵ Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

disposed to the Transvaal but they turned a deaf ear to Burgers's proposals that they should become his vassals and a stepping-stone on the road to Delagoa Bay.¹ Further south, Cetewayo had long questioned the validity of the Swazi cession of land along the Pongola to the Transvaalers and, for some years past, had even played off the Natal against the republican officials in the hope of regaining the Blood River territory. The Pretoria Government had allotted a few farms in that area, but had not ventured to do anything more definite, and now, on the death of Panda, Cetewayo had been crowned king of the Zulus by Shepstone and had begun to revive the old military discipline.²

Land and warriors, the patrimony of chiefs, thus brought the European Governments into conflict with one another. The all-pervading influence of the Diamond Fields also spread to the tribes. As the diggings deepened into mines, the demand for native labourers grew louder and wages rose everywhere to the disgust of farmers who already resented the competition of the railway contractors as much as their fathers in the Colony had resented Montagu and his road gangs. Natives flocked from all parts to Griqualand West. Many died on the road, many were robbed on the way back, but still they came to meet men of other tribes in peace for the first time, to talk and to learn hitherto unsuspected vices. They returned to their kraals with money in their pockets and ideas in their heads, to plague their chiefs and magistrates who were already worried by the traders attracted to the native territories by the new purchasing power of the inhabitants. Most of them too came back with guns in their hands. There had been a gun traffic in South Africa *post memoriam hominum* but never anything like the traffic of Kimberley.³ The Free State tried to stop it on more than one occasion. Once it inadvertently went too far and was faced with what was really an ultimatum from Southey; once it had a brush with armed Basuto on its own soil, and at last Natal diggers offered to help Brand to check the nuisance.⁴ For the Langalibalele crisis had arisen and revealed in a flash the dangers of the gun-trade and the radical weakness of the native policy of Natal.

In Natal coloured folk were legally equal to Europeans but the Bantu were treated as a race apart. A monogamist Bantu could apply for letters of exemption from native law, and such a one exempt for seven years and resident for twelve years in

¹ Wilmot . . . *Southey*, p. 406; *Cape Times*, Dec. 7, 1894 (article by James Buchanan).

² C. 1137 of 1875.

³ Matthews, *Incwadi Yami*, p. 278; Aylward, *op. cit.*, pp. 416, 428; Leyds *First Annexation*, p. 158 (notes).

⁴ *Notulen*, O.F.S. Volksraad, 1873, p. 9; *Cape Argus*, Nov. 29, 1873.

1866.

1873.

1873.

1864-
1865.

the colony could, on a certificate signed by three European electors and countersigned by a magistrate, apply to the Lieutenant-Governor, who might at his discretion grant him the franchise.¹ Natives have since been known to run the gauntlet to the vote but before 1876 none of them had even taken out letters of exemption. The majority lived in the reserves held as a native trust by the Lieutenant-Governor and his executive council. There they were ruled by their own chiefs, went to the public works in native fashion at the call of the Great Chief at Pietermaritzburg or followed Shepstone and his sons to quell unruly neighbours. Many of them, however, left the reserves to join their friends on the farms or the Crown Lands, thereby escaping the *corvée*, and hundreds of refugees poured annually into Natal from outside to swell a subject Bantu population which had latterly been increased by the annexation of the Amaxolo in the Alfred district.² 1866.

Such a system could not have endured without a man like Shepstone at its head, a man who understood the 'men of the Black House' and was implicitly trusted by them.³ Even so the Shepstone system had not kept pace with the times; its meagre allowance of £5000 annually forced it to leave all civilising work to the missionaries at their forty stations; it was sufficient if it could merely control the new generation of tribesmen which knew not Blood River nor Magongo. Many of the elected members of the legislature were jealous of the Shepstone monopoly of native policy, and the levy of a £5 marriage tax taught the natives that their rulers were squeezing them for money or labour. 1873.

In the absence of police the laws against the sale of liquor, squatting without leave and the possession of unlicensed guns were only enforced by fits and starts. In the year of the hated marriage tax Langalibalele, a Hlubi chief in north-western Natal on the Basuto-Nomansland border, was ordered to send in some of his men to have their guns registered.⁴ After some hesitation he sent in five men out of eight named and Shepstone, busy with the coronation of Cetewayo, did not press the matter at the moment. But rumour produced a flutter in Natal which communicated itself to the Hlubis; the chief searched native Government messengers and, when an armed party was sent to arrest him, fled into Basutoland, the central South African powder-

¹ Acts 11 of 1864 and 28 of 1865 (Eybers, p. 194); Brookes, *History of Native Policy*, p. 58.

² *Selected Documents (Natal Leg. Council)*, No. 25 of 1866.

³ Martineau, *Frere*, II. 238.

⁴ Colenso and Durnford, *History of the Zulu War*, pp. 17 ff. On Natal Native affairs, *vide* C. 1025 of 1874; C. 1119, 1121, 1141, 1158, 1187, 1342 of 1875; G. 27-74 (Cape).

magazine. A party was sent in pursuit. It was fired upon and it fled; troops, volunteers and native levies hurried to the scene from Natal, Nomansland, Basutoland and Capetown; Griqualand West offered help, and men in both republics took down their rifles at the prospect of trouble with the Basuto. Molapo, however, handed Langalibalele over quietly; the Hlubi lands were confiscated, and the Natal volunteers carried off cattle and 'apprentices' from a small tribe which had sheltered Hlubi women. This exhibition of Zoutpansberg methods in a British colony was followed by the legal but most unsatisfactory trial of Langalibalele by the officials and chiefs who had fought against him. He was banished to Robben Island since there was no room for him in Natal; but the chorus of protest led by Bishop Colenso awakened echoes in Downing Street and moved Carnarvon to order the transfer of the unhappy chief to the mainland.¹

Dec.
1873.

1874.

July
1873.

By producing a South African confederation for the duration of the war which never took place, Langalibalele had advertised the fact that, as in Grey's time, confederation was to be approached primarily along the line of seeking a native policy on a South African scale. Carnarvon declared his intention of inaugurating a civilising policy for the Bantu, but he showed clearly that the secondary motive which drove him forward was the need for settling the troubled affairs of Griqualand West. Southey had duly become Lieutenant-Governor of that province. He had set up an Executive Council of three, and a Legislative Council of three officials and four elected members to represent the 7000 Europeans in the territory. But he had been in difficulties from the first. Two of his leading officials went on leave; the public accounts were already in confusion; the police were expensive but indispensable; there could be no security of tenure and no legal protection for the holders of town 'stands' and claims until the land titles were established; the Port Elizabeth syndicate which owned Vooruitzigt told him that where they had hitherto put up with shillings for diggers' licences, they now meant to have pounds. Southey determined that they should not. He not only refused to collect any more licence monies for the proprietors, but demanded a refund of those that had been collected, and thereby gave rise to a long controversy which was only ended two years later by the state purchase of the Vooruitzigt royalties for £100,000.² He was, however, able to deal with humbler gamblers at once. He cleared out Malays, Hindus and

¹ C. 1121 of 1875, pp. 60, 92; C. 1158 of 1875 *passim*.

² C. 1401 of 1876, pp. 1 ff.; C. 1342 of 1875, pp. 41, 70, 177, 180; Wilmot, *Southey*, pp. 236 ff.

Chinese from their hells and expedited the departure of two American citizens with their faro tables and £60,000 of other folk's money.

In all this Southey had the support of the main body of the diggers, four of whom he summoned to advise him on matters directly affecting the diggings; but he soon fell foul of the land speculators and the Diggers' Committees which still sat at the four main camps. He suspended the jumping rule whereby anyone could annex a claim which had remained unworked for a week, set up a mining board with small powers and less money to cope with the land slides and permitted companies to mine as well as individuals. Public opinion was beginning to face the fact that the deepening of the mines was making the old rule of one man one claim impossible, but there were many who resented the passing of the Diggings as the small man's paradise. The centre of opposition was the Committee at New Rush which was dominated by two men who dreamt of a diggers' republic and, when one of them was defeated at the polls, objected even to elected members on the new Legislative Council.¹ Times were bad; the death rate was high; broken men were hanging about and soon a clamour arose against red tape, unsympathetic officials, the lack of a colour bar, illicit diamond buying and the rest, a clamour which even the appointment of one of the two leaders to the mining board failed to quell.² July 1873.

Into this rising tumult stepped Alfred Aylward, a man of many aliases, fresh from eighteen months' imprisonment for shooting a fellow digger in cold blood.³ He organised a Mutual Protection Society with which the land sharks began to cooperate. The sharks were becoming nervous. A land commission to unravel the confusion in the overlapping land titles of Griqualand West had led to nothing more definite than talk on the part of one of its members of 'the big land swindle'; but now Southey classified the claims and proposed to appoint a special commission with judicial powers to settle such cases as might be laid before it. Some of his legislative councillors played for time, notably Arnot, member for Hay and thus officially 'the Honourable'; but the High Commissioner, whose 1874. 1872.

¹ C. 1342 of 1875, pp. 108, 121.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 3 ff.; Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 290; Wilmot, *Southey*, p. 412.

³ C. 1342 of 1875, p. 120; Martineau, *Freve*, II. 410 ff. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who knew Aylward, said he was a most 'amusing ruffian, full of Irish stories, which he tells inimitably.' Aylward *alias* Rivers *alias* O'Brien *alias* Nelson was a Fegian centre who had turned Queen's evidence in the Manchester murder trials. He played a stormy part at Kimberley and later in the Transvaal and Natal, wrote the best book of his time on the Transvaal (*The Transvaal of To-day*, 1878), and curiously enough died in his bed (Maurice and Arthur, *Life of Wolseley*, p. 130). Probably his real name was Murphy (Carter, *Narrative*, p. 101).

eyes were open at last, insisted on the appointment of a judge instructed to inquire into all claims whatsoever, from Arnot's 800 square miles downwards.¹

1874.

This dispute between the authorities was raging when the historian, James Anthony Froude, travelled through South Africa. He was, as he said, 'a private man of letters' travelling for his own amusement, but none the less Carnarvon had asked him to call in at the Cape on his way to Australia, and he reported regularly and shrewdly to his friend the Secretary of State on the prospects of confederation. Some of his speeches in the Western Province and the Free State were not calculated to calm ruffled feelings; but it was he who convinced Carnarvon that the Free State had been wronged in the matter of the Diamond Fields and that moderate men in all parts saw the reactions of native policy upon the mutual relations of the states.² It might be too late to withdraw from Griqualand West now, but confederation pointed to the way out of that slough and out of other sloughs as well. Carnarvon, therefore, recalled Lieutenant-Governor Pine from Natal, ordered a full inquiry into the Langalibalele case, bade Barkly press his claims in the Keate Award Area no further and encouraged him to proceed with the Griqualand West land court.³ He then sent Sir Garnet Wolseley with wide powers to reform the constitution and the native administration of Natal,⁴ and sat down to write his famous despatch to the High Commissioner proposing a round table conference in South Africa to consider a comprehensive native policy, control of the gun trade and, perhaps, confederation.⁵

May
1875.

The most serious obstacle in the way of the confederation policy was likely to be the divergent native policies of the states and colonies; but Brand was known to be liberal in these matters, Burgers was an advocate of equal rights and both Griqualand and Natal were susceptible to official pressure. The differences in the civil and criminal laws of the states were marked but not radical and, though the status of the governments concerned differed more markedly, Carnarvon hoped that the two republics would be willing to step down to the level of the self-governing Cape, and he knew that Griqualand and Natal would be only too pleased to step up to it. It was a reasonable hope. The old Colony was by far the largest, most thickly populated,

¹ C. 1342 of 1875, p. 42; C. 1401 of 1876, pp. 35 ff.

² Buckle, *Disraeli*, VI. 419; Harding, *Carnarvon*, II. 176; C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 63 ff.; Martineau, *Frederic*, II. 173; Greswell, *Our South African Empire*, I. chap. 9.

³ C. 1121 of 1875, p. 941.

⁴ C. 1187 of 1875, pp. 5, 6; C. 1192 of 1875, p. 92.

⁵ C. 1244 of 1875, pp. 1 ff.; C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 1 ff.

wealthiest and most stable civilised community in South Africa ; it was the seat of the High Commissioner, in closer touch than any of the other states with England and the outer world, and possessed of three ports unhampered by the sand bar of Durban or the fever-sodden hinterland of Delagoa Bay.

On the other hand there were obstacles which were less apparent to Carnarvon than to others. He himself was able and possessed of a high sense of duty ; he owed his appointment as Colonial Secretary to his unremitting study of colonial matters ; but he was so ' crotchety, nervous of being found fault with, and obstinate to a degree when he has once got an idea into his head ' that his colleagues called him ' Twitters.'¹ His emissary, Froude, was sent three weeks too late ; Barkly's annexations had alienated the republicans, and the Free State at least was much better able to stand on its own feet than it had been a few years previously. Moreover there was no general understanding in South Africa of the meaning of the word ' confederation.'² To some it meant a federation like that of Canada ; to others an independent federation like that of the United States ; to others again, especially in the republics, a close alliance in which each state would keep its own laws, flag and independence. Finally all hope of speedy success depended on the support of the suspicious Molteno ministry at Capetown.

Wolseley fired the first shot. He arrived among the Natalians and ' drowned their liberties in sherry and champagne.'³ The local politicians and still more their wives and daughters were flattered by the entertainments and attentions of this brilliant soldier and his staff ; they hoped for a larger garrison and an Imperial guarantee for railway and immigration loans ; they liked the idea of a new native policy over which elected councillors would have more control than formerly and the Shepstones less. Besides, Natal was not in a mood to be critical. Her Government and planters—it was much the same thing—had overcome the scruples of the Indian authorities and, in spite of French and West Indian competition, had once more begun to import coolies.⁴ 1874. Hence, helped by the fact that two of the most determined advocates of responsible government were absent and that another, possibly as a result of the sherry and champagne, voted for the bill by mistake, Wolseley carried ' Jamaica ' reforms, strengthening the official element in the legislature for five years to come.⁵

¹ Wilmot, *Southey*, p. 270.

² C. 508 of 1872, p. 12.

³ Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, p. 127.

⁴ No. 20 of 1874 ; *Leg. Council (Natal)*, 1 of 1872, pp. 8, 50 ff. *Natal Government Gazette*, 1873, pp. 82, 137, 334.

⁵ Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, pp. 79 ff., 85 ; H.C. 255 of 1875 ; Eybers, p. 199.

He then turned to native affairs. Natal had raised mounted police after the Langalibalele troubles. But that was not enough. Wolseley abolished the marriage tax, increased the hut tax and remedied as far as might be the results of recent high-handed acts of the administration. He also set up a Native High Court, whose judge was to have original jurisdiction and hear appeals from the magistrates' courts, and from whose findings in serious cases an appeal was to lie to the Supreme Court. The Secretary for Native Affairs thus lost those judicial powers which he had hitherto wielded as Great Induna of the Great Chief, a sore blow to Shepstone and a perplexity to the tribesmen. Wolseley also appointed a Commission which presently produced a handbook of native custom, virtually the beginnings of a code, and then made way for the new Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer.¹

Sept.
1875.
June
1875.

Meanwhile Carnarvon's despatch had reached Capetown.² It was welcomed by Westerners and Midlanders who saw in confederation the best prospect of railway extensions, by Easterners who hoped for Separation, by those few who were annexationists at all times and places, and by those, still fewer, who agreed with the Chief Justice and Hofmeyr that confederation alone would dispose of all outstanding disputes and ward off the boundary, customs and railway wars which they saw looming ahead. On the other hand, Molteno was up in arms at once against the despatch. Confederation would mean the upsetting of the balance of parties against him, the revival of the controversies East against West, expenses for defence and the loss of customs revenue to the inland states at a time when the credit of the Colony was deeply pledged for railway loans; it would involve his government in the Diamond Fields imbroglio and in Natal's native troubles, and must *ex hypothesi* raise the whole issue of native policy.

There was another consideration which weighed heavily with Molteno. Responsible government had been hardly won; many in the Colony were still opposed to it; the appointment of his Attorney-General, de Villiers, as Chief Justice had led to an attack on the new system and, in the current session, he had been assailed by Hofmeyr and some of his own supporters in the House for hearkening to the Secretary of State too much in the matter of Langalibalele and the possible extension of Cape authority over the Transkei and Namaqua-Damaraland.³ Now, with Wolseley in Natal carrying out the very changes which

¹ Eybers, p. 247; Brookes, *Native Policy*, p. 65.

² On the Confederation campaign in 1875, *vide* Molteno, *Life of Molteno*, I. 327 ff.; II. *passim*; Hofmeyr, *Life of J. H. Hofmeyr*, pp. 120 ff.; Walker, *De Villiers*, chapter vii.; C. 1399 of 1876 *passim*, especially Froude's report, pp. 58 ff.

³ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 65 ff.; C. 1399 of 1876, p. 64.

Wodehouse had not so long ago proposed for the Colony, came this Downing Street scheme which even suggested the names of delegates: Froude, 'inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity,'¹ for Great Britain, Molteno himself for the Western Province, and John Paterson, the high priest of Separation, for the Eastern.

The Council, by a small majority, recorded its appreciation of Carnarvon's deep interest; but on Molteno's motion the Assembly resolved that the time was not ripe for a conference, and Sprigg, the leader of the opposition, agreed that the first move must be made from within South Africa. Parliament dispersed, and on that very day Froude arrived to take part in the rejected conference. He was button-holed by the Separationists at the docks; he found nearly all the newspapers attacking the Ministry; he concluded at the end of an interview that the Premier was finding excuses for a hasty action rather than defending a policy and, in spite of Barkly's warning, he redoubled the clamour by speaking at a banquet organised by the Separationists and followers of Hofmeyr.² He then went on to Natal, whence Wolseley had already sent envoys to take soundings at Pretoria and Bloemfontein.³ There he heard that Griqualand West had approved of the conference; he knew that Brand was well disposed provided the Diamond Fields question were fairly settled, that Piet Joubert, acting President of the South African Republic, was willing to recommend it to his executive with 'all due caution for the particular interests' of his state⁴ and, finally, that Carnarvon was thinking of a conference in Natal in which the Cape Colony might or might not take part as it chose.⁵ On receipt of a cypher message from the departing Wolseley that confederation was impossible so long as Molteno was in office, Froude decided that Molteno must go. He returned to Capetown by way of the Eastern Province, throwing himself as 'Royal Commissioner to the people' upon the people for support and receiving everywhere petitions in favour of the Imperial policy.⁶

Froude's propaganda was by no means the failure that it is the fashion to deem it. He set the tide flowing strongly against Molteno, but circumstances which he could not control arose to thwart him. Burgers had gone to Europe empowered to raise money for his Delagoa Bay railway on the security of public land and a £1 tax on each farm and non-landholding burgher. During

¹ Buckle, *Disraeli*, VI. 411.

² C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 5, 9, 64-71.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 70; Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, p. 86.

⁴ C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 17 ff., 30; Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁵ C. 1399, pp. 5 ff., 33, 35.

⁶ Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, p. 88; C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 76 ff.

May-
Aug.
1875.

July
1875.

his absence the Transvaal executive proclaimed a new boundary in the Keate Award Area and appointed a commission to register land claims, proclaimed the Blood River territory republican soil, gave it all out in farms and tried to tax the 15,000 Zulus living on it and, finally, crowned Umbandine, over whom Cetewayo claimed suzerainty, king of the Swazis and induced him to sign a treaty which, whether he understood it or not, made him a Transvaal subject.¹ Then the MacMahon Award gave Portugal all and more than all that she had asked for at Delagoa Bay, and though Great Britain secured a promise that the Bay should not be sold to a third party, the Transvaal was at last sure of a non-British port as soon as the fever belt could be traversed safely.² Burgers in Europe redoubled his talk of the Transvaal's 'golden joys,' begged for an alliance with Belgium, Portugal and Germany and for leave to send a consul to Berlin, concluded a commercial treaty with Portugal and raised a loan at usurious rates in Holland for the railway which had not yet been surveyed. All this at the moment that Natal had arranged to build a railway to the republics.

If the Transvaal promised to stand less in need of connection with its southern neighbours than formerly, Griqualand was drifting into a condition which might well make all shrink from having anything to do with it.³ Southey suspected that wealthy men were behind the growing agitation, possibly the proprietors of Vooruitzigt anxious to force the Government to buy them out; but in any case, Aylward's Defence Association found means to arm seven companies, including one of Germans.⁴ Some of the officials asked for troops, but Barkly was inclined to sympathise with the opposition and feared to send up a force which might frighten the republics.⁵ At length armed men tried to rescue a prisoner outside the court house; Aylward superintended the hoisting of the black flag and retired to the Transvaal, there to publish his own death notice, and Kimberley broke into full rebellion in the middle of a territory whose native peoples were restive, the Griquas because their lands were passing from them and the Koranas and Batlapin because most of their lands were treated as Crown lands and they themselves as ex-subjects of Waterboer. There was nothing for it, and the troops occupied

¹ Carter, *Narrative*, p. 562; Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, p. 507; Soutter MSS., July 1, 1875 (Pretoria Archives); C. 1748 of 1877, pp. 5, 7, 23.

² C. 1361 of 1875, pp. 247 ff.; *Rec. S.E.A.*, IX, 263-4.

³ C. 1342 of 1875, pp. 83, 220; C. 1401 of 1876, p. 3.

⁴ C. 1342 of 1875, pp. 43, 70, 73, 103. There is good reason to believe that some of these men proposed to offer the country to the Free State and, if it refused the offer, to set up a little republic (Cunynghame, *My Command*, pp. 174, 193).

⁵ C. 1342 of 1875, pp. 63, 105, 148 ff., 164 ff., 172.

the town. The commanding officer, however, showed his sympathy so strongly with the insurgents that Aylward was encouraged to come to life again and be acquitted with other ringleaders. The High Commissioner personally relieved Southey of his duties.¹ June-Aug. 1875.

Nevertheless, Carnarvon was still so hopeful that he inserted a mention of his scheme in the Queen's Speech. Burgers had assured him that the Transvaal would take part in the conference, Natal had approved² and the Cape Parliament was meeting for a special session. The Legislative Council voted in favour of a conference and, after a long debate, the Assembly rejected Molteno's motion condemning the 'agitation created . . . in the name of the Imperial Government.'³ In other words, Froude was on the point of defeating the Prime Minister when another despatch arrived from Carnarvon announcing that as the public discussion had done all that a conference in South Africa could do, the next stage would be a conference in London. The ministerialists jumped at the opening, offered their help in the solution of the Griqualand problem and shelved the whole of the bigger scheme. The Governor flirted for a moment with the idea of an appeal to the country, but in the end decided that the petitions in favour of confederation were not strong enough to warrant a dissolution.⁴ Froude for his part sailed home. Nov. 1875.

The next move came from the Free State. The *ad hoc* judge, Stockenström, gave his famous judgment in the Griqualand West Land Court. It was a judgment that left a host of questions unsettled and even raised new ones on the far side of the Vaal, but one point was made as abundantly clear as Stockenström meant that it should be: namely, that Waterboer had never had any sovereignty outside Griquatown and Albania.⁵ The British claim to the Diamond Fields was thus destroyed and Brand hastened to London. There he accepted £90,000 and the promise of £15,000 more if the Free State should begin to build a railway within five years.⁶ March 1876.

Thus was the long dispute officially laid to rest and means provided for the cancellation of the last of the Free State paper money just as the members of the London Conference began to assemble. Carnarvon, the chairman, Wolseley, vice-chairman,

¹ C. 1342 of 1875, pp. 159, 219 ff.; C. 1401 of 1876, p. 75; Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

² C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 19, 25, 55; *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 413.

³ C. 1399 of 1876, pp. 41-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 ff., 48, 52-3.

⁵ C. 1401 of 1876, pp. 67 ff.; *Cape Argus*, March 28, 1876; *Diamond News*, March 18, 1876; C.O. June 1880, pp. 13 ff.

⁶ C. 1631 of 1876, pp. 29, 70 *et passim*; Eybers, p. 342.

Aug. 1876. and Froude as representative of Griqualand West were joined by Shepstone and two elected members from Natal. But Natal was the only South African state adequately represented. Brand attended but, under instructions from his Volksraad, withdrew as soon as confederation was mentioned, and Molteno, who had come to London too late to assist in the Diamond Fields settlement, refused even to appear as a witness.¹ However, as Carnarvon remarked, the proceedings were marked by 'a singular unanimity' and gave him the information which enabled him to take the next step.

1876. The next step was to approach confederation, now an *idée fixe* with him, through the Transvaal instead of through the Cape. Carnarvon may have owed something of this idea to Wolseley² or to Shepstone intent on forming his great native state centring round Natal, but probably it was mainly his own. As early as 1874 he had bidden Barkly use his influence to secure the election of a well-disposed President in the expected event of Burgers' death,³ and now, with the cry for colonies rising in Germany and the Brussels Conference pointing to the coming scramble for Africa, he had become impatient. The diamonds of Griqualand were his and Natal had the necessary port; link both with the Transvaal, potentially rich in minerals, and a north-eastern confederation would be formed with which the Free State and the recalcitrant Colony must come to terms.

1873. Carnarvon was the prophet of the event thirty years hence and, even at the moment, the state of the Transvaal seemed to favour his designs. From the first the impulsive Burgers had been regarded by the Dopper party as the elect of the townsmen and the friend of publicans and sinners in whose debt he sometimes was. Anti-British or rather anti-foreign feeling was dying down in the republic, but Burgers overstepped the mark when he imported Liberal Hollanders like Dr. Jorissen, whose education policy was as shocking to many of the burghers as that of de Mist and Janssens had been to their grandfathers.⁴ Some 300 families had already trekked beyond the Kalahari to escape the rule of a heretical ex-predikant; before his departure to Europe, the Doppers had ousted his attorney-general from the executive council and substituted their own leader, Kruger, as additional Volksraad nominee; during his absence, they had overturned many of his reforms and marked Kruger as his successor.

1876. On his return, Burgers found that he had little hope of

¹ C. 1631 of 1876, pp. 45, 47, 67, 75; C. 1399 of 1876, p. 89.

² Colenso and Durnford, *Zulu War*, p. 64.

³ Wilmot, *Southey*, p. 408.

⁴ Martineau, *Froude*, II. 165; Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 155; Malherbe, *History of Education in S.A.*, pp. 235 ff.

re-election in 1877. Taxes were coming in so badly that the railway material had to be left upon the quay and the railway tax increased in the hope of meeting the first half-year's interest on the Dutch loan. From Durban, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and London itself the old cries of slavery and annexation were going up, for the Natal railway was advancing northwards and the land of the Transvaal, pledged for public and private debts, was almost unsalable. The cries were echoed within the republic by the shopkeepers, many of them representatives of Natal and Cape firms, and by the diggers on the Lydenburg goldfields, where times were bad and fly and redwater fever played havoc with the transport cattle.¹

Then came the war with Secocoeni. In spite of his guns, the Bapedi chief was not dangerous outside his reserve, but the fever and horse-sickness of his mountainous country made him difficult to subdue. He refused to pay his taxes or to give up land which the republic claimed as part of the Swazi cession of 1846 or to allow prospectors to enter his valleys. The neighbouring farmers went into laager and called on Pretoria for help while the miners practically formed a little republic and called upon Capetown and Pietermaritzburg. Burgers, on a false report that the local mission station had been burnt, took action and, to the burghers' dismay, led in person. He scored an initial success, but the Swazis went home complaining that the Boers had not supported them, and the commandos, mistrusting their leader, did likewise. Burgers left volunteers paid in the time-honoured fashion with looted cattle and the promise of farms to hold Secocoeni in check, and returned to face an angry legislature and a revenue falling short of the meagre state expenditure. A special war tax was voted which there was not the remotest hope of collecting; the Cape Commercial Bank, already in low water, began to press for the repayment of loans furnished for the purchase of the paper-money and war expenses; the Postmaster-General took his salary in stamps and the Surveyor-General in land, the other civil servants went without, and the neighbouring colonies had to finance the Transvaal mail contractor. Meanwhile, many in the colonies and in England believed that Cetewayo had stirred Secocoeni up and had set on his 'dog,' Umbelini the Swazi, to raid the little clans in the eastern Transvaal and that he even meant to attack the Transvaal himself.² Finally, burghers were said to be passing resolutions in favour of annexation.³

¹ Aylward, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 126; Haggard, *Cetewayo*, pp. 88, 109; Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 188 ff., 478 ff., 562 ff.

² Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 426; Leyds, *First Annexation*, chapter xiii.; Burgers said Joubert, Kruger and others refused to lead and that the Executive Council insisted that he should do so (Carter, *Narrative*, p. 563), *cp.* Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

³ *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 479.

Such were the tidings which, mingled with much unfair criticism of the Transvaal, poured in upon Carnarvon. He decided that he must annex the republic to avert a general native war and to further his confederation scheme. At the end of the London Conference, in reply to a business deputation of Easterners led by Paterson, he said he contemplated a permissive federation Act and that, as a strong hand was needed, he proposed to press his confederation policy by all the means in his power.¹ Disraeli did not like the idea, for the Eastern Question was becoming critical and 'Paul Kruger is an ugly customer,' but as usual he left it all to 'Tewiters.'² Carnarvon therefore commissioned the newly knighted Shepstone to annex the Transvaal provisionally if he possibly could, provided he was satisfied that a sufficient number of the inhabitants or the Volksraad desired it.³ A week later he asked Frere to go out as High Commissioner, federate South Africa and, thereafter, remain as first Governor-General. Frere, ignorant of the Shepstone adventure, assented.⁴

Oct.
1876.

It is clear that Carnarvon meant to annex the Transvaal at once, for he told Shepstone that, unless he had to act immediately on arrival, he must do nothing without leave of Barkly. Unluckily for him, the departure of the supporting troops from England was delayed, Shepstone's mail-boat was wrecked on Dassen Island near Capetown and Shepstone, on arriving in Natal, dallied for some weeks feeling the pulse of Cetewayo.⁵ Meanwhile Molteno, who had recommended to Carnarvon a slow unification of South Africa by means of treaties incorporating with the Colony first Griqualand West and then the other outlying states, returned home; the Free State ratified the Diamond Fields settlement; Brand and de Villiers began to draft a scheme of federation to be laid before Frere, and Carnarvon sent out the draft Permissive Bill for the criticism of the various governments.⁶ Frere himself landed at Capetown and, a fortnight later, was amazed to learn that Shepstone had annexed the Transvaal.

April
1877.

Jan.
1877.

Shepstone had ridden into Pretoria with a few followers to be welcomed by the President as a friendly adviser with one of the state balls which so scandalised his sterner burghers. He began wisely with a sherry and champagne policy but, after an interview with the executive council at which Kruger warned him not to

¹ Buckle, *Disraeli*, VI. 414; C. 1631 of 1876, p. 59; C. 1732 of 1877, p. 1.

² Buckle, VI. 371, 405, 411.

³ C. 1776 of 1877, pp. 1-2; *Letters of Queen Victoria*, II. 479.

⁴ Martineau, *Frere*, II. 161.

⁵ Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 194; Leyds, *First Annexation*, chapter xiv., C. 1776 of 1877, p. 81.

⁶ C. 1681 of 1877, p. 11; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 129. *Cape Government Gazette*, Jan. 12, 1877; *Cape Argus (Supplement)*, Jan. 13, 1877.

tamper with their independence, he relapsed into a devastating silence. The Volksraad met, postponed the presidential election till May and ratified the peace which had just been concluded with Secocoeni.¹ Shepstone promised Burgers that he would take no action if he could carry various reforms in the constitution and the machinery of government. This Burgers tried desperately to do; but Secocoeni refused to sign the definite peace treaty; the bank declined to discount Government bills and the Volksraad would have nothing to do with the Permissive Act. It also rejected the President's proposed reforms and, with over 300 armed Boers in the street outside, cautioned him to defend its cherished independence.² Shepstone then declared that there was nothing for it but annexation. The Volksraad, in alarm, adopted some of the rejected reforms, created the post of Vice-President and elected Kruger to fill it, appointed J. G. Kotze, a Grahamstown advocate, as judge of the new professional High Court, transformed the Secocoeni volunteers into police under the ubiquitous Aylward, passed a treason law covering expressions of disapproval of the Government, set a good example by paying taxes, and dispersed. Meanwhile, Imperial troops, Cetewayo's warriors and a representative of the Standard Bank lined up on the frontier.³ There can be little doubt that the Zulus massed on a hint from Shepstone; but they soon withdrew after alarming the Utrecht farmers, and Shepstone took the final steps.⁴ He discussed with Burgers the annexation proclamation and the President's formal protest and then, disregarding the executive council's offer, for what it was worth, of a treaty with the other states of South Africa for mutual protection, ran up the Queen's flag.⁵

March
1877.

April 12,
1877.

Frere comforted himself with the thought that this disconcerting annexation would strengthen the hands of the confederationists.⁶ He was wrong. Annexation cut the ground from under his own feet. He had come with a fine Indian record behind him, popular and trusted wherever he went, to carry through confederation, which he believed was near at hand, and the

¹ Martineau, *Frere*, II. 179; Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 42; C. 1776 of 1877, p. 88; Leyds, *First Annexation*, p. 179.

² C. 1776 of 1877, pp. 110, 117 ff.; Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 562 ff.; Leyds, *op. cit.*, pp. 180 ff.; Haggard, *Cetewayo*, pp. 110 ff.

³ Amphlett, *History of the Standard Bank*, p. 45.

⁴ Colenso and Durnford, *Zulu War*, p. 98; Leyds, *op. cit.*, pp. 198 ff.; C. 1766 of 1877, pp. 135, 150; C. 1833 of 1877, p. 100.

⁵ C. 1776 of 1877, p. 152; Carter, *Narrative*, chapter ii.; Eybers, pp. 446 ff.; Burgers, who had spent his own money in the service of the Republic, retired to the Cape Colony, where he lived in poverty till July 1878, when he was given a small pension with arrears from April 1877 (Carter, pp. 39, 569, 573).

⁶ Martineau, *Frere*, II. 186, 193.

comprehensive native policy which would be possible at the close of the expected native war which was to drive all South Africans to stand together even as they had done against Langalibalele. The general war might still break out but there was now no hope of winning over a Transvaal grateful for its rescue by the Imperial arms. It did more than that. The Free State, fearing for its independence, declined to have anything more to do with confederation and, in the Western Cape Colony, a storm of protest arose against Shepstone's act. That the 'neologians' who supported the Rev. S. J. du Toit of the Paarl in his new Afrikaans-speaking campaign should protest was only to be expected. What was much more significant was that Hofmeyr and his followers, who had hitherto supported the policy of confederation in which the Imperial Government should be the 'leader of a South African patriotism,' condemned annexation as the deathblow of their hopes.¹ For Shepstone had extinguished one of the republics; and Froude, who himself had done much to stir the Afrikaners to political consciousness, had shrewdly noted the republics as 'the special glory' of the Afrikaners; poor things possibly at the moment, but their own.²

The official attitude of the Cape was hardly more promising. Molteno, who was as suspicious of Frere as Frere of him, bluntly said that he wished to have no further concern with the Imperial policy. On the other hand, he fulfilled his promise to Carnarvon by carrying a bill for annexing Griqualand West. The European population of that derelict colony had been reduced to less than 7000 by the call of the Lydenburg gold and the pressure of the joint-stock companies which had recently been relieved of all limitation of the number of claims that they might own; its public debt was heavy and its people displayed no enthusiasm for absorption by the Cape.³ The bill received the royal assent in the following April, but it was not put into force till much later. Griqualand as a separate colony was too valuable a counter to be given away so long as there was any hope of using its vote on a confederation conference.

On the other hand, the Legislative Council of Natal, seeing the hinterland of its colony annexed in its interests, approved of the Permissive Act. That measure closely followed the British North America Act which had federated Canada.⁴ It was too elaborate for a mere enabling Act and too vague for a precise constitution, but it had an easy passage through the House of Lords. It was more roughly handled in the Commons by the

¹ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.

² C. 1399 of 1876, p. 72.

³ C. 1980 of 1878, p. 15; Martineau, II. 189.

⁴ C. 1980 of 1878, pp. 32, 35 ff.; 195 of 1877 (text of the Act).

old-fashioned Tories and Exeter Hall men, while Parnell's Irish practised their new obstruction tactics upon it with such success that it came out in a vaguer form than ever. Many of its provisions were excellent; it aimed at union rather than at a loose federation and thus, in spirit as well as in many of its details, anticipated the South Africa Act of 1909; nevertheless, it was still too much an Act of confederation 'as the Queen may direct.' As such it was not calculated to make Frere's task easier.

Frere, meanwhile, was feeling his way towards his civilising native policy. His prescription was a frank acceptance of responsibility, a good frontier police, firm and just rule of the tribes in reserves, a labour tax to encourage habits of industry, and no canteens. To evade responsibility was to substitute the 'gun-runner and the canteen-keeper for the English magistrate,' and, as it was, the tribes near the frontier were already 'practically managed by white men, good or bad, who are not Government officials.'¹

There were signs that the Cape meant to take up its responsibilities beyond the Kei and in Namaqua-Damaraland. Barkly had at first merely upheld the Pondo Line and attempted to buy Port St. John's from the Pondos; but in Nomansland (Griqualand East), Adam Kok, troubled by Orpen's system of dual control, had asked to be either ruled or left alone. The latter alternative had been chosen, and his three districts of Kokstad, Umzimkulu, and Matatiele had been placed under Orpen²; the claims of Nehemiah Moshesh to the Matatiele lands had been definitely rejected, and magistrates sent to Maclear, Qumbu, and Tsolo, the remaining districts of Griqualand East. Adam had 1875. then died, and Captain Blyth, most able of native administrators, had taken over his three districts from Orpen just in time to prevent a rising by Nehemiah. That chieftain had been relegated to Kingwilliamstown, and the Bacas of Mount Frere added to 1876. the districts under Blyth's jurisdiction. Similar steps had been taken in Tembuland, where Gangaliswe had once more asked for protection. Magistrates had been appointed for the districts of Emjanyana, Engcobo, Umtata, and Mquanduli, but, in deference to public opinion, Gangaliswe had still been recognised as 1875. chief.³

Tembuland and Griqualand East, two of the four big divisions of the future Cape Native Territories, were thus taking shape; there were already magistrates in Fingoland proper; but there were none in East and West Pondoland, Xesibeland, Emigrant Tembuland, or in Bomvana-Galekaland, where Kreli's 12,000

¹ Martineau, II. 260, 351, 356.

² Dower, *Early Annals of Kokstad*, pp. 50 ff.

³ G. 21-75; G. 16 and 39-76; G. 12-77 (Cape).

warriors, cramped for room, were bickering with the Tembus and the Fingo 'dogs.'¹ The power of such magistrates as there were was little more than diplomatic, and the only share the Cape Parliament had in the system was that of making up deficits in their salaries. West of the Kei, in the Colony itself, Sandile's Gaikas still regarded Krelî as chief paramount and had, to a great extent, worked themselves free from the control of their magistrates. The tribes on both sides of the frontier were, indeed, recovering fast from the effects of the cattle-killing of 1857, many of their young men owned guns, and the death of their hero, Macomo, a prisoner on Robben Island, wounded their pride. Gaikas were even buying land from Europeans to the west of the Keiskamma and in the Waterkloof, to the anger of farmers who were debarred from buying tribal lands and still less the small farms round Kingwilliamstown granted by Grey to Bantu on European tenure.² Soon there were complaints of cattle-stealing, and a commission under Sprigg reported in favour of sweeping measures for defence ; but beyond sending a magistrate to Bomvanaland and passing Acts for the annexation of Fingoland and Griqualand East, the Molteno ministry did nothing for fear of expense.³ After all, there had been no war these many years ; there would be no war ; and then the war came, fatally delaying Frere's attempts to further confederation.

1873.

Aug.
1877.

Frere, worried by the course of events in the Transvaal, set out thither by way of the Eastern Frontier. He heard that the police had crossed the Kei to protect the Fingos who had fallen foul of the Galekas. From Kingwilliamstown he sent Brownlee to summon Krelî to his presence. Krelî, mindful of the fate of his father, Hintsâ, declined to put himself in the power of any successor of Harry Smith while war threatened. He refused to come, and said that he could hold in his young men no longer ; both sides drifted into war and, as Frere had prophesied, the Imperial troops had to bear the brunt of it. The Fingos and many of the Tembus, with an eye to Galeka cattle, sided with the Colony and, after a bad beginning and heavy rains which delayed transport, reinforcements arrived, and the Galekas were pushed back behind the Bashee.⁴

The war was apparently over and the commandos and volunteers were dismissed, but unluckily all Frere's efforts to prevent his ministers from attacking the Gaikas for past cattle thefts and a present threatening attitude were nullified by the police, who followed runaway belligerents into the Gaika reserve.

¹ Vide *Cape Native Affairs Blue-books*, 1874 onwards.

² Theal, VI. 28.

³ G. 1-77 (Cape).

⁴ C. 1961 of 1878, pp. 66 ff., 152, 177 ; G. 17-78 (Cape).

The police were fired on and, at the same moment, the Galekas, who had deposited their cattle safely in Pondoland, poured back across the Bashee, to be joined by some of the Tembus and Sandile's Gaikas. This time the regulars, the police, and expensive volunteers did the fighting, for, as in the days of Maitland and Harry Smith, the Colonists disliked service under imperial officers and turned out badly.¹ Frere meanwhile had to fight his own ministers. He found that politicians on the war-path are less merciful than soldiers. He had tried in vain to check Merriman's bellicosity and protested against Attorney-General Stockenstrom's thesis that rebels taken in arms could be shot without mercy or trial. He now resisted Molteno's appointment of a commandant-general of the Colonial forces, an officer unknown to the law, to deal with the rebel Gaikas without reference to the imperial general who had hitherto commanded on both sides of the Kei. The ministerial plea that the Gaika campaign was a mere police matter was discounted by the arrival of two more regular battalions and the Diamond Fields Horse to assist a self-governing colony which had neglected its own defence. At last Molteno fell back on his well-worn parliamentary tactics and offered his resignation. Frere declined to accept it; but, a day or two later, strong in the belief that the ministry was unpopular and the knowledge that Kreli had been sent flying at the battle of Kentani, he took a step legal but unique in the annals of responsible government. He dismissed his Prime Minister and called on the Kaffrarian, Sprigg, to form a cabinet.²

Feb.
1878.

East of the Kei the war was practically over but trouble was arising with the tribes everywhere. Secocoeni took up arms in the Transvaal;³ Griquas and Pondos rebelled in Griqualand East; in Griqualand West the Griquas had discovered that Waterboer and Arnot had swindled them by ceding all their lands and not, as they had been led to believe, the diamond diggings only, and Stockenstrom's judgment in the Land Court drove them into the hands of lawyers and land speculators in the effort to prove their claims.⁴ Koranas and Batlapin were in like case and it only required the presence of a Xosa emissary and the attempt to levy a fine on a Batlapin chief to cause a serious rebellion which spread across the Orange to the northern border of the Cape Colony. The scuffling was soon ended in Griqualand East, but the Diamond Fields Horse had to come galloping home from the Eastern Frontier to save Griquatown and Kuruman; the fighting

Feb.
1878.

¹ Martineau, II. 201; C. 1961 of 1878, p. 230; C. 2000 of 1878, *passim*.

² Martineau, II. 202, 206, 210; Molteno, *Life of Sir J. C. Molteno*, II. 300 ff., 340; C. 2079 of 1878, p. 37 ff.

³ C. 2100 of 1878, pp. 4, 5.

⁴ C.O. June 1880, pp. 10, 19.

June
1878.

there was not over till November and, south of the Orange, the little war dragged on. Meanwhile in the Ciskei, Sandile was killed after having twice asked for terms, and an amnesty was granted to the remnant of the rebels.¹ The war with Secocoeni continued.

The Kaffir war had cost the Colony the lives of sixty Europeans, £1,750,000 and a severe fright. Sprigg urged on by Frere therefore attempted to make a general settlement. Having established his position in Parliament against Molteno, he passed an Act for disarming the tribes, reorganised the police as the Cape Mounted Rifles, raised mounted yeomanry, encouraged volunteer regiments as in the halcyon days of Grey, overhauled the burgher militia and met the heavy expense by a house duty, increased customs on tobacco and spirits and, to the fury of Hofmeyr and the Western wine farmers, an excise on spirits.² Within the Colony the Gaika reserve was sold for farms and in the other locations the chiefs were replaced by magistrates, but east of the Kei there was neither annexation nor occupation by Europeans. There was however a great extension of European control. Galekaland, divided into the districts of Kentani and Willowmore, was united with Bomvanaland (Elliotdale) and the Emigrant Tembu lands of Southeyville and Xalanga to form the magistracy of Tembuland under Blyth; the Xesibes of the Rode valley (Mount Ayliff) were added to Griqualand East which was consolidated under the chief magistracy of Brownlee, ex-Secretary for Native Affairs; and Nquiliso, chief of West Pondoland, was recognised as independent and given £1000 in return for leave to build roads through his territory and the cession of Port St. John's to the Queen.³

1878.

The independence of the Transkeian tribes was thus rapidly passing away. It was not Frere's wish that the independence of the tribes to the north of the Colony should continue. His aim was to extend British protection over all of them up to the Portuguese borders on both sides of Africa and thus to exclude the foreign intervention which he feared was coming. It would, he believed, have to be extended sooner or later in the interests of all concerned.⁴ On the West Coast, the Guano Islands had been formally added to the Colony and the whole of Namaqua-Damaraland was vaguely regarded as a future colonial reversion. After Hahn's pacification the Rhenish missionaries and the hunters and traders had returned even though the game was being killed off. Troubles had soon come again. The Hottentots, poor and

1873.

1870.

¹ C. 2144 of 1878, pp. 194 ff.; G. 17-78; G. 43-79 (Cape).

² Martineau, II. 220; Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

³ G. 43-79 (Cape); C. 2252 of 1879, p. 29.

⁴ Martineau, II. 260.

desperate, were reinforced by coloured vagabonds from the Colony; the Herero confederacy showed signs of breaking up, and at last the missionaries persuaded Kamaherero to ask the advice of the High Commissioner. Then came the Transvaal trek-boers fleeing from Burgers to the eastern border of Damara-land. Kamaherero in alarm asked for British protection. The Cape Parliament sanctioned the annexation of Walfisch Bay, one good harbour on that coast, and as much of the hinterland as might be necessary, and the Hereros at Okahandja received a magistrate; but the Kaffir war prevented any further extension of control and, in spite of Frere's urgency, H.M. Government would only permit him to annex Walfisch Bay.¹

Nor were Frere's efforts to extend a protectorate over the tribes to the west of the Transvaal successful. The request of Shepstone and the resident farmers that the Keate Award Area be restored to the Transvaal was not heeded; a mission to Lobengula, King of the Matabele, perished far to the north of Bulawayo, and Warren had to be content to march as far as the Molopo river receiving requests for British protection from most of the chiefs, disarming a few of the clans and giving the tribesmen in Griqualand West their long-delayed reserves.² For the rest, the British authorities continued to treat Mankoroane and Montsioa as paramount chiefs of the Batlapin and Barolong on the confused Bechuana border, the happy hunting-ground of Boers, deserters and adventurers.

In the middle of 1878 Frere once more took up the question of confederation. He was weakened by the resignation of Carnarvon but he was sure of the support of Sprigg and his Eastern ministry, and he set out hopefully for the Transvaal by way of Natal to relieve Shepstone of his duties as tactfully as might be and to investigate the affairs of Zululand. All that he had heard on the Eastern Frontier had taught him that Cetewayo was at the bottom of the troubles with the natives everywhere. It is hard to say how far the belief was justified, for white South Africa was 'seeing black' at the moment; but fear of Natal's native problem was making the Cape hang back in the matter of confederation, and 35,000 Zulus subject once more to Chaka's discipline and armed with guns were a potential danger to Natal and to the Transvaal borders.³ For some time past the Natal newspapers had been full of rumours of massacres in Zululand, and missionaries of all nationalities, finding their work of no avail in face of a

¹ Theal, V. 326 ff.; G. 50-77; G. 17-78; G. 33-79 (Cape).

² C. 2220 of 1879, pp. 34, 109 ff., 151, 235; C. 2252 of 1879, pp. 40 ff.; C. 2454 of 1879, pp. 27 ff.

³ Martineau, II. 223 ff.; Aylward, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

disapproving king and a conservative people, had been steadily abandoning Zululand, not without threats on the part of some of their followers of the wrath to come from the British side of the Tugela if the Zulus would not become Christians.¹

1877. The Zulus were in a resentful mood. The annexation of the Transvaal, by ringing Zululand round with British territory, had made the 'washing of spears' a difficult matter, for Somtseu would not allow Cetewayo even 'one little raid' upon the Swazis. But worse was to come. Hitherto Shepstone had supported Cetewayo in his claim on the Blood River land, but now that he had heard the Transvaal side of the story, he told the king that his claim was groundless.² Cetewayo was furious with 'that liar Somtseu.' He allowed his 'dog,' Umbeline, to raid the clans of the eastern Transvaal once more and sent men into the disputed territory to build a kraal for an induna who should rule the Zulus living there alongside the 75 Boer homesteads. He withdrew his men on demand, but not before the farmers had laagered and Shepstone had demanded troops.³

June 1878. The Zulus were, however, troubled as usual with civil strife and Cetewayo agreed to submit his claims to an arbitration court appointed by the Natal Government. Frere assented and at once asked the unwilling Imperial Government for reinforcements to finish the Kaffir war and to enforce what he was assured would be a decision adverse to the Zulus.⁴ Secocoeni then rose at Cetewayo's instigation and, in response to messages from Shepstone that the king was tampering with other tribes, Frere sent a naval squadron up the coast of Zululand. The commission duly reported. It threw aside much of the Transvaal evidence and gave Cetewayo more than he had asked for. Cetewayo, *Chaka redivivus* in the eyes of his people, therefore argued that if he had been given some, he must be entitled to all that had been Chaka's. He not only built a kraal in the Blood River Territory but built another north of the Pongola near the German settlers at Luneburg. Then, without his knowledge, two runaway wives of Sirayo, a minor Zulu chief, were seized on Natal soil and carried back to be executed in Zululand. Bulwer demanded that the murderers be handed over but Cetewayo, who had previously had such a one returned upon his hands, merely offered compensation and apologised. Bulwer

¹ Colenso and Durnford, *Zulu War*, chapter xi.

² C. 2079 of 1878, p. 53.

³ C. 2144 of 1879, p. 190.

⁴ Disraeli was unwilling to send more troops. There were 6000 already at the Cape and, as he told the Queen, 'there appears . . . too much eagerness on the part of the authorities to encourage war, as long as it can be carried on principally by your Majesty's British forces' (*Queen Victoria's Letters*, II, 646).

SOUTH-EASTERN AFRICA

1874-81

Scale of Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100

30° East Longitude



British Territory as in 1874
 Transvaal (Eastern frontier vague, 1874)
 Orange Free State

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was willing to negotiate, but Frere, taking the same line as with Kreli in 1877, insisted on having the murderers and a fine.¹

Sept.
1878.

Frere now arrived in Natal. He was in a better position to control the situation than before as the Natal and Transvaal correspondence was at last passing through his hands; but the Griqualand West and Northern Border scuffles were still going on and Secocoeni was unsubdued. He again asked for reinforcements and sent troops to reassure the Luneburg Germans, and when the Zulus on the lower Tugela interfered with military surveyors who had ignored their warnings, as at Block Drift on the eve of the War of the Axe, and ill tidings came in that the troops had retreated before Secocoeni, he concluded that nothing but the drought prevented a Zulu onslaught on Natal.²

Oct.
1878.

Frere determined to take the Zulu bull by the horns. To set aside the Blood River award was impossible; to enforce it *sans phrase* would mean a rebellion in the Transvaal which might spread far afield. He therefore accompanied the promulgation of the award with an ultimatum which virtually applied to the Zulus the principles of disarmament he was already applying to the coast tribes.³ He demanded compensation for the dispossessed farmers, reparations for the Sirayo and other incidents, the observance of the promises which he had been led to believe Cetewayo had made to Shepstone at his coronation, the break-up of the Zulu military machine and the reception of a Resident in Zululand. Conflicting reports of these proposals reached the king who, in spite of the rains, set about collecting the reparations cattle, while Frere pushed on with the military preparations which he believed would at least be necessary to support Cetewayo against his own warriors if he tried to comply with his demands. In spite of friction between the civil and military officials in Natal, in spite too of arrogant young officers who talked of marching through Zululand in skirmishing order, he felt confident.⁴ Hamu, Cetewayo's rival, had promised to remain neutral; the Transvaal leaders gave good advice and, though most of them and their followers declined to give active help, Piet Uys and other Boers of the Utrecht district were ready to assist against the common enemy.⁵ The misgivings of the British ministry had been quieted; reinforcements were due in January, and by that time he hoped to be in Pretoria to cover Shepstone's retreat to England 'on leave.'

Dec.
1878.

¹ On the negotiations preceding the Zulu War generally, *vide* Colenso and Durnford, *Zulu War*; Martineau, *Frere*, II.; Worsfold, *Sir Bartle Frere*.

² C. 2220 of 1879, p. 354; Martineau, II. 259.

³ Worsfold, *op. cit.*, pp. 108 ff., 118 ff.; C. 2222 of 1879, pp. 201 ff.

⁴ Martineau, II. 269, 282; Butler, *Autobiography*, pp. 96 ff.

⁵ Martineau, II. 264, 270; Leyds, *First Annexation*, p. 245.

Frere had been anxious for some time past to go to the Transvaal. All had been quiet for the first few months after the annexation. Bearing in mind that the idea of annexation had coloured everything Shepstone had seen in 1877, the fact remained that he may well have believed that he had had sufficient justification for what he had done.¹ Pretoria had been full of men expectant of a change, some desiring it and a few anxious for it if it were to be accompanied by an Act of Oblivion blotting out old offences in the colonies. Petitions in favour of annexation had come in from the townsfolk; Volksraad members had aired opinions in private which they would never have dared to utter publicly; the Boers had made no active resistance and all the executive councillors from Kruger and Jorissen downwards had kept their seats as they had stipulated, save only Joubert who resigned and began to work up an agitation secretly against the annexation. Most of the civil servants had taken the oath and once more drawn their salaries; six Volksraad members had signed a petition against the sending of Kruger and Jorissen to London to plead for independence, and Jorissen himself had gone very half-heartedly.² Shepstone had at once repealed the hated war tax and the pass fee levied on 'foreign' Kaffirs; the price of land rose sufficiently to permit of its sale by creditors at 6*d.* per acre; the Standard Bank became the Government bank and credit was restored. Many of the Boers of the south were not displeased at new conditions which gave them a market in the towns for their produce, and were even willing to put up with the Union Jack provided they and the blacks were ruled in the way to which they were accustomed.³ They waited to see how Shepstone would fulfil his promises that the Transvaal should have its own laws and legislature with the fullest possible powers, that Dutch, which he himself spoke to perfection, should be for practical purposes as much the official language as English, and that the laws should only be altered by competent legal authority.⁴

Had Shepstone followed his first inclination and summoned the Volksraad, the annexation would doubtless have been ratified; but he yielded to Frere who preferred consultation with leading burghers and men of property on the constitution which he himself outlined.⁵ Thereafter Shepstone, *more suo*, let matters drift. May 1877.

¹ Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 26 ff., 561 ff.

² C. 1883 of 1877, pp. 9, 23; Martineau, II. 181; Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 41, 50; Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 161; *Zuid Afrikaan*, March 2, 1878; Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*, p. 187.

³ 'Times,' *History of the S. African War*, I. 59; verbal information by Mr. D. Draper (at this time Mr. Draper was a Transvaal burgher).

⁴ C. 1776 of 1877, p. 152; Aylward, p. 391.

⁵ Martineau, II. 184-6; Jorissen, *Herinneringen*, p. 34. Jorissen says that Shepstone would have carried the Volksraad with him.

The Treasury stinted him of money ; he stood quite alone, the usual fate of men such as he, ' silent, self-asserting, determined to oppose all innovation and division of his authority,' capable of ruling a tribe ' after white Zulu fashion ' but unable to deal with Boers and English or German townfolk whose political support, as in Natal, he made no sort of effort to win. The Boers indeed liked him personally for his simple ways, but he offended their legalistic minds by creating special commissionerships unknown to the law ;¹ he alienated the editor of *De Volksstem* by taking away the Government printing contract, alarmed Frere by his reliance on Burgers' finance minister and drawings on Imperial funds, and, apart from appointing his son, Henrique, Secretary for Native Affairs, did nothing to develop the much-needed native policy.

Jan.
1878.

Carnarvon had told Kruger and Jorissen that the annexation must stand, but promised to meet their wishes as far as he could and to permit the use of Dutch as one of the official languages. They had thereupon promised to do their utmost to ' promote a feeling of satisfaction,' asked for Government employment, and then passed on to the Continent, where they received much sympathy but nothing else.² They returned to find a changed political atmosphere. The Boers, encouraged by the clamour in the Free State and the Colony, were complaining that their country had been annexed under false pretences, and there was enough truth in the charge to give point to their complaints. Kruger moreover soon lost his seat on the executive council and thus became a free agent ; Jorissen, admonished more than once from the Bench for incompetence, was presently retired on good terms from the post of State Attorney and sent over to the opposition.³ Then Secocoeni, angry that he could only remain in his reserve as a British subject and egged on by Cetewayo, rose in arms ; the Swazis refused to help so long as the Government used Zulu police, the burghers declined to turn out, the transport broke down and the campaign collapsed. Matters went from bad to worse. The post-annexation boom died away ; the Delagoa Bay enthusiasts saw their hopes blighted and the Natal railway advancing but slowly ; taxes came in less regularly than ever ; a second campaign against Secocoeni failed, even the annexation party cried out against Shepstone, and Kruger and Joubert, armed with large petitions against the annexation, set out once more for Downing Street.⁴

Feb.-
April
1878.

Oct.
1878.

¹ Martineau, II. 240, 265, 305-7 ; Carter, *Narrative*, p. 47 ; Aylward, *op. cit.* p. 301.

² C. 1883 of 1877, pp. 16, 36 ; C. 1961 of 1878, p. 147 ; Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff.

³ C. 2144 of 1878, p. 135 ; Carter, *Narrative*, p. 45. For the extent of Jorissen's legal training, *vide* Jorissen, *Herinneringen*, pp. 7 ff.

⁴ Aylward, pp. 271, 347 ff. ; Leyds, *op. cit.*, p. 233 ; C. 2144 of 1878, pp. 102, 143 ; C. 2220 of 1879, p. 365.

Frere met the Transvaal delegates in Natal on their way home and underlined Hicks Beach's promise of self-government. A week or two later the time limit fixed in the Zulu ultimatum expired.¹ On the appointed day four columns crossed the Zulu border and, on the morrow, the Transvaalers in congress at Wonderfontein made a solemn league and covenant to regain their lost independence.² Ten days later 800 regulars and as many native levies were wiped out by the Zulus at Isandhlwana, and though the Zulu rearguard was beaten off at Rorke's Drift, all Frere's hopes of reaching Pretoria speedily were ruined.³

Luckily the Zulus did not cross the Tugela, it may be because Cetewayo still thought he was the friend of the English,⁴ it may be because Colenso had told him he would get better terms if he did not attack, it may be because his Usutu and the hostile Usibebu faction, thinking the war was over, fought each other in a bloody battle. Nevertheless, the news of the disaster excited the tribes everywhere and, in Basutoland, Morosi of Outhing rose against the Colony.⁵ On the other hand, the Transvaalers sat still, the Free Staters offered help, reinforcements poured in, and Frere was able to set off cheered by the tidings of Wood's victory at Kambula. He found hundreds of armed Boers awaiting him in camp between Heidelberg and Pretoria. He was surprised at their insistence on independence, but he was soon on good terms with the leaders, especially with Kruger, whom he liked for his honesty and restraining influence. With Joubert his relations were not so good and he damaged his own influence by losing his temper with him. He was, however, convinced that the real malcontents were a small minority inspired by foreign wirepullers and that the large attendance at the camp was the result of intimidation. He once more promised them self-government as part of a confederation, ordered the fuller use of Dutch as an official language, recognised a local flag and sent on to the Queen the leaders' memorial detailing their grievances and offering the alliance which was their idea of confederation. He then set about clearing up the incredible confusion in the administration. He ordered Lanyon, the acting administrator, to summon an executive council and a temporary legislature to pave the way for a constitution-making conference and a Volksraad, and began to arrange for the railway from Capetown to Delagoa Bay by way of Pretoria and Kimberley which was to be the spinal cord of the coming federated South

¹ Martineau, II. 258; C. 2128 of 1878, pp. 17 ff.

² *Ibid.*, 284; Leyds, p. 243; C. 2260 of 1879, pp. 71 ff.; C. 2316 of 1879, p. 1.

³ Martineau, II. 274; Colenso and Durnford, pp. 228 ff.

⁴ Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 199.

⁵ A. 17 of 1879 (Cape); C. 2318 and 2374 of 1879.

April
1879.

Africa.¹ At last the Boer laager broke up, and on the same day Frere heard that the harassed Disraeli ministry had censured him for his Zulu policy.²

The censure from a ministry which had never expected anything more than a defensive war was accompanied by a request that he would remain in office, but it gave the signal for a renewal of the agitation against the Imperial policy.³ Pretoria was at once filled with talk of retrocession ; Frere had to return to Capetown without visiting Bloemfontein ; the Free State Volksraad refused to listen to its President and voted its sympathy with the Transvaalers ; and in the Colony, Hofmeyr organised another protest against the annexation, and du Toit proposed the formation of the Afrikander Bond on bitterly anti-British lines.⁴ On the heels of all this came the news that Wolseley was coming out as High Commissioner for South-East Africa, and cold instructions to drive that willing horse, the Sprigg ministry, along the road to the confederation which the censure and the division of Frere's powers put definitely out of reach.⁵

Disraeli and his colleagues naturally wanted to end their South African adventure. The life of the ministry was running on ; Egypt and the Clan-na-Gael in Ireland had been added to the anxieties of war in Afghanistan and strained relations with Russia ; the scramble for Africa had fairly begun and German ' colonials ' were advocating the colonisation of Matabeleland and the Transvaal ; the British sinking fund had been suspended and the Zulu war was costing millions. That drain ended at last. Chelmsford, hearing that Wolseley was coming to supersede him, ploughed his way through central Zululand, losing the Prince Imperial on the way, and forced Cetewayo to a final battle at Ulundi.⁶

July
1879.

The news of the victory gave great joy to the Court and the Horse Guards where Wolseley was unpopular as a youthful thruster of forty-six, but it failed to raise the corpse of confederation from the dead. Sprigg had too much else on his hands to attempt the impossible that year. The Northern Border war had ended, but the struggle with Morosi was destined to smoulder on till the death of the chief six months later ; everywhere the tribes were excited by the Zulu war and the Disarma-

¹ Martineau, II. 285 ff., 309, 321 ; Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 51 ff. ; *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1881 (article by Frere) ; Leyds, *op. cit.*, pp. 246 ff. ; C. 2367 of 1879, pp. 54, 84 ff., 97 ff.

² C. 2260 of 1879, p. 109.

³ Buckle, *Disraeli*, VI. 409 ff. ; Worsfold, *op. cit.*, pp. 231 ff.

⁴ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 195 ff. ; C. 2454 of 1879, p. 106 ; C. 2482 of 1880, pp. 37, 446 ff.

⁵ C. 2454 of 1879, p. 51.

⁶ Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, pp. 119 ff. ; C. 2454 of 1879, p. 119.

ment Act, and Sprigg himself differed from the Secretary of State on the score of policy in Griqualand West and the Transkeian territories. In the end the Colony definitely annexed Fingoland and all Griqualand East except Mount Ayliff; but Hicks Beach refused to let it have Galekaland till confederation should be achieved, and held Sprigg to part at least of the debt owing for the troops employed in the Kaffir war.¹ The Cape Parliament reaffirmed the Griqualand West Annexation Act, but Sprigg played for time in the hope that he might avoid taking over all the debts of the little colony and, on the main issue of confederation, declined to commit himself till he knew what Wolseley's Transvaal and Zululand settlements were to be. Hence, in spite of alarming talk in unofficial but influential quarters in London of a suspension of the Cape constitution as the surest way of attaining closer union, no definite move was made during the session.² 1879

There was little hope of success whatever Sprigg might do, for South-eastern Africa was completely beyond Frere's control. Wolseley's natural jealousy had been so inflamed by Bulwer that he would listen to no advice from Frere. In Zululand he adopted the plan which Grey had urged upon Panda. He divided the country into thirteen parts and, adding a leaf from Shepstone's book, placed the tribes where possible under scions of the houses which had ruled before the days of Chaka, on the principle that the Zulus would remain quiet once the alien Chaka system was abolished. Elsewhere he appointed special chiefs: Hamu the traitor and John Dunn the gun-runner who had deserted Cetewayo in his hour of need. The weakness of the scheme was that there was no controlling power. Hicks Beach indeed hinted at a protectorate, but Wolseley adhered to his original instructions and placed residents with merely consular powers in each district.³

Meanwhile, in the Transvaal Lanyon was making headway in spite of his unpopularity. He reorganised the administration, collected the taxes and, until Wolseley stopped him, pressed Secocoeni hard. The new High Commissioner arrived in Pretoria to find the Boers in Cromwellian fashion requisitioning powder and holding a day of prayer for the success of the independence movement. He fortified Pretoria and the principal villages, forced Secocoeni to surrender and thereupon began to send home the troops. In spite of Frere's disapproval and of local advice, he foreshadowed a rigid Crown Colony constitution what time Sept. 1879.

¹ Eybers, p. 65; A. 3-80 (Cape); The Cape ultimately paid H.M. Government £150,000 out of the £259,963 claimed; Natal paid £250,000 out of £1,000,000. It is always heavy work to collect war-debts (C. 3280 of 1882, pp. 2, 15, 16, 33).

² C. 2454 of 1879, p. 158; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 140.

³ C. 3864 of 1879; Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, pp. 120 ff., 131; Martineau, II. 353.

Nov.
1879.

Gladstone in Midlothian was thundering against all annexation policies.¹ In December over 6000 Boers met once more at Wonderfontein, hoisted the Vierkleur, decreed the summoning of the old Volksraad in April and decided to boycott all who co-operated with the authorities.² Nevertheless, Wolseley promulgated his constitution and, having seen the executive and legislative councils assemble, handed over his duties to Pomeroy Colley.

April
1880.

At the same moment Gladstone's Liberals took office. Gladstone was in a difficult position. The Queen disliked him much and the idea of parting with provinces still more; she admired Frere whom so many of his followers reprobated; vested interests had sprung up in the Transvaal; a gold rush was probably coming which would reduce the Boers to a minority; retrocession, he was told, would lead to civil war; his philanthropic wing led by that redoubtable Birmingham Radical, Joseph Chamberlain, would not hear of the abandonment of the natives; official reports were reassuring; all would surely come right if confederation and self-government were followed as the pole-stars.³ The Cape was once more the key of the position and the dutiful Sprigg prepared to go forward; but Kruger and Joubert colloqued with Afrikaner members at Hofmeyr's house in Capetown and Sprigg was forced to accept the previous question.⁴ Frere's *raison d'être* was now gone and he sailed home amid a chorus of regrets broken only by a Stellenbosch complaint about the excise; Griqualand West was at last incorporated in the Colony, the Natal 'Jamaica' constitution expired and the Basuto war began.

June
1880.

Sept.-
Oct.
1880.

Sprigg had disarmed the Galekas and loyal Fingos in spite of protests from Colonists who held it a breach of faith to take at current rates guns which, after paying customs dues, had often been bought at fancy prices. He now essayed to disarm the Basuto. Missionaries, merchants and magistrates protested; Wolseley feared it would lead to the general native war which had so long haunted the British official imagination; Kimberley damned the idea with faint praise and disclaimed all responsibility.⁵ As for the Basuto, they had waxed rich of late years and their chiefs disliked magisterial control; the finer points of responsible government were beyond them and they

¹ Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 ff.; Martineau, II. 361; Scoble and Abercrombie, *Downfall of Krugerism*, Appendix K; C. 2482 of 1880, p. 380.

² Leyds, *First Annexation*, p. 262; C. 2505 of 1880, p. 113.

³ Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, p. 132; Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, II. 263, 266; C. 2586 of 1880, p. 12; C. 2676 of 1880, p. 46a.

⁴ C. 2655 of 1880, pp. 4 ff.; Martineau, II. 346, 369; Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 170 ff.

⁵ C. 2569 of 1880, pp. 1, 3, 7, 15, 36, 45-6.

by no means appreciated the fact that since 1871 they had been ruled from Capetown and not from Windsor ;¹ they had helped the Colony against Langalibalele and Morosi, and could not believe that they would be rewarded by the confiscation of their cherished guns. But Frere viewed disarmament as a necessary civilising measure like the abandonment of rapiers by European gentlemen, and Sprigg not only demanded the guns but doubled the hut tax and proposed to take part of Quthing to pay for the expenses of the late war against Morosi. The chiefs petitioned the Queen to whom they had given their country, but the handing in of guns was fixed for April 1880. At that very time died Moroko, the enemy of Moshesh ; his sons began to fight for the succession and, on the other side of Basutoland, the clans of Griqualand East were in a ferment. Letsie, paramount Basuto chief, and Jonathan, son of Molapo, were willing to give up their weapons, but Lerothodi, Masupha, Joel and Lesoana, the old firebrand, all refused and drove out those who obeyed the law. Sprigg sent up the police and the War of Disarmament began.²

1879.

Sept.
1880.

Brand viewed it as a rebellion and allowed the Colonial forces to use the Free State as a base, but the rising spread to Griqualand East, whose clans were stirred up by the East Pondos. In both areas the Colony was helped by friendly tribes and order was soon restored south of the Quathlamba mountains ; but, in Basutoland itself, Maseru was held with difficulty, the Basuto horsemen did great execution on the yeomanry at Kalabani and the inconclusive struggle dragged on.

Behind the dust and uproar in the valley of the Orange, the Transvaalers rose.³ Colley had believed that time was on his side and had made no reforms pending the expected arrival of Sir Hercules Robinson, the new High Commissioner, and, even as late as October, so well-informed an observer as Aylward in Natal feared that the Boers would not rise. Both were wrong. The Potchefstroom officials sued one, Bezuidenhout, for his taxes and when he proved that he had paid them, saddled him with costs and distrained upon his waggon. To the Boers all direct taxes were an iniquity and this was much worse ; besides they argued that if they paid taxes willingly, they would be recognising the interloping government at Pretoria.⁴ Cronje with 300 men rescued the waggon, 1500 armed men speedily assembled,

Nov.
1880.

¹ C. 2569 of 1880, pp. 9, 11.

² C. 2755 of 1881, pp. 1, 38 ff., 58, 120 ff. ; C. 2821, pp. 37, 69 ; C. 3708, p. 1. On the war generally, *vide* C. 2755, 2821, 2964 of 1881 ; C. 3112 of 1882 ; C. 3493 and 3708 of 1883.

³ For full and fair account of the Transvaal war, *vide* Carter, *Narrative* ; Morley, *Gladstone*, II. chapter iii. On the outbreak *vide* C. 2783, 2838 of 1881.

⁴ Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 98 ff., 180 ff.

and British reinforcements had to be sent up from Natal. Brand warned the acting High Commissioner at Capetown that the crash was coming, but the vital message, forwarded thence by post, only reached London after the War of Independence had begun.¹ The Boers assembled in thousands at Paardekraal. The old Volksraad sat once more, decreed the restoration of the Republic, named Kruger, Pretorius and Commandant-General Joubert as a triumvirate to take charge of their interests,² and once more offered to enter into alliance with the other South African states. Apparently the meeting went further than some of the leaders, and notably Kruger, had wished; but in any case Cronje set off to have the proclamation re-establishing the Republic printed at Potchefstroom, another party moved off to hold the Lydenburg-Pretoria road and the main body marched to Heidelberg to hoist the Vierkleur. They did so on Dingaans' Day just as Cronje fired the first shot at Potchefstroom.³

Dec. 16,
1880.

There were about 3500 British troops in all South Africa, ill-disciplined, weakened by systematic desertions, damaged in prestige by the disaster of Isandhlwana and incapable of shooting straight; for those were the days when 'Royal George' of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief, was still able to thwart 'the damned new-fangled notions' of Wolseley or anyone else.⁴ On the other hand, the military reputation of the Boers stood very low. Colley and Lanyon underrated them as a fighting force and even some of their friends and leaders feared that they would disperse at the first check.⁵ They had no cannon to speak of and so would be handicapped in siege work, but they had one very great advantage: they could shoot and they had the Westley-Richards rifle capable of killing at 600 yards. They were thus better equipped than they had ever been before and they were better shots than they ever were again.⁶ They shot a British column to pieces at once at Bronkhorst Spruit and cooped up the rest of the Transvaal garrison in Pretoria, Potchefstroom and the other fortified villages, while Joubert's burghers and a few unofficial Free State allies faced Colley on Laing's Nek.

Neither side wished to push matters to extremes in face of the Basuto and Kaffir troubles; negotiations began almost at once and Earl Kimberley offered to frame a scheme of settlement if the Boers would lay down their arms.⁷ This offer reached Joubert just after he had repulsed Colley at the Nek, and a more

Jan. 26,
1881.

¹ Morley, *Gladstone*, II. 272.

² Leyds, *op. cit.*, pp. 265 ff.; C. 2794 of 1881, pp. 3 ff.

³ Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 116 ff.

⁴ Maurice and Arthur, *Wolseley*, p. 114.

⁵ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 172; Butler, *Autobiography*, pp. 267, 274.

⁶ 'Times' *History*, III. 62.

⁷ C. 2783 of 1881, p. 77.

explicit offer was despatched on the very day that he checked Colley once more at Ingogo.¹ Kruger now offered to admit a commission if the troops would withdraw from the Transvaal. Not unnaturally this proposal was rejected, but Kimberley offered to appoint a Royal Commission with wide powers and bade Colley arrange an armistice.²

The Gladstone Ministry was only too anxious to find a way out of the tangle. On the one hand it was faced with concerted non-payment of rents and cattle-houghing in Ireland, a petition in favour of the Transvaal from influential Hollanders, and the fear of a rising in the Free State and possibly in the Cape ;³ Granville, the Foreign Secretary, was much impressed by Bismarck's plea that white men must not fight in sight of the tribes⁴ and, already, the Natal Zulus were restive at the news of the reverses to the Imperial arms. On the other hand was the ugly fact that the executive had annexed the Transvaal ; Parliament had since legislated for it and, therefore, nothing but an Act of Parliament could lawfully disannex it. But only one-third of the unwieldy ministerial party had voted in favour of retrocession ; five philanthropic ministers, including John Bright and Chamberlain, had abstained from voting, and there was not the remotest hope of getting such an Act through the Houses. A compromise had to be made by which the Transvaalers should have control of their own affairs without seeming to have been excluded from the British Empire. The formula of Suzerainty would meet the case, but first there must be an end to the fighting.

Colley was anxious to relieve the beleaguered Transvaal towns and demanded an answer to his armistice proposals within forty-eight hours. His message only reached Kruger on the day after the sender had been killed at the rout of Majuba.⁵ Kruger's answer was favourable and with Brand's help an armistice was arranged on the day that Potchefstroom capitulated. Kimberley proposed that a commission should consider 'the giving back of the Transvaal subject to British Suzerainty, a Resident at the capital, and provisions for guarding native interests ; control over relations with foreign Powers and as to frontier affairs to be reserved.'⁶ The Triumvirate accepted Suzerainty, on Wood's definition, as meaning that 'the country has entire self-government as regards its own interior affairs, but that it cannot take action against or with an outside Power

¹ C. 2837 of 1881, pp. 1, 6 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 10.

³ Selborne, *Memorials*, II. 3.

⁴ Fitzmaurice, *Life of . . . Granville*, II. 225.

⁵ Morley, II. 276 ; C. 2837 of 1881, pp. 16, 23 ; Leyds, *op. cit.*, chap. xix.

⁶ C. 3114 of 1882, p. 49.

Feb. 27,
1881.

without the permission of the Suzerain';¹ they left much else to be settled by the commission, and faced the possible loss of the native and gold-bearing territories to the east of the thirtieth degree of east longitude. But this possibility they prudently kept from the ears of their followers.²

March 21,
1881.

The commandos dispersed, but Sir Hercules Robinson had one pressing duty to perform before he could join his fellow commissioners, Wood and Chief Justice de Villiers, at Newcastle. On his arrival in Capetown, he had offered to mediate between the Colony and the Basuto. Two of the rebel chiefs were prepared to cease fighting provided they might keep their land and their guns, but in spite of the cost of the war and the wholesale desertion by the burghers and yeomanry, Sprigg demanded the guns and part of Quthing.³ Kimberley refused to allow Quthing to be touched, and the war went on marked by costly colonial victories till the chiefs quarrelled among themselves and turned to the Governor. Robinson gave his award leaving Basutoland undiminished and promising to give back surrendered guns to 'trustworthy' warriors on payment of a licence fee. The award was generally accepted, a fine of cattle was paid and a few guns were registered; but the honours of war rested with the Basuto. And they knew it.⁴

Jan.
1881.

April
1881.

The failure in Basutoland, following hard upon the confederation débâcle, broke the back of the Sprigg Ministry. The final blow was given by the despised and almost rejected Griqualand West. Led by Rhodes, this group demanded a railway, and, when Sprigg could not give it them, turned him out in favour of Thomas Scanlen.⁵

May
1881.

Meanwhile the Transvaal Commission was sitting at Newcastle and then at Pretoria. The members differed among themselves on some vital points. British reinforcements had arrived, and Wood to the last wanted a military settlement, or at least a march through the Transvaal in force before evacuation; he likewise pressed for the retention of all or part of the eastern territories. The Boer leaders for their part long hesitated to accept Kimberley's interpretation of the peace terms as 'including, of course, the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse' by H.M. Government.⁶ On the other hand, the

¹ C. 3114 of 1882, pp. 51 ff.

² Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 462. On the negotiations generally, *vide* Leyds, *First Annexation*, chapter xix.; Walker, *De Villiers*, chapter viii.; and C. 2892 and 2998 of 1881; 3114 and 3219 of 1882.

³ C. 2964 of 1881, pp. 5, 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 17, 21; A. 44-81 (Cape).

⁵ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 187; Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, p. 63.

⁶ C. 3114 of 1882, p. 7. On the ratification, *vide* Carter, pp. 522 ff.; Leyds, *op. cit.*, chapter xx.; *Staats Courant* (S.A.R.), Oct.-Nov. 1881.

majority of the commission decided that partition would lead to more trouble with the Boers than it was worth. Swaziland was to be independent, but the whole of the eastern districts were to be given back provided the Queen retained her veto on all native legislation and the British Resident was given full powers and a seat on the proposed Native Locations Commission, which was to hold land for the natives, who, under the ordinary law, could hold none. Besides being an attempt to safeguard native interests, this bargain was an eleventh-hour effort to do the work which, apart from the tardy collection of hut-tax, Henrique Shepstone's Native Affairs Department had failed to do. A month after the Royal Commission had moved on to Pretoria, July the administrator was made Great Chief, and native law was 1881. recognised in the courts as in Natal.¹ A few days later the Pretoria Convention was signed.

The Pretoria Convention defined the boundaries of 'the Aug. Transvaal State' on all sides for the first time, gave it 'complete 1881. self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty' and, besides embodying the points already mentioned, prohibited slavery, assured equal civil rights to all, saddled the State with a considerable share of the debt accumulated since the annexation, but, in spite of Wood's warning, made no mention of the franchise.² A specially elected Volksraad met at the end of September and opposed ratification so furiously that Kruger had to tell it that if it did not ratify, there would be war again. Kimberley urged it to trust to time and experience to prove the necessity for future concessions, and at last it ratified Oct. 'the unsatisfactory state document . . . for the time being and 1881 provisionally.' And so the troops marched down through Laing's Nek into Natal.³

Imperial Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter XI.:

Basutoland: *Disturbances*, C. 2318 of 1879; *Zulu and Basuto Wars*, C. 2374 of 1879; *Correspondence*, C. 2569 of 1880; C. 2755, C. 2821, C. 2964 of 1881; *Future Administration*, C. 3708 of 1883.

Cape of Good Hope: *Further Correspondence*, C. 459 of 1871; C. 508 of 1872; C. 732 of 1873.

Delagoa Bay: *Correspondence re Claims*, C. 1361 of 1875.

Griqualand West: *Report on the Land Question*, C.O., June, 1880.

Natal: *Further Papers re the Kaffir Outbreak (Langalibalele)*, C. 1121, C. 1158, C. 1342 of 1875; *Further Correspondence re Natal*, C. 1192 of 1875; C. 1401 of 1876; *Correspondence re Changes in the Constitution*, H.C. 255 of 1875.

¹ C. 3114 of 1882, pp. 19, 28, 64; Brookes, *History of Native Policy*, pp. 124 ff.

² Eybers, pp. 455 ff.; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 336; C. 3219 of 1882, pp. 25, 53.

³ C. 3098 of 1882, pp. 95 ff.

South Africa: *Proposals for a Conference*, C. 1244 of 1875; C. 1399 of 1876; *Permissive Federation Act*, No. 195 of 1877; *Further Correspondence*, C. 1631 of 1876; C. 1681, C. 1732, C. 1833 of 1877; C. 1961, C. 1980, C. 2079, C. 2100, C. 2144 of 1878; C. 2220, C. 2252, C. 2260, C. 2316, C. 2367, C. 2454 of 1879; C. 2482, C. 2505, C. 2584, C. 2586, C. 2655, C. 2676 of 1880.

South African Republic (Transvaal): *Correspondence re the Transvaal*, C. 1748, C. 1776 of 1877; *Letters of the Transvaal Delegates*, C. 2128 of 1879; *Instructions to the Royal Commission*, C. 2892 of 1881; *Pretoria Convention*, C. 2998 of 1881; *Report of the Royal Commission*, C. 3114, C. 3219 of 1882.

CHAPTER XII

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA, 1881-96

Afrikanerism—Economic depression—Native problems: Basutoland and the Transkei; the Transvaal—Stellaland, Goshen, and the New Republic; the London Convention and German South-West Africa; British Bechuanaland and the Protectorate; Pondoland—Kruger's Policy; the Rand mines and De Beer's Consolidated—Matabeleland; Swaziland and Kosi Bay; the first Swaziland Convention and the occupation of Mashonaland; the Matabele war—Rhodes's federation policy: Glen Grey Act; Pondoland; the Uitlanders; Swaziland once more—The Reformers and the Raid.

Secretaries of State for the Colonies: Earl of Kimberley, April 1880–Dec. 1882; Earl of Derby, Dec. 1882–June 1885; F. A. Stanley, June 1885–Feb. 1886; Earl Granville, Feb.–Aug. 1886; Earl Stanhope, Aug. 1886–Jan. 1887; Sir H. Holland (Lord Knutsford, 1888), Jan. 1887–Aug. 1892; Marquis of Ripon, Aug. 1892–June 1895; J. Chamberlain, June 1895–Oct. 1903.

High Commissioners and Governors of the Cape Colony: Sir Hercules Robinson, Jan. 22, 1881–May 1, 1889; (Lieut.-General Hon. Sir L. Smyth, acting 1883; Lieut.-General H. D. Torrens, acting 1886; Lieut.-General H. A. Smyth, acting May 1–Dec. 1889); Sir Henry B. Loch, Dec. 1889–March 1895; (Lieut.-General W. G. Cameron, acting 1891–92 and 1894); Sir H. Robinson (Lord Rosmead, 1896), May 30, 1895–April 1897.

Premiers of the Cape Colony: J. G. Sprigg, Feb. 6, 1878–May 8, 1881; T. Scanlen, May 1881–May 12, 1884; T. Upington, May 1884–Nov. 24, 1886; J. G. Sprigg, Nov. 1886–July 16, 1890; C. J. Rhodes, July 1890–May 3, 1893, and May 1893–Jan. 12, 1896.

Governors of Natal: Major-General G. P. Colley, July 2, 1880–Feb. 27, 1881; Sir H. E. Bulwer, March 6, 1882–Oct. 23, 1885; Sir A. E. Havelock, Feb. 1886–June 5, 1889; Sir C. B. H. Mitchell, Oct. 1889–Aug. 1893; Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, Aug. 1893–March 6, 1901.

Premier of Natal: Sir John Robinson, Oct. 10, 1893–Feb. 14, 1897.

Presidents of the Orange Free State: Sir J. H. Brand, Feb. 2, 1864–July 16, 1888; F. W. Reitz, Jan. 1889–Nov. 1895.

Presidents of the South African Republic : Triumvirate, Aug. 1881–May 1883 ; S. J. P. Kruger, May 8, 1883–May 31, 1902.

British South Africa Company (Mashonaland) : Chief Magistrate : A. R. Colquhoun, June 29–Sept. 18, 1891 ; Dr. L. S. Jameson, Sept. 1891–Sept. 1894 ; then *Administrator for Southern Rhodesia*, Sept. 10, 1894–Jan. 1896.

‘ PLANTS of slow growth endure the longest,’ Froude had written in the light of his South African experiences, ‘ and the final consummation, however devoutly to be wished, can only be brought to wholesome maturity by the deliberate action of the South African communities themselves.’¹ The Colonial Office was at last convinced that Froude was right, and three months before the battle of Majuba, Kimberley had bidden Sir Hercules Robinson make no attempt to raise the Confederation issue again unless ‘ it should be initiated spontaneously by the Colonies ’ in their own interests.²

The Confederation policy, so long in dying, was dead at last ; the hills round Laing’s Nek had echoed to the funeral volleys, and the Imperial Government was in no position to attempt a resurrection even had it wished to do so. For its prestige was far gone in the eyes of white and black alike. The long-enduring and sorely strained reputation of the handful of redcoats in which Governors had been wont to put their trust had been blown to the winds. Any future intervention in the affairs of Boers, who were satisfied that British soldiers could always be beaten, would have to be in force.

Boer contempt at one extreme was balanced by bitterness at the other. The loyalists who abandoned the Transvaal, and still more those who remained, fulminated against the power which had deserted them, and, in the colonies, ‘ Majuba ’ became a word of power in moments of political excitement. Faith in the continuity of British policy had been destroyed and the attention of foreign Powers attracted to South Africa at a time when it was difficult for Great Britain to deal firmly with the Transvaal without seeming to threaten. There was for the present no hope that the Transvaalers or indeed the Free Staters would willingly enter even an economic federation, for all were suspicious, and the anti-British foreigners who flocked to Pretoria were naturally ready to play upon those suspicions in the interests of their concessions and influence.

Even in Natal, Downing Street rule had given an impetus to republican feeling, and disappointed imperialists could lament that, if the British Government were to be content with Simons-town only, a republican federation would certainly be formed.

¹ C. 1399 of 1876, p. 83.

² C. 2754 of 1881, pp. 3, 4.

For some years past there had been a vigorous thrusting of the same anti-imperial spirit in the Cape Colony against the Southey-Shepstone policy of the later 'seventies. Among the English it took the form of a 'Colonialism' inspired by Merriman's condemnation of Froude's confederation campaign as 'an agitation from abroad.'¹ So long as Great Britain looked after external defence they were well content, but intervention by the 'imperial factor' in internal matters they would not have, unless, of course, there was work to be done beyond the strength of the Colony. It was a sufficiently cynical attitude and galling to the representatives of the aforesaid factor, but the development of the same spirit among the Dutch-speaking colonists at first threatened the very British connection.

The first overt signs of this spirit had appeared in 1873.² Hitherto the tide had run strongly in the direction of anglicisation. The Dutch of Holland was indeed the religious language, but the spoken tongue it was not nor ever likely to be. Over against it stood English with all its vigour and wealth of literature, the commercial language of half the world, whose advantages the bulk of the Cape Afrikaners and many of the Republicans also were eager that their children should have, provided it was not forced upon them. In spite of experiments by a few writers like Louis Meurant, their own spoken Afrikaans was in no sense a literary language. Again, though the divisional councils had given the country folk some training in representative institutions, they had taken so little part in the general politics of the Colony that when the Colony achieved self-government, less than one-third of the members of the two Houses bore Dutch names.

The cutting of the Suez Canal diverted elsewhere the stream of Anglo-Indians who had found favour in the eyes of the Western Dutch; the discovery of the diamonds attracted British citizens of a less prepossessing type; the Diamond Fields controversy shocked Afrikaner national sentiment into being, and the grant of responsible government gave it new opportunities for political expression.³ A sign of the times was the formation of Boeren Vereenigen in the Eastern Province on the model of the English Farmers' Associations. But a much more significant movement began in the same year in the West. Arnoldus Pannevis, a Hollander schoolmaster, and the Rev. S. J. du Toit, predikant at the Paarl, set on foot a campaign on behalf of the

1873.

¹ C. 1399 of 1876, p. 79; Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 4, 5, 24.

² On Afrikaans and the Afrikaner Bond, *vide* Hofmeyr, *Life of J. H. Hofmeyr*, chapter xiii.; *Union Year Book*, No. 8, pp. 14 ff. (article by J. J. Smith); L. van Niekerk, *Die Eerste Afrikaanse Taal Beweging*.

³ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 142 ff.

Afrikaans tongue. These enthusiasts were almost a secret society at first, but during the heat of the Carnarvon confederation campaign they founded 'Di Genootskap van regte Afrikaners . . . to stand up for our Language, our Nation and our People.' The 1875. association found a voice in the newspaper *Di Patriot*, edited by du Toit's brother, but it met with much opposition from upholders of High Dutch, an opposition which was redoubled when it proposed to translate the Bible into Afrikaans. Of all its opponents one of the strongest was Jan Hofmeyr, a rising power in the world of journalism and politics. Stung by Sprigg's excise, which hit the Western wine-farmers, always his staunchest supporters, Hofmeyr began to organise the Boeren Bescherms 1878. Vereeniging, an association which might easily become a political machine. Next year he took his seat in Parliament, but the really important move was made by du Toit. The censure on Frere encouraged him to publish the principles of the Afrikaner Bond on July 4, a notable day in the history of independence. 1879.

The Bond was bitterly anti-British and, by intention, Pan-Afrikaner.¹ It achieved a foothold in the Free State, but it 1880. did not flourish even in the Colony till the Transvaal war of independence. Then it advanced into the Eastern Province; Chief Justice Reitz and Borckenhagen, the young German editor of the *Free State Express*, organised it north of the Orange 1881. with the war-cry 'Africa for the Afrikaners,' and during the critical Volksraad debates on the ratification of the Pretoria Convention, Commandant-General Joubert presided at the inaugural meeting in the Transvaal. After the retrocession du Toit himself went north to Pretoria as superintendent of education to press for the local manufacture of munitions and a United States of South Africa under their own flag, and to curse Brand and Hofmeyr as tools of the British.

The real strength of the Bond, however, lay in the Colony. Hofmeyr was alarmed at the rate at which branches of his Bescherms Vereeniging were being absorbed by the Bond. At first he failed to persuade his followers to take up politics, but he gradually brought them into action on the language issue. Dutch electors in the Albert district had petitioned in the 'fifties for the use of Dutch in Parliament. A local branch of the Vereeniging had recently revived the claim, the Dutch Reformed Church supported the appeal, and Hofmeyr, at that time a member of the Scanlen cabinet, moved in that sense. It was 1881. at the end of a weary session and the matter was shelved; but next year the motion was carried without opposition, and,

¹ Newton, *Unification of South Africa*, I. 86 ff.; T. Schreiner, *The Afrikaner Bond*, pp. 19 ff.

- at the same time, the recommendations of a recent Education Commission were adopted permitting the use of Dutch as a medium of instruction in first and second class schools at the discretion of the school committees.¹ Thus fortified, Hofmeyr joined issue with the Bond, whose aims and spirit he heartily disliked. Independence might be the ultimate destiny of South Africa, but at the moment it spelt cutting the painter and Transvaal domination under Kruger or Joubert, in neither of whom had he any confidence. In spite of the resistance of the *Di Patriot* party, he succeeded in arranging a conference between the Bond and the Vereeniging at Richmond. There union was effected; Hofmeyr got the upper hand and forthwith began his long struggle to transform the aims and spirit of the Bond in the Colony.²
- 1882.
- 1883.

The background of Hofmeyr's campaign was hard times in all South Africa. During the confederation struggle all had gone well financially; the real value of money was rising all the world over; South Africa was full of troops and contractors; exports rose and imports outstripped them; the output of Kimberley diamonds increased out of all knowledge. The formation of joint stock companies in Griqualand was accompanied by heavy speculation in mining shares, the first such speculation that South Africa had experienced since the copper boom of the 'fifties; but in the confidence begotten of the boom, Kimberley was given two additional representatives; the building of the new Houses of Parliament, begun in 1875, was resumed; Capetown built a reservoir, lit its railway station with electricity, carried on its breakwater sufficiently to really shelter vessels, and built a graving dock. The ocean passage to England was cut down to three weeks, and railways were undertaken to Hopetown, Colesberg, and Aliwal North on the road to the Diamond Fields.³

- As with the Colony so with Natal. European immigrants were coming in faster than they had hitherto done, and though Indians were coming in still faster and showed no signs of going home again, the little colony was confident. The cable linked it to London by way of Aden, the harbour works at Durban promised well and the railway reached Maritzburg. On the eve of the expiry of the Wolseley constitution the great majority of the legislature demanded responsible government. This Earl
- 1879-
1880.

¹ Eybers, p. 66; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 149. For further legislation *re* use of Dutch, *vide* Eybers, pp. 133, 136.

² Newton, *op. cit.*, I. 95.

³ Amphlett, *History of the Standard Bank*, pp. 59 ff.; Gardner Williams, *Diamond Mines*, pp. 220 ff.

Kimberley was willing to give provided Natal would pay for its own defence ; but a general election fought on that issue resulted in nothing more than the addition of further elected members to the Council with two nominees especially acquainted with native affairs, an excellent innovation which had been urged on a recent native affairs commission by Shepstone and Bantu witnesses. For the rest, honourable members decided to get as much control of policy as was consistent with the retention of a considerable garrison.¹ 1882.

The sky was soon overcast. First, phylloxera appeared in the vineyards of the Cape ; then the over-capitalised diamond companies in Griqualand West, which had wasted too much of their substance in riotous litigation, called up their share capital ; the banks suddenly refused to make advances on the mining securities, and diamond scrip speedily fell to half its previous value. Illicit diamond buying was rampant in spite of Acts consolidating the laws upon the subject ; the fall of masses of reef made the recovery of stones difficult and working expenses burdensome. The smallpox which had wiped out the Javanese in Capetown reached Kimberley, whence it spread over the Free State, in spite of sulphur fumigation at the frontier, to die away in the mountains of Basutoland. Drought accompanied disease and presently redwater fever slew the cattle from the Colony to Zululand. Under these circumstances public works in the coast colonies languished, especially as Bantu labourers worked much more slowly than European navvies and were inclined to indulge in stick fights. The Cape Parliament Houses were finished, but the Cape railways only struggled forward slowly and the Natal line stopped dead at the capital. 1885.

The South African states were in the trough of such a depression as they had not known since the 'sixties and were deprived of the co-ordinating influence of the Imperial Government. The retrocession of the Transvaal was a sign that that government had decided to interfere henceforth as little as possible in the affairs of South Africa beyond the borders of its own colonies. The self-denying ordinance was unavailing. Within a short three years, owing to a breakdown of Cape native policy, it was entangled once more in Basutoland in the heart of the South African state system ; in less than five, as a result of Transvaal restiveness and German intervention, it had annexed St. Lucia. 1884.

¹ C. 3174 of 1882 ; C. 3796 of 1883 ; Eybers, pp. 201 ff. ; Brookes, *Native Policy*, p. 71. Europeans in Natal in 1878 were 22,000 ; Indians, 12,825 ; Bantu, 290,000. In 1884 they were 35,453, 27,206 and 361,766 respectively. The Imperial garrison in 1882 consisted of two battalions and a cavalry regiment.

1885. Bay, extended a protectorate over the coasts of Pondoland and taken charge of all Bechuanaland from the borders of Griqualand West to those of Matabeleland. A little later it had taken over the bulk of Zululand, while the Cape had annexed nearly all the Transkeian territories.

1886-1887. There was little in 1881 to suggest that the Cape would ever take so bold a step. Its immediate problem was how to make some definite settlement with the Basuto and to decide whether or no it was to extend its rule over Kaffirland and Namaqua-Damaraland. Its prestige was gone from Basutoland, and Orpen, the Governor's Agent, was hard put to it to maintain some show of authority by personal influence and the support of the paramount chief, Letsie, who clung to him for fear of his brothers.¹ The tribes were much divided by the jealousies of their chiefs; traders and canteen keepers along the Free State border debauched them under the eyes of the helpless magistrates; the tribesmen still had guns which in many cases they declined to register. Scanlen insisted that he could not restore order by force unless he was allowed to abandon all Basutoland north of the Orange, settle friendly Basuto in part of Quthing and give out the rest in farms.² Kimberley refused. He would have no partition and was in no mind to take charge of four-fifths of a country which had been upset by Cape ministers. Scanlen therefore cancelled both the Disarmament Act and the Robinson Award, threatened to confiscate the lands of all who resisted and tried to carry out his threat.³ Chinese Gordon came from Mauritius to reorganise the colonial forces; but he overwhelmed ministers with contradictory telegrams, found it impossible to work with Sauer, Secretary for Native Affairs, suggested that the defiant Masupha of Thaba Bosigo should be practically independent and finally withdrew, saying that he would not fight against tribesmen whom he admired so much. So 'the sort of a war' smouldered on.⁴

1882. Government was in a stronger position in Kaffirland. Fingoland and Griqualand East had been annexed to the Colony; most of the other districts were under Cape magistrates; disarmament had been carried out fairly effectively and, of all the territories east of the Kei, only the two Pondolands were fully independent. A modification of the Basutoland system was being extended to both classes of district based on the principles of a gradual substitution of the power of magistrates for that of the chiefs, the civilising of the tribes and the financial autonomy of

¹ C. 3112 of 1882, p. 132; C. 3708, p. 24.

² C. 2964 of 1881, p. 27; C. 3112 of 1882, pp. 102, 107, 124.

³ C. 3112 of 1882, p. 129.

⁴ C. 3493 of 1883 *passim*.

the territories.¹ Legislation was by the Governor-in-Council on the usual terms and no Colonial Act applied unless specifically stated. Hicks Beach had asked for a statutory code of laws and provision for the extension of the franchise,² but Sprigg would only promise the franchise when the territories should become ordinary districts of the Colony. The vote was therefore withheld and the sale of liquor forbidden.

Civil cases in which Bantu only were concerned were tried from the first according to native law, an important principle borrowed from Natal, and this principle was, in the main, upheld by a strong Native Law Commission, which none the less 1883. drafted a Transkeian penal code to supersede the native criminal law.³ The chiefs still heard petty criminal and civil cases with an appeal to the magistrates; magistrates had wide jurisdiction subject to an appeal to the Chief Magistrate or, after 1882, to the Eastern Circuit or Supreme Courts; capital charges were heard by a court of three magistrates and, after 1882, by the Circuit Court. At the same time, the Fingos, the most advanced of all the tribes, began to raise a local rate, to which the Government contributed an equal amount, and spent it on local purposes through the magistrate and headmen who met as a board quarterly. Meanwhile, Europeans had already gone into Tembuland and Griqualand without leave. A parliamentary commission, therefore, after much bickering among its members as to the amount of land which ought to be taken, cut off large 1882-1883. areas along the base of the Drakensberg mountains for European settlement.⁴ Thus was Grey's projected colonisation of Nomansland in a measure effected.

Hicks Beach had also proposed that Basutoland and all the Transkeian territories except the Pondolands should be united as a single dependency of the Cape⁵; but under stress of a falling revenue and the Basuto fiasco, Scanlen began to swing round to the idea of handing them all over to the Imperial Government to be administered as a South African India, and Rhodes, soon to be Treasurer, bluntly stated that the Cape ought to annex land and not natives.⁶ Scanlen did not act on the letters patent empowering him to annex Tembuland, Galekaland and Port St. John's, and, after a visit to Basutoland where he found even Letsie demanding direct Imperial control, sent Merriman to London to get rid of Basutoland at least. There was nothing else to be 1883. done. On the western Basuto border, the sons of the late

¹ Brookes, *Native Policy*, chap. iv.

² A. 3-80, pp. 13 ff.

³ *Report of Commission on Native Laws and Customs*, G. 4-83 (Cape). The criminal code came into force in 1886.

⁴ G. 66 and 92-83; G. 2-84 (Cape).

⁵ A. 3-80 (Cape), p. 17.

⁶ Vindex, *Political Speeches*, p. 58.

Moroko of Thaba Nchu were at each other's throats, rival Basuto chiefs were driving opponents into the Free State, and Brand, faced as Wodehouse had been with the spread of a neighbour's war to his own territory, called on H.M. Government to maintain order in terms of the treaty of Aliwal North. Great Britain therefore took over Basutoland on condition that the Cape paid that territory its fair share of the customs revenue.¹ The Imperial factor had its uses after all.

March
1884.

On the other hand the Transkei was not abandoned. A coalition of Uppington, Hofmeyr and Sprigg defeated Scanlen at the general election on this issue and, rather than face it out in the House, Scanlen courted defeat on a minor matter connected with the phylloxera. So the Scanlen Ministry 'retired on a bug' whose 'nasty legs covered the whole of the Transkeian map';² the Cape retained its hold east of the Kei, and Brand incorporated Moroko's territory in the Free State.

May
1884.

The native difficulties of the Transvaal were even more serious than those of the Cape and were presently complicated by the arrival of the long-expected rival first-class European Power on the West Coast. Nearly all the belated reforms carried out by the Royal Commission were not unnaturally regarded as dead letters, and so long as native legislation was subject to the Queen's veto in terms of the Pretoria Convention, the Transvaal took no effective steps to deal with the native problem. The Native Locations Commission marked out some reserves within the republic and failed to mark out still more, but that was all.³ The Government was very poor, trade was bad and, for a time, the state was hard put to it to maintain its authority over tribes within the borders. In Lydenburg, Mampuru, successor to the deposed Secocoeni, murdered that unhappy chief, defied the authorities and fled to the caverns of Njabel, chief of the Mapoch group of clans, near Middelburg. Njabel refused to give him up and for eight long months kept the commandos at bay. It was a serious matter for the Transvaal, for another failure might have results similar to those which had followed the breakdown before Secocoeni. Already newspapers were hinting that another 'Basuto' débâcle would be ruinous to the prestige of the white man in South Africa, but two thousand burghers, Secocoeni's people and dynamite finished the war at last. Mampuru was hanged for murder and Njabel's tribe was broken up.⁴

1881-
1884.

1882-
1883.

¹ C. 3708, pp. 3, 22, 35, 39; C. 3717 of 1883, p. 141; Newton, *Unification*, I. 92 ff.

² Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 246.

³ Brookes, *op. cit.*, pp. 126 ff.

⁴ Theal, *History*, 1873-84, II. 136 ff.; Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*, pp. 390 ff.

Meanwhile, trouble had arisen on the Western Transvaal border. Even before the Royal Commission of 1881 had fixed the new boundary in the Keate Award Area, Montsioa, the 'pro-British' Barolong chief of Sehuba, had fallen upon his 'pro-Boer' kinsman, Machabi of Polfontein.¹ The Pretoria Convention line, a compromise between the Keate line and that desired by the Transvaalers, ran right through the lands of the chiefs who had been in alliance with Burgers, and while the ratification of the Convention hung in the balance, Moshette, the Barolong chief of Kunwana, avenged Machabi by driving Montsioa away to Mafeking. Further south on the Griqualand West border Mankoroane, ruler of Batlapin Taungs, attacked the 'pro-Boer' David Massouw, the Korana of Mamusa, who had assisted Moshette.²

All these chiefs relied on European supporters who were to be paid, in the usual fashion, in looted land and cattle. The fighting was not serious in the south and there the Pretoria Government mediated peace. Mankoroane and Massouw both gave up land on which the steady-going J. G. van Niekerk founded the Republic of Stellaland, where he was soon joined by farmers from the various republics and colonies.³ But in the north the fighting was fiercer, for many of the borderers had had a bone to pick with Montsioa since 1868. Gey van Pittius, Moshette's agent, laid waste the country to the gates of Mafeking, and, to gain time, Montsioa became a Transvaal vassal and gave up the best of his land. There van Pittius founded the Republic of Goshen.⁴

The petty republics of Stellaland and Goshen raised big issues. The Transvaal, hard pressed for money and owing the Cape no gratitude for its past selfish customs policy, had levied duties on colonial produce, a protective policy in keeping with Boer instincts, but a sinister novelty in that a tariff wall was thereby erected for the first time within South Africa.⁵ The two little republics would, humanly speaking, soon be incorporated in the Transvaal, and they straddled right across the Missionaries' Road, up which the trade of the Cape must pass to the interior. One man was quick to see the danger. Rhodes urged Scanlen to buy the 'neck of the bottle,' the farms just beyond the Griqualand border, which Mankoroane offered to sell to the Colony.

¹ C. 3098 of 1882, pp. 17, 24, 36.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 107; C. 3381 of 1882, p. 73.

³ Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, pp. 95 ff., on the Volunteers; C. 3419 of 1882, p. 67 (peace); C. 4194 of 1884, pp. 7, 8; C. 3686 of 1883, p. 51.

⁴ C. 3486 of 1883, pp. 71 ff., 80.

⁵ *Staats Courant* (S.A.R.), Nov. 10, 1881.

It was in vain that he assured him that those Transvaalers who were behind the little western republics were 'bouncing' the road to the interior.¹ Scanlen feared Hofmeyr, who at that time looked on the hinterland as the reversion of the Transvaalers, and refused Mankoroane's offer.

1883.

Meanwhile the scramble for Africa had begun.² Livingstone and Stanley had blazed the trails; the Brussels Conference had pointed the way towards an international exploitation of the Dark Continent; Bismarck and Disraeli at the Congress of Berlin had turned the attention of diplomatists to Africa to distract it from the manifest weaknesses of the 'peace with honour.' France took the hint with such vigour that her activities in Tunis drove Italy, which also had ambitions in that quarter, into the Triple Alliance alongside of Germany and Austria; and Leopold of Belgium, deeming international action impossible and scenting a more excellent way, formed the Congo Association and raced France with much success for control of the Congo basin. Soon Great Britain was fairly entangled in Egypt, Italy was established in Eritrea, and the French were next door at Obock. France also wrangled with Britain for control of the Niger, carried matters with a high hand in Madagascar, and put her prohibitive tariffs into force on the Gaboon. It was certain that she would enforce these tariffs elsewhere. Great Britain therefore tried to save the Congo basin for free trade by concluding a treaty with Portugal which recognised Portuguese claims far up the river on both banks, declared navigation free, and provided for international control of the basin.

1882.

1879.

1883.

It was not only the mercantilist imperialism of France that free-trade England had to fear. The Great Powers of Europe and North America were all adopting a protective economic policy; the new great industries demanded the products of tropical Africa; the formation of exclusive economic blocs was visibly taking place and, into the midst of the scramble, stepped Germany clad in shining armour. Bismarck had long ago declared himself opposed to colonies and fleets,³ but missionaries, explorers, merchants and manufacturers of the Fatherland assembled in the Frankfort Colonial Society clamoured for a German empire in Africa. The Iron Chancellor gave way. The new Triple Alliance secured his rear; Russia was friendly; colonial expansion might assuage France's grief for lost Alsace-Lorraine and, duly encouraged, might add to the embarrassments of Great Britain;

¹ Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 157.

² On the Scramble, *vide* Scott-Keltie, *Partition of Africa*; Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*; Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II. 314 ff.; Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, pp. 508 ff.

³ Fitzmaurice, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

German colonials were bristling against the British and Australians in Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and New Guinea, a Reichstag election was near, and the 'colonials' might hold the balance. He determined to twist the Lion's tail wherever he could lay hold of it.

Bismarck found an excellent handhold for that purpose in Namaqualand-Damaraland.¹ Walfisch Bay and the Guano Islands were British, and British subjects held most of the concessions on the mainland; but nearly all the missionaries were German, and Germans controlled most of the trade in ivory and feathers. The coast had long been vaguely regarded as being within the orbit of the Cape, but Afrikaner's request for protection had been refused, and on the withdrawal of the Transvaal trekboers to Angola, the Hereros had once more fallen on the Hottentots. The Cape, busy with the Basuto, had merely cut off powder supplies and left them to fight it out, and the British Government, as in 1868, had replied in non-committal terms to German inquiries on the question of jurisdiction. Robinson indeed sent a warship and Cape volunteers to defend Walfisch Bay; but, almost immediately afterwards, Lüderitz, a merchant of Bremen, bought tracts of land further south for the usual rifles and money from the Namaqua chieftain of Bethany and asked for German protection. Bismarck once more asked whether German subjects might rely on British protection, and, on being told that H.M. Government would consult the Cape, assured Lüderitz that Germany would protect his rights to any unclaimed territory. The agent of the Bremen merchant promptly acquired the harbour of Angra Pequena and the adjacent area from a local chief and hoisted the German flag, a German warship cast anchor in the bay, and a British gunboat was warned off.

1880-
1881.Nov.
1882.May
1883.Oct.
1883.

These negotiations contributed a deeper note to the clamour rising along the Great North Road. Van Niekerk of Stellaland provisionally arranged for union with Goshen, and both he and his puppet, Massouw, asked for Transvaal protection.² The reply would depend on the nature of the proposed revision of the Pretoria Convention. Kruger had recently been elected President by a three to one majority over Commandant-General Joubert, and was above all things anxious to regain his republic's old status of complete independence. His hopes were rising, for Derby, the new Secretary of State, was reported to be well-disposed. S. J. du Toit, General N. Smit, and he therefore went to discuss matters in London.

1883.

¹ For the Namaqua-Damaraland negotiations, *vide* Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II. 347 ff.; also C. 2754 and 2783 of 1881; C. 3113 of 1882; C. 3717 of 1883; C. 4190 and 4265 of 1884.

² C. 3841 of 1884, pp. 22, 23.

Feb.
1884.

Derby had to deal with a Parliament and public which were alarmed at German competition, and with Exeter Hall men led by Lord Shaftesbury and inspired by the Rev. J. Mackenzie who were determined to resist any extension of Boer authority over the tribes.¹ Nevertheless he met Kruger more than half-way. Under the bilateral Convention of London, native legislation was freed from the Queen's veto, the powers of the Resident were cut down to those of a consul and the debt reduced by a third. On the other hand, all Europeans were to be entitled to full civil rights and equal taxation; there were to be no vindictive tariffs nor prohibitions on the importation of British goods and, sole remnant of the substance of suzerainty, the Transvaal was to conclude no treaty with states other than the Free State nor with tribes to the east or west without the approval of H.M. Government. Kruger fought hard for the Road and even offered to neutralise it, but the High Commissioner and Scanlen were present to stiffen Derby's back and insist that there must be a compromise. Finally the Transvaal was given a line which included part only of Stellaland and Goshen and, in recompense for the exclusion of the Road, saw all mention of the hated suzerainty dropped out of the Convention.² So the Transvaal delegates proceeded to Holland, Berlin, Paris and Lisbon and thence home, taking with them a young Hollander lawyer, Dr. W. J. Leyds, who became State Attorney in place of Jorissen, dismissed once more.

Kruger had gained much for his state including the right to use the old title of South African Republic, but he was faced with the difficult task of getting the Convention ratified before the end of August. Once the Convention had been ratified Great Britain would be empowered to appoint commissioners to co-operate with Transvaal officials in maintaining peace on their respective sides of the eastern and western borders. Derby, however, took the false step of sending Mackenzie as commissioner to Bechuanaland at once. Mackenzie first made a treaty with Mankoroane and then rode on to Vryburg, the capital of Stellaland. There he found the townfolk in favour of absorption by the Cape and the die-hards withdrawing towards the Transvaal.³ He took control of the government as far as he could by appointing the Administrator, Van Niekerk, as his assistant commissioner without asking his consent, and hastened on to Goshen where van Pittius and Montsioa were once more at war. He arrived at a fortunate

¹ Mackenzie, *Mackenzie*, pp. 173 ff., 279 ff.; Mackenzie, *Austral Africa*.

² Eybers, pp. 469 ff.; Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, chapter xvi; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 180 n.; C. 3841 of 1884, pp. 106, 145 *et passim*; C. 3947 of 1884, pp. 40 ff.

³ C. 4194 of 1884, pp. 3, 4, 13, 17.

moment, for the chief had just seized Rooigrond, the headquarters of the Goshenites, and part of the new Transvaal territory. Mackenzie therefore declared a British protectorate over Montsioa and all that he held, raised police and returned to hoist the Union Jack at Vryburg.¹ Thereat there was wrath in Pretoria and dismay in Capetown where Upington, with an empty treasury, was nervously contemplating the annexation of Bechuanaland a year hence. The High Commissioner bade Mackenzie lower his flag, and sent Rhodes north to supersede him and to co-operate with Joubert, the Transvaal commissioner.²

Rhodes arrived at Taungs the very moment that the Transvaal Volksraad unwillingly ratified the London Convention and Germany proclaimed a protectorate over Namaqua-Damaraland.³ Aug. 1884. Derby and Granville had declared that any German claim on the coast up to the Angolese border would infringe British rights and had pressed the Cape authorities for arguments in support of the assertion; but the tottering Scanlen ministry, fearing to incur expense, had returned no answer, and when Upington at last persuaded the Assembly to resolve to annex all up to the Portuguese frontier, it was too late.⁴ Bismarck had recently renewed the Dreikaiserbund with Austria and Russia and had asked Great Britain for Heligoland to guard the outlet of the projected Kiel Canal. Troubles were thickening round Great Britain in Africa and the South Seas. Gordon had gone into the Sudan 'to smash the Mahdi,' France was pressing forward on the Slave and Gold Coasts and had joined Germany in denouncing the Anglo-Portuguese Congo Treaty. Bismarck therefore told Granville that he could not show himself friendly to England in Egypt unless England were complacent elsewhere. Granville had no choice but to agree to a joint commission in Fiji and to a German protectorate over the coast of South-West Africa.⁵

Personally, Bismarck was delighted with Granville's conduct, especially as he had also secured Togoland and the Cameroons; but with an eye to the Reichstag elections he blustered in public and declared that friendly relations depended on the denial of the Cape's claims to South-West Africa. The danger in British eyes was that Germany might stride across Bechuanaland and join hands with the Transvaalers or move north-eastwards to link up with the Portuguese or her own agents who were already busy in

¹ C. 4194 of 1884, pp. 31, 40, 44; C. 4213 of 1884, p. 31.

² C. 4213 of 1884, pp. 12, 13. On Rhodes *vide* Michell, *Rhodes*, I. II.; Basil Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*; Fuller, *C. J. Rhodes*; Vindex, *Political Speeches*. A full bibliography is given by Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 331 ff.

³ C. 4213 of 1884, p. 45; C. 4262 of 1884, pp. 3, 11.

⁴ Fitzmaurice, *op. cit.*, II. 349 ff.; C. 4262 of 1884, p. 1.

⁵ Fitzmaurice, *op. cit.*, II. 351, 354.

East Africa. In either case the Cape would be cut off from the interior. It was no idle fear, for when Granville cautiously asked the German ambassador in London whether there was any possible connection between Germany and the Transvaal, he was coolly told that the question was 'one of curiosity.' And the survey for a railway eastward from Angra Pequena (Lüderitzbucht) was put in hand at once.¹

Rhodes for his part determined to extend the authority of the Cape over Bechuanaland, exclude the nerveless imperial factor, capture the central plateau 'and let who will have the swamps which skirt the coast.'² He induced the Stellalanders to submit to Cape rule provided their lands were assured to them; but he and Joubert failed to stop the fighting in Goshen. There, Montsioa gave himself and all his lands, save a tiny reserve, into the hands of van Pittius, and the Rev. S. J. du Toit, who had just succeeded Joubert, tried to force his President's hand by hoisting the Vierkleur.³

Sept.
1884.

This second display of clerical enthusiasm for coloured bunting might have had no more serious results than Mackenzie's had not Kruger, on that very day, annexed Goshen provisionally and subject to the consent of Her Majesty. He did so as the best means of compelling the British Government to take definite steps to end the confusion on his western border, fully intending to withdraw if any objection was made.⁴ There was objection in full measure. In the Colony, where the annexation was believed to be definitive, the newly formed Imperial League demanded imperial intervention and the avenging of Majuba; in Bechuanaland Rhodes saw unexpected virtues in the imperial factor.⁵ Kruger made du Toit lower his offending emblem and withdrew his own proclamation.⁶ But already General Warren was on the way to uphold British interests in the interior.

Oct.
1884.

Behind all the froth of the agitation there was solid ground for alarm. The West Coast was not the only desirable site in South Africa which invited German occupation. Apart from Port St. John's, the long Pondo coast was still unclaimed, and beyond Natal the coast was open as far as Delagoa Bay. In East Pondoland, Umquikela had long protested against the Pondo line. He now applied to Natal for a treaty, took to cattle-rieving, threatened to prevent troops from marching along the

¹ Fitzmaurice, *op. cit.*, II. 355, 359 ff.; Rose, *Development*, p. 523; E. A. Pratt, *Rise of Rail Power*, p. 304.

² C. 4194 of 1884, pp. 88 ff.; Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*, p. 16.

³ C. 4213 of 1884, pp. 93, 97, 117, 123, 137.

⁴ C. 4213 of 1884, p. 136; C. 4251 of 1884, p. 33; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 184; Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, pp. 500 ff.

⁵ *Cape Times*, Sept. 25, 1884; Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 196.

⁶ Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, p. 168 (note); C. 4213 of 1884, p. 104.

waggon road from the Kei to the Natal border, and proposed to levy tolls on Cape waggons. Upington annexed Port St. John's as the only means of safeguarding Cape trade; whereupon Umquikela attacked the Xesibes and tried to open another harbour at Port Grosvenor. H.M. Government replied by declaring a 'warming-pan' protectorate over the whole of the Pondo coast and warned the Cape to annex such coasts as properly belonged to it.¹

Jan.
1885.

In Zululand the situation was more complicated.² Wolseley's thirteen chieftains had fought among themselves and called in the usual white assistants so freely that H.M. Government had restored Cetewayo as king. His kingdom was reduced in size; Usibebu remained independent; the Reserve of Dunn and Hlubi along the Natal border were put under a Resident, and Cetewayo's royal powers did not include the right to make treaties or to cede land without leave.³ War promptly ensued; the loyal Usutu were beaten, Cetewayo was driven out to die in the Reserve, and refugees crossed over to colonial or republican soil.⁴ For some time past Natal had pressed in vain for leave to annex Zululand, whither she proposed to send her own redundant Bantu; but H.M. Government disclaimed authority there.⁵ The Transvaal, on the other hand, was debarred from interfering by the London Convention. There were, however, a few Boers living in Zululand. They were now joined by Lukas Meyer and 300 others, who called on their kinsmen to come and restore order. Men came from the republics and British colonies inspired by a sense of 'a holy duty' to answer the appeals of the Zulu chiefs and to rescue the frontiersmen.⁶ Perhaps the empty lands beyond the Tugela and St. Lucia Bay acted as secondary inducements; but in any case they came, divested themselves as far as might be of their former citizenship by their own declaration, and secured a cession from Dinizulu, son of Cetewayo, whereunder, in return for establishing his authority, they were promised as much land as their leaders might consider necessary for the foundation of an independent republic.⁷

Jan.
1883.

Feb.
1884.

May
1884.

They crowned the Zulu prince as a vassal king of the future republic; a few days later a hundred of them and the Usutu

¹ On Pondoland, *vide* C. 2586 of 1880; C. 4590 of 1885, p. 15 *et passim*; Fitzmaurice, *op. cit.*, II. 370; G. 3-84 (Cape), pp. 15 ff.; G. 2-85, pp. 190, 196.

² On Zululand and the New Republic (1882-7), *vide* C. 3182, 3247, 3270, 3293 of 1882; C. 3466, 3616, 3705 of 1883; C. 3864, 4037, 4191, 4214 of 1884; C. 4274, 4587 of 1885; C. 4645 of 1886; C. 4913, 4980, 5143 of 1887.

³ C. 3466 of 1883, pp. 105 ff., 253.

⁴ C. 3864 of 1884, pp. 60, 104, 190; C. 4037 of 1884, pp. 13, 41.

⁵ C. 4037 of 1884, p. 117.

⁶ C. 4191 of 1884, p. 58; C. 4214 of 1884, pp. 83 ff.

⁷ C. 4037 of 1884, p. 83; C. 4214 of 1884, p. 69; C. 4274 of 1885, p. 2; C. 4645 of 1886, pp. 33, 48; C. 4913 of 1887, p. 7.

drove Usibebu into the Reserve, and the managing committee presented their bill to Dinizulu.¹ So many men had been and were still being moved by a sense of duty that full-sized farms for all of them would have absorbed three-fourths of Zululand. The committee compromised for about half, organised their New Republic round Vryheid as a capital, invited Joubert to become President, and sent surveyors, including young Louis Botha, to mark out the frontiers.² Those frontiers included St. Lucia Bay, where a German in the service of the Transvaal acquired a large cession from Dinizulu. In response to a rumour that he meant to sell it to an agent of the indefatigable Herr Lüderitz, a rumour presently justified by the event, H.M. Government bethought itself of the old treaty of 1843 with Panda. It annexed the Bay in the interests of Natal. The plenipotentiary of the New Republic sought help in France, Holland and Germany; Vryheid, Pretoria and Berlin protested in chorus, but the thing was done. The only serviceable harbour between Durban and Lourenço Marques was in British hands.³

Dec.
1884.

The Imperial Government still proposed that the Cape should have Bechuanaland, but ministers and the High Commissioner could not agree as to terms, and the arrival of Warren to head the projected expedition northward ended the discussion.⁴ Rhodes persuaded the Stellalanders to offer no resistance, Kruger warned the men of Goshen to expect no help, and Warren set off with 5000 men, British and Colonial. He and Rhodes met Kruger and agreed to beacon off the Convention boundary, and an Order in Council was issued providing for the administration of justice in Bechuanaland.⁵ Unluckily Warren, under the influence of Mackenzie, declared martial law and tried to upset Rhodes's Anglo-Dutch scheme of land settlement in favour of a purely English scheme. He pushed on to Mafeking to find the Goshenites fled, and, though the High Commissioner made him revoke his martial law, he went on beyond the Molopo to tell the chiefs that all was now under British protection as far north as the 22nd degree and westward to the 20th degree of east longitude.⁶ Warren was then recalled, and as the Cape Ministry still made difficulties and many Stellalanders petitioned against

¹ C. 4191 of 1884, p. 56; C. 4645 of 1886, pp. 33, 46.

² C. 4214 of 1884, pp. 69, 83, 107; C. 4274 of 1885, p. 29; C. 4645 of 1886, p. 47. Joubert declined the offered presidency.

³ C. 4587 of 1885, pp. 12, 58, 76, 80, 89, 97; Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II. 368 ff.

⁴ C. 4275 of 1885, pp. 9 ff. *et passim*.

⁵ C. 4432 of 1885, pp. 25 ff., 85 ff. *et passim*; C. 4432 of 1885, pp. 1 ff. Goshenites trekked much of Warren's baggage northward at £2 a day per waggon! (Pauling, *Chronicles of a Contractor*, p. 55).

⁶ C. 4643 of 1886, pp. 57, 93; C. 4588 of 1885, pp. 57, 81; C. 4432 of 1885, pp. 48, 106.

absorption by the Colony, British Bechuanaland south of the Molopo was proclaimed a Crown Colony.¹ As for the native men of straw, the Imperial authorities declined to treat Mankoroane as a paramount chief under the new conditions since his town of Taungs was a den of horse-thieves led by Scotty Smith, the Turpin of the borderlands. Mankoroane's rival, Massouw, was less lucky, for, when he tried to prevent the erection of Transvaal beacons in his territory, Joubert and the *staats artillerie* broke up his tribe and transformed his kraal of Mamusa into the dorp of Schweizer-Renecke.²

Warren's expedition, spectacular though it was, cleared the air. Germany and others realised that Great Britain and her colonies had interests in the interior which they were determined to maintain and, in the course of the next few months, most of the outstanding difficulties between Great Britain and Germany were amicably disposed of. True, Gordon was slain at Khartum; Dr. Rolfs still struggled with Sir John Kirk at Zanzibar; Harry Johnston was hard put to it to forestall Karl Peters in East Africa and, in the Pacific, Bismarck snapped up parts of New Guinea and Samoa. But the most dangerous African questions were settled at the Berlin Conference. All the great Powers save the U.S.A. recognised Leopold's Congo Free State and agreed to treat the Congo, the lower Zambesi and the Shire as free rivers and their basins as free trade areas. They also laid down rules for the Scramble. To be valid, occupation of the coast lands must be effective and duly notified to the signatory Powers, and a Sphere of Influence—blessed word—was defined as an area in which a given Power admittedly had prior rights over all others.³

So the Anglo-Egyptian forces abandoned the Sudan; the Italians ensconced themselves at Massowah; the Royal Niger Company made good its hold in Southern Nigeria; France declared a protectorate over the Comoros and Madagascar, and Bismarck gave up such claims as he might have had on St. Lucia Bay and the parts adjacent in exchange for concessions in the Cameroons. The Reichstag elections were safely past; he had got most of what he wanted; France showed no signs of forgoing *La Revanche* and besides, 'the Boers were not prepared to take any proper action in the matter' of the Bay. He proposed 'to hold rather with the English' than with the French.⁴ German pressure on Great Britain ceased as suddenly as it had begun, according to plan.

The way was now cleared for the recognition of President

¹ C. 4588 of 1885, p. 117; C. 4643 of 1886, p. 93.

² Theal, *History, 1873-84*, II. 173 ff.

³ Fitzmaurice, *Granville*, II. 371 ff.; Hertslet, *Map of Africa*, p. 20.

⁴ C. 4587 of 1885, p. 80; Rose, *Development*, p. 528.

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Oct. 1886. Meyer and his New Republic. This was accorded, but the little state was deprived of its seaboard and its protectorate over Dinizulu and, next year, Great Britain annexed the remains of Zululand.¹ That territory was placed under the Governor of Natal and a Resident, one of whose first acts was to banish the rebellious Dinizulu to St. Helena.

1887. The Cape, too, summoned up courage to take part in the scramble. It relieved the Imperial Government of Walfisch Bay and, in the lands to the west of Natal, annexed Galekaland and Tembuland and prepared to end the growing confusion on the Pondo border, where Umquikela was taking toll on the waggon road, stirring up trouble with the West Pondos and driving recalcitrants into Griqualand East.² Bismarck too was still showing himself inclined to support the claims of a couple of German traders who were settled among other concessionaires on the East Pondo coast; white men were egging Umquikela on against the Xesibes, and Escombe of Natal was negotiating with him with a view to annexation. A show of force by the Cape was all that was necessary. The Xesibes of Mount Ayliff were annexed at last to the Colony; Umquikela's claims over Port St. John's and the road through the Rode Valley were bought out; the two Pondolands were left independent for a season with a British protectorate over their coasts, and comparative peace reigned in all the Transkeian territories.³

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Dec.
1886.

Thus the whole coast from the mouth of the Orange round to the Portuguese border south of Delagoa Bay was in British hands save the narrow belt of Tongaland wherein lay the harbour of Kosi Bay. Inland, a great wedge of British territory had been driven between the Transvaalers and the Germans up to the boundary of Matabeleland, the reputed region of King Solomon's Mines.

The connection between the port and the mines was closer than would at first sight appear. It was supplied by the Transvaal. Kruger, heir to the Retief-Pretorius policy, aimed at the formation of a great independent republic north of the Orange with a port of its own on the Indian Ocean. The London Convention withheld from him control of the road to the north and full liberty of action in the sphere of foreign policy, but it did not specifically debar him from making treaties with tribes to the north of the Limpopo. Similarly, since St. Lucia Bay was now British and Lourenço Marques still Portuguese, the only possible independent outlet was through Tongaland; but to reach blue water there

¹ C. 4980 of 1887, p. 60; C. 5892 of 1890, pp. 72 ff.; C. 5143 of 1887, p. 41.

² On Pondoland, *vide* C. 5022 of 1887; C. 5410 of 1888; G. 5 and 30-86; G. 12-87 (Cape).

³ Eybers, pp. 69, 70; G. 10 and 10a (Cape).

he must make treaties whose ratification rested with the Imperial Government.

Kruger's prospects of success in either direction were complicated by the fact that the issues were not purely political. Political divisions in South Africa were ceasing to coincide with racial. Sentiment remained as a great force, but it was yielding to economic pressure and was itself becoming a dividing rather than a uniting force among Afrikanders. The Bond had failed as a Pan-Afrikander institution. Kruger as triumvir had been pleased to see du Toit attacking Hofmeyr, a possible presidential rival; but once he himself had been elected President with the help of his fellow-Doppers, he frowned upon an association which might be used against him in future elections and already had his most dangerous opponent, Joubert, for a patron. The Hollanders, too, worked against du Toit, the apostle of Afrikaans, and the Bond flickered out in the Transvaal. 1884-
1889.

Its fate was much the same in the Free State, where Brand had from the first deprecated it as a possible *imperium in imperio* and a redundant school of patriotism in a Boer republic. In the Colony the Bond became a purely colonial institution. Its formulae were not finally worded to Hofmeyr's taste till 1889, but he gradually made the institution itself a training-ground in politics for the Cape country folk.¹ So the Cape Bondsmen became loyal to the Crown, jealous for the rights of Afrikanders and strong to support or overthrow ministries, while the prudent policy of Robinson, the High Commissioner, did much to sweep away the suspicions which they and colonially-minded Englishmen had entertained for the Imperial factor.

For that very reason Cape Afrikanders were suspect in the eyes of the Transvaalers. There was jealousy mingled with that suspicion. The lot of the Transvaalers had been harder than that of the Free Staters and, still more, the Colonists. They were, and they knew they were, less versed in the arts of civilisation, though their leaders believed that given time and a fair chance they could reach the same level.² Now, as the task of governing his republic became more complex, Kruger found that 'sons of the soil' might indeed hold office, but the actual work of administration had to be done by others. Cape men and even Free Staters he would not have. He fell back reluctantly on educated Germans and Hollanders, and thereby annoyed his burghers who objected to being patronised by some of these men as country cousins, and infuriated Afrikanders in other parts who asked whether they too were not sons of the soil.

The Sinn Fein economic policy of the Transvaal inflamed all

¹ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 208 ff.

² Carter, *Narrative*, pp. 12 ff.

these jealousies. From the first, the restored republic, regardless of its restricted home market and lack of skilled men and experience, had granted concessions and set up Burke's 'teasing customs-house and a multiplicity of perplexing regulations' in the hope of thereby becoming self-supporting. The policy had the effect of endowing it with more industries of a sort than any other state in South Africa, but it naturally failed of its main object and awakened bitterness among burghers and uitlanders alike. They had to pay high prices to the concessionaires, who were usually Continentals, for goods which in many cases were imported in a practically finished form.¹

The railway policy of the Republic also taught the Free State and the Colony to regard it as the business enemy. The Cape trunk lines had reached Kimberley, Richmond and Aliwal North. The Colony desired to carry those lines on to republican soil and to secure free trade within South Africa; but the farmers of both republics feared the railways as deadly competitors in the transport-riding business and possible threats to their cherished independence. Therein they were right, but a definite railway policy was forced on the Transvaal by a rush to De Kaap on the alluvial goldfields of Lydenburg and the discovery of gold quartz at Moodie's hard by. Quartz required heavy machinery. Some speedy, cheap and tsetse-proof connection with Delagoa Bay, the natural harbour, became imperative. The Portuguese gave a concession to McMurdo, an American citizen, who floated a company in London to build a railway from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal border, and the Republic gave a Hollando-German syndicate the monopoly of railway construction within its own borders.²

Natal, which still hoped to carry its line on into the republics, found it to its interest to work with the Transvaal against the Cape Colony, but the Free State was pulled in two directions. As an Afrikaner republic it felt that it ought to support the Transvaal; but the Transvaal tariffs were disconcerting and, as a community of producers and consumers, it looked towards the Cape ports. The Cape had retaliated against the Transvaal but it had given Basutoland a share of the customs revenue; Rhodes was already talking of a customs union; Hofmeyr won protection for Cape produce against overseas goods, a policy which would well suit the Free State, and Rhodes obtained a rebate on the carriage of goods to the Free State equivalent to the difference between the Cape and the lower Natal duties.³

¹ Cd. 623 of 1901, *passim*; *Staats Courant* (S.A.R.), Oct. 11, 1881.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 17 ff.; C. 5903 of 1890, p. 19.

³ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, chapters xix., xx.; Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, pp. 455 ff.; Botha, *Kruger en Leyds*, chap. ix., x., xi.

At one stage there was even a hope that the Transvaal would be drawn south. Its finances and the popularity of its President were both at low ebb.¹ The Free State rejected petitions in favour of republican union for fear of falling under the limitations of the London Convention; McMurdo's railway had foundered temporarily in the mud-flats behind Delagoa Bay; the Hollando-German syndicate showed no signs of commencing operations, and the Warren expedition had shattered any hopes that Pretoria might have entertained of a railway linking it with the West Coast. Twice Kruger asked the Cape for a customs union and once even for the extension of the dreaded Kimberley line; but though Brand suggested a general Zollverein and Rhodes renewed his entreaties, the hard-pressed Upington ministry let the golden opportunity slip. It was never recovered, for when the Cape presently suggested a customs conference, Natal replied with polite generalities and the Transvaal refused point blank.¹ For the Struben brothers had discovered gold conglomerate on the Witwatersrand; the news had leaked out to Kimberley, and the diamond lords were rushing to the High Veld. Mining areas were proclaimed on the Rand; in September, Johannesburg began to take shape; the great Sheba mine was opened in Lydenburg, and the Transvaal which had hitherto been the Cinderella of the South African family suddenly blossomed forth as the Rich Relation.²

Hofmeyr, the Cape Bond and Sprigg, who had taken Upington's place as Premier in a reshuffled ministry, begged Kruger to talk business and not to cause bad blood among brother Afrikaners.³ Kruger's reply was uncompromisingly businesslike. He tried to force the Free State into the economic orbit of his state. McMurdo was advancing once more under pressure and the Netherlands Railway Company had at length begun to build the trunk line to Pretoria. Wherefore, Kruger met Brand and offered to renew the old treaty of amity and commerce in exchange for an offensive and defensive alliance, declined to hear of a real federation and insisted that the Port Elizabeth line must be kept out of the Free State for ten years to come. Brand refused to put his burghers at the disposal of the most unruly state in South Africa, especially as the Transvaalers talked of the need of a port through which foreigners might come 'with a view to future complications.' Nor would he have his hands tied in the matter of railways. With a Bond-supported Ministry at Capetown and

¹ In 1885 the Government raised a loan of £5000 privately with difficulty; in 1886, to save expense, the Volksraad proposed to abolish the four urban seats. (Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, pp. 454, 457; Cd. 2479 of 1905, p. 21.)

² G. 42-86 (Cape).

³ *The Gold Fields of South Africa* (1890); Glanville, *South African Gold Fields* (1888).

⁴ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 331; G. 37-87 (Cape).

Robinson as High Commissioner he was less fearful of southern influences than was his brother President.¹

Jan. 1888. Brand then joined with Hofmeyr in securing a customs conference. The Transvaal refused to attend and the Durban Chamber of Commerce successfully repudiated the work of the Natal delegates; but the Cape and the Free State agreed upon principles, and in spite of the offer of a Natal line to Harrismith, the Free State Volksraad carried the extension of the Port Elizabeth line to Bloemfontein by the casting vote of the chairman.²

July 1888. At this crisis Brand the peacemaker died and the railway war went on. Rhodes, back once more in politics after consolidating the diamond interests of Kimberley, still hoped that Kruger would allow the Free State line to pass through Johannesburg and Pretoria on its way to the Zambesi and the riches of Central Africa towards which his eyes were steadily turning. Hofmeyr shared his hopes and together the two men defeated Sprigg's proposal to extend Kruger's bugbear, the Kimberley line, to the Transvaal frontier. Rather than have that Kruger promised that, if only the Free State line would wait at Bloemfontein till the Delagoa line was within 200 miles of Pretoria, it might then come on and he would give free trade to the Colony.³

March 1889. So Kruger gained time and concluded a close defensive alliance with Reitz, the new President of the Free State.⁴ Each republic was only to be bound to aid its fellow if it thought that its cause was good, but the Free State was none the less drawn politically towards the north. Economically, however, it was drawn strongly towards the south by the conclusion of a customs convention with the Colony. Natal's delegates had withdrawn from the customs conference, calling on the Imperial Government to defend their commercial interests against the Cape;⁵ but McMurdo's railway had stopped again and Joubert talked of blocking the Delagoa line and admitting the Natal railway. Kruger wavered once more and promised that if only the Kimberley extension were stayed till the Delagoa line was finished, he would give free trade to the Colony. He was saved by the Portuguese, who seized McMurdo's railway and carried it on themselves.⁶ The Transvaal Volksraad, not for the last time, promptly showed itself more unyielding than its President in the matter of customs policy, and the Delagoa line reached republican soil. The reply of the South came short and sharp. A syndicate headed by Rhodes and Alfred Beit had just

¹ *O.F.S. Orangebook i Rapport . . . Oct. 1887*; 'Times' *History of the War*, I. 95 ff.

² G. 8-88 (Cape); C. 5390 of 1888.

³ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

⁴ Van Oordt, *Paul Kruger*, p. 498.

⁵ G. 26-89 (Cape).

⁶ C. 5903 of 1890.

secured a charter for the British South Africa Company to permit of the exploitation of 'King Solomon's Mines,' and it now contracted with the Cape Government to carry the Kimberley line northward through Bechuanaland.¹ Since Kruger would not have the Cape-to-Cairo railway through his republic, it should go along the boundary, drawing to it the traffic of the western Transvaal. Oct. 1889.

The financial strength of the redoubtable syndicate lay in the diamond mines of Kimberley. The process of amalgamation had begun when joint-stock companies had come into being, and had been hastened by the slump and the heavy falls of earth 1882. which made individual working an impossibility. The need for unified control of the industry was obvious. The extension of the Diamond Trade Act to the whole Colony and the compounding 1885. of native labourers did something to check I.D.B., but that evil could never be ended till all the South African states were prepared to work together in this and in other matters; while, on the abandonment of the open pit system, the various companies mined and countermined each other underground and sought to undercut each other in the law courts and the diamond market.

Two men came to the front in the struggle for control: Barney Barnato, an East End Jew, and Rhodes, the son of a Hertfordshire parson. In the intervals of keeping his terms at Oriel, struggling with the men of Goshen and drawing up a comprehensive will which endowed Great Britain with the most desirable portions of the earth in the interests of humanity, Rhodes had 1880. formed the Old De Beers Company. With the constant help of Alfred Beit and the occasional assistance of Rothschild, he joined issue with Barnato. Barnato held most of the famous Kimberley mine, the richest of all the diamond areas; nevertheless, Rhodes won the game. Old De Beers and the Kimberley companies made way for De Beers Consolidated, which soon acquired May 1889. Bultfontein, Dutoitspan, a large share in the Free State mine at Jagersfontein and, presently, the new Wesselson Premier near 1891. Kimberley. It thus controlled 90 per cent. of the diamonds of South Africa and therefore, in view of the comparative exhaustion of the Brazilian alluvial areas, the vast bulk of the diamond output of the world.²

The amalgamation was not complete before the Rand began to take the place of Kimberley as the political and economic

¹ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 357, 384; *B.S.A. Company Report for 1889-92*, p. 3.

² Gardner Williams, *Diamond Mines*, chapters ix., x.; Amphlett, *Standard Bank*, pp. 65 ff.; Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, pp. 92 ff.

centre of gravity in South Africa. Rhodes was directly interested in the affairs of the Transvaal in that he was one of the founders of the Goldfields of South Africa Company, but, for a long time, his influence was on the external rather than the internal politics of the republic. It is never easy to say what Rhodes's plans were at any one time, but his ideas when fully developed came to this: the Imperial Government was slow to scramble for Africa; therefore the Colony and his companies must annex as much of the unclaimed interior as possible. Given that, the Transvaal and Natal would surely be obliged to enter the customs union. As in the case of the German Zollverein, the customs union might speedily become a political federation over which the Union Jack would float as the federal flag while the republics kept their constitutions and their own flags for local purposes, as Lydenburg had done on joining the S.A. Republic in 1860. In this economic and political federation, the old Colony would take the position due to it as the natural leader, the base of the advance northward and the possessor of the southern terminus of the Cape-to-Cairo railway and Transcontinental telegraph which were to link up with the British systems in Egypt, form the trunk lines for any coastal connections through foreign territory and tap the labour supply of Central Africa for the gold-mines.¹ So, with a suitably low tariff and a preference for British goods in the widest sense of the term, the Empire would be provided with a solid economic bloc from end to end of Africa, the core of a possible Imperial Zollverein which might even become an Imperial federation. The idea of such federation was in the air. The Home Rule Bill had given rise to talk of federalism within the United Kingdom; improving means of communication and the Queen's Jubilee had naturally turned men's thoughts in that direction; at the first Colonial Conference, itself a sign of the times, Hofmeyr had advocated a common customs barrier round the Empire against foreign goods which would thus pay for the maintenance of the Navy, at any rate in the first instance.² But the first step was to make sure of Matabele-Mashonaland, the domain of Lobengula, which lay just beyond the northern border of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Under the trust deed which Rhodes had forced upon the uncomprehending Barnato, De Beers was empowered to spend its profits on the northern expansion; ³ but if the British wedge was to be driven in to the valley of the Nile or even to the shores of Lake Tanganyika, it must be driven quickly. It was Rhodes's tragedy that he must always work in a hurry in a

¹ Cd. 1897 of 1904, p. 124.

² Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

³ Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 184 ff.; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 196.

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continent where men of rival nationalities were also busy driving wedges. In the centre Leopold was rapidly transforming the Congo Free State into a Belgian preserve, and though Great Britain and Germany had defined their mutual boundaries in East Africa, the borders of German South-West Africa were still debatable and might extend far across Africa. France and Germany had also settled their outstanding disputes and had recognised the claims of Portugal to a wide lateral belt right across Africa from Mozambique to Angola in so far as those claims did not conflict with the rights of other states.¹ Germany from the west and Portugal from the east might easily meet on the middle Zambesi; it was becoming a question too how long Portugal would respect the Shire and lower Zambesi as open rivers. Lord Salisbury had protested against the claims of Portugal to part of Matabele-Mashonaland and the shores of Lake Nyassa on the ground that British subjects were specially interested in those areas. But protests were one thing and action another. Rhodes's best hope was the Berlin Act, which laid down that claims must be made good by occupation and, though Portugal rightly urged that this rule only applied to coast-lands,² occupation was after all the surest way of making any claims good. And the Portuguese had not shone as effective occupiers of African territory hitherto.

The acquisition of Matabele-Mashonaland, however, promised to lead to trouble with the Transvaal. The Boers were an expansive people. Some had only recently settled down in Angola; others were now peacefully penetrating Swaziland; others again were gazing at the grasslands beyond the Limpopo and reminding one another of their old treaty of friendship with Umsilikazi, Lobengula's father, and arguing that the London Convention, by omitting to close the door definitely, had implicitly left the North to them as a sphere of influence. The clause which limited the treaty-making power of the Republic to the west and east had really aimed at preserving the road to that very North for British and colonial traffic, and the unbeaconed northern boundary of the Protectorate apparently cut the Transvaal off from all access to it; ³ but however that might be, signs of what was coming had already appeared.

Lobengula had not been disturbed by the proclamation of the Protectorate, though he had waxed wroth when his neighbour, Khama, the Mangwato of Shoshong, had offered the Queen lands between the Shashi and Macloustie rivers which he also

¹ C. 5904 of 1890, pp. 1 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 9.

³ C. 4588 of 1885, p. 12.

1887. claimed.¹ He knew something of white men, for his kingdom had long harboured the usual European advance-guard of missionaries, hunters, traders and scallywags. Soon concession-hunters were busy in the Protectorate and presently they clustered round the Tree of Justice at Bulawayo. Among them was a representative of the ubiquitous Rhodes and Beit who reported that Lobengula desired British protection. Had not his father long ago signed a treaty of amity with D'Urban? ²

July 1887. The first treaty to the point was signed by one, Grobler, who entered into an alliance with Lobengula on behalf of the Transvaal and arranged for special privileges for burghers north of the Limpopo under the jurisdiction of their own consul.³ Robinson announced that H.M. Government was willing to define the boundary of the Protectorate so as to leave the Transvaal a window open to the north, but as the activities of the concession-hunters at Bulawayo continued unabated and the Transvaal was said to be stretching the Grobler treaty to control the granting of such concessions, he sent J. S. Moffat, assistant commissioner at Khama's, to safeguard British interests in Matabeleland.

Feb. 1888. Moffat induced the king to sign a treaty pledging him not to cede territory without leave of the High Commissioner, and in spite of Transvaal protests, Robinson ratified the treaty and sent up the Bechuanaland Police to Fort Elebi partly as a warning to the Republic and partly to prevent strife between the Matabele and the Bamangwato in the Shashi lands.⁴ Meanwhile Grobler had been appointed consul at Bulawayo. He rashly entered the disputed territory and was slain in a scuffle with one of Khama's subordinates. It was freely stated at Pretoria that the Bamangwato had been egged on by British officials. Kruger, however, was moderate as usual, except for an attempt to invoke foreign arbitration over a trivial point at the last moment; Robinson handled the ugly business tactfully and the incident closed with the payment of compensation by Khama in person at Pretoria.⁵

Oct. 1888. Nevertheless, Robinson insisted that Lobengula's dominions were within the British sphere under the Moffat treaty. Helped by Moffat and the timely arrival of prominent British officials, the agents of Rhodes and Beit secured the famous Rudd concession

¹ C. 4588 of 1885, p. 12.

² C. 4588 of 1885, p. 22.

³ Leyds, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

⁴ C. 5904 of 1890, p. 16; Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 300.

⁵ C. 5918 of 1890, *passim*; Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff.; Leyds, *op. cit.*, pp. 396 ff.; De Waal, *With Rhodes in Mashonaland*, p. 30.

which, in return for 1000 Martini-Henrys, 100,000 rounds, £1200 annually and, of all things, a steamboat to ply on the Zambesi, gave its holders the monopoly of the minerals in all Lobengula's kingdom.¹ That concession was upheld by the Imperial Government and ultimately became the basis of the British South Africa Company.

It now remained for Rhodes to keep the wavering king to his bargain and to float a company which could utilise the concession. The first end was achieved more or less by two of his agents, Maguire and Thompson, and at one critical stage by Dr. L. S. Jameson who, at Rhodes's request, abandoned a lucrative practice at Kimberley to 'keep Lobengula sweet' with that elusive charm and bantering tongue of his.² The second objective was not attained so easily. In London the South African Committee headed by Chamberlain fiercely attacked the wholesale concession and the guns which were to be part payment for it. Knutsford, the Secretary of State, winced at the guns, and was not satisfied that it was wise to let loose a gold-seeking joint-stock company in tribal country. But he was assured that natives always put up the sights as far as they would go to make the guns shoot harder, and that, therefore, such weapons would be less dangerous in their hands than assegais; and since, with the revival of mercantilism, the day of the chartered company had come again in Borneo, Nigeria and East Africa, he was at last induced to consider a company under a Royal Charter in Southern Africa.³

But Mackenzie and a strong section of the London Chamber of Commerce demanded direct rule by the Crown in Matabeleland. Two distinct schools of Imperialism had taken shape in the heats of the Irish controversy. The one, the Home Rule school to which Rhodes, Hofmeyr, Sir George Grey in his old age, and all who took the 'colonial' view belonged, held that expansion must be carried out by the self-governing colonies as active agents and initiators; the other, the Unionist, held that the Imperial Government must act and rule even though that rule give way ultimately to colonial control. It was on Unionist principles that Warren and Mackenzie had fought Rhodes's Bechuanaland settlement and, more recently, had striven with the open sympathy of Chamberlain, the Radical supporter of Salisbury's Tory ministry,

¹ C. 5918 of 1890, pp. 139, 146.

² Colvin, *Jameson*, I. 89. C. D. Rudd was Rhodes's partner in the Goldfields of S. A. Co.; Rochefort Maguire was a fellow of All Souls'; and F. R. (Matabele) Thompson was an Eastern Province man. It takes all sorts to make an Empire (Hole, *op. cit.*, p. 67).

³ C. 5918 of 1890, pp. 129, 154, 180.

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to separate the powers of the High Commissioner, who was responsible only to the Queen, from those of the Governor of the Cape, who must follow the advice of his ministers. Robinson had successfully defended his double powers at the cost of a personal quarrel with Knutsford. His term was ending, but it was confidently hoped in Capetown and in Pretoria also that he was merely going home to be reappointed. He destroyed all hope of that by his own act. On the eve of his departure he declared as his own personal opinion, but for all the world to hear, that there was no room for the action of the Imperial factor on a large scale in the internal affairs of South Africa.¹

April
1889.

So Robinson sailed and Sir Henry Loch, a staunch Unionist, was appointed to take his place, while Rhodes and Beit added many concessions in Bechuanaland to the all-important Rudd concession. But a rival group led by Lord Gifford was strongly entrenched in the Protectorate; yet another group had a footing in Matabeleland; worse still, Lobengula repudiated the Rudd concession, the usual fate of such documents, and, to appease his young bloods, executed the induna who had most markedly favoured the concessionaires.² Rhodes and Beit therefore joined hands with their principal opponents, made the necessary arrangements with De Beers, applied for a charter covering the Protectorate and what is now Southern Rhodesia, and even went so far as to offer to share with H.M. Government the cost of a telegraph line to Mafeking and to pay for a British Resident at Bulawayo who should give moral support to the projected company.³ That company was to carry the railway and telegraph lines northward, encourage immigration, promote trade, and 'develope and work mineral and other concessions under the management of one powerful organisation, thereby obviating conflicts and complications . . . and securing to the native chiefs and their subjects the rights reserved to them under the several concessions.' At length the charter was issued to the British South Africa Company. Two stipulations and one warning the Crown gave. The Duke of Fife, the Duke of Abercorn and Albert (Earl) Grey were to become directors to give something more than a mere financial tone to so potentially powerful an association; the rival concessionaires, whose name was legion, must be bought out to avoid the troubles which were afflicting Swaziland; and the directors were reminded that, though the Charter gave them the faculty of exercising wide

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¹ C. 4839 of 1886, pp. 100 ff.; C. 4890 of 1886, p. 28; C. 5488 of 1888, pp. 16 ff.; Newton, *Unification*, I. 97, 102; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 206; Mackenzie, *Mackenzie*, pp. 416 ff.; Vindex, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi.

² C. 5918 of 1890, p. 201; Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*, pp. 107, 113.

³ C. 5918 of 1890, p. 195; *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1889-92, p. 2.

powers in Lobengula's dominions, those powers could only become real with that sovereign's consent.¹

So far, so good, but the other Richmonds in the field had not been idle. England's 'most ancient ally' was making trouble on both sides of the lower Zambesi. Portugal had closed that river and seized a British ship, while Serpa Pinto was wrestling with Harry Johnston, consul at the Blantyre mission, for control of the Shire river and Lake Nyassa, not without the use of force against the Makololo.² Pinto now proposed to push up the Zambesi and then southward down one of its tributaries to meet Colonel d'Andrada, administrator of the Mozambique Company, who claimed great concessions in Gazaland and Manica and the Mazoë valley. Portuguese control over the eastern coast belt had somewhat improved of late, though the semi-independent prazo owners with their fighting tails of blacks were still a danger to the Royal authority. D'Andrada soon claimed that he had reasserted control over Gungunhana, king of the Shangaans in Gazaland, and over the Mashona of the hinterland up to the line of the Sabi river, who had long been vaguely regarded as Portuguese subjects and were reported never to have seen the Matabele who also claimed them as 'dogs.'³ Portugal tried in vain to bring Germany into the negotiations with Great Britain; but Salisbury ridiculed their vast claims based on forts in ruins, like Portuguese influence. He threatened to reply with force if the protected Makololo were again interfered with and followed this up with an ultimatum before which Portugal fell back pending a general settlement of boundaries.⁴

The Chartered Company was thus left face to face with the Transvaal. Kruger had no particular ambitions in the North but he earnestly desired Kosi Bay in Tongaland. To reach that port he must pass through or acquire Swaziland whose independence had been guaranteed by the Convention, and the lands of Umbegisa and Zambaan, two petty chieftains ruling on either side of the Maputa river between the Swazis and the Tongas, and, finally, come to terms with Zambili, queen of the Tongas. His power to make treaties with all these chieftains was limited by the Convention.⁵

Swaziland was surrounded on three sides by republican soil,

¹ Eybers, *Select Documents*, pp. 559 ff.; C. 5918 of 1890, pp. 189, 224.

² C. 5904 of 1890, p. 13.

³ D'Andrada, *Manica and Report*; C. 5904 of 1890, pp. 65, 76, 80, 223.

⁴ C. 5904 of 1890, pp. 70, 201, 206 ff.

⁵ On Swaziland, *vide* C. 5089 of 1887; C. 5918, 6200, 6201 of 1890; on the port, *vide* Botha, *Kruger en Leyds*, chap. xii.

the grazing was valuable to burghers, and Kruger desired to renew the control which his state had exercised there between 1875 and 1881. Unfortunately Natal also desired to have Swaziland, wherefore Joubert and A. Shepstone manœuvred against each other for a protectorate while Umbandine the king gave grazing rights and concessions of the most amazing scope, variety and intricacy to anyone who would supply him with champagne and greyhounds.¹ Once the truncated New Republic had been recognised and the remains of Zululand annexed by Great Britain the affairs of Swaziland came to the front. Theophilus Shepstone the younger (Offy) had become agent and adviser to the bibulous Umbandine, but the British Government declined to recognise him officially and suggested a joint British-Transvaal inquiry. Offy and the concessionaires then elected a committee to govern the Europeans in Swaziland and H.M. Government, seeing the hope of peace, dropped the idea of an inquiry. At the same time it took the Tongas into the British sphere by treaty and erroneously took with them Zambaan and Umbegisa.²

July
1887.

July
1888.

Feb.
1889.

April
1889.

The next move in the complicated game was the absorption of the New Republic by the Transvaal as the district of Vryheid and the acquisition of the most essential Swazi concessions by the enlarged republic. The Transvaal was thus in a position to prevent any settlement in that distressful country without its goodwill. It now declared that Zambaan and Umbegisa had been included in the Tonga treaty wrongfully, and the two chiefs, protesting their independence, asked for Transvaal protection.³ Umbandine, for his part, dismissed Shepstone and entrusted himself to one, Miller, who forwarded a request for British protection, a request which was seriously discounted by the fact that the king granted a startling concession which virtually put the control of his foreign policy into the hands of Hermann Eckstein, a Johannesburg German and friend of Kruger. Kruger therefore privately told Robinson that he would withdraw his claims in the north and west if he might have a free hand in the lands of Umbandine, Zambaan, Umbegisa and Queen Zambili.⁴

Kruger had good hopes of success, for the High Commissioner knew that Umbandine was playing double and had already roundly stated that Swaziland must come under the rule of either

¹ C. 5089 of 1887, *passim*.

² C. 6200 of 1890, pp. 11, 40 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 85, 110, 140.

⁴ C. 5918 of 1890, p. 190; C. 6200 of 1890, pp. 116, 135, 160.

Great Britain or the Republic ; but the letter reached Robinson at the moment of his departure and the later official message thus had no chance of serious consideration till Loch should arrive in December. Undeterred, the majority of the Europeans in Swaziland declared in favour of Transvaal rule just as the Volksraad showed finally that it would have nothing to do with any customs or railway union with the colonies.¹ H.M. Government therefore revived the idea of a joint commission for which Kruger had asked ; but before the members could meet, Umbandine died leaving the Queen Dowager to rule with Offy Shepstone once more as adviser. All that the commission could do, in face of a renewed request by the whites for Transvaal rule, was to set up a joint government of three to control them for four months in place of the corrupt committee and withdraw.²

July
1889.Dec.
1889.

Loch arrived to find all the complicated issues of South African politics coming to a head. In the midst of the confusion one, Bowler, announced his intention of leading a Transvaal trek into Mashonaland. Kruger, anxious to come to terms with Great Britain, forbade the trek, and in spite of Loch's somewhat unnecessary demand that he should hold himself responsible for any violation of British territory in the north, wisely invited the High Commissioner to meet him and discuss the general situation.³

The ensuing conference at Blignaut's Pont was not so representative as had been expected for though Rhodes attended, neither Sprigg nor Reitz was present. Loch had in his hand the report of the British Commissioner to Swaziland recommending that the Transvaal should be allowed to rule the Swazi whites and annex Umbegisa, but should also be asked to promote British interests in the north, give free entry to South African produce, permit either the Cape or the Natal railway to cross its borders, and join a customs union with one or other of the colonies. Thereafter, the Republic might have a railway strip through Swaziland and an area at Kosi Bay subject to British rights of pre-emption, but Zambaan must come to Zululand.⁴

March
1890.

Discussion at the conference turned mainly on Swaziland and the port.⁵ Loch was under orders to demand joint rule over

¹ Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

² C. 6200 of 1890, pp. 105, 115, 130, 163, 204, 237, 240.

³ Leyds, *op. cit.*, pp. 429 ff. ; C. 6217 of 1890, p. 14.

⁴ C. 6201 of 1890, pp. 5 ff.

⁵ C. 6217 of 1890, *passim*, for Loch's report on the Conference and negotiations ending with the ratification of the First Swaziland Convention. *Vide* also Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, chapter xxiii. ; Leyds, *op. cit.*, chapters xxxviii.-xl.

the Swaziland Europeans and to deny the Republic sovereign rights over the railway strip through that territory. He refused to bargain for a Transvaal withdrawal in the north by giving the Republic sovereignty over Swaziland, and insisted that Kosi Bay and the railway strips must be purchased at the price of entry into a customs union. Kruger regarded withdrawal in the north as the *quid pro quo* for British withdrawal in the east, for he knew that the prospect of land in Swaziland was the only means of assuaging the disappointment of Joubert and his supporters who were set upon a northward expansion. Rhodes at least agreed that that was the bargain, and Loch went so far as to assent to the annexation of the Little Free State on the Swazi border which Umbandine had ceded to a Transvaal official, to promise to help Kruger to make the treaties which would clear his path to the sea and, at the last moment, to recommend that he should have Umbegisa's lands and a sovereign strip through Swaziland. Kruger agreed to an extension of the life of the joint government in Swaziland and, since he could not bind himself to anything more without the consent of his executive council and Volksraad, satisfied Loch with a promise to recommend the terms to his executive.

Soon Kruger was complaining that the bargain was too hard. His position was very difficult. At the Pont, he had gone as far as he could personally to accept what Loch called a provisional agreement ; but though he presently admitted he had no objection to that agreement in principle and even submitted it to his executive, he soon found that it was as much as his place was worth to press it on them and still less upon his Volksraad and his burghers, incensed as they were against the British by the folly of certain irresponsibles who had insulted the Vierkleur on his journey through Johannesburg to the Pont. Loch had secured some concessions for him ; but the Imperial Government still refused to recognise sovereign rights over the Swazi strip and shelved the matter of Umbegisa, and now Loch sent him a signed draft of the convention, named a date for ratification¹ and proceeded to organise police to support a British commissioner in Swaziland in terms of the London Convention in case ratification should not be forthcoming.

To ease the strain Loch also sent Hofmeyr to Pretoria and, at the end of protracted negotiations, authorised him to promise that once joint rule were established over the Europeans in Swaziland and the work of the proposed concessions court completed, the British Government would consider any other points

¹ C. 6217 of 1890, p. 15.

which the Republic might raise with a desire to meet them.¹ Kruger was immensely relieved at the proposal and the executive at last gave way.² All mention of the doings at the Pont was omitted; everything save the Swazi-Matabeleland clauses was made dependent on the entry of the Transvaal into a customs union within six months of acquiring the port and the railway strips, and either party was left free to denounce the convention if it were not fully carried out within three years.³ The Volksraad ratified this First Swaziland Convention as a temporary measure and intimated that it had no wish to share in the disputes pending between the British and the Portuguese. Aug.
1890.

Rhodes meanwhile made all haste to occupy Mashonaland. The immediate prospects of his Company depended on that, and all his schemes depended on his Company. It must prove itself a financial success if it was to get the funds it required from the investing public; and, to do so, it must find the expected New Rand north of the Limpopo quickly. If the New Rand were found, the rush of Europeans thither would make Charterland and not the Transvaal the coming economic centre of South Africa, capable of dictating, in conjunction with the Cape, the terms of the economic federation and possibly of the political federation which was to follow. A large white population would also be able to relieve the Company of the task of administration which it had obviously no intention of retaining longer than it must, and would leave it free to build railways.⁴ Given speedy development, the railways would soon pay off the debentures with which they were financed and furnish large dividends on the handful of actual shares, nearly all of which were in the hands of the Company and its friends.⁵ Moreover, Rhodes proposed that only companies should be allowed to mine and, in each of them, the Chartered Company was to take anything up to 50 per cent. of vendor's scrip on flotation instead of royalties.⁶ Thus, if all went well, the B.S.A. Company would become a great gold trust drawing revenue from subsidiary companies.

Finance and politics alike called for speed. He tried to form a South African board of control for his Company, but as neither Hofmeyr nor Chief Justice de Villiers would serve upon it, he

¹ C. 6217 of 1890, p. 17.

² Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 400 ff.

³ C. 6217 of 1890, pp. 3 ff.

⁴ Vindex, *Political Speeches*, and early *Reports of the B.S.A. Company*, *passim*.

⁵ *B.S.A. Co. Report*, Dec. 19, 1893, p. 3, and Jan. 18, 1895, pp. 3 ff.

⁶ *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1889-92, p. 18; *B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Nov. 29, 1892, p. 9.

gave up the idea and himself received the Company's power of attorney in Africa.¹ He was more successful in winning general support for his schemes by the judicious distribution of shares among Bondsmen² and others, and in arranging with three contractors who were to raise 200 Pioneers, cut a road to Mount Hampden and build forts to guard it. Jameson was sent to get the necessary leave of entry from the King. His name smelt sweet at Bulawayo, for Lobengula remembered that 'the Doctor' had cured him of his gout and that, during his last visit, a letter of commendation from the Queen herself had arrived, borne by four magnificent lifeguardsmen in a bright-red coach, a letter which Jameson had tactfully reworded.³ Now Loben gave his consent or, rather, he did not withhold it; Selous, the mighty hunter who was to guide the column, began to cut the Road and the Pioneers moved up to Macloutsie. Apart from the fact that they were to be accompanied by 500 Bechuanaland Police and a body of native labourers, the Pioneers were just such a force as had followed Lukas Meyer into the New Republic, even in the matter of promised payment in gold claims and, as soon as the Company should be in a position to grant them, farms of 3000 acres.

May
1890.

Rhodes tried to start them off into Mashonaland at once, but Loch threatened to have the Charter cancelled if he moved them before he himself was satisfied that they could move without imperilling themselves and the peace of South Africa,⁴ and it was only at the end of June that they started on their 400-mile march. Lobengula, perhaps alarmed at the size of this party of 'men to dig gold,' perhaps finding it necessary to placate his warriors, half-heartedly ordered them back; but Loch moved the Bechuanaland Police up to Fort Elebi and so secured the column a safe passage. Forts were built *en route* at Victoria and Charter, Salisbury was founded and the Pioneers were disbanded.⁵

Sept. 12,
1890.

The foundations of Rhodes's federation were now well on the way to completion. The Swazi Convention had been ratified, Mashonaland occupied, and various important boundary questions apparently settled. An Anglo-German Convention gave Germany Heligoland in exchange for Zanzibar, and a frontier in South-West Africa which, to Rhodes's unconcealed disgust,

July
1890.

¹ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 208; Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 388; Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, p. 141.

² Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 276.

³ Colvin, *op. cit.*, I. 120; Leyds, *op. cit.*, p. 425; C. 5918 of 1890, p. 237.

⁴ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 224.

⁵ On the founding of Rhodesia, *vide* A. R. Colquhoun, *Matabeleland*; A. Darter, *Pioneers of Mashonaland*; Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*; B.S.A. Co. Reports; A. G. Leonard, *How We made Rhodesia*.

embraced the long Caprivi Zipfel running up to the middle Zambesi. Similarly the first Anglo-Portuguese Convention left Manicaland south of the Zambesi to Portugal, but gave Great Britain Nyassaland and a Portuguese promise to build a railway from the new port of Beira to Mashonaland and to open the Pungwe river to traffic.¹ Aug. 1890.

Rhodes's base in the Colony was also secure. He had taken little part in politics from 1884 till 1888, but thereafter he had drawn near to Hofmeyr. Racialism was apparently dead; the aims of the Bond now approximated to his own Home Rule policy; he shared Hofmeyr's views on such matters as the Imperial Zollverein, Protection and Natives. Hofmeyr, for his part, preferred the Chartered Company to the Crown in the North and showed no inclination to tax diamonds in spite of the hold on the electoral machinery which he was perfecting through the Commissie van Toezicht, a supervising committee manned by himself and two other Bondsmen. Sure of the support of the Bond, Rhodes joined Sauer in defeating Sprigg's schemes for local railways; Sprigg resigned and Rhodes became Premier at the head of a cabinet which included some of the ablest parliamentarians and administrators in the Colony.² July 1890.

Rhodes's powers were thus immense. He was Prime Minister of the Colony and controller of De Beers at Kimberley, of the Goldfields Company on the Rand and, as far as Africa was concerned, of the Chartered Company itself. He hoped that British Bechuanaland would soon come to the Colony and the Protectorate to the Company and that, if all went well, Matabeleland on one side and Manica-Gazaland on the other would be added to Mashonaland. Kruger was of course an obstacle, but if Gazaland were secured, the Delagoa line would be cut below Komati Poort and he must come to terms. The High Commissioner was more immediately obnoxious. His multiplicity of offices and functions could alone rival those of Rhodes; he was as determined a man as Rhodes himself; it was not his wish that Rhodes was Premier, for he had asked Sauer to form a ministry first; he did not like chartered companies and he was resolved that there should be no change in the status of either of the Bechuanalands until he could persuade H.M. Government to annex the Protectorate outright. He had already taken power by Order in Council to exercise jurisdiction there and, if he had to give up British Bechuanaland, he meant to

¹ C. 6212 of 1890, pp. 4 ff.; Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 287; Eybers, p. 567.

² Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, chapter xxii.; Williams, *op. cit.*, chapter xiii. C. J. Rhodes, Premier; J. W. Sauer, Colonial Secretary; J. X. Merriman, Treasurer; J. Rose-Innes, Attorney-General; J. Sivewright (Bond), Public Works; P. H. Faure (Bond), Native Affairs.

have the Protectorate as an imperial base in close touch with Rhodes's growing empire in the North.¹

Loch might grumble but fortune favoured Rhodes. The Portuguese did not ratify the Convention and Salisbury declared that Great Britain's hands were free.² The Company's agents were already busy in Manica and they now secured a concession from Mutassa, a vassal of Gungunhana the Shangaan whom the Portuguese claimed in his turn as a vassal.³ The Portuguese champion, D'Andrada, ventured up to Mutassa's kraal. He was ignominiously arrested and sent home by way of Capetown, while the terrible Company tried to make good a treaty which it had just signed with Gungunhana himself giving it all Gazaland including Beira.⁴ An East Coast port was as much a matter of life and death to the Company as it was to Kruger, for transport to Mashonaland from the south cost seven times as much as along the Pungwe route, and with the coming of the rains, the Pioneers were short of supplies and practically cut off from the south by flooded rivers. The Company was doomed to disappointment. Great Britain signed a *modus vivendi* with Portugal reopening the Pungwe route; Gungunhana declared himself a subject of His Most Faithful Majesty; Jameson was arrested running guns to him on the Limpopo, and the Portuguese closed the Pungwe.⁵ Rhodes sent a friend with a party of labourers to Beira to make good his entry or to get himself fired on ('they will only hit him in the leg,' said Rhodes the optimist), but no fruitful incident developed till the Portuguese rashly exposed themselves to defeat at Massikessi in the very month that the *modus vivendi* ran out.⁶ Parties of the Company's men at once scattered eastward seeking concessions, but Salisbury called a halt; the Bishop of Bloemfontein and Loch's secretary turned back a few gallant souls who were on their way 'to take Beira,' and a new Anglo-Portuguese Convention was signed which gave the Company Manica, withheld Beira, and found employment for an Italian arbiter for several years to come.⁷

Trouble with the Portuguese was accompanied by trouble with

¹ Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 241.

² C. 6212 of 1890, pp. 19, 23.

³ *B.S.A. Co. Report* (Nov. 29, 1892), p. 6; C. 6495 of 1891, p. 218.

⁴ C. 6495, p. 193, *q.v. passim* for details of this bickering; also D'Andrada, *Manica and Report*.

⁵ C. 6212 of 1890, pp. 7, 29; C. 6495 of 1891, pp. 115 ff., 130 ff., 162, 193; Colvin, *op. cit.*, I. 182.

⁶ C. 6495, pp. 173, 234; Colvin, I. 185.

⁷ C. 6375 of 1891; C. 6495 of 1891, p. 264; *B.S.A. Co. Reports*, Nov. 1892, p. 16; Jan. 1895, p. 25; C. 8434 of 1897 (Manica arbitration); Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*, p. 261.

Nov.
1890.

May
1891.

June
1891.

Transvaalers. Rhodes had gone to London at the close of 1890 to secure the deed of settlement which extended the sphere of his Company to the north of the Zambesi outside Nyassaland and to be made much of by Society which had been fired by his enthusiasms and had just invested in Chartered Shares. He returned to find that two Transvaalers, D. J. Malan and Adendorff, had obtained a land concession in southern Matabeleland from the grandson of the Chibi, a vassal of Lobengula. The concession was therefore worthless, but Barend Vorster, a noted Transvaal company promoter, took it up and, with the open support of Joubert, proposed to found a 'Republic of the North' in Banyailand, while the Portuguese consul at Capetown independently organised a Boer settlement in Manica as 'a wall of iron' between Beira and the redoubtable Company.¹ Rhodes, Hofmeyr and S. J. du Toit, back from Pretoria a disillusioned man,² beat up the Bond against the Adendorff trek and against the pro-Hollander Transvaal executive with such success that Loch had to reason with prominent Bondsmen. Kruger might lament Hofmeyr's 'worship of the golden calf' but he had no mind to play into Joubert's hands or to compromise his own plans in the east.³ He condemned the trek, which thereupon wilted and presently expired in the presence of Jameson's police and machine-guns on the banks of the Limpopo. Rhodes defeated the Manica trek with 'the silver lance.'⁴

June
1891.

He also defeated the High Commissioner. Loch had declared a protectorate over the Company's sphere south of the Zambesi and had taken power under an Order in Council to legislate by proclamation, extend Cape law, appoint magistrates, raise revenue and generally maintain the peace therein.⁵ All this was to apply as far as possible to Europeans only, for Lobengula was still explicitly recognised as a reigning sovereign without whose leave the Company could have no jurisdiction even over white men, a jurisdiction which the Queen had advised him to leave to Jameson on the analogy of Tati.⁶ Loch wished and Rhodes had at first been inclined to agree that the High Commissioner should have sole power of legislation and that actual administration should be in the hands of Imperial officials paid by the Company and

April-
June
1891.

¹ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 154; Michell, II. 31 ff.; Colvin, I. 206; Walker, p. 216.

² Kruger had tried to save du Toit, but public opinion was against him and he had to let him go (Malherbe, *op. cit.*, p. 267).

³ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.* p. 417.

⁴ Michell, *Rhodes*, II. 31 ff.; Williams, *Rhodes*, p. 154; Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 206; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 216.

⁵ C. 7171 of 1893, p. 1; Newton, *Unification*, I. 119 ff.

⁶ C. 5918 of 1890, p. 233.

debarred, as in the case of the old East India Company's service, from embarking on trading ventures. But H.M. Government would take no responsibility ; it allowed the B.S.A. Directors to legislate concurrently with its own representative by means of ordinances,¹ and henceforward Rhodes paid little heed to the Imperial factor outside the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

The position of the Company was difficult, for strictly speaking it had power neither to rule nor to grant land. This latter disability was in a measure removed by the acquisition of a land concession. Lobengula, hoping to divide the alien forces which were closing in upon him, granted a concession to Edouard Lippert of Johannesburg empowering the holder for a hundred years to grant, lease or rent land in his name in return for an annual payment. Alas for Lobengula ! Lippert, a cousin of Beit, sold his concession to the Company, which was now in a position to give farms to its Pioneers and to announce its success to the shareholders at their first meeting.²

Dec.
1891.

All was going well. The trunk line had reached Vryburg ; a subsidiary company was about to build a railway from Beira ; the vendor's scrip policy promised well. But there were two flies in the ointment : the New Rand had not been discovered in Mashonaland, and the tidings which had already been indirectly announced were now officially confirmed, that the Company did not own the Rudd and other important concessions. These were owned by some of its chief directors and their friends who, on joining hands to apply for the Charter in 1889, had formed the Central Search Association with a modest capital to buy up concessions in Bechuanaland and the North, and had arranged to provide the capital for the projected British South Africa Company. As soon as they heard that the Charter would be forthcoming, the Central Searchers had agreed verbally among themselves that the future Chartered Company should have the use of their concessions in return for half its net profits. The B.S.A. Company had then come into being with a capital of 1,000,000 shares of £1, three-fourths of which were privately issued to directors and prominent supporters, and the remainder held over for contingencies. Once the Pioneers had set out, the Association became the United Concessions Company, with a capital of £4,000,000. It met the Chartered board and, without confounding the persons, divided the prospective substance by contracting that the United Concessionaires should be bought

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 207, 224 (based on Loch's *Materials*) ; B.S.A. Charter, § 10.

² C. 7171 of 1893, p. 8 ; Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 171 ; Moffat, *Life of J. S. Moffat*, p. 261 ; B.S.A. Co. *Annual Meeting*, Dec. 22, 1891, p. 8.

out at the first opportunity with 1,000,000 specially created B.S.A. shares. On the news that the Pioneers had founded Salisbury, many of the original Chartered shares were sold in 1890. the open market at a high price and, in deference to the feelings of the 5000 new shareholders, the capitalisation was postponed till the end of 1891. Such was the news that was now broken 1891. to the shareholders. Some of them threatened legal proceedings if the arrangement were carried out, and the capitalisation was postponed till the end of 1892.¹

The news did not reassure the suspicious High Commissioner, all the more as Rhodes, who had once talked of contributing to the cost of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, now offered to administer it if he were given £50,000 annually to do it with, and this though the Protectorate tribes were already paying light taxes. Rhodes had so many expensive irons in the fire. He was trying to buy Delagoa Bay, taking his telegraph into Salisbury, borrowing from De Beers for the Vryburg-Mafeking railway and pressing forward beyond the Zambesi to make contact with Lugard in Uganda. Would those £50,000 be spent in the Protectorate? Loch was not too sure. Jameson had recently taken charge in Mashonaland, and Loch had had to tell him that he could not levy hut tax on the Mashona subjects of Lobengula. Now the doctor was cutting down official staffs and police to the bone, thereby virtually throwing the task of maintaining the peace upon the Imperial Bechuanaland Police, and talking cheerfully of empty coffers while he ran the country by tact and, on occasion, Jameson law. Twice his officials had exercised forcible jurisdiction over Mashona, and, though the delinquent chiefs were admittedly public nuisances, they were none the less Lobengula's men, and, in any case, Loch held that conflict could have been avoided.²

Rhodes met his shareholders for the first time, and assured Nov. them that no danger need be apprehended from the Matabele, and 1892. that all was for the best in the best of all possible spheres.³ But Knutsford had only acknowledged the Lippert Concession on condition that it really belonged to the B.S.A. Company; Ripon, Secretary of State in Gladstone's new ministry, showed himself equally insistent and, once his attention had been officially

¹ Vide *B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Dec. 22, 1891; *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1889-92, p. 2; *Report of Extraordinary General B.S.A. Co. Meeting*, Nov. 20, 1893; *Report of B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Dec. 19, 1893; *Report for 1892-94*, p. 2; *The Economist*, Nov. 18, 1893.

² Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 198; Gardiner, *Harcourt*, II. 190; Michell, *Rhodes*, II. 93; C. 7171, pp. 5, 10, 20, 24, 26; Colvin, *Jameson*, chapter xvii.

³ *Report of B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Nov. 29, 1892, p. 7.

drawn towards the unusual relations of that Company with the United Concessions, much more inquisitive than his predecessor had been in the matter of details.¹ In view of all this, it was essential that the capitalisation should be carried through; nevertheless, it had to be put off till the end of 1893. And so the Company sank into debt. Its cash and reserve of shares were almost exhausted; it was living on a monthly subsidy from De Beers and other friends; the Beira railway was still far from completion; the New Rand had not been discovered in Mashonaland, and the collapse of the Australian gold boom promised to have repercussions elsewhere. To add to Rhodes's anxieties, his cabinet split; but the fact that distressed him most was the crumbling of his chartered company, the keystone of the federation of the future.

A way out of the impasse was providentially indicated by Lobengula. The Matabele, though much mixed now with other tribes, still lived for the most part in Zulu fashion, grouped in kraals, within sixty miles of Bulawayo. They were a potential danger to the Europeans, a scourge to their native neighbours, and the despair of the missionaries, to whom, like the Zulus, they refused to hearken and whose more docile flocks they threatened.² The occupation of the Transvaal by Europeans and the formation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate had deprived them of two of their raiding grounds, and the arrival of white men in Mashonaland made the washing of spears still more difficult. No political boundary had been laid down between Matabeleland and Mashonaland, but a line had been indicated a few miles to the west of Victoria beyond which white men were not to go without special leave of the king.³ The rule was none too well observed⁴ and Lobengula, who had to make the best of the evil military system which he had inherited, had difficulty in restraining his young men, who resented the presence of Europeans among their Mashona 'dogs.' He turned their spears north-westward against the Barotse; but small impis invaded Mashonaland twice, once in the far north to collect taxes, a financial expedient for which Lobengula apologised to Jameson, and again in the south against the Chibi, when they passed close to Victoria. Nevertheless, as

¹ C. 7171 of 1893, pp. 9, 32 ff.

² On the Matabele tribal system, *vide* Hole, *Making of Rhodesia*, chapter iv.

³ On the Matabele War of 1893, *vide* B.S.A. Co. Reports; Norris-Newman, *Matabeleland and How We got it; The Downfall of Lobengula*, by various writers; C. 7171, 7190, 7196 of 1893; C. 7284, 7355 of 1894.

⁴ Colenbrander, the Company's agent at Bulawayo, wrote to Moffat that white men disregarded the line and that 'old Ben . . . is trying to pull straight, therefore they ought from their side to help him in cases of this sort all they can' (C. 7171 of 1893, p. 44).

April
1893.

1891.

1892.

late as June 1892, Jameson could report that the relations with the natives were excellent.¹ But the fact remained that the Matabele were in the way. So long as Lobengula's power stood the Company could have no territorial jurisdiction nor ownership of land even in Mashonaland, and now the interests of the Company were swinging to the west into Matabeleland. The Cape-to-Cairo railway must run along the Matabele highlands towards Lake Tanganyika, which was within reach now that the Anglo-Portuguese disputes in Barotseland had been settled; finally the New Rand, on which the capitalisation depended, was believed to run from Salisbury to Tati through Bulawayo itself. June 1892.

Rhodes had hardly been dissuaded from sending in the Pioneers to settle with the Matabele in 1890.² Since then the idea had grown up in Mashonaland that war must come sooner or later. That opinion was not shared by Jameson, who looked to a slow but steady absorption of the fighting Matabele into the general body of native labourers.³ Circumstances, however, forced his hand. Early in 1893 the telegraph line was cut near Victoria, and the Company's men seized cattle from the suspected Mashona culprits. The cattle proved to be royal beasts, and Lobengula had difficulty in preventing his warriors from intervening. The matter was settled amicably, but Jameson warned the king that impi which frightened away Mashona labourers might be severely dealt with.⁴ Presently Lobengula complained that royal cattle in the keeping of one chieftain near Victoria had been stolen by another, and sent a small party to punish the wire-cutters and the thieves. It was turned back and he therefore sent a large force and a message that no white man would be harmed. The message arrived on the day July 1893. that the impi began to kill Mashona and to burn kraals round Victoria.⁵

Jameson was anxious to avoid the expense of war which would 'throw the country back till God knows when.'⁶ He sent word to the local authorities that they must get rid of the impi peaceably and check alarmist reports. They failed and, very properly, refused to give up refugee Mashona. Jameson then heard that the indunas would await him and hurried into Victoria to find the Mashona taking refuge in the hills, and the Europeans, in the

¹ C. 7171 of 1893, p. 33.

² Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 293.

³ Colvin, *Jameson*, I. 267.

⁴ C. 7171 of 1893, pp. 42 ff.

⁵ C. 7171 of 1893, pp. 46 ff., 50, 54; C. 7555 of 1894, *passim*.

⁶ Michell, *Rhodes*, II. 85.

intervals of a cricket match, listening to speeches and at least one sermon on the text *Bulawayo delenda est*.¹ Mashona kraals were still burning, and he concluded that there was no way out now but shooting. He wired to Rhodes that it might be necessary to march on Bulawayo, and received the famous reply 'Read Luke xiv. 31':² He read his Luke, decided that 1000 men would be enough, and told the indunas to draw their men off towards the border within the hour. Most of them prepared to do so, but some of the young bloods were charged by the police as they retreated slowly across the town commonage with looted cattle, attacking kraals as they went. Obedient to the king's orders to harm no white man the warriors made virtually no resistance; nevertheless, Jameson was told that the Matabele had fired first.³ He therefore reported to the High Commissioner in that sense, arranged military details, and sent a stiff message to Lobengula.⁴

July 18,
1893.

Lobengula was apologetic till he heard his warriors' version of the Victoria incident. He then returned a defiant answer, but apart from that strove to keep the peace, if only because some of his best regiments were in quarantine with smallpox.⁵ Loch and Ripon also tried to avert the appeal to arms,⁶ to the annoyance of Jameson, who grumbled with truth that if the fighting season were lost 'our show is burst for some time to come.'⁷ Jameson spoke more truly than perhaps he knew. He was thinking in military terms, but others were thinking financially. It was arranged that if the capitalisation could be effected before the end of the year, the United Concessions and its allies would raise £170,000 on debenture for the benefit of the B.S.A. Company.⁸ From that moment it was either Lobengula's head or the Company's. Jameson raised volunteers to be paid in time-honoured fashion with land and claims and captured cattle;⁹ Rhodes sent up horses and equipment and set out slowly for Mashonaland; a force of 'Johannesburg lambs' was enlisted;¹⁰ some judicious agent-provocateur work was done on the Matabele

July 31,
1893.

¹ C. 7171 of 1893, p. 50; C. 7555 of 1894, p. 41.

² M'chell, *op. cit.*, II. 85; Williams, *Rhodes*, p. 174.

³ C. 7555 of 1894, p. 7.

⁴ C. 7171 of 1893, p. 60; *Downfall of Lobengula*, pp. 63 ff.

⁵ C. 7171 of 1893, pp. 63 ff.; C. 7196 of 1893, pp. 13, 45.

⁶ C. 7171 of 1893, pp. 51, 72; C. 7190 of 1893, p. 1; C. 7196 of 1893, pp. 14, 33.

⁷ Colvin, I. 264.

⁸ *B.S.A. Co. Report for 1892-94*, p. 2; *B.S.A. Co. Extraordinary General Meeting*, Nov. 20, 1893. It was the only means of saving the Company, and all that hung thereon.

⁹ Cave Commission: Evidence, Aug. 7 and Dec. 17, 1919; *Times*, Nov. 10, 1893.

¹⁰ Colvin, I. 295; Williams, pp. 174 ff.

border, and communications between Lobengula and the anxious High Commissioner were found to be singularly defective.¹ On the day that the last of the horses arrived, two police going in well beyond the commercial border reported that they had been fired on; Loch reluctantly gave leave for patrols to be sent in to bid the indunas remove the impis which were said to be on the border;² Oct. a day or two later the invaluable imperial factor was drawn in^{1893.} when a corporal of the Bechuanaland Police, who was soon made lieutenant at the request of the Company, reported that he too had been fired on near the Macloutsie river. The columns started, and Rhodes arrived at Salisbury.³

The fighting was soon over. The machine-guns, a novelty in warfare in those days, worked wonders at Shangani and Imbembezi, and the volunteers entered the ruins of Bulawayo to Nov. find the king fled. The Bechuanaland Police meanwhile had^{1893.} held half the impis in the Matoppo hills and now came in with the supplies which the volunteers almost totally lacked. The campaign ended with the coming of the rains and the annihilation Dec. of Wilson's gallant patrol. A month later it was reported that^{1893.} Lobengula was dead.⁴

So the Company's men and the Imperial police 'broke a king and built a road' while in London the shareholders, encouraged by the rise in the price of shares at the mere rumour of war, dazzled by the prospects of 'two or three New Johannesburgs' in Matabeleland, overawed by the warning of the Company's lawyer that if the pre-Charter verbal agreement were to be set aside the Company would have no rights in Mashonaland let alone in its new conquest, and silenced by the reminder that 'we want Nov. those 170,000 golden sovereigns,' agreed to double their own Dec. capital for the benefit of the United Concessionaires, who there-^{1893.} upon handed over the concessions and expired in their corporate capacity.⁵ The Chartered Company then raised not £170,000 but £750,000 on debenture wherewith to pay its creditors for the cost of the campaign and general expenses till January 1896, when interest thereon would first become payable.

Meanwhile, in Africa, Loch fought hard for his 'East India Company' scheme and at the very least for strict Imperial control over the Company. He was defeated. Even before the

¹ C. 7196 of 1893, pp. 22, 35 ff., 45, 48, 66 ff., 69.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 79.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 91; C. 7290, p. 3; Colvin, I. 270; Newman, *Matabeleland*, pp. 215-16.

⁴ *Downfall of Lobengula*, pp. 2 ff., 202 ff., 214; C. 7290 of 1894, p. 8.

⁵ *B.S.A. Co. Extraordinary General Meeting*, Nov. 20, 1893; *B.S.A. Co. Annual and General Meetings*, Dec. 19, 1893; *B.S.A. Directors' Report*, Dec. 19, 1893, p. 2, and *Report for 1892-94*, p. 2; *Economist*, Nov. 18, 1893.

war was over Jameson had given out town stands at Bulawayo, and Rhodes, with the Cape Ministry as chorus, declared *coram populo* that his Company, having won the war single-handed, was entitled to the spoils. It was not true. As in 1890, the Bechuanaland Police had covered the advance and had done much of the work in the pursuit of Lobengula. They now had to patrol Matabeleland while the Company raised a small police force and the volunteers dispersed themselves prospecting.¹ Ripon did his best for the High Commissioner as he always did; but Rhodes won the Cape elections, the second Home Rule bill divided Rosebery's Liberal Imperialists from Harcourt's Radicals and, when Gladstone made way for Rosebery, Rhodes got most of what he wanted. Under the Matabeleland Order in Council, Jameson became administrator with a council of officials empowered to legislate by regulation, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner and concurrently with his proclamations and the Directors' ordinances, while provision was also made for a single-judge court. All that Loch could do was to warn Ripon to stand by for future trouble, with the Portuguese for choice.²

Jan.
1894.

July
1894.

The Matabele war was a turning-point in the modern history of South Africa. It made 'Southern Rhodesia,' the keystone of Rhodes's federation, ready to be set in place as soon as the springs of the arch had been completed. Those springs were steadily rising. Rhodes's first cabinet administered the old Colony well; Merriman's prudent finance enabled the Cape to withstand the big bank failures of 1890, and the ensuing Bank Act promised to avert a repetition of the disaster. But a time had come when three of his colleagues, Merriman, Sauer and Innes, refused to sit any longer beside Sivewright, whose departmental methods they could not stomach, and for whom Sauer cherished a bitter hatred. Rhodes with the help of Sprigg managed to patch together another and much weaker cabinet, but the crisis cost him the services of the three malcontents and of Sivewright and the confidence of the influential Chief Justice, de Villiers, under whom he had offered to serve and had then left in the dark till he had formed another ministry of his own.³ On the other hand, he had strengthened his alliance with Hofmeyr by supporting the proposal that the study of both English and Dutch should be encouraged in the schools and, though Hofmeyr's attempt to defend


April
1893.


1892.

¹ C. 7290 of 1894, p. 37; Hole, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

² B.S.A. Directors' Report for 1892-4, pp. 31, 35; C. 7383 of 1894, p. 9; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 241.

³ Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, pp. 186 ff.; Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 221 ff.





SOUTHERN AFRICA
1884-95

0 50 100 200 300 Miles

- British Territory in 1884
- Annexations, 1884-95
- Republican Territory in 1884
- Annexations, 1884-95
- Portuguese Territory
- Railways as at New Year, 1896

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Sivewright, a fellow Bondsman, weakened his and therefore Rhodes's hold on the Bond, that body as a whole still rallied to Rhodes's economic policy and his plans for the development of the North as the heritage of Dutch and English Colonists alike.

Rhodes's economic policy was to the taste of the Bond. He held that the time was not ripe for colonial manufactures, jeered, not altogether unjustly, at the local match factory, and pointed to Kruger's monopolies as a horrible warning; but, as one who came of farming stock himself, he protected the natural products of the country. Hasty duties on Australian mutton¹ were a curious commentary on the Imperial Zollverein which he and Hofmeyr envisaged, girding at 'this Free Trade craze' in England what time Randolph Churchill, the apostle of Tory Democracy, dilated on the desire of the British working classes to recover colonial trade; but he tried to insert the Rhodes customs clause in the Matabeleland Order in Council whereunder 1894. Charterland was never to go beyond the existing low Cape tariff and was to admit South African and British goods free and thus set the pace for the future customs union.² Ripon refused to have it so; but Rhodes, undismayed, sent de Villiers and Hofmeyr to the Ottawa Colonial Conference, itself largely the outcome of his correspondence with the premiers of Canada and New South Wales, to discuss cable and steamship communications and Imperial reciprocity. The Liberal Government indeed gave the Australian colonies freedom to offer intercolonial reciprocity, but 1894. Ripon on behalf of Great Britain declined the offer as economically unsound and politically impossible so long as the most-favoured-nation treaties with Belgium and the German Zollverein stood.³ As for Imperial Federation, Rhodes had already subscribed to the funds of the Irish party to ensure that, in the event of Home Rule 1888. being granted, Irish members should be retained at Westminster as an example to other self-governing portions of the Empire. He had since given money to the Liberals with the same end in 1892. view.⁴

The difficulty of winding up the affairs of one of the banks which had collapsed in 1890 pointed to the need for one body of law for all South Africa, but the failure of Rhodes's scheme for a national teaching university at Groote Schuur in face of the opposition of the colleges outside the Cape Peninsula, and the breakdown of de Villiers' plan for a federal appeal court, suggested

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 249.

² H.C. 177 of 1894; C. 7782 of 1895.

³ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, pp. 448 ff.; Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 245 ff.; C. 7553 of 1894; Wolf, *Life of Lord Ripon*, II. 218 ff.

⁴ Williams, *Rhodes*, p. 133; Michell, *Rhodes*, I. 247; II. 47.

that federation could not be achieved piecemeal.¹ At the bottom of that question as ever lay the native problem. Rhodes knew well enough that so long as the native policy of the Colony differed so markedly from those of the Republics and of Natal there was little hope of closer union. In his salad days he had believed that an 'Indian despotism' was the best way to deal with tribal natives. He had modified his views somewhat since and now stood side by side with Hofmeyr, midway between the average Bondsman who held quite sincerely that the only way to civilise the native was for the European to have the land and the native to learn the dignity of labour in his service, and those others like Sauer who held that the native must be protected in his possession of the land and yet be allowed to acquire the franchise.² The position of the Bantu in the Colony proper was not quite so untrammelled as it had been. The vagrancy law had been stiffened; tribal natives had been deprived by law of access to liquor; Rhodes himself had helped to carry a bill which cut out the so-called communal tenure of land as a claim on the franchise. That Act had, however, extended the franchise to natives in the Transkeian territories who could qualify on the usual terms, and soon the cry was raised that blanket Kaffirs were getting on to the register. Rhodes therefore raised the property qualification from £25 to £75 per annum, expunged the £25 salary qualification and imposed a simple education test.³

Rhodes was prepared to go much further, and impending differences upon native policy undoubtedly did much to produce the strain which wrecked his first ministry. After the election of 1894 he added the portfolio of Native Affairs to that of the Prime Minister by statute and carried his famous Glen Grey Act. Most of the principles of that measure had already been carried out or projected, but Rhodes has the credit of systematising them and carrying them through as no other man could. Natives were to be encouraged to take land on quit-rent subject to the European system of survey and individual title, a source of expense which has deterred many natives from doing so to this day, and were to be prevented from selling or mortgaging this

¹ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 440; Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 213; Vindex, *Speeches*, p. 275.

² Williams, *Rhodes*, pp. 203 ff.; Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, chapter xxv. For the views of a well-to-do Western Province farmer of those days, *vide* De Waal, *With Rhodes in Mashonaland*: 'If Kaffirs only knew the advantages of serving under white masters, they would gain more civilisation in one year than they do from missionaries in fifty. . . . As it is, there is now a general scarcity of labourers; Kaffirs can live so easily that they decline to be dependent on the European. They are, however, beginning to recognise their degraded position. . . .' (p. 105).

³ Eybers, pp. 70, 73.

1879.
1883.

1887.

1892.

Aug.
1894.

land without leave. The defence of this part of Rhodes's policy cost Hofmeyr the support of many Bondsmen who were, however, reassured when the vote was withheld from such tenants and a labour tax was prescribed for all non-landholding men who did not go out to work for three months in the year. Sauer and his friends resisted these last two points and the labour tax was never collected, but they approved of the system of location and native district councils under the presidency of officials which were to raise local rates and spend the money locally.¹

The Act was applied first to Glen Grey district in the Ciskei and then almost immediately to four districts in the Transkei. It has since been widely extended in the Transkeian territories with excellent results on the whole, but Rhodes avowedly intended that it should have a much wider application. He called it 'a native Bill for Africa.'² Much of the said continent was coming under his control, and more might come. He had offered to administer Uganda and the Bechuanaland Protectorate in return for Imperial subsidies; he still meant to have British Bechuanaland, and he actually annexed the two Pondolands to the Colony. West Pondoland had for long been quiet, but in East Pondoland, Sigcau, successor of the stormy Umquikela, 1887. had failed to control his half-brother, Umhlangaso. Umhlangaso first bullied Sigcau into giving trading privileges to a couple of Germans, and then rebelled and took refuge in Natal. Natal had its own designs on Pondoland, but Sigcau tried to keep on good terms with the Cape authorities; the German Government declined to support its traders, and Rhodes decided to annex. He drove through Pondoland in state, overawed Sigcau with a display of machine-gun fire, and thus ended the last independent chieftainship in all the land between the Kei and the Natal border.³ Sept. 1894.

The annexation of native territories was one thing, the achievement of federation another. The stumbling-block to any scheme of that kind was the Transvaal. Sinn Fein, the instinctive avoidance of contact with unfamiliar things, was in the ascendant at Pretoria. The Transvaal was still in the main a farmers' republic and most of its burghers desired that it should remain so, but the influx of Uitlanders, secured of their civil rights under the Convention and specifically invited into the republic by the Transvaal delegates to London in 1884,⁴ was fast changing the condition of the state. The influx, small at first, had swelled to

¹ Newton, *Unification*, I. 129; Brookes, *History of Native Policy*, p. 113.

² Vindex, *Speeches*, p. 390.

³ Williams, *Rhodes*, pp. 207 ff.; G. 9-94; G. 8-95 (Cape).

⁴ Cook, *Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War*, p. 262.

great proportions after the opening of the Rand goldfields. Many of the burghers looked askance at these men who came from the four corners of the earth to build a huge rambling city at Johannesburg where corrugated iron alternated with stucco and marble facings, and to develop there an industry, the like of which the world had never seen, in mines which were owned, for the most part, by overseas shareholders, controlled by European managers and miners and worked by hordes of black barbarian labourers. And in their wake came the cosmopolitan riff-raff that had corrupted Kimberley.

The Pretoria Government, hampered by the lack of railways and a slack administrative tradition, was faced with an industrial and social problem with which its small and inexperienced official staff was quite unfitted to deal. Yet it did much for the newcomers. Its gold law was the most liberal in the world, and if its Native Pass, Illicit Liquor and Gold Thefts laws were poorly administered, they had at least been passed in the interests of the new industry, and a half-hearted enforcement of the law was nothing new in the Transvaal. Kruger, moreover, treated the white workmen well.¹ He accepted many amendments which the newly formed Mechanics' Union proposed in the mining regulations and refused to have employees searched for gold by agents paid by the state but controlled by the Chamber of Mines; for, apart from other considerations, he was quick to see that the Uitlanders could be split politically along the line which divides Capital from Labour. The Uitlanders for their part found many of the officials eminently bribable; nevertheless they had real grievances. Before the annexation the Transvaal had been eager to learn English. It had given preference to bilingual teachers and, where these had been lacking, had ordered that English-speaking teachers should be provided; but after the retrocession, du Toit, as superintendent of education, had made Dutch the only medium of instruction.² The rule had not been strictly enforced till Dr. Mansvelt came up from Stellenbosch and, abandoning the sound theories of mother-tongue instruction which he had held there, swung over to the ultra-Dutch views of his fellow-Hollanders with whom he surrounded himself. Many English medium schools lost the state grant, and provision for the education of English-speaking children remained very defective till 1896.³ Again, the laws enforcing the use of Dutch in public transactions were a nuisance,

1866.

1892.

¹ Rose, *The Truth about the War*, pp. 29, 45.

² Malherbe, *History of Education in S.A.*, pp. 259 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 274 ff.

though in practice as much English as Dutch was used in the inferior courts. The customs dues helped to keep up the cost of living, and the concession policy of the Government bred hangers-on who bled the Uitlanders and swindled the state, and the Uitlanders who paid nearly all the taxes and made the Government rich were denied a voice in the direction of the policy of the State.

The vote was the monopoly of sons of the soil and favoured individual immigrants and, for the sons of the soil, the Uitlanders entertained a contempt and lack of understanding that was repaid in kind. Before 1882 the term of residence necessary for acquiring the franchise had been one year. It was then raised, reasonably enough, to five to meet the gold rush to Lydenburg¹; but, though some Uitlanders demanded the vote on easier terms, very few even registered during the ensuing five years. They had too much else to think about. The first great Rand boom 1889-1890. frightened the burghers; the insult to their flag in Johannesburg infuriated them; they feared lest they be swamped in their own republic by these foreign fortune-seekers, here to-day and openly intending in most cases to be gone to-morrow, who if they had the power would pile up debt in the name of development and then, when the mines gave out—and until the proving of the deep levels in 1894 there was little to show that the Rand would have a long life—would fold up their tents and silently steal away, leaving the holes in the ground and the public debt to the permanent inhabitants. Worse still, the majority of the Uitlanders were British subjects and therefore suspect, for the memory of the agitation which had preceded Shepstone's annexation had not faded and some of the would-be voters seemed to think they could become burghers and still retain their British citizenship.

Hence a drastic franchise law was passed.² A Second 1890. Volksraad was set up designed to deal with the concerns of the mining areas, but it had no taxing powers and its acts were subject to review by the First Raad. The franchise for the new House was given two years after registration, and eligibility for a seat therein after four; but the vote in presidential and First Raad elections would only be forthcoming after fourteen years, and, even so, there was no guarantee that the term would not be lengthened at a moment's notice. For on one vital point the Grondwet was not clear. In practice the unicameral Volksraad legislated either by *Wet*, a leisurely process which entailed the publication of the proposed measure three months in advance,

¹ Eybers, p. 437; Law No. 7 of 1882.

² Eybers, pp. 488, 495.

or by *Besluit*, a mere resolution carried on the spot. The High Court had twice upheld the latter practice and declared that since the Raad was a sovereign legislature, the Grondwet itself was not immune from hasty alteration, and the Courts had no power of testing laws by the touchstone of a rigid constitution.¹ It was thus possible for Kruger to keep within the law by altering the law. Individuals were given the vote, but this was an act of grace and not a right.

Probably, had the franchise laws been never so liberal, few overseas men would have become burghers at the price of forgoing British citizenship; but many South Africans would, and their allegiance would have strengthened the Republic as a republic. But most of them, had they been given the franchise, would surely have joined Schalk Burger, Lukas Meyer, Louis Botha, Ewald Esselen, and other liberally minded Boers who, backed by Eugene Marais of *Land en Volk* and Celliers of *Die Volksstem*, inveighed against the Hollanders and almost compelled Kruger to vote Joubert into the presidential chair and that would have been the end of much of what Kruger stood for.

So the franchise was withheld to make enemies, inflame grievances, give a handle to those who wished to destroy the Republic and, as the indignant Free Staters protested, differentiate the Transvaal from all other South African states on racial grounds. The root of the trouble was that the Kruger party behaved like a Chosen People towards a community which included many who were more universally recognised as such, and whose British members, under the stimulus of the new Imperialism, were beginning to suspect that they too had a claim to the title. A single Chosen People can usually be tolerated in a given state, but two are an embarrassment and three a disaster.

Signs of trouble to come soon appeared. Charles Leonard, a brilliant attorney from the Cape, formed the National Union. Times were bad. There was drought; the first Rand boom had broken and though the arrival of the Port Elizabeth line at the Vaal promised to reduce the cost of living, a new customs law cancelled the benefit in advance. Middle-class men and artisans therefore combined to secure equal rights and redress of grievances in an independent republic by constitutional means, while the magnates held aloof for fear of spoiling business.²

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 288.

² Kruger had told the Johannesburgers in Sept. 1887 that he would make no difference between old and new-comers, except that he would not give the latter the vote. (Van Oordt, *op. cit.*, p. 473.)

1884-
1887.

1892.

1892.

The Imperial Government had no power under the Convention to interfere, and at first it had no serious wish to do so ; but at length it sought to use the Swaziland negotiations as a lever to secure the franchise for the Uitlanders. Since the ratification of the first Swaziland Convention the Transvaal had secured railway strips through the lands of Zambaan and Umbegisa but had taken no steps in Tongaland, for that would commit it to joining the customs union. In Swaziland itself the joint government was not a success ; the Transvaalers were not more helpful than they had to be and now threatened to enforce the taxation concession which they had acquired. Hofmeyr's promise that their wishes would be considered still stood, and Loch was so anxious to settle the matter either by taking Swaziland himself at the risk of bad blood with the Dutch everywhere or by letting it go to the Republic under safeguards, that he twice went to London to urge the matter on Knutsford's attention. At the end of a long and dilatory correspondence with Pretoria, Ripon, Knutsford's successor, bade Loch confer with Kruger once more and, *inter alia*, to raise the question of the Uitlanders.¹

The conference took place at Colesberg.² It failed to settle anything, and the Transvaal gave notice that the existing convention would cease in August. Loch therefore went to Pretoria to renew negotiations. At Kruger's request Swaziland was dealt with separately. The President wished to incorporate it completely in his state under republican law, but he yielded at last to Loch's insistence that, once the Swazis had issued an Organic Proclamation empowering him to rule the whites, it should be governed like a protectorate. For the rest, he was averse to limiting his tariff to the then height of the Cape customs barrier or to including the Natal railway in any agreement, but he agreed to Ripon's demand that a railway to the east of Swaziland should only be built with the consent of H.M. Government or 'under a future contemplated convention.' He failed to induce Loch to agree to any modification of the London Convention, especially with regard to the control of foreign affairs, and on his side showed himself opposed to the equality of the English and Dutch languages, attached to the dynamite monopoly and ready to offer nothing more than a selective franchise.³

The Second Swaziland Convention was put into final shape and was presently ratified by the Volksraad, but it never came

¹ C. 7212 of 1893, pp. 3, 13 ff., 123 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 137, 143, 145 ff., 152.

³ C. 7212 of 1893, pp. 148 ff. ; Wolf, *Ripon*, II. 230 ; Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, pp. 323 ff. ; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 239.

1892-
1893.

into force. Loch's visit to Pretoria, however, profoundly affected the future course of his policy. He had been accorded a hearty welcome as the first representative of Queen Victoria, whom the Boers honoured as a great lady, to visit Pretoria since 1881. But the welcome could not hide the bitterness of party feeling. A furious presidential election had just ended. Kruger, Joubert and Chief Justice Kotze had all stood forward as candidates. There had been the possibility of a fourth candidate, for Chief Justice de Villiers had gone up from the Cape at Rhodes's suggestion to take soundings. He had, however, withdrawn; Kotze had won very few votes and Joubert had been narrowly defeated by Kruger amid such excitement that there had been some danger of an armed protest, as in times past. A commission of inquiry had declared Kruger duly elected, but Loch found that personal, religious and political rancours were still acute, and the Bench was at daggers drawn with the Executive and Legislature. He concluded that Kruger did not command the support of a majority of his own burghers, let alone of the Uitlanders, that once the Swazi question was settled the Republic would fall to pieces, and that many of the Boers felt vaguely that Great Britain must some day reoccupy their country. If internecine strife broke out he determined, in the last resort, to step in and end it. On the other hand, a wild welcome at Johannesburg on his way home convinced him that there was no fear of the 'English republic' that Rhodes dreaded, and that the day was coming sooner than was generally expected when 'all the States of South Africa will, at their own request, be united under the British flag.'¹

1891-
1894.

May
1891.

Perhaps the wish was father to the thought, but Rhodes cherished the same hope and not without reason. Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Matabele-Mashonaland had joined the Customs Union; Cape Bondsmen were raging against Kruger's *Sinn Fein* policy; the railways were advancing to put an end to that isolation. The Port Elizabeth line had reached Bloemfontein and, at the end of the same year, Sivewright, Rhodes's right-hand man in such matters, had arranged that the Cape should lend the Netherlands Railway Company enough money to enable it to raise a large loan from Rothschild's where-with to finish the Delagoa Bay line. In return the Cape had been given leave to carry its own line into the Promised Land and to fix the rates over the whole length to Johannesburg for three years to come.² On New Year's Day, 1893, the first train from

¹ C. 7212 of 1893, pp. 153 ff.; *Cape Law Journal* of 1894, pp. 173, 269; Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

² Williams, *Rhodes*, p. 248; G. 5-92 (Cape), pp. 2, 5.

Capetown entered Pretoria. Soon to the west the Bechuanaland Railway Company, an offshoot of the Chartered Company, was incorporated to carry the Vryburg line to Mafeking and the British Government agreed, much to Germany's annoyance, that no line from the west should pass through the Bechuanaland Protectorate without the consent of the Chartered Company, which would in its turn consult the Cape.¹ On the east the Second Swaziland Convention safeguarded the approach through Kosi Bay, and Rhodes had already begun to negotiate with the Portuguese for the lease or purchase of Delagoa Bay on behalf of the Cape Colony. These negotiations were hampered by the reference of McMurdo's claims to the Berne Arbitration Court and the existence of another bidder who may be safely located in or near Berlin; but the Chartered North was visibly taking shape under Jameson's skilful hands and the Matabeleland Order in Council; nearly a thousand miles of road had been built and the east coast railway was through to Chimoio, two days' ride from Salisbury.² In the old Colony Rhodes's base had been secured by his victory at the general election. Jan.
1894.

The Transvaalers began to fear Rhodes, 'thin, grey and haggard' though he was. As the suspicion that he was aiming at the control of their republic rose to a certainty, the rival factions drew together and cemented the defensive alliance by appointing Ewald Esselen, chairman of Joubert's election committee, State Attorney.³ Even so the Republic was shaken by storms in the middle of the year. The First Raad had rejected a large Uitlander franchise petition in 1893. It now rejected a still larger one and codified the electoral laws in such a way that no Uitlander could acquire the vote before the age of forty and that only at the end of fourteen years' residence, for the greater part of which he would have been denationalised under an oath of allegiance which may have been modelled on that of the U.S.A. but which was none the less unnecessarily galling to British subjects in a South African state permeated by British influences and surrounded by British territory. Even sons of Uitlanders born in the country fell under these disabilities unless their fathers took the oath of allegiance.⁴ Then in the course of a petty native war against Maloboch in the northern districts, the Government commandeered British subjects who, unlike the nationals of most other states, were not exempted by treaty. Most of the men called up responded, but a few objected and 1894.

¹ *B.S.A. Directors' Report*, Dec. 19, 1893, p. 3.

² *B.S.A. Directors' Report*, 1894, pp. 3 ff.

³ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁴ Laws No. 14 of 1893 and 3 of 1894; C. 7554 of 1894.

June
1894.

thereby gave rise to complications with the High Commissioner. The Swazis moreover refused to issue the Organic Proclamation provided for by the recent Swaziland Convention and, as the life of the joint government was about to expire, Loch hurried up to Pretoria.¹

Loch was so convinced that civil war was coming in the Transvaal that he mobilised the Bechuanaland Police on the western border, and, at Kruger's request, did not visit Johannesburg for fear of an 'incident'; but in spite of that, on his arrival at Pretoria, he was the recipient of such a tumultuous welcome from Uitlanders that had the President not been more level-headed than some of his advisers, the negotiations might have been imperilled. As it was, the commandeering question was easily disposed of and the life of the joint government in Swaziland extended till the end of the year;² but Loch did not venture to show Kruger Ripon's despatch suggesting a five-year franchise scheme. On the other hand he received an Uitlander deputation mostly of the professional and artisan type. Some of them spoke of force till he pointedly asked them how many rifles they had, and then showed them the folly of any such idea.

Out of these circumstances arose the legend propagated after the Jameson Raid that Loch had suggested that escapade. Loch's plan, though similar on the surface, was utterly different in spirit and intention. He was much more perturbed at the course of events north of the Vaal than he had been in 1893, and fully believed that civil war must ensue if a Volksraad as intransigent as the last was returned at the coming elections in October. If war came he, as High Commissioner, intended to warn Kruger that he held him responsible for the safety of the British lives and property endangered by his policy, and that if protection were not forthcoming, he would furnish it himself by pushing up troops along the advancing western railway and arming the Uitlanders. He believed, and most people in those days believed, that the Uitlanders were bound to win in the long run and, if they won without British help, might after all form a republic hostile to any British federation. He therefore asked for troops and instructions. Ripon vouchsafed neither; but Loch had not spoken without his book.³ Just after his visit, Charles Leonard's brother and Wessels, leader of the Transvaal bar, delivered fiery speeches at a mass meeting on the Rand, and Chief Justice Kotze, who had long demanded security of tenure

¹ C. 8159 of 1896, pp. 1, 9; C. 7611 of 1895, pp. 5, 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15; C. 8159 of 1896, pp. 18, 21.

³ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 274; Wolf, *Ripon*, II. 227; C. 7554 of 1894; C. 7611 of 1895; A. 6-96 (Cape), Appendix, p. vi.

and adequate salaries as the true safeguards for judicial independence, toured the country declaring that the Government's policy was a danger to the Republic.¹

Others unknown to Loch were also contemplating action. The possibility of working the deep levels on the Reef had at last been proved. All along the line for thirty miles on either side of Johannesburg the gold-bearing quartz dipped down, flattening out as it sank, to a workable depth of 3000 feet and more. Most of this banket formation was not rich but it was consistent, calculable and well-nigh inexhaustible; there was abundant cheap coal near at hand (would the Reef ever have paid for the working without that coal?); the deep levels promised the Rand a long life and a big population and demanded that working costs be brought down and railway and customs issues disposed of. A few of the mining magnates headed by Lionel Phillips, the new chairman of the Chamber of Mines, began to flirt with the National Union. They admittedly did not 'care a fig' for the franchise nor take much interest in politics for fear of irritating 'old Kruger'; but they wanted decent administration and felt that something might be done to 'improve' the Volksraad if an election fund could be raised, despite the law against it, without putting their hands into their own pockets.²

Rhodes's company, 'the Goldfields people,' had suggested that Phillips should approach the Colossus, but Alfred Beit shrewdly warned him that no good would come of that at the moment.³ The time was, however, rapidly coming when Rhodes would be more accessible. His luck had held good up to a point. Natal had secured self-government, and the new ministry at Pietermaritzburg supported the idea of an economic union;⁴ H.M. Government had proclaimed a protectorate over Uganda, and the Congo Free State had ceded a railway strip linking Lake Tanganyika with that territory. But there Rhodes's luck ran out. King Leopold hastily withdrew the priceless cession under pressure of France and the Kaiser, who threatened to summon a fresh Conference on Africa, and Downing Street bade Rhodes give up all hope of acquiring Delagoa Bay since Berlin would not let him have it even if Lisbon were willing.⁵ The All-Red route

¹ C. 8159 of 1896, pp. 41 ff.; *Cape Law Journal of 1894*, pp. 173, 269.

² A. 6-96 (Cape), Appendix, pp. 1 ff. This, the Cape Inquiry into the Jameson Raid, includes the Transvaal Green-book No. 2 of 1896, with a translation.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. vi. ff.

⁴ On self-government in Natal, *vide* C. 6487 of 1891 and H.C. 216 of 1894; Eybers, p. 204.

⁵ Gardiner, *Harcourt*, II. 311 ff.; *Michell, Rhodes*, II. 95.

June
1893.

June
1894.

Sept.
1894.

from the Cape to Cairo was thus blocked and the strangle-hold on the Transvaal averted. Further, personal inspection in company with Jameson and Hays Hammond, an American engineer from Johannesburg, convinced Rhodes that the New Rand was not to be found north of the Limpopo, and Hammond told him that unless there was a radical change politically in the Transvaal there would be a rising. Already the Rand seethed with mass meetings, secret societies and rifle clubs; if Rhodes would help, well and good; if not, the Uitlanders would take their own line.¹ President J. B. Robinson or Barney Barnato would not be an improvement on Paul Kruger—far from it—and, alternatively, a republic run by Peruvian Jews and the *Sydney Bulletin* Australians who were flocking to Johannesburg would be even worse.

Rhodes returned home thoughtful by way of Lourenço Marques, where his offer of help against the threatening tribes was declined, perhaps prudently, and thence through Pretoria, where he warned Kruger not to go too far lest he unite all South Africa against him. Meanwhile Jameson talked to all sorts and conditions of men on the Rand and concluded that Hammond was right.² Rhodes therefore decided that he must bargain with the Uitlanders, for if once they got railway connection with Delagoa Bay and Durban and ceased to be dependent on the Cape ports, they would hardly be content to play second fiddle in an economic federation controlled by the Cape and Charterland. Meanwhile, Jameson must drill his Rhodesian police and volunteers, a determined body of men who might do much riding light in open country with the machine-guns which had done such execution in Matabeleland and had so greatly impressed Rhodes on his recent trek through Pondoland. The country between Johannesburg and the railhead at Mafeking was open enough.

Then came the fatal Volksraad elections. Rehoboam sat in Solomon's seat and Kruger, thus emboldened, delivered a stiff defence of the dynamite monopoly and began very tentatively to arm.³ Loch hastened to London determined to resign, for he feared that the Bechuanaland Protectorate was slipping from his grasp into that of Rhodes. In that case, he knew he would not be able to control the course of events.⁴ Moreover, matters were going badly in Swaziland. So far from issuing the Organic

¹ Colvin, *Jameson*, I. 307; Williams, *Rhodes*, pp. 354 ff.; Michell, *Rhodes*, II. 118 ff.

² Williams, p. 248; Colvin, II. 13.

³ At this time the republic had a mixed bag of 18 field-pieces and about 100 artillerymen. Some rifles and maxims were now ordered and provision made in the estimates for forts round Pretoria (*'Times' History of the War*, I. 147).

⁴ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 255.

Proclamation, the Swazis had dismissed Offy Shepstone from his post as royal adviser, repudiated the Proclamation of 1890 under which the joint government functioned, and sent a deputation to London. British concessionaires urged them to stand out for the *status quo*, and Transvaalers tried to create the confusion which would entitle them to intervene under the Convention. Ripon and Loch now agreed that Swaziland must fulfil its 'manifest destiny' by passing to the Transvaal under proper safeguards for native interests.¹

But Kruger's East Coast port was another matter. Loch had repeatedly asked for leave to help the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay in case they were attacked by the Transvaalers or by the Germans or by the French, who had a naval base on the Cape route at Cape Verde and a strong expeditionary force in Madagascar. Rosebery, the premier, feared the French, but Ripon was now convinced that the Germans, who were brutally crushing the Hereros in South-West Africa, were the enemy, and that they meant to extend a protectorate over the Transvaal. The Foreign Office hinted to Germany that the Transvaal was in the British sphere of influence and would have said much more but for strained relations with France. The Colonial Office decided to annex all that lay between Swaziland and the sea and so 'mak siccar.'²

Ripon persuaded Loch to return to finish the business. Kruger was to have Swaziland under the terms of the abortive Convention of 1893, but not necessarily with the consent of the Swazis. That, in Loch's opinion, was the price which must be paid to avert war between the two white peoples of South Africa. So it was arranged by the President and High Commissioner at the Volksrust-Charleston Conference; the Pretoria Volksraad ratified the Third Swaziland Convention, and the Transvaal at once took over the territory.³ Meanwhile, much had happened. It was known that a German squadron was coming to Delagoa Bay to grace the formal opening of the Netherlands railway a few months hence. Kruger, whose State Secretary had just sailed for Berlin, addressed the Pretoria Germans on the Kaiser's birthday in terms which could only be interpreted as a confirmation of all the fears of Loch and Ripon.⁴ Ripon delayed no longer. Zambaan's, Umbegisa's and the lands of the Tongas were annexed and the Transvaal was cut off from the sea.⁵ It was still open to

Dec.

1894.

Feb.

1895.

Jan.

1895.

April-

May

1895.

¹ C. 7611 of 1895, pp. 17, 21 ff.; Wolf, *Ripon*, II, 222 ff.

² Wolf, *Ripon*, II, 231; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 253 (based partly on Loch's *Materials*). *Vide* van Oordt on Transvaal-German correspondence; *op. cit.*, p. 608.

³ C. 7611, pp. 23, 34 ff., 42 ff.

⁴ FitzPatrick, *op. cit.*, p. 106; Botha, *Kruger en Leyds*, pp. 469 ff.

⁵ C. 7780 of 1895, pp. 41 ff.; C. 7878 of 1895; Leyds, *Transvaal Surrounded*, pp. 346 ff.

Kruger to negotiate for Kosi Bay; but he would have to deal directly with Great Britain now and, since the Wilhelmstrasse presently hinted that the inclusion of the Republic in the customs union, on which the acquisition of the port depended, would be a violation of the *status quo* which it desired to maintain, there was little chance that the negotiations would ever be resumed. Nor were they.¹

Rhodes now took steps to force the hemmed-in republic into his economic federation, 'always respecting' republican independence.² He sailed to London to be lionised, to be made a Privy Councillor, to see his new provinces christened 'Rhodesia' and to hear Jameson, with the Prince of Wales in the chair, prophesy a speedy South African economic federation from which political federation would surely follow.³ That was his aim. He knew that his time was short. His heart was troubling him; he had never fully recovered from the shock of a heavy fall from his horse in 1891; his self-control was going; most of his old friends were already gone and, in their stead, were a crowd of Byzantine courtiers at Groote Schuur who shielded him from the sane breezes that blow in the outer world of facts. His power was over-great.⁴ In London *The Times* and the *Morning Post* supported him; in South Africa his hold on the six papers of the *Argus* group was tightening, and soon the two great checks on his political action were removed. He helped to expedite Loch's departure at the beginning instead of the end of the Cape session, and to persuade Sir Hercules Robinson to return to Cape Town as High Commissioner. The change was fiercely assailed by Rhodes's opponents in South Africa who wrongly believed that Sir Hercules was still interested in De Beers and similar companies, and by Chamberlain and the English Unionists, who hated the 'colonial' policy for which Robinson stood. It was partly for that reason that Rhodes wanted him. If trouble arose, it would be well to have a High Commissioner who enjoyed the confidence of most of the English and the Dutch; indeed, Kruger himself was at first inclined to welcome the return of his old friend, till the clamour in Cape Town and perhaps second thoughts made him suspicious. Sir Hercules, however, had another qualification in Rhodes's eyes. He was old and not in the best of health; he would not be likely to interfere so much as Loch had done with the activities

Jan.
1895.

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 254; Translation of *German White-book*, 1896 (Cape): Germany especially desired to maintain the commercial *status quo*, lest the Transvaal 'sink down into a province of the great "Rhodesia" . . .' (p. 2).

² Williams, *Rhodes*, p. 245.

³ *B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Jan. 1895, pp. 19 ff.

⁴ Williams, *Rhodes*, pp. 249 ff.

of his Prime Minister, and would yet be at hand when he was needed.¹ So Loch sailed home, and with him, for all practical purposes, the imperial factor; while Hofmeyr, harassed by ill-health and the sight of the Bond falling to pieces, resigned his seat in Parliament. Hybris descended upon Rhodes. Nemesis and Ate would follow in due course.

The campaign to secure the inclusion of the Transvaal in the coming federation had already begun. The Delagoa Bay line was finished, the Natal line was on the Transvaal border, and the Sivewright Agreement expired. But the Cape still controlled the railway through the Free State and, to retain the Rand traffic, reduced its rates to Viljoen's Drift on the Vaal. The Netherlands Company retaliated by tripling its rates over the 40 miles linking the drift to Johannesburg. The Netherlands Company which owned the Rand end of all the lines, obviously had the whip hand; an attempted settlement at a railway conference at Cape Town broke down, and the Cape merchants, loading their goods on ox-waggons at the river, trekked them thence to the Rand.²

It paid them to do so, for the 'Kaffir Boom' in mining shares following on the proving of the deep levels was at its height, a boom which spread to London and Berlin and induced French investors to plunge so heavily that their country rapidly qualified for a voice in the settlement of any trouble that might arise in the Transvaal. Meanwhile Rhodes carried a bill annexing British Bechuanaland to the Colony and pressed once more for the transference of the Protectorate to the Chartered Company,³ while Jameson in Johannesburg warned him that he must try to ride the whirlwind that was beating up there.⁴ He and Beit made their financial arrangements accordingly. Rhodes had recently told his long-suffering Chartered shareholders that there was no need to raise new capital, but he now asked them to authorise the issue of 500,000 new shares at £3 10s. apiece.⁵ Already the Company had taken steps to lay the foundations of a native administration in Charterland, and if Rhodesia were not soon off-loaded upon the Cape or upon a federation, money would be needed to finance a stable government there. Besides, the railway must be carried on from Mafeking, and interest on the Matabele War debentures would fall due at the New Year.

¹ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 252; Gardiner, *Harcourt*, II. 338; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 255.

² Selborne, *Review*, p. 31; Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 484; Cook, *Rights and Wrongs*, p. 51.

³ C. 7932 and C. 7962 of 1896; Eybers, p. 76.

⁴ Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 30 ff.

⁵ *B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Jan. 18, 1895, p. 9; *B.S.A. Co. Extraordinary General Meeting*, July 12, 1895.

The shares were authorised, but the issue was postponed for a season.¹

May
1895.

In the middle of the year the political atmosphere in South Africa seemed to be clearer. Robinson arrived with instructions from Ripon to play the part of mediator in the Transvaal if occasion arose. The controversy over his appointment died away,² the Delagoa Bay railway was formally opened in the presence of a German squadron and a much stronger British squadron alongside and, such was the good feeling of the moment, Kruger narrowly escaped the offer of a G.C.M.G.³ Next week the 'cordite vote' shattered the Rosebery Ministry, Lord Salisbury took office, and, to the dismay of Rhodes, Joseph Chamberlain, the high priest of Unionism, became Colonial Secretary. But the sky soon clouded. The Free State Volksraad objected to some of the terms of the customs union and talked once more of federation with its sister republic,⁴ while on the Rand the National Union renewed its activities. It was strengthened by the personal request of the High Commissioner that Kruger should show himself accommodating but weakened by the defection of some of its Labour members, who, mindful of the fate of the Kimberley voters in the days before the Cape Ballot Act, unsuccessfully demanded that a ballot clause be tacked on to the next franchise petition.⁵ It was perhaps partly for this reason that the Volksraad rejected the resultant Uitlander petition and one of the members challenged the petitioners, who this time included several leading capitalists, to 'come on and fight.'⁶

Aug.
1895.

The appeal to arms came soon enough. Shortly after the prorogation of the Cape Parliament Kruger gave notice that the Vaal drifts would be closed to overseas goods.⁷ He thereby outraged Cape and Free State opinion and did not soothe ruffled feelings when, in reply to warnings that he had broken the London Convention by discriminating against overseas goods, he blandly offered to set matters right by including colonial goods in the embargo. The breach of the Convention meant the prospect of war, the overthrow of the Pretoria Government and, if all went well, the speedy inclusion of Rhodesia in a South African federation. At the prospect a boom in Chartered and allied shares set in, 'the wildest and most indiscriminate gamble

¹ B.S.A. Co. Notice, July 24, 1895.

² Information furnished by Sir Graham Bower, at that time Imperial Secretary to Robinson.

³ Wolf, *Ripon*, II. 228, 234.

⁴ *Notulen (O.F.S. Volksraad)*, 1895, pp. 685 ff.

⁵ Rose, *Truth about the Transvaal*, p. 27.

⁶ FitzPatrick, *Transvaal from Within*, p. 400.

⁷ C. 8474 of 1897 for details of the Drifts Crisis.

that the Stock Exchange has witnessed for many a year.¹ During September, Chartereds touched £9 for the £1 share; the Bechuanaland Railway Company proposed to raise £1,300,000 on debenture to carry on the Mafeking line, and the B.S.A. Company guaranteed the interest on the £900,000 worth which were taken up at once.² The drifts were duly closed. Rhodes Oct. 1, 1895. and his fellow ministers thereupon arranged with Chamberlain for joint action, and troopers with drafts for India were instructed to touch at the Cape for orders. But no troops were ever landed Nov. 5, 1895. for, in response to an ultimatum, Kruger reopened the drifts.³

Rhodes thus lost the chance of facing Kruger with the support of H.M. Government and at least the acquiescence of most South Africans outside the Transvaal. If he meant to have federation within the year he must rely now on his Company and the Uitlanders. He had already taken steps towards that end. During the Drifts crisis four of the Johannesburg Reformers, Phillips, Leonard, Hammond, and his own brother, Frank, had arranged with him that Jameson should come in from the western border to assist a rising which should follow the issue of a statement of their grievances; while he for his part undertook to arm the Uitlanders and deliver the High Commissioner at Pretoria at the psychological moment. It is not clear what was actually passing in the minds of the plotters. All that is certain is that Rhodes told them that he wanted an economic federation and that 'the rest will come in time.'⁴ Even so the Reformers must have looked askance at such a consummation on Rhodes's terms.

The plot worked ill from the start. H.M. Government refused to hand over the Protectorate to the Company in face of the protests of the chiefs and the watchful Loch in London, but it did give it a railway strip along the Transvaal border.⁵ Immediately detachments of the B.S.A. Police rode down to occupy a Oct. 1895. camp at Pitsani a few miles north of Mafeking while the Cape Government took over British Bechuanaland. The Bechuana- Nov. 1895. land Police were disbanded, but agents of the Company induced many of them to stand by while Jameson went into Johannesburg, obtained the famous letter inviting him to come in presently to the defence of the women and children,⁶ and then returned to

¹ *The Economist*, Dec. 28, 1895.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1895; *B.S.A. Directors' Report*, 1894-5, p. 2.

³ A railway conference at Pretoria, Nov. 5, came to nothing.

⁴ On the Raid, *vide* Williams, *Rhodes*; Michell, *Rhodes*, II.; Colvin, *Jameson*, II.; Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*; FitzPatrick, *Transvaal from Within* (the Reformers' side of the story); S.A.R. Green-book No. 2 of 1896, translated in A. 6-96 (Cape); Nos. 380 and 311, 311 (i), 311 (ii) of 1897 (*Report of Select Committee*).

⁵ C. 7962 of 1896, p. 21; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 263.

⁶ A. 6-96 (Cape), pp. liii ff.

Bulawayo to lick the Rhodesian volunteers into shape. Jameson did his share of the work only too well. The Reformers could not do theirs. Enthusiasts might still drill the rank and file who were furious enough to do anything against Kruger and his Continentals, but there was little chance of a serious rising in the midst of a boom, and at headquarters, where alone the plot was known to a handful of men, there was division. Some meant business; others were plainly playing with the idea of a revolution by telegram. They postponed the rising for a week because of the races; they boggled over the question of the revolutionary flag, while canny Boers with one eye on the 'rest camp' at Pitsani, where the police drilled with unremitting vigour, withdrew their savings from the Bechuanaland banks,¹ and Jameson fretted and fumed, fearful of discovery and apparently without any clear idea as to whether his Raid was to be the signal for the Rising or *vice versa*. At last, with open drilling going on in the streets, men, women and children fleeing the town, and the Chartered men insisting that the rising must take place without delay, two Reformers journeyed to Capetown to settle the flag question with Rhodes while the Kruger Government undertook to reduce railway rates and duties on foodstuffs, and promised to give equal subsidies to Dutch and English schools and to raise the franchise and ballot questions at a special session of the Volksraad in January. Nevertheless, Leonard issued his manifesto of grievances and called a mass meeting for January 6; ² and next day, in London, it was formally announced that the long-deferred issue of the 500,000 new Chartered shares would take place on January 8.³ But already the ill-armed Reformers had decided to postpone 'the flotation' and had sent messengers to stop Jameson at all costs.⁴

Dec. 27,
1895.

The postponement was made too late. Jameson had made up his own mind that the Johannesburgers would never move if they were left to themselves; he thought he knew Rhodes's wishes—'Take what you can get and ask me afterwards'; he had rushed Lobengula successfully in the past; he would now rush the Reformers and, thereafter, Kruger and the Imperial Factor. He paid no attention to frantic messages from Harris, the Company's secretary in Capetown, 'on the surface a genius but, under the crust, as thick as they are made'; ⁵ still less would he hearken to instructions from the lukewarm Reformers; he even discounted orders from Rhodes himself to stand fast.

¹ Information given by Mr. H. M. Quigley, at the time bank manager at Vryburg.

² FitzPatrick, *Transvaal*, p. 136; C. 7933 of 1896, p. 65.

³ *The Economist*, Dec. 28, 1895.

⁴ A. 6-96 (Cape), p. lx.

⁵ Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 229.

Rhodes, he argued, wanted him to go in but, as Premier of the Colony, must keep up appearances. Very well; he himself would take the responsibility. If only he could get to Johannesburg, he was sure that he could make things move (for 'the Doctor' had a wonderful way with him).¹ So he wired to Rhodes at the last moment that, unless he heard from him to the contrary, he would start. Fate and Rutherford Harris saw to it that the message reached its destination too late, and, when Rhodes wired to him to stand fast, the telegraph line had been cut south of Mafeking.² So Jameson rode into the Transvaal with some 500 fighting men, never realising that, though the act was his, the responsibility for it must fall upon his chief. Dec. 29,
1895.

Thirty-six hours later, the horrified Reformers heard definitely that Jameson was coming to their rescue.³ Putting a bold face on their difficulties, they co-opted fifty or more prominent citizens to their committee, prepared to declare themselves a provisional government, hoisted the Vierkleur upside down as the flag of the Republic-about-to-be-reformed and gave out what arms they had. The Pretoria Government withdrew its police from the Rand, refused to allow the German consul to bring up marines from Lourenço Marques to defend his consulate,⁴ and sent Cronje, the hero of the siege of Potchefstroom, to organise the defence at Krugersdorp.

All was soon over. On receipt of definite news, the High Commissioner, counselled by his own good sense and Hofmeyr, repudiated the Raiders and ordered them back; ⁵ the Reformers agreed to what was practically an armistice which tied their hands for the next twenty-four hours; Jameson failed to break through at Krugersdorp and, next day, was compelled to surrender near Doornkop just as the High Commissioner, at Kruger's invitation, arrived at Pretoria.⁶ Sir Hercules and the Pretoria officials induced Johannesburg to lay down its arms; whereupon Kruger arrested sixty of the Reformers and, after a prolonged struggle with some of his commandants who favoured drumhead court martial and a firing-party, handed over Jameson and his followers to be punished by the Imperial authorities.⁷ Jan. 2,
1896.

So ended all prospect of peaceful federation in South Africa for a generation.

¹ So Jameson explained his action to Mr. L. Curtis in 1907.

² A: 6-96 (Cape), pp. 26, 27, cclxii.

³ FitzPatrick, p. 138.

⁴ *German White-book*, 1896 (Cape), p. 4. Kruger told the consul that if he was afraid he might have a guard of fifty burghers (Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 265).

⁵ C. 7933 of 1896, p. 8; Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 490.

⁶ For Robinson's policy, *vide* C. 8063 of 1896, pp. 116 ff.

⁷ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 266.

Imperial Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter XII. :

- Angra Pequena : *Correspondence*, C. 4190, C. 4262, C. 4265 of 1884. [*Vide also South Africa*, C. 2783, C. 2873 of 1881; C. 3113 of 1882.]
- Basutoland : *Further Correspondence*, C. 2964 of 1881; C. 3112 of 1882; *Reorganisation of Colonial Forces*, C. 3493 of 1883; *Future Administration*, C. 3708 of 1883.
- Bechuanaland : *Further Correspondence*, C. 5237 of 1887; C. 5524, C. 5918 of 1890; *Transfer to Cape Colony*, C. 7932 of 1896; *Visit of Khama*, C. 7962 of 1896.
- Delagoa Bay : *Correspondence re Railway (McMurdo's)*, C. 5903 of 1890.
- Natal : *Instructions to Sir H. Bulwer*, C. 3174 of 1882; *Correspondence re Constitution*, C. 3796 of 1883; *Further Correspondence re Cetewayo*, C. 3466 of 1883; *Further Correspondence re Natal and Zululand*, C. 3864, C. 4037, C. 4191, C. 4214 of 1884; C. 4274, C. 4587 of 1885; C. 4645, C. 4913, C. 4980, C. 5143 of 1887; C. 5892 of 1890; *Correspondence re Responsible Government*, C. 6487 of 1891; H.C. 216 of 1894.
- Portugal : *Portuguese Claims . . . in Mashonaland*, C. 5904 of 1890; *Correspondence re Convention of 1890*, C. 6212 of 1890; *Correspondence re Portuguese East Africa*, C. 6495 of 1891; *Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal*, C. 6375 of 1891; C. 8434 of 1897.
- Rhodesia (British South Africa Company) : C. 7171, C. 7190 of 1893; *Further Correspondence re Mashonaland, Matabeleland, etc.*, C. 7196 of 1893; C. 7290 of 1894; *Death of Two Indunas*, C. 7284 of 1894; *Sir F. Newton's Report*, C. 7555 of 1894; *Papers re Administration of Matabeleland and Mashonaland*, C. 7383 and H.C. 177 of 1894; *Correspondence re Customs Duties*, C. 7782 of 1895; *Report of Select Committee on B.S.A. Company*, No. 311, 311 (i), 311 (ii), 380 of 1897.
- South Africa : *Correspondence re Proposed Conference*, C. 1399 of 1876; *Instructions to Sir H. Robinson*, C. 2754 of 1881; *Further Correspondence*, C. 2783, C. 2837 of 1881; C. 3113 of 1882; *Correspondence re Customs Conference*, C. 5390 of 1888; *Correspondence re High Commissionership*, C. 5488 of 1888.
- S.A. Republic (Transvaal) : *Correspondence*, C. 3098, C. 3381, C. 3419 of 1882; *Further Correspondence re Convention*, C. 3947 of 1884; *Further Correspondence re Transvaal and Adjacent Territories*, C. 3486, C. 3686 of 1883; C. 3841, C. 4194, C. 4213, C. 4252 of 1884; C. 4275, C. 4432, C. 4588 of 1885; C. 4643, C. 4839, C. 4890 of 1886; *Petition to Sir H. Loch*, C. 7554 of 1894; *Correspondence re British Subjects*, C. 7633 of 1895; *Correspondence re Recent Disturbances*, C. 7933 of 1896; *Correspondence re Affairs of S.A. Republic*, C. 8063, C. 8159 of 1896; *Closing of the Drifts*, C. 8474 of 1897; *Report of Concessions Commission*, Cd. 623 of 1901; *Minutes of Labour Commission*, Cd. 1897 of 1904.
- Swaziland : *Correspondence*, C. 5089 of 1887, C. 6200 of 1890; *Report of Sir F. de Winton*, C. 6201 of 1890; *Convention*, C. 6217 of 1890; *Further Correspondence*, C. 7212 of 1893; C. 7611 of 1895; *Correspondence re Native Tribes to N.E. of Zululand*, C. 7780 of 1895; *Correspondence re Native Territories (Tongaland)*, C. 7878 of 1895.

CHAPTER XIII

UNIFICATION 1896-1910

Immediate political results of the Raid—Matabele-Mashona rebellion—Judicial and Press crises in the Transvaal—Milner—Rhodes's second federation scheme—Negotiations—War and Reconstruction—Chinese Labour—Afrikander revival—Self-government and the Closer Union movement: economic pressure; Indians; the Zulu rebellion; Southern Rhodesia—The National Convention.

Secretaries of State for the Colonies: J. Chamberlain, June 1895–Oct. 1903; Alfred Lyttelton, Oct. 1903–Dec. 1905; Earl of Elgin, Dec. 1905–April 1908; Earl (Marquess) of Crewe, April 1908.

High Commissioners and Governors of the Cape Colony: Sir H. Robinson (Lord Rosmead), May 30, 1895–April 1897; Sir Alfred Milner, April 21, 1897–March 6, 1901; (Sir William Butler, acting 1898–1899).

High Commissioners and Governors of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony: Viscount Milner, March 1901–April 1905; Earl of Selborne, April 1905–May 1910.

Governor-General of the Union of South Africa: Viscount Gladstone.

Governor of the Cape Colony: Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, March 6, 1901–May 1910.

Premiers of the Cape Colony: J. G. Sprigg, June 13, 1896–Oct. 13, 1898; W. P. Schreiner, Oct. 14, 1898–June 17, 1900; J. G. Sprigg, June 18, 1900–Feb. 21, 1904; L. S. Jameson, Feb. 22, 1904–Feb. 2, 1908; J. X. Merriman, Feb. 3, 1908–May 30, 1910.

Governors of Natal: Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, Aug. 1893–March 1901; Sir H. E. McCallum, May 1901–June 5, 1907; Sir Matthew Nathan, Sept. 2, 1907–Dec. 23, 1909; Lord Methuen, Jan. 17–May 1910.

Premiers of Natal: Sir John Robinson, Oct. 10, 1893–Feb. 14, 1897; Harry Escombe, Feb. 15, 1897–Oct. 4, 1897; Sir Henry Binns, Oct. 5, 1897–June 8, 1899; Sir Albert Hime, June 9, 1899–Aug. 1903; G. M. Sutton, Aug. 1903–May 1905; C. J. Smythe, May 1905–Nov. 1906; F. R. Moor, Nov. 1906–May 31, 1910.

Presidents of the Orange Free State: F. W. Reitz, Jan. 11, 1889–Nov. 1895; M. T. Steyn, Feb. 21, 1896–May 1902.

Lieutenant-Governor of the Orange River Colony: Sir H. J. Goold-Adams, Jan. 1901; *Governor*, July 1, 1907 onwards.

Premier of the Orange River Colony: Abram Fischer, Dec. 1907–May 31, 1910.

President of the South African Republic: S. J. P. Kruger, May 1883–May 1902. *Lieutenant-Governors of the Transvaal*: Sir A. Lawley, Sept. 29, 1902–Dec. 3, 1905; Sir R. Solomon, 1905–Dec. 1906.

Premier of the Transvaal: Louis Botha, Feb. 1907–May 31, 1910.

British South Africa Company (S. Rhodesia): Earl Grey, March 1896–Dec. 1898; Sir W. H. Milton, 1898–Oct. 1914.

THE Raid revealed the risks run by a state which works through a semi-independent body like a chartered company. The sudden movement of five hundred troopers seven thousand miles away

set the balance of the Armed Peace a-quiver in Europe. There the Triple and Dual Alliances already faced one another, and Great Britain, splendidly isolated, was anxiously reckoning the troops necessary to hold the Canadian frontier against the U.S.A. in case President Cleveland should carry out his threat to intervene in a long-standing Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute. Jameson's ride into the Transvaal called forth all the anti-British jealousies of Europe. The Pretoria Germans called on their government for aid, and the chiefs of the Wilhelmsstrasse nervously responded. They sent an additional warship to Delagoa Bay and despatched a threatening protest to London, while the Emperor tried to beat up French and Russian support against perfidious Albion. On learning of the surrender at Doornkop, the German Ambassador in London recovered the semi-ultimatum unread, but the Kaiser despatched his famous telegram of congratulation to Kruger as a substitute for the troops which he had at first wished to send to uphold a German protectorate over the Transvaal. Thereupon, Great Britain equipped a flying squadron, partly as a warning to the All-Highest and his enthusiastic Reichstag, partly as a precaution against American intervention on the Spanish Main. In a few days the storm subsided on both sides of the Atlantic. Great Britain came to terms with the United States; St. Petersburg sent a reassuring message to London; Portugal, the ancient ally of England, declined to have Germans in Lourenço Marques, and France intimated that in case of war her neutrality would be of the most pro-British variety and possibly something more. Soon 'My dear William' was explaining to 'Most beloved Grandmamma' that his marines had only been intended to protect the German consulate 'as they do in China and elsewhere' and in no case to have taken 'any active part in the row.'¹

The crisis of the Raid cleared the air to this extent that the Powers now knew that Great Britain would fight rather than allow any of them to interfere in South Africa; but in South Africa itself it added immensely to Great Britain's difficulties. All the pre-Raid problems awaited solution in an atmosphere of suspicion and reviving racialism and, now, the Imperial authorities must attempt the solution themselves. Rhodes, the unofficial High Commissioner, was out of action; his office of Privy Councillor was imperilled; his power of attorney and his very seat on the Chartered Board were gone, and his Charter was challenged by Merriman and Sauer, who were prepared to face the prospect of Crown Colony rule in the North which alone

¹ Lee, *Edward VII*, pp. 719 ff.; *German White-book*, 1896 (Cape); C. 7933 of 1896, p. 48; Hammann, *World Policy of Germany*, pp. 68 ff.

prevented Hofmeyr from joining in the attack. Hofmeyr and most of his Bondsmen washed their hands of him and many Englishmen turned away from one whom they regarded as the head-centre of a bullying plutocracy which had dragged their flag in the mud.¹ Their judgment was harsh, for Rhodes, with his schemes for the good of Anglo-Saxon civilisation, and therefore in his eyes the good of mankind, was immeasurably more than a mere plutocrat ;² but he was now politically impossible. Sprigg with a patchwork cabinet reigned in his stead at Capetown, and a parliamentary committee, helped by the publication of letters which had passed between the Raiders and Reformers and had been captured by the Boers in the saddle-bag of one of Jameson's over-confident officers, unequivocally condemned the ex-premier.³ Meanwhile, the English courts sentenced Jameson and his principal officers to imprisonment. July
1896.

The last state of the Uitlanders was worse than the first. All that could be expected of the Cape Colony were ministerial appeals and private Bond reminders to Kruger to remember that the condition of his republic was bound to have reactions in the Colony. In the Free State, whose burghers had lined the banks of the Vaal during the Raid with more than one anxious glance backward at the Basuto, the anti-English reaction ran strongly. Its officials, Afrikanders and Scots, corresponded with the peccant Cape in the highest Dutch of which they were capable instead of in the customary English, as a protest against all things British ; and Judge M. T. Steyn easily defeated J. G. Fraser in the race for the presidential chair from which ill-health had driven Reitz shortly before the crisis. Still less could help be expected from anyone in the Transvaal save from Kruger only. The Uitlanders were bewildered and more divided than ever ; some of the mining magnates headed by J. B. Robinson went over from the Chamber of Mines to the continental Association ; four of the leading Reformers were sentenced to death for high-treason

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 269 ; C. 8423 of 1897, p. 31.

² Compare this letter from Rhodes to Harcourt written at Gwelo, on May 13, 1896, at the height of the Matabele Rebellion :

'The enclosed explains my letter. It has come just as we start to try and make a junction with Buluwayo. We are 250 men and the Buluwayo column is 500. There are about 6000 natives in between us and Buluwayo and we may make a mess of it. I would be sorry to think that you thought I was "capable but not honest." I have tried to unite South Africa and no sordid motive has influenced me. . . .

C. J. RHODES.'

'May 14. We start in an hour. . . . You make one mistake—the Dutch in Africa are not all with Kruger and my action was not English v. Dutch. But we would not have the German element and the Pretoria Government must go.'
(Gardiner, *Harcourt*, II. 392.)

³ A. 6-96 (Cape).

and the rest to imprisonment, and though these sentences were presently commuted for fines which Rhodes and Beit to their credit paid, the prisoners were only released on promising to abstain from politics for three years to come. The Liberal Boers, on the other hand, had been driven into the arms of Kruger, who was now assured of a new lease of political life, immense moral prestige and an unimpeachable excuse for the arming of his state, which he systematically undertook.¹

At first Englishmen had not known what to think. During the actual crisis, Chamberlain had so far given way to those who clamoured for strong action that he had bidden the High Commissioner demand the immediate redress of Uitlander grievances; but Sir Hercules had disregarded his instructions, and thus left him free to invite Kruger to London to talk out mutual difficulties.² Chamberlain somewhat spoilt the effect of the gesture by a rash speech and the premature publication of his scheme of Home Rule for the Rand, and the President, making the most of his opportunity, asked for compensation for the Raid, cancellation of the Charter, full incorporation of Swaziland in the Transvaal and a bilateral treaty in place of the London Convention which was 'so injurious to the dignity of an independent republic.'³ Nevertheless, Kruger meant to go, in spite of Chamberlain's warning that Article 4 of the Convention governing the treaty-making powers of the Transvaal must stand. He had even named the men who were to have accompanied him, when a message reached him from Berlin that high authorities there advised that H.M. Government be made to go to Canossa; the continental schoolmasters stirred up the suspicious burghers, and Kruger, fearing for his office, drew back.⁴ Had he gone he would certainly have received a great ovation from the impressionable London crowd and achieved a settlement of some at least of the outstanding questions. As it was, Chamberlain was left to silence the small group in the Commons, which pointed out that the road to Canossa lay through Pretoria itself, with the reminder that war with the Transvaal would be a serious matter and could in no case be undertaken to enforce internal reforms, and to carry on his discussions with Kruger by letter with all the delay and chance of misunderstanding that diplomatic correspondence entails.⁵

The effect of the Raid was to scatter the political fragments of

¹ C. 8063 of 1896, p. 114; '*Times*' *History of War in S.A.*, II. 66 ff.

² C. 7933 of 1896, pp. 19, 51, 59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 90; C. 8063 of 1896, p. 13.

⁴ C. 8063 of 1898, p. 9; C. 8423 of 1897, pp. 15 ff.; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 270.

⁵ Cook, *Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War*, p. 62.

South Africa which Rhodes and economic pressure had begun to draw together. Rhodes's own base in the Colony had been destroyed; the election of Steyn portended a movement on the part of the Free State towards the Transvaal and away from the Colony; there was no hope now of gaining the Bechuanaland Protectorate for the B.S.A. Company. Chartered directors were hurriedly resigning, and the Imperial Government, which had just relieved the British East Africa Company of its duties, might even cancel the Charter. But Rhodes did not despair. Hofmeyr himself had thundered against the threat of German intervention implied in the Kaiser's telegram, time and Kruger's tariffs would surely swing the Bond over to his side once more and his fellow Englishmen would forgive.¹ He had hurried to London as soon as he could after the Raid to face the financial troubles that were crowding on his Company. Chartered directors were down below the price at which the new issue of shares must be taken up, interest on the Matabele War debentures was falling due at last, and the Cape to Cairo railway, shut out from the line of life through the Transvaal, must be carried on through the Bechuanaland Protectorate. These difficulties were overcome, and Earl Grey, privy to the Raid, was sent out of harm's way to organise a proper administration in Southern Rhodesia. Thither Rhodes followed him, hoping that all might yet be well in Charterland at least. Two days after his arrival the Matabele rose and slew every Rhodesian they could lay hands on.² March
1896.

The capture of the Company's police at Doornkop and the subsequent disbanding of the Rhodesian volunteers did not cause the rebellion; they merely gave the Matabele their long-awaited opportunity. The leaders of the tribe must have known that the war of 1893 had not been of Lobengula's seeking, and they certainly knew that since the fall of their king they had had no one to look to. The head of the Company's native department was a good official, but he had to control a defective system through a handful of subordinates, some of whom were young, inexperienced and little credit to themselves or their employers, and, in the last resort, he must rely on the Matabele police, who lorded it over their fellows. But the root troubles here as elsewhere were land, cattle and labour. The widely scattered Mashonas, farming light granitic soil, had not felt the pressure of Europeans, especially as most of the white men had soon moved away westward; but in Matabeleland the closely grouped tribesmen had felt the pressure at once. For they

¹ Hofmeyr, *op. cit.*, p. 496.

² *B.S.A. Directors' Report*, Feb. 1896, p. 14.

favoured the heavy loams to which their fathers had been used in Zululand, and these loams covered the gold reef. These lands were pegged out at once, and the allocation of two large and little-known reserves was small compensation, since the soil of one was poor and the water supply of the other deficient. The Company, as successor of Lobengula, had then claimed all cattle as royal cattle and, pending the promised distribution, entrusted most of the beasts to the indunas to check the wholesale scramble by blacks and whites which had followed the war. The police at first took drafts of these animals, and when, on the eve of the Raid, the distribution was effected, few were satisfied. Locusts had come with the white man, and now rinderpest attacked the herds; the slaughter of the newly distributed beasts by the officials in an attempt to stay the plague infuriated the tribesmen. Compulsory labour, not merely the customary labour for public purposes, but for private purposes also, was demanded by the native commissioners and their police from stubborn and by no means fully conquered folk who were told by their prophets that the shedding of white man's blood would alone end the prolonged drought.¹ So the Matabele slew and, when volunteers from all parts and imperial troops from the Protectorate came up, withdrew into the Matoppo Hills. Eighteen hundred men, however, could make no lasting impression on this Matabele Basutoland; the drought and rinderpest which ravaged all South Africa made transport very difficult; the Company's funds ran low, and, to the surprise of the officials, the apparently docile Mashona rose in their rear.

June
1896.

At last where the soldiers had failed, the diplomatist succeeded. Rhodes in person made terms with the Matabele indunas in the Matoppo and disbanded his levies.²

The Imperial Government insisted that the Company should keep a costly body of troops and police in Matabeleland, and the Mashona revolt smouldered on for twelve months longer; but serious fighting was over, and though the Chartered Company was now financially embarrassed, Rhodes was free to set his house in order.³ He tried to bring men and money into the country by making lordly grants of land to development companies; he himself took up two large cattle runs; he helped Grey to staff the administration with good men drawn mostly from the coast colonies. Then, encouraged by messages from Afrikaner friends, and restored in prestige by the indabas in the Matoppo, he passed

¹ C. 8130 of 1894, p. 5; C. 8547 of 1897, pp. 5, 11, *et passim*.

² Vere Stent, *Incidents in the Life of Cecil Rhodes*, pp. 27 ff.

³ C. 8060 of 1896; C. 8732 of 1898; *Report of B.S.A. Extraordinary Meeting*, Nov. 6, 1896. The Rebellions cost the B.S.A. Company nearly £2,500,000.

slowly and triumphantly through the Colony on his way to London, there to 'face the music' before a committee of the Commons appointed to inquire into the genesis of the Raid and the past administration of the Company.

Rhodes's progress and the liberation of all except two of the Reformers gave the signal for an outburst in some of the London and colonial newspapers against the Pretoria Government as an oppressive system and a bar to the full development of the gold industry. Much of it was unfair, for some of the laws had been passed for the benefit of the Uitlanders, and others might benefit them if they were well administered. A municipal law had been framed which promised to give Johannesburg some measure of control over its domestic concerns; an Education Act gave much more adequate state assistance to schools for the children of those who paid nine-tenths of the taxes; the Ballot Act, which was to come into force in 1898, would go far to weaken official pressure at elections; some eight hundred Uitlanders who had taken up arms against the Raiders had been enfranchised. But this last measure merely flicked the rest of the Uitlanders on the raw, for it was an act of grace, and the hope of getting the franchise as a right was further off than ever. As it was, anxious memorials came in from enfranchised burghers begging that this extension of privilege might cease. Kruger reigned supreme in the executive, wielding great power over the expenditure of public money, virtually appointing every official in the land, and, with the State Secretary, acting as 'the Government'—that word of power in South Africa—to which the rest of the executive councillors habitually referred their differences. Conservatism, moreover, ruled the Volksraad, and the Liberal opposition was apt to wilt whenever the redoubtable President entered the Raadsaal.

All this was galling, but some recent legislation was, in Uitlander eyes, dangerous. The Aliens Expulsion Act, approved in principle before the Raid, was now law; so was the Immigration Act, which aimed primarily at excluding paupers, persons with contagious diseases, and other undesirables, but which might be used to keep out others; so were the Press Law and the prohibition of unlicensed open-air meetings which might well be used to fetter freedom of speech and writing.¹ It is true that these Acts gave the authorities very few powers which were not exercised by a British Home Secretary, that the Expulsion Act was only used once before the war of 1899, and then, with general approval,

¹ C. 8423 of 1897, pp. 44, 56, 65; Eybers, p. 505; Acts 6 of 1894 (open-air meetings) and 25, 26 and 30 of 1896.

against the murderer of Woolf Joel, that only three public meetings were prohibited, two of which were to have been in favour of the Government, that the Immigration Law was presently repealed as a technical breach of the London Convention and a nuisance to neighbouring communities, and that the Press Law was aimed at a violent and unbridled press. The Uitlanders could not foresee all this in the early months of 1897. They were naturally suspicious of such powers conferred by an oligarchic, reactionary, unicameral legislature on an executive which had a taste for meddling with the minutiae of administration and was largely staffed by continentals whose lack of sympathy with British and Colonial Uitlanders was notorious.

Besides times were bad. Railway rates, distance from the ports, the inability of the farmers to supply the needs of the growing urban population, and the restrictive economic policy of the state kept up the cost of living and, therefore, working costs in the mines. There was a lack of native labour; illicit liquor sellers played havoc with such labourers as were available; some mines were closing, others reducing their staffs, and a stream of emigration was setting towards Rhodesia or the Cape ports; banks were shortening credit and, in the background, rinderpest destroyed the cattle, and fever and lack of food killed the poorer burghers and the natives of the Waterberg and Zoutpansberg by the score. And so it continued throughout 1897. The gold-mines, hastily organised and burdened with a rate of wages fixed during the bonanza times, felt the pinch, the development of the deep levels still fell short of the producing stage in most cases, the public revenues dwindled, the farmers, in whose interest the state was run, grew poorer every day, and the Government was driven to vote large and increasing sums for the relief of destitute burghers.¹

1897.

It was under these depressing circumstances that the authorities fell foul of the bench and the press, which, failing the unattainable franchise, were regarded by the Uitlanders as the palladia of such liberties as they enjoyed.²

Chief Justice Kotze as one of the leaders of the Afrikaner party was suspect of the Continentals, as a politician he had often failed to see eye to eye with his President, and, as a jealous defender of judicial independence, he now came into conflict with the executive and the legislature. The Grondwet had been drawn up forty years back by men unversed in politics and living in conditions utterly unlike those of the late 'nineties.

¹ C. 9093 of 1898.

² On the issue between Kruger and Kotze, *vide* Sir J. Kotze, *The Judicial Crisis*, and Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 287 ff.

It by no means made it clear whether or no the Volksraad was a sovereign body superior to the written constitution. The Volksraad had legislated both by wet (statute), a process which occupied at least three months, and by besluit (resolution), a method which entailed no delay whatever. Much of the law touching mining, property, contract, the franchise and the High Court itself had been made by besluits whose validity Kotze had more than once upheld as the work of a sovereign legislature. Fuller study of the early history of the Republic convinced him that he had been wrong and the need for putting some check on hasty legislation impelled him to set matters right. In spite of Kruger's warning not to tamper with besluits, he ultimately gave judgment in a mining case against the Government and in favour of the plaintiff, Brown, denying the power of the Volksraad to alter existing law by besluit and claiming for his court the right to test laws in American fashion by the touchstone of the Grondwet. Jan. 1897.

The Brown judgment involved the Government in a payment of £372,000, opened up a vista of similar judgments, threatened chaos to the laws of the Republic and the loss of much-needed capital to the mines, and imperilled delicate negotiations with the Free State. Steyn, the new President at Bloemfontein, stood for three principles. The first, the referendum to Het Volk, he had failed to carry through a Volksraad jealous of its powers; the second, economic freedom, he had in a measure achieved, for though he stood by the customs union with the Cape, he had taken over the Free State railways from the Colonial administration; the third, closer relations with his northern neighbour, he was on the point of securing. But he himself held very definite opinions on the shortcomings of his prospective allies, and now the Brown judgment startled his burghers, few of whom had any love for Transvaalers, many of whom followed Fraser in opposing entangling alliances with the North and all of whom were proud of the stability of their little state and of its courts. The Transvaal executive, therefore, hurried Law No. 1 of 1897¹ through the Volksraad by besluit, denying the existence of the testing right and, in spite of the fact that the judges had been appointed for life and could only be removed after due trial, authorising the President to dismiss any of them who, in answer to his challenge, still claimed it.

The Uitlander press and its friends in the Colony supported by the Johannesburg bar, Dutch and English alike, took up the cudgels on behalf of judicial independence; a few wealthy Uitlanders privately guaranteed the judges against immediate

¹ Eybers, p. 508.

March
1897.

want in case of dismissal ; the judges themselves, though divided on the score of the existence of the testing right, protested in a body against Law No. 1, appealed to the sovereign people and practically declared a strike. Kruger first broke the judicial strike by appointing a sixth and more amenable judge, gave his other judges two weeks in which to claim or renounce the testing right and concluded his offensive and defensive alliance with Steyn. Kotze, meanwhile, called on the Chief Justice of the Cape to come to the rescue. Before his appeal could reach Capetown, de Villiers had set out for Pretoria. There he persuaded the judges to promise that they would not exercise the disputed testing right, on the understanding that their President would as soon as possible submit a draft law to the Volksraad establishing the independence of the bench and providing special machinery, as in the Free State, for the alteration of the Grondwet. On these terms Kruger agreed to suspend the operation of Law No. 1, and so the immediate crisis passed.

March
1897.

After the courts, the press. The newspapers on both sides, supported either by the Government or by wealthy corporations and individuals, were noisy and bitter, and the noise of the opposition organs was swelled by the anti-Kruger clamour which rolled northward from the Colony. Criticism of a President is always apt to be more disturbing to the public peace than criticism of a minister under a constitutional monarch. King and President alike symbolise the unity of land and people, but whereas all the world knows that the King can do no wrong, President Kruger was the active head of the executive and, in the eyes of some of those he ruled, could hardly do right. But to criticise his actions was to criticise all he stood for. These criticisms were all the more alarming to the isolated Pretoria Government because Kruger looked on the newspapers as the expression of the opinion of little-known Johannesburg and also because he believed that, in spite of the failure of his hated police to find them, even by dint of wading mine dams, thousands of rifles which should have been given up after the Raid were still concealed along the Reef. He had already suppressed the *Critic*, which had promptly reappeared as the *Transvaal Critic* and sent a protest to Downing Street. He now took the much more serious step of suppressing *The Star*. The directors thereupon appointed a new editor, re-christened their paper *The Comet*, and in their turn appealed to the High Commissioner against the suppression as a breach of the Convention.¹

So the outcry against Krugerism waxed louder. It rose *fortissimo* as Rhodes took the water on his way home. Rhodes

¹ C. 8423 of 1897, pp. 80 ff., 130.

had not improved his chances at the hands of the Westminster committee of inquiry by sneering at the 'unctuous rectitude' of his fellow-countrymen who had annexed half the earth and yet condemned his Raid; but he had defended himself well, pleading in extenuation fear of German intervention, a plea to which von Tirpitz's agitation for a big German navy lent weight. He emerged, if not with flying colours, at least so secure in popular esteem that even the busmen smiled upon him, and he now returned to Capetown heralded by *The Times* as the champion who was to defeat the plot against the British connection which de Villiers, whose main ambition at the moment was to be sworn in as Privy Councillor, was said to be hatching with Hofmeyr, whom he disliked, and Kruger, who distrusted him. De Villiers' real sin was that he had often talked of returning to active political life and had latterly hinted at a moderate Anglo-Dutch party which he was in many ways qualified to lead. *The Times* and the Cape Progressives, who were being recruited by the newly-founded South African League from among the English in opposition to the Afrikaner Bond, meant to make Rhodes Premier once more if only he would 'come out as a Progressive,' break with the Bond on internal as well as on external policy and abolish the protective duties on foodstuffs which weighed so heavily on the townsmen.¹ Rhodes would not. He still hoped to make a federation based on Anglo-Afrikaner support; he felt that it was some of the Bondsmen who had broken with him and not he with them; he would do nothing to make the breach wider; so in spite of the urgency of Edmund Garrett of the *Cape Times*, a keen critic of some parts of his earlier policy and now an ardent Progressive, he took little active part in the work of the Cape session. He promised indeed to 'fight constitutionally' to win 'equal rights for every white man south of the Zambesi,' but, as soon as he could, he fled north to his Rhodesians.²

June
1897.

Meanwhile Kruger, urged thereto by Steyn and de Villiers, took steps to restore the credit of his state which had been so sorely shaken by the judges' crisis. The mining houses, appreciative of a Government which with all its faults taxed lightly, were anxious to meet him halfway; once the deep levels reached the producing stage the depression would pass; the Chamber had drawn close enough to the rival Association to permit of a reduction of native wages, and both looked to a general settlement with the authorities which would pave the way for amalgamation, a diminution in the cost of living and a consequent reduction of white wages also. *The Star* dropped its

¹ Cook, *Garrett*, p. 137; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 296 ff.

² Michell, *Rhodes*, II. 202; Cook, *Garrett*, p. 139.

appeal unto Caesar and resumed its old name; the High Court pronounced the decree of suppression *ultra vires* and Kruger appointed two Commissions: one under Schalk Burger to consider the needs of the gold industry and another to overhaul the Grondwet and carry out the recent arrangement with the judges.

Kruger's relations with the British Government afforded an additional argument for reform. His post-Raid popularity had evaporated in the chilly atmosphere of diplomatic correspondence with a Secretary of State whom he and his advisers suspected of foreknowledge of the Raid.¹ The penitential white sheet prescribed for Great Britain by Pretoria and Berlin could not be worn for ever by a proud people which was waxing fat with prosperity to the strains of Kipling's imperialistic muse and, as the Diamond Jubilee drew near, was inclined to play the part of Jeshurun towards the country in which some of its members were so deeply interested that Chartered shareholders alone outnumbered Kruger's burghers. Chamberlain had so far avoided direct discussion of Article 4, but at the New Year of 1897, faced with a bill of costs for Raid expenses at the rate of £30 for every burgher called up and, in addition, a globular £1,000,000 for 'moral and intellectual damages,' he queried the former account, refused to pass the latter claim on to the Chartered Company, protested against the immigration law and once more drew attention to the Transvaal's unauthorised extradition treaties with Holland and Portugal and its adhesion to the Geneva Convention as breaches of the London Convention.²

March
1897.

The complaint was not unreasonable if Convention rights were to be maintained and the hegemony which Great Britain had so long enjoyed in South Africa upheld. There was much that was disquieting to a British Colonial Secretary. The Transvaal, busily surrounding its capital with forts gunned by Creusot and Krupp, was now allied to the Free State on terms which gave it a call on that republic's resources limited only by the necessity of proving that its cause was just;³ a large section of the Bond in the Cape was advocating common action with the republicans who had arranged to set up the federal Raad

¹ Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Sir W. Harcourt, political opponents of Chamberlain and members of the Committee of Inquiry, were satisfied that he was innocent of complicity; *vide* Gardiner, *Harcourt*, pp. 392, 423 ff.; J. A. Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, I. 191 ff.; *Cape Times*, May 16, 1926, and Oct. 24, 1922; Cook, *Rights and Wrongs*, p. 65; Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 157 ff.; Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, pp. 282 ff.; Swift MacNeill, *What I have heard*, p. 258.

² C. 8721 of 1898, p. 1; C. 8423 of 1897, pp. 1, 41, 47, 62, 71, 110, 113, 115 ff.

³ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 112; *Bloemfontein Gazette Extraordinary*, March 22, 1897.

first talked of in 1889; Leyds was once more on his way to Europe; fear lest Germany, France or the Transvaal should acquire an area on Delagoa Bay impelled Great Britain to send a strong squadron thither and imparted an anxious tone to the speeches in which Chamberlain wished Godspeed to Sir Alfred Milner, the new High Commissioner. April
1897.

Sir Alfred Milner was a Balliol man of Jowett's dispensation, a Liberal in so far as he could be identified with party politics, and a born administrator who had made his name first in the Inland Revenue and then in Egypt. He set out with the good wishes of all parties, but his reception in South Africa was more mixed. The Progressives, who had just tumultuously welcomed Rhodes, hailed him as their champion. Gone were the days when English colonials spoke with ill-concealed irritation of 'Downing Street' or asked querulously why Great Britain 'always gave way.' Chamberlain was not the man to do things by halves, and here was another man who had the reputation of meaning what he said. Surely, in this year of the Diamond Jubilee, he would not give way. If the Transvaal wished to be regarded as a foreign Power, let it be treated as such. Already Progressives were talking of riding through the Republic with 2000 colonial troopers.¹ On the other hand, though the Bond Congress had decided not to co-operate with the federated republics, it and its English allies looked askance at a man who, with his Egyptian past and the present support of 'Pushful Joe,' reminded them too much of Frere and Carnarvon; the arrival of British warships at Delagoa Bay and the coming of troops to a new camp at Ladysmith gave rise to wild rumours in Pretoria as to Great Britain's intentions. But the warships departed and Milner indicated that his policy was pacific. He showed, indeed, that he took a high view of British paramountcy, but he invited moderate men to help him in the task of guiding Kruger still further along the path of reform, reassured Steyn that the reinforcements at Ladysmith were merely a reply to Kruger's armaments, and received Steyn's promise that his help would always be forthcoming provided Transvaal independence were respected.² The Jubilee atmosphere engendered demonstrations of loyalty in the colonies and such good feeling in the republics that Kruger closed the public offices on the great day, released the two remaining Reform prisoners and sent his congratulations to the Queen, whose portrait adorned so many Boer *voorkamers*. Nor was the main body of the Uitlanders forgotten. Johannesburg was given its municipal council, with limited powers, but partially elected on an

¹ Sir J. Molteno, *The Dominion of Afrikanderdom*, p. 119.

² Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 147 ff., 153; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 305.

easily accessible franchise; the Immigration Act was repealed and an appeal promised to the courts under the Expulsion Act.

Clouds soon gathered. The Westminster committee of inquiry presented a report on the Raid, which Chamberlain duly signed.¹ It acquitted the Imperial authorities of complicity and roundly censured Rhodes; but it had failed to press for certain evidence which enemies of Rhodes and Chamberlain believed to be vital. Next day, to the fury of Kruger, who was already angry that Jameson's punishment had not been more severe, the Secretary of State whitewashed Rhodes in the Commons. Worse still, in reply to the Transvaal's claim for Swiss arbitration on disputed points in the Convention on the analogy of unfettered states, Chamberlain retorted that the Convention of 1884 was not a treaty but a mere declaration of Great Britain's intentions and that it still included the suzerainty of 1881.² Milner tried to explain away the untenable claim as a matter of etymology, but it redoubled the suspicion which his own talk of paramountcy had awakened in the republicans and their friends. Then came the report of the Transvaal Industrial Commission. It left little to the imagination and it came at a bad time; for revenue was falling sharply, the clamour of poor whites for loans, donkeys and mealies echoed unceasingly round the stoep of the Presidency, and the Commission's recommendations pointed to a still further loss of state income. The plea of public poverty was weakened by the conduct of the Volksraad which chose this moment to increase the emoluments of its own members; but Kruger, alarmed at the course of events and the Uitlander agitation, drew back. He fulminated against Schalk Burger, chairman of the commission, and obtained a Volksraad committee which toned down the painfully truthful document.³ Nevertheless, the legislature declared against further monopolies and only failed to cancel the dynamite concession by a single vote; railway rates were reduced; the Netherlands Company was obliged to give the state a larger share of its takings, and many customs duties were lowered; but other duties were raised, so that the Treasury gained in the exchange, the proposed board of officials and mining house nominees to supervise the administration of the Gold Thefts, Illicit Liquor and Pass Laws was set aside as a breach of the Convention which had entrusted control of public affairs to the enfranchised burghers, and a 5 per cent. tax on mining profits was levied which, combined with the failure to carry out the report of the commission in its entirety, drove the

¹ Nos. 380 and 311, 311 (1), 311 (2) of 1897.

² C. 8721 of 1898, pp. 14, 21.

³ C. 9507 of 1899, p. 6; C. 9345 of 1899, pp. 1 ff., 14 ff.

Chamber and the Association together in an armed neutrality against the authorities under the presidency of a Frenchman, Rouliot.¹

So Kruger faced the presidential election which was destined to be his last. In spite of the numerous requisitions which poured in upon him from supporters, he faced it with some trepidation. The delay in giving effect to the recommendations of the Industrial Commission had been by no means entirely his fault; he had had to negotiate with the Netherlands Railway Company and the railway departments of neighbouring governments; difficult legal questions were involved in any dealings with the dynamite monopoly which he defended as necessary for the independence of the state, for, if it did not actually make dynamite, it could at least make cartridges. Yet the delay to carry out the report had led to a storm. Not only did the British Uitlanders cry out, but the French and Germans informed their respective governments that their interests were being neglected; meetings of burghers petitioned for the nationalisation of the railways and the cancellation of the dynamite monopoly; even loyal Hollanders complained and the Volksraad showed unwonted signs of independence. Three Government measures were thrown out in quick succession and a motion to hold over the operation of the Ballot Act till after the presidential election was defeated.

Kruger stood for re-election upon his record and fortune favoured him. Joubert and Schalk Burger split the Progressive vote; Chamberlain played into his hands by reiterating his views on suzerainty on the eve of the poll; the slogan 'Beware of Rhodes and keep your powder dry' decided many a waverer, and he was re-elected by an overwhelming majority.²

Feb.
1898.

The old President and all that he stood for were thus entrenched. Moreover, the election had shown how little the Uitlanders had to hope for politically from even the liberal Boers. Joubert's policy had been negative, a mere disagreement with Kruger; and Burger had shown that his liberalism was of a very diluted quality. He had evaded the question of the testing right, expressed his satisfaction with the existing system of education, and, above all, pronounced against any extension of the franchise. He favoured alliance with the Free State where Steyn had just failed to induce the Volksraad to narrow the franchise; but he would not have union even with that republic, for the independent Transvaal, dominant and untrammelled,

¹ C. 9345 of 1899, pp. 44 ff.; FitzPatrick, *Transvaal from Within*, p. 311.

² *Die Volksstem*, Nov. 20, 1897; Sir D. Chaplin, *Letter-books* (unpublished), *passim* for 1897-8.

was to be the centre of the united South Africa for which he was working.¹

The first steps which Kruger took after his re-election redoubled Uitlander suspicions. Some time since, Chief Justice Kotze had not only decided that Rhodes was not so black as he had been painted and that de Villiers, by reason of his conduct during the judges' crisis, was much blacker, but he also held that Kruger had broken the arrangement then made by referring the problem of safeguarding the bench and the Grondwet to a commission instead of himself introducing the necessary measure in the Volksraad before the end of 1897. De Villiers maintained that the period of grace would not be over till the end of 1898, and the President insisted that he meant to fulfil his promise; but once the election was over, Kotze declared the agreement at an end and claimed the testing right once more. The President, with the remark that the devil first invented the testing right in the Garden of Eden, abruptly dismissed him under Law No. 1.²

Feb.
1898.

The order of Kotze's going after twenty years of service, and still more the appointment in his stead of Gregorowski, the hanging judge of the Reformers' trial, raised a storm among the Uitlanders and embittered the Legislative Council election in the Colony. Rhodes's hopes of a British federation to balance and one day to absorb the federated republics largely depended on the result of that election.³ The old arguments in favour of the federal solution of South Africa's political problems had been reinforced by a recrudescence of trouble with the tribes during 1897 in Mashonaland, British Bechuanaland, East Griqualand and Pondoland. Moreover, Rhodesia, 'the Dominant North' was apparently qualifying for its destined rôle in such a federation. The white population of Matabeleland had doubled during the past six months; Salisbury, Umtali and Gwelo were already flourishing little towns; the Dutch centres of Melsetter and Enkeldoorn bade fair to follow suit; Bulawayo was revelling in a real estate boom on the strength of the arrival of the Cape to Cairo railway. Rhodes, encouraged by an interview with the High Commissioner, spoke enthusiastically of the coming federation and hurried away to the South-about-to-be-dominated.⁴

Dec.
1897.

There he had been steadily acquiring economic and social influence. He had vested his Groote Schuur property near Capetown in the future federal government, laid out great fruit farms at Drakenstein and organised the De Beers dynamite factory at

¹ Chaplin, *Letter-books*.

² Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 316 ff.; Kotze, *Judicial Crisis*.

³ Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, p. 296; Vindex, *Speeches*, pp. 520-630.

⁴ Williams, *Rhodes*, p. 299; *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1896-7, pp. 56, 154.

Somerset West hard by, and, in Natal, raised higher now in the political scale by her recent acquisition of Zululand and Tongaland, 1897. he had interested himself personally in the sugar industry and, through De Beers, in the coal of Newcastle. He now arranged that Harry Escombe should carry a permissive federation bill through the Maritzburg legislature, and went on to the Colony to work for a redistribution of seats which should give the rapidly growing Progressive towns fairer representation as against the rural Bond, and thus ensure the passage of a permissive bill for the Colony. He subscribed to party funds and, in the words of Garrett, completed his education as a Progressive by attacking the Bond and Krugerism in the same breath; but he disappointed his would-be disciples once more by slipping away to London to make sure of Southern Rhodesia, whose fate still lay on the lap of the gods of Downing Street.¹

Meanwhile the High Commissioner had unexpectedly shown his hand. For a year he had remained studiously passive, learning to read the Dutch newspapers, travelling round the country, at times sorely hampered by Progressive exuberance and by no means inclined to take seriously all the complaints which reached him from the Rand.² But the handicap was too great. A reserved and silent man, suspect as the nominee of Chamberlain, he had not won the expected support of English and Dutch moderates towards that settlement of the Transvaal question which was definitely to warn off foreign interlopers. The foreign situation was disquieting. Great Britain was more than ever the object of the envy of less affluent but, from the military point of view, more powerful neighbours; the Germans were passing the first of their Naval Acts; the French, furious at British sympathy with Dreyfus, had occupied Madagascar in force and cancelled British consular jurisdiction and commercial privileges there; French troops were moving from Lake Chad towards the Upper Nile as Kitchener advanced along the river to deal with the Khalifa; the scramble for spheres and coaling-stations in the Far East proceeded while Chamberlain discoursed of the devil and a long spoon *à propos* Russia, the ally of France. At Graaff Reinet, Milner, moved by the wording of a Bond address of welcome, suddenly gave vent to the hopes and fears which had long been forming in his mind. 'Loyal! of course you are loyal,' he cried. 'It would be monstrous if you were not,' and he called on his hearers to urge the Transvaal, the cause of all unrest in South Africa with its talk of external dangers and toleration of internal abuses, to bring its institutions, and still

¹ Cook, *Garrett*, pp. 139, 222.

² Sir W. Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 392; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 309.

more the spirit of its administration, into line with those of its neighbours. In any case, he added, Great Britain was not to be frightened out of the position which she had always held in South Africa.¹

April
1898.
Oct.
1898.

It was a fair warning, but coming when it did, it convinced everyone that the High Commissioner was the ally of the Progressive party. That party won the Council election by a narrow majority. Rhodes was now full of hope. Escombe, it is true, had been unexpectedly defeated at the Natal general election, but Natal none the less joined the customs union at last, and the Rhodes Customs Clause was to be embodied in the new Rhodesian Order in Council. Under that Order the Chartered Board indeed lost its powers of legislation and must submit to much stricter imperial control than hitherto, especially in the matter of police, but in spite of an elected minority of Rhodesians in the new Legislative Council, it still remained master in Rhodesia, and Rhodes, a director once more, told the shareholders that the Rhodesians would soon have self-government and would then repay them their past expenditure on administration.²

Oct.
1898.

The consummation of that hope and of much else depended on federation, and that again on the fate of the Cape redistribution bill. The measure passed the second reading, but two days later a vote of no confidence was carried, and Sprigg, strong in the possession of supply, appealed to the country. But it was Rhodes who took the lead, coming out at last as a Progressive. True, he agonised some of his friends by airing 'thoughts' which sorted ill with the pure milk of Progressivism,³ but he at least declared that the issue was the Union Jack *versus* the Transvaal Vierkleur and roundly attacked the Bond and the Independent 'Mugwumps.' It was in vain. The Progressives were defeated by a short head and Sprigg had to make way for Schreiner, parliamentary leader of the Bond, and a ministry which included Merriman, Sauer and the Mugwump, Richard Solomon.

The Cape Parliament, under this new leadership, acted on a resolution taken in the previous session, and set an example to the rest of the Empire by unanimously voting an annual contribution of £30,000 to the Navy; the defection of a Bond member obliged the ministry to compromise on the redistribution issue; but the fact remained that, in Schreiner's hands, federation through the Cape was as much out of the question as it had been in Molteno's a quarter of a century earlier.

It was this fact which sent the High Commissioner to London

¹ 'Times' History, I. 208 ff.

² Newton, *Unification of S.A.*, I. 143 ff.; C. 8732 of 1898 and C. 9138 of 1899, *passim*; *Report of B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, April 21, 1898, p. 11.

³ Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 180; Cook, *Garrett*, p. 142.

to confer with the Secretary of State. Both men were convinced that a South African Government inspired by British ideals was the only means of ending the interstate friction which was becoming more serious as the exploitation of the gold mines proceeded. British investors and traders were not the only parties interested. The chairman of the Chamber of Mines was a Frenchman; French and German newspapers lamented that Great Britain took no steps to safeguard the financial interests on the Rand; ^{Nov. 1898.} ¹ Brown, the American citizen who had set Kruger and Kotze by the ears, held Great Britain, 'in her capacity as suzerain,' responsible for the losses he had incurred under Law No. 1 of 1897. ² That suzerainty, real or alleged, was in any case threatened by Leyds's return to Europe as ambassador furnished with the funds for a consular service worthy of an independent republic, and Leyds claimed the Transvaal's right to arbitration on the analogy of ordinary European states. ^{May 1898.} ³ Neither Chamberlain nor Milner wanted a war which would bring them no credit and would merely hasten the inevitable entry of the Transvaal into a federation; but Milner had already asked for more troops to balance the Transvaal's armaments; he was convinced that Kruger had only yielded and would only yield to pressure, and, now that the Khalifa had been broken and the French headed off at Fashoda, ^{Sept.-Nov. 1898.} the Imperial Government was free to apply that pressure. ⁴ The U.S.A., at least, after dealing more or less justly with Spain, could hardly be censorious if Great Britain took a strong line with another recalcitrant little State. Chamberlain therefore protested against the Transvaal's use of its treaty-making powers, and though he admitted that the suzerainty preamble of the Convention of 1881 had indeed been dropped, declared that the claim to a suzerainty was in any case represented by the facts of the situation, and observed that with the preamble had gone all specific mention of Transvaal independence. ^{Dec. 1898.} The military ^{Jan. 1899.} authorities at the Cape were bidden to prepare a scheme in case of sudden war. ⁵

At the New Year, Rhodes was also in a London swayed more and more by the Stock Exchange as the production of the deep levels rose from the £7,600,000 of 1894 to £16,000,000. The Rhodesian

¹ For instances *vide* Cook, *Rights and Wrongs*, p. 87.

² War interrupted these proceedings, but in 1902 Washington took up Brown's case. The dispute was only settled in Great Britain's favour by a special court under a French president in November 1923 (21588-24, Government Printing Office, Washington, U.S.A.).

³ Leyds, *Correspondentie*, pp. vi. ff.; C. 9507 of 1899, pp. 7 ff.

⁴ Gardiner, *Harcourt*, II, 461 ff.; Molteno, *Dominion of Afrikanderdom*, p. 141.

⁵ C. 9507 of 1899, p. 28; Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 417.

mines were producing at last ; the promising township at Selukwe screened the wreckage of last year's boom at Bulawayo ; a new issue of Chartered shares was eagerly over-subscribed and a loan raised to carry on the railway northward from Bulawayo towards Lake Tanganyika, in spite of Chamberlain's refusal to give an Imperial guarantee on Rhodes's terms. During the negotiations Rhodes showed clearly that he had given up all hope of working for federation through the Cape.¹ He was willing to let the Vryburg-Mafeking line, the main security for the proposed guaranteed loan, go to H.M. Government or to Rhodesia or to a federated South Africa, but not to a colony which by its redistribution policy and the unseating of certain Progressives for corrupt practices had given Schreiner a fair working majority. In other words, he must work now through Rhodesia and the Transvaal, if only that he might get control of the ' cosmopolitan and untrustworthy ' Uitlanders of the Rand, and save the Boers from perishing off the face of the land as the forces of latter-day civilisation overwhelmed them.² For already the Poor White problem was a problem in the Transvaal.

It had long been recognised by the cooler heads in Johannesburg, and Kruger's policy so far had proved it, that the Transvaal would give way on all points covered by the Convention but might very well be induced to fight if internal matters such as the franchise were tampered with. But now, in London, the belief that Kruger would never look down the mouth of the cannon from which he had recoiled during the Drifts Crisis of 1895 was diligently propagated by *The Times* and the newly founded *Daily Mail* among the people of a metropolis which had not known serious war for forty years ; the claims of the Uitlanders, the intelligent and active taxpayers of the Republic, were urged by the *Liberal Daily News*, which had recently been captured by Rhodes's friends,³ and by the judicious *Westminster Gazette*. In the Colony both cries were taken up by the *Cape Times* and *Het Dagblad*, in which du Toit, erstwhile father of the Bond, called on Afrikaners to join his Colonial League in Rhodes's interests, while Rhodes added the *Diamond Fields Advertiser* to the *Argus* group, which ramified from Capetown to Salisbury and whose hold upon the Rand was now reinforced by the independent *Transvaal Leader*. It was in vain that the pro-Kruger *Rand Post* demanded the shooting of all critics of the Government ; the S.A. League had thrust out a branch from the Colony to Johannesburg some months since, and now attacked the undoubted weaknesses of the Pretoria administration.

¹ C. 9323 of 1899, p. 20.

² Cd. 369 of 1900, p. 8.

³ Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, II. 126 ; Gardiner, *Harcourt*, II. 466.

The League protested against the stiffening of the press laws and the much fuller use of Dutch which Mansvelt, abandoning his sound policy of 1896, was enforcing in the public schools to check the 'unnational and unpedagogical' demand for more English, and went on, with far less justification, to cry out against the Expulsion Act, and to take up the cudgels on behalf of anyone who could claim the title of British citizen. Cape coloured men were arrested illegally. The League ignored the courts and went direct to the acting British Agent. The authorities in response to repeated complaints proposed to enforce long-neglected laws against Indian traders, unpopular with all save the poorer burghers who found them cheap salesmen and easy creditors. The League championed its Asiatic fellow-subjects. A policeman, in self-defence but in the victim's own house, shot an Uitlander, Edgar, returned home red-handed from the manslaughter of another. The League summoned an unauthorised open-air meeting and published a petition to the Queen.¹

Butler, the acting High Commissioner, believed, in the light of experience gained in the South Africa of the late 'seventies, that the country needed a rest cure rather than 'a surgical operation.' His opinion of Johannesburg, formed on the spot, was low. He refused to send on a fly-blown petition to Her Majesty, counselled Chamberlain not to take the League too seriously, pointed to Rhodes as the 'sceneshaker' and, in reply to a request for proofs, furnished them with a Cape ministerial minute in support.² Meanwhile the League mass meeting was prohibited and two leaders, who nevertheless addressed the crowd, were arrested. They were soon released, but the policeman, Jones, who had shot Edgar, was acquitted on good evidence, and an Uitlander meeting in the Johannesburg Amphitheatre was broken up under circumstances that pointed to official connivance. Thereupon the League collected 21,000 signatures for a new petition to the Queen.³

The rank and file of the Uitlanders were thus coming to the front as in the days before the Raid, but they were by no means a united body. A counter-petition in favour of the Government was soon furnished with 23,000 names, and, more to the point, was the fact that the mine magnates held aloof. The Consolidated Goldfields indeed dismissed an employee, Wybergh, who had taken the chair at the Amphitheatre meeting.⁴ Nevertheless, financial Johannesburg had its grievances: illicit liquor,

¹ C. 9345 of 1899 *passim*; Rose, *Truth about the Transvaal*, chapter vii; Malherbe, *History of Education*, pp. 274, 289.

² Butler, *Autobiography*, pp. 398, 401, 406 ff., 415.

³ C. 9345 of 1899, p. 185.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

gold thefts, the new tax on profits, the drainage concession given to a Government supporter, and the difficulties which were said to be put in the way of recruiting through the Native Labour Association, a recent offshoot of the Chamber. Above all there was the high price of dynamite, and when Chamberlain declared that a renewal of the dynamite concession would be a breach of the Convention, Kruger found himself faced with a possible combination of H.M. Government and the Chamber of Mines.¹

Kruger decided to take the sting out of the attack of his actual and potential enemies by economic reform and a very guarded extension of the franchise. He had good reason to do so for internal strains were once more weakening his republic as the memories of the Raid faded. The support which he had received from the Cape and the Free State during the judges' crisis had shown him that good might come out of the South after all. From the middle of 1898 therefore he had appointed Afrikaners wherever he could find them to high office: Reitz, ex-President of the Free State as State Secretary, Piet Grobler, Foreign Secretary, Barend Kleynhans, Minister of Mines, and J. C. Smuts, a young Cape advocate, State Attorney. Conversely, the influence of the Continental group had waned. Leyds's work now lay in Europe, whither also Middelberg, manager of the Netherlands Railway Company, departed, taking with him his new order of the Red Eagle and leaving his successor to hope against hope that the Transvaal might still become 'a greater Holland';² and if Mansvelt's new Hollandising campaign in the schools drove the English to rally round the Witwatersrand Council of Education and open opposition schools, it also drove burghers to send their children to school in the Free State and the Colony, and moved Afrikaner teachers to demand an end of Hollander domination and full liberty for Transvaalers as for Free Staters to have English in the schools of a bilingual country.³ Steyn was insistent that there must be reforms, and Steyn was the indispensable ally;⁴ Leyds came back from an interview with Chamberlain well knowing that intransigence might mean war and that, till the Transvaal had put its house in order, it need not look to Europe for aid.⁵ Finally, a group of mining houses offered a loan of £600,000 with which to expropriate the dynamite monopoly.⁶

Kruger used Lippert, the original dynamite concessionaire, as go-between and opened negotiations with these capitalists

¹ C. 9317 of 1899, p. 6.

² Cd. 624 of 1901, p. 44.

³ Malherbe, *History of Education*, pp. 273 ff.

⁴ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 303.

⁵ I state this on the authority of Lord Selborne, who was present at the interview.

⁶ C. 9317 of 1899, pp. 7 ff.

and a pair of selected Uitlanders. The London friends of this committee approved of the general terms proposed; but they also asked that the bench be rendered inviolate and that the Government assist the mines to recruit labour, enforce the liquor laws, and admit to the executive council a financier approved by some 'independent' firm like Rothschild to control future taxation. On these terms they were willing to support loans and discourage malicious political agitation, but on the vital point, the franchise, they declined to commit themselves until the Uitlanders as a body had been consulted.¹

As these negotiations proceeded the general situation became easier. Chamberlain dropped the plea that the dynamite concession was a breach of the Convention, and tartly silenced the one member of the Commons who demanded strong action on the Uitlanders' behalf. Butler, moreover, had already been informed that there was no special reason to fear immediate war and was now ordered to curtail long-authorized military expenditure.² On the other hand, Kruger's proposals for an involved nine-year franchise, non-retrospective and lacking the vote at presidential elections on which his regime depended, were naturally condemned by the Uitlanders and their friends, all the more since he accompanied them by a determined attempt to rush a renewal of the dynamite monopoly through the Volksraad. Perhaps Kruger could not have offered a more liberal franchise at the moment, for he had to consider his stubborn Raad and still more stubborn burghers convinced that Rhodes meant to have their Republic and vote them down with droves of mine employees and venal Peruvians.³ The scheme might, however, have served as a basis of discussion had not the Lippert negotiations broken down. The proposals were published prematurely; the Transvaalers shrank from putting their finances under the ultimate control of a Rothschild; the parties separated with mutual charges of bad faith, and working men's meetings along the Reef demanded the capitalists' franchise proposals as 'the irreducible minimum.' Milner, back once more in South Africa, noted 'the formidable proportions' to which this agitation had grown against a ruling caste which made the Uitlander rank and file feel that they were 'aliens, inferiors and suspects.'⁴

The tribes were whispering of the coming war between the white men, and the exodus of Uitlanders from the Rand had

¹ C. 9349 of 1899, pp. 213 ff.

² Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 423.

³ C. 9345 of 1899, p. 205; Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 148. 'Peruvians' were low-class Jews.

⁴ C. 9345 of 1899, pp. 207 ff., 215 ff.

Feb.
1899.

already begun, when an attempt was made to break away from the interchange of diplomatic notes which had brought matters to such a pass and to return to the personal intercourse of the days of Robinson and Loch. During Milner's absence, Merriman had tried to arrange a South African round table conference excluding the Imperial Factor and, though Milner's return had ended that scheme, Schreiner sent the Chief Justice of the Colony to pave the way for a conference between the High Commissioner and the two Presidents.¹ De Villiers did not see Kruger, but at the end of a difficult task he returned to Capetown satisfied that Schalk Burger, Reitz and Smuts would urge their President to get rid of the dynamite scandal and give a reasonable five-year franchise, always provided that the British demands were fully presented once and for all. Chamberlain approved; Steyn, though excluded from the formal conference, acted as honest broker; Hofmeyr, Merriman, de Villiers and others in the Colony deluged Pretoria with good advice, and Milner himself hoped that a settlement of the franchise, Policy No. 1, would make it possible to take up Policy No. 2, the discussion of the 'nasty questions' which would still remain, in a 'less thunder-charged atmosphere.' By itself Policy No. 2 might well lead through a course of 'ineffectual nagging' to war, and if that came Johannesburg would curse him to a man. Given a free hand he hoped to make a settlement.²

May
1899.

But Milner's hands were not free. Chamberlain approved of the Conference, but he also replied to the Uitlanders' petition with his 'grievance despatch'³ retailing all the sins and shortcomings of Pretoria, and, though he told the Uitlanders, on a hint from Milner, that they could not become Transvaal burghers and yet retain their British citizenship as their leaders had led them to believe, that did not prevent Leaguers demanding an immediate majority in the Volksraad and telling one another that the Union Jack at Pretoria would reduce working costs on the Rand by 5s. per ton. The Transvaalers for their part suffered for the absence of the suave and cautious Leyds. Reitz, confessedly no diplomatist, led Milner to talk of a one in ten chance of war by blurting out that the self-government of the Transvaal was derived not from the Convention but from its inherent rights as 'a sovereign independent state,' and, on the very eve of the Bloemfontein Conference, the Volksraad tampered with the franchise granted to favoured Uitlanders after the Raid.⁴

¹ 'Times' History, I. 258; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 330 ff..

² C. 9345 of 1899, pp. 209 ff.; Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 536; Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 174; Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 427.

³ C. 9345 of 1899, p. 226.

⁴ C. 9507 of 1899, p. 32; Cd. 369 of 1900, p. 2.

At the Conference itself, an unhappy mixture of semi-public discussion and formal interchange of notes, Milner took the line which Steyn afterwards confessed was the only way to deal with Kruger: he tried to make him understand what he wanted and stuck to it. Steyn, Fischer and Smuts begged Kruger to grant the simple five-year franchise with adequate representation for the mining areas which Milner proposed; but Burger and Wolmarans held that enough had been done already; a large petition came in protesting against doing anything at all, and the most that Kruger would offer was an elaborately guarded seven-year franchise which he tried to make contingent on the settlement of those other 'nasty questions': arbitration in future disputes and the incorporation of Swaziland in the Transvaal. Kruger begged Steyn not to play the tame elephant to get him into the English kraal and, in spite of Steyn's efforts, Milner declined to take up subsidiary issues till the franchise had been disposed of. The Conference ended in deadlock. 'This Conference,' said the High Commissioner, 'is absolutely at an end and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it.'¹

Steyn returned from his leavetaking with the High Commissioner to order Mausers and cartridges from Germany and, at Westminster, Chamberlain startled honourable members, who had assembled with their thoughts more set on the suspension of the Sinking Fund than on anything approaching war, by telling them that a new situation had now arisen. Thereupon, he published his own grievance despatch and another written by Milner on May 4 which had been withheld pending the Bloemfontein Conference.² A new situation had arisen with a vengeance, for Milner described the condition of the thousands of British subjects living as helots in the Transvaal as a matter of South African concern and destructive of the Queen's authority everywhere, and insisted that to win the franchise for those of them who were permanently settled would help them to help themselves and furnish a striking proof that H.M. Government was not to be ousted from its rightful position in South Africa by a heavily armed republic and its republican-minded sympathisers in the Colony.

All things are lawful, but all things are not expedient, and coming as it did on the morrow of the abortive Conference, the despatch clanged like a trumpet-call presaging war. But clearly H.M. Government as a whole had no definite warlike policy as yet. Just before the Conference Milner had indeed promised Natal

¹ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 180 ff.; C. 9404 of 1899 for details of Bloemfontein Conference.

² Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 191; C. 9345 of 1899, pp. 209 ff., 226 ff.

defence by the whole strength of the Empire and, now, in South Africa there were rumours of an *einkreisung* of the republics and a raid from Tuli in case of hostilities; Southern Rhodesia asked for arms and, at Kimberley, De Beers began to prepare for the worst. But the War Office continued to cut down establishments and it was only towards the end of June that Butler received orders to collect transport.¹

The Imperial Government was in a difficult position. If it sent troops to South Africa it might bring matters to a head; if it waited till war had broken out, the delay might well be fatal, for the Transvaalers outnumbered the British regulars by four and, with the Free Staters, by seven to one; the young bloods were more than ready to fight if it came to the push, and many of the older men reckoned at the very least on the neutrality of the Cape Afrikaners, and some were led by their newspapers to expect European intervention. The old President was fatalistic: if war must come, let it come; better that than the loss of hard-won independence; but, on the score of foreign intervention, Leyds was consistently discouraging. With France practically bankrupt and Germany anxious to settle her differences in the Pacific amicably with Great Britain, there was little help to be looked for unless Russia made trouble for England in Asia. The best hope was either that Chamberlain and Milner were bluffing or that the Queen and the Liberals would refuse to allow the Tories to go to war. Kruger could not know the bellicose temper of the Widow of Windsor or the imperfect control which Salisbury, immersed in foreign affairs, exercised over his redoubtable Colonial Secretary; still less did he appreciate the fact that the Liberals were hopelessly divided between the Radicals, deprived now of the leadership of Morley and Harcourt, and the imperialist wing under Rosebery.²

Kruger's guess that Chamberlain was bluffing with his policy of 10,000 men and firmness was, at the moment, correct, for Chamberlain told Campbell-Bannerman as much when he tried to persuade the Liberal opposition to close ranks with the ministry on the Transvaal issue. But Milner did not bluff on principle, and it was while Wolseley was vainly urging the politicians to mobilise an army corps at once that Kruger let loose the storm by introducing his seven-year franchise with all the features to which Milner had objected.³ Milner's account of the negotiations at Bloemfontein had won him the support of Rose-Innes

June 12,
1899.

¹ Cd. 44 of 1900, p. 1; Butler, *Autobiography*, p. 440.

² Cd. 369 of 1900; Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 535; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 332 ff.; Cook, *Rights and Wrongs*, p. 284 and chapter xxx.; W. P. Schreiner (Assembly), Sept. 24, 1900.

³ C. 9415 of 1899, pp. 39, 43; C. 9518 of 1899, pp. 40, 58.

and many Cape moderates; the manifest weaknesses of the new franchise bill won him the support of more; and the Schreiner ministry feared to speak its mind lest he call in Rhodes and Sprigg to take its place. Meanwhile the *Morning Post* called for an ultimatum; the Uitlander Council made wild demands; Cronje and Joubert stirred the burghers up against any concessions; Transvaalers taunted Free Staters with wishing to back out of their alliance, and early in July the Volksraad reassembled and light-heartedly gave four new seats to the mining areas and fifteen to rural constituencies. But already Hofmeyr and Herholdt, a member of the Cape ministry, were in Pretoria to tell the Raad in secret session to look for no armed help from the Colony and to induce Kruger to modify the franchise bill and appoint a commission to deal with dynamite.¹

The Cape delegates were assured that changes would be made in the franchise law. Schreiner hastily declared himself satisfied² and stood at bay while the Progressives attacked him for allowing ammunition to pass through to the Free State, the new Hime ministry in Natal resolved to support H.M. Government, and Queensland offered a contingent. Fuller information of the proposed scheme, however, damped Schreiner's satisfaction and led Chamberlain to ask for full details before the bill was passed.³ The Transvaal authorities declined to delay. The executive council resolved to give the mining areas five seats in each Raad, and the Volksraad passed the seven-year retrospective scheme in a form simpler than before, but none the less so riddled with pitfalls that the State Attorney had to issue an explanatory memorandum. Milner, still intent upon a five-year franchise, commented that the Uitlanders would hardly accept such a measure;⁴ but *The Times* declared that the crisis was at an end, and Chamberlain, supported by a full Treasury bench, told the Commons that though Uitlander grievances must be redressed, there must be no use of force, accepted the principle of non-foreign arbitration on disputed points in the Convention, and suggested a joint inquiry into the franchise law.⁵

July
27-28,
1899.

The crisis was not over. Rhodes, President now of the S.A. League and lately returned to Capetown from dining with the Kaiser and receiving an honorary degree at Oxford, declared for 'equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi,' and,

¹ Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, p. 543; van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 197 ff., 219 ff.; C. 9518 of 1899, pp. 19, 25.

² *'Times' History*, I. 296; *S.A. News*, July 8, 1899.

³ C. 9518 of 1899, p. 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 45, 63.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 29; Cd. 369 of 1900, p. 16.

as in the days before the Raid, prophesied the near approach of federation provided H.M. Government stood firm; Johannesburg demanded the franchise to the strains of 'Rule, Britannia'; petitions poured in from the Colony, Natal and Rhodesia praying for redress of Uitlander grievances; *The Times* opened fire again, and the distant Canadian Parliament expressed sympathy with Uitlander aspirations.¹ Friends in London and the Colony urged the Transvaalers to accept the joint inquiry, Netherlands ministers advised the acceptance of an international commission, and Leyds bade Kruger expect nothing from the Continental Powers; but the Transvaalers themselves resented what they regarded as an unwarrantable interference in their domestic concerns and, on Steyn's advice, offered better terms in lieu thereof.² As a result of conversations between Smuts and the British Agent, Conyngham Greene, they proposed a five-year franchise which would carry with it the vital vote for the presidency, not less than a quarter of the seats in each Raad to the mining areas, and discussion of details of the franchise law with the British Agent, provided the Imperial Government would drop the suzerainty claim, interfere no more in internal matters and refer minor points to arbitration.³

Aug.
1899.

The five-year offer in itself was, as Milner frankly said, as liberal as anything he could have asked; but experience had taught him to be on the look-out for traps, and Reitz spoilt the effect by pointing out that the franchise bill would not be submitted to the Raad till the provisos had been accepted. To the alarm of Steyn and Hofmeyr, Reitz thereby dragged that blessed word, suzerainty, out of the obscurity into which it had sunk and, in Chamberlain's eyes, asked Great Britain to give up all claim *à tout jamais* to intervene whether under the Convention or not.⁴ Milner observed once more that this settlement of the franchise would merely afford a better hope of agreement on other points at issue; the Uitlanders and the League declared it valueless without other far-reaching concessions; Sprigg revived the ammunition controversy in Capetown and, in London, Chamberlain accompanied the publication of the despatches on the suzerainty issue with the taunt that Kruger was dribbling out reforms 'like water from a squeezed sponge.'⁵ The taunt was true, for to the distress of its friends, the Transvaal, like any

¹ Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 186; C. 9518 of 1899, p. 58.

² Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 233; Leyds, *Correspondentie*, pp. 79 ff., 104, 187 ff.; Cd. 369 of 1900, p. 15.

³ On the Smuts-Greene pourparlers, *vide* C. 9521 of 1899, pp. 44 ff.; C. 9530 of 1899, pp. 19 ff.; Cd. 43 of 1900, pp. 45 ff.

⁴ C. 9521 of 1899, pp. 47, 59, 62.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 63; C. 9530 of 1899, p. 11; Cd. 43 of 1900, p. 14; Cook, *Rights and Wrongs*, p. 191

weak state forced into a corner, had wriggled desperately to avoid a clear settlement ; but it came ill from the man who had already alarmed Pretoria by taking as part of one and the same offer the formal proposals and the list of further possible advantages which Greene had merely discussed with Smuts, and who now sat down to pen a despatch of 'qualified acceptance.' For Chamberlain agreed to accept the proposed reforms but rejected the three provisos on the ground that he could not abandon Convention rights and the substance of suzerainty.¹ Aug. 28, 1899.

The despatch arrived at Pretoria at a dangerous moment. The Volksraad was discussing a law to permit the Government to resume ownership of mine lands and to confiscate the property of non-residents guilty of treason, and another cancelling the appeal to the courts under the Expulsion Act ; the executive had arrested one or two Uitlander editors and thereby hastened the exodus from the Rand ; business there was coming to a standstill and the trading centres on the coast were feeling the consequent ill effects. Milner urged Chamberlain not to let matters drag lest there be a reaction against the Imperial policy.² Already Baden-Powell was raising troops in Bechuanaland and Rhodesia, and Butler had been removed as a wet-blanket. On the other hand, Raad members indulged in bellicose speeches and, though the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay under British pressure were threatening to hold up supplies of Mauser cartridges for lack of which the burghers would soon be forced to rely on their old Martini-Henrys, Kruger told Steyn that if the troops in Natal were meant for use, 'we must begin.'³ In this tense atmosphere Pretoria not unnaturally read Chamberlain's reply to the five-year offer as a refusal. It fell back on the seven-year proposals and reluctantly accepted the joint inquiry. H.M. Government, however, refused to go back and, failing the fulfilment of the Smuts-Greene proposals and the dropping of the provisos, reserved to itself the right 'to consider the situation de novo, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.'⁴ Aug. 31-Sept. 1, 1899.

Liberals in England hailed this despatch as a great step forward, for they believed that nothing but pressure from his colleagues had induced Chamberlain to negotiate further ; but coming as it did side by side with the news that 10,000 troops were to be drafted to South Africa from India and the Mediterranean, it was read in Pretoria as something very like an ultimatum.⁵ Both sides drifted rapidly into war. Reitz accused Chamberlain

¹ C. 9521 of 1899, p. 49. Reitz had not intended to touch Convention rights.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 38 ff., 51 ; C. 9530 of 1899, p. 14.

³ Leyds, *Correspondentie*, pp. 109 ff. ; Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 238 ff.

⁴ C. 9521 of 1899, pp. 52, 64.

⁵ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 206 ; 'Times' *History*, I. 337, 339.

of putting forward new terms;¹ Milner, against Schreiner's wishes, sent a few troops and officers to Kimberley to stiffen the town guard; the Free State Raad resolved to stand by its ally on the very day that H.M. Government took up Policy No. 2, promised to send its detailed list of demands as soon as possible and decided to mobilise an army corps; the troops in Natal moved up to Dundee, and Reitz replied at length to the five-month old 'grievance despatch' and urged the Free State to go to war quickly.² Sept. 22,
1899.

So far the Transvaal had only thought of standing on the defensive, but now it decided to attack. An ultimatum was drawn up, and Leyds, who had hitherto counselled caution, cabled that friends in Europe wondered why the Republics did not strike before Great Britain was ready.³ The pacific petition of fifty-eight Cape parliamentarians to the Queen availed nothing; all Steyn's efforts to mediate or secure the mutual withdrawal of armed men from the frontiers pending the receipt of Chamberlain's demands failed.⁴ The British indeed fell back from their untenable position in northern Natal, but other detachments were moving up the Great North Road, while the burghers of both Republics flocked to the borders, the Transvaalers jeering at their reluctant allies. Steyn⁵ seconded by Joubert, de la Rey, Lukas Meyer and Louis Botha delayed the despatch of the ultimatum till the afternoon of October 9, but on the 12th the crackling of mausers at Kraaipan in the Land of Goshen proclaimed the beginning of the Anglo-Boer war. Sept. 26,
1899.

Had the British had 50,000 men on the spot, the war might have been as short as most of the war party believed and nearly all the friends of the republicans feared it would be. As it was they had little more than half that number, and of these one-third were colonial volunteers. Provided the war was a short one—and the war of 1881 had been very short—the odds were in favour of the Boers. The potential strength of the British Empire was enormous but its immediate striking force was neither great nor capable of rapid expansion.⁶ 106,000 voluntarily enlisted regulars were with the colours; but 70,000 of them were in India and so many of the Home Army were young or physically unfit that many of the 78,000 reservists would be absorbed in bringing the field battalions up to strength. Behind the regulars stood some

¹ C. 9530 of 1899, pp. 11 ff.; Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 354.

² C. 9530 of 1899, pp. 16, 17, 38; C. 9345, p. 226; Cd. 43, p. 74.

³ Leyds, *Correspondentie*, p. 174.

⁴ C. 9530 of 1899, pp. 39, 47.

⁵ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I. 266 ff.

⁶ On the military situation at the outbreak of war, vide 'Times' *History*, II. 6 ff.; *Account of the War*, by the German General Staff (translation), I. 19 ff.; Maurice, (*Official*) *History of the War*, I.

120,000 militiamen and perhaps 200,000 volunteers enrolled for home service only. The majority of the regulars were drawn from the towns and all were trained on lines which developed their sense of discipline and devotion to their officers to the highest pitch, taught them to shoot somewhat better than their predecessors in the 'eighties, but apparently relied on their natural courage and patient humour to atone for repressed initiative and ignorance of campaigning conditions. The Indian and Egyptian services were more workmanlike, and even in the Home Army which was detailed for the cleaning of the slate in South Africa, some of the men and still more of the officers had seen service in 'little wars' in India and Africa; but the generals were wedded to the old ways and were thrust into the field with scratch staffs; promotion was as a rule by seniority; the officers as a class were not the brains of the nation, and their peace duties and social tradition told against the scientific study of their profession. On the other hand, Intelligence was good as far as it could go for lack of funds; the field artillery was the most highly trained in the world; the mounted infantry were at that time unique in Europe; both infantry and cavalry had been taught to co-operate with quick-firers, and the use of khaki uniforms made them much less perfect targets than the *rooibaatjes* of Majuba days. The original expeditionary force was well equipped and speedily transported over six thousand miles of ocean; bitter experience soon taught the infantry to drop the Waterloo tactics which warfare against savage or semi-civilised enemies from Ulundi to Omdurman had perpetuated; the whole of the forces sent to South Africa were successfully supplied by the Service Corps on a much larger scale and for a much longer period than had been anticipated over narrow gauge, single lines of railway running through a huge and difficult country many of whose people were either disaffected or actively hostile.

Probably no European army of the day faced, in a greater Spain, with all and more than all the difficulties that had harassed Napoleon in the Peninsula, would have done better than the British did. The Boers were still a fighting people fighting on their own ground and in their own fashion, loosely organised in district commandos under their field cornets and elected field commandants, the whole under a commandant-general elected in the Transvaal for ten years and in the Free State for the period of the war. The Transvaalers had had experience of native scuffles as recently as 1898; the Free Staters were less war-hardened but they were equally well versed in that hunting on the veld which had so much in common with their style of fighting. Apart from the commandos were the disciplined mounted police,

the Zarps, and in each republic a small but efficient corps of state artillery with perhaps thirty old-fashioned pieces and seventy good guns, including six-inch Long Toms and one-pounder quick-firing pom-poms. Guns would be difficult to replace, but the Netherlands Railway Company and the dynamite factory could supply ammunition and, when all is said and done, the strength of the Boers lay in their mounted riflemen. Man for man they might not shoot so well as their fathers in 1881 but they were better armed. Most of them had the clip-loaded German Mauser, with a flatter trajectory and an accuracy greater than the British Lee-Metford. They relied on cover, open formation with their horses in the rear, barbed wire to hold off the infantry and deep narrow trenches as a refuge from shell-fire. But they had their weaknesses. At first the high command was poor: Joubert was old and most reluctant to take the field against Great Britain; Cronje was a bulldog with no idea of strategy and, throughout, decisions were usually taken by councils of war assisted by the circumadjacent burghers who, for their part, were apt to insist on going home when they felt so disposed, anxious at all times to keep their line of retreat open and for long totally wanting in discipline. Nevertheless, the Boers had two great advantages. They could and, once the British came up in force, they must stand on the defensive at a time when rifle-fire was already deadly and the attackers had few means of countering it. For in 1899 the armoured car and aeroplane, for practical purposes, were not, and the tank existed only in men's dreams. Again, the British from first to last put 300,000 men into the field, the Boers perhaps 66,000 including cosmopolitan volunteers and Cape rebels; but whereas vast masses of the British were tied to the lines of communication, the Boers, helped by 'home supply,' were able to put a much greater proportion of their strength into the firing line.¹

The war, 'the fight of the two kopjes which lasted two years and a half,' passed through two distinct stages. The first, the period of regular warfare, ended with the annexation of the Transvaal in September 1900; the second, the period of prolonged skirmishing which from a military point of view was little more than an exasperating interruption of the civil work of reconstruction, ended only in May 1902.

At the outset the Boers had over 20,000 men ready to invade the northern triangle of Natal on two sides. In that colony, the

¹ In 1899 there were 31,329 Transvaalers and 22,374 Free Staters liable to service. Add to them some 2500 volunteers of all nationalities and 10,000 Cape and Natal rebels (*Times' History*, II, 86 ff.).

first of the drafts from India had landed and Sir George White had 13,000 British regulars and some 3000 Natal levies at his disposal, 4000 men were posted at Ladysmith and, in deference to the local politicians and their over-confident commander, Penn Symons, 4000 more lay further north at Glencoe. Basutoland, neutral by common consent, divided the republicans and the British in the Natal area from their friends further west. Nearly 20,000 other burghers were distributed along the southern and western borders of the Republics from the Basuto frontier to the Limpopo opposite Tuli. Facing them were 5200 regulars and 9000 colonial volunteers without artillery, whose sole hope was to hold Kimberley, Mafeking, the Orange River bridge and the railway junctions south of the river till Sir Redvers Buller should advance with his army corps through the Colony and the Free State on his way to Pretoria. So with the British forces standing on the defensive, the Imperial Parliament met to vote supplies; the Cape Parliament adjourned; martial law was proclaimed in Natal and the Colony north of the Orange; Chartered and De Beers shares rose appreciably on the outbreak of a war which was to clear the way for federation, and Boer columns poured across the frontiers.

At Talana and Elands Laagte the invaders learnt a respect for the British Tommy which they had not hitherto entertained, but they soon forced White back into Ladysmith and saw the road to Maritzburg and the sea open before them. Joubert lost his opportunity. At first he would not cross the Tugela, and when he did, the troops from India were pouring up the line to meet him. In spite of Botha's prayers to ride on, he fell back behind the river and closely invested Ladysmith, while on the western front the commandos sat down before Kimberley and Mafeking. Steyn was loath at first to send his men south of the Orange, for the Schreiner ministry had begged him not to do so; but at last, realising that there was no hope of Colonial neutrality, he sent them in to push their enemies back and give Cape Afrikaners a fair excuse for joining them. Within three weeks of the occupation of Colesberg, five border districts in which the Dopper element was strong had gone over almost bodily to the republicans, and though the territory was not formally annexed, those of the inhabitants who joined the invaders were 'considered and treated' as burghers of the Republics.¹

Meanwhile, the British army of invasion had landed. The bad news from Natal led Buller to change his plans. He broke up

¹ On Boer Annexations, *vide* Cd. 261, p. 95; Cd. 43 of 1900, pp. 217 ff.; van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 5. On the Rebellion, *vide* Cd. 264, p. 5; Cd. 420, pp. 26 ff. For Milner's despatches of April 25-June 6, 1900, *vide* Cd. 261, pp. 95, 160.

his army corps, sent a column up each of the three Cape trunk lines and led the main force himself to the relief of Ladysmith. At first all went well. Methuen marched to the Modder by way of Belmont and Graspan and forced the crossing with 9000 men ; but in the Black Week the whole scheme broke down. On the left, Methuen was disastrously checked at Magersfontein, Gatacre failed at Stormberg in the centre, and Buller on the right was defeated at Colenso. Dec. 9-15, 1899.

These rapid reverses taught the British public that ' fifty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay ' were not enough for the work in hand. Lord Roberts was despatched as commander-in-chief with reinforcements and Kitchener of Khartum to play Carnot to his Dumouriez ; militiamen were encouraged to volunteer ; contingents from Canada and Australia were eagerly accepted. Pending Roberts's advance, the struggle swayed to and fro. On the British left, Cape rebels took Kuruman and, as the troops withdrew to join Roberts, they were joined by a few Transvaalers who annexed Prieska, Kenhardt and Upington to the Republics. In the centre French pressed hard on Colesberg ; but on the right in Natal, though the Ladysmith garrison beat off attacks at Waggon Hill and Caesar's Camp on the ridge commanding the town, Buller was defeated at Spion Kop and again at Vaal Krantz. Feb. 1900.

At length Roberts moved off with 30,000 men of the western and central forces on a wide flanking movement to cut off the Free Staters in the Colony. In response to the clamour raised by Rhodes and the Kimberley civilians, he was obliged to waste time and wear out his cavalry by relieving the town first ; but, luckily for him, the contemptuous Cronje held on to the Kimberley road too long and when he at last withdrew, he was so hampered by his waggon train that Roberts was able to round up him and his 4000 men at Paardeberg. It was the turning point in the first period of the war. The Free Staters trooped home from the Colony and from before Ladysmith ; Buller forced the crossing of the Tugela and relieved White's weary men ; Roberts broke the Free Staters at Poplar Grove under the eyes of the two Presidents, and again at Abraham's Kraal. Thereupon the commandos dispersed ; Roberts entered Bloemfontein and, thinking the war over as far as the Free State was concerned, offered to allow all save the leaders to go home on parole.¹ Feb. 27, 1900.

The offer was not unreasonable, for even before the débâcle at Abraham's Kraal both Republics had offered to make peace on the basis of continued independence ; now their fighting force was reduced to less than half its strength and they were sending

¹ Cd. 261 of 1900, p. 62.

up S.O.S. signals to France, Germany, Russia and the U.S.A. The British Government refused to make peace on the terms proposed, but a long delay in the operations followed.¹ Kitchener crushed the Prieska rebellion, and Baden-Powell held out cheerfully at Mafeking with Plumer waiting hard by at Sefeteli to relieve him once Carrington's Field Force should come down the newly completed Beira-Salisbury railway; but Roberts's force, weary and short of supplies, was immobilised at Bloemfontein while the enteric bred of the muddy waters of Paardeberg swept off his men by scores and, in Natal, Buller marked time gloomily as he watched the pick of his troops departing to join the central column.

The delay saved the Boers. Joubert died; the energetic Louis Botha succeeded him, and Christian de Wet brought his fellow Free Staters into the field once more by cutting up British detachments at Sannah's Post and Reddersburg. De Wet wasted time in a vain attempt to take Wepener, but 30,000 burghers unhampered now by the waggons which had cost Cronje so dear, were ready to harass Roberts when he moved off on his long march to Pretoria.

Roberts's advance was a grand attack under unified command all along the line. On the left, Mafeking was relieved and the Griqualand West rebellion stamped out; on the right, Buller occupied Newcastle; in the centre on the banks of the Vaal, Roberts annexed the Free State as the Orange River Colony,² and pressed on into Johannesburg. Then, disregarding scanty supplies, de Wet's attacks on his communications and the weariness of his men disillusioned with the charms of the Golden City which they had come so far and so fast to rescue, he marched straight forward past the silent forts into Pretoria. Again there was talk of peace. Even before the fall of the capital, Steyn, Reitz and Smuts had been hard put to it to dissuade Kruger from surrendering under protest, for only 15,000 burghers kept the field and the ready money was almost gone. Now, with Botha at Diamond Hill barely covering the eastward line of retreat, the war council secretly negotiated with Roberts.³ Good news, however, came in from de Wet, de la Rey threatened to set up an independent republic in the west rather than give in, and at length the remains of the Kruger Government retired down the Delagoa Bay line. Meanwhile part of Buller's army marched north to join hands with Roberts, and the rest turned westwards into the Free State, where the local commandants were quarrelling with each

May
1900.

June 5,
1900.

¹ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 53; Cd. 261 of 1900, p. 20.

² Eybers, p. 344.

³ Ben Viljoen, *Reminiscences*, chapter xvi.; Cd. 1791 of 1903, pp. 58, 71.

other. As a result de Wet had to flee to the Magaliesberg, leaving most of his followers behind as prisoners in the Brandwater Basin, Prinsloo was captured with 4000 men on the Basuto border and another large force under Olivier was taken. In the last pitched battle of the war the retreating Transvaalers were defeated at Dalmanutha and their old President, abandoning the soil of his republic from which, Antaeus-like, he had drawn his strength, sailed on a Dutch warship from Lourenço Marques to Marseilles. Aug.
1900.

The Republics were now cut off from the outer world; Roberts declared the war at an end, annexed the Transvaal and with difficulty prevented an exuberant London tourist agency from running trips to the conquered territory. The way was apparently clear for the post-war settlement. In the Cape, the Schreiner cabinet had fallen. The Cape ministers were all anxious to deal gently with the rebels, many of whom were of the ignorant *bijwoner* type and nearly all of whom had gone into rebellion at a time when their districts had been occupied by republicans to whom they were bound by ties of sympathy and blood. Schreiner, Solomon and Herholdt were reluctantly prepared to support Chamberlain's demand that rebels should be disfranchised, but Merriman, Sauer and de Water headed a party revolt which wrecked the cabinet. Sprigg once more filled the gap and, with the help of Rose-Innes as Attorney-General and Schreiner's band of Adullamites, was able to carry on without the help of the out-and-out Progressives. The usual Indemnity Act was passed, special tribunals were set up to try all accused of rebellion, theft or violence, and those found guilty of rebellion were disfranchised for five years. So the Cape Parliament was prorogued, not to meet again for nearly two years. June
1900.

Oct.
1900.

The Imperial Parliament, on the other hand, was dissolved although it had two more years to run. In England Englishmen had quarrelled so bitterly on the score of South African policy that some observers looked for civil war if the campaign was a long one; in parts of Ireland men rejoiced openly at the early British reverses. At first, the Imperial Government had proposed to secure the fullest possible liberty and self-government for all alike in South Africa. In the Republics, civil administration and settled life had been restored as far as possible in the track of Roberts's advancing troops. After the annexation of the Free State, commerce and agriculture in the southern areas had begun to return to 'normalcy,' and the civil departments staffed by ex-republicans, Englishmen and Colonials had carried on under the mere supervision of the military authorities. But Chamberlain then announced that the people of the conquered

provinces must prove their willingness to assist in the restoration of peace during a period of Crown Colony rule before acquiring responsible government.¹ So, while Uitlanders marched with Roberts to Pretoria to take up the reins of office dropped by the Kruger Government, arrangements were made for a nominated legislative council in the Orange River Colony. Chamberlain induced Salisbury to appeal to the British electorate for a ratification of his Crown Colony policy. He himself supplied the election material and the war-cry. He first told the Liberals that, if they had not encouraged Kruger by opposing him, there would have been no war,² and then published captured letters which had been written before the war by Merriman, de Villiers and te Water to friends in the Republics. Taken by themselves these letters substantiated many of the charges against Krugerism and Transvaal diplomacy and, though they also went far to disprove the existence of the alleged Afrikaner conspiracy against Great Britain before the war of which so much had been and was still being made, their publication had great effect.³ The Tories swept the country to the cry of 'Every vote given to the Liberals is a vote given to the Boers.'

For every eight votes cast for Chamberlain's policy in this Khaki Election, seven were cast against it; nevertheless, the post-war settlement was now firmly in his hands and Milner's. It was soon clear that that settlement was to be far-reaching. The war was being waged essentially to clear the way for the federation which Rhodes, in newly-relieved Kimberley, had foretold would speedily follow the grant of 'equal rights to every civilised man south of the Zambesi' and the hoisting of the Union Jack, 'the finest commercial asset in the world,' at Pretoria. Since that speech, Rhodes had busied himself with his great scholarship scheme and the search for health in England, Italy and Egypt and had taken little active part in politics for fear of hampering the High Commissioner; but now he warned the jubilant Leaguers of Capetown that it was Krugerism which had been overthrown and not the Dutch with whom they would have to go on living after the troops were gone.⁴ To the end Rhodes clung to the hope of once more working with Afrikaners and English combined. Chamberlain apparently cherished the same expectation. In any case he issued dormant commissions which conferred the High Commissionership on Milner to be held separately from the office of Governor of the Cape with which it had been associated since 1846, and empowered

¹ Cd. 547 of 1901, pp. 1 ff.

² Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, I. 233 ff., 290.

³ Cd. 369 of 1900; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 336 ff., 372 ff.

⁴ Williams, *Cecil Rhodes*, p. 319.

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1900.

Oct.
1900.

him to administer the Transvaal and O.R. Colony as soon as Oct. Roberts had departed and to summon the intercolonial conferences which were to lead to federation.¹ 1900.

Roberts sailed home with many of his veterans, but the war did not end. Though the British held nearly all the railways, many highly mobile commandos were still at large under more or less independent leaders. De Wet suddenly emerged from the Magaliesberg and, though troops and floods prevented him from crossing the Orange, his subordinates invaded the Colony. Kritzinger approached Mossel Bay and Hertzog threatened Malmesbury; ² elsewhere, de la Rey was active in the Magaliesberg; Botha raided Utrecht and Vryheid on the one side and the Delagoa Bay railway on the other; Smuts was successful at Modderfontein, and de Wet and Steyn entered the Midlands of the Colony with 1400 men. Dec. 1900. Feb. 1901.

Milner had good cause to complain that matters had gone backwards during the preceding six months. The character of the struggle had, moreover, hardened. It may have been coincidence that a *Volkskongres* met at Worcester in the Western Province of the Cape to express sympathy with the republicans in the very week that de Wet had made his first abortive attempt to cross the Orange; it was certainly disconcerting that the authorities should have sent the dreaded Australians to overawe the assembly with machine guns.³ It was inevitable that, with Boer commandos near Malmesbury, Colonial loyalists should form a defence force, and that, in spite of Sprigg's scruples, martial law should be extended over the whole Colony outside the ports and the native territories; ⁴ it was almost as inevitable that the burning of farmhouses in the ex-republics should be carried out more systematically than hitherto. How else could the British cope with burghers who were in the field one day and the next on the stoeps of their homes, each of which was a potential fort and a permanent source of information and supply? To hem in the actual commandos, Kitchener began to string out barbed wire and blockhouses along the railways. Orders were also given to destroy farms from which shots were fired or which lay nearest to any point at which the railway or telegraph line had been cut. Dec. 1900-Jan. 1901.

Milner opposed this policy of farm-burning which would make his task of reconstruction more difficult, and Chamberlain feared its political results; but Kitchener apparently agreed with de la Rey that war is 'just war' and went forward.⁵ Nevertheless,

¹ Newton, *Unification*, I. 172 ff.

³ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 378 ff.

⁵ Spender, *General Botha*, pp. 85, 104.

² Cd. 522 of 1901, *passim*.

⁴ Cd. 823 of 1902, p. 11.

March
1901.

he also tried gentler methods and, believing that the struggle was kept alive by a few determined leaders, organised a Burgher Peace Committee at Pretoria, formed camps to shelter Boer refugees and discussed terms of peace with Botha at Middelburg.¹ Apart from other considerations, Queen Victoria had just died and her successor was anxious to close the temple of Janus at least during the coronation celebrations. Kitchener offered good terms: progress to self-government through representative institutions; no coloured franchise till the latter had been secured and even then the maintenance of white supremacy; £1,000,000 to meet the claims of burghers against their late governments; the prospect of a loan to farmers, the promise that no special war tax would be laid on the farms, and the relegation of colonial rebels to the mercies of their own governments. The Middelburg Conference failed for H.M. Government ruled out the representative institutions and refused Kitchener's plea for the amnesty to rebels which, according to Milner, would have 'a deplorable effect on loyalists.'² 'We are now,' remarked Kitchener privately, 'carrying the war on to put two or three hundred Dutchmen in prison at the end of it. It seems to me absurd and wrong, and I wonder the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not have a fit.'³

The efforts of a Cape mission to England itself were equally unsuccessful. The Bond parliamentarians were alarmed at the Worcester *Volkskongres* and other signs that Bondsmen might get out of hand and give the authorities an excuse for suppressing their organisation. They therefore commissioned Merriman and Sauer to get into touch with Hofmeyr, who had left the impossible political atmosphere of Capetown for the tranquillity of a German spa, and then petition the Imperial Parliament for South African federation on the lines of the Australian Commonwealth Act which had just been passed at Westminster. Their prospects were not altogether hopeless. Milner could justly complain of 'the carnival of mendacity' which characterised the peace agitation in some of the colonial newspapers and declare, with equal truth, that colonial loyalists would prefer an indefinite war to an inconclusive peace.⁴ This, with the war fever raging and the coast towns full of Imperial men and money, was not surprising; but even in the Colony martial law irked the loyalists; popular sympathy with the Boers found the usual expression in the Anglophobe Continental press; and, in England, the Liberal

¹ Cd. 1791 of 1903, p. 211. On Middelburg Conference, *vide* Cd. 528, 546 and 663 of 1901.

² Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, I. 328.

³ Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, II. 26.

⁴ Cd. 547 of 1901, pp. 55 ff.; Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, I. 326.

Opposition, led by Campbell-Bannerman and its rising hope, Lloyd George, was lifting its diminished head. The Liberals had recaptured the *Daily News*; Bannerman had declared for self-government as soon as order should be re-established, and even Liberal Imperialists like Grey and Asquith were not minded to hold out for unconditional surrender.¹ The Bond petition was indeed presented to the Commons by Sir Robert Reid (Lord Loreburn), but Hofmeyr declined to take part in a useless crusade. Merriman and Sauer were refused a hearing at the bar of the House, and their lecturing tour in the country, undertaken at a time when Lloyd George had to flee from a public meeting disguised as a policeman, had no immediate results.²

Meanwhile Milner occupied the time which, owing to the continuance of the war, must elapse before he could set out for the North by sounding the Cape and Natal ministries on the coming settlement. Both looked forward to federation; Sprigg deprecated a too speedy return to self-government in the new colonies; Hime asked for so much of the south-eastern districts of the Transvaal as would link Natal to Swaziland and enough of the Free State to give Natal the Harrismith railway and a corridor to coveted Basutoland.³ At length Milner published his dormant commissions and, leaving Hime to dream of succeeding where Shepstone had failed, transferred the High Commissioner-ship from Capetown to Johannesburg, the financial, industrial and presumably the future political capital of South Africa.⁴ Some of the heads of the new departments had preceded him and he, on arrival, steadily recruited the necessary staffs. Some critics complained that he relied overmuch on young men from Oxford and employees of the mining houses, but to whom else could he turn? Outside the mining houses, men of affairs were not easy to come by and the Oxford 'kindergarten' atoned for such mistakes as it made by its energy and freshness of outlook.

Knowledge of affairs, energy and freshness were all needed if the hell of the war-time republics was to be changed, if not into a new heaven, at least into the new earth which Milner planned. The destruction wrought in the tip-and-run fighting with its farm-burning and consequent concentration camps meant that everything would have to be rebuilt from the foundations upwards and built better than before. The underlying ideas

¹ Spender, *op. cit.*, I, 319 ff.

² Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 385.

³ Cd. 1163 of 1902, p. 3.

⁴ Hely Hutchinson went from Natal as Governor of the Cape; McCallum became Governor of Natal; Goold Adams became Deputy Administrator of the O.R. Colony; R. Solomon legal adviser to Milner; Wybergh, a prominent Uitlander and Leaguer, Commissioner of Mines; E. B. Sargant, Director of Education; Patrick Duncan, ex-secretary to Milner at the Inland Revenue, Treasurer.

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1900.

of Milner's policy of reconstruction were two. First, the fighting Boers were to be pushed out towards the frontiers and as many of their peaceful fellows as possible restarted on their farms under the care of Baden-Powell's S.A. Constabulary, who were already holding the ring round Pretoria, Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Secondly, British were to be settled on the land on the lines laid down by the Arnold Forster commission,¹ not with the impossible idea of swamping the older population, but to give a British outlook and tone to the new administration and the coming federation, to cut across the fatal line which had hitherto separated the urban British from the rural Dutch, and to set the latter a good example in the new farming methods which were to increase the production of the country.² Increased production was the sole hope of maintaining a healthy white population above the flood of blacks, and the Rand was the key of the situation. The O.R. Colony could be expected to pay its way on the old simple scale, but it would have nothing over. Therefore, the 'overspill' of the Transvaal gold mines must furnish the money and the credit to pay for the new railways, roads, public works and education which were to 'lift' the ex-republics and make the overburdened British public some direct return for the blood and treasure it was pouring out on behalf of the Uitlanders.³ The Boers' farms could not be taxed; the Rand, about to be relieved by the cancellation of the dynamite concession and the expropriation of the Netherland and Selati railway companies, must and should pay.⁴ King Stork promised to be a harder taskmaster to the mine-owners than King Log.

At the moment little could be done beyond extorting permission from Kitchener for Uitlanders to return to the Rand, nominating a town council in Johannesburg and restarting three mines, a mere 150 stamps out of the pre-war 6000, but nevertheless a beginning. Then Milner sailed to England to press his views on the Colonial Secretary,⁵ to be made a viscount and to arrange the details of the Crown Colony rule which was to follow the conclusion of peace. Peace seemed to be near for the tide ran strongly against the Boers in the early months of 1901. De Wet and Steyn narrowly escaped capture on colonial soil; de la Rey was beaten at Lichtenburg and again at Taaibosch Spruit; Plumer took Pietersburg and with it the Transvaalers' last remaining line of railway and thereafter 'drove' the Lydenburg district; the Boers surrendered in batches, their ammunition ran low and, in the absence of de la Rey, the Transvaal

¹ Cd. 626, 627 of 1901.

² Cd. 1163 of 1902, pp. 88, 126; Cd. 1551 of 1903, p. 37.

³ Cd. 628 of 1901; *Times' History*, VI. 22.

⁴ Cd. 1163 of 1902, p. 122.

⁵ Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, I. 332.

leaders almost gave way. But Kruger bade them fight on. So ^{May} they fought on while Kitchener slowly enmeshed them in his ^{1901.} barbed wire, sent more and more of them to the prison camps in the Cape Peninsula and St. Helena, the Bermudas and Ceylon, and gathered men, women and children into the concentration camps.¹

These camps were increasing in number, size and notoriety.² The first of them had been opened at Krugersdorp as a shelter ^{Aug.} for refugees whose numbers grew after Kitchener had failed to ^{1900.} persuade Botha to leave surrendered burghers unmolested on their farms. The refugees were soon joined by families from the destroyed farms. A year later there were forty such camps sheltering 85,000 souls, under civil administration in the O.R. Colony and Natal and military in the Transvaal. Under either administration the experiment was at first disastrous. The camps grew rapidly in size; the sites of some were badly chosen; there were the usual cases of rascally contractors, stupid officials, shortage of transport and faulty or inadequate rations; medical staffs were insufficient to cope with the epidemics of measles and pneumonia which raged among people who had often left their homes in poor physical condition and had suffered hardships on the road, and who were in many cases unsuited by their primitive ideas of hygiene and their suspicion of the officials to adapt themselves to life in crowded camps. The camps were naturally denounced by the Boers and the Liberals in England; but after the first breakdown the situation was saved by Anglo-Indians trained to deal with famine crowds, helpful suggestions from visiting commissions of ladies, and Milner's energy. At the end of the war there were 200,000 inmates, including some 80,000 natives in separate camps, with a death-rate down to very reasonable proportions. Botha was then able to express his thankfulness that so many of the Boers' families were in British hands, and Steyn to adduce the condition of the camps as an argument for going on with the war; nevertheless, the death of 4000 women and 16,000 children and the policy of farm-burning of which those deaths were the indirect outcome, left a deep mark on the Afrikaner consciousness.³

From the military point of view, the camps were worse than useless. The British cared for the women and children while the men fought and Milner, to the great comfort of the Boers,

¹ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 69; Kestell, *Met de Boeren Commandoes*, p. 158; Cd. 902 of 1902, p. 19; Maurice, *Official History of the War*, IV. 659 ff.

² On the Concentration Camps, *vide* Cd. 608, 694, 789, 793, 819 of 1901; Cd. 853, 893, 902, 934, 936, 939, 942, 1161 of 1902; 'Times' *History*, VI. 24 ff.; Spender, I. 334 ff.

³ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 87; Kestell and van Velden, *Peace Negotiations*, p. 83; de Wet, *Three Years' War*, p. 491. The death-rate was at its worst in June 1901.

was bitterly attacked for the 'methods of barbarism' which, in Campbell-Bannerman's words, characterised this stage of the struggle.¹ But even Liberal Imperialists agreed that the reconstruction must be left in Milner's hands. He returned to Johannesburg, bringing with him a loan of £6,000,000 to be expended on administration, new rolling-stock, relief and land settlement as soon as the never-ending war should end. Kitchener drove the northern Free State, enlisted hands-uppers as National Scouts in the Transvaal and Volunteers in the O.R. Colony, and gave notice that all who did not surrender before September 15 would be permanently banished and the cost of maintaining their families charged against their property.² The threat was followed if anything by increased activity. Botha raided Natal; de la Rey's New Model, a disciplined force, dominated the Western Transvaal; Smuts and his khaki-clad followers rode into the Midlands of the Colony. At that Kitchener overcame Sprigg's opposition and extended martial law to the Cape ports as the only means of stopping gun-running to the republicans. Scheepers and Kritzinger were taken and, though Maritz rode to within thirty miles of Capetown, the republicans, in spite of Smuts's entreaties, failed to show themselves in strength in the Colony. It was cold comfort to the men in the south to learn that de Wet in the far-away northern Free State had rushed the Yeomanry camp at Tweefontein.

Sept.
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1901.

Tweefontein was the last notable Boer success. The hold of the British was tightening once more; all was quiet in the vital Rand area; the railways were working day and night to cope with the supply of troops and concentration camps and with the Uitlanders who were streaming back to Johannesburg as the mines reopened. Milner worked hard to restore the gold industry, and Solomon, his legal adviser, revised the Gold Law on conservative lines; but the real difficulty was not law but labour. Milner called in Sir Godfrey Lagden from Basutoland to improve the recruiting machinery, to simplify the burdensome pass system, and to cause anguish to the illicit liquor sellers; but the local Bantu, with the many opportunities of earning easy money above ground that the war afforded, were shy of resuming work 3000 feet below the earth's surface.³ In any case Portuguese East Africa had always been the great labour reservoir for the Rand. Milner, therefore, concluded the *modus vivendi* whereby the Mozambique officials agreed to help the mines to recruit at 13s. a head and, since Delagoa Bay was as much the natural port

Dec.
1901.¹ Spender, *op. cit.*, p. 351.³ Cd. 904 of 1902, pp. 21 ff.² Cd. 732 of 1901.

of the British Transvaal as it had been of the S.A. Republic, to maintain the pre-war proportions between the rates over the Lourenço Marques railway and those of the colonial lines.¹

The new administration took shape in the midst of the confusion. Resident Magistrates steadily replaced the military in the occupied towns; the foundations of a four-judge Supreme Court were laid at Pretoria to receive appeals from a single-judge court on the Rand, which its members staffed in turn, and from the new three-judge court at Bloemfontein; a mass of republican *besluiten* were swept away and proclamations drafted wholesale against the day of Crown Colony rule.² The proposed changes did not go far enough to please everyone. There was talk in certain quarters of a South African court of appeal on a federal basis and of the substitution of English law and practice not only for the admittedly tangled law of the Transvaal but for the Roman-Dutch law which was the basis of the civil law of all South Africa. The prudence of the new judges, nearly all Cape-trained men, and the influence of de Villiers, C.J., defeated the movement. In the main, such changes as were made followed Cape precedents.³

Outside the law courts, Anglicisation had much freer scope. Sargent, director of education in both the new colonies, first revived the schools in the towns and then, inspired by the keenness of Boer prisoners of war for education, started schools in the concentration camps to 'make the children happy' and to teach them English.⁴ When the local supply of teachers ran out he imported others from Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Before the end of the war, 42,000 children were at school, more than had ever been so at any one time before, and most of the teachers were on excellent terms with the parents, especially with the all-important mothers. Preparations were also made for a comprehensive British land settlement. Most of the ambitious irrigation schemes, drawn on an Egyptian scale by Sir William Willcocks, had to be set aside on the score of expense;⁵ but land boards bought large blocks of land in each colony and established a few settlers thereon even before the close of hostilities.

The new settlers were looked upon as the forerunners of the

¹ Cd. 3564 of 1907, pp. 61 ff.

² Eybers, pp. 347, 515; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 406 ff.

³ The Transvaal Supreme Court when completed in 1902 consisted of Sir J. Rose-Innes, Sir W. Solomon and J. W. Wessels of the Cape, and Sir W. J. Smith of British Guiana, where till 1917 portions of the Roman-Dutch code survived. The president of the O.R.C. court was A. F. S. Maasdorp from the E.D. Court at Grahamstown.

⁴ Cd. 1551 of 1903, p. 109; Malherbe, *History of Education*, pp. 297 ff.

⁵ Cd. 1163 of 1902, pp. 37 ff.

big move that was to be made in the coming winter of 1902, the beginning of the rush that was to carry South Africa to affluence and to federation.¹ To further this latter end, steps were taken to suspend the Cape constitution. The Progressives' dread of partition had obliged Milner to give up his original plan of putting the rebellious border districts under Crown Colony rule and leaving the rest to govern itself as before. He now favoured a general suspension till federation should be achieved. There was nothing new in the idea. Lord Durham, long ago, had held that there could be no self-government in Canada without 'a decidedly English legislature,' and Durham had been followed by Lord Sydenham, who had taken advantage of the suspension of the constitution of rebellious French Quebec to unite that province with British Ontario. There had been hints of suspension in high quarters in London during the later stages of the South African confederation campaign in the 'seventies. Now, in spite of Chamberlain's refusal to accept the idea, Milner made no secret of his belief that a self-governing Cape would be a serious obstacle to his plans for reconstruction, federation and, above all, a comprehensive native policy while yet there was time, and that, if all the colonies were to become self-governing prior to such a settlement, South Africa might well be condemned to tread once more the weary road which in 1895 had led to the Vaal drifts and what had lain beyond them.

Therein, Milner was a true prophet. Meanwhile, at the end of the war the Transvaal and O.R. Colony would be controlled by officials supported presumably by the growing British element and by those 4500 burghers who were already fighting for the King, representatives of thousands whose one desire was to be let alone by British officers and Boer commandants alike ;² self-governing Natal, ruled by the imperialistic Hime ministry and gratified by the grant of Vryheid, Utrecht and part of Wakkerstroom, would be open to pressure in the matter of Durban traffic to the Rand ;³ the Chartered Company was despairing of ever finding the new Rand in Southern Rhodesia and was deeply indebted for war expenses to the Imperial Government. But in the Cape, since Rhodes still declined the office and Jameson as yet lacked both the standing and desire to lead, the Progressives were leaderless, and Milner had no confidence in the supple Sprigg. If Parliament met, Sprigg might have to choose between reliance on the Bond and a resignation which would overwhelm the work of reconstruction in the Colony in a racial general election. Parliament had not met since August 1900 ; it hardly represented existing opinion ; the register was out of date ; Sprigg was financing

¹ 'Times' History, VI. 38.

² *Ibid.*, VI. 43.

³ Cd. 941 of 1902.

himself on Governor's warrants. The constitution had thus been freely broken. It only remained to clear away the fragments.¹

So Milner argued and, for some time past, sporadic Leaguers had demanded Suspension; but the movement never gathered weight till Rhodes headed a petition in its favour. Had Rhodes lived, Suspension might have been carried, but he died at Muizenburg and Milner was left to push his policy single-handed. He came to the Peninsula and interviewed ministers and others while Sprigg, bereft of Rose-Innes, who had gone to preside over the new Supreme Court at Pretoria, wavered unhappily between memories of his long parliamentary past and a present dread of the Progressives. Smartt, one of Sprigg's colleagues, now left him to head the Suspension movement; forty-two Progressive Members of Parliament petitioned H.M. Government, and the High Commissioner openly supported their petition with a hint that Suspension was the price to be paid for the speedy withdrawal of martial law. March
1902.

The inner circle conveyed the real meaning of the petition to Chamberlain. It was ostensibly Rhodes's policy: no partition, an equal voice with Natal in matters of common interest and, prior to the restoration of self-government, redistribution of seats and a new registration of voters; in other words, provision for a Progressive majority. The opposition was handicapped, for, outside the towns, the electorate was practically silenced under the weight of martial law; nevertheless, Bondsmen and Moderate Englishmen combined to defend their common privilege of making mistakes if they chose, free from official guidance. They made Sprigg's life such a burden to him that he at last declared himself against Suspension and fled to London to attend the Coronation and the Premiers' Conference. There the policy met its end, in spite of a vigorous campaign in the Colony which produced 30,000 signatures in its favour. Hime of Natal proposed it in the interests of imperial unity; Seddon of New Zealand, fresh from a week's sojourn in South Africa, seconded; but the Secretary of State in the chair looked coldly on the proposal, Laurier of Canada threatened to leave the Conference if it were carried, and both Sprigg and Barton of the Australian Commonwealth supported Laurier. Chamberlain, therefore, bade the Cape Parliament meet forthwith and promised that no special measures should be taken unless it proved recalcitrant. May
1902.

There was one overwhelming reason why Suspension should thus have been abandoned. In the midst of the struggle in the

¹ On Suspension, *vide* C. 1162 of 1902; Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 393 ff. As a parliamentarian, Chamberlain rejected the advice of Milner the administrator.

Colony and the immense preparations for a move forward north of the Orange, 'peace broke out' as unexpectedly as it did on a later and more famous occasion. Latterly the British had driven parts of the Free State and the Transvaal with a success which was hardly marred by de la Rey's capture of Methuen at Tweebosch. The end had been foreshadowed when Rosebery's Liberal Imperialists demanded peace by negotiation provided the Boers made the first advances;¹ it was brought nearer when the Foreign Office declined the good offices of the Netherlands Government, but left the way open for negotiations with the Boer leaders in South Africa. British public opinion clearly favoured peace; Irish land and a Coercion Act awaited attention; the Balfour Education Bill promised ministers a stern struggle with the formidable Nonconformist conscience. Hence Kitchener sounded the acting Transvaal President, Schalk Burger, and allowed the leaders of the two Republics to meet at Klerksdorp. It was doubtful at first whether they would listen to talk of peace. De Wet, convinced that attack in the Colony was the only defence for republican independence, had sent Smuts to besiege Ookiep and take general command till de la Rey should come south of the Orange.² Steyn, again, still hopeful of complications in Europe or in Asia and long since jealous of Kitchener's *toenadering* with the Transvaalers, pleaded that time was on their side; 21,000 Boers still were in the saddle; their families were safe in the concentration camps; the supplies lacking on the High Veld were to be had in the coast colonies; a 'Rosebery Ministry' would soon come to the rescue, and if must be, they could surrender unconditionally and thus preserve the right to rebel later with a clear conscience. So the negotiations dragged on, the Boer leaders holding out for independence, and Milner, associated now with Kitchener in the discussions, offering substantially the Middelburg terms. Meanwhile the British relieved Ookiep, Ian Hamilton drove de la Rey's country in the Western Transvaal heavily for the first time and little commandos everywhere were driven against the barbed wire and taken in detail. In May, thirty representatives from each republic met at Vereeniging. At first Steyn and the war party held the upper hand in spite of Schalk Burger, Lukas Meyer, Botha and Hertzog; but Smuts came in with the news that all hope of a general rising in the Colony was gone; Kitchener whispered that the Tory Government would not last for ever and, though Steyn resigned the shadow of his presidency rather than give way, even de la Rey admitted that the burghers would fight no more

March
1902.

Dec.
1901.

Jan.
1902.

April 9,
1902.

March
1902.

¹ Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, II. 11.

² Maurice, *Official History of the War*, IV. 577 ff.

however much the leaders might wish it. De Wet brought most of the Free Staters round and the terms were accepted by 54 votes to 6. That same night the peace of Vereeniging was signed at Pretoria.¹ May 31,
1902.

Under the peace treaty the republicans surrendered their independence. In return the British Government promised £3,000,000 to repair the ravages of war, a large development loan free of interest for the first two years and full responsible government before any native franchise was given; but beyond the private information that they would be dealt with by their own governments, no mention was made of colonial rebels. Once the commandos had laid down their captured Lee-Metfords, Crown Colony rule was proclaimed, Kitchener departed and Milner was left with a free hand within the Crown Colonies and immense influence without them. He needed it all. 45,000 Uitlanders had already returned to the Rand but, beside the 200,000 troops, colonial volunteers and irregulars waiting to be sent away or reabsorbed in civil life, there were 32,000 Boers in the prison camps, and 110,000 more of all ages and sexes and nearly 100,000 natives in the concentration camps to be restored to what was left of their homes. It was mid-winter; grazing was scarce and the transport cattle were riddled with new and indigenous diseases; the Army drove hard bargains for much-needed supplies; crowded troop trains blocked refugee trains toiling up the single lines of worn-out railway to the High Veld; drought came in November. Nevertheless, by March 1903, the garrison had been cut down to about 30,000 men; all save 100 helpless souls had been sent home from the concentration camps, and only 1000 fighting men lingered in the prison camps overseas whence they refused to return till de la Rey in person had assured them that the talk of peace was not a trap.² Jan.
1904.

Repatriation and reconstruction were helped in their early stages by an interchange of visits. Botha, de la Rey and de Wet went to London to ask for a modification of the peace treaty. They were made welcome by the King; they soon won the regard of a public which counted Joan of Arc and George Washington as, in some sense, national heroes who had inexplicably taken the wrong turning; but Chamberlain they found urbanely firm.³ They then passed on to join Steyn and Reitz on the Continent in an effort to raise funds for the Boer widows and orphans. It

¹ Cd. 1096 of 1902; Cd. 1163 of 1902, p. 155; Eybers, p. 345; Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, II. chapters lv., lvi.; Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 84 ff.; Kestell and van Velden, *Peace Negotiations*; Shaw, *Letters to Isabel*, p. 202.

² Cd. 3127 of 1906, pp. 53 ff.; Cd. 1551 of 1903, pp. 1 ff.; 'Times' *History*, VI. 44.

³ Cd. 1284 of 1902, p. 7.

was a case of much cry and very little wool and, realising that 'the civilised world' to which they had appealed had lost interest in them, they returned home determined to make the best of the Treaty of Vereeniging and Chamberlain's promise of further help for distressed families.¹

The Secretary of State had preceded them to South Africa. The auguries were hopeful. The coast colonies were enjoying a wild post-war boom; Johannesburg, flooded with newcomers, looked forward to a population of 1,000,000 within a year or two; the Cape Parliament had belied the fears of the Suspensionists by raising its contribution to the Navy from £30,000 to £50,000 and passing the Indemnity Act in return for Sprigg's promise of an inquiry into the past working of martial law, a promise but imperfectly fulfilled in the event.² Martial law had been withdrawn from the colonies, old and new, and a commission under Lord Chief Justice Alverstone had scaled down the punishments of most of the rebels and released others.³ Chamberlain landed at Durban, preached conciliation, arranged that Natal should compensate its own citizens for war losses as its contribution to the cost of the campaign, and journeyed on to be well received in the Transvaal by all save a few ultra-loyalists who wanted immediate self-government.⁴ He worked hard with Milner for a fortnight, hastening the settlement of claims for relief and compensation, and providing for a guaranteed loan of £35,000,000. But he was also determined to take back something tangible wherewith to solace an overburdened Chancellor of the Exchequer. The mine-owners were already distressed by Milner's 10 per cent. tax on profits, his insistence that mines should pay rates to the enlarged Johannesburg municipality, and his unblushing talk of taking an unwontedly large share of future mineral discoveries for the state. Chamberlain, notwithstanding, induced a large group of firms to promise to raise forthwith £10,000,000 as the first instalment of a £30,000,000 loan as the Transvaal's war contribution. And so by way of Mafeking and Bloemfontein to Capetown.⁵ There, Sprigg was dependent on the Bond which, in the House, followed Merriman and Sauer and, outside, took its orders once more from Hofmeyr, while Jameson was drifting rather than climbing into the position of leader of the Progressives. The 'callous devil' from Birmingham, as Jameson called him,⁶ made much of Hofmeyr and the English Moderates, listened hopefully to the postprandial hint of a prominent Bondsman that £5,000,000

Dec.
1902.

¹ Cd. 1329 of 1902, *passim*.

² Cd. 1364 of 1902.

³ *Ibid.*, VI. 87.

⁴ 'Times' History, VI. 70 ff.

⁵ 'Times' History, VI. 79.

⁶ Colvin, Jameson, II. 217.

might be forthcoming from the Colony for the war-chest, and pointedly neglected the Progressives. He then sailed homeward, without the suggested £5,000,000 but with the knowledge that the last of the rebels would soon be free men, though disfranchised for five years to come.

So far, so good. But repatriation was expensive. To save time and distress, Milner gave assistance first and asked for proofs of claims afterwards. The £3,000,000 grant earmarked for the ex-republicans was shared out at the rate of £25 apiece whether it was required or not, and the balance was paid to those whose losses exceeded that amount. 'Protected burghers,' that is, the Hands-uppers, received an additional £1,900,000; British Uitlanders, neutrals and natives were given another £2,000,000, and close on £3,000,000 were issued in short-term loans, of which the colonial governments ultimately recovered about half.¹ The financial settlement caused much bitterness. The Die-hards complained, often with truth, that too many of the loaves and fishes went to Hands-uppers;² both accused the authorities of overcharging for the supplies which many of them took in lieu of their share of the grant. An impartial commission afterwards found that most of the prices were fair, and that, for the rest, the goods had been delivered on the farms carriage-free; but Milner's socialism got him into trouble in another quarter. In a time of dearth up-country and of boom prices at the ports, he saved the burghers from the rapacity of merchants and store-keepers and drew down upon his head the anathemas of the commercial fraternity.³

Worse still, after the peripatetic Government ploughs had turned over enough soil to give promise of food for the year, the harvest failed. Farmers who were hard pushed themselves and lacked both beasts and labourers, refused to allow *bijwoners* to return to their farms, especially as many of these tenants-at-will had been National Scouts. Relief works in the O.R. Colony and Burgher Settlements on the farms of friendly farmers north of the Vaal did something to meet the difficulty; ^{March 1903.} ⁴ but the relief works could be only temporary and the metayer colonies failed. They were private ventures, badly run, and their failure left South Africa to wrestle with the growing poor white problem as best it might. British settlement, on the other hand, proceeded but slowly. The 1400 heads of families ultimately established in the Transvaal and on the cornlands of the eastern O.R. Colony formed a useful leavening, but they could not have the social and

¹ Cd. 3028 of 1906, pp. 53 ff.

³ 'Times' History, VI. 48, 49.

⁴ Cd. 1551 of 1903, p. 65; Cd. 1553 of 1903, p. 14.

² Cd. 1284 of 1902, pp. 5, 19.

political effects expected of the great immigration which failed to materialise.

1907.

With the coming of good rains at the close of 1903, repatriation twice carried out was accomplished. Meanwhile, drought or no drought, Milner had striven to bring about the 'lift' in other directions.¹ The guaranteed loan gave him money wherewith to pay for irrigation and forestry, new roads, and a programme of railway construction which, when completed, doubled the track in the two provinces. Public buildings in the style that Herbert Baker was popularising rose in all directions; scientific farming was encouraged by precept, example and agricultural shows; the teachers followed the children out of the camps, and by the end of 1904 more children were at school in town and dorp than even in the camps; nor were the claims of higher education in Johannesburg and Bloemfontein forgotten. Municipal councils were set up in the towns and local powers were offered to the country districts;² the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor anchored the capital of the Transvaal at Pretoria, already the seat of the Supreme Court and the possessor of public offices, and Johannesburg found compensation for the disappointment of its hopes in a Water Board and the prospect of a plentiful supply of water for the first time. True to his policy of autocracy tempered by consultation, Milner also established nominated Legislative Councils at Bloemfontein and Pretoria.³

Jan.-
May
1903.

Milner also did what he could to bring about federation. He was already Governor of the two northern colonies; the S.A. Constabulary and the railways, united now as the Central South African Railways, were under his control; a due share of the guaranteed loan must be allotted to the O.R. Colony. He therefore set up an Intercolonial Council, the Crown Colony version of the Republican federal Raad, to advise him on these and other matters of common concern.⁴ He also hoped that a South African educational federation might arise from the deliberations of the heads of the four colonial education departments at Bloemfontein and the subsequent Teachers' Conference.⁵ This hopeful movement died away, but, in the economic sphere, Milner achieved that federation to which Rhodes had looked

July
1903.

¹ Of the £35,000,000 loan, £6,000,000 were used to cover existing liabilities, £14,000,000 for the expropriation of railway companies, £5,000,000 for repatriation and compensation, £10,000,000 for development ('*Times*' History, VI. 84).

² Ord. 38 and 58 of 1903 (Transvaal); Ord. 6 and 12 of 1904 (O.R.C.).

³ Cd. 2104 of 1904, p. 6, for history of the various councils. Six members including burghers in the O.R.C., enlarged by the addition of 4 more officials and 4 burghers in 1904. In the Transvaal, 16 officials and 14 others.

⁴ Cd. 1641 of 1903, p. 5; Newton, *Unification*, I. 220 ff. The Intercolonial Council ended in 1908, but its Committee, the Railway Board, survived.

⁵ Malherbe, *History of Education*, p. 307.

forward. He presided over a Customs Conference at Bloemfontein which swept away the tariff walls between the four colonies, Southern Rhodesia and the Native Protectorates and, following Canada's example, gave a preference to goods from the United Kingdom and offered reciprocity to other parts of the Empire.¹ March 1903.

The Bloemfontein Customs Conference took two other momentous resolutions: first, that 'in view of the coming federation,' the native question must be handled as a whole, and, secondly, that if British tropical Africa failed to supply the labour necessary for the Rand mines, recourse must be had to temporary, indentured, unskilled labourers from Asia.² The fruit of the first resolution was the report of the Native Affairs Commission of 1903-5 which laid down the future lines of South African native policy; of the second, Chinese Labour.³

The common factor in the two resolutions was that problem of labour which had exercised European South Africans since the far-off days when van Riebeeck hesitated between buying Angolese negroes, forcing the Hottentots to work by taking away their cattle, and importing industrious Chinese. From the first the labour supply for the Rand mines, drawn from the Transvaal and from Mozambique, had never been over-plentiful; after the Kaffir Boom of 1895 it became really inadequate, hampered as the industry was by the pass laws and the liquor scandal, lack of systematic recruiting, haphazard organisation of the mines themselves and the filthy conditions under which the 'boys' had to live—or die. The Industrial Commission of 1897 had talked of a recruiting board and had got no further; the Chamber of Mines had found Simla chilly when it mentioned Indian coolies, and local Transvaal opinion truculent when it discussed the rival merits of Italians and Chinese; the 100,000 natives at work on the outbreak of war had dispersed as the mines closed down and the Republican authorities reduced their wages from 45s. per month with food and lodging to 20s. In the first elusive flush of victory the Chamber had raised wages to 30s., formed the Native Labour Association to monopolise recruiting and prevent one mine from capturing the boys intended for another, and even cherished the hope that kraal natives would be forced to work. The *modus vivendi* with Mozambique, whence

¹ Cd. 1599 and 1640 of 1903. Reciprocity was arranged with Canada in 1904, Australia in 1906, and New Zealand in 1907.

² Cd. 1640 of 1903, pp. 12 ff.

³ On Chinese Labour, *vide* Cd. 1895-6-7-8-9, 1941, 1945, 1956, 1986, 2025, 2026, 2028, 2183 of 1904, and Campbell, *Chinese Coolie Emigration*, pp. 160 ff.

75 per cent. of the labourers were wont to be drawn, had commended the Labour Association to the favour of the Portuguese ; but Milner had also obliged the mine-owners to carry out much-needed reforms and appointed a medical committee which reduced the appalling death-rate to more civilised proportions.

At the close of the war only 30,000 boys were at work and barely one-third of the available stamps falling. The natives were full of money ; they or their newly-wed wives were busy in the kraals, on the farms or on repatriation and railway construction work ; they did not fail to note that 30s. was really a reduction of the pre-war rate of pay ; they disliked the new regulations, which bound them to work for six months and go to the mine to which they were assigned ; they felt no serious call to go down the mines at all. In spite of the extension of piecework and the raising of the pay to the old 45s., only 50,000 natives were forthcoming when the Bloemfontein Conference met. Owners, managers and engineers had for the most part made up their minds that the local supply was insufficient, all the more as Natal had forbidden recruiting within her borders and was competing for the Portuguese Shangaans. Some, like the ex-Reformer FitzPatrick, frightened of Natal's Indian experience, were against the importation of the Chinese of which their friends had long spoken ; but, on the other hand, indentured labour was nothing new in South Africa. The old apprenticeship system had been based upon it ; Natal had imported Indian coolies since 1860 ; the Cape Parliament had once sanctioned the use of Chinese on the farms and, though no action had then been taken, it was now introducing Italians ; in Southern Rhodesia mine-owners had tried 'Arabs,' Somalis and Abyssinians without success and were now clamouring for Chinese.¹

1901.

1870.

A small group of men on the Rand, led by F. H. P. Creswell, manager of the Village Deep, favoured a white labour policy as the only means of saving European civilisation from dependence on black barbarism. By reorganising the internal working of his mine Creswell showed that white labour was much less expensive than had been supposed. He was, however, hampered by a strike of skilled men against unskilled European labour and by the failure of a similar experiment on four other mines ; the main body of mining opinion turned against him, and the Chamber condemned his policy on the grounds that white men could not be employed on the same work alongside blacks and that, if the white labour policy were adopted, 48 of the 79 producing mines would be ruined and the profits on the remainder seriously diminished. Creswell retorted that the failure of the experiment

¹ Cd. 1200 of 1902 ; Cd. 2028 of 1904 ; *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1900-2, p. 272.

on the other mines had been due to lack of incentive to the white workers, the absence of a reorganisation of the work and opposition by financiers, and backed his assertions by an independent expert report to the effect that Europeans could supplement natives in certain departments both above and below ground.¹

From the Chamber's point of view the issue was simple. Nearly three hundred mining companies had been floated during the twelve months following the peace and substance must be given to them. Much money had already been spent on preliminary work. Admittedly Creswell's policy might not mean a loss on general working expenses but it would mean a loss of profits, and if mines planned for speedy exhaustion were worked slowly, the fall in the price of shares would be serious. The Chamber's policy was, in short, to develop as much low grade ore as possible within the next five years and to find the labour wherewith to do it cheaply.² To Milner the issue was still simpler. The mines were a perishing asset. Their rapid development would attract newcomers who, as in California and Australia, would found other industries destined to flourish when the mines were holes in the ground guarded by towering dumps. In this way a great Johannesburg would make a British Transvaal which would hold the balance in a British South Africa which, in its turn, might go far to consolidate the Empire.³ On the rapid development of the mines depended his whole policy of 'lift' and federation under the Crown. He fought hard against the Chinese solution, but he soon began to talk of it as the one way of attaining Creswell's ends by other means. The Chinese were to be a scaffolding which could be dispensed with as soon as a great white society had arisen within it freed from dependence on Mozambique and the tribes.⁴

Jan.
1903.

During the war Chamberlain had given Southern Rhodesia permission to experiment with Asiatic labour but under such stringent regulations that the experiment had never been made. On Chamberlain's arrival in Johannesburg, Milner asked leave to carry it out in Rhodesia, but now the Colonial Secretary refused, for the Chartered Company was much too unpopular in England to permit of a sorely shaken ministry taking such a risk indirectly on its behalf.⁵ When the Bloemfontein Conference met the general economic situation in South Africa was threatening. The harvest had failed; repatriated burghers, new British

¹ Cd. 1896 of 1904, p. 65; Cd. 1897 of 1904, pp. 403, 581, 574 ff., 612 ff.

² Cd. 1896 of 1904, p. 74; Cd. 1897 of 1904, pp. 120, 129, 132, 423, 438, 462, 610.

³ *'Times' History*, VI. 19.

⁴ Cd. 1895 of 1904, pp. 39 ff.

⁵ Cd. 1200 of 1902; Cd. 2028 of 1904, p. 8. Chamberlain said the Transvaal and Rhodesia must have the same policy in this matter.

settlers, overstocked storekeepers, out-of-work irregulars and those others who had flocked to the Rand were grumbling; in the coast colonies, the customary land and produce boom which had accompanied an imperial war was showing ominous signs of breaking; but all might yet be well if the mines could be set at work at full pressure. Milner reluctantly faced the fact that the labour necessary for his schemes was not to be found locally, and appointed a Labour Commission to investigate alternative sources.

The Chamber set to work to educate the public and to convince the Secretary of State that the demand for Chinese was a popular one. Farrar, another ex-Reformer, opened the campaign;¹ the Labour Importation Association took it up and made good headway in spite of the opposition of the White League, the African Labour League and the Trades Labour Council; the Boer leaders, disapproving of the proposed importation, stood aside and counselled their people to take no responsibility in the matter. Milner then went to London to refuse the offer of the Colonial Secretaryship and to find Lyttelton, Chamberlain's successor, willing to risk the Chinese. He returned to face inevitable unpopularity in a Transvaal where times had markedly changed for the worse.² The Civil Service and the Constabulary were retrenching; revenue was falling by £100,000 a month; broken men were drifting away from the Rand and the issue of the first instalment of the magnates' loan had been postponed.³ Lung sicknesses were playing havoc with the labour supplies from Central Africa⁴; recruiting further afield in Uganda, Lagos and Nigeria had failed; the importation of English navvies for railway work had proved a costly failure;⁵ the Indian Government had turned a deaf ear to appeals for coolies who should set natives free from the railway construction since the Transvaal would not modify its anti-Asiatic laws;⁶ the very suspension of the road and railway programme failed to swell the number of natives on the mines above 65,000, white miners struck against the use of Italians, and the employment of 1000 Europeans on unskilled work only raised the white total to 13,000. The one contribution to the solution of the labour problem which the Boer leaders had made so far was that Basutoland, Swaziland and the reserves should be broken up and the squatters' law strictly enforced to ensure an equal distribution of labourers.⁷

Meanwhile the majority of the Labour Commission had

¹ Cd. 1895 of 1904, pp. 8 ff.

³ 'Times' History, VI. 118.

⁵ Cd. 1895 of 1904, p. 159.

⁶ Cd. 1683 of 1903, *passim*; Cd. 2239 of 1904, p. 44.

⁷ Cd. 1897 of 1904, pp. 501 ff.; Cd. 1899 of 1904, p. 22.

² S. Baldwin, *On England*, p. 189.

⁴ Cd. 1950 of 1904, *passim*.

reported that there was an actual shortage of 129,000 boys, with no African supply in sight, and that in 1908 the shortage would be 365,000. The minority report queried these calculations and insisted that there must be a fixed ratio between white and black labour, but the majority report had its effect on a public which was fast swinging round in favour of the Chinese.¹ Creswell, Wybergh, commissioner of mines, and Money Penny, editor of *The Star*, had been obliged to resign their several offices; the Labour Importers broke up an opposition meeting at the Wanderers'; Farrar's petition, admittedly 'skilfully organised,' bore the names of three-fifths of the adult white males of the Transvaal other than Government servants; the press was unanimous; the bulk of the white miners were satisfied when they learnt that the Chinese would be kept to purely unskilled work; Boers, Southern Rhodesians and Natalians looked forward to the freeing of natives for service on the farms; guileless ecclesiastics had visions of the seeds of Christian virtue scattered over the Celestial Empire by returning Johannesburg coolies.² There were dissentients. The Cape ministry protested; but its protest was discounted by the fact that there was a general election pending in which the coloured voters, nervous of possible Chinese competition, would play an important part, and the Progressives at least were quieted with a promise that the Chinese would be shut out from the Colony just as Indians were excluded from the O.R. Colony.³ The Labour Ordinance duly passed the Transvaal Legislative Council, and in spite of opposition from Liberals and questionings from 'White Australia' and New Zealand, mindful of their share in winning the war, it was carried at Westminster with very few changes. The coolies began to arrive in June; by the end of the year 23,000 had come, 20,000 more were on the way and Government had long since started relief works for Europeans.⁴

The outcry against the Chinese soon died down. Gold output leapt upwards; native labour came in slowly at first and then more quickly, till the pre-war figure had been reached; the number of Europeans employed on the mines rose markedly. It must always remain a question whether this rise would have been less or greater had recourse not been had to the coolies; but, in any case, the 'overspill' from the mines made the completion of the road and railway programmes possible and, as the other Transvaal towns grew in sympathy with Johannesburg,

¹ Cd. 1894-6-7 of 1904.

² Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, II. 146.

³ Cd. 1895 of 1904, pp. 128, 229; Cd. 1899 of 1904, p. 6.

⁴ Cd. 1986 of 1904, pp. 3 ff.; Cd. 2104 of 1904, p. 2; Cd. 2183 of 1904, pp. 3, 26; Cd. 2401 of 1905, p. 47.

the adult male population, potential voters, grew also and thereby improved the prospects of a British federation.¹

Feb.
1904.

These prospects were still further brightened by a Progressive victory in the Colony. There, Sprigg had at last made a false step in his egg-dance, and Jameson, leader now of a well-organised party prepared to 'vote British,' was returned to power. Thanks largely to the disfranchisement of the rebels, Sprigg, Merriman and Sauer were all unseated, but Jameson had to be content with a majority of one in the Upper House and of five in the Lower. By dint of an all-night sitting and a free use of the Speaker's closure, he carried a bill creating twelve new constituencies mostly in urban, and therefore presumably Progressive, areas. He then relieved the disfranchised rebels of their disabilities.²

For the moment the tide was apparently running strongly against the Afrikaners; nevertheless, once the pressure of martial law had been removed, they had begun to rally their forces. After the peace a few die-hards had trekked away to Rhodesia or British East Africa; others, determined to avoid the very sight of the Union Jack, had gone into German or Portuguese territory, and a few wanderers still farther afield to the Argentine, whence the survivors presently returned. As a people they had kept to the terms of the treaty. Criticism of the authorities they were able to give in full measure; but that was all in the game, and from the first they had freedom of the press and public meeting. At first they were much divided. So little dealing would Die-hards have with Hands-uppers that more than one predikant in the ex-Republics excommunicated National Scouts till they should publicly confess the error of their ways. There was bitterness against Transvaalers in the hearts of Free Staters. Their little republic had been ground between the upper and the nether millstones of a war arising partly at least from the shortcomings of that Pretoria Government which, they most firmly held, had jettisoned them in the end. Rebels felt that they too had been abandoned. But these divisions were overborne by one outstanding fact. The war had undoubtedly brought federation nearer by placing British and Afrikaners everywhere under the same sovereign and promising them all ultimately the same constitutional status; but it had one result which, from the point of view of those

¹ Gold output was, in 1903, £12,000,000; in 1904, £16,000,000; in 1905, £20,800,000; in 1906, £24,600,000. The adult males on the Rand increased by 30 per cent. in twenty months and £4,000,000 worth of new buildings were sanctioned in Johannesburg alone. The average number of Europeans employed on the mines for the twelve months prior to June 1904 was 13,000. This rose to 15,000 in 1905 and to 18,000 in 1906.

² Colvin, *Jameson*, II.; Act 29 of 1906.

who looked for the speedy anglicisation of South Africa, was most disconcerting. It taught the Afrikaners that they were a people.

The *Afrikaner Volk* proceeded to find itself along cultural and then along political lines. The Old Colony led the way. There Hofmeyr, soon after his return from Europe, revived the Taalbond to combat English with the weapon of High Dutch.¹ Jan. 1903
A little later a much more effective armoury was discovered. Humble enthusiasts for the spoken Afrikaans, first here, then there, began the Second Language Campaign. In the Crown Colonies the struggle centred upon the schools.² Against the wishes of the chief educational adviser all local share in the choice of teachers and courses of instruction had been swept away by a Government which paid all expenses and was so set upon inculcating a knowledge of English that it only countenanced the use of Dutch as a medium of instruction up to a maximum of five hours per week, and that by special request. This attempt to out-Mansvelt Mansvelt led to a popular reaction. Opposition schools were opened in the Transvaal to preserve as much as possible of the pre-war system; Steyn and Mansvelt sent help from Holland, and soon the *Chrijstelike Nasionale Onderwijs* committee had its own examining board and local committees, elected by parents, in control of some 200 schools in the two ex-republics. The authorities appointed advisory committees for the state schools with very shadowy powers and, to end the competition of the C.N.O. schools, Milner offered to set up local committees with an elective majority to select teachers from the Government list, provided they found half the expenses. Clerical Feb. 1904.
influence and the financial tradition of the country were against this settlement, and so the scholastic war went on. If, in view of the excellent education provided in the Government schools and the unpopularity of some of the imported Hollander teachers, the C.N.O. movement did not achieve all that its promoters expected of it, it at least stimulated national sentiment among the rising generation.

The Afrikaners meanwhile organised politically. Hofmeyr renamed the Bond the South African Party in the hope of winning over moderate Englishmen who disliked the old name and its associations. In the North the Boer leaders held aloof from 1903.
any share in the administration. Botha, de la Rey and Smuts, pleading that the time was not yet ripe for any representative institutions, declined the proffered seats on the Transvaal Legislative Council and the Labour Commission.³ Botha, however,

¹ Hofmeyr, *Hofmeyr*, pp. 591 ff.

² Malherbe, *History of Education*, pp. 305 ff.

³ Cd. 2104 of 1904, p. 9.

1904.

brought the Die-hards and Hands-uppers together in conference and later, helped by the enthusiasm aroused by Kruger's funeral at Pretoria, formed the Het Volk party pledged to conciliation and self-government. A month later, Steyn, partially restored to health, returned home to work for self-government in the O.R. Colony.¹

Jan.-
Feb.
1905.

But it was the restive British of the Rand who compelled the first slackening of the bearing rein. Ex-Uitlanders, who in the good times had called the Government timid and unenterprising, now censured it for having been wildly optimistic; others attacked it on the score of Chinese labour. Milner and Lyttelton came independently to the conclusion that a change must be made.² Immediate self-government was to them out of the question. The acquiescence of the Boers in British citizenship was still doubtful; the British were not yet numerous enough to be left to themselves, and were, moreover, 'politically inexperienced and thoughtless to a degree'; both peoples would inevitably form parties along racial lines. But the Balfour ministry was tottering; the Liberals were saddled with many promises and, if they came in, might thrust the solution of the Chinese puzzle on a self-governing Transvaal. Milner and Lyttelton, therefore, proposed to postpone the day of full self-government by setting up a constitution which would give the Transvaal representation strong enough 'except where vital imperial interests are concerned, practically to direct the policy of the administration.' The change was, however, delayed till Milner was gone. He went, worn out with the work of reconstruction, whose distinguishing mark, as he justly boasted, was 'the colossal amount which has been done in the time.'³ The scope and quality of that work constitute his best claim to memory among South Africans.

April
1905.

The new High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, able, approachable, and a keen farmer, was a man who might expect to be continued in office even if the Liberals came in and whose views were yet nearly enough akin to those of his predecessor to ensure a certain continuity of policy. The Lyttelton letters patent promised, however, to circumscribe his authority considerably, for they provided for a unicameral legislature, one-fifth official and the rest elective on a very low European franchise, which should have full powers in all matters save the reserved list and the moneys payable to the Intercolonial Council.⁴ The news of

¹ Cd. 2479 of 1905, pp. 58 ff.; van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 204.

² Cd. 2400 of 1905, pp. 1 ff.; C. 2479 of 1905, *passim*; Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, II. 169.

³ *Times' History*, VI. 145, 168 ff.

⁴ Cd. 2400 of 1905, pp. 6 ff.

the impending change and the promise of a similar constitution for the O.R. Colony had already crystallised parties in the Transvaal. The mass of the urban British accepted the Lyttelton scheme and formed the Progressive party under Farrar ; but others, led by men of South African birth like E. P. Solomon and H. C. Hull, who were hostile to the ultra-British atmosphere of the Government offices and to Johannesburg domination, had already formed a Responsible Government party and now declared that the new constitution would not march ; the Labour groups drew together under Creswell ; the Boers rallied to Het Volk, which held that any change short of full self-government was undesirable.¹ As the elections drew near it was clear that the main struggle would be between Het Volk, which demanded the allocation of seats on a population basis to favour the married men and large families of the countryside, and the Progressives, who held out for the automatic re-distribution of seats on the basis of voters—that is, 'one vote, one value'—a system that would benefit the towns where, in those days, bachelors did much abound.²

The election never took place. The Milner-Chamberlain régime as modified by Lyttelton and Selborne was fighting against time. The hectic popularity of the Tory ministry won in the Khaki Election had long since faded. The National Debt rose ; Consols fell ; Chamberlain's Tariff Reform campaign rent the ministerialist ranks and drove the Liberals together for the first time since Gladstone's Home Rule Bill had scattered them ten years before. The electorate for its part, sickened by the reports of war commissions and threatened with high prices by a Government innocent of any scheme of social reform, listened once more to the renewed cry of 'Chinese slavery.' The gravamen of the Liberal charge against the system had always been that it was 'very like slavery'³ for, though the coolies were not closely compounded as at Kimberley but merely confined to the mining properties which were often to be measured by the square mile, yet their position was peculiar in that they were specifically limited to unskilled labour. In other words, they were human machinery to be used and returned to store when no longer needed by capitalists whose influence, in popular estimation, had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished, all the more as they had defaulted in their war contribution.⁴ Troubles too were arising in connection with

¹ Cd. 2479 of 1905, *passim*.

² Milner had suggested Proportional Representation with three-member constituencies, but got no support (*'Times' History*, VI. 160).

³ Spender, *Campbell-Bannerman*, II. 145. On Chinese Labour from 1905 onwards, *vide* Cd. 2401, 2786 of 1905 ; 2788, 2819, 3025 and No. 156 of 1906 ; Cd. 3338 of 1907, and Campbell, *Chinese Coolie Emigration*.

⁴ Cd. 1895 of 1904, p. 230.

this strange form of labour. The coolies had behaved well at first ; they had spent their wages freely and set up a good local demand for produce ; but later batches were often of a lower type ; many of them complained of knavish Chinese compound police, bullying white bosses, illegal deduction of wages and even flogging, and pointed to the failure of their employers to give the promised increase of pay. The coolies on the New Randfontein mine struck ; others driven desperate by sodomy and gambling debts sought to find their way back to China, robbing and, on occasion, murdering as they went. Selborne was obliged to let the Boers of the neighbourhood have arms, to station mounted police on the East Rand and to warn the mine-owners that, if there were any more murders, the Chinese would have to go.

April
1905.

Dec.
1905.

Hardly had Selborne instituted his reforms than the Balfour ministry fell. The new Premier, Campbell-Bannerman, at once forbade further recruiting and emerged from a general election with a bigger majority than any since the days of the great Reform Bill. In that election, the cry of Chinese slavery played more than its due share in routing the Tories ; on the other hand, 14,700 recently issued licences to import coolies could not be cancelled without breach of contract.¹ Bannerman, who had always advocated the grant of responsible government to the ex-Republics, therefore gave leave to any Chinese who so desired to return home, an offer of which very few ' slaves ' availed themselves, and then, to the horror of his hot-gospellers, left the fate of the 47,000 coolies actually on the Rand to be decided by the self-governing Transvaal.²

This arrangement was almost certainly due in part to the presence in London of Smuts, strong in the knowledge that Het Volk and the Responsible Government party had come to an understanding on the score of the Chinese and common action at the expected elections. In any case, the West Ridgeway Commission was sent to inquire into the Chinese problem and the form of government best suited to the Transvaal. The commissioners found mass meetings of miners convinced by Creswell that the ratio between white and yellow men had not been maintained, Selborne raising fresh police and issuing more arms to frightened farmers, a select committee pointing to barbed wire as the only effective check on runaways, and Botha proclaiming the country in danger. Their chief duties, however, lay in the constitutional sphere. They proposed an allocation of seats which they hoped would secure the even balance of parties in the first Parliament. That was apparently all that Het Volk hoped for, but the Progressives only accepted the

¹ Spender, *op. cit.*, II. 228.

² Cd. 2788 of 1906, pp. 2, 9.

compromise after the High Commissioner had narrowly escaped recall for his championship of the Lyttelton constitution. At the elections the British vote was split by Labour and Independent candidates; the bulk of the Nationalists, *videlicet* Responsible Government men, followed Solomon into the Het Volk camp; Het Volk gained a majority over all other parties, and Botha took office with Smuts as his Colonial Secretary.¹

July
1906.

Feb.
1907.

Opponents of the new policy feared that Het Volk would prove tyrannical to the British and disastrous to Transvaal prosperity. Many of Botha's followers, on the other hand, suspected that self-government would be a mere sham, for bills touching Indians and indentured labour were to be reserved, there was to be no further importation of coolies, the Labour Ordinance was to be repealed within the year, civil servants were specially safeguarded and the Land Boards were to be maintained for five years as a protection to Milner's British settlers. These mutual fears proved to be groundless. Drastic anti-Asiatic bills received the Royal Assent; Botha in the main followed the recommendations of a Crown Colony commission in reducing official staffs; the language clauses of Smuts's Education Act were moderate; the Premier, anxious to obtain the wherewithal to implement his election promises of a Land Bank and agricultural railways, was in no hurry to bid farewell to the Celestials. It was only after his return from the Colonial Conference that he announced that no more would be heard of the magnates' war loan, that H.M. Government had guaranteed a loan of £5,000,000 which would make the administration independent of the mining-houses, and that the coolies would go home as their contracts expired.² So it was done and all the more easily in that the supply of native labour had for some time past been greater than the demand. Reduced working costs, improved methods and an adequate labour supply promised a long life to the low-grade mines of the Rand, from which the last Chinaman departed in March 1910.³

April
1907.

The wealthiest of all the South African colonies had thus passed under the control of the Afrikaners within five years

¹ On grant of Responsible Government to the Transvaal, *vide* Cd. 3250 of 1906. The constitution provided for a nominated Legislative Council of 15 to become elective after four years if desired; an Assembly of 69 (Rand 34, Pretoria 6, Districts 29), elected by Europeans in roughly equal constituencies. Dutch could be used freely in the Houses but English was to be the official language. At the elections Het Volk won 37 seats, Progressives 21, Nationalists 6, Independents and Labour 5.

² Cd. 3528 of 1907, p. 159; Cd. 3621 of 1907.

³ Jan. 1907. Europeans 17,000; Chinese 54,000; Natives 94,000.
Dec. 1908. " 18,600 " 12,000 " 150,000.

The output of gold in 1908 was nearly £30,000,000.

of the war of conquest. It was only a matter of time before the O.R. Colony fell into the hands of Steyn, Hertzog and their Orangia Unie party.¹ In the Cape, the power of the Progressives was waning. The very formation of his ministry had tried Jameson's tact to the uttermost and, once the excitement of the elections was over, his party began to split.² The rival ports, the inland towns, the Border farmers, East and West, all cherished incompatible ambitions; Merriman and Sauer had soon found their way back to the Assembly to plague the Premier and, when Jameson favoured protection to placate the farmers, he alienated the townsmen. The ministry had taken office just as the post-war slump hit the Colony with full force; the effects of the drought were presently accentuated by cattle sickness, and year by year revenue fell from the lordly £12,000,000 of 1903 to the miserable £7,000,000 of 1907. Jameson, retrenching, never drew his allowance as Prime Minister,³ but his followers would hardly submit to an income tax or to the advances on brandy in stock which alone reconciled the S.A. Party to the excise; the farmers complained that the growing Graaff meat trust was spoiling the market for their cattle; the jealousies of the ports wrecked all Jameson's hopes of ratifying the offer of a railway conference which had, under pressure from Milner, set aside one-third of the Rand traffic for the Cape ports. Railways, indeed, bade fair to be a source of division rather than a bond of union unless political federation could be achieved. A second anxious conference pointed the moral; Natal was with difficulty dissuaded from leaving the customs union⁴ and, now, the self-governing Transvaal, intent on reducing the cost of living, was certain to denounce the customs convention. If it did so, Natal must follow suit; economic war would ensue between the north-east and the south-west clamorous for revenue, a war in which the latter would be fatally handicapped in that the railways of the O.R. Colony, the economic ally of the Cape, were controlled by the Transvaal.

Selborne was as anxious as ever Milner had been to achieve federation before the colonies were free to fall upon each other, but he was prepared to try different means to achieve his end. He and some prominent members of the Kindergarten had long realised that responsible government must come and ought to come, if only because the jealousies of British officials and politicians in each colony for their neighbours in other colonies proved that the Crown Colony régime was unsuited to South African

¹ On R.G. in the O.R.C., *vide* Cd. 3526 of 1907. The Orangia Unie party was formed in May 1906 (van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 207).

² Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 237 ff.

³ Jameson held no portfolio.

⁴ Cd. 2977 of 1906.

May
1905.

1906.

conditions. It was no use waiting, as Milner had proposed to wait, till the British section was strong enough to write the federal constitution ; the rivalries of the colonies were so keen that the Afrikanders could always find means to produce a deadlock. By the end of 1906 it was obvious that the British would never be in a position to dictate the constitution ; rather, there was every prospect that the Afrikanders would soon be in a position to discharge that function. The parts were being reversed and it would fall to the British, fearful of ' Dutch ' domination and possible secession from the Empire, to block the way to closer union.

There were, however, hopeful signs. The Cape Progressives were rapidly passing out of the ' vote British ' stage ; the Boers in the ex-republics were gaining confidence in the Liberal interpretation of imperialism ; Botha was big enough to see that he must carry the main body of the British with him. Curtis and Duncan, Brand and Kerr and other members of the Kindergarten in the Transvaal, fired by Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton*, were already debating the question of closer union ;¹ Botha and Smuts discussed the formation of a federal court of appeal with the Cape Chief Justice, de Villiers ; the Colonial Conference approved of the creation of such a court either with or without political federation. But all this was not enough. The question of closer union must be raised openly. No Afrikaner could do that without alarming the British ; but the British could now do it without arousing suspicion of imperial domination in Afrikaner hearts. By making the first move, the British would ' capitalise ' their position as political underdog. April
1907.

The High Commissioner and Curtis's committee therefore drafted the famous Selborne Memorandum covering correspondence which had recently passed between Jameson and the Governor of the Cape in the matter of railways ;² F. S. Malan, the leader of the Cape Bondsmen, agreed to support the movement towards federation which the terms of the Memorandum implied ; and Jameson, whose inveterate hero-worship was fast transferring itself from the dead Rhodes to the living Botha, promised, Premier as he was, to serve under Malan on any national convention that might meet as a result of his efforts. Merriman and Sauer, suspicious of ' the petty interference ' of the High Commissioner, were against the scheme ; but Malan had his way. He moved and Jameson seconded a resolution in favour of taking steps towards closer union ; Hofmeyr blessed the undertaking ; June
1907.

¹ R. H. Brand and P. Kerr, members of the Railway Board ; P. Duncan, ex-Colonial Secretary ; L. Curtis, ex-Assistant Col. Sec.

² Cd. 3564 of 1907 ; republished and edited by Basil Williams (1926).

the Memorandum was published and South Africa fairly entered upon the final stage on the long, long road to federation.

The main thesis of the Selborne Review was that, since the railway interests of the various colonies were 'not only distinct but absolutely incompatible,' the alternative solutions were 'arbitration or the sword.' This potent argument in favour of closer union was reinforced by hard times, the growth of good feeling and the imminent breakdown of the Customs Union. It was driven home by grave difficulties with Indians in the Transvaal and Natal, native unrest in Natal, stagnation in Southern Rhodesia and the approach of self-government in the O.R. Colony.

The South African Indian problem was only part of that which affected many lands washed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its local roots lay in the coast-belt of Natal. Indians had been imported steadily since 1860. As coolies, they had made the sugar industry possible and, as free men, at first with the encouragement of the authorities and then in spite of them, they had played an important part in the economic development of Natal. Ex-coolies gave the coast towns an unrivalled supply of fish, fruit and vegetables; they owned or leased on short terms land in the coast-belt which no one else would touch and made it fit for sugar-planting; they worked as domestic servants, farm labourers and petty artisans far outside the tropical areas. And they increased in numbers.

As in the Cape, free Natal Indians were entitled to the parliamentary and municipal franchises. By 1891 they were fast gaining in numbers on the Europeans, two-thirds of them were free men and some of them had votes. To induce coolies to go home at the end of their indentures, the old law offering them Crown land at the end of ten years was repealed, and, on achieving self-government, Natal tried to arrange ways and means with the Indian Government for removing her now redundant Asiatics. Failing in this, she stiffened her laws against them. An education test was applied to immigrants; the parliamentary franchise was denied to all who came from states which, like India, lacked representative institutions; trading licences were withheld from those who failed to keep their books in English; coolies who neither reindentured nor went home at the end of their term were taxed £3 annually, and presently this tax was extended to their children. Such was 'the bitter example' which had moved the Indian Government to refuse the Transvaal's request for coolies.¹

1893-
1903.

1904.

¹ U.G. 12-14, p. 39; Andrews, *Documents re Asiatic Bill*, pp. 25 ff.

The Cape Colony contained few Indians, for it lay out of their track, and the Free State had long ago barred its entries to Asiatics; but Indians had speedily found their way into the Transvaal, the hinterland of Natal. The mass of the Natal coolies were low-caste Madrassis, but Surat traders of higher standing had followed them, and it was principally these men who pushed over the Drakensberg. The Republican Government had taken steps to repel the invasion by forbidding Asiatics to own fixed property and rendering them liable to registration and residence in special locations. But, like so many other laws in the old Transvaal, these rules had been more honoured in the breach than the observance; the Pretoria authorities feared to go too far lest they break the London Convention and, as it was, the grievances of British Indians had taken their modest place in the Uitlanders *centum gravamina*. During the war, British ministers and others had given colour to the belief that all restrictions would be removed; but, even before the end of the struggle, Milner had had to suggest that all Asiatics should be registered and all, save those of the better class, confined to trading and residential locations.¹ 1885.

Chamberlain refused, and for a long time no definite step was taken. Throughout the Crown Colony period the officials were haunted by the fear of embarrassing the British Raj in India where Bengal was already crying out against Lord Curzon; but, to balance that fear, was the belief that unauthorised Indians were being smuggled into the Transvaal and that the law was being evaded by impersonation. An outbreak of plague in the filthy Indian quarter at Johannesburg redoubled the popular outcry in the towns against Indians, but H.M. Government could only suggest that low-class Indians should be confined to locations on purely sanitary grounds and that an education test on Cape and Natal lines be applied at the frontier.² The expiring Legislative Council took the hint and prescribed finger-print registration for all unindentured Asiatics; but, at the Colonial Office's request, the ordinance was held back pending the grant of responsible government.³ One of the first steps of the new Transvaal Parliament was to re-enact this ordinance, the next to pass an immigration law which included an education test and thumb-print registration.⁴ And already Gandhi, a well-to-do Indian barrister of Johannesburg, had organised passive 1906.

¹ On Indian grievances, *vide* C. 7911 of 1896; Cd. 1683-4 of 1903.

² Cd. 2239 of 1904, pp. 3, 37.

³ Cd. 3308 of 1907, p. 58. Apparently the Ordinance (29 of 1906) was partially enforced at the very end of the Crown Colony regime (Cd. 3251 of 1906).

⁴ Acts 2 and 15 of 1907.

resistance thereto among the Transvaal Indians,¹ and now anxious questions flashed across the wires from Simla and even Peking. Plainly, South Africa must face Asia with a united front if it was to deal with a problem which had its roots in Natal and bore fruit in the Transvaal.

It was the Bantu rather than the Indian menace which agitated Natal at the moment.² The Europeans of that colony were outnumbered by their Indians, free and indentured, but they were overwhelmed by the natives by nine to one. The war had naturally unsettled the tribes; the withdrawal of most of the troops suggested to them that the King was angry with his white children; emissaries of the Ethiopian movement were present to point to the lesson of the stand which the Hereros and Hottentots were making against the Germans in South-West Africa. Meanwhile, for years past, conservative officials had done little more than carry on the traditional Shepstone policy of strengthening the tribal system. Even so, their suggestions had been ignored by legislators who accompanied the steady acquisition of Crown lands in Natal proper and the European penetration of Zululand by stiffening the labour laws, punishing stock theft, increasing the squatter's tax and, finally, levying a poll-tax whose main weight fell on a people driven desperate by high rents and usurers.³

The poll-tax was the last straw, and a small rising took place in Natal proper. Martial law was proclaimed and imperial troops were rushed down from the Transvaal at the request of the Natal authorities; but the local forces were strong enough to restore order. A dozen leaders were condemned to death by court-martial and, when Downing Street sought to stay the public executions, the Natal ministry resigned, the Australian government asked the meaning of this interference in the affairs of a self-governing colony, the ministry resumed office, the executions were carried out and a serious rebellion flared up in Zululand.⁴ This time help had to be called in from the Cape Colony and the Transvaal before the rebellion was stamped out in blood. The surviving ringleaders were despatched to St. Helena and a commission was appointed to overhaul the Natal native administration. Before long, however, martial law was proclaimed once

¹ Gandhi was moved by Tolstoy's interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount to throw up his lucrative practice and devote himself to the service of his people, living as best he could.

² On Natal's native troubles, *vide* Cd. 2905, 2927, 3027, 3247 of 1906; 3563 of 1907; 3888, 3889, 3998, 4001, 4194, 4195, 4328, 4403, 4404, 4585 of 1908.

³ Acts 40 of 1894, 159 of 1899, 28 of 1902, 48 of 1903, 38 of 1905. *Vide* also Eybers, pp. 252 ff.; Brookes, *Native Policy*, pp. 74 ff.; *Report of Natal Native Affairs Commission*, 1907, pp. 2, 7, 9; Evans, *Black and White*, pp. 184 ff.

⁴ Cd. 2905 of 1906, pp. 3, 25, 32.

1904-8.

1894-
1905.Feb.
1906.

1906.

more; Dinizulu, chief of the Usutu, was arrested for alleged com- 1907.
plicity in the late rebellion, and Miss Colenso and H.M. Govern-
ment, mindful of the fate of Langelibalele, began to press for a
fair trial for the son of Cetewayo.¹

Natal, still a small and struggling colony, was apparently unfitted to rule swarms of tribesmen without danger to them, to herself and to her neighbours. There was a possibility that, in default of federation, a still weaker and more heavily burdened European community might be called on to undertake a similar task. In Southern Rhodesia the memory of the pioneering past faded as conditions became more settled and magistrates more numerous; while the indunas, as salaried officials of the Company under the control of the Native Commissioners, kept order in the kraals, collected taxes and furnished labour for the public works in the usual Bantu fashion. The Order in Council of 1898 still held the Company responsible for administrative deficits, but it had also given the Rhodesians an elected minority in the Legislative Council. From the first, political life had centred round the closely allied questions of responsibility for the accumulated administrative deficits and the ownership of the unalienated lands. Neither the Charter nor the Lippert Concession had given the Company ownership of land; but lapse of time, 'damned iteration' and the failure of H.M. Government to define rights had bred the idea that the unalienated lands were, like the minerals, a commercial asset of the shareholders under concession from Lobengula deceased. Similarly, the Charter made no mention of a refund of the expenses of government other than the cost of public works; for, in 1889, all concerned had believed that the mineral profits would meet expenses for the short time that the Company would have to rule. These expectations had been disappointed and, since 1898, the directors had followed Rhodes in claiming that a fair proportion of past and all future deficits must ultimately fall upon self-governing Rhodesia as a public debt.

The elected members had repudiated this debt, asked who 1899-
really owned the lands and tried to tax the Company on the 1900.
revenues drawn by it from both land and minerals. The war drove these quarrels underground and subjected Rhodesia to a severe strain, which it nevertheless bore so well that Rhodes was able to boast that 'this great dominant North with the Transvaal

¹ Cd. 4195 of 1908; Cd. 4585 of 1909. At H.M. Government's suggestion W. P. Schreiner, leader of the Cape bar, defended Dinizulu. The Natal officials were slow to move and the imprisoned chief awaited trial for nine months. A special court sentenced him in March 1909 to four years' imprisonment from the date of his surrender. After Union, Botha, mindful of New Republican days, released him (Spender, *Botha*, p. 224).

June
1901.

will dictate the situation,' and to prophesy that Company rule would soon end with the coming of federation¹ The close of the war, however, found the Company robbed by death of the inspiration of Rhodes's personality, heavily in debt to the Imperial Government for war expenses, and short of revenue. The mines, which the Company had been obliged to help during the war, were shorter still of labour.² The war debt was presently cancelled, but Colonial Fingos proved to be more disappointing as mine-workers than the Matabele and Mashona, attempts to import extraneous labour of various kinds either failed or were disallowed, and the bulk of the labour force had to be drawn from Northern Rhodesia, Nyassaland and East Africa. As for revenue, H.M. Government refused to allow the hut-tax to be raised from 10s. to the Transvaal level of £2. Recourse was, therefore, had to a poll-tax of £1 on each adult male and 10s. on each polygamous wife.³

1904.

1894.

Sept.

1900.

Beyond the Zambesi the Company had long ago taken over the administration of North-Eastern Rhodesia from the Imperial authorities, and had since laid the foundations of its power in North-Western Rhodesia outside the Barotse reserve by treaty with Lewanika, King of the Barotse. But the centre of its power still lay in the south. There changed circumstances led to a change in policy. Hitherto the Company had neither mined, farmed nor traded on its own account. Its aim had been to encourage subsidiary gold-mining companies, develop the land and link up the mining centres by rail and telegraph with the ports by affording them liberal grants of land, guaranteed debentures and Imperial subsidies. In return it took the bulk of the shares in the railway companies and up to 50 per cent. of the vendor's scrip in the companies which alone were permitted to mine gold. Now, in face of the post-war slump, East Coast fever, stationary population, and the fading of their hopes of El Dorado, the Board tentatively substituted a royalty on gold for the 50 per cent. levy, reduced the 50 per cent. to 30 per cent. on base metals which, since the discovery of coal at Wankies, were being taken seriously,⁴ and left its officials with a bare majority in the legislature. But this was not enough. The elected members not only rejected proposals based on a report by Sir George Goldie that they should assume two-thirds of the £7,500,000 deficits as a public debt in exchange for one-third of the lands and minerals, but repudiated all liability, claimed the lands for the Rhodesians, demanded lower railway rates and a royalty on all minerals, and

1899.

1903.

¹ *Bulawayo Chronicle*, June 15, 1901.

² *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1898-1900, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 243; *Ibid.*, 1900-2, pp. 18, 72, 238; *B.S.A. Annual Meeting*, Oct. 1904, p. 10.

⁴ Mines . . . Ordinance, No. 19 of 1903.

talked of popular representation on the executive as a first step to the elimination of the Company as a ruling power.¹ 1904.

So the quarrel dragged on, exacerbated by the attempts of the Board to raise a public loan. Then Selborne visited Rhodesia. He found the farmers up in arms against the prospecting rights of the favoured mining companies, individuals clamouring for the right to mine, general resentment against the Company as a dangerous competitor, and a demand for a clear distinction between its administrative and commercial spheres.² So little distinction had hitherto been drawn that practically all expenditure was still put down to administrative account. Even so, administrative revenue was on the point of meeting expenditure and, thus encouraged, Rhodesians were asking for responsible government, failing that for Crown Colony rule and, in any case, for a Royal Commission of Inquiry. Elgin refused the last demand, and the benevolent despots of London Wall, conscious of a morose body of shareholders which still footed the bill and still waited for a dividend, determined to regain that personal touch with the Rhodesians wherein had lain so much of Rhodes's strength. Hence in Jameson's words, 'an avalanche of directors' descended upon the country and brought with it a declaration of policy promising a royalty system, freedom for individual miners, a clear division between commercial and administrative finances and an elective majority in the legislature.³ 1906. Oct. 1907.

The new Chartered policy failed to satisfy Rhodesians, for the directors still claimed the lands under an 'accumulated title' and gave no satisfactory reply in the matter of the deficits;⁴ but it gave a fresh direction to Rhodesian politics by reviving Rhodes's plan of inclusion in a federal South Africa. One of the visiting directors had frankly said that the Company would like 'a good get-out'; Jameson confessed that he had hinted to FitzPatrick that the Transvaal should make an offer, and one elected member proposed to clear away difficulties with the ex-republics in advance by curtailing the natives' rights to the franchise. Dec. 1907.

South of the Limpopo the political leaders were feeling their way towards some kind of federation. Botha and Smuts might find Steyn somewhat difficult on the score of education policy, but Steyn had come back from Europe determined to work for union before an Anglo-German war swept down upon a divided

¹ *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1903, p. 17; *B.S.A. Annual Meeting*, Oct. 1904, pp. 7, 12; *Bulawayo Chronicle*, Oct. 8, 1904.

² *Bulawayo Chronicle*, Oct. 23, 1906, *et passim*, Sept.—Oct. 1906.

³ *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1907, pp. 20, 27 ff.; *Proceedings of the Cave Commission*, 1919—20, 5th day.

⁴ *Report of a Conference*, Oct. 1907.

June
1907.

South Africa;¹ in the Colony, Jameson pursued his conciliatory policy by renaming the Progressives Unionists to win over the English Moderates and co-operating with Botha in his struggle for a better mail contract with the Union-Castle Company. But time was running short. The Transvaal had denounced the customs convention, letters patent had just been issued to the O.R. Colony² and, now, the very decision to press the federation policy forward sealed Jameson's fate.

Dec.
1907.

Jameson's Free Trade and Protectionist wings were at each other's throats, his budget was dismal and he was forced to levy a 10 per cent. tax on mineral profits, in other words, on De Beers, which was already staggering under the competition of the new Premier Mine near Pretoria, in which the Transvaal Government was deeply interested, the beginning of steady production in South-West Africa and the falling-off in the demand for diamonds due to a financial crisis in the U.S.A. The S.A. Party had had no desire to take office until the times should alter, but it was determined that, if federation was to come, it should not come through a Unionist Ministry which contained two Chartered directors. The party leaders decided to turn Jameson out and, at last, they beat him in the Legislative Council. 'The Doctor' appealed to the country and fought a good losing battle on the federation platform, but Schreiner, who believed that group politics were the only way of avoiding racial divisions, refused to join him in a Moderate-Unionist coalition to 'smash the Bond'; the S.A. Party was strengthened by the reinstated rebels and still further encouraged when, in the middle of the campaign, Abram Fischer took office in the O.R. Colony with Hertzog as his Attorney-General and Director of Education. The S.A. Party carried the Legislative Council elections, and Jameson made way for Merriman as head of a Bond-Moderate Ministry which was presently confirmed in power by the result of the Assembly elections.³

Feb.
1908.

The self-governing constitution for the Transvaal had been passed by the Imperial Parliament avowedly as a step towards federation from within South Africa.⁴ The passing of three of the five colonies,⁵ and those the largest, more or less completely under Afrikaner control cleared the way for that consummation. Hardly had Merriman taken office before Smuts wrote that now was the time to push for it. Merriman jumped at the opening

¹ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 220, 341.

² A Legislative Council of 11 nominees to become elective after four years if desired, and an Assembly of 38 elected on much the same franchise as in the Transvaal (11 town and 27 country members) (Cd. 3526 of 1907).

³ S.A. Party 69; Unionists 34; Independents 4.

⁴ A. B. Keith, *Selected Speeches*, II. 3 ff.

⁵ Southern Rhodesia was not technically a colony till its formal annexation by the Crown in 1923.

and even proposed that federation, 'the nearer to unification the better,' be carried by a *coup de main* on the part of the colonial parliaments without reference to that at Westminster. The cool advice of Chief Justice de Villiers to whom the correspondence was shown dissuaded Merriman from his *per saltum* tactics; but all concerned were agreed on the need for haste, for the Liberals showed signs of splitting and, if they fell, they might be succeeded by a ministry which would look less kindly than they on unification under Afrikaner auspices.¹ Preliminaries were informally arranged and, at the intercolonial railway and customs conference at Pretoria, Smuts moved six resolutions prescribing the procedure for attaining immediate union.² Perhaps, had the Cape and Transvaal leaders wished, a solution of the railway and customs questions might have been found; but the opportunity of fusing the economic and the political sides of federation was too good to be missed, and nothing was done beyond carrying the six resolutions and prolonging the existing railway and customs arrangements for a further year.

There were still lions in the path and no man could yet say whether or no they were chained. In spite of the agricultural revival which had begun in 1907, the old Colony was very depressed and Merriman's financial policy at first depressed it further. Faced with a deficit of £1,000,000, he levied an income tax suitably furnished with an eye of a needle through which the agricultural camel might pass with most of its load; he retrenched; he docked the salaries of civil servants; to Hofmeyr's dismay he charged voters a fee on registration; he wrought grievous damage to the schools by throwing the whole of the deficits on the local school boards. Suffering thus, the Cape was naturally jealous of the Transvaal which, waxing fat on the proceeds of the mines, could afford to be indifferent to its less fortunate neighbours. Englishmen everywhere were crying out against the retrenchment campaign in the O.R. Colony and Hertzog's attempt to enforce a rigid bilingualism in the schools; the Free Staters, on the contrary, were angry that the Transvaalers should have received self-government before themselves and should then, in a time of acute depression, have presented the giant Cullinan diamond to the King; moreover, they complained that the more flexible Smuts Act made the fulfilment of their own education policy difficult.³ Both Free Staters and Natalians, particularist by tradition, feared, each from their own point of view, anything that would expose them to being swamped by the Cape or the Transvaal. Indeed, in all parts of South Africa

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 425 ff.

² Newton, *Unification*, II. 217 ff.

³ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 244.

the mass of men had never looked for more than the loose kind of federation with which civilised states had experimented from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. The idea of a close union was as yet confined to a few leaders.¹ Nevertheless, *The Government of South Africa* and *The Framework of Union*, two studies of existing South African constitutions and of federal systems, were being widely read and discussed in Closer Union Societies everywhere, and, led by the Cape, the four Parliaments resolved to send delegates, representative of all parties and proportioned in numbers to the size and importance of each colony, to a National Convention.

June-
July
1908.

A little later Southern Rhodesia was invited to send delegates, but without the power of voting. There was no intention of incorporating that territory as an original member of the coming union but, with the administrative revenue at last meeting expenditure and the Company so hard pushed for money that it was issuing second debenture stock and calling on H.M. Government for aid, incorporation at an early date was a contingency not to be lost sight of.²

Basutoland and the native protectorates of Swaziland and Bechuanaland, though members of the customs union, were not represented. Basutoland had been under Imperial rule since 1884 and Bechuanaland since 1885, but the history of Swaziland had been more chequered. Its career as a protectorate of the S.A. Republic since 1895 had been troubled by tribal quarrels, intrigues of resident and non-resident concessionaires, interference by the High Commissioner and the constant efforts of the Pretoria authorities to incorporate it fully in the Republic.³ In 1903 it had fallen under the rule of the Governor of the Transvaal, who had appointed a commission to cut a way through the jungle of concessions.⁴ Some the commission abolished, others it reduced so as to give the tribesmen about one-third of the land, but the work was still unfinished when the territory reverted to the High Commissioner on the establishment of responsible government in the Transvaal. Many South Africans looked forward to the immediate incorporation of these territories in any federation, but the native inhabitants of all three shared a preference for rule by the King's officers to that of their European neighbours who, they suspected, knew little about them save that their arms were strong and some at least of their lands good.⁵

1907.

The National Convention met at Durban with the knowledge

¹ Cp. Milner's 'Why stop at Federation?' (*Times' History*, VI. 216).

² *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1908, pp. 22-3.

³ C. 9206 of 1899.

⁴ *Newton, Unification*, I. 232 ff.

⁵ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 456, 463.

present to each delegate that a colony which failed to join at once must not expect to obtain ground-floor privileges later.¹ Oct. 12, 1908. The tide flowed strongly in the direction of unification as opposed to federation. The President, de Villiers, had learnt much of the weaknesses of even a close federation in the course of a recent visit to Canada, and the influence of the Vice-President, Steyn, was enough to check federalist tendencies among the O.R. Colony men. On the other hand, neither of the outstanding champions of federalism attended the Convention: Schreiner because he had resigned to defend Dinizulu, Hofmeyr because he thought that unification had no chance of being carried and preferred to fight for the federal cause in the open. The five Natal delegates were thus left to fight alone for federalism behind the closed doors of the Convention chamber.

At the outset the principle of unification under the Crown was carried. In the application of that principle the Transvaalers had all the advantages of wealth and preparedness over their rivals. Het Volk and the Progressives had agreed with one another while they were yet in the way; they alone came to the Durban sessions supported by experts and armed with a constitution drafted by Smuts and the Curtis group. As a rule, therefore, it fell to them to make proposals and to the others to make amendments.

Many points were settled without difficulty, but some, like native policy and education with all its linguistic complications, were discreetly shelved; some, like the relations of the provincial governments to the central authority, were only partially settled; others almost wrecked the Convention before a compromise was reached.

The twin problem of the franchise and the allocation of seats in the lower house among the provinces awakened the politician in every delegate. The High Commissioner and a few members of the Convention advocated a civilisation test for all aspirants to the vote, a principle which would have enfranchised some at least of the natives and coloured folk in the ex-Republics and, conversely, disfranchised the poor whites. This breach with the traditions of the northern provinces and, to a less extent, of Natal was too much for the vast majority of the delegates and it was only with great hesitation that they agreed that the Cape should retain its non-European franchise on condition that it could be altered by a two-thirds majority of both houses sitting together.

¹ The Convention sat at Durban, Oct. 12–Nov. 5; at Capetown, Nov. 23–Dec. 18, 1908, and Jan. 11–Feb. 3, 1909; at Bloemfontein, May 3–11, 1909. On the work of the Convention, *vide* Cd. 4525, 4721 of 1909; Sir E. Walton, *Inner History of the National Convention*; *Minutes of the National Convention*; Walker, *De Villiers*, chapters xxv., xxvi.

In the Cape and Natal, non-Europeans were allowed to stand for election to the provincial councils but they lost their right of standing for election to Parliament.

The main struggle on the allocation of seats in the Assembly lay between the Cape and the Transvaal. The Cape, whose white population was nearly as great as that of the three other provinces put together, pressed for seats in proportion to the European population of each province; the Transvaal, where all white men had votes and non-Europeans had none, demanded that the number of European voters be taken as the basis. In the end each province took the basis that suited it best. The Cape received fifty-one seats but lost the seven due to its coloured and native voters; the Transvaal received thirty-six, and the two smaller provinces were given seventeen apiece for at least ten years or until the total number of seats in the Assembly should reach one hundred and fifty.

The scales thus tilted against the Cape were still further weighted by the arrangements for future redistribution. The Convention adopted a scheme of automatic redistribution to avoid a repetition of the fierce struggles for representation which had embittered recent Cape and Transvaal politics. The total number of European male adults in the four colonies in 1904, divided by 121, the number of seats in the first Union Assembly, gave the Union quota. If it was found after the quinquennial census that the number of white men in a given province had increased by the amount of the quota, that province was to be given an additional member; if it had decreased, it was to lose a member, and so in proportion. The Cape was bound to suffer heavily under this scheme for, in 1904, its European male population had been artificially swollen by Transvaal refugees and 'birds of passage' attracted by the post-war boom. Most of these men were now gone overseas or to the Transvaal, whither the majority of still newer immigrants were going. Hence, the Transvaal stood to gain more rapidly than it should have done at the first few redistributions.

The question of the native franchise led naturally to a consideration of the future of the Protectorates. H.M. Government, realising that these would probably have to be handed over to the Union sooner or later, insisted that terms should be laid down definitely against that day and even conveyed a gentle hint at one stage that, unless such terms were laid down, there could be no Union as far as it was concerned.¹ Selborne had to give up much of his scheme of administration by a practically independent commission but, finally, both parties agreed to

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 449, 455 ff.

append a schedule to the South Africa Act which more or less embodied the existing protectorate system. In especial the Protectorates, on incorporation, were assured that they would not be exposed to differential duties, or to tampering with tribal lands, this last no idle proviso since Natal and O.R. Colony delegates were already asking for power to take native lands in exchange for others in Bechuanaland, and some Cape members wanted to annex the fertile southern strip of that area even before the transfer of the territory as a whole to the Union.¹

Railways and the site of the capital remained. At the very last, after threatening the Convention more than once with disaster, the capital was divided. Parliament was to sit at Capetown, the appeal court at Bloemfontein, at any rate in theory, and the executive was to be lodged at Pretoria in the massive Union Buildings on which the Transvaal was spending its surplus lest it be put to baser uses. Natal, on the other hand, received 30 per cent. of the Rand traffic under the railway convention for which she had been pressing since 1903, as against from 50-55 per cent. to Delagoa Bay and the remnant to the Cape ports.²

The Draft Act was naturally assailed on various grounds in Feb. each of the colonies as soon as it was published; but Hofmeyr 1909. failed to swing the Bond against it in the Cape, and three of the Parliaments accepted the Draft, though those of the Cape and the O.R. Colony proposed serious amendments. The Transvaal legislature proposed none, but by signing a commercial con- April vention with Mozambique,³ its executive aroused a storm in Natal, 1909.

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, p. 475.

² Note on the S.A. Act. The Union of South Africa was to be a legislative union under the Crown. *Executive*.—Governor-General and 10 Ministers. *Parliament*.—(a) Senate of 40 members, 8 from each province elected by the provincial councillors and members of the Assembly, and 8 nominated, of whom 4 were to be chosen for their knowledge of native affairs. Senate to last for ten years with no power to touch financial measures. . . . (b) House of Assembly of 121 in the first instance (Cape 51, Transvaal 36, O.F.S. and Natal 17 each for at least ten years or until the total of the House reached 150). Parliament was to have power to do anything by a bare majority save that Sect. 137 making Dutch and English the official languages and Sect. 35 safeguarding the Cape coloured franchise could only be altered by a two-thirds majority of both Houses sitting together. *Courts*.—One Supreme Court for the Union organised in an Appellate, Provincial and Local divisions. *Provinces*.—Administrator appointed for five years, irremovable. Executive Committee of 4 elected by the Provincial Council by proportional voting, also irremovable. Provincial Council, equal in size to the provincial representation in the Assembly (25 each in Natal and O.F.S.) elected on the Parliamentary franchise for 3 years, expiring only by the effluxion of time, to exercise such powers as may be delegated to it by Parliament. *Union* was to take over all existing colonial treaties, etc., debts as against assets, and to run the railways on business lines separately from the general administration. *New Provinces*.—Southern Rhodesia and the Protectorates to be incorporated by Order in Council on petition of both Houses (Eybers, 517 ff.).

³ A. 1-1909 (Transvaal).

which had already hailed its returning delegates as traitors. The amendments were nevertheless disposed of at a short final session at Bloemfontein, the revised Draft was accepted by three of the parliaments and by an unexpectedly large majority of the electorate voting at a referendum in Natal and, in spite of Schreiner's efforts to mobilise English opinion against the franchise clauses, which he regarded as a trap rather than a safeguard, it passed the Lords without challenge, easily overrode opposition in another place, and duly received the Royal Assent.¹

The sublime Burke has observed that there is a 'sacred veil to be drawn over the beginnings of all governments.'² In any case, the formation of the first Union Ministry was attended by more than ordinary difficulty. One possible candidature for the office of Premier was ended by the death of Hofmeyr; another, when Steyn stood aside at his doctor's orders. The issue from the first really lay between Botha and Merriman. Both would have served under Steyn, but it was doubtful whether either would serve under the other. Botha had many advantages. He was an Afrikaner, Natal born and Transvaal trained, a farmer, a Liberal in the old republican days, bilingual, genial, boundlessly tactful, the representative of the dominant North. Merriman, too, was a farmer, English born, South African by adoption, with a great knowledge of men and of affairs, cultured, eloquent, imposing, the Cape Parliament with all its honourable traditions in the flesh. But he was not tactful and never had been. Jameson worked for a 'best man' Government. At first he had good hopes. He won over Schreiner, the Cape Unionists and, after great difficulty, the Transvaal Progressives, but he found Natal, economically dependent on the Transvaal, prepared to adapt its politics to its circumstances and Botha himself opposed to a coalition. Botha was hopeful of framing an electoral platform broad enough to accommodate the bulk of the English and the Dutch who had so much in common.³ He was anxious to have Merriman as his Minister of Finance and was on his way to Capetown to discuss matters when Merriman publicly declared himself in favour of existing parties. In spite of Steyn's efforts, Botha declined to serve under his rival; wherefore Lord Gladstone, the first Governor-General, proclaimed Union and summoned Botha to office; de Villiers, newly created Baron and Chief Justice of the Union, opened the appellate division at Bloemfontein and promptly transferred its sittings to Capetown, and all parties rallied to the electoral combat.

¹ Newton, *Unification*, II. 256 ff.

² Perhaps the veil will be withdrawn when the Merriman papers, now in the S.A. Public Library at Capetown, are published.

³ Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 287 ff.; Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 236 ff.

May
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The Progressives in the Cape, the O.F.S. and the Transvaal had already formed up as the Unionist Party under Jameson to work for unity and to help Botha against his own extremists; the Natalians stood as Independents; the fast-growing Labour Party came to a working arrangement with Botha, who renamed his combination of Het Volk and Nationalists, the S.A. National Party. The Senate was formed with a substantial Botha majority and the results of the Assembly elections were soon known. In spite of the failure of Steyn to induce the Afrikaner parties in the various provinces to unite, the divisions of the 'British' vote gave Botha a majority over all other parties in the Assembly, a victory marred only by the personal defeat of himself and two other ministers.¹

Imperial Parliamentary Papers to which specific reference is made in Chapter XIII. :

Cape of Good Hope: *Correspondence*, Cd. 264 of 1900; *Petition for the Suspension of the Constitution*, Cd. 1162 of 1902.

Natal: *Correspondence re Defence*, Cd. 44 of 1900; *Correspondence re Addition of Territory*, Cd. 941 of 1902; *Correspondence re Native Disturbances*, Cd. 2905 of 1906; *Report of Native Affairs Commission*, Cd. 3889 of 1908; *Correspondence re Union Referendum*, Cd. 5099 of 1909.

South Africa: *Further Correspondence*, Cd. 43, 261, 420 of 1900; Cd. 547, 1163 of 1901; *S.A. Despatches*, Cd. 522 of 1901; Cd. 823 of 1902; *Papers re Negotiations*, Cd. 528, 546, 663 of 1901; *Report on . . . Refugee Camps*, Cd. 891 of 1901; Cd. 902 of 1902; *Papers re Terms of Surrender*, Cd. 1096 of 1902; *Papers re Interview with Boer Generals*, Cd. 1284, 1329 of 1902; *Further Papers re Transvaal and O.R. Colony*, Cd. 1551, 1553 of 1903; Cd. 1895, 2104 of 1904; Cd. 3528 of 1907; *Proceedings of Customs Union Conference*, Cd. 1599, 1640 of 1903; *Papers re Intercolonial Council*, Cd. 1641 of 1903; *Report of S.A. Native Affairs Commission*, Cd. 2399 of 1905; *Report of Transvaal Labour Commission*, Cd. 1894-6-7 of 1904; *Correspondence re Transvaal Labour*, Cd. 1898-9, 1986, 2028, 2183 of 1904; Cd. 2788 of 1906; *Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance*, Cd. 3251 of 1906; *Report of Foreign Labour Department*, Cd. 3338 of 1907; *Papers re Transvaal Constitution*, Cd. 2400, 2479 of 1905; *Letters Patent (Transvaal)*, Cd. 3250 of 1906; *Customs Convention*, Cd. 2977 of 1906; *Letters Patent (O.R. Colony)*, Cd. 3526 of 1907; *Papers re Federation (Selborne's Memorandum)*, Cd. 3564 of 1907.

Southern Rhodesia (British South Africa Company): *Report of Land Commission*, C. 8130 of 1896; *Instructions and Report . . . on Native Administration*, C. 8060 of 1896; C. 8547 of 1897; *Correspondence re Changes in Administration*, C. 8732 of 1898; *Papers re the B.S.A. Company*, C. 9138 of 1899; *Correspondence re Bechuanaland Railway*, C. 9323 of 1899; *Correspondence re Labour Supply*, Cd. 1200 of 1902.

Swaziland: *Further Correspondence*, C. 9206 of 1899; *Letters Patent*, Cd. 3250 of 1906.

¹ National Party 66; Unionists 39; Independents 12 (Natal 11); Labour 4 (*The Round Table*, No. 1.).

Transvaal (South African Republic): *Correspondence re Recent Disturbances*, C. 7933 of 1896; *Correspondence re Imprisonment of Reformers*, C. 8423 of 1897; *Report of Select Committee on the B.S.A. Company*, 311, 311 (i), 311 (ii), 380 of 1897; *Correspondence*: C. 8063 of 1896; C. 8721 of 1898; C. 9507 of 1899; *Papers re Complaints of British Subjects*, C. 9345 of 1899; *Correspondence re Explosives Monopoly*, C. 9317 of 1899; *Correspondence re Bloemfontein Conference*, C. 9404 of 1899; *Further Correspondence*, C. 9415, 9518, 9521, 9530 of 1899; *Correspondence re Political Situation*, Cd. 369 of 1900; *Report of Land Settlement Commission*, Cd. 626, 627 of 1901; *Report on . . . Finances*, Cd. 628 of 1901; *Papers re Legislation for Natives*, Cd. 904 of 1902; *Papers re Indian Grievances*, C. 7911 of 1896; *Correspondence re Coolies on Railways*, Cd. 1683 of 1903; *Correspondence re British Indians*, Cd. 2239 of 1904.

CHAPTER XIV

UNITED SOUTH AFRICA, 1910-24

Provincial finance and education—The Botha-Hertzog split—The Natives Land Act—Indians—Rand strikes—Southern Rhodesia—The Great War—The growth of the Nationalist-Labour Pact: financial and economic problems; Industrialism and Protection; Indians and trade; Bantu and the Colour Bar; Revolution on the Rand—Smuts and 'Greater South Africa': the South-West Africa Protectorate; Southern Rhodesia; Mozambique—Provincial finance once more; the Pact Ministry.

High Commissioners and Governors-General of the Union of South Africa: Viscount Gladstone, May 31, 1910–July 1914; Baron de Villiers (acting) July–Nov. 1912 and July–Sept. 1914; Viscount Buxton, Sept. 8, 1914–June 1920; Prince Arthur of Connaught, Nov. 1920–Nov. 1923; Earl of Athlone, Jan. 21, 1924, onwards.

Premiers of the Union: General Louis Botha, May 31, 1910–Aug. 28, 1919; General J. C. Smuts, Sept. 3, 1919–June 1924; General J. B. M. Hertzog, June 30, 1924 onwards.

Administrators of Southern Rhodesia: Sir W. H. Milton, Dec. 1898–Oct. 1914; Sir F. D. P. Chaplin, Nov. 1, 1914–1921; *of Northern and Southern Rhodesia*: Feb. 17, 1921–Sept. 20, 1923; *Governor of Southern Rhodesia*: Sir John Chancellor, Sept. 21, 1923.

Premier of Southern Rhodesia: Sir Charles Coghlan, Oct. 1, 1923.

Administrators of the South-West Africa Protectorate: Sir Howard Gorges, Oct. 30, 1915–Sept. 1920; G. R. Hofmeyr, Oct. 1, 1921 onwards.

THE story of the years which have elapsed since Union falls into three periods. In the first the new Union Government took up the task which none but High Commissioners had hitherto attempted of regulating the affairs of South Africa as a whole. In the second that task was rendered immeasurably more difficult by the enormous interruption of the Great War. In the third the Union, endowed with the high but ill-defined status of a

post-war British Dominion and with new powers and responsibilities in South-West Africa, found that bread-and-butter politics were for it, as for the rest of an impoverished world, a matter of life or death. The chapter ends with the fall of the Smuts Government, lineal descendant of Jameson's ministry in its later moderate phase and of Botha's conciliatory Transvaal cabinet, the accession to power of a Nationalist Afrikaner and Labour alliance, and the passing of both Rhodesias from the hands of the Chartered Company into those of the Crown.

Union, carried on a wave of good feeling, was celebrated with a great pageant at Capetown. But waves break and insubstantial pageants fade as they near the solid earth, and the opening of the first Union Parliament by the Duke of Connaught brought South Africa back to realities. The financial relations of the provinces to the central authority, education and bilingualism, natives, Indians, European labour, all must be dealt with. Southern Rhodesia and, if it might be, the Protectorates awaited incorporation in a Union which must remain merely a close federation until provincial laws had been consolidated. The work must be done by representatives of provinces which had never acted long together either in peace or in war, and which, other than the old Colony, had had either a very short or otherwise inadequate experience of parliamentary life. And in that undertaking the lead had to be given by a ministry divided against itself. Nov. 1910.

The Botha cabinet was really federal: four ministers from the Cape, three from the Transvaal, and two from each of the smaller provinces.¹ The contrast between Botha's amiable though vague *conciliatie* and Hertzog's rigid Free State particularism had been obvious during the Convention. Now Botha felt that he owed his defeat at Pretoria to his colleague's education policy; Hertzog refused to ease the strain by ascending the bench and looked askance at his chief's entente with Jameson, while behind Hertzog stood his fidus Achates, Steyn, suspicious of the ministry's close connection with Natal.²

Ministry and Parliament both showed their inexperience during the early sessions. Generally speaking ministers were over-ready to share responsibility with *ad hoc* boards and to refer tangled bills to select committees. They showed no inclination

¹ Louis Botha, Premier; J. C. Smuts, Defence; H. C. Hull, Finance (Transvaal); J. W. Sauer, Railways; F. S. Malan, Education; H. Burton, Native Affairs; D. P. de V. Graaff, Public Works (Cape); A. Fischer, Lands; J. B. M. Hertzog, Justice (O.F.S.); F. Moor, Commerce; O'G. Gubbins, without portfolio (Natal).

² Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 242 ff.; H. Fremantle (*Cape Times*, Dec. 4, 1922).

whatever to stand or fall by any measure ; cabinet solidarity was weak ; Smuts openly desired a division of functions foreign to the British system between the executive which should administer and the legislature which should make laws. Party cohesion had been relaxed by the very achievement of Union ; the Unionist opposition, intent on helping Botha against his own left wing, rarely opposed ;¹ provincialism throughout was too strong for such centripetal forces as were at work. The whole trend of events was towards a group system and a reshuffling of parties.²

1910-
1911.

The questions of finance and education occupied most of the first two sessions. Both were calculated to raise provincial patriotism to fever heat. The system of provincial government laid down by the Convention was a temporary arrangement designed to calm the fears of the smaller provinces. Many delegates had hoped that it would soon make way for one more convenient and less reminiscent of old state jealousies on the lines of the Cape divisional councils. As it was, the Convention had decreed that the provincial authorities were merely to exercise such powers as were delegated to them by Parliament and had taken elaborate precautions to exclude party politics ; but it had postponed the vital question of financial relations to a more convenient season.

The ex-Colonial governments had surrendered many sources of revenue to the Union. Their successors were limited to direct taxation, which they dreaded since it must almost inevitably fall on fixed property, or to borrowing on their own credit, which entailed asking leave of the central authority. Meanwhile, pending the report of a commission under an Imperial *podestà*, the provinces were to be maintained by the Union exchequer. Reliance on the treasury was in keeping with the traditions of the country districts outside the Cape province but, so long as this process went on, the Cape would be paying its own share of local expenditure through its divisional councils and school boards and part of that of the other provinces through the Union exchequer.³

This manifest injustice obliged a reluctant ministry to grasp the nettle albeit somewhat half-heartedly. It undertook to pay £ for £ on the money raised by the provinces including that raised by the Cape local bodies, and to provide for an annual increase up to 5 per cent. for general purposes and 15 per cent. for education ; but, to avoid direct taxation, the Transvaal

¹ Colvin, *Jameson*, II. 299, 305 ff.

² *Round Table*, No. 15.

³ U.G. 11 and 14 of 1912.

was allowed to keep its native pass fees, though natives were under Union jurisdiction, and Natal and the Free State were given an undisguised dole of £100,000 each for the next ten years. Even so, such was the opposition that this compromise was only carried in 1913, and already the provincial councils had belied the hopes and intentions of their makers by organising on party lines. Next year Labour, victorious in the Transvaal elections, challenged the whole provincial system by passing *ultra vires* ordinances which conferred on select committees of the 1914 council powers allotted to the executive.

The only function of the provincial councils which could not have been equally well discharged by divisional councils was the care of education 'other than higher.' Much had been done for the schools in the later 'nineties, and still more during the decade following by Milner's Kindergarten and Jameson's Progressives. The general tendency had been to make primary education compulsory for Europeans, to give the local public a greater share in the control of the schools and, in the Cape, a measure of financial responsibility also, and to accord a fuller recognition to Dutch in the ex-republics. In each of the provinces the traditional right of Afrikaners to select the teachers was shared by the education department, to a greater or a less degree, with district school boards and local school committees.¹

In the Cape and Natal the question of the medium of instruction had presented few difficulties, but it had been and still was a burning question in the northern provinces. Selborne had relaxed the rigours of the Milner regime, but it was only after the passing of the Smuts Education Act that the C.N.O. schools 1907. in the Transvaal had entered the State system. Under that Act Dutch-speaking children were not to be taught in English below Standard III, but thereafter English was to be the medium in all save two subjects and the *sine quâ non* for promotion from standard to standard. In the O.R. Colony practically all the C.N.O.

¹ *Cape Colony* (1905-9).—Municipal and District school boards with majorities elected by the ratepayers to found new schools and enforce primary education on Europeans between the ages of 7 and 14. The Government levied a school tax on the value of fixed property through the divisional and municipal councils and made up deficits. Local committees selected, the school boards appointed, and the Director of Education, if necessary, dismissed teachers. *Transvaal* (1907).—Elective District school boards administering central funds, enforcing European education between 7 and 14, selecting teachers who were appointed and dismissed by the director. *O.F.S.* (1908).—District committees with elective majorities levying fees and administering central funds, enforcing European education between 7 and 16, nominating teachers from the official list whom the director appointed and dismissed. *Natal* (1909).—Local advisory committees elected by parents and nominal compulsion; but education was not free and all was really done by the central authority (Malherbe, *History of Education*, pp. 127 ff., 335 ff., 378 ff.).

1905. schools had made terms with the Government under an agreement to which Hertzog had been a party but, with the coming of self-
 1908. government, Hertzog had carried an Education Act prescribing education in the mother tongue up to and including Standard IV, the gradual introduction of the other language as a medium in the earlier standards and the use of each language for three of the principal subjects after Standard IV. The scheme worked ill. The English opened opposition Council schools with scant success; official explanations and even conferences on the meaning of the language clauses made confusion greater; three inspectors, summarily dismissed by Hertzog for alleged obstruction, were awarded damages by the courts; the Director of Education resigned on the eve of Union, and the uproar was redoubled when a council of examiners dealt strictly with teachers who failed to reach the official standard of bilingualism. 'No Hertzogism' had been the rallying cry of the British at the election of 1910.¹

Hertzog was thus the bogey of the British and the idol of the Free State Afrikaners when Parliament essayed to guide the provinces in the way they should go in the matter of language in the schools. From the teaching point of view, mother-tongue instruction was sound, especially in the early stages; but duplicated classes would be expensive, truly bilingual teachers were rare and separate schools would keep the two white peoples apart. Besides, what did 'Dutch' really mean in South Africa? Some said it was the tongue of the Netherlands; others a simplified form of that language; others again, and their number was growing, the spoken Afrikaans of the country which, though still suspect of the Old Guard, was seeking to standardise its grammar and spelling under the guidance of Steyn's Suid Afrikaanse Akademie.

The matter was entrusted to a select committee which presented two reports. The one, signed by seven members, recommended that teachers be allowed to qualify in either language and that after Standard IV the parents might choose the medium of instruction. The other, signed by the Transvaaler C. R. Beyers alone but clearly favoured by Hertzog also, advocated mother-tongue instruction throughout and bilingual teachers. A stormy party caucus at last adopted the majority report while, outside, Steyn thundered that, much as he had been opposed to the creation of provincial councils, now that they had been created he meant to see their rights respected. The Transvaal acted on the report at once, the Cape followed suit and thereby in a measure gave up the long-standing parental right of choice of medium to which

¹ Malherbe, *History of Education*, pp. 381 ff.; Act 5 of 1907 (Transvaal); Act 35 of 1908 (O.R.C.).

Natal decided to adhere, and the Free State adopted enough of 1912. the majority report to enable the Council schools to come under the provincial administration.¹

Parliament made less rapid progress in the matter of higher education, which properly fell within its purview. At the end of the 'nineties, the Victoria College at Stellenbosch and the S.A. College at Capetown, the oldest and largest of the colleges which prepared candidates for the examinations of the University of the Cape of Good Hope, increased their staffs, limited themselves to post-matriculation classes and carried their work into more genuine university spheres than hitherto. Their example was followed by other colleges, old and new, which, on receiving recognition, were given representation on the council of the examining University. Rhodes had dreamt of a national teaching university at Groote Schuur, Mansvelt of a Hollander university at Pretoria, and Alfred Beit had since given a site 1904. for a university at Johannesburg; but the really decisive step was taken by the S.A. College, which asked for a charter for 1905. itself as a separate university. Bad times and local rivalries frustrated this attempt and the examining university seemed to be entrenched more strongly than ever when, on the eve of Union, further colleges were founded at Pretoria and Pieter- 1910. maritzburg.² The dissipation of money and effort, the varied efficiency and size of these institutions, the impossibility of looking for research from inadequate and overworked staffs, the dehumanised tests afforded by written examinations alone, all pointed to the necessity for a change. But bill followed com- 1913- mission and commission bill and, beyond ascertaining what 1914. could not be done, Parliament reached no conclusion before the outbreak of the Great War.

On the other hand, the ministry carried Irrigation and Land Settlement Acts and a much-needed Defence Act. Milner had 1912. abolished the commando system in the ex-republics in favour of the costly constabulary. Botha had revived the field cornets as civil officials but had asked H.M. Government to maintain a garrison of 30,000 men in South Africa. Constabulary and garrison had since been drastically reduced and the question of South African defence had been discussed with Haldane, the British War Minister, by Union delegates in 1909 and again in 1911. The Defence Act was the fruit of the Imperial Defence Conference held in London in the latter year.³ It provided for

¹ S.C. 2-1911; Malherbe, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

² Other colleges were the Huguenot College, Wellington; the Diocesan College, Rondebosch; the Kimberley School of Mines, transferred to Johannesburg in 1903; Grey University College, Bloemfontein (1904); Rhodes University College, Grahamstown (1904).

³ Cd. 5745, 5746 (i) and (ii) of 1911.

a small permanent force supplemented by a modified form of compulsory service in defence force regiments or rifle associations, an ingenious combination of existing urban volunteers and the commandos traditional to the countryside which left wide powers in the hands of the executive and rendered all members of the new force liable for service anywhere in Africa in time of war.¹

Meanwhile, though the amalgamation of the provincial ministerial parties into one South African Party apparently strengthened Botha's position, internal strains and external pressure were really weakening his cabinet. Merriman, 'the humble musket-bearer in the ranks,' repeatedly opened a hot fire upon his chiefs for their Transvaal optimism, shocking to an upholder of the more modest Cape financial tradition; Beyers, ex-Speaker of the Transvaal Assembly, harassed the ministry with his following of conservative Transvaalers; there was a widespread outcry against the concentration of the civil service at Pretoria and the increase in the cost of the public service occasioned by up-country allowances. Then the cabinet began to split visibly. The treasurer, Hull, complained that Sauer, jealous of all Transvaalers, was running the railways without reference to his colleagues and least of all to himself, whose department, deprived by the constitution of all share in railway profits, would assuredly have to make up any deficits. In the end, Hull resigned and Botha had to rearrange the portfolios in a way which detracted from his ministry's efficiency and enhanced the power of his two Free State colleagues.

June
1912.

The Hull-Sauer crisis was followed by much more dangerous developments. The twin rocks of offence on which the first Botha cabinet made shipwreck were the Premier's conception of the relations of the Union to the rest of the Empire and, closely allied thereto, Hertzog's dread lest his chief's policy of *conciliatie* might expose the tender plant of Afrikaner nationalism to the corrosion of outside influences. The old Transvaal had fought hard against those influences before 1899. During and after the war Afrikaners everywhere had shared in the struggle. There were many reasons why they should do so. The old *lekker leven* had been passing even before the war, and now reconstruction, scientific farming, Jew storekeepers, and all the paraphernalia of latter-day Western civilisation were combining

¹ Act 13 of 1912. Permanent force of 2500 mounted police and artillery. Cape and Durban Garrison Artillery and Fortress Engineers to co-operate with the Imperial garrison in time of war. D.F. Regiments totalling some 25,000 men, either volunteers or, if necessary, men drawn by lot on a district basis between the ages of 17 and 25, the remainder serving in Rifle Associations making their own rules and selecting their own officers subject to ministerial approval.

with large families and drought to drive the less efficient of the farmers under.¹ The new parliamentary system was unfamiliar to most of them; the new and complicated executive was much less accessible than the old Presidents on their stoeps. Rightly or wrongly, Afrikaners ascribed all that irked them to British influence. Their own patriotism was intensely local and instinctively protectionist, whether in matters of colour, language or economic policy. Politically they felt that they were being dragged into world affairs at the chariot wheels of an Empire for which they felt no love, while Englishmen came to them, who knew but one home, 'like Romans to a Roman province, at home everywhere.'² The parallel with the ancient Greeks, traders loving the sea breezes and combining loyalty to the home of their choice with affection for the mother city, would have been more just, especially if Shakespeare and the Authorised Version be admitted as a substitute for Homer; but, in any case, the straiter sect of the Afrikaners would have none of it. They objected to the preference on British goods, slight though that was; they feared what might come of Botha's attendance at the Imperial Conference; they were alarmed at his talk in London of the need for immigration and a worthy contribution to a Navy which was hard put to it to maintain the necessary preponderance over that of Germany. A newspaper hint that in time of war the Union might remain neutral earned their ready approval. 1911.

Those were days when Smuts could still dismiss the discussion of imperial affairs with something like a shrug of the shoulders; but Botha replied to *Die Volksstem's* feeler with the blunt reminder that the enemy, and not South Africans, would sit in judgment on such limited liability. During the Hull-Sauer quarrel he and Hertzog talked over their mutual difficulties with apparently good results but, unluckily, the Hertzogites found fresh cause of offence in his sympathetic references to Rhodes—*fons et origo mali* in their eyes—on the occasion of the unveiling of the Memorial at Groote Schuur. Then, goaded by constant Unionist attacks, Hertzog twice unburdened his soul roundly, declaring that he believed in Imperialism only in so far as it benefited South Africa, that the two white peoples must be left July 1912.

¹ There was a widespread belief that the poor whites were the product of the S.A. war. This was not so. To go no further back, many poor whites found land and salvation by joining the Great Trek and, so long as there was empty land to trek to, their numbers were kept down. But Kruger was much exercised by their presence in increasing numbers in the old Transvaal; many farmers failed to find their feet again in the bad times that followed the uprooting of the S.A. war; since then, changing economic conditions have tended to increase this class of unadaptables (*vide* U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 106, 111).

² So a widely travelled Afrikaner expressed himself to the writer.

free to develop along their own lines in two streams, and that the Union should be ruled only by pure Afrikaners.

The one speech was delivered when Botha was on the point of attending a party congress in Natal, the other while he was on his way to take part in a bye-election at Grahamstown, another intensely English centre. Both speeches trespassed on delicate ground. They were taken to mean not only that the interests of South Africa and the Empire must clash, but that the Union was the preserve of the *ware Afrikaner* only, a term of a narrower significance than now. They angered Englishmen and dismayed many Afrikaners. The Natal congress was not a great success, the Unionist majority in Albany was larger than ever, and Leuchars, a recent Natal accession to the ministry, resigned in protest. Botha tried to induce Hertzog to retire too, for nearly all his colleagues insisted that he must go and, when he would not, made up his mind that whatever there might be to say for two streams in the country, there could no longer be two voices in his cabinet. He himself resigned and reformed the ministry without including his ex-Minister of Justice.

Dec.
1912.

Hopes of a reconciliation were cherished for a time, but Hertzog burnt his boats in a fiery speech at Smithfield, a majority of the Free State members supported the vote of no confidence moved from the Labour bench in the Assembly, their constituencies were soon full of talk of a new party and demands for Botha's resignation, and Steyn urged both protagonists to stand down in favour of another *Volksvader*. At last at a S.A. Party congress, de Wet, the Free State hero of the Anglo-Boer war, led a substantial minority out of the hall. The Afrikaners were split as decisively as were the British.¹

Nov.
1913.

1913.

At the end of the year, Botha very nearly resigned, for party, Native, Indian and European Labour troubles almost overwhelmed him. The political and constitutional struggles of the two decades preceding Union had driven the native problem underground. Each colony had been free to take its own line. In the Cape the rule had remained theoretical equality between white and black. The tendency had, however, been to raise the franchise qualifications to keep out the blanket Kaffir and *pro tanto* to bring Cape practice nearer to the law of the ex-republics. Save on a few points, native law was still unrecognised in the Colony proper, but in the Transkei it was fully acknowledged and, there, good administration and a steady extension of the Glen Grey council system had given the Bantu security for their lands and a training in local government. The native policy of Natal, an amalgam

1895-
1911.

¹ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 255 ff.; *Round Table*, Nos. 10 and 11.

of embalmed Shepstonism and acquisitiveness had produced a serious rebellion. This in turn had been followed by an experiment somewhat on the lines which Selborne had recommended to the National Convention for the Protectorates, whereby a strong standing commission administered native affairs subject only to very general parliamentary control. In the Transvaal advanced natives had been relieved of the pass law after the war and, by a decision of the courts, had been enabled to acquire land in their own right ; but the mass of the Bantu in the ex-republics were still in their pre-war condition, subject to the pass laws and heavy hut tax, unable to own land, debarred as far as possible from many avocations, and insecure in the reserves which were in some cases still unbeaconed. Some lived, where they had long lived, on the Crown lands ; others were either encouraged by farmers to settle on their farms, farming on halves or thirds, regardless of the old Squatters' Law which limited the number of such families to five for any one farm ; others again, especially in the northern Transvaal where lands teeming with natives had been disposed of as farms, were permitted by the farmers or the land companies to remain where they were as squatters on payment of a rent. Insecurity of tenure was the radical weakness of the whole system. There could be no finality in such a state of affairs.

The first attempt to deal with the native problem on a South African scale had been made by the Lagden Native Affairs Commission.¹ Rightly judging that land was the root of the matter, the commissioners recommended that the system of individual title be encouraged without being unduly pressed ; but, lest the natives acquired too much land, all save three proposed to limit their right to buy or lease to certain specified areas. For the rest, with an eye to the labour on which Milner's policy of reconstruction depended, they proposed to forbid any to squat on farms except as labourers, to shut out undesirables from private locations, to tax all able-bodied men resident therein, to levy rents on those living on Crown lands and, generally, by means of industrial education and better facilities for travel, to awaken new needs and desires among the tribesmen. As for the franchise, they suggested that each colony should set up one or more native constituencies and debar natives from voting at ordinary elections ; but they left it to the local parliaments to say whether or no natives should be eligible for seats therein. Few tangible results followed from the report at the time ; the National Convention declined to touch so dangerous a subject except in so far as it concerned the Cape franchise and the future of the Protectorates and, in the years immediately following

¹ Cd. 2399 of 1905.

1911. Union, all that was done was to abolish the Natal standing commission and provide for the better treatment of native labourers in the larger towns.¹

At last the Government was compelled to move. Farmers, especially those along the Basuto border, revived the old complaint that had precluded the Kaffir war of 1878: natives free to buy anywhere were said to be penetrating European areas too rapidly while Europeans were forbidden to buy land in the reserves. The growing Labour Party, intent on extending the field of employment for white men and wedded to the work and wage-fund theories, demanded social, industrial and, as far as might be, territorial segregation for the two races. A spasmodic effort to eject natives from farms under the Squatters' Law was followed by a Natives Land Act.² Natives and Europeans were alike forbidden to acquire land in each other's areas, and farming on shares was abolished, but it was left open to farmers to renew existing labour contracts on terms which would reduce natives living on their farms to the level of servants. Since the existing division of lands was manifestly unjust to the natives, a commission headed by Sir William Beaumont was appointed to mark out additional areas for them.

Had the new areas been marked off first the Act would have aroused less opposition from both black and white; as it was, the commission could not report before 1915 at the earliest and, meanwhile, native rights were seriously curtailed. The Cape was exempted by decision of the courts, and elsewhere the executive freely used its powers of dispensation; but in the Free State natives were ejected from farms right and left under the watchful eyes of the Basuto. The anti-European Native National Council, growing in strength daily, organised a deputation to the King.

As if black Africa were not enough, brown Asia had been added to the burden of the white man and that by his own act. There were comparatively few Indians in the Cape and hardly any in the Free State, but there were plenty in the towns of the Transvaal and, in Natal, they swarmed. Natal, it is true, had long talked of getting rid of her free Indians, till tea had come to supplement sugar and further coolies had been imported. But the days of this policy were numbered. From 1907 onwards the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and his Council had contemplated ending the whole evil system of recruiting this semi-servile labour, evil in its effects on those parts of India where native touts harried the villages for recruits, evil too in its effects on the morals of the coolies and,

¹ Acts 26 of 1911 and 1 of 1912.

² Act 27 of 1913.

still more, of those luckless women who had to accompany them, one to every three or four men. The system as a whole was not ended till 1920, but Natal was warned at once that a new Act which made it more difficult than ever for free Indians to obtain trading licences had earned her the refusal of any more coolies. In answer to the prayers of a Natal deputation and the request of the Colonial Office to let matters stand till the South Africa Act had been safely passed, Simla relented. Natal was allowed to recruit till 1911 on condition that Indians who had been refused licences by municipal councils might appeal to the Courts.¹ 1908.

So with their highly-protected sugar flourishing, but their tea already suffering at the rough hands of Bantu labourers, the Natalians were left to face the fact that the last coolie would finish his indentures in 1916, that their Indians outnumbered them, and that nearly all of them had come to stay. Indeed, to many Indians, Natal was the only home they had ever known.²

Meanwhile, in the Transvaal, the immigration law of 1907 had been supplemented by a Gold and Townships Act which stiffened up old laws and forbade non-Europeans even to occupy land in the proclaimed gold areas which covered so much of the Rand and other townships.³ 1908.

As the South Africa Act clearly entrusted the care of Indians to the central authority, the Union Government negotiated with Gandhi, who had linked up his passive resistance agitation with the political agitation which was raging in India. Some progress was made towards a settlement: educated Indians were relieved of the finger-print test, Indians who had left the country were allowed to return, and Indians who had refused to register were given another chance to comply with the law.⁴ But in the main the negotiations broke down and, in spite of Gandhi's demand for equal treatment for all, an immigration law was framed with an education test and other regulations frankly aimed at 'Indians and other Asiatics.' At this the Jews, whose numbers and nervousness were increasing, took fright and H.M. Government suggested that all mention of specific peoples should be omitted.⁵ This was done to the satisfaction of the Indians 1911

¹ Act 22 of 1909 (Natal).

² In 1911 there were about 150,000 Indians in the Union. Of these, 7000 were in the Cape, 11,000 in the Transvaal, 100 (?) in the O.F.S., and 133,000 in Natal. Of the Natal Indians, some 40,000 were still under indenture and nearly 30,000 had been born in the province. There were 98,000 Europeans and 962,000 Bantu in Natal. In 1920, the Cape parliamentary franchise was held by 2429 Indians, that of Natal by 45. In 1921, 67.27 per cent. of the Indians were Union born.

³ On Indians (1906-11), *vide* Cd. 3308 of 1907; 3887, 3892, 4327 of 1908; 4584 of 1909; 5363 of 1910; 6087 of 1912; and Andrews, *Documents relating to the New Asiatic Bill* (1926).

⁴ Cd. 3892 of 1908, p. 4; Cd. 4327 of 1904, p. 14.

⁵ Cd. 5579 of 1911; Cd. 6283 of 1912; Cd. 6940, 7111 of 1913.

and the Jews, but the Free Staters demanded much more definite legislation and wrecked the measure.

1913. Discussion with Gokhale, a member of the Viceroy's Council, led to the informal arrangement that, if names were omitted and a few priests and professional men were allowed to land each year, the Indians would submit to elastic tests; while the authorities for their part, without pledging themselves, gave Gokhale to understand that the vexatious and ineffective £3 tax on Indians who neither reindentured nor went back to India would disappear from Natal. The Immigration Bill was carried at the third attempt much on the lines proposed, empowering the executive, subject to an appeal to the courts, to debar anyone from entering the Union on economic or social grounds. But the £3 tax remained unrepealed.¹

Uproar ensued in South Africa and in Hindustan. Gandhi brought forward his Five Points demanding the repeal of the Free State law against the entry of Asiatics as a racial stigma, the restoration of the old right of Indians born in the Cape to return thither, the abolition of the £3 tax, legislation to prevent the Natal courts from refusing entry to the sole wife of a marriage under a polygamous code on the ground that the marriage was really polygamous, and a reform in the harsh administration of existing immigration, landholding and licensing laws.

1913. Thus set out, Gandhi's plea won the support of many Europeans in England, India, and even in South Africa; but the weakness of his case was none the less serious. The Indians by reason of their religion and ancient traditions were a class apart in South Africa, despised by the Zulus as servile aliens, able by dint of a low standard of life and incredible industry to undercut European trading rivals, and, in many cases, content with truly Oriental sanitary conditions and a code of business ethics to match. The mass of them were of low caste or of no caste. Yet Gandhi was claiming the rights of Europeanised British citizens in South Africa for men who were 'untouchables' in their own country. The claim could not be admitted. That, whether right or wrong, was the view taken by the majority of South Africans of a question which was at bottom economic. Gandhi was, however, determined that passive resistance should continue till his Five Points were conceded and, at last, in protest against the Immigration Act, he led a procession of Indians on foot into the Transvaal by way of Laing's Nek. He and many others were lodged in gaol for their pains.

Gandhi's arrest was followed by strikes of coolies on Natal

¹ Act 22 of 1913. For Gokhale's speeches, *vide* Andrews, *Documents relating to the Indian Question* (1926), pp. 1 ff.

plantations, one of which was attended by loss of life and property; but he himself was soon released and a commission under Sir William Solomon, assisted by a high Anglo-Indian official, Sir Benjamin Robertson, was appointed to investigate Indian grievances. Gandhi boycotted the commission because Indians were not directly represented thereon, but the Government based an Indian Relief Act on its recommendations.¹ In spite of the 1914. fears of Natalians and Free Staters that, by analogy, the Bantu would soon ask to be relieved of the hut tax, it abolished the hated £3 tax and directed that the sole wife of a 'polygamous' marriage should be admitted and registered as monogamous.

By agreement with Smuts, Gandhi accepted, as 'a complete June and final settlement of the controversy which has unfortunately 1914. existed for so long,' the Relief Act and a long-desired assurance that it was and always had been the desire of Government to see that 'existing laws' were administered 'in a just manner with due regard to vested rights.' Some of his followers wished him to persist in passive resistance till they were relieved of the laws affecting trading licences, residence, landowning, and movement from province to province. Gandhi refused. He did, however, remind Smuts in his letter accepting the settlement of the issues of the late passive resistance campaign that these other questions must be sympathetically considered one day, and that nothing short of full civic rights would satisfy his fellow countrymen. Then, having told his followers that the present Agreement was the basis from which they must work to win relief from their remaining disabilities, he sailed for India.²

Gandhi had only been deterred from leading another pil- Jan. grimage up the road which led to Volksrust and gaol by the 1914. outbreak of serious trouble in the world of European labour. At the time of Union, 'Labour,' to most South Africans, still meant natives or indentured coolies, and 'Industry' employment on the state railways or the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal and Natal; trades unionism was an unwelcome novelty to most of them, the syndicalism of France and Germany a name, the great British shipping and railway strikes a distant inconvenience. 1911. Nevertheless, the gulf which divided Labour and Capital along the Rand was at last becoming patent to all. Life on the Rand mines was neither so easy nor so lucrative to the employees as it had been in the days of Kruger and the Cornish 'Brother Johns.' No man, from the mine manager downwards, was sure of his job for long; there was, as between absentee shareholders and ever-

¹ Cd. 7265, 7644 of 1914; Act 22 of 1914.

² Andrews, *Documents re New Asiatic Bill*, pp. 15 ff., 33 ff., and *The Indian Question*, pp. 12 ff.

changing staffs, little of that personal touch which could compensate the men for the non-recognition of their union; silicosis (miners' phthisis) bred of the dust raised by the rock drills made life underground highly dangerous. How dangerous men realised for the first time from the reports of a commission appointed immediately after Union just as the development of the mines, begun in 1904, reached its zenith and conditions of white employment became more precarious.

At first there had been little difficulty. The white men had done the skilled and semi-skilled work, the raw native the unskilled work under white supervision. That was the customary colour bar which also held good at Kimberley in the egalitarian Cape. But times were changing. Already the intelligent Chinese had had to be restricted by law to unskilled work and now the Bantu, by no means stupid, were learning. They could not be kept at rough labour for ever. But any radical change in the division of work on the mines would have to reckon with Creswell's Labour Party which might easily find support from some of the Hertzogites. Nearly 60 per cent. of the miners were still drawn from the United Kingdom, but they were being joined by a stream of Afrikaners, younger sons, *bijwoners*, unsuccessful farmers, the living testimony to the agricultural revolution which, as yet imperfectly appreciated, was none the less taking place. Among these men moved others from countries where violence was part of political practice and even of theory.

1911. The Labour Party, under-represented though it was in Parliament, helped to carry a Mines and Works Act whereunder regulations were issued shutting out non-Europeans from many employments, in the ex-republics at least, on the grounds of safety, health and discipline.¹ Thus entrenched behind the so-called statutory colour bar, Labour secured compensation for the victims of miners' phthisis and vainly resisted a measure which declared strikes on the state railways illegal.² But it was in conference assembled at Capetown that it showed what its policy was to be. It was non-committal on the score of socialism, for many delegates were trade unionists rather than socialists; the Northerners, wedded to colour distinctions, declined to follow the lead of those Cape unions which admitted coloured men who were prepared to hold out for union conditions of labour; but the Congress as a whole, preferring to concentrate on the Bantu question first, in the hope that the coloured would then be easier to handle, demanded segregation for black and white, white immigration and an end to all contracted labour. 1912. The policy was in keeping with that of the ministry, which in the ensuing session carried

¹ Act 12 of 1911.

² Acts 34 of 1911 and 19 and 28 of 1912.

the Natives Land Act and, appalled by the ravages committed by pneumonia and phthisis, put a stop to the recruitment of tropical labour for the mines from beyond the 22nd degree of 1913. south latitude.

Meanwhile a petty quarrel between a new manager and some miners on the New Kleinfontein mine spread till it covered the whole issue of the recognition of trade unions. The Government at first tried to stand aside. Then, alarmed at the growing signs of violence, it hurriedly intervened with Imperial troops for July 1913. lack of an organised force of its own, tried to prevent a mass meeting too late and, in the ensuing riots, had to watch the troops fire on the mob. Victory lay with the strikers. They were promised reinstatement, a judicial commission which duly found that many of their grievances were very real,¹ recognition for their unions by both Government and Chamber of Mines, and rules for dealing with future industrial disputes. The ministry, harassed by Indians and Hertzogites, also appointed a commission to consider an eight-hour day and a minimum white wage on the railways, and another to investigate wages, cost of living and cognate subjects.

It was a promise of peace where there was no peace. Towards the end of the year the white coal-miners of Natal struck; syndicalists in the Transvaal, playing on the fear that recent retrenchment was but the earnest of more to come, organised a widespread strike on the railways; the Federation of Trades brought the gold-miners in by declaring a general strike throughout Jan. 1914. the Union. This time there was no hesitation on the Government's part for, already, the Basuto had broken out on one of the mines. It declared martial law, called up 60,000 men on commando or in the newly organised Defence Force regiments, maintained essential services with those railwaymen who stood by their posts, and forced the leaders of the strike to surrender to de la Rey and his machine-gunners.²

All was over in a few days at the cost of only two lives, but Smuts threw away much of the prestige thus gained by summarily and illegally deporting nine syndicalists to England. Parliament met with the protests of the outraged judges and the embarrassed Imperial Government ringing in its ears.³ Many ministerialists were unwilling to stigmatise the deportees as undesirable immigrants⁴; Labourites and Unionists combined to defeat the proposal that the executive should have power to declare martial law without subsequent recourse to Parliament

¹ Cd. 6941-2 of 1913; U.G. 55, 56-13.

² Cd. 7384 of 1914, *passim*.

³ A. B. Keith, *Selected Speeches*, II. 109 ff.

⁴ Some of them afterwards became members of the Union Parliament.

for an Act of Indemnity, and only the free use of the closure ensured the punishment of all those who in future should seek to force others to join trade unions or break a contract in a public utility service.¹

The authorities refused to re-employ some of the ringleaders in the late strike, but they by no means exercised all the powers which they legally held against the rank and file. On the other hand, it was only Labour's victory in the Transvaal provincial elections and at a bye-election in the Cape Peninsula that induced the ministry to go forward with the remedial legislation promised after the July strike. They duly protected wages, gave more liberal phthisis compensation and provided for the compensation of injured workmen of all classes and colours save native mine workers, who were already covered, and domestic servants and farm hands²; but they had to jettison a measure which indeed recognised trade unions but declared strikes and lock-outs illegal till a board had duly reported thereon. Labour declined to part with the right to strike in the year which saw the Triple Alliance of transport, railways and coal preparing for battle with Capitalism in Great Britain itself.

So the Houses rose in July and members went to their homes through a countryside ravaged by the worst drought for a generation past.

The distressing course of events since 1910 ruined the hopes of those who, on either side of the Limpopo, had looked for the speedy inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the Union. At the time of the opening of the National Convention, H.M. Government had declined either to help the B.S.A. Company financially or to touch the question of the ownership of the unalienated lands till the end of the first term of Chartered rule should be at hand in 1914. At first, therefore, the Rhodesian delegates had been inclined to dwell on the advantages of incorporation. But they soon swung round to the view that, though incorporation was Rhodesia's 'ultimate destiny,' at the moment it would mean debt and endless trouble unless terms were first made with the Company.

Besides, hope eternal was once more springing in Rhodesia and at London Wall. The small miners and farmers were prospering, the railway companies were beginning to pay their way, many creditors of the Company were exchanging their debentures for shares, and the Company's first farm, the Premier, taken up in 1907, was doing well as a training ground for settlers. Already the Board had organised a commercial branch distinct

¹ Act 27 of 1914; Cd. 7384 of 1914.

² Acts 15, 25 and 29 of 1914.

from the administrative, and it now decided to seek the hitherto elusive dividend on, rather than below, the surface of the soil.

After all, whatever Rhodesians might think, the Company was 'an association formed for the acquisition of gain.'¹ It took up other farms at Rhodesdale and Sinoia, Lomagundi and Marandellas and as it realised the possibilities of cattle ranching in a country free from the many diseases which afflicted other parts of Southern Africa, it sold a large block of land in the neglected south-east to Liebig's. Jameson, too, began to talk as Rhodes had done of developments in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and in Northern Rhodesia and of a railway which should tap the copper mines of the Katanga. Presently Selborne was making hopeful speeches in Rhodesia; Jameson himself arrived and the Duke of Connaught, fresh from the opening of the first Union Parliament, followed him. 1910.

These proofs of Imperial interest and Chartered energy were rewarded by the election of a legislature unanimously opposed to Union.² A new Order in Council gave the elected members a marked majority in future and the High Commissioner, Gladstone, assured all concerned that neither the Company nor the Rhodesians should ever be summarily thrust into Union. The Board went forward with its new policy of encouraging immigration. A good stamp of settler came in, the price of land rose and with it the value of the Company's farms along the railway, and the Company, in funds at last and fired by the enthusiasm roused by the unveiling of the memorial to its founder at Groote Schuur, elected Jameson chairman, appointed three full-time directors, entrusted the training of settlers to the new Agricultural College, farmed its estates in good earnest, and launched forth on a large scale as a cattle rancher. 1912.

All this meant the opening up of the resources of the country, but it also meant that the Company, like the Dutch East India Company long ago, was now competing with its own subjects. Some of them, led by Gladstone to expect great changes when the Charter should expire, formed leagues to press for the removal of the Company, for more elective seats in the legislature, or for a Royal Commission. A fresh election was drawing near and the Board acted promptly. First, Maguire of Rudd Concession fame, and then Jameson in person hurried out with a statement of policy. They proposed to confine land settlement to a zone 25 miles wide on either side of the existing railways and of the new lines which were foreshadowed. So would the task of government be rendered easier and cheaper and so would the settlers be kept

¹ *B.S.A. Extraordinary General Meeting*, Jan. 1908, p. 19.

² Cd. 7264 of 1914, pp. 1 ff.; *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1911, p. 5.

in touch with each other and with the schools.¹ But so also, some Rhodesians grumbled, would settlers be tied to the railways which, built for the service of the mines, ran along the watershed where most of the land had already been alienated.² The value of the Company's holdings and even of their own would be enhanced but newcomers, the hope of the future, would be obliged to buy at a price. There was, moreover, in their eyes, the danger that acceptance of the scheme would involve the recognition of the Company's claim to the unalienated lands as a commercial asset.

1914-
1915.

This aspect of the new policy was emphasised by a rearrangement of the native reserves effected by a commission which did for Southern Rhodesia what the Beaumont Commission was presumably doing for the Union.³ In the past reserves had been roughly marked out as occasion demanded. These reserves lay mostly in the south and east, the coming cattle country. In nearly all cases they had been marked off without survey. The commission found that native commissioners had, as a rule, vastly underestimated the areas which they were setting aside for the natives; they therefore rearranged the European and Bantu areas in such a way that 6,600,000 acres of what had been reserve-land ceased to be so and 5,600,000 of other land became part of the reserves. Champions of the tribes complained that much of the old and new land was poor, but the fact remained that 40 acres were available for every native who actually lived in the reserves and that the despised sandy soils have since proved themselves the best tobacco lands in the territory. In any case the Imperial Government ratified the findings of the Commission, thus giving the tribes as far as possible security of tenure, and showed its confidence in the commissioners' sense of justice by subsequently appointing two of them to rule the great native territories of Basutoland and Uganda respectively.

The Commission's report was admittedly 'very satisfactory' to shareholders whose directors had just reasserted their claim to the unalienated lands, which were apparently worth the £7,750,000 which had been spent on the administration and development of the country. For the Rhodesians were told that the claim for a refund of these deficits need trouble them no more but that, meanwhile, the only alternative to a renewal of the Charter was

¹ Cd. 7645 of 1914, pp. 31 ff.; *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1913-4, pp. 46 ff., 67 ff.

² Only 8,500,000 acres remained unalienated of the 33,000,000 within the 25 mile zone. At the close of 1913, in all S. Rhodesia, the Company held some 3,851,000 acres as against 9,000,000 held by other companies and 12,000,000 held by individuals. Reserves covered about 20,428,000 acres, unalienated lands nearly 48,000,000.

³ Cd. 8674 of 1917.

incorporation in the Union.¹ Apart from other considerations, fears aroused by a recent speech by Botha that this was indeed the case and a lively apprehension of 'the Company's displeasure' were sufficient to give the pro-Charter party an overwhelming victory at the ensuing elections. One of the 'Common Platform' candidates gained a seat on petition but only after the crucial vote had been carried in favour of a renewal of the Charter for ten years. This extension was duly granted by a Supplemental Charter.² March 1914.
1915.

The B.S.A. Company had thus gained the time necessary for the maturing of its commercial schemes; it could face with comparative equanimity the claim which the Imperial Government had at last put forward to the unalienated lands on its own behalf;³ it could, if it wished, bargain at its leisure with the Union authorities for the incorporation of Rhodesia. Possibly it had some such end in view; certainly, Botha visited Southern Rhodesia in July, 1914. But there the General heard that which brought him hurrying home to Pretoria. Austria had delivered an ultimatum to Serbia, the British fleet had disappeared into the mists of the North Sea to the strains of 'Heart of Oak,' and on the Continent the swarming battalions of the Armed Peace were forming column of route.

In the Union, racialism, stirred afresh by the Botha-Hertzog quarrel, had begun to die down. As in the days after Majuba, economic issues had blurred the divisions between English and Dutch. S.A. Party men and Unionists had worked more and more together, especially in the months following the Rand strikes, and, with Smuts talking of a tax on undeveloped land to balance the income tax, those British who had half feared that he and Botha would use their power for purely Afrikaner ends were convinced of their error. Similarly the Labour Party, strengthened by a steady recruitment of urban Afrikaners, harked back to its old alliance of 1907 with Het Volk against 'Park Lane rule' and exchanged good offices with the Hertzogites. The war checked this hopeful development, drove the Hertzogites in upon themselves and, by reviving the racial conflict, became a war on two fronts, the foreign and the home.

Amid loyal demonstrations in the towns and the opening of subscription lists for the purchase of unprocurable machine-guns for the Old Contemptibles, the ministry at once offered to set free the Imperial garrison by itself taking over the defence of the Union. The offer was gladly accepted and the Naval

¹ Cd. 7645 of 1914, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*; Cd. 7970 of 1915.

³ Cd. 7509 of 1914.

Volunteers and the local Defence Force were mobilised in quick succession for the defence of the all-important Cape Peninsula ; but it was only after some division of opinion that the ministry decided to send an expedition, as H.M. Government wished, to destroy the coast wireless stations at Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund.¹

Aug. 10,
1914.

But there was another side to the picture. In the country districts there was much talk of neutrality ; in Pretoria, Defence Force officers from Commandant-General Beyers downwards spoke of resigning if an aggressive campaign were undertaken ; in the western Transvaal there was the threat of serious trouble. Stirred by reports that Germany meant to set up a protected republic in South Africa and by the visions of a local prophet portending the fall of the British Empire, stirred also by de la Rey, the uncrowned king of that part of the country, burghers met in arms at Treurfontein. De la Rey frankly proposed to strike for independence, for, ever since the close of the Anglo-Boer war he had been awaiting the opportunity and had looked to Botha and Smuts to head the movement. He was, however, dissuaded. Neither Beyers nor Kemp, another highly-placed Transvaal officer, countenanced his plan and Botha convinced him that the Scriptures condemned rebellion. With a hint of better times to come, he bade his would-be followers disperse, and this they did 'amid a strange and unwonted silence.'²

Aug. 15,
1914.

The whole of the Defence Force was now warned to hold itself in readiness for service anywhere in Africa, nearly all the Imperial troops sailed away, the Nationalist Party Congress condemned the projected campaign, and Parliament assembled. News of the violation of Union territory by a German patrol decided many members reluctantly to support the attack on South-West Africa, and loyalty to Botha deterred even de la Rey from voting against a policy of which he heartily disapproved. So, having provided £2,000,000 for the maintenance of 15,000 troops for six months, the Houses rose.³

Aug. 21,
1914.

Sept. 14,
1914.

This modest estimate was soon belied by a rebellion.⁴ Parliament's endorsement of the ministry's policy brought matters to a head. Beyers resigned and conferred with de la Rey at Pretoria. The two men then hurried off by car towards the Defence Force camp at Potchefstroom. What their intentions were is still a matter of debate.⁵ They may have proposed, as the

¹ Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 501 ff. ; Cd. 7873 of 1915.

² U.G. 10-15, p. 6 ; U.G. 46-16, pp. 46, 83, 85, 102 ; Webb, *Oorzaken*, pp. 10 ff.

³ Act 3 of 1914 (special session).

⁴ On the Rebellion, *vide* U.G. 10-15 ; U.G. 42, 46-16 ; Webb, *Oorzaken van de Rebelle* ; Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 293 ff.

⁵ U.G. 10-15, p. 8 ; U.G. 46-16, p. 102 ; Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 40.

authorities believed, to use the 1600 western Transvaalers there assembled to raise the Lichtenburg district, march on Pretoria, and thereafter obtain arms through Maritz, who was in charge of the Union forces at Upington and in close touch with the German authorities at Windhuk; they may, as their friends declared, have been set upon less desperate courses. Be that as it may, they never reached the camp. Police patrols were on the watch along the Rand for motor-car bandits who were terrorising the neighbourhood. Beyers ignored their challenges to stop till at last one of the policemen fired and killed the unhappy de la Rey.¹ 1914. Sept. 15.

Beyers, disavowing any idea of stirring up rebellion, now joined de Wet and other leaders in calling on the Government to withdraw its troops from the German border and in organising a national demonstration against the campaign. Botha, therefore, promised to do the work himself with an expedition of volunteers and, learning of Maritz's double dealing, pushed forward loyal troops towards Upington to relieve that officer of his command. Thereupon, Maritz, strong in the possession of a treaty with the German Governor promising aid, an independent South Africa and leave to annex Delagoa Bay in exchange for Walfisch Bay, withdrew to the German border, handed over as prisoners of war such of his men as would not follow him, and threatened to attack Upington unless he were permitted to meet Hertzog, Beyers, de Wet, Kemp and other real or supposed leaders of the rebellion.² Oct. 1914.

Maritz's treachery fired the train elsewhere. The Government replied by declaring martial law and commandeering men in the Transvaal to crush Maritz. A party of commandeered Transvaalers mutinied; they and others like them fled to the farm to which Beyers had retired. Meanwhile, de Wet made up his mind that since Maritz was fighting, he must be helped. He addressed meetings in the northern Free State; presently, he and others tried forcibly to stop recruiting of volunteers; they then occupied one or two towns and, in the Western Transvaal, Kemp's men stopped trains and requisitioned men and material.³ With men of opposite intentions thus moving about with arms in their hands, collision was well-nigh inevitable. Botha fell upon Beyers's men and scattered them near Rustenburg, classic ground whereon Kruger had once ended a civil war. One wing of the rebellion was thus broken, but, in the Free State, de Wet now proclaimed his intention of getting into touch with Maritz and then marching on Pretoria to proclaim South Africa's independence. All Steyn's Oct. 27.

¹ A doctor was shot on the same night under similar circumstances at the other end of the Rand (U.G. 48-14).

² U.G. 10-15, p. 23; U.G. 46-16, pp. 94, 119; Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

³ U.G. 10-15, pp. 27, 28, 31; U.G. 46-16, pp. 46 ff.; Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

efforts to bring him and Beyers together in conference failed ;¹ shots were fired ; de Wet's son was killed, and the old general and his men began to behave with the fierceness bred of desperation. Outside South Africa the general situation was very grave. The German rush in the West had been stemmed on the Marne and at Ypres, but a strong German squadron had sunk British warships off the coast of Chile and, if it came eastward, there was nothing in the South Atlantic to prevent it bombarding the coast towns of the Union with incalculable repercussions in the countryside, and disaster to the small expeditionary force at Lüderitzbucht.

On the other hand, Botha soon had 40,000 men in the field, Afrikaners for the most part, led by picked officers, his old companions of the Anglo-Boer war days. He kept the predominantly British town regiments as much as possible in the background lest the struggle became a war of races ; he promised all the rebels, save ringleaders and those guilty of breaches of the rules of civilised warfare, immunity from criminal proceedings if they surrendered within ten days, and then fell upon de Wet at Mushroom Valley and routed him. Thereafter it was a matter of rounding up scattered bands as mercifully as possible. De Wet was run down by troops in motor-cars on the edge of the Kalahari, Beyers was drowned in the Vaal, Kemp alone of the rebel leaders got through to Maritz. Cheered by the news that Sturdee's battle-cruisers had destroyed the German Pacific Squadron off the Falkland Islands, Botha was able to declare the rebellion over.

Nov. 12,
1914.

Dec. 20,
1914.

At the time it was natural to assume that the rebellion was the outcome of a conspiracy fostered by German money and intrigue. Germany had long been the traditional counterpoise to Great Britain in South Africa ; German volunteers had fought manfully for the republics in the late war ; Beyers, as Commandant-General, had been made much of by the Kaiser shortly before the war ; many Afrikaners had studied at German universities or at those of Holland which had so much in common with them ; a strain of German blood ran in the veins of nearly all of them. Any such easy explanations must be set aside. There is little evidence to suggest that, at the start, there was any cut and dried conspiracy. Had there been, the outcome of the rebellion might have been very different, for Beyers was a fine soldier. Of Maritz's treachery there can be no question ; but, as far as the judicial evidence goes, it would seem that Kemp, de Wet and Maritz only began to act in concert in the latter part of October and that, as late as the first days of November, Beyers

¹ Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, II. 293 ff.

aimed at nothing more definite than ousting the ministry and stopping the South-West campaign.¹ As for German intrigue, intrigue there was ;² but the causes of the rebellion lay much deeper than anything it could have created. Opposition to the policy of invading South-West Africa brought a mass of fears, desires and prejudices to a head. Doubtless, some burghers took up arms for fear of their neighbours, others because they were told that the ministry wanted them to rebel as an excuse for withdrawing from the war, others because they thought that they were actually being called up by the authorities, others again because they believed that Steyn and Hertzog were the real leaders, a mistaken belief to which the silence of the Free State champions gave colour. Nor was the hope of *novae tabulae* wanting, for the drought was terrible, and jealousy, the besetting sin of the Afrikaners, was present in full measure among the leaders. But the prime motive forces which brought the mass of the rebels into the field were two : the longing to regain their lost independence and a very human desire to avenge themselves on Great Britain for their sufferings during the Anglo-Boer war. In short, England's adversity was the Afrikaner's opportunity. And underlying these motives, there was something else, a vague *malaise*, a feeling that the Afrikaners were somehow an oppressed people, oppressed by all the social, political and economic forces which, rightly or wrongly, they associated with the name of Britain. Maritz spoke for many when he announced that 'he did not want the land ruled by Englishmen, niggers, and Jews.'³ There was little bitterness against individual Englishmen. 'This,' said one old burgher, 'is a family affair between us Afrikaners. You Englishmen must keep out of it.'⁴ Essentially that was so. The rebels regarded Botha and Smuts as traitors to the people, who had made terms with all that threatened their way of life, and now stood in the way of independence. The ministry had lost the confidence of Het Volk ; it must therefore resign.

From this point of view, the rising was the old *gewapende opstand*, the appeal from votes in the Volksraad to the clicking of triggers at the door of the Volksraad chamber which Cloete had heard in Maritzburg in 1843 and more than one republican president since. It was the death rattle of Parliaments which had been heard more recently at the Curragh and in the Ulster of Carson and 'Galloper Smith.' From every other point of view, the *opstand* was a rebellion and to be treated as

¹ U.G. 46-16, pp. 42, 91, 102. Evidence before the Court of Inquiry was very incomplete. Many of those who knew most declined to appear.

² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

³ U.G. 10-15, pp. 28, 63.

⁴ Said by a burgher to one of the writer's brother officers.

such unless the Union was to become a puritan Mexico. Twelve hundred rebels were sent home on parole, but Defence Force officers taken redhanded were court-martialled, and one of them, Fourie, was shot; and when Parliament reassembled, four thousand men were still in prison awaiting sentence. A court of three judges was set up to try the more important prisoners,¹ and the bulk of the remainder were released subject to serious civil disabilities for ten years to come. Official provision for compensation for losses was rendered unnecessary in the Free State, where the damage had been greatest, by the formation of the *Helpmakaar Vereeniging* to assist loyalists and rebels alike. It was a hopeful phenomenon.

Botha now energetically pressed forward the attack on South-West Africa.² In any case that attack would have been no light matter, for the territory was in area three-quarters of the size of the Union itself and, thanks to an annual grant of £1,000,000 from Berlin, it was equipped with railways, roads, wireless, wells and with far more arms than could be used by the 3000 soldiers, police and able-bodied men amongst its 12,000 European inhabitants. Between the ports held by the Union forces and the grassy tablelands of the interior lay some 30 miles of waterless desert; the southern approach was almost as difficult; the line of attack from behind lay across the Kalahari Desert. It was now high summer and the delay caused by the rebellion meant that Botha would have to use a larger force than had at first been intended; but Parliament sanctioned a loan of £16,000,000 for two years of war and in April 1915 all was ready.

Botha struck in with three columns: one from the Orange by way of Warmbad and Keetmanshoop, and two others eastward from the ports. He entered Windhuk with the Swakopmund column in May and, after an incredibly rapid march of 120 miles in a week, received the surrender of the main German force of 4000 at Tsumeb in the north of the colony. Generally speaking, the warfare had been carried on with restraint by both sides. The Germans poisoned the wells and spread land mines, but they sometimes omitted to explode the one and always gave notice of the other; hence, though 50,000 South Africans took part in the campaign from first to last, their losses were very small. Botha, conciliatory in the hour of victory, gave excellent terms to the defeated Germans and returned home to fight a general election.³

¹ Acts 10 and 11 of 1915.

² Buxton, *Botha*, chapter v.; *Union and the War*, pp. 10 ff.

³ Union losses were 113 killed and 311 wounded. German officers were allowed to keep their arms and to settle in towns in the Union on parole; civil officials and reservists were permitted to remain in their homes on parole; the rank and file of the troops were interned but kept their arms without ammunition (*vide Eybers*, p. 570).

July 9,
1915.

As a party the Hertzogites had been strengthened by the rebellion and the South-West expedition. The great majority of those who had followed de Wet out of the S.A. Party congress in 1913 had been Free Staters. But from the first, they had had the support of men in the other provinces, and now they had won over more and more of those who believed that Botha was subordinating the interests of the Union to those of an Empire which was entangled at Gallipoli, threatened at the heart by the first submarine campaign and helpless to aid its Russian ally staggering under the hammer strokes of Hindenburg. They were numerous in the Free State and the Transvaal where they already called themselves Nationalists; they were sure of the support of the party which was forming in the Cape round the Rev. D. F. Malan of Graaff Reinet and they hoped also for the help of the Labour party. But Labour was divided. The international socialist wing broke away on the war issue, and though Creswell hurried back from South-West Africa to secure a great majority vote in favour of seeing the war through, he was too late to save the party. Electors in the towns, inflamed by the anti-German riots which had followed the sinking of the *Lusitania*, voted Unionist and almost wiped out the Labour party in Parliament. On the other hand the S.A. Party fared ill. Three ministers were defeated ¹ and Botha's followers found themselves a minority in the Assembly dependent on Smartt's Unionists, whose support would only be forthcoming so long as they prosecuted the war. The Nationalists came back as a compact group, supreme in the Free State and strong in the support of nearly half the whole rural electorate. They were now the real opposition entitled to all the prestige that that office carries with it.²

Oct.
1915.

The war on the home front was now waged with unremitting vigour. Holding, as they did, radically different views on the rights and wrongs of the world war, the parties had no lack of opportunity of joining battle. Beyond sending a few men to Nyassaland and Northern Rhodesia, the Union had been unable to despatch troops far afield till the Hun had been driven from the gate, and many men, impatient, had sailed to England or Australia to enlist on their own account. The Government now talked of sending a force to East Africa and called for volunteers for an infantry brigade and five batteries of heavy artillery for service in Europe. Other Dominion troops were highly paid, but the South Africans, after having been discharged at the close of the South-West campaign, were called

¹ Two in the O.F.S. and one in a Dopper constituency in the north-eastern Cape Province.

² S.A.P., 54 seats; Unionists, 40; Nationalists, 27; Labour, 3; Independents, 6. Votes cast for the S.A.P., 95,000; for the Nationalists, 77,000.

upon to re-enlist at the British rate of pay, the famous King's shilling a day.¹ The Unionists and Labour men demanded the full Union rate of 3s., the ministry proposed to make up the difference for the troops in Africa but to do nothing for the European contingent, and the Nationalists, who were calling for a loan to enable rebels to pay for the damage they had done, objected to any contribution at all. The release of many rebel prisoners on payment of fines and a promise to take no part in politics till their terms should be completed failed to placate the Nationalists, and Botha only silenced the Unionists and Labour men by warning them that any division on the pay question must run upon racial lines.

1916. Botha's difficulties were enhanced by Smuts's departure to take command of the heterogeneous force which, furnished by four or five distinct governments, was operating or rather failing to operate in East Africa. So he faced Parliament burdened with Smuts's portfolio as well as his own and, while the Germans sought to force their bloody way inch by inch into Verdun, carried an Enemy Trading Act in the teeth of Nationalist opposition.² The one bright spot on his political horizon was an unexpected surplus on the revenue; but the cost of living was becoming a serious matter; Smuts, robbed by a tardy subordinate of complete victory on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, continually asked for more money and more men to round up von Lettow's Germans and askaris; the South African brigade indeed made its name at Delville Wood during the Somme offensive, but was so shot to pieces in the process that it had to be virtually reconstituted.³ A projected rebellion, inspired perhaps by the wild doings in Dublin in Easter week and the first misleading news of the Battle of Jutland, was nipped in the bud thanks to de Wet's timely warning, but the Nationalists continued to 'fight constitutionally' and bitterly. Hertzog invited dissatisfied Englishmen to form a separate party and co-operate with his own, and his followers tried to stampede Botha's men by accusing the Premier of meditating coalition with the Unionists.

July
1916.

Botha strove to reassure his waverers by studied coolness to the Unionists. He even cherished hopes of Afrikaner reconciliation. The stirring of Afrikaner sentiment by the unveiling of the Bloemfontein memorial to the dead of the concentration camps, the death of Steyn, and the release of the last of the rebels seemed

¹ By the New Year of 1916, 7500 had gone to Europe independently and 1200 were in Nyassaland-Rhodesia. By April, 600 had taken Imperial commissions, 11,000 were with the Overseas Contingent, and 24,000 in East Africa. 50,000 South Africans in all served in East Africa exclusive of coloured troops and many native bearers.

² Act 39 of 1916.

³ J. Buchan, *South Africa in the War*, pp. 61 ff.

to pave the way for such a consummation. He called for a great national celebration of Dingaan's Day at Paardekraal. But the Nationalists would not dance to the piping of one who was sending a coloured battalion to East Africa and raising a Bantu labour corps of 10,000 for service behind the lines in Europe. They held rival celebrations and, a few months later, just as the Imperial War Conference assembled, began to preach republicanism openly.

Dec.
1916.May
1917.

Republicanism was stimulated by many causes. Men's nerves were frayed by the long-continued war; the Nationalists looked to the cry of 'republic' to rally the older folk in the ex-republics and the young men everywhere who, being young, were as much inclined to go to extremes as any Oxford undergraduates; they resented the settlement of the pay question whereby the Imperial Government was to pay the South African troops the full 3s. a day in return for a Union grant of £1,000,000 to general war expenses; they listened eagerly to the talk of 'self-determination' and the 'rights of small nations' which emanated from the Downing Street of Lloyd George and the White House of President Wilson; they hoped that the fall of the Czar and the entry at long last of the U.S.A. into the war on the side of the Allies would mean favours to republicans at the Peace Conference. True, their leaders counselled caution for the period of the war, but others were not so prudent.¹

The Nationalists as a party found in the wool controversy an excellent means of attacking the Imperial idea along the economic line. During 1916, with armies to be clothed on an unprecedented scale, wool farmers all the world over had made fortunes. They proposed to repeat the process in 1917. The intensified German submarine campaign, however, sadly restricted the shipping available and prevented the removal of part of the 1916 clip from South African warehouses. The British Government therefore offered to buy the whole of the 1917 clip at a price lower than that of the preceding year but none the less 55 per cent. higher than the pre-war rate. Nationalists saw in this a British plot to use the qualified command of the sea to swindle the wool farmers. They induced many of them to reject the offer and fell upon the Botha ministry so hotly that Smartt hinted at a Unionist-S.A. Party coalition.²


Oct.

1917.

Botha ostentatiously repudiated the very thought of a compact which would surely drive half his own followers into the Nationalist camp. He held on stolidly while the East African campaign dragged on and ill news came in from Europe of the Bolshevik revolution, the immobility of the French armies after

¹ *Vide* South African press *passim*.

² *Round Table*, No. 29.



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the disastrous attack on the Chemin des Dames, the losses of the British in the mud of Passchendaele, and the collapse of the Italians at Caporetto, ill news hardly compensated for by the British dash at Cambrai, the Italian stand on the Piave, and Allenby's romantic entry into Jerusalem. Recruiting, long concentrated on the overseas contingent, was becoming more difficult and Botha only stilled the Unionist cry for the conscription which homogeneous Australia had rejected, by declaring that he would have to recall the brigade from Europe to quell the consequent rebellion.¹ As it was, the Nationalists were demanding a complete amnesty for rebels, attacking him for his support of a British ministry which had seized Dutch ships carrying contraband, and opposing Smuts's departure to take part in the councils of the Empire in London. Dec. 1917.

Mutual rancours were raised to fever heat when tidings came in that the Germans had driven through the British line opposite Amiens and the Channel ports. The South African brigade had added to its laurels at Marrières Wood and the gunners at Givenchy,² but at home the attitude of the natives, resentful of the rising cost of living and the punishment of native strikers in Johannesburg, was so threatening and rumours of a coming Afrikander rebellion were so insistent that Botha was obliged to call on the natives to keep the peace and on all loyalists to stand by the authorities. Perhaps the talk of rebellion was as much the result of the recent resuscitation of the Intelligence Department as of anything else; but in any case, relief came at last from the intolerable strain. Foch struck near Rheims, the British began their tremendous thrust eastward from Amiens and, as the forces of the Central Powers crumpled from the Dardanelles to Scapa Flow by way of Mons and Sedan, men realised to their surprise that the Great War was at an end. March-April 1918.

For a short time it was freely believed that the republican agitation would cease with the gunfire. So far was this from being the case that the Nationalists sent a delegation to Europe to demand, at the hands of the Peace Conference, independence for all South Africa or, failing that, independence for the ex-republics or, in the last resort, independence for the Free State June 1918.

¹ The estimated total white man power of South Africa was 685,000. Of these 136,070 enrolled for service and 76,184 went overseas. In addition, 92,837 Bantu and coloured men served in various capacities. The percentage of Europeans who went overseas to the total white man power was 11.12 as compared with 13.48 from Canada, 13.43 from Australia, and 19.35 from New Zealand. The South African overseas effort was comparatively great, for the demands for men in East Africa were considerable and a large proportion of the Europeans were either unsympathetic or actively hostile to the Allied objects in the war (*Round Table*, No. 35, p. 496 sqq.).

² Buchan, *op. cit.*, pp. 162, 180, 272. Nov. 1918.

Dec. 1918. alone. Meanwhile Botha had taken his seat beside Smuts on the Imperial War Cabinet. In due time the two generals signed the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations not merely as members of the British delegation, but as representatives of the Union and, with a protest against the impossible penalties laid upon the fallen Germans, they returned home to give an account of their stewardship.

July 1919. Botha never lived to meet Parliament. After a short illness he died, worn out, at Pretoria. It thus fell to Smuts alone, robbed of his tactful *alter ego*, to face all the pre-war difficulties in a more acute form than ever and the many new problems which had arisen during the long struggle. Parliament ratified the Peace Treaty¹ and authorised the Government to accept the League's mandate for South-West Africa, and all parties acclaimed the new Premier when he called for a fresh start on the basis of industrial development and co-operation between the two white peoples. The only difficulty was to define the meaning of *co-operatie*, word beloved of Botha. The Unionists recalled Jameson's ideal of a 'best-man ministry' and offered to discuss amalgamation with the S.A. Party; but the call of the blood was still strong and Nationalists and S.A. Party men diligently sought a way towards the reunion of the divided Afrikaners.

Sept. 1919. The Nationalists accepted Lloyd George's gentle repulse of their delegation in Paris as definitely closing the question of separate independence for the ex-republics; but if, as the British Prime Minister claimed, the Union rested on a pact between Dutch and English which could not be repudiated by one only of the parties to it, that did not alter the fact that the South Africa Act was 'a scrap of paper'—the phrase was famous in those days—which could be modified at will by the two Houses and the King. Hertzog declined to give an assurance that he and his followers would join with the three other parties in cordially accepting the British connection as symbolised by the Crown; still less would he admit the truth of Smuts's contention that under its constitution the Union had no legal right to secede from the Empire. In short, in words reminiscent of Hofmeyr's softening of the early anti-British formulae of the Bond, he pointed to independence as the ideal but left it to the people to say whether or no they would actively seek to achieve it. Attempts to reunite the Afrikaners broke down and, as the life of both Houses would end in the following November, Smuts decided to fight an Assembly general election at once on the old party lines, trusting to the 'hearty co-operation' of the Unionists as in the past to give him a majority.

¹ Act 49 of 1919.

Apart from the hectic prosperity which followed the war, Smuts had few advantages in the coming struggle. The very prestige which he had gained in Europe was an offence to his opponents, and the domestic record of the Botha ministry was of little help to him. The record was that of a ministry harassed by war and the fear of civil war. It was by no means entirely barren. The very interdependence of the S.A. Party and the Unionists on the war issue had cleared the way for many valuable consolidating measures.¹ Something had been done for the administration of justice, more for the victims of miners' phthisis and still more for university education. The last of many commissions had solved that tangled problem. The old examining University of the Cape of Good Hope had been abolished, separate charters had been given to the Universities of Cape Town (S.A. College) and Stellenbosch (Victoria College), and the remaining widely scattered colleges had been federated as the University of South Africa.² The ministry had even tried its prentice hand at industrial legislation to meet new conditions but, at the same time, it had stirred up a hornets' nest among the Indians everywhere and had, according to its enemies, shown subserviency to the gold magnates in matters of finance and lack of courage in its social legislation.

At the beginning of the war the main sources of revenue had been the mines and the customs. Faced with a deficit and war expenditure, Parliament had heavily increased the customs and excise, rigorously cut down the income tax exemption, taken a special levy on gold-mining profits and appropriated the sinking fund and the land revenues.³ These measures had been followed by super-income, excess profits and diamond taxes and by drawing on the accumulated *bewaarplaatsen* funds.⁴ Each year a deficit was expected, but each year as loan money poured in and wool and bunkering coal poured out, a surplus had been forthcoming by dint of using all the special war levies for general purposes and putting down practically the whole of the war expenditure to loan account. On the other hand, as prices and working costs rose, the deficit on the railways had mounted up and men had begun to wonder how much longer the track or

¹ E.g. Insolvency, Patents, Trade Marks, Mental Disorders, Railway Regulations (1916), Electoral, Deeds and Justices of the Peace laws (1917).

² Acts 12, 13 and 14 of 1916.

³ Acts 26 of 1914 and 36 of 1917; 28 of 1914 and further Acts 1915-18; 34 of 1916.

⁴ *Bewaarplaatsen* (dumping grounds) had been set aside in the early days of the Rand. With the coming of deep-level mining these areas had become workable and the question had arisen as to who was entitled to the profits. Since 1908 these monies had been paid into the Treasury pending a settlement. In 1918 this fund amounted to some £2,000,000.

1918.

even the sturdy but irreplaceable British-built engines would stand the strain. The Nationalists and Labour men, meanwhile, censured the ministry for giving half the *bewaarplaatsen* funds to the owners of the surface lands instead of keeping the whole,¹ and for reducing the amount payable by the lessees of the first of the Government Mining Areas on the Far East Rand to become payable.²

June
1918.

But the most costly blunder of the Botha ministry had been its failure to handle the cost of living issue boldly. At the outbreak of the war, Parliament had come to the rescue of the banks and the producers of gold, wool and hides and had given the executive wide powers to regulate or even to undertake the supply of necessities. These powers had lain dormant till May 1916, when the cost of living including rents rose in the larger towns to 15 per cent. above the pre-war level. A permanent cost-of-living commission was then appointed to report monthly.³ A maximum price for sugar was presently fixed with good results, but in spite of a 23 per cent. rise in cost of living, serious sectional strikes on the Rand and a shortage of wheat due to lack of shipping, the ministry refused to follow the advice of the commissioners and fix a maximum price for wheat. The officially recognised 'Burton loaf,' a wholesome but somewhat insipid mixture of wheat, barley, rye and maize, was a poor substitute for action and an offence to half the housewives in the land. Similarly, a Moratorium Bill, designed to control rents and the supply of labour and stores to the mines or any other industry necessary to the public welfare, was opposed by an unholy alliance of farmers and diamond lords. Ministers voted against each other in the Assembly and the Bill was thrown out in another place at the end of the session in the odour of bad faith.⁴

March
1920.

Such a record was not to be wiped out by eleventh-hour promises of social and economic reform. Labour swept the towns at the expense of the Unionists, the Nationalists were returned as the largest single party, and the S.A. Party, the Unionists and Independents combined only gave the ministry a precarious majority of four.⁵

¹ Act 24 of 1917.

² Six such areas had been leased by public tender. The lessees of the first to become payable complained that the yield was so much richer than had been anticipated that they would have to pay a share to the state falling within the steeply graded upper portion of the government scale. The amount was reduced. At the same time the ministry declined to countenance state mining (Act 30 of 1918). *Vide* U.G. 6 and 19-17; U.G. 1 and 4-18.

³ Act 6 of 1918.

⁴ The Moratorium Act was passed in 1919 (No. 49) and extended in 1920 (No. 38).

⁵ S.A.P. 41; Unionists, 25; Independents, 3; Nationalists, 44; Labour, 21.

Condemned to carry through his reconstruction policy with Labour holding the balance, Smuts secured legislation more or less on British lines to check profiteering, speculation in food-stuffs and rackrenting, and to provide housing loans to municipalities.¹ Of other great outstanding problems, he touched only three: civil government for the South-West Africa Protectorate, currency and banking, and the administrative side of the native question. In the industrial sphere, the other side of the native question, nothing was attempted nor was it likely to be attempted till the ministry was assured of a compact majority. There was some hope of obtaining that, for party divisions were already beginning to leave the racial line. The S.A. Party and the Unionists on the whole worked well together and the *rapprochement* between the Nationalists and Labour men was becoming closer; but national sympathy attracted many of Smuts's followers towards the Hertzogites, who in turn, farmers as most of their constituents were, shrank from the socialistic tendencies of Labour.

The stumbling-block to this *hereeniging* of the two sections of the Afrikaners was, as ever, the question of the relation of the Union to the Empire. All could agree to put 'South Africa first' and to refrain from committing their country further to Great Britain, especially in the matter of the federal imperial council adumbrated by the Conference of 1917 and stoutly combated at the time by Smuts. Many S.A. Party men were willing to admit that secession, which had played but a small part in the recent elections, might come in time as South Africa developed as a free nation of the British Commonwealth; but few of them would agree that secession could come before the mass of both white peoples desired it. Still less were they willing to uphold 'sovereign independence' as the ideal or to admit the inherent right of a Dominion to secede. The S.A. Party and the Nationalists met in conference at Bloemfontein just after the latter had gained markedly at the provincial elections. They failed to agree, and Smuts called on 'all right-minded South Africans' to join a new party to defeat secession and the disastrous reactions which a Nationalist victory would presumably have on overseas investors of much-needed capital.

In spite of some resistance from Natal, fearful lest the towns be sacrificed to the backveld, the moderate party long ago envisaged by Jameson came into being. The Unionists joined an enlarged S.A. Party; three of them entered the cabinet;² the

¹ Acts 27, 29, 7 and 13, 35 of 1920.

² Sir T. Smartt, Agriculture; J. W. Jagger, Railways; P. Duncan, Interior, Education and Public Health.

Senate conveniently expired through effluxion of time and the Assembly was dissolved. The Nationalists tried to push secession into the background and to join Labour in fighting on the economic battleground; but the ministerialists pinned them down to the constitutional issue. At the polls they held their own, but Labour lost heavily, and the enlarged S.A. Party was returned with a majority of 22 over all others in the Assembly and a majority in the Senate which was increased by judicious nominations.¹

Smuts proposed to devote himself to finance and administration rather than to legislation, for he would have to justify himself on the economic plane to which party divisions were clearly tending. Unluckily for his hopes, the European markets, balkanised and crushed by reparations, were so helpless that Great Britain had to step in where Germany had failed and buy a large part of the 1919 South African wool clip at pre-war rates, rates which were none the less nearly 20 per cent. in advance of current prices. Then the British post-war boom collapsed and the South African boom collapsed in sympathy.

Smuts had already taken some steps to prepare for bad times. Previous to the outbreak of the war the large corporations which practically monopolised South African banking had had a restricted right of issuing notes.² Parliament had then recognised notes of less than the customary £5 as legal tender anywhere and exchangeable for gold at the banks' head offices, and had forbidden the export of gold. That export had, however, continued to such an extent that the mines and therefore the banks were obliged to import gold to pay the natives who were suspicious of paper. Restrictions on the export of bullion had then been withdrawn. Gold at once left depreciated sterling and went to a premium on the basis of the gold dollar of the U.S.A. which had returned to the gold standard in May. As the premium rose upwards to 40 per cent., the sinking percentage of working costs to yield promised a new lease of life to the low-grade gold-mines which had hitherto been troubled by the rising cost of stores and labour. Meanwhile, the world demand for wool and other raw products stimulated exports, the banks gave credit freely and huge balances accumulated in London. To recover these the banks suddenly restricted business and, by their large discounts, hit the farmers, depleted local deposits and went far to wipe out the profits accruing to the mines from the gold premium.

The Government, therefore, took power to issue treasury

¹ The Nationalists held 45 Assembly seats as at the end of the session, but Labour fell from 25 to 10, even Creswell losing his seat on the Rand.

² The chief were the Standard Bank, National Bank, and Bank of Africa.

Feb.
1921.

Oct.—
Nov.
1920.

July
1919.

gold-certificates as legal tender against gold and to suspend redemption of these certificates should gold exceed a certain price.¹ At the same time the sole right of issuing notes was entrusted to a central reserve bank with limited powers, of whose capital the commercial banks, sorely against the grain, were called upon to subscribe half. Gold payments were suspended just as the depression struck the Union.² The panic-stricken banks abruptly shortened credit; overstocked merchants, shopkeepers and speculators were ruined; the premium dropped so fast that some of the weaker low-grade mines had to close down; Kimberley followed suit; produce prices fell to the damage of the farmers, and falling wages largely cancelled the benefits of falling prices in the towns. The poor white problem, veiled by the good times, became insistent at the very moment that the Government began to talk of modifying the rent and other emergency laws of 1920, promised heavier taxation to meet the deficit which was piling up as customs and mining revenues fell away, and proceeded to cut down the war bonus in the railway and civil services. Soon the eight-hour day on the railways was threatened and the railway administration was borrowing from an exhausted Treasury to pay the interest which it had failed to find in the high and ever higher rates that were killing the export trade in coal. Labour, for its part, demanded a state bank. 1920

Under these depressing circumstances the ministry set about industrialising South Africa in earnest. It was in industry that Smuts proposed to find room for such poor whites as could not obtain employment on the farms, for the attempt to re-establish them as independent cultivators of the soil had been tried too often to warrant a repetition. Before the war the exports of the Union had been almost entirely primary: gold and diamonds, which together stood for ten-thirteenths of the total production of the country³ and the source of livelihood to the great majority of its inhabitants; then wool, hides, feathers and mealies. The mining and luxury era had reached its zenith at the time of Union and was already passing in 1914. Some of the older gold-mines had been already worked out; ostrich feathers had suffered severely and diamonds had been over-produced before war had come to cause the downfall of the one and the temporary eclipse of the other. 1914

On the other hand, Kimberley had soon recovered sufficiently to be specially taxed and the agricultural revival, much of it 1916.

¹ Act 31 of 1920.

² The treasury certificate clauses held good till June 30, 1923. They were then extended till June 30, 1925, when South Africa returned to the gold standard (Act 22 of 1923; *Round Table*, Nos. 57 and 59).

³ £49,600,000 out of a total production of £65,000,000 in 1913.

the fruit of Milner's reconstruction, had made great strides. The ostriches, departing, had left behind them fences and lucerne, the produce markets had boomed during the war and the Union had taken its first agricultural census. Prices had fallen disastrously since the Armistice, but now the price of wool was once more rising and great preparations were being made for the export of fruit. South Africa was, in short, beginning to export not merely goods of small bulk and high value, in mediæval style, but goods which would fill a modern cargo ship and justify ship-owners in reducing outward freights in the expectation of a homeward load. Already bunkering coal had pointed that lesson. Nevertheless as late as 1917 South Africans were still thinking in terms of primary products and bewailing their failure to supply themselves with their own wheat.

In that year, South Africans began to note the new manufacturing industries which were sprouting in the forcing-house of the war. The Botha ministry took action. It held an industrial census, passed a Workmen's Compensation Act and, in the following year, passed Factory and Wages Acts on British lines.¹ The Smuts ministry now provided juvenile affairs boards,² but the Senate threw out supplementary bills for regulating wages and apprenticeship on the last day of the session, to the prejudice of the ministry's reputation for good faith. Meanwhile, ministers had flirted with the idea of protection since reading the report of an industrial commission shortly before the war.³ They now talked of bounties to the steel and iron works which were to spring up near Pretoria, promised to set up a tariff board which should frame a 'scientific tariff' in place of the rough 15-20 per cent. *ad valorem* system then in vogue, and, after inspecting a display of wares in the lobby of the House, gave boot manufacturers a double measure of protection on the spot. In the next session they carried an Anti-dumping Act to protect the nascent industries of the Union from competition with those of laborious Central Europe.⁴

The industrialisation of South Africa thus tentatively undertaken was a matter of extraordinary difficulty. Here was a

¹ Acts 13 of 1917 and 28 and 29 of 1918. Under the Regulation of Wages Act, Boards were set up to fix minimum wages for women and young persons. These Boards did not prove very effective; part of the Act fell into disuse and, in 1925, the whole of it was replaced by a new Wages Act (27 of 1925). This Act provided for a Wages Board of three members, to which the Minister of Labour might add one representative of employers and another of employees (U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 46 ff.).

² Act 33 of 1921. The Act provided machinery for guiding youngsters from the schools to industries. It has fulfilled its purpose (*ibid.*).

³ U.G. 10-12.

⁴ Act 13 of 1922. This protective policy has been carried still further by the Nationalist-Labour Government of 1924.

huge country with a mixed population of less than 15 to the square mile, that is, less than one-thirteenth of the density of the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.¹ The points at which population was massed lay hundreds of miles apart and could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Four-fifths of the wage-earning population were non-Europeans; three-fourths of the total population and 44 per cent. of the European population lived upon the land. In the reserves, the Bantu farmed at a mere subsistence level; native wages on the farms outside the reserves were very low and, in many parts, agriculture was not on a cash basis nor even on a wage basis.² Only five per cent. of European farm-lands were actually under cultivation; wide distances enhanced the costs of collection and distribution; and, arising out of it all, was the growing problem of the poor whites.³

The industrial problem was governed, as it always had been, by the fact that the purchasing and productive power of the vast majority of the population was painfully low. The swarming Bantu had not half the purchasing power of the Europeans who themselves numbered less than the population of many a European city; the coloured folk and Indians were indeed paid better than the natives, but their wages were always lower than those of white men in industries other than agriculture; and among white men the rates of pay for artisans in many dorps were only half or less than half those in the bigger centres; indeed, the 'spread' of wages between different industries and different districts was 'several times as great as in any other country.'⁴

Yet in the principal urban areas, European artisans drew higher pay than in any European country, and even unskilled coloured labourers drew better wages than unskilled men in such cities as Milan, Brussels and Berlin. It was not only nominal wages that were high, but real wages also, higher than in any other parts except the U.S.A., Canada and Australia, and that without any phenomenal efficiency on the part of the men who drew the wages. Moreover, the national income was low. The

¹ U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 75.

² *E.g.* in Ventersdorp (Transvaal) only half a dozen farmers in the district pay cash wages, of 20s.-40s. per month. Instead, farmers plough up 3 to 6 morgen of land for each native family on their farms and give grazing rights. Native men work all the year round for this, women and girls when required. In Dordrecht (Cape) some men are paid wholly in kind, five sheep or one heifer every six months, with food (including an occasional meat ration), lodging, clothes and boots as required, grazing for stock and dipping for sheep. Frequently a month's service means 30 working days (U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 13 ff.). In short, the South African agricultural system is, in many ways, still in the fourteenth century.

³ U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 115.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 12, 34, 160.

annual production per head of those working under European supervision was less than £100 per annum; if the reserve natives were included, it was £43; if the total population, occupied and unoccupied, were taken into account, it was £26. In other words, the Union's capacity to pay was that of crowded European countries like Italy; the actual wages paid to its Europeans was on the United States and Canadian scales. Between the two, there was a great gulf fixed. It was bridged by underpaying the vast mass of the workers.¹

There were those who questioned the wisdom of the industrial policy which the ministry had adopted. Was industry, they asked, the proper haven of refuge for the poor white, South Africa's Old Man of the Sea? Was he the kind of material out of which a successful industrialist could be made? Would it not be better to make one more effort to plant him on the land, or at least to check his manufacture by turning away from the misleading parallel of Great Britain's experiences during her industrial and agricultural revolutions and looking rather to Ireland, where security of tenure had transformed the feckless tenant-at-will, the Irish *bijwoner*, into a reasonably contented peasant?² For the rest, they said, encourage farming by keeping down the cost of living and therefore the cost of production, instead of bolstering up industries which contributed less than 17 per cent. of the national income. The ministry's policy might have its advantages but a reduction of the cost of living was not numbered among them; yet South Africa, more than most countries, must keep a watchful eye on costs of production for the world market. The self-contained U.S.A. with an enormous home market might be content to export only one tithe of its annual production; the United Kingdom, a great trading community, could only afford to export one-third; but the Union, with its tiny and isolated home market, had to export over half. Each year, nearly all South Africa's gold, itself representing nearly one-fifth of its total income, its diamonds, much of its coal and other minerals and, above all, more than one-third of its farm produce must go overseas or be left upon the producers' hands as in the bad old days of the Dutch East India Company.³

The critics of the new protective policy were as voices crying in the wilderness. The great majority of men of all parties were

¹ 96 per cent. of those of all races earning less than £500 p.a. drew less than £240 in cash; 90 per cent. drew less than £120; 80 per cent. less than £80; 54 per cent. less than £36 (U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 264; *vide* also *ibid.*, pp. 26, 33, 77, 80).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 115, 167.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 159 ff.

in favour of protection, those of the growing Nationalist-Labour opposition even more strongly than the ministerialists. But the social legislation which accompanied the protective laws, typified by the juvenile affairs boards, marked a turning-point in the history of South Africa. It was a virtual admission that the labour policy of the past two and a half centuries had been a grand mistake. Hitherto white South Africa had striven to persuade or to compel black and brown South Africa to work for it and that cheaply. Now some few white men, more far-sighted than the rest, were suggesting that low-paid labour was not cheap in the long run and that it was no good thing that the bulk of the work should be done by those whose productive powers were lowest and whose consumption, based on low wages, was low in proportion. Captain de Chavonnes and Dr. Philip had, each in his generation, pointed the same moral and now at last men were prepared to hearken. White youths relying on coloured men never learnt how to work; they would not start at the bottom of the ladder alongside of them and so had small hope of reaching the top by their own unaided efforts. 'Cheap' labour was proving to be a substitute for brains in South Africa as elsewhere, and the new census showed that the Union, for all its gold and diamonds, was a poor country overrun by middlemen.¹ The history of the farms and of the mines showed that in all occupations not requiring skill the scales were weighted heavily against the highly paid white man. Was that story to be repeated in the new factories?

Some men, especially in the south, held that the only way to save Western civilisation was to train European youths for the new and old industries, to fix minimum wages and to admit non-Europeans to the trade unions on definite terms and thus prevent them from pulling down the European standard of life. Part of that policy had been half-heartedly adopted by the ministry. Others in the more dogmatic and nervous north demanded that since black and brown South Africa after these many years had at last learnt the dignity of labour, they must be prevented from working, at all events in competition with the white man, by the extension of the colour bar. In any case, white men realised that the problem of the non-Europeans was merely the other side of their own.

The non-European problem resolved itself into three: that of the coloured man proper, of the Indian and of the Bantu. The first was by far the simplest. The coloured folk lived mainly in the western districts of the egalitarian Cape. They and their fathers had never known a civilisation other than the European.

¹ U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 119.

Their ideas and mode of life could make them, politically and economically, a positive source of strength to white society if properly handled, for they were, generally speaking, merely the poorer members of that society. But the main industrial development was not about to take place in the Cape province. The necessary minerals and machinery, much of the transport and most of the capital were to be found in the Transvaal and in Natal, the home of the Indians and of the Bantu. Serious trouble was threatened by the Africans. Trouble no less serious had already arisen with the Asiatics.

1914. South Africans had hardly realised the bitterness aroused in India by the events which had preceded the Smuts-Gandhi Agreement nor did they appreciate the meaning of many events which had happened since. India had served the Empire well during the war; she had been represented at Imperial Conferences and at Versailles; the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were about to witness to her enhanced political status. At successive Imperial Conferences, Indian spokesmen had pressed for the removal of the disabilities laid upon their countrymen in Dominions whose ranks India had now virtually joined. No resolution was taken on that head in 1917, Smuts merely remarking that the Immigration Act of 1913 had allayed the fears of Europeans lest they be swamped, and that other subsidiary matters could easily be dealt with. Next year both India and 1917. South Africa readily accepted the principle, a mere affirmation of existing practice, that each part of the Empire had the right of regulating the composition of its population. At the same time the Indian delegates gathered that their request for the repeal of the Transvaal laws which restricted the right of Indians to hold or own land, *videlicet*, to trade, would be sympathetically considered.¹ 1918.

1916. It was on this point that the quarrel between India and the Union was renewed.² The indenture system with all its evils had ended in Natal. It was now ending as far as Indians were concerned all the world over. In South Africa the immigration and cognate laws which had formed the main topic of the 1914 inquiries and negotiations had ceased to be a serious source of grievance. On the other hand, South Africans still wrongly believed that Indians were increasing faster than Europeans in Natal, and, probably with more justice, that they were still evading the Transvaal immigration regulations. What was certain was that Indians had found loopholes in the Transvaal

¹ Andrews, *Documents re New Asiatic Bill*, p. 19.

² *Round Table*, Nos. 38, 46, 63.

law forbidding Asiatics to own fixed property. They formed limited liability companies which, not being individuals, could hardly be Asiatics incapable of owning land, or they induced Europeans to buy land and mortgage it to them at cost price.¹

Indian traders were thus spreading along the Rand and, by reason of the colour prejudice against them and their habit of sub-letting rooms to swarming families, were depreciating the property of white neighbours who already complained of their unfair competition. Be that as it may, municipal councils had latterly sought to combat the invasion by withholding trading licences from Indians as undesirables ; but when the Krugersdorp magistrate upheld three Indian appeals, the city fathers had recourse to the hitherto ineffective Gold Law of 1908. They procured an injunction against a European who proposed to lease proclaimed land to an Indian trader. At once, applications for injunctions came 'thick as autumnal leaves in Vallombrosa.'

Parliament, on the advice of a select committee, forbade the issue of new though not the re-issue of existing licences to Indians in mining areas, and stopped the limited liability and mortgage loopholes ; but it maintained such vested rights as had arisen by those means prior to May 1919.²

Protests against the Act poured in from India and from Anglo-India ; the South African Indians talked of an appeal to the League of Nations to uphold their inherent right to trade, at all events in competition with the Greeks and East European Jews who formed so large a proportion of their adversaries and whose style of life and conception of business were not vastly superior to their own ; Gandhi confessed that he could see no final solution of the land and trading problems ; but, outside the Transvaal towns, South Africans were inclined to take the matter quietly, trusting to time, education, and the enforcement of sanitary regulations, however unpleasant that might be for slum landlords of all races, to raise the Indians' standard of life. In spite of bickering over the issue of trading licences as Indians penetrated the Cape ports, there was hardly any talk of repatriation there ; coastal Natal would frankly have missed them had they gone ; and the general situation was eased somewhat by the départure of 4000 Madrassis who asked an eager Government to help them home to escape the rising cost of living.³ But

¹ Of the 16,000 Transvaal traders in 1921, 5816 were Indians. There had been only three limited liability companies of this sort in 1913 ; in May 1919 there were 370.

² Act 37 of 1919 ; *Report of Select Committee on Indian Disabilities*, April 1919.

³ Voluntary repatriation stimulated by a state bonus has since taken place, e.g. 2787 in 1923 ; 1063 in 1924 ; 1400 in 1925, or a total of 31,000 (1914-25).

anti-Indian leagues in the Transvaal kept the agitation alive, and these leagues were presently reinforced by others in Natal, where some of the Europeans objected to the spread of Indians into the farm-lands outside the semi-tropical coast belt.

In the course of the quarrel the question arose as to the meaning of the 'vested rights' which, under the Smuts-Gandhi Agreement, were to be duly regarded in the administration of then existing laws. It was a question which vitally concerned the Imperial and Indian governments, for Secretaries of State in the past had accepted unpalatable Natal and Transvaal immigration laws as the best means of ensuring fair treatment for Indians already in those colonies. The Indian authorities and many others, including the Solomon Commission, had interpreted the 1914 agreement to mean that 'no new law would be passed imposing fresh restrictions on Indians'; in other words, that the 1914 status of Indians would be maintained.¹ The inquiries and negotiations of 1914 had turned mainly on the immigration question which was not now in dispute; but a letter written by Gandhi shortly after the conclusion of the Agreement now came to light for the first time. It did not form part of that Agreement but was avowedly a note on the vested rights which were to be safeguarded under the Gold Law of 1908. Therein Gandhi stated that he had not pressed for a definition of vested rights under that head lest he thereby tied the hands of his countrymen, but that, in reply to an inquiry, he interpreted them to be freedom for an Indian or his successor to live and trade anywhere in the township in which he was then established. This was the very point at issue, and the Indians, eager to gain the right to hold land, jumped at this letter and held it up as a full definition of all the vested rights that Gandhi had had in mind in 1914.²

The Indians thus laid themselves open to having rights other than those covered by Gandhi's note on the Gold Law materially reduced, and prejudiced their case before the commission which, again assisted by Sir Benjamin Robertson, investigated the question. That commission recommended the encouragement of voluntary repatriation and segregation, the limitation of new licences to special Asiatic quarters, the long overdue consolidation of licensing laws throughout the Union, the strict enforcement of the immigration laws and, with one dissentient, the restriction of the right of Indians to hold farm-lands to the coast belt of Natal.³ For the time being the ministry took no action, but at the Imperial Conference, what time the Governor-General was withholding his assent from a Natal ordinance depriving Indians of the municipal

¹ Andrews, *Documents re New Asiatic Bill*, pp. 26 ff., 31 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33; *Cape Times*, Jan. 22, 23 and 27, 1926.

³ U.G. 4-21.

franchise,¹ Smuts on economic grounds declined to commit South Africa to the policy adopted by the other Dominions of admitting domiciled Indians to 'rights of citizenship.'²

The Indian problem was more a matter of retail trade than of labour. The crux of the labour problem was the position to be held by the Bantu. In spite of a high infantile death-rate and the tuberculosis, syphilis and typhus which played havoc with adult natives in their kraals and still more in the slums of the towns, Europeans commonly believed that they were increasing very much faster than themselves.³ It was a mistaken belief, but what was plain for all men to see was that a great change had come over the Bantu during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The tribal system was crumbling. Native custom was so far being modified that in some cases natives paid money instead of the sacred lobola cattle, committing under European influence the very 'sin of buying wives' which had horrified Sir Harry Smith in days gone by. Divided though they were, they were growing in solidarity, realising that they were the basis of society and losing faith in the white man's religion and education.

They were roughly divided into four classes: those who lived in the reserves, often in the direst poverty and always under such conditions that a great number of men had to supplement their

¹ Indians were deprived of the Natal municipal franchise in 1924-5 (Ord. 19 of 1924 and 3 of 1925). Natal also forbade Indians to buy or lease municipal land (Ord. 5 of 1923). The Transvaal asked applicants for trading licences to produce certificates of fitness from competent authorities (Ord. 12 of 1926).

² There were 166,000 Asiatics in the Union in 1921, of whom nearly 70 per cent. had been born in the country. There were 1200 Indians in Canada, 3000 in Australia, and 600 in New Zealand. The Indians in Natal numbered 141,000; the Europeans, who were rapidly overtaking them, 136,000. (Europeans in Natal now outnumber Indians and are increasing faster than them in the Transvaal.) Smuts reaffirmed his position at the Conference of 1923 (Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 22). In April 1924 a Class Areas Bill was brought forward for the second reading. It went further in some respects than the recommendations of the 1920 commission and provided for compulsory segregation for residential and trading purposes. The Smuts Ministry then fell, but the measure was taken up in practically the same form by the Hertzog Ministry in 1925. It was not carried, but was reintroduced in a more drastic form as the Areas Reservation Bill of 1926. Direct negotiations between the Indian and South African Governments resulted in an amicable arrangement and the Bill was dropped (1927).

³ It is difficult to estimate the relative increases of the various peoples of South Africa. The census of 1904 was defective as far as natives were concerned. The first Union census of 1911 was not much better. The census of 1921 was, therefore, the first reliable numbering. The slaughterings among the Bantu in the early part of the nineteenth century have almost certainly been overestimated. There was much displacement. (Roberts, *Reflections on Population*; *Cape Argus*, June 27, 1925 (article by W. Macmillan).)

	Europeans.	Coloured.	Asiatics.	Bantu.
1911 . . .	1,276,000	428,000 (ca.)	150,000 (ca.)	4,019,000.
1921 . . .	1,519,000	545,000	166,000	4,698,000.

The proportion of Europeans to others in 1921 was thus about 1 : 3.5.

earnings by going outside to work ; those, a great number, who lived as squatters or labour tenants on European farms ; the growing class of more or less detribalised natives who lived in the towns or on the farms, including those who came on short-term contracts to the mines either from within the Union or from Portuguese East Africa ; and, lastly, the small class of educated natives who had emancipated themselves completely from tribal conditions. The threat to the European skilled labour monopoly arose from the third and fourth classes. As yet, from lack of skill and experience, native competition in manufactures was not severe,¹ but, on the gold-mines, many natives had risen from the ranks of unskilled to those of semi-skilled labour. They had done work which should have been done by their white bosses either because those bosses would not or, in the case of some of the newly-arrived miners, could not do it. In any case, the Bantu were learning, and the inducements held out to the mine-owners to employ them on higher grade work were almost overwhelming. They thrived on a wage which spelt starvation to white men ; they required a smaller contribution from the management towards miners' phthisis benefit ; they could be compounded ; they were amenable to the criminal law for breach of contract ; they had neither trade unions nor votes.

It was useless simply to shut the door in the faces of the Bantu. If their entry into industry was to be checked, they must be given alternative outlets for their energies.² The obvious outlet was on the land, and the idea underlying the Natives Land Act of 1913 had been territorial segregation. The work of the Beaumont Commission appointed to set aside additional native areas had been delayed by the war ; but the mere expectation of its report quieted the agitation against an Act which was of its nature temporary, and loyalty to the Great White King called forth thousands of Bantu to willing labour behind the lines in Flanders and East Africa.

1916.

The report when it did come was not a hopeful document.³ It proposed to add 4,000,000 acres to the 6,000,000 already set aside for the Bantu ; that is, to allocate 13 per cent. of the area of the Union to 4,500,000 natives and the remainder to some 2,000,000 Europeans and others. It is true that much of the land occupied by Europeans had been taken before ever the Bantu had appeared in those parts and much more while they

¹ The proportion of Europeans to others varied inversely as the size of the factories. The native population increased by nearly 700,000 between 1911 and 1921. Most of the newcomers found work without displacing Europeans, whose numbers had also increased. The use of labour-saving machinery was accompanied by the employment of more men (U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 102).

² *Vide* reports of commissions (1906-22) quoted by U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 122 ff.

³ U.G. 19, 22 and 25 of 1916.

had been temporarily absent, but a great deal had been simply occupied regardless of any claims the natives might have had upon it. Outside the Cape province, Crown lands had been freely taken up in this way since 1913 and the natives resident thereon had been given the choice of moving elsewhere or of taking service with the new owner. This process had gone so far that the commission confessed that there was little hope of giving the Bantu large, compact blocks of land on which to develop along their own lines. White men would not have their farms included in such areas, and many of them were asking why the natives were to have the good land that the commission actually proposed to give them.

In spite of many excellent provisions, the Native Administration Bill based on the report still left natives, outside their own areas, dependent on their masters and gave the executive no ^{1917.} power to expropriate land-owners who held out for fancy prices. The Assembly divided on racial lines and the measure was shelved. Provincial commissions ¹ then traversed the same ground as the Beaumont Commission with a like result, and all that Smuts and Hertzog could suggest was that natives should be permitted to acquire land in the areas common to the various reports and that further provision be made at a more convenient season. Beyond giving effect to the first suggestion and administering native affairs well or ill according to the system in vogue in various parts of the Union, nothing further was done to meet the needs of the Bantu. So the men of 'the black house' lost faith in the good intentions of their rulers and, as the years ran on, the solution of the land question became more difficult.

Meanwhile other grievances rankled. Educated natives and semi-skilled 'boys' on the mines resented the pass laws and the colour bar enforced in the ex-republics; the mass of their fellows were harassed by low wages, the rising cost of living ² and a sense of bewilderment at the white man's conception of law. Why should the magistrate regard so many deeds as crimes which to them were merely *delicta privata* to be atoned for by wergild? The meaning of debt they understood as fully as did the labour touts who traded on their knowledge; but what was a contract? Why should not a man change his mind if he wanted to?

The connection between contract and the cost of living was brought home to the native mind abruptly. The white employees at the Johannesburg power-station struck, refused the good offices ^{May-} of the other trade unions and forced the city council to capitulate. ^{July} 1918.

¹ U.G. 8, 22, 23, 31, 34 and 41-18.

² On economic condition of the natives *vide* U.G. 14-26; *Cape Times*, April 12, 1926 (*At the Roots*, by W. Macmillan); S.C. 6a and 10-27.

The underpaid native sanitary boys tried to follow their example but, being subject to the criminal law, were punished by the magistrate. Immediately afterwards the white gold-miners were strong enough to oblige the Chamber to sign the Status Quo Agreement entrenching them in their employments as against non-Europeans.

1920. The contrast was too glaring to be passed over. Something had to be done. Smuts dealt with one side of the sorely inflamed problem.¹ He set up a permanent Native Affairs Commission to advise the Prime Minister on all matters concerning natives, provided for the extension of the Transkeian system of local government and taxation to all native areas, and proposed to summon conferences of chiefs, headmen and other Bantu dignitaries from time to time. It was a great step forward in one respect. It promised the personal touch and the solemn debate beloved of the tribesmen, and it offered them a sounder training in local government than was enjoyed by many Europeans in the Union; but it left the vital matter of the land untouched. The delimitation of new reserves was only to take place after the economic and administrative relations of the two races had been established on a firmer footing.

Then another aspect of the native question was revealed. In spite of a recent increase of wages, the first since the outbreak of the war, there had already been passive resistance by natives on the Rand, a student riot at the Lovedale native college, and a serious native strike at Port Elizabeth accompanied by indiscriminate shooting on the part of unauthorised Europeans. Religion now came to inflame the economic and racial quarrel. Overmuch study of the more sanguinary portions of the Old Testament had produced some 160 native sects, all Chosen People, nearly all independent of European control and many duly furnished with prophets. One of these sects, the Israelites, led by their prophet Enoch, had settled in the Bulhoek native location near Queenstown much to the annoyance of the permanent inhabitants. At first they had merely come annually as to a Zion to feast, but now the local officials unwisely treated Enoch as headman and he, repeatedly defying the law, tried to organise an anti-European conspiracy. The failure of an attempt to eject the Israelites by police, who were notoriously under orders not to fire, hardened the hearts of a people who were taught that bullets could not harm them. At last, after repeated attempts to persuade them to go away, the Native Affairs Commission recommended that force be used. The Israelites charged the 800 police like Dervishes and were shot down in scores.² A judicial commission exonerated

May
1921.

¹ Act 23 of 1920.

² Report of *Native Affairs Commission*, A 4-21.

the authorities from blame save for their disregard of Livingstone's advice never to point a gun at a native unless you mean to shoot ; but the incident had ugly reverberations among Bantu who, like any Nationalists, were talking of 'self-determination.' In response to a rumour that the King's veto on legislation was to be abolished, some of them asked for representation at the next Imperial Conference.

The stormy course of native politics awakened a new interest in the whole question among those Europeans who were frank enough to acknowledge and to lament their ignorance of native customs and point of view. The University of Cape Town, after many efforts, founded a school of anthropology primarily to study African life and languages ; the University of the Witwatersrand, which had recently broken away from the federal University of South Africa,¹ followed its example, and presently the study was taken up at the College at the seat of government itself. Unluckily, before these hopeful movements had been fairly set on foot, the whole of the social, economic and political issues bound up with the native question ran together with a crash which shook the Union to its foundations.

The ministry, suffering as had Jameson's from the internal strains set up by differences of opinion on the score of free trade and land taxing, had laid itself open to the charge that it was showing more energy in cutting down wages and war bonuses than in reducing the cost of living. It was a charge which Labour and the Nationalists were not slow to bring. Labour had done well at recent by-elections, and it was at this moment that the Chamber of Mines, in Labour's eyes the master of the Government, essayed to modify the colour bar. Nov. 1921.

The Chamber took up an eighteen-months'-old report of a commission which had been appointed at a time when the low-grade mines were fighting a losing battle against rising working costs. The commission had recommended that, in view of recent advances in medical knowledge, the recruiting of tropical labour from beyond the 22nd degree of south latitude should be permitted temporarily, that mining should be reorganised so as to give the labourers a longer spell on the actual 'face,' and, against the wishes of the three Labour commissioners, that the unions be asked to agree to the removal of the colour bar.² That colour bar was of two kinds: the so-called statutory bar embodied in regulations framed under the Mines and Works Act, and the conventional

¹ Its place in that body was taken by the Potchefstroom College (Act 19 of 1921).

² U.G. 34-20. In 1921, the statutory colour bar protected 7057 men in 32 occupations, the conventional bar 4020 in 19 more.

bar secured by the Status Quo Agreement whereby the Chamber, while refusing to dismiss non-Europeans already engaged on semi-skilled work, undertook not to prejudice the position of Europeans further. No action had been taken on the report at the time, for the gold premium had come to the rescue; but, now that the premium had fallen from 42s. per ounce to 19s., the Chamber felt that it must act.¹ It first persuaded the unions to agree to a reorganisation of work in the mines and then, terrified at a further rapid fall of the premium, proposed to give up the existing costly system of mining by contract and to employ non-Europeans on semi-skilled work.

Battle was thus joined on the ground where the most efficient of the coloured peoples pressed hardest upon the least efficient of the whites. It was a serious matter for those immediately concerned. If the premium disappeared, 24 of the 39 producing mines might expect to make losses which would drive them to discharge 10,000 whites and many thousands of blacks; if the men accepted the Chamber's terms, 2000 of their weaker brethren would lose their jobs, though some of them would be reabsorbed as the richer mines recruited their full tale of native labourers.² But it was also a serious matter for Labour all over South Africa. The scarcity of skilled men, the soaring cost of living and the extravagance bred of great expectations in the early days of the diamond mines of Kimberley and the gold mines of the Rand had set the standard of white artisans' pay very high. The railways had taken their cue from the mines, the engineering trades from the railways, and so it had gone till the tradition had grown up that a pound a day was the birth-right of all white workers. The nearer to the Rand, the more that ambition was likely to be realised and, now, the very citadel of the Rand was threatened.³

The Chamber and the Rand Federation of Trades conferred hopefully and adjourned but, before they could meet again, the coal-owners, thinking to save their export trade, tried to cut wages and refused the Government's offer of mediation which the men had already accepted. It was the signal for general confusion. The gold-owners gave the legal month's notice to terminate the Status Quo Agreement without prejudice to current negotiations, the Transvaal coal-miners struck, and the gold-miners, not unnaturally reading the Chamber's notice as an ultimatum, joined hands with the discontented engineering staffs and struck too. With over 20,000 Europeans and 180,000

¹ It fell from 104s. to 97s. 4d. in a few days. The pre-war price of gold was 85s. per oz.

² There was no scheme of industrial insurance to tide displaced workmen over.

³ U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 84 ff., 151.

Dec. 9,
1921.

Dec. 15,
1921.

Jan. 10,
1922.

natives thus standing idle, negotiations soon broke down. In response to Smuts's offer of mediation, the Chamber proposed a ratio of employment of one European to 10.5 natives. The Federation retorted with a demand for a population ratio of one to 3.5 enforceable by law on all industries save agriculture, and called for help against a ministry which refused to protect the white race.¹

The cry was an answer to a hint. Just before the coal strike, Tielman Roos, leader of the Transvaal Nationalists, had bidden his people stay quietly on their farms in case of trouble, apparently to avoid spoiling the prospect of co-operation between themselves and Labour at the next elections. The prospect was a good one. The Mine Workers' Union was full of disinherited Afrikaners from the land. These men formed the majority of the 'commandos' which, variously armed, paraded the Reef and flocked to a mass meeting to demand a provisional republican government, while Roos summoned an informal congress of Transvaal parliamentarians at Pretoria. The Chamber then offered to retain half the men marked for dismissal pending an inquiry; but the Federation held out for resumption of work on the old terms, and so the struggle dragged on, working havoc with trade and revenue and railway receipts, while native labourers were sent home wholesale. Even were the strike to end at once they could not be speedily replaced; hence, to avoid a complete dissipation of the 'labour force,' Smuts successfully appealed to the Chamber to reopen the mines. At first the response was small for, even after Parliament had declared such organisations illegal, the commandos terrorised 'scabs'; nevertheless, many white men were anxious to return to work while work was to be had. The flow back to the mines increased daily and Parliament, setting aside Hertzog's plea for laws forbidding the diminution of the sphere of European employment, resolved by a small majority on an impartial inquiry.

But the shooting stage had been reached. The power-station men struck; the harassed police fired on the mob at Boksburg, and, in alarm, the Federation made new proposals. These the Chamber rejected with contumely. The answer was decisive. The Council of Action, a small group of Communists affiliated to the Third International, thrust the Federation aside and let loose 'the bare-armed fighting man.' The police held out at a few vital points, but for some days most of the Rand was in the hands of revolutionaries one of whose first acts was to attack natives in some of the compounds. The natives, however, remained quiet; burgher commandos and regiments of the recently

¹ On the strike *vide* U.G. 35 of 1922.

reorganised Defence Force were hurried forward; Smuts, at great personal risk, dashed in from Capetown to take charge, and soon all was over. At the end of a desperate struggle which cost South Africa twice as many lives as the whole of the South-West Africa campaign,¹ the Federation called the strike off, the Miners' Union disowned the revolutionaries and the Chamber took back such men as it required on its own terms.

The political results of the Rand Strike were far-reaching. Smuts at once appointed a judicial commission to examine the causes of the rising and a Mining Industry Board to recommend future policy towards the mines. He also carried the overdue Apprenticeship Act.² Hertzog, on the other hand, announced that the Nationalists would work with Labour at the next elections. It was the first official intimation of the coming Pact which was destined to overthrow the Smuts Ministry, a *modus vivendi* between parties both of which cherished a lively hatred for the Premier and for the Capitalism with which they identified him, both of which were deeply interested in the question of coloured labour, the one desiring it for the farms, the other fearing it as an industrial competitor, and both of which were suspicious of immigrants and averse to warlike adventures, at least outside the borders of the Union.

It was to affairs outside the Union that Smuts now addressed himself. The sanguine hopes of those who had looked to see him return from Versailles with great acquisitions of territory to the west and to the far north had been disappointed. Even Botha's claim that South-West Africa must remain a province of the Union had not been realised. The Protectorate was merely mandated to the Union to be administered as an integral part of its territory subject to limitations obviously intended to safeguard the native peoples, and the duty of reporting annually to the League of Nations.³

Of the 208,000 natives therein, the half who lived under tribal conditions in Ovamboland in the north were only nominally under European rule. The rest, the half-breeds, Hottentots and Hereros of Damara-Namaqualand, dwelt within or without the 7,000,000 acres of reserve lands in the Police Zone of the south and centre. The Europeans were settled almost entirely in the Police Zone, either on the grassy uplands which, even in that

¹ Killed in G.S.W.A., 113; on the Rand, 230 of all classes and colours.

² No. 26 of 1922. The Act supplemented the apprenticeship clauses of the Wages Act of 1918. It has been gradually enforced with good results in such trades as building, boot, clothing and furniture-making and printing (U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 47).

³ U.G. 39-19, p. 10; U.G. 44-19. On South-West Africa, *vide* also U.G. 34-19; U.G. 24-21 and annual reports of the Administrator.

land of intermittent rivers and precarious rainfall, gave grazing for the cattle and permitted agriculture under irrigation, or on the tin, copper and marble mines and the diamond mines of the desert coast-belt.¹

The 15,000 German inhabitants had been reduced by repatriation, voluntary or otherwise, to some 8000.² They retained full civil rights but, during the war, the nominated municipal and district councils with their restricted powers had been abolished and the whole country subjected to martial law. Nominated municipal councils had again been set up after the war and a High Court created whose judge heard criminal cases with two assessors, and administered Cape civil law and such German law as was not inconsistent therewith subject to an appeal to the Union appellate division.³ The military authorities had soon made way for a civil administrator who was now assisted by a nominated Council of Advice manned by Germans and South Africans in equal proportions and an official versed in native affairs. Jan. 1921.

These conditions could hardly last. Some 10,000 South Africans and other immigrants had settled in the country and were restive under one-man rule.⁴ The Germans, moreover, were still citizens of the Fatherland in a ceded colony, neither aliens in the land nor yet subjects of the Union which ruled them on behalf of the League. Nationalists were inclined to hold that the mandate foreshadowed self-determination for them but, however that might be, there was little hope of developing the country until the position of the Germans was regularised. The Government was already boring for water, the Imperial Cold Storage Company was contemplating a big meat export through Walfisch Bay, and a small beginning in self-government was made when half the seats in the municipal councils were made elective; but it was only in 1923 that Smuts came to terms with Berlin on the head of citizenship. Subject to ratification by the Union Parliament, German nationals were to become British subjects unless they contracted out before a given date, and German was to be an official language and the medium of instruction for German children.⁵ It was an agreement that pointed to self-government and, *pace* the League, to the ultimate incorporation of the Protectorate in the Union. 1922.

¹ Government found 70 per cent. of the working expenses and drew 66 per cent. of the profits of the diamond mines.

² 6374 Germans were sent home, including 3718 soldiers and other officials and 1433 others at their own request.

³ Union Year Book, No. 8, pp. 988 ff.

⁴ The total European population was 19,432 in June 1923.

⁵ The Smuts Ministry fell before the necessary Act could be passed. It was carried as a non-party measure in 1925. A more liberal form of government was also instituted (Act 42 of 1925).

The suspicion that Smuts was seeking to call in another province to cancel in advance the accession of strength which South-West Africa might be expected to give to his opponents, goes far to explain the vigour of the opposition from within the Union to his policy of incorporating Southern Rhodesia. Under the Supplemental Charter of 1915, the governing powers of the B.S.A. Company had been extended till October 1924 unless an absolute majority of the Legislative Council could satisfy the Imperial Government before that date that Rhodesia was fit for self-government or unless, presumably, the country entered the Union.¹ Railway extensions and other schemes of development had necessarily been curtailed while the Company and its subjects, white and black, bore their full share in the war. The Company worked its farms and ranches, encouraged agriculture and the industries allied thereto, administered the reserve natives by a happy combination of Basutoland and Transkeian methods and waited for better times. It also expended modest sums on capital account and stood ready to make good administrative deficits. This last it was not called upon to do, for, taking one year with another, revenue balanced the carefully controlled expenditure.

The *raison d'être* of the Company as a ruling power was thus ceasing now that the country was beginning to pay its own way. The great majority of the elected members of the legislature, averse to union with the South, were still more opposed to the amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, which was more than once suggested.² Amalgamation with the 'Black North' with its million Bantu and sprinkling of Europeans, would indefinitely postpone the self-government which they more and more confidently expected. The responsible government movement received a great impetus from the long-awaited verdict of the Privy Council in the matter of the unalienated lands. The Judicial Committee, to which that issue had been referred in 1914, laid it down that these lands had always been what Rhodes himself had once called them, Crown lands, but that, so long as the Company continued to rule, it was entitled to use the land revenues for the reduction of the accumulated administrative deficits and thereafter to look to the Crown for reimbursement either from the further sales of lands or otherwise.³

The Chartered Board at once claimed a refund of those deficits with interest and told the Rhodesians that, as the lands

¹ Cd. 7970 of 1915.

² *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1915, p. 27; Legislative Council debates, April 1917. North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia had been united as Northern Rhodesia in 1911 (*B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1911, p. 9).

³ *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1920, p. 42.

were no longer to be regarded as a commercial asset of the Company, they must expect no further capital expenditure by the Company on their behalf.¹ The elected members with one dissident therefore resolved to press for responsible government. But Milner, now Colonial Secretary, counselled delay and appointed the Cave Commission to fix the amount due to the Company from the Crown;² the pro-Union party in Rhodesia marshalled its forces, and the Nationalists in the Union itself raised the cry that Smuts was going to bring in a solid phalanx 1919. of Rhodesians 'to break the back of Afrikanderdom.'

There was much to be said for the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in the Union. It was Rhodesia's traditional destiny. The country had been colonised largely from the south; its law was fundamentally the Cape law; its appeals lay to Bloemfontein; its railways, continuous with the Union system, were actually worked by the Union as far as Bulawayo; its trade lay mainly with the towns and ports of South Africa; it was a member of the customs union. Further, it was doubtful whether it could stand alone. Milner had pointed to finance and the swarming Bantu as the chief obstacles to autonomy. The territory was large, nearly 150,000 square miles, and most of its 33,000 Europeans were strung out along the railways. Around them were 770,000 natives, three-fifths of whom lived a tribal life in reserves.³ Part of the Company's claim of £7,866,000 would have to be found by a country which was just paying its way with nothing over for development or assisted immigration. Till that debt was paid the Crown lands would be beyond the reach of the Rhodesians. Again, the great mass of those lands on the high and healthy plateau along the railways had already been alienated and half the remainder was below the 'health line,' good cattle country but not so good for men and, in any case, needing heavy expenditure on roads and railways before it could be made really available.⁴ The financial and native experiences of Natal, the nearest South African parallel to Rhodesia, had not been encouraging, and Natal had not harboured a corporation such as the B.S.A. Company was and would remain. For the Company controlled directly or indirectly the minerals, the railways, vast estates and the land bank; it held shares in most of the producing mines and in subsidiary companies of all kinds, and it was possessed of great powers and concessions in the neighbouring

¹ *B.S.A. Co. Annual Meeting*, Aug. 1918.

² *Cmd. 1129 of 1921; B.S.A. Co. Reports*, 1919, p. 6; 1920, p. 4.

³ There were 425,000 natives in reserves of 19,500,000 acres, 125,000 on Crown lands, and 150,000 on farms, etc.

⁴ 8,360,000 acres lay within 25 miles of the railways, and 49,600,000 further away.

territories of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland.

On the other hand, many Rhodesians feared centralised Pretoria rule and the republicanism of the Union. They prided themselves, and justly, on being British in spite of the Jews, Greeks and Moslems in the towns and the Afrikaners, perhaps one-eighth of the total European population, who lived in groups and thus did much to render the expenses and inconveniences of official bilingualism unnecessary. They dreaded an influx of poor whites into their empty acres and the free movement from the south of the bankrupts and other undesirables which, *mirabile dictu*, their immigration laws had hitherto succeeded in keeping out. They feared too the drawing off of their native labour supply to the Rand, and held with much truth that their native policy was better than that of adjacent parts of the Union. Above all, they wanted to experience self-government before going into Union and so to go, if at all, on equal terms.

The issue was settled for the moment, not in Rhodesia but in the Union, where the Hertzogites outdistanced Smuts's followers at the elections. The pro-union party in Rhodesia was destroyed before it had gone into action and, at the general election, 12 out of 13 members were returned pledged to responsible government. Having thus secured the requisite absolute majority, they petitioned for self-government. Milner once more played for time, but the award of the Cave Commission revolutionised the situation. The commission fixed the amount due to the Company at £4,435,000, with an additional £830,000 for the public works covered by the terms of the Charter, less the value of the extensive lands which the Company had granted to itself or to subsidiary corporations for 'consideration other than cash.'¹ With the prospective debt thus dwindling, the elected members tried again. This time they found Downing Street more amenable. Winston Churchill appointed the Buxton Commission which recommended the grant of self-government subject to rigorous safeguards for the natives, the Chartered Company and the railways.² Then, at the request of the pro-Unionists who had rallied after the victory of the enlarged S.A. Party at the elections of February 1921, Churchill asked a Rhodesian delegation to confer with Smuts in Capetown on its way to London.

The conference which followed was informal. Neither party

¹ *B.S.A. Co. Report*, 1920, p. 77; Cmd. 1129 of 1921 and Minutes . . . of the Cave Commission.

² There were to be 6 Ministers, a unicameral legislature of 30, with power to add an upper house later, mining and railway bills were to be reserved for H.M. pleasure, and native affairs were, as far as possible, to be subject to the Imperial control retained under the Order in Council of 1898 (Cmd. 1273 of 1921).

March
1920.

Jan.
1921.

Oct.
1921.

was in a position to negotiate, but it is certain that Smuts made a strong bid for incorporation. Letters Patent based on the Buxton Report were then published.¹ The debt which Rhodesia must assume was cut down to some £1,100,000; the sale of the Crown lands was entrusted to a Crown Agent; the issue between this modified autonomy and, presumably, Union was to be decided at a referendum held before the end of October. Delegates from all the Rhodesian parties, with others from Northern Rhodesia holding a watching brief, then discussed terms privately with the Union authorities at Capetown. To the dismay of many of his own followers and to the wrath of the Nationalists and Labour men, Smuts had to let Parliament rise without confiding to it the terms of the Union's offer. The opposition objected with justice that, if the Rhodesians accepted these terms at the referendum, the Union Parliament would be faced with a *fait accompli* which it could either ratify or reject but in no wise modify, and that there was nothing to prevent the inclusion by a similar procedure of other provinces which would still further upset the balance of black against white in an unwieldy Union. However, there was no help for it; the Union's negotiations were involved in a dispute between the other parties to the settlement. The Company was threatening the Crown with legal proceedings unless it paid the amount of the Cave Award with interest from 1918 on the day that it should take over the government of Rhodesia; and the Crown retorted with a demand for the refund of the large sums advanced to the Company for war expenses.

At last the terms of the Union's offers to the Rhodesians and to the Company were published.² They were accorded a mixed reception. Chartered shares rose appreciably, the large newspapers on both sides of the Limpopo spoke well of them and Natalians regarded the wide powers left to the proposed provincial council at Salisbury as a welcome concession to the federal idea. Others in South Africa were less enthusiastic and the Nationalist and Labour parties were frankly hostile for, apart from any other considerations, the Union was being asked to pay £6,836,000 to the 'great money power' for the Crown lands, railways, public works and the privilege of incorporating Rhodesians, many of whom would certainly resent the loss of an opportunity of

¹ Cmd. 1573 of 1922.

² *Cape Times*, July 22 and 31, August 1 and 22, 1922. Rhodesia was offered 4 seats in the Senate and 20 in the Assembly, a Provincial Council of 20, a special grant of £50,000 for 10 years to make up for the loss of advantages under the Rhodes Customs Clause, a development fund of £500,000, the great gain of Union railway rates, a land settlement board controlled by Rhodesians, and the promise that the Union would not take away their native labourers. On the other hand, they were asked to permit free movement across their borders and to accept official bilingualism.

ruling themselves for a time. And after all, the Company would still retain the invaluable minerals.

Smuts fought hard to win Rhodesia. He was not offering to pay nearly £7,000,000 for twenty Rhodesian votes in the Assembly even in the unlikely event that all would be cast in his interests. To him the Union was what the old Cape Colony had been to Sir George Grey, the most important power in Africa. Rhodesia was the railway bridge to the copper of the Katanga and to much else in the far north. Already a Union trade commission was on the point of starting for Kenya, and Nyassaland and Uganda were borrowing Union railway officials, thus 'giving a wider outlook to the railway policy of the Union.' Smuts visited Southern Rhodesia during the referendum campaign. While he was in the country his influence as representative of Botha's *conciliatie* and his own appeal to Rhodesians to take 'the broader point of view, the future of the sub-continent' told in favour of Union; but once he was gone all the old fears returned, especially the fear of the poor whites, a fear intensified by Smuts himself, who spoke of the need of incorporating both Swaziland and Rhodesia in the Union to save the western Transvaalers from becoming *bijwoners* in their own country.

Oct.
1922. Under these circumstances the Responsible Government Party gained a decisive victory at the referendum.¹ A financial deadlock which arose at the last moment between the Crown and the Legislative Council was averted by the British taxpayer, who performed his appointed function by providing £3,750,000 in quittance of the amount due to the Company under the Cave Award; the Crown waived its claim to the £2,000,000 of war expenditure; the Rhodesians undertook to pay the Crown £2,300,000 for the much-disputed lands and the public works² and, on the thirty-third anniversary of the foundation of Salisbury by Rhodes's Pioneers, 'the Colony of Southern Rhodesia' was formally annexed. Sir Charles Coghlan, long the champion of self-government, formed the first ministry and, at the ensuing elections, overwhelmed Labour and the ex-Unionist Independents. In that same month, in Northern Rhodesia, the Company handed over the reins to the Crown as represented by a Governor assisted by the already existing elective Council of Advice.

Sept.
1923.

April
1924.

Thus the Chartered Company passed out of the ranks of the world's rulers and presently declared its first modest dividend, while the Rhodesian Parliament met, and faced a hopeful budget, the task of finding a port more suited to its needs than

¹ The majority in favour of Responsible Government was 2785 out of a total electorate of 22,000, of whom one-third were women. At the elections Coghlan's Rhodesian Party carried 26 seats and Independents 4.

² Cmd. 1984 of 1923.

Portuguese Beira and the disquieting fact that the customs union would expire at the end of the year.¹

The Union was also considering the question of ports. The Mozambique Convention still governed its relations with Delagoa Bay. That agreement had been concluded at a time when the Transvaal was above all things anxious to secure cheap imports and Portuguese Shangaan labourers for the mines. Now, the need for this labour was less and the need for export facilities was growing greater each year. The railway through Portuguese territory and the harbour of Lourenço Marques itself failed to give those facilities, especially to Transvaal coal. Moreover, Portuguese officialdom with a mercurial paper currency of its own was frankly an inconvenience at a port full of English and South African business men. The Union therefore denounced the Convention and asked for a share in the control of both railway and port. The threat to build a rival railway through Zululand to a new port at Sordwana Bay or at Kosi Bay of famous memory failed to shake the Portuguese in their refusal and, amid the jubilation of Natalians interested in the cotton areas of Zululand and expectant of a Rand market bereft of duty-free Portuguese sugar, the whole of the Convention lapsed save those clauses which permitted the Union to recruit labour in Mozambique.²

In the course of these negotiations Smuts met the advocates of white labour by promising to limit the importation of Shangaans to half what it had been before the Rand strike. That promise marked his return to domestic politics. Labour, nationalism, the natives and finance were all consciously or unconsciously combining to overthrow his ministry. The artificial bulwarks of white labour on the gold-mines were weakening. After the great strike the Mining Industry Board³ had arranged with some success for conciliation boards in the gold, coal and power industries ; but it had reported against any extension of the colour bar and had recommended that, in the semi-skilled grades where racial competition was taking place, mine managers should use their discretion subject to the Chamber's ratio of one white man to every 10·5 blacks for what that was worth. Reorganisation of the mines had proceeded on these lines, facilitated by a decision of the courts that the statutory colour bar was *ultra vires*.⁴ Opponents of the policy complained that the freer use of non-Europeans in-

¹ Act 7 of 1925 laid an embargo on the importation into the Union of Rhodesian cattle below a certain weight.

² Negotiations are still going on (May 1927).

³ U.G. 39 of 1922.

⁴ *Rex v. Hildic Smith*, Nov. 1923.

creased the number of accidents below ground.¹ The complaint was discounted by the fact that many of these mishaps were due to rock-bursts which naturally became more common as the mines sank deeper and the pressure of the ground above put an intolerable strain on the pillars supporting the roof of the galleries; but, from another point of view, the situation was disquieting. The use of improved machinery, the elimination of the weaker brethren and the abolition of mining on contract reduced working costs² and increased the yield, but they did it at such a cost to the life of the mines that it was officially estimated that in 1932 half the existing mines would be worked out. If this estimate were correct, some industries more capable than gold and diamonds of maintaining a civilised society must be found and that quickly.

Smuts's opponents determined to conduct that search themselves. There was less to keep the Nationalists and Labour men apart than there had been. Transvaal Nationalist congresses might still reaffirm the principle of secession, but the Free Staters would do what Hertzog bade them do and, in the Cape, secession had never recovered the vitality it had lost during the elections of 1921, in spite of Sinn Fein example and imported Irish aid. On the other hand, Englishmen were talking now of the 'Commonwealth' rather than of that 'Empire' to which the obvious retort had been 'Republic.' The tactful handling of the Indian question by the British Government, the transfer of the defences of Durban and Capetown to the Union, the indefinite postponement of the abhorred Conference which was to have defined the powers and procedure of the Dominions in Imperial matters, the apparent solution of the Irish question towards which Smuts had lent a helping hand, Smuts's insistence on 'the equality of nationhood' within the Empire, the admission by Bonar Law, a logical Scot, that the Dominions had the right to secede, all had a reassuring effect on the minds of Nationalists. If the Irish Free State was a Dominion, what was there to prevent South Africa becoming even as Ireland, at all events as far as concerned constitutional status? If Canada was to have her own ambassadors and to sign a fisheries treaty with the U.S.A. on her own account, why not South Africa also? The success of the Washington Disarmament Conference, Great Britain's abandonment of the Japanese Alliance and her philosophic acceptance of the cool reply given by Union ministers to the call for help against the Kemalists on the Bosphorus,

¹ Figures for 1915-24 do not bear out this allegation (U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 121).

² Working costs in 1921 = 25s. 8d. per ton; in Dec. 1922 = 21s. 2d.; pre-war = 17s. 11d.

Smuts's return from successive Imperial Conferences with free hands and the assurance that, in spite of the French and Belgians in the German Ruhr district, there would be no great war in Europe for a generation at least, all proved that the Union was not to be hastily committed to foreign adventures at the call of others. And if war did come after all, the visit of a strong British squadron¹ suggested that it need not touch the Union too closely. There might be obvious profit in the Imperial connection if it meant a preference on tobacco, wines and fruit and, though the preferences were not confirmed by the British Labour ministry which took office immediately after the offer had been made, much of the ensuing outcry arose not from Nationalists or Labour men exultant at Ramsay Macdonald's victory, but from S.A. Party men led by the Premier himself who denied to the Mother of Parliaments the right of review which was universally conceded to Dominion legislatures.

Unmoved by a stream of social legislation, the Nationalists and Labourites moved steadily towards an alliance.² The Nationalist leaders discreetly pushed secession into the background; the Labour chiefs declared that the 'democratic and socialist commonwealth' was merely an 'ultimate' objective; both, to win over those urban electors who had lost confidence in the ministry but who feared Hertzog's past too much to put him into office, publicly exchanged assurances that the votes cast at the next election would not be used for cutting the painter. April 1923. Soon Hertzog was calling for a policy which should protect the 'civilised labour' of Europeans and coloured folk from Bantu pressure. It was a partial application of Selborne's civilisation test for the franchise to the more vital sphere of economic life, Feb. 1924. a summons to South Africans to face the fact that, up to a point, it was not the colour of the skin that mattered but the civilised or barbarian mode of life.

Hertzog's declaration of policy committed him to finding those 'additional areas' for which the Bantu had been waiting these ten years and without which no settlement of the native and, therefore, of the Labour problems was possible. It was full time. Events in South-West Africa had disturbed the natives throughout the Union and drawn the outraged eyes of the Council of the League upon its mandatory. The Bondelzwarts, a Hottentot tribe whose leaders had served the Union well during the war, rebelled against their new rulers. The May 1922.

¹ Including the great ships *Hood* and *Repulse*.

² Strike Condonation Act (29 of 1922); Rents Act Extension (20 of 1923); Industrial Conciliation Act (11 of 1924); Apprenticeship Act Amendment (15 of 1924). On the Industrial Conciliation Act, *vide* U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 47 ff.

administrator led a large force into their reserve in person and killed over 100 men, women and children with the help of aeroplanes. He then issued a report which failed to carry conviction. One member of the Union Native Affairs Commission, a stout old Transvaal general, warmly approved of the native policy of the Windhuk authorities, but the other two guardedly censured it. The Mandates Commission of the League thereupon called for a full report, condemned the administrator's methods of conducting negotiations with the tribesmen, approved of the conciliatory measures taken since the scuffle and urged that relief be given to the poverty-stricken Bondelswarts.¹

The Bondelswart affair surprised the public of the Union, which knew little of what was really going on in the Protectorate. What was going on in their own country was plain for all to see. Councils might work well in the Transkei and other large native areas, though even there educated natives grumbled at their lack of power and the rank and file regarded them as ingenious taxing machines; but they were useless to the 2,000,000 natives, nearly half the total, living on the farms. From the farms and from the reserves, overcrowded by men who had rarely been shown how to improve their wasteful methods of cultivation, a stream of permanently detribalised folk poured into the towns. They came, and their women with them, even into towns of the Western Province of the Cape, where hitherto there had been few of them.² Everywhere they threatened to pull down the coloured man's standard of life and, *a fortiori*, the white man's. Small and compact cities like Durban and Bloemfontein handled the influx well, but elsewhere there was chaos. Parliament tried to meet the emergency by passing the Urban Areas Act which laid down a uniform pass law outside the Cape, empowered municipalities to set aside locations and assured the natives of a measure of local self-government and security of tenure short of freehold.³

Most of the countryside was already in European hands. The towns were now closed to the Bantu, except on sufferance, at a time when the black men were growing daily in political consciousness, and their more advanced members, cut off by the colour bar from many trades and industries, were falling back like any Babus on clerical work, the ministry in native churches and agitation. Native conferences twice met under the Act of 1920 at Bloemfontein and Pretoria. The second time the meeting was held, significantly enough, in the old Raadsaal itself and

¹ *Round Table*, No. 53; U.G. 30-22; U.G. 41-26.

² Perhaps 300,000 by 1925 (U.G. 14 of 1926, p. 37).

³ Act 21 of 1923.

yet another conference was summoned by the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Church, an organisation not hitherto identified with such a policy. The burden of the delegates' complaints was passes, the Urban Areas Act, and above all the existing allocation of the land which made self-development in reserves an improbability for most of them and 'differential treatment' of white and black an illusion for all.

The native conferences also demanded that, since the two northern provinces neglected their duty of educating the natives, the Union should take over full control of education. The demand called in question the relations of the Provinces to the Union. The attempt to put those relations on a sound basis proved fatal to the decaying Smuts ministry.

Since Union, provincial services had been extended widely in all directions, but 'education other than higher' was still the main duty of the provincial administrations and the main source of expense. There was much to show for the expenditure. Far more children had been brought into the schools since Union than ever before, and the training of teachers had been improved out of all knowledge; but such was the provincial demand for Union money that ministers had soon begun to dilate on the virtues of self-help. They found their audience most unsympathetic. The trend of events was all in the other direction. Even in the Cape, the stronghold of local self-government, the able but autocratic administrator, Sir Frederic de Waal, had steadily crushed local initiative in the sacred name of efficiency. Local patriotisms, dread of centralisation, fear of unsettling the foundations of Union, and the temporary affluence bred of war had shelved the report of a commission which proposed to transfer ^{1916.} the control of all education to the central authority and to entrust the remaining powers of the provincial governments to fourteen large divisional councils.¹ The ministry refused to abolish the provincial councils even when the first span of life allotted to the system by the South Africa Act ended; but twice it cautiously limited its liabilities and then, faced with a heavy deficit on the general revenue and an accumulated deficit of ^{1922.} £4,500,000 on the railways, it put its foot down.² It drastically modified the old expansive system by giving a mere block grant amounting to 90 per cent. of the 1921 subsidy with an allowance for a 3 per cent. increase yearly on the £ for £ basis. It also took away the native pass fees from the Transvaal on the ground that native policy was a Union concern, and told the provinces that they might find extra revenue, if they must, in heavier liquor licences.

¹ Seven such councils in the Cape, 4 in the Transvaal, 2 in the Free State, 1 in Natal (U.G. 45-16 and 8-17).

² Acts 9 of 1917; 5 of 1921; 5 of 1922.

Crushed by a financial burden which it had never been designed to bear, the provincial system threatened to collapse. Thereafter it rained commissions, the upshot of whose findings was that, since education swallowed up 75 per cent. of the provincial revenues, the Union should provide all reasonable sums for primary and secondary education up to a limit fixed for each province on a capitation basis, and curtail provincial powers of taxation as a relief to the general taxpayer.¹ Nationalists inveighed against a 'merchants' report' that struck at education and indicated fixed property as the only sound foundation for local finance; Transvaal Labour rallied to the defence of free secondary education, fruit of its electoral victory in 1914; Natal bristled at the proposed limitations on provincial freedom. Provincial elections, however, left the Free State as solidly Nationalist and Natal as nominally S.A. Party as before, and merely changed the balance of parties in the Cape and the Transvaal sufficiently to ensure that the opposing forces would cancel out in the executive committees and thus leave the last word with the respective administrators. The ministry failed to come to terms with the provincial authorities and then made up its mind to carry its commissions' main proposals.

The prospects of success were by no means hopeless. The ministry had lost much of its prestige; it was suffering from the loss of popularity which attends over-long tenure of office; it inevitably had to bear the odium bred of the hard times which had dogged its footsteps for the past four years. Unemployment in the Union was less than in many other parts of the world, and the Kimberley mines had been reopened;² but times were undoubtedly bad. Farmers as a body could not get good prices and the diamond producers were once more in difficulties as the competition of British Guiana, Angola, the Congo and the alluvial diggers in the Union itself pressed upon them.³ Retail trade was sluggish; fires which had all the appearance of special dispensations of Providence perturbed the insurance companies; business men with long and honourable careers lamented the laxity of the Union's company laws and the ease with which bankruptcy could be used as an ordinary trading weapon. But there were signs of better days to come. Sweeping reductions in expenditure, and a record traffic as the wool, coal and fruit export recovered, gave the railways a surplus which reduced their accumulated deficits to a mere £770,000. The cost of fighting a widespread plague of locusts was heavy, but the coming budget promised to be more cheerful than any since 1920. It is true that Jagger,

¹ U.G. 19 of 1923; U.G. 41 of 1923; U.G. 19 of 1924.

² U.G. 14 of 1926, pp. 103, 167.

³ *Round Table*, No. 59.

restorer of the railway finances, resigned, a martyr to Free Trade, and that the one-time effective majority of twenty-four had been reduced by by-elections to eight; but the Nationalist-Labour Pact had not yet proved itself a reality, and the ministry might still hope to carry on.

The hope was disappointed. The loosely-allied opposition parties closed their ranks in an attack on the proposed provincial settlement. There were those who looked to see the Smuts ministry go down fighting but, for whatever reason, it elected to sacrifice most of its Finance Bill.¹ Amid an uproar from the Cape teachers, who were threatened with salary reductions, it passed a short Bill tiding over the provinces financially for the time being and promised to lay down uniform scales for teachers' salaries throughout the Union. It was its last act. The loss of a test by-election at Wakkerstroom sent Smuts to the country in the very month that the Responsible Government Party swept the board in Southern Rhodesia, and the Chartered Company ceased to rule north of the Zambesi. The provincial issue was lost sight of in the dust and heat of a purely party general election, at the end of which the Pact was returned with a majority of 27 in the Assembly.² Smuts, weary with seventeen years of office, handed over the reins to Hertzog, who gave seats in his cabinet to one Labour leader from the Transvaal and another from Natal.³

It was the end of a chapter. Men of British and Afrikaner stock stood shoulder to shoulder in the country and sat together on either side of the House. The old 'racial' lines of division were cut clean across by the economic. The re-alignment of parties was a proof that the two sections of the Europeans had realised that the issues on which they had hitherto divided were as nothing to the issues raised by their contact with non-Europeans. South Africans were at last fully conscious that they stood face to face with 'black Africa and yellow Asia.' Wherefore, the new Premier, head of a coalition pledged above all things to the fostering of 'white South Africa,' addressed himself to a study of that Native Question which had exercised van Riebeeck in the beginning.

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¹ Act 21 of 1924.

² Nationalists, 63 seats; Labour, 18; S.A. Party, 53; Independent, 1.

³ F. H. P. Creswell (Defence and Labour), and T. Boydell (Posts, Telegraphs and Public Works). An eleventh portfolio was created in 1925 and given to a Labour member, W. Madeley.

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
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