



PAPERS OF
THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL WAR AND MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS



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AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS

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CONTENTS

I. REPORT ON THE ALLEGED DELAY IN CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER McCLELLAN AT ANTIETAM, AND THE CAUSES OF THE DELAY OF THE SECOND ARMY CORPS IN ENTERING INTO THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM	1
By MAJOR JOHN C. GRAY, JR.	
II. THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN	5
By MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL S. SUMNER, U.S.A., Retired.	
III. THE TWELFTH CORPS AT GETTYSBURG	19
By COLONEL CHARLES F. MORSE, Second Massachusetts Volunteers.	
IV. THE MINE RUN CAMPAIGN, NOVEMBER, 1863	43
By COLONEL THOMAS L. LIVERMORE, Eighteenth New Hampshire Volunteers.	
V. THE MINE RUN AFFAIR	55
By CHARLES L. PEIRSON, Colonel Thirty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers and Brevet Brigadier-General.	
VI. THE RELIEF OF CHATTANOOGA, OCTOBER, 1863, AND GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE	65
By COLONEL CHARLES F. MORSE, Second Massachusetts Volunteers.	
VII. PETERSBURG, JUNE 15—FORT HARRISON, SEPTEMBER 29: A COMPARISON	83
By GEORGE A. BRUCE, Captain Thirteenth New Hampshire Volunteers and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel.	
VIII. CEDAR CREEK, OCTOBER 19, 1864	117
EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO COLONEL BENJAMIN W. CROWNINSHIELD FROM GENERAL W. H. EMORY.	
IX. THE CAPTURE AND OCCUPATION OF RICHMOND	119
By COLONEL GEORGE A. BRUCE.	

X. MILITARY PRISONS: NORTH AND SOUTH . . .	147
By MAJOR JOHN CHESTER WHITE, U.S.A., Retired.	
XI. THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S RE- ELECTION UPON THE WANING FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES.	207
By BREVET MAJOR HENRY S. BURRAGE.	
XII. THE OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1898.	233
By BRIGADIER-GENERAL CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U.S.V.	
XIII. FILIPINO CHARACTERISTICS AS MANIFESTED IN DIPLOMACY AND WAR	261
By MAJOR-GENERAL E. S. OTIS, U.S.A., Retired.	
XIV. THE VISIT OF THE ALLIES TO CHINA IN 1900	295
By CAPTAIN HENRY LEONARD, United States Marine Corps.	
XV. THE NECESSITY OF A BROADER SYSTEM OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION IN THIS COUNTRY, AND OUR MILITARY POLICY	319
By MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, Chief of Staff, U.S.A.	
XVI. THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	341
By CAPTAIN F. E. CHADWICK, U.S.N.	
XVII. THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH	361
By ANTHONY J. ABDY, Commanding Fifty-third Bat- tery, Royal Field Artillery.	
XVIII. A JUDICIAL VERSUS A MILITARY SETTLE- MENT OF SOME INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES	405
By BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM CROZIER, U.S.A.	
XIX. THE GEOMETRICAL FACTOR IN NAPOLEON'S GENERALSHIP	423
By PROFESSOR R. M. JOHNSTON.	
XX. AMERICAN TACTICS IN THE PRESENT WAR .	435
By THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM.	
INDEX	459

ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND DIAGRAMS

GETTYSBURG — BATTLE ON THE RIGHT AT CULP'S HILL, JULY 2D AND 3D, 1863	22
MAP SHOWING ATTACK ON PETERSBURG, AND CAPTURE OF RICH- MOND	144
A STUDY IN CONTRASTS	152
SOME OF THE CONFEDERATE OFFICIALS AT LIBBY PRISON . . .	180
SOME PRISONERS OF WAR IN "LIBBY PRISON," RICHMOND, VA.	182
PHOTOGRAPHS OF EXCHANGED PRISONERS OF WAR FROM SOUTH- ERN PRISONS	204
A FAMILY OF FAMINE SUFFERERS IN INDIA	204
PLAN OF LADYSMITH	364
U.S.S. CONSTITUTION (OLD IRONSIDES)	437
U.S.S. NIAGARA	448
DIAGRAMS SHOWING AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESIGN FOR BIG GUNS IN TURRETS ALIGNED OVER THE KEEL . . .	451
DIAGRAMS OF DECK PLANS SHOWING ARRANGEMENTS OF TURRETS IN MODERN FIRST LINE DREADNOUGHTS	452



I

REPORT OF MAJOR JOHN C. GRAY, JR.

MAJOR AND JUDGE-ADVOCATE, U.S.V.

FOR THE COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION ON THE ALLEGED
DELAY IN CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC UNDER McCLELLAN AT ANTIETAM,
AND THE CAUSES OF THE DELAY OF
THE SECOND ARMY CORPS IN
ENTERING INTO THE BAT-
TLE OF ANTIETAM

Read before the Society April 10, 1876



REPORT OF MAJOR JOHN C. GRAY, JR.

ON THE ALLEGED DELAY IN CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC UNDER McCLELLAN AT ANTIETAM, AND THE
CAUSES OF THE DELAY OF THE SECOND ARMY CORPS
IN ENTERING INTO THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

THE battle of South Mountain was fought September 14, and the enemy retreated across the Antietam Creek, without making any attempt to stop or delay pursuit, except that McLaws' division remained to occupy and cover Maryland Heights.

McClellan reached the ground on the east of the Antietam on the 15th about noon, and the whole army (except Franklin's command) was there in the course of the night; the distance from South Mountain was some six or seven miles. The troops certainly could have been all on the ground before midnight.

McLaws remained in Pleasant Valley till the afternoon of September 16, so that Franklin could not have quitted his position there.

The rest of the army was or could have been in position to attack on the morning of the 16th. At that time it was certain that a large body of the enemy was detached from the main army at or near Harper's Ferry, and could not reach it during the 16th. This more than made up for the absence of Franklin.

There seems no sufficient reason why an attack was not made on September 16. There was plenty of time to reconnoitre the ground. The other reasons given by General McClellan were that the troops were not well supplied with rations, and had expended some ammunition, but these reasons he does not seem to allege with any great strength.

As to the attack on the 17th, there is weight in Swinton's suggestion that neither Hooker nor Mansfield should have crossed the day before battle, as it served merely to develop the plan of attack.

Hooker and Mansfield being over, I do not think there was any fault in not crossing Sumner over that night. Franklin was absent, and Sumner might have been needed to reënforce the centre and left, for there was no reserve. If Hooker had not attacked so recklessly, but had been more deliberate in his advance, Sumner would have had time to support him.

The battle could have been fought better on the 16th than on the 17th; that it was not, was mainly McClellan's fault.

That it was not more successful on the 17th was the fault of the subordinate generals, partly of Hooker and Sumner, but principally of Burnside.

The Chairman, after the foregoing report was read, asked if any officer present could speak certainly about the position of the troops, with which he served, on the evening of the 15th of September, 1862. Colonel Folsom said that the Second Corps was up. General Weld said that the Fifth Corps was up.

A letter was then read from Colonel Livermore (who was unavoidably absent from the meeting), in which he stated that the First Division of the Second Corps, to which he belonged, reached Antietam Creek not later than 2 P.M. September 15, and that his regiment, the Fifth New Hampshire, was deployed as skirmishers in the advance.

Mr. Ropes said that he differed from the Report of the Committee in one respect: that it seemed to him that it would have been better if General Sumner's Corps had crossed the Antietam very early on the morning of the battle, or even the night before, so that the attack might have been made simultaneously by the three corps.

Major Gray said that General Franklin was detained in

Pleasant Valley by McLaws till late on the 16th, so that he did not arrive till noon of the 17th; and that on this account Sumner was kept back some hours as a reserve, until the battle was fairly begun. He further said that the way in which the First and Twelfth Corps were fought by General Hooker was most injudicious, and that their early exhaustion was entirely unnecessary.

In regard to the operations on the left wing, Mr. Ropes said that General Lowell had told him that General McClellan sent five officers to General Burnside to order him to move, before he started. General Weld said that he heard General McClellan say, at the time, that he had sent all the officers he had to start Burnside.



II

THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL S. SUMNER
U.S.A., RETIRED

Read before the Society January 2, 1917



THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN

IN discussing the Antietam campaign, it will be necessary to go back several weeks, and speak of the movements of the Union army, previous to the march through Maryland.

General Pope's advance toward Richmond was attracting the attention of General Lee, and considerable reënforcements were sent from his army to check Pope. It was then determined to bring the whole Army of the Potomac to the support of Pope. This movement at once relieved General Lee of all embarrassment, and allowed him to concentrate his entire army against Pope, with the great advantage of operating on interior lines.

General McClellan strongly opposed this movement; whether or not he was right, is still a matter of discussion among military writers. At all events, Pope was forced back, and was in full retreat when the Army of the Potomac finally came on the field.

It is not necessary to mention this campaign further. When it ended, the Union army was in the defences at Washington, and the Confederate army was at Manassas, with an open door in any direction except Washington. It is easily seen why a regular investment of the Capital was impracticable, so the rebel authorities determined on an invasion of Maryland. The Army of Northern Virginia was put in march for Harper's Ferry and the fords of the Potomac in that vicinity.

At that time General McClellan was in Washington. He was still the nominal commander of the Army of the Potomac, although most of his command had been detached, and were under the control of General Pope.

Pope was relieved, and the army came once more under the command of McClellan.

No time was lost in the advance of the army to intercept and give battle to General Lee, who had invaded Maryland by way of Edwards' Crossing, while a force under Jackson was sent to Harper's Ferry to capture the garrison of ten thousand men occupying that place.

The army under McClellan consisted of six army corps, five brigades of cavalry, and an artillery reserve.

The corps commanders were: —

General Hooker	First Corps
General Sumner ¹	Second Corps
General Fitz John Porter	Fifth Corps
General Franklin	Sixth Corps
General Burnside	Ninth Corps
General Mansfield	Twelfth Corps
General Pleasonton	Cavalry
General Hayes	Reserve Artillery.

After reaching Frederick, Maryland, Lee turned north, and with part of his army passed through South Mountain Pass, presumably to invade Pennsylvania; in fact, his cavalry under Stuart had gone as far as York.

The Army of the Potomac moved on parallel roads converging at Frederick. Just before reaching that place a very important document was found in an abandoned Confederate camp; it was an order or memorandum from Lee's headquarters giving an outline of his movements and affording an opportunity to estimate the strength of his army. General McClellan soon obtained possession of this paper, and presumably profited by the information it contained.

The movement of the Union army was so rapid that General Lee was forced to reoccupy the passes in the mountains, until he could concentrate his army.

This brought on the engagements at Crampton's Pass and South Mountain Pass. The Union troops engaged were the

¹ Father of the writer, who was his Aide-de-Camp. (Ed.)

Sixth Corps at Crampton's, and the First and Ninth at South Mountain.

The large Second Corps was in reserve north of Frederick. At this point the Twelfth Corps was placed under the control of the commander of the Second Corps, and remained as part of his command until the close of the campaign.

It may be well to say here that perhaps at no time during General McClellan's connection with the Army of the Potomac, did he so thoroughly possess the confidence of the army as during this march through Maryland; he had the loyal support of all his corps commanders, several of whom were close, personal friends. The division commanders were equally loyal, and the rank and file simply worshipped him; certainly no other commander ever possessed the affection of the army to such a degree as "Little Mac."

General Lee, having determined to give battle, hastened to concentrate his widely separated army at Sharpsburg, and General McClellan, anxious to strike the enemy, pushed his forces through the several mountain passes, and placed his army along Antietam Creek. The First, Second, Ninth, and Twelfth Corps were in position on the evening of September 15. The First on the extreme right, the Second and Twelfth in the centre, and the Ninth on the left. The natural position would have been the Ninth in the centre, and the Second and Twelfth on the left, as the First was a part of Burnside's command. This disposition was probably made to give General Hooker full control on the extreme right.

The 16th of September was apparently spent in reconnoitring, perhaps to give time for the Sixth Corps to reach the field and for the Fifth Corps to take its position. It was a day vitally important to Lee, who had been out-generaled in the matter of concentration, and his army was widely separated.

The First Corps, under Hooker, crossed Antietam Creek on the afternoon of the 16th, and made preparations to attack

the left flank of the enemy. Next morning, in fact, he did attack at daylight on the 17th, and after a spirited fight was forced to withdraw.

The Twelfth Corps (Mansfield's) crossed during the night, but apparently was not in position to move with Hooker; they made a separate and independent attack and forced their way as far as the Hagerstown road, near the Dunkard Church.

General Sumner had orders to be prepared to move at daylight; he was ready. Sedgwick's division was on the road, and French's division was ordered to follow. Richardson's division, for some reason, was held back, but moved after considerable delay.

The artillery could be heard plainly on the right, and General Sumner was so impressed with the necessity of reaching the field of battle that he, personally, rode over to the army headquarters hoping to facilitate the movement of his command. After waiting about an hour and a half he received the order to move at 7.20 A.M. As it turned out these were valuable minutes.

General Sumner accompanied his leading division (Sedgwick's). He supposed he was marching to aid Hooker and Mansfield in a successful attack. After crossing Antietam Creek, he was met by General Meade, who informed him of Hooker's repulse, and he found the Twelfth Corps in a precarious position. This placed him in a very awkward situation. If he halted and withdrew the Twelfth Corps, it meant a virtual abandonment of the attack and consequent disarrangement of the plan of battle. If the Twelfth Corps was to be supported in its advanced position, it had to be done without delay. He decided to advance, and Sedgwick's division was formed for attack. The formation was in three lines; presumably with proper intervals on the start.

At this time Greene's division, of the Twelfth Corps, was holding a position near the Dunkard Church on the Hagerstown pike. In moving forward, Sedgwick's division inclined

to the right and crossed the pike a short distance to the north of the church.

At this point General Sumner observed that French's division, Second Corps, was too far to the left, and not in position to connect with Sedgwick; he sent an urgent order to French to make a vigorous attack in order to aid the advance of the leading division. I know of this because I carried the order myself.

On crossing the pike, Sedgwick still had Greene's division on his left; he pushed forward, intent on turning the left of the enemy's position, which was the prime object of the whole movement.

Sedgwick's attack was successful on the start, and he naturally kept moving forward. Meanwhile, General Lee actually denuded his right flank, to hurry reinforcements to his endangered left; it was the opportune arrival of this force (two divisions) that checked Sedgwick and forced him to withdraw.

In moving forward, the second and third lines of Sedgwick's division gradually closed on the first line. It was the duty of brigade commanders to preserve proper intervals, but there is always confusion in such movements when under fire, and the natural instinct of the men is to close together. That the division was practically closed "en masse" when assaulted on its left flank, is probably true, and for this reason it was not able to make the fight it might have made under more favorable conditions. But Sedgwick's division was not the only command that suffered from flank attacks at Antietam. Hooker was driven back by an attack on his right flank. An advance by the rebels after Sedgwick's repulse was met by an attack on their flank. The attempt to turn Richardson's left flank was successfully met by the Fifth New Hampshire, and finally Burnside was forced back by an attack on his left flank.

General French was already engaged with the enemy when I reached him. In his effort to move forward he had struck the rebel left centre, and was committed to that part of the

field during the entire battle. The First Division, Second Corps (Richardson's), came on the field later and took position on the left of French. These two divisions fought through most of the day, and were the most successful troops on the Union side.

I have gone more minutely into this phase of the battle, because the handling of Sedgwick's division has received much attention from military writers. Viewed by the light of subsequent knowledge regarding the Confederate line, and its heavy reënforcement, the attack by a single division may be classed as extra hazardous. The division might have been halted at the Hagerstown pike, where its left flank was protected and put on the defensive, before firing a shot. It would have been a safe and cautious move, but if adopted, meant a suspension of the turning movement for which the Second Corps had been sent to the right of the line. Taking a general view of the operations on the right of the Union line, the question of turning the left flank of the enemy is easily debatable, but as such a plan was decided on, all the troops assigned to that task should have been on the field and prepared to act in concert; as the attack was made, the several corps followed each other and at too great an interval to be of mutual assistance.

It seems strange that the position of the rebel cavalry and artillery on the extreme left of their line, should not have received more attention. A Union cavalry division, with its horse batteries, might have materially aided Hooker in his initial attack and been of great service on the right flank during the battle. While these several attacks were being made on the right, the Sixth Corps (Franklin) was marching from Pleasant Valley; these fresh troops were ordered to the right of the line, the advance brigade reaching its destination before noon. The arrival of this corps assured the safety of the right flank, and in fact afforded another opportunity to renew the fight.

Franklin favored another attack; Sumner opposed it, and McClellan finally agreed with Sumner. As the attempt was not made, its advisability must always remain an open question. Most writers agree with Franklin, assuming that the rebel left was in bad condition. They overlook the fact that strong reënforcements had been sent to the left of the line; that Stuart still held his commanding position unmolested, and that Jackson contemplated an aggressive movement during the afternoon, which was given up on discovering the heavy concentration of artillery on the right of the Union line. This does not show extreme weakness.

The fact is, Franklin did not propose to attack with the entire corps, as many writers indicate. He proposed to send two brigades of Slocum's division, holding the remaining brigade in reserve. His plan was to reoccupy the line near the Dunkard Church, which had been fought over several times and finally vacated by Greene's division, Twelfth Corps. As the rebel line extended a considerable distance to the west of the church, this move could hardly be called a renewed effort to turn the enemy's left.

The occupation of the woods about the Dunkard Church simply meant an advanced position in front of the rebel line, and in view of the unsatisfactory conditions on the right, General Sumner was wise in not caring to risk another repulse.

Referring to this incident in his report, General McClellan says: "General Sumner, having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed; as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for attack, would peril the safety of the whole army."¹

In the centre the fight was continued, with more or less severity, all through the day, but no determined effort was made to pierce that part of the Confederate line.

Let us now turn our attention to the left. I was not on that part of the field during the battle, and can only speak of it

¹ 27 W. R. 61.

through others. Whatever orders may have been issued, it is apparent from all accounts that there was great delay in the attack. Much time was lost in attempts to cross the bridge, and no effort was made to find a passable ford till the afternoon. Finally, the Ninth Corps made a successful crossing, and were driving the enemy toward Sharpsburg, when they in turn were assaulted on their exposed left flank by Hill's division coming from Harper's Ferry, and forced back to Antietam Creek. This ended the fighting on the left. It would appear that both wings of the Union army met the same fate in their attempts to turn the flanks of the enemy.

By the evening of September 17, Lee had his whole available force on the field, and the selected position had not been seriously impaired; he had fought hard and had lost many men, and a considerable part of his army were incapable of aggressive action. The same may be said of the Union army. Both McClellan and Lee contemplated active operations the next day. Lee was dissuaded from attacking McClellan by Jackson and Longstreet, and McClellan concluded to wait for additional troops coming from Washington.

On the night of the 18th, the rebel army withdrew from Sharpsburg and crossed the Potomac, unmolested. This ended the campaign in Maryland.

The battle of Antietam was the bloodiest fight in a single day during the war. The rebels lost 8000 men or more, and the Union army about 12,000. It was fought without artificial protection of any kind, only the natural lay of the land being used for advantage.

Mr. Ropes says in his book that "Lee had lost 13 guns, 39 colors, and upwards of 15,000 stand of small arms, and more than 6000 prisoners. The Federal army had not lost a gun or a color." If this refers to the entire campaign, the loss of 10,000 Union soldiers at Harper's Ferry should be included.

As McClellan's army remained masters of the field of battle, Antietam can be classed as a Union victory, but I have

never heard of any one on our side who was exactly satisfied with the result, except, perhaps, McClellan himself.

There has been much speculation as to the reason for General Lee making a stand at Sharpsburg. The assertion has often been made that it was a grave military mistake, and would have ended in disaster had the Union army been more energetically handled. Of course this is pure conjecture; no one knows what might have happened; all we know is what did happen, — but the advantage of selecting Sharpsburg is, perhaps, more apparent.

The rebel army had invaded Maryland, a purely aggressive move in the enemy's country, made after a decisive victory over the Union army. Now, if Lee retreated without accepting battle, the Confederate Government would lose prestige, and the moral of his army would be seriously impaired; he could not afford to throw away the fruits of the summer campaign; a retreat would be worse, perhaps, than a defeat.

Whether or not Sharpsburg was always in mind, or the result of changing conditions, is not known, but the country about Sharpsburg was favorable for a defensive line, and General Lee, with practised eye, placed his troops to greatest advantage; his left flank rested practically on the Potomac, while his right rested on Antietam Creek; reënforcements hurrying to the field came up behind the right, and along the natural line of retreat.

Antietam might have been a more decisive Union victory; should have been a more decisive victory; but it was no walk-over, as many writers have claimed.

When one reads the numerous criticisms on the handling of the Union army at Antietam, they are, perhaps, inclined to sum up the evidence in this wise: Hooker and Sumner were too fast on the right. Burnside too slow on the left. McClellan too undecided in the centre.

It must be remembered, however, that Antietam was a Union victory, and will be so recorded in history. That the

victory was not more decisive is due as much to McClellan's lieutenants, as to himself, and they should bear their share of responsibility.

McClellan had a definite plan of attack, and the necessary instructions were given presumably on time. To Hooker was assigned the task of turning the left flank. To Burnside, the task of turning the right flank. Contingent on the success of these movements, an attack on the centre was to be made with all available troops on hand.

In the battle under discussion it is questionable whether two small corps could accomplish the work assigned them on the right, but it is obvious that the two corps should have attacked together, and not separately.

As McClellan has stated that Hooker was selected for command on the right, it is presumed that General Sumner's appearance on that part of the field was not anticipated. As the exigencies of battle took him to the right, after Hooker's troops had been repulsed, it is, perhaps, unfortunate that he was not on the ground and his corps in position when the battle commenced.

It is possible that McClellan hoped that Hooker's attack would be so successful as to enable him to use the Second Corps (which had come through the Peninsula campaign with an enviable record, and had in no way been mixed up with Pope's defeat) to make the decisive move on the centre of the rebel line.

Regarding the left, I will simply copy the following passage from McClellan's report: "After sending General Burnside several orders to attack I directed Colonel Sacket, Inspector-General, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sacket to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly." ¹

¹ 27 W. R. 63.

Planning a battle is one thing ; having it properly executed is quite another matter. History is full of examples where the wisest plans have often led to defeat through faulty execution.

I have attempted only a sketch of the Antietam campaign, and have made it as brief as possible in order to give members an opportunity to discuss the various phases of this peculiarly interesting battle.

In order to facilitate such discussion, I will enumerate some of the principal points ; these questions are not put in the spirit of carping criticism, but solely as military problems : —

1st. As McClellan had four army corps in position on Antietam Creek on the evening of September 15, why did he fail to attack Lee's inferior force on the day following ?

2d. As Burnside commanded the right wing, First and Ninth Corps, why did McClellan place Sumner's command (the Second and Twelfth Corps) between the First and Ninth Corps ?

3d. As McClellan had determined that Hooker should have entire charge of operations on the right, and had promised him the Twelfth Corps in addition to his own command, why did the two corps not move together ?

4th. The Second Corps (Sumner's) was ordered to be ready to march at daylight, but required additional orders to move. Did McClellan expect that Hooker's attack would be so successful as not to require the assistance of the Second Corps ?

5th. Having determined on the move of the Second Corps, why did McClellan hold back the First Division after the corps started ?

6th. As the Twelfth Corps was on the field, why did Hooker make his attack before this corps was in position to assist ?

7th. The Twelfth Corps having failed in its attack, how did the Second Division (Greene) manage to hold its position, unsupported, near the Dunkard Church all through the varied phases of the battle until nearly noon ?

8th. When Sumner reached the field with the Second and Third Divisions of his corps, and learned that the First Corps was not available for action, and that the Twelfth Corps needed immediate support, should he have continued the attack, or taken up a defensive position and withdrawn the Twelfth Corps from immediate contact with the enemy?

9th. When Sedgwick's division crossed the Hagerstown pike, Greene's division, Twelfth Corps, was in position on the left, near the Dunkard Church; why was Greene unable to protect Sedgwick's left flank?

10th. When Franklin's Sixth Corps reached the right of the line, should he have been ordered to renew the attack? In case he attacked, could he have driven the enemy's cavalry and artillery from their detached commanding position on the extreme left, and assaulted Jackson's reënforced line, at the same time?

11th. Why was the left of the rebel line considered the most advantageous point of attack?

12th. Why did McClellan concentrate all his cavalry behind the centre, instead of using it on the two flanks?

13th. Was it intended that the attacks on the right and left should be simultaneous?

14th. Had Burnside made a determined attack in the early morning, could Lee have withdrawn two divisions from his right and sent them to the assistance of his left flank?

Finally: Had McClellan preserved the original formation of his army and placed the First and Ninth Corps on the right, the Twelfth Corps in the centre, and the large Second Corps on the left, would his plan of battle have been more successful?

III

THE TWELFTH CORPS AT GETTYSBURG

BY

COLONEL CHARLES F. MORSE
SECOND MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS

Read before the Society March 6, 1917



THE TWELFTH CORPS AT GETTYSBURG

GETTYSBURG has been more written about, historically and otherwise, than any other battle of the Civil War, and it is with some hesitation that I have ventured to add another contribution to the literature on this interesting subject. I have been led to do this because, in most of the historical accounts of the battle, it has seemed to me that sufficient importance has not been attached to the critical situation on the extreme right of the line between the hours of seven and ten in the evening of July 2, nor to the fighting, both defensive and offensive, on the morning of July 3, for nearly seven hours, which resulted in the entire success of our troops on that portion of the line.

General Meade in his official report makes the briefest mention of the part taken by the Twelfth Corps in the battle, and made several serious errors as to the facts. When his attention was called to what seemed to be omissions and misstatements, he very freely admitted that he had not given credit where it belonged, and in February, 1864, he made an amended statement which to a certain extent corrected his original report. Later on, extracts from these reports will be given.

What occurred on the right made a vivid impression on me at the time, as the events were all within a comparatively small compass, close at hand, and the margin seemed very narrow between possible great disaster and the success which was ultimately attained.

In the pursuit of facts connected with these occurrences, I have examined official reports and other sources of information, and while these contain many discrepancies in their statements, I have gathered from them what seemed essential for

a consistent story of the happenings on the right of the line at Gettysburg.


The Twelfth Corps, commanded by Major-General H. W. Slocum, reached Two Taverns, on the Baltimore pike, about two miles from Gettysburg, toward four o'clock in the afternoon of July 1. At that time the battle of the First and Eleventh Corps with the advance of Lee's army was nearly over, and the troops of those commands had retreated through Gettysburg and were taking position on Cemetery Hill.

Hancock had reached the field and had assumed command. He extended the line to the right, with Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and took possession of a portion of Culp's Hill.

From Two Taverns, where the Twelfth Corps had halted along the pike, the batteries on Cemetery Hill could be seen plainly, standing out against the sky-line, and there was still a brisk cannonading going on from there. After a short halt the corps was moved to the right across country east of Rock Creek, until it faced a slope toward Benner's Hill, where the line was halted and deployed with skirmishers in front. The country here was open, and mounted officers of the enemy could be seen on the high ground apparently examining the position.

Nothing occurred on the line there formed, and in the dusk of the evening the corps was moved a short distance to the rear, where it remained that night behind a strong picket line.

The next morning, July 2, there was some skirmishing with the enemy along the front, but no engagement in force while in that position. That morning General Slocum received a written order from General Meade to take command of the Fifth and Sixth Corps in addition to his own, and Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, the commander of the First Division, was also ordered by General Meade to take temporary command of the Twelfth Corps.



Gettysburg

N
W

11TH CORPS

WADSWORTH DIVISION
1ST CORPS

GEARY'S DIVISION
SHALER
KANE
CANDY

GREENE
NICHOLS
ONEALE
WALKER

JOHNSON'S DIVISION
JONES
STEUART
SMITH
DANIEL

Rock Creek

Pike
Baltimore

LOCKWOOD

+++++

1ST BRIGADE
MCDUGALL
RUGER'S DIVISION

Stonewall
Breastworks
DUMAS
2D MASS

27TH IND.
Swale


3RD BRIGADE
COLGROVE
1ST DIVISION

LOCKWOOD

GETTYSBURG
 Battle on the Right
 at Culp's Hill
 July 2nd and 3rd 1863

——— Union
 - - - - Confederate

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Soon afterwards the latter corps was marched to the Baltimore pike and across Rock Creek towards Gettysburg. The First Division, now under command of Brigadier-General Thomas Ruger, took up a position which became the extreme right of the battle line at Gettysburg. The Second Division, Brigadier-General Geary, was at first placed in rear of the Fifth Corps, which had gone to the left to connect with the Third Corps, but a little later was moved to the right, where it took up a position on the left of Ruger, connecting on its left with Wadsworth's division of the First Corps and completing the occupation of Culp's Hill.

The line now occupied by the Twelfth Corps was very strong naturally, and was a strictly defensive position.

Culp's Hill is a prominent eminence rising from the Rock Creek valley, called by General Edward Johnson, in his report of the battle, a "mountain"; all of the hill was very rough and rocky, covered thickly then with good-sized second-growth oaks and other hardwood trees, at that time in their thickest foliage. From Wadsworth's right Geary's line followed the crest of the ridge, about as shown on the map; Greene's Third Brigade being on the extreme left, then Kane's Second Brigade, and on the right Colonel Candy's First Brigade, which connected with the First Division. The First Brigade of the latter division, commanded by Colonel McDougall, was formed along the same rocky ridge in two lines, but not far from his right the ridge terminated and the hill fell off abruptly to what is called in many of the reports the "swale." This formation of ground did not permit of the entire Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Colgrove, being formed on the high ground, so a part of it was placed on the rocky hill which rose from the south side of the swale, the same general line being continued. This so-called swale was a low, flat meadow, about a hundred yards wide, between the two rocky, wooded hills. Through this swale trickled a small stream, at that time nearly dry, which flowed into Rock Creek.

On the right of Ruger's Third Brigade, and nearly at right angles to it, Lockwood's brigade of three regiments, which had just been attached to the Twelfth Corps, continued the line to the Baltimore pike.

In front of this strong position, at varying distances, was Rock Creek, flowing generally in a southeasterly direction, a sluggish stream fordable in front of Geary's division, but in Ruger's front, where it was affected by the dam of McAllister's mill near where the stream crossed the pike, it was five or six feet deep with a muddy bottom and fifty feet or more wide. The hill on the south side of the swale, occupied by a part of Colgrove's brigade, was commanded by Wolf Hill, also very rough and rocky, on the east side of Rock Creek; but this hill was regarded as inaccessible for artillery, and as a matter of fact was never occupied by the enemy at any time during the battle.

As soon as the troops of the Twelfth Corps were in position, they were ordered to construct breastworks. This was done effectively, especially in the front of Greene's brigade on the left, where, with the foresight and skill shown at all times by that officer, he not only protected his front by a breastwork of logs, but also constructed a traverse at about right angles to his line, to cover his flank. This traverse was an important factor in the defence of that part of the line. All of Greene's breastworks were surmounted by head logs which gave almost complete protection to the men while firing. In addition to the breastworks along the entire front of the Twelfth Corps, there was a heavy stone wall parallel to the line of McDougall's brigade and about forty-five yards in rear of it, in which he established his second line. On the right of the swale, rather light breastworks were constructed, facing Rock Creek on the east and the swale on the north. The artillery brigade, consisting of one Pennsylvania and two regular batteries, was on high ground, on the west side of the pike in rear of the First Division.

It will be well here to recall to mind briefly the general formation of Meade's battle line, as finally established. This line is best described as being in the form of a fish-hook. The Twelfth Corps on the right, with its general front to the east, formed the point of the hook. Next came Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, extending from Culp's Hill along the ridge curving to the left and facing northeasterly. Next the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill, facing Gettysburg on the north, with the other two divisions of the First Corps in its rear. The Second Corps was on the left of the Eleventh, forming the centre of the line; then came the Third Corps, with the Fifth Corps on the left of the line extending to the Round Tops. The last three corps formed the shank of the hook and they faced west. The Sixth Corps was in reserve and in rear of the Fifth Corps.

From the position of the Twelfth Corps, in an air line across to the Second Corps, was hardly a mile, and the entire line of battle measured less than four miles. The country about the Round Tops was thickly covered with woods, but other parts of the line to the left of Wadsworth's division were in open country. The area inside of the line was mostly open fields with small farmhouses and other buildings dotted about.

Throughout the day of July 2 very little occurred to disturb the movement of troops into their positions and the preparations for defence. It was not until about four o'clock in the afternoon that Longstreet made a furious attack on the Third Corps, which, by the ill-advised movement of General Sickles, had advanced to a position beyond that assigned to it by General Meade. From the right of the Twelfth Corps there was a clear, unobstructed view across the open, intervening country, and with the first of the firing the non-combatants could be seen streaming out of the woods on the left. The roar of artillery and the crackle of the infantry fire seemed very near, and with these sounds of battle came the unceasing rebel yell. Wounded men could be seen going to the rear, and

ambulances were making rapid trips between the front and the field hospitals. In the open fields west of the Baltimore pike, in rear of our lines, were the parks of ammunition trains and headquarters wagons with their hundreds of mules and attendants of all kinds that always gather about a wagon camp. Near this camp was the park of the reserve artillery, also west of the pike, and as the battle went on, batteries were frequently detached and went bounding away to the support of the fighting line, with their horses at full run.

When the uproar of battle was at its height, about 6 P.M., and disaster seemed to threaten, General Meade ordered the entire Twelfth Corps to reënforce the left. Orders were given to this effect by General Slocum, but he took the responsibility of leaving Greene's brigade on the left of the corps in its position, with instructions to General Greene to occupy with his brigade the vacated intrenchments of the corps.

Lockwood's brigade led the advance of the Twelfth Corps, followed by the two brigades of the First Division. General Williams going with Colonel Lockwood to direct the movement.

The order to General Geary to follow the First Division was given personally by General Slocum, who says in his official report, "The two brigades of the Second Division, under Brigadier-General Geary, by some unfortunate and unaccountable mistake, did not follow the First Division, but took the road leading to Two Taverns, crossing Rock Creek."¹ Geary claims that he did not know the object of this move and that the First Division was out of sight when he started. Considering that a fierce battle was raging at the time and that there were many indications that the forces engaged were needing help, it did not show much of a soldier's instinct to take a road leading to the rear and follow it for about two miles before halting.

General Williams in his official report says, "The First

¹ 43 W. R. 759.

Division marched under heavy artillery fire in the direction of heaviest firing.”¹ This took the division across fields and byways in a generally direct line. As it approached the firing line, shells were continually bursting overhead and there was the general noise of battle, but the devilish rebel yell was subsiding, which seemed to indicate that the enemy’s advance was checked. When near the front, General Williams, who was with Lockwood’s brigade, was met by Major McGilvery, commanding the First Volunteer Brigade, Reserve Artillery, who told him that his batteries were without support and threatened by the enemy’s infantry in the woods in front, where it had just retired, carrying several of his guns. Lockwood deployed his force, advanced into the woods, and recaptured three of the guns, which the enemy abandoned in their retreat. Ruger, with his First and Third Brigades, deployed in two lines and pushed into the woods farther to the left, but did not become engaged with the enemy.

It was now quite dark, firing on the left — except scattering shots — had ceased, and soon afterwards orders were given for the First Division to return to its position on the right.

Greene’s brigade, it will be remembered, had remained in its position on the left of the Twelfth Corps, with instructions to occupy the entire line of intrenchments vacated by the movement of the other troops of the corps.

It is doubtful whether any brigade commander in the army was better qualified to discharge the duties in the situation which now developed than General George S. Greene. He had proved his worth at Cedar Mountain, Antietam, and Chancellorsville; in each of these battles he had rendered distinguished service. He was a grim old fighter, modest as he was brave, gentle and courteous in his manner both to superiors and subordinates; he had the respect and confidence of all.

It was quite dark in the woods at seven o’clock, when, by

¹ 43 W. R. 774.

his report, his right regiment moved into the intrenchments of Kane's brigade. Just as this movement was about completed, a furious attack was made along his picket line, which was driven in.

This was the advance of General Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's Corps, and the troops engaged in this attack were mostly those of Jones', Nichols', and Steuart's brigades. When General Greene first received orders to occupy the intrenchments to his right, he called on General Wadsworth and the Eleventh Corps for reënforcements and received two regiments from each of these commands, about as this attack began. The enemy soon extended his left beyond the right flank of the regiment sent into Kane's intrenchments, so it was withdrawn and placed in the traverse which Greene had so wisely planned that morning and which now served a most useful purpose. Attack succeeded attack, but they were mostly directed against the strongest parts of Greene's line and they failed to break it at any point.

The enemy did, however, take possession of all of the intrenchments vacated by the Twelfth Corps, except those beyond the swale. General Greene reports that the attacks ceased about ten o'clock, after steady fighting for about three hours. His men had the great advantage of being behind well-constructed breastworks, and, while there were many casualties that night, the loss on our side was small compared with that of the enemy, who was in largely superior force.

The period from seven until ten o'clock that evening was a very critical one for Meade's army, and the enemy failed to take advantage of a great opportunity. After the departure of the Twelfth Corps there was nothing to obstruct the march of a part of Johnson's troops to the Baltimore pike, through the position which had been occupied by the First Division, which would have placed this force practically in the rear of the whole Union army and across its main line of retreat.

There are many evidences of the absence of any enterpris-

ing commander of the Confederates from a close touch with the situation that night. Johnson had four brigades in his division, two of them well up by seven o'clock that evening; the other two, Walker's and Nichols', not far behind. If, after driving in Greene's pickets and getting possession of Kane's breastworks, he had continued a strong demonstration against Greene's line, but had not centred his main attack there, he could have pushed on a few hundred yards farther across the pike with one or more brigades and would have been in a position to cause a demoralizing panic in the wagon trains, with a rebel yell and a few volleys. At this hour, between eight and nine in the evening, there were no troops within a mile that could readily have been detached to this scene of disaster and the advantages would all have been with the Confederates.

I have been led to these speculations as to what might have happened, by statements in some of the Confederate reports and miscellaneous papers, which convey the impression that those high in command did not understand the situation that night or it would have been taken advantage of.

Stonewall Jackson had a way of always being near the advance of his troops in any important movement, and knew when and where to strike effectively; if he had been with his old command that night, the result might have been very different.

However, we escaped the peril which was so near, and steps were speedily taken to mend the break in our line. General Greene relates that General Kane, after marching to the rear with General Geary, heard the sound of fighting in the lines which he had left, and tried to learn the nature of this movement toward Two Taverns and what was the proposed destination. Kane was a fiery fighter, a brother of Dr. Kane, the Arctic explorer, and not the kind of man to march to the rear when there was fighting going on at the front. Not being satisfied with what he could learn, he countermarched on

his own responsibility, and got back to near his old position about ten o'clock. On attempting to go to his former line, he was fired on by the enemy's pickets, and General Greene, hearing the firing, sent a staff officer to conduct him along the Baltimore pike to a position in rear of his own brigade.

The situation on the left had been so absorbing that apparently but little was known of the occurrences on the right until the fighting was all over. It was probably between nine and ten o'clock when the First Division began its march to its old position on the right, the Third Brigade being in the advance. It was a clear night, with a full moon, but the march was slow, as much of it was across country, and it was, perhaps, between ten and eleven o'clock when the advance of the division crossed the Baltimore pike. The Thirteenth New Jersey and Twenty-seventh Indiana filed through the woods into their intrenchments to the right of the swale, and the Second Massachusetts, which followed the Twenty-seventh Indiana, started to cross it.

At this time General Ruger, who had become suspicious, sent orders to Colonel Colgrove to throw out skirmishers before proceeding farther. This order was passed to Lieutenant-Colonel Mudge, commanding the Second Massachusetts, and a small squad of men was sent forward, which returned in a few minutes with a single rebel prisoner. The regiment was then formed in line, facing the woods beyond the swale, and a full company was sent out, which went across the swale and returned soon after with twenty-three more prisoners who were gathered up not far from Spangler's Spring; they all had canteens and appeared to be straggling about looking for water. Thus far there had been nothing to indicate how much of a force there was in the woods beyond the swale, and, to determine this more definitely, Colonel Mudge moved his regiment forward to the other side, halting on the edge of the woods. He then ordered Captain Fox, with his Company K, to push forward through the woods, up the hill, and find out what was there.

I was major of the regiment at that time, and was directed by Colonel Mudge to go with Captain Fox and bring a report to him when the situation had been developed. The woods were so dark that it was impossible to distinguish anything more than a few yards ahead, and the way was rough and rocky.

After proceeding, perhaps, one hundred and fifty yards, it became evident that we were approaching a considerable body of men, but as it had been intimated that some of our own people might be in the woods, Captain Fox quietly halted his company and sent two of his men forward to make inquiry. They went on in an ordinary, careless way some twenty yards, and, when in close contact with this unknown force, called out the usual formula on such occasions, "What regiment, boys?" The answer came, "Twenty-third Virginia," followed by the exclamation, "Why, they 're Yanks," and a slight scuffle, after which one of these men came hustling back; the other remained with his captors.

No shot was fired and no aggressive movement was made on the part of the enemy. It still seemed possible that this was not an organized force in our front, and, to settle this question beyond a doubt, Captain Fox ordered his company forward without concealment. There was an almost immediate challenge, to which Captain Fox responded, "Surrender! Come into our lines." The answer to this was sharp and clear, "Battalion, ready, Fire!" and the fire came from quite a long, scattering line, but did little damage, as Captain Fox's company was on a much lower level and the bullets went over their heads; two men only were wounded.

The company retired down the hill and the situation was reported to Colonel Mudge, who moved his regiment back across the swale, and was then ordered by Colonel Colgrove to place it on the left of the Twenty-seventh Indiana, the Third Wisconsin being on its left. In this position the Thirteenth New Jersey faced Rock Creek, the remainder of the

brigade facing the swale and the woods beyond. The First Brigade, when it came up, finding the enemy in its breastworks, extended the line to the left, but at a considerable angle, facing the swale in a more easterly direction.

Lockwood's brigade was placed on the west side of the pike to support the artillery of the corps, which was put in position to cover our former breastworks on the left of the swale. Candy's brigade, the last of the Second Division, filed into place about one o'clock in the morning of July 3, and a line was completed that in a general way encircled the country which had been occupied by Johnson's division.

Orders were given that night to Generals Ruger and Geary to attack the enemy at daylight and drive him out of our works. During the night Johnson was reënforced by Daniels' and O'Neal's brigades of Rodes' division and Smith's brigade of Early's division. Johnson now had seven brigades which were massed between Rock Creek and the position occupied by the Twelfth Corps. Smith's and Daniels' brigades, with the Second Virginia of the "Stonewall" brigade, were on the left, occupying the breastworks of the First Division, with a portion of one brigade facing the swale and the woods occupied by Colgrove's brigade. The other five brigades were massed on the right facing the Second Division.

After the movements described, the night was very quiet and peaceful. There was nothing to indicate that two large armies were lying on the ground, the lines in places hardly a pistol-shot apart.

At the first streak of dawn the pickets on both sides of the swale began firing, and, as the range was very short, the men had to protect themselves behind rocks and trees. At about the same time, which is named in official reports as 3.30 to 4.30, the artillery of the corps began firing from its position, west of the Baltimore pike, at the breastworks occupied by the enemy at ranges of six hundred to seven hundred yards. This firing was maintained for about fifteen minutes. When it

ceased, the First Brigade, First Division, pressed forward into the woods in their front and began the attack. At the same time with this advance, the enemy began a furious attack on the Second Division, particularly on Greene's line, charging almost to his breastworks. The fire which they met was so severe and their losses so heavy they could make no impression on this well-defended line, but, though repeatedly repulsed, they came again and again to the attack.

At about 6 A.M., when Greene's brigade had exhausted its ammunition, Kane's brigade took its place and Greene's men went to the rear to clean their guns and get a fresh supply of cartridges. About 8 A.M. the enemy massed their troops and made a determined attack. At this time Shaler's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, came to reënforce the line, followed a little later by two regiments from Wadsworth's division. General Greene pursued his plan of successively relieving the troops in the first line with fresh regiments, which, he says in his report, would come up with a cheer and pour fresh volleys into the advancing enemy. Every attack was beaten off, but though repeatedly repulsed they would only retire a short distance to form again. Candy's brigade and the First Brigade of the First Division did good work at this time on the right of Greene, pouring in a cross-fire.

At about ten o'clock two of Johnson's brigades were formed in a column by regiments and made a last desperate attack on Greene's and Kane's brigades, the latter at that time being on Greene's right; but, though they were pushed fairly into our lines, where, according to Geary's report, the dead of the First Maryland Battalion, which was in advance, mingled with our own, they were repulsed. In this last charge many of Walker's "Stonewall" brigade threw down their arms and rushed forward with white flags to surrender. Major B. W. Leigh, Johnson's Adjutant-General, rode forward to prevent this surrender, but was shot down when very near our lines.

After the last repulse our troops rushed forward with cheers

and reoccupied the breastworks they had vacated the evening before and the defeated enemy retired to Rock Creek.

The battle on this front had lasted nearly seven hours. According to Geary's report 900 of the rebel dead were buried in front of our lines. There were 500 unwounded prisoners captured, besides 400 of the wounded which were left on the field. The flag of the "Stonewall" brigade was captured by the Sixtieth New York, and the Fourteenth Virginia flag was taken by the Seventh Ohio. Five thousand small arms were gathered up on the field. The strength of the Second Division in this fight was 3922; Greene's brigade numbering but 1424; Kane's brigade only 650. The loss in killed and wounded in the division was 549, of which 303 were in Greene's brigade.

The comparatively small loss of our troops is accounted for by the almost complete protection afforded by our breastworks, against which Ewell's brigades wasted their strength in their efforts to break our line and reach the Baltimore pike.

While the battle was raging in front of the Second Division and McDougall's brigade of the First Division, General Ruger received orders to try the left of the enemy's line across the swale with skirmishers, and, if the resistance was not too great, to advance two regiments. These orders were transmitted to Colonel Colgrove by a staff officer, but there has always been a dispute as to just what the order was that was delivered. In his official report Colonel Colgrove says: "At this juncture Lieutenant Snow of your staff came up and said, 'The General directs that you advance your line immediately.'" ¹ He explains that the position was such that he could advance but two regiments in line, and that it was impossible to advance skirmishers, as they would be cut down by the enemy's fire from behind breastworks and rocks before they could cross the swale. He says: "The only possible chance to carry his position was by storming it. . . . I selected the

¹ 43 W. R. 813.

Second Massachusetts and Twenty-seventh Indiana for the work, and ordered the Second Massachusetts to charge the works in front of their position ; the Twenty-seventh Indiana, as soon as they should gain the open ground, to oblique to the right and carry the position held in the ledges of rocks.”¹ The commanders of both regiments gave the orders “Forward, double-quick!” The men jumped over the breastworks and rushed down the short declivity with cheers. When they reached the open ground they were met by a most destructive fire. The Twenty-seventh Indiana was exposed to both a flank and front fire. It suffered so severely that, to save it from total destruction in this hopeless charge, it was ordered back when about halfway across the swale. The Second Massachusetts, though losing heavily, crossed the swale and reached the woods on the other side, where, under protection of the rocks and trees, it began firing, the enemy’s line then being not a pistol-shot away. Lieutenant-Colonel Mudge was killed by a bullet while crossing the swale, and this became known when the woods were reached and firing began. Being next in rank, I then assumed command. My official report at this point says: “I found on going to the right that the regiment that had advanced with us had never reached the woods, and that the enemy was throwing a force in our rear. I ordered the regiment at once back far enough to uncover the right flank, which left the enemy in a very exposed position. They fell back rapidly, but lost heavily in so doing.”² The force referred to in this report appeared to be a regiment or more, and they were deployed into the swale at the double-quick about fifty yards in rear of the Second Massachusetts. The movement of the latter regiment was a right oblique to the rear, and when it faced about and began firing, the enemy was not only exposed to this fire at very short range, but also to that of the other regiments of the brigade, which could now fire without causing loss to the Second Massachusetts.

¹ 43 W. R. 813-14.

² 43 W. R. 817.

Those of the enemy who escaped dropped into cover as soon as they reached sheltering rocks. The position now occupied by the Second Massachusetts was a depression of ground, with a sunken stone wall in front, which gave some protection from the enemy's fire. My report goes on to say: "I remained in my new position, inflicting heavy loss upon the enemy, until my ammunition was nearly exhausted, when I sent to Colonel Colgrove for further instructions. He ordered me to bring the regiment back to the rear of its former position."¹ This movement was effected in perfect order, though at an additional loss of one man killed and six, including one officer, wounded.

The attack by these two regiments should never have been ordered, as it was hopeless to expect to carry a strong, fortified position, occupied by a greatly superior force, by a front attack exposed from the start to a merciless fire. It was a costly mistake, as the Twenty-seventh Indiana lost in the charge 15 men killed or mortally wounded and 7 officers and 76 men wounded, a total of 98. The Second Massachusetts carried into action 23 officers and 297 men. It had 4 officers and 41 men killed and 6 officers and 84 men wounded, a total of 135, or about forty-three per cent of the number engaged. Three color-bearers were killed and one seriously wounded, the fifth color-bearer carrying the flag until the end of the action.

If these two regiments, instead of making this front attack, had been moved from the left of the Third Brigade to the right of the First Brigade, the loss would have been comparatively small, and they could have taken an effective part in the general attack to recover our breastworks from the enemy.

A steady fire was now maintained from the line of the Third Brigade, which was made more effective by extending skirmishers farther to the right toward Rock Creek, where they enfiladed the enemy's line. Finally about 10.30, when the gen-

¹ 43 W. R. 817.

eral forward movement was made, the Third Brigade reoccupied its former line of works. At the last moment the remnant of the force which had escaped from the swale and taken refuge among the rocks, about one hundred men, displayed a white flag and surrendered. These men were from a North Carolina regiment of Daniels' brigade.

After the recovery of our breastworks, fighting on the right practically ceased, and there came the period of perfect quiet referred to in all accounts of the battle. Then, at one o'clock, came the signal gun, and the great artillery duel began. To those who are experiencing the gun-fire of the present war this cannonade would perhaps seem a trifling affair, but to those who heard it and saw its effects it was beyond anything which war had yet shown them. From the position on the right our guns could be seen standing out against the sky-line through the smoke clouds, the bursting shells and explosion of many caissons adding to this grand war spectacle. In the interesting narrative of General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac (3 B. & L. 173), he writes of this great cannonade: "Most of the enemy's projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates" and, in a prior passage, "I saw evidence of the necessity under which the [artillery] reserve had 'decamped,' in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons which had been placed under cover of a hill but which the shells had managed to search out. In fact the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on the crest." Many of the solid shot came over the entire field to the right causing some casualties in the infantry lines. Pickett's charge was out of the sight of troops on the right, but at the last moment, when the general mêlée occurred on the crest of Cemetery Hill, the mob of rebel prisoners which came into our lines was in plain view, and the cheering from the centre spread along the entire line. Just before this climax, some of the troops of the First Division, Twelfth Corps, were ordered

to the centre, and had begun a movement in that direction, but the end came and the troops marched back to their works.

This was the final act at Gettysburg, and nothing further occurred on the right, except some picket firing after dark, which was mostly occasioned by the groping about of the enemy among their wounded who had been left on the field in the last of the fighting.

The official report of the battle by General Williams, dated August 22, 1863, and that of General Slocum, dated August 23, 1863, give full accounts of the operations of the Twelfth Corps and mention with strong commendation the gallant defence by General Greene of his front on the evening of July 2 against a greatly superior force. These reports also refer to the other principal events and movements in which this corps took part.

General Meade's official report is dated October 1, 1863. I quote his reference to the action of the Twelfth Corps: —

“During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth Corps were sent as reënforcements. During their absence, the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, advanced and occupied a part of his line.

“On the morning of the 3d, General Geary (having returned during the night) attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and occupying his former position. A spirited contest was, however, maintained all the morning along this part of the line, General Geary, reënforced by Wheaton's brigade, Sixth Corps, maintaining his position and inflicting very severe loss on the enemy.”¹

This is the only reference made to the Twelfth Corps in General Meade's report. General Slocum was naturally indignant at the apparent ignoring of the facts stated in his report and wrote a letter, dated December 30, 1863, to Gen-

¹ 43 W. R. 117.

eral Meade, calling the attention of the latter to his errors in many particulars. I quote as follows:—

“Your report is the official history of that important battle, and to this report reference will always be made by our Government, our people, and the historian, as the most reliable and accurate account of the services performed by each corps, division, and brigade of your army. If you have inadvertently given to one division the credit of having performed some meritorious service which was in reality performed by another division, you do an injustice—to brave men and defraud them of well-earned laurels. It is an injustice which even time cannot correct. That errors of this nature exist in your report is an indisputable fact.”¹

He then goes on to say that Lockwood’s brigade, which received great credit as being attached to the First Corps, was in fact at no time a part of that corps, but was a part of the Twelfth Corps, and in the action referred to was accompanied by General Williams, the temporary commander of the Twelfth Corps. In reference to General Meade’s statement as to the operations of Geary’s division he makes a quotation and says:—

“From this statement it would appear that Geary’s division marched to the support of your left; that Williams’ division did not; that his (Williams’) division, or a portion of it, was guarding the intrenchments when the enemy gained possession; that Geary returned, and with his division drove the enemy back; that the engagement the next morning was fought by Geary’s division, assisted by Wheaton’s brigade. . . . Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts as set forth in the report of General Geary, as well as that of General Williams. Geary’s division did not march even in the direction of your left. Two of his brigades, under his immediate command, left the intrenchments under orders to

¹ 43 W. R. 763-64.

move to the support of your left, but through some unfortunate mistake he took the road leading to Two Taverns. Williams' entire division did move to the support of your left, and it was one of his brigades (Lockwood's), under his immediate command, which you commend, but very singularly accredit to the First Corps.

"Greene's brigade of the Second Division remained in the intrenchments, and the failure of the enemy to gain entire possession of our works was due entirely to the skill of General Greene and the heroic valor of his troops. His brigade suffered severely, but maintained its position, and held the enemy in check until the return of Williams' division. The 'spirited contest' maintained by General Geary, reënforced by 'Wheaton's brigade,' was a contest for regaining the portion of our intrenchments held by the enemy, and was conducted under the immediate command of General Williams, and was participated in by the entire Twelfth Corps, reënforced not by Wheaton's but by Shaler's brigade."

In conclusion he says, "I sincerely trust that you will endeavor to correct as far as possible the errors above mentioned, and that the correction may be recorded at the War Department."¹

General Meade wrote an answer to this letter in which he admits very frankly the errors in his report and regrets them, stating at some length how they occurred and that they were inadvertent. He agrees to correct them, and on February 25, 1864, he wrote to General Halleck a letter in which he made a concise and correct statement of facts as given in General Slocum's letter and official report, which as far as possible corrected the record.

Gettysburg will always occupy a place by itself among the battles of the Civil War in the minds of those who were there and to those who have made a study of it.

There are many reasons for this. The armies which fought

¹ 43 W. R. 764, 765.

there on both sides were at the highest state of efficiency they reached at any time during the war. A large part of these troops were the men of '61 who had been in active service, marching and fighting for two years, and were seasoned veteran soldiers. While numerically the Union army had more men than the Confederate, yet at the points of encounter there was little difference in the forces engaged. It was square, stand-up fighting, with no flinching on either side.

Gettysburg meant more to the Confederacy than any other battle of the Civil War. It was literally their "high tide," for if Lee had won the battle and the Army of the Potomac had been forced to retreat toward Washington, there seems little doubt that foreign intervention would have come, as at that time there was a large element in the North which would have welcomed peace at any price.

The catastrophe was averted by the splendid fighting qualities of our soldiers, and by the feeling that pervaded the army — that there must be no such thing as defeat when fighting on our own soil.

In these later years, General Meade has been much criticised by many writers for not attacking after the repulse of Pickett's division, and in the light of what has since been known, it seems probable that if the Sixth Corps had been brought forward and advanced in the centre, Lee's line would have been broken. Such a movement might have been fatal to the Army of Northern Virginia, and the war might have been more speedily brought to an end; but there is much to be said for the course which was adopted and which was approved at the time by most of the generals of the army. In these later criticisms, written in the peaceful quiet of a library, with maps and references at hand, perhaps the human factor in the equation is not enough considered.

It must be remembered that for three hot July days, with little rest at night, nearly every man in the army, from the general in command, oppressed by his new and great respon-

sibilities, down to the privates in the ranks, had been under the greatest possible strain, mental as well as physical, and that during these three days they had had an insufficiency of food and a minimum of sleep; they were in fact tired out. If they had been ordered forward that afternoon, they would have responded with a cheer, but they were not called on to advance, and when they lay down that night on the ground they had fought for, there were few in the army who did not feel well satisfied with the result. Perhaps that is the wisest conclusion for us to come to, now.

IV

THE MINE RUN CAMPAIGN, NOVEMBER, 1863

BY

COLONEL THOMAS L. LIVERMORE
EIGHTEENTH NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS

Read before the Society, April 4, 1916

(Based on official reports in War Records, vols. 48 and 49)

THE MINE RUN CAMPAIGN, NOVEMBER, 1863

FULL accounts of this campaign have been given in General Humphreys' book, "The Virginia Campaign of 1864-5," and in the paper of General Davis printed in this Society's Volume 3.

The campaign is an interesting example of strategic sparing between two accomplished generals, which served as practice for the battle of the Wilderness which, five months later, began on the same ground, with manœuvres modified on both sides by the experience in the earlier campaign.

The following synopsis of the Mine Run campaign is offered as a frame for the picture drawn by General Peirson in his paper of this evening.

The Army of the Potomac lay on the line which it had taken after forcing the passage of the Rappahannock early in November, 1863, extending from Wellford Ford on the Rappahannock at Hazel River, through Brandy Station to Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock.

The Army of Northern Virginia was posted south of the Rapidan from Walnut Run to Hume's Shop on Mountain Run, and thence up along the south bank of the Rapidan to Barnett's Ford.

From its rear the Wilderness, spreading south of the Rapidan on a radius of about twelve miles, presented a formidable passage for the Union army in any attempt to march by the Confederate right flank, toward its rear or toward Richmond. This thick forest had been the scene of the battle of Chancellorsville in May, 1863, and was destined in the following twelve months to be the field of the battle on Mine Run and the battle of the Wilderness in which three battles fifty thousand men were killed and wounded.

To pass along the front of the Confederate line in an effort to turn its left flank, the Union army would expose its own flank and rear to attack, and an attack upon the Confederate front could succeed only after forcing the passage of the river. But on November 26 Meade marched into the Wilderness to attack Lee's right flank, counting upon the fact that the right end of the Confederate line, while twenty miles from its left end, was only ten miles from the centre of the Union line, and hoping therefore to defeat the right wing before the left wing could come to its aid. To this end he directed that the Third and Sixth Corps should march from his right, to pass the Rapidan by Jacob's Ford and thence march to Robertson's Tavern (Locust Grove), and there join the Second Corps which he directed to cross at Germanna Ford; that the First and Fifth Corps should cross at Culpeper Ford and march to Robertson's Tavern and Parker's Store, respectively; and that then the whole army should move rapidly by the Orange, Turnpike, and Plank roads to fall on Ewell's corps—the right wing of Lee's army which held the line from Hume's Shop to Robertson's Ford. The delay of the Third Corps to arrive at the Rapidan resulted in delaying the arrival of the Second Corps at Robertson's Tavern until November 27. In the meantime Lee, being advised on the 26th of Meade's movement, started his troops to meet the Union columns south of the Rapidan. At about ten o'clock on the morning of the 27th two divisions of Ewell's corps, marching easterly on the Orange Turnpike, encountered the Second Corps coming westerly on the same road at Robertson's Tavern and, being checked by this corps, halted for the arrival of the other (Johnson's) division of Ewell's corps. Warren, commanding the Second Corps, also halted it for the arrival of the Third and Sixth Corps. French, commanding the Third Corps, on the morning of the 27th, at the house of Widow Morris, long hesitated in choosing his road between the two roads which forked there, and finally, erroneously

taking the right-hand one, by an unhappy chance encountered Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which was on its way from Bartlett's Mill to Robertson's Tavern, and was delayed until night in the consequent engagement. Meade wrote in his report¹ that in his opinion the unnecessary delay in the progress of the Third Corps and in its attack of the enemy in the front "was one of the primary causes of the failure of the whole movement"; and Humphreys states² that had the column, led by the Third Corps, moved promptly, it would have arrived at Robertson's Tavern at the same time with the Second Corps, and then the three corps, numbering 40,133 infantry, would have encountered Ewell's corps, numbering 16,971 infantry, "at a time when Hill was too far off to be available, and when the Fifth and First Corps were advancing on the Plank road to meet him."

Davis expresses the opinion³ that greater expedition by French would have insured a victory at Robertson's Tavern on the afternoon of the 26th or the morning of the 27th, because Gordon's brigade of Hays' division was on the Plank a short distance west of the Tavern on the night of the 26th; Hays' division in the vicinity of it by 6 A.M. of the 27th; Stafford's brigade at Zoar Church on the 26th [five miles from the Tavern]; Hampton's cavalry brigade in the vicinity of the Tavern at 9 A.M. of the 27th; and the head of Hill's corps on the field at 1 P.M. This statement is modified by reference to the records as follows:⁴ Gordon's brigade was on the Turnpike three miles west of Robertson's Tavern until 6 A.M. November 27, when it was joined by Hays with two of his other brigades. After an hour's delay, they moved toward the Tavern. They were there halted by the presence of Warren's (Second) corps which had arrived at about 10 A.M.⁵ Stafford's brigade, early on the morning of November 27,

¹ 48 W. R. 15.

³ 3 M. H. M. 499.

⁶ 48 W. R. 14.

² *Gettysburg to the Rapidan*, 58.

⁴ 48 W. R. 817, 818, 830, 838, 839, 846, 877, 885.

before the appearance of the Union advance, rejoined its division near Bartlett's Mill about five miles from the Tavern.¹ It was not at Robertson's Tavern, but the vicinity of New Hope Church, two miles or more away, that Hampton's brigade arrived at 9 A.M. and Hill's corps at 1 P.M.²

If the Third and Sixth Corps had arrived at Robertson's Tavern with the Second Corps and had promptly joined it in the attack and pushed it hard, there is reason to conclude that they would have prevailed, not only against the three brigades of Hays, and his fourth brigade (Pegram's) which arrived at 2 P.M. from the fords of the Rapidan, but also Rodes' division, which was at Zoar Church as late as 9 A.M.,³ and Johnson's division, which leaving the intrenchments between Mountain and Walnut runs at about 11 A.M.,⁴ had to march seven miles to reach Robertson's Tavern. But a thorough victory would have required vigor in leadership, promptness, and coöperation such as had not been exhibited in the Army of the Potomac up to that time.

On November 28 the First, Second, and Sixth Corps marching westerly along the Turnpike, supported by the Third and Fifth Corps, met only the enemy's pickets east of Mine Run, to the west side of which Lee had withdrawn his army during the night. General Peirson's personal narrative begins at this point. The First Corps, in which he was serving, cannonaded the enemy, pushed a skirmish line across Mine Run in sharp combat, and threw bridges over that stream in preparation for an assault. Early in the day Warren had been sent with his corps and Terry's division of the Sixth to the Orange Plank road to feel for, and, if possible, turn, the Confederate right flank. A report at evening that he had reached a position from which he could turn that flank by an assault and reports that an assault was practicable, by the First and Third Corps on the centre, and the

¹ 48 W. R. 846. W. R. Atlas XLV, 1.

³ 48 W. R. 876, 885.

² 48 W. R. 895, 898.

⁴ 48 W. R. 846, 871.

Fifth and Sixth Corps on the left of the enemy, led Meade to plan for the three assaults. Late in the evening Warren, reporting in person, so impressed Meade with the confidence that his force could carry everything before it, that, in view of French's opinion against assaulting with the First Corps, Meade, abandoning the assault in the centre, sent to Warren two of French's three divisions for his attack on the enemy's right. Meade wrote in his report that on the morning of November 30: "The batteries of the right and centre were to open at eight o'clock, at which time Warren was to make the main attack, and at nine o'clock Sedgwick was to assault with his column" ¹ (the Fifth and Sixth Corps), and that the infantry of the centre were to demonstrate, and join in the attack if the assault were successful.

Warren spent the night in arranging his force for the assault on a front of a mile, in two, and in places three, lines.

Hill, whose corps was opposed to Warren, wrote in his report that on November 28 his line extended from the Turnpike, across the Plank road, to the Catharpin road, and was covered by earthworks; that it being found, on the 29th, that the enemy was extending on the Confederate right, his (Hill's) line before daylight of the 30th was extended to his right by two brigades.

Warren wrote in his report: "At daylight all was prepared, and as the sun shone upon the enemy's line, I examined the whole front. I found that the line had been reënforced with all the troops and artillery that could be put in position; the breastworks, epaulements, and abatis perfected, and that a run for eight minutes was the least time our line could have to close the space between us, during which we would be exposed to every species of fire. I at once decided not to attack, and so informed General Meade. . . . Any further attempt to outflank the enemy . . . was not justifiable on any principle." ² The record contains the following despatch from him to

¹ Sedgwick's report agrees with this. 48 W. R. 17, 797.

² 48 W. R. 698.

Meade of that morning: "It is now 7.45 and I have heard no firing from you, from which I fear the enemy has left your front. His position and strength seem so formidable in my present front that I advise against making the attack here. The full light of the sun shows me that I cannot succeed."¹ There is no reason to suppose that any misunderstanding by Warren of the time set for his assault affected his decision, but to show what he understood I venture to here transcribe from a record of my recollections made so soon after the war that they were yet fresh in memory, and many years before Warren's despatch was published; a passage relating to this campaign in which I served on General Warren's staff, which may be otherwise interesting in extending General Peirson's picture from the centre where he was, to the left of the Union line: —

"Next day after reaching Mine Run we found ourselves moving rapidly away, to our left, from Robertson's Tavern, and learned that in consequence of the report . . . that several miles up the Run the enemy's line could be taken in flank. General Meade had put two divisions of General French's corps and one of the Sixth Corps, under General Warren, and directed him, with them and his corps, to move rapidly to the point designated . . . and there assault the enemy or turn his flank, and he was to cut loose from the rest of the army to do this, leaving several miles between us and it. Our advance brigade, under Colonel Miles, struck the enemy in small force before nightfall and made short work of him. We came by one or more of the rebel dead beside the road. We had come into one of the main roads [Orange Plank road] leading across the branches which join to form Mine Run, and our headquarters were pitched in a wood beside it after dark. It was a very cold night and Brownson, Bingham, and I rolled into our blankets together for warmth. We were roused long before daylight and took our breakfast. As we

¹ 49 W. R. 517.

sat around a bright fire with General Warren, waiting for the coming of light, he told us of the assault we were to make and said: 'If I succeed to-day, I shall be the greatest man in the army. If I don't, all my sins will be remembered.' We were informed that he was to assault with the six divisions . . . in one hour after our troops at Robertson's Tavern had opened fire with their artillery, which they were to do at an early hour. . . . Just as twilight was glimmering we rode with the General down to the lines, and as light dawned we took in the whole situation. Our six divisions were in line, each regiment massed, the right division resting on the [Plank] road. . . . Our line was partly in a meadow, and the left was on rising ground. In this meadow, in front of our line, a little stream ran parallel to it, . . . which was one of the branches, if not the head, of Mine Run. Beyond this stream the land rose gently, and up the slope about four hundred yards were the enemy's works. Our skirmishers were within a stone's throw of the enemy's, but they disdained to fire . . . and ours were equally silent. The enemy seemed to be quite willing to have us make all preparations for the assault, and with good reason, for their works commanded a slope which could not have been improved for defence. They were breast high and apparently very thick. We counted sixteen pieces of artillery in front of two of our divisions [a third of a mile in length] and there were plenty of men all in readiness for us. Some of them sat in front of the works looking at us, and we saw their generals moving, mounted, with their staffs, behind the works. We had seen steeper slopes and more rugged ground between us and the enemy, and had seen them fully prepared for our attacks, before, but certainly never had made ready to charge a more formidable position. At Fredericksburg I think the artillery could not have hit our men if they once had reached the foot of Marye's Heights, but here, infantry and artillery would have fair shooting until we reached the muzzles of the guns. Our men, who had been told that

they were to charge, were piling their knapsacks on the ground that they might be unincumbered in the charge, and were pinning on their blouses slips of paper with their names written on them. I never saw anything more impressively characterizing our volunteers. Men who, knowing the danger they were to meet, could, in cold blood, evince their determination to do their whole duty, by labelling their bodies for the grave-diggers.

“General Warren indicated a hill, about fifty yards in rear of the centre of the line, as his post in the action, and we of the staff noted that not only was it within easy range of the enemy’s guns, but also that there was a battery posted on it so that we should have a fine fire on us. We were to be despatched — one to each division commander — all at the same moment, with the order to charge. With these facts before us we followed the General to the hill, and dismounting, lay with our bridles on our arms waiting for the time to come. . . . The hour for the opening of the artillery [on the right] arrived and we heard nothing for an hour more, and then it opened with a great noise. As sixty minutes had nearly flown we anxiously looked at our watches, but we might have spared ourselves the trouble, for, when the hour came, no one stirred, and half an hour later . . . I found the General had gone, . . . and believing nothing was to be done for the present I went to the rear to look after my train. As I struck the Plank road I met General Meade riding to the front looking as savage as any one could, accompanied by a few of his staff. They were riding hard and had come across from Robertson’s Tavern without escort I judge. . . . I was told afterwards that General Warren had determined not to charge, on his own authority, and had so sent word to General Meade, and that the latter was riding to meet him; that Warren then offered to charge if Meade would then tell him to do so, and that the latter declining to do this, [and though he] expressed himself as disappointed in the extreme that Warren had not charged,

. . . refused to look at the position and directed a retreat. I was also told that at the time appointed for our charge, French, whose divisions Meade had given to Warren . . . taunted Meade with ‘Where are your young Napoleons’ guns, why don’t they open?’ . . . I do not wonder that he was raging as he rode to meet Warren who theretofore had been his favorite. . . . General Warren was a . . . brilliant and ambitious soldier, but . . . was always ready to set up his own judgment against that of his superior officers, and this failing was what, I suppose, brought him into trouble at the end of his brilliant career in the field, . . . but on this occasion his independence waited on, and his ambition gave way to, his humanity, and in my estimation he displayed more courage in refusing to make, than he would have had in ordering, the assault. In command of nearly one half the army, the youngest major-general in it, with the hopes of General Meade resting upon his action, when to do nothing was almost as bad as defeat, with such orders that the responsibility for defeat would have rested on General Meade wholly, or in part; with a command full of courage, and believing that, with victory, he would be the greatest man in the army; he, as he afterwards said in my hearing, when he rode along his lines on that bright morning and saw the enemy’s position, thought of the wounded who were frozen at Fredericksburg and resolved not to risk a defeat.”

Meade’s army having lost 1272 killed and wounded and 381 missing, recrossed the Rapidan on the night of December 1 and the next morning. The Confederate corps of Ewell had lost 601 killed and wounded. There is no report of the missing or the losses in Hill’s corps. Ewell’s and Hill’s corps then resumed their line along the Rapidan from Morton’s Ford to Barnett’s Ford. Longstreet, with two divisions returning from Tennessee, took position in reserve at Gordonsville in April. Lee’s army was thus posted when the Union army under Grant entered the Wilderness in May, 1864.

Crossing at Germanna and Ely Fords, instead of turning up the Turnpike to strike the right of Lee's army where it lay, as was done in the Mine Run campaign, Grant attempted, by pushing through the Wilderness to the south, to turn Lee's right and at the same time draw him to battle in the open country beyond the forest ; but Lee took the offensive in moving by the Turnpike and Plank road against the marching columns and thus forced the battle in the Wilderness in which neither side gained ground. It is a debatable question whether it would not have been better for Lee, when the direction of Grant's march was determined, to have intrenched in his path for a defensive battle in the open country, as he had done in November at Mine Run, and as he did at Spottsylvania three days later to forestall the resumption of Grant's march onward.

V

THE MINE RUN AFFAIR

BY

CHARLES L. PEIRSON

COLONEL THIRTY-NINTH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS AND BREVET
BRIGADIER-GENERAL

Read before the Society April 4, 1916

THE MINE RUN AFFAIR

IT is hard to find an event of the Civil War that has not already been described over and over again by much abler hands than mine. Such description from me, therefore, is of no value except that which arises from the fact that the writer was a participant in the action and can add a personality to his account which, owing to the lapse of years, may give it some interest.

My theme will be the Mine Run Affair. It took place on November 26, 1863, and the following days.

Major-General George G. Meade, having won the battle of Gettysburg, did not attack General Robert E. Lee during his passage of the Potomac River in retreat, because of the uncertainty of further recruiting his army as shown by the New York riots, and for the reason that a reverse to our army, while it was so near the Capital, would influence foreign recognition of the Confederacy in their favor. General Meade prepared to delay his attack upon Lee until later when, having followed him from Gettysburg, he should find some favorable opportunity at a little more distance from the city of Washington, being, however, fully determined to attack him on the first favorable occasion which presented itself. This General Meade told me himself when I met him in Boston shortly after the war.

My regiment was at Gettysburg, and I had an opportunity of talking with General John Sedgwick, upon whose staff I had previously served, and upon whom I called while he was with his corps at a little place called Funkstown.

General Sedgwick said to me that on that day there had been a consultation among the general officers, and all had agreed (Wadsworth and Howard excepted) that General Lee,

while his force was crossing the river, held a commanding position, much superior to that of the Union army, and that his troops were in the best of fighting condition. They nearly all agreed with General Meade that to follow Lee and attack later was the wisest plan.

If at the time of Gettysburg we could have forced Lee to recross the river, that would have been all that we could have then asked, while now we had badly defeated him besides. This bagging an army, your equal in numbers, is a hard thing to do, and no soldier expects to do it.

The country between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers had been traversed to and fro for some months by the Union and Confederate armies.

Early in August, 1863, a disagreement sprang up between General Lee and the Confederate Cabinet, and Lee tendered his resignation. He desired to retire to the line of the James River, while President Jefferson Davis insisted upon his defending the line of the Rappahannock. Much recrimination existed in the Confederacy in regard to the immense loss occasioned by the advance into and retirement from Pennsylvania. Prior to their return there were indications of the intentions of the rebels to retire beyond the Rapidan, and all agreed that the line of the Rapidan would only be defended for the purpose of retarding the movements of the Union forces.

During this period of inactivity, General Meade was in constant receipt of advice and suggestions from the prominent officials at Washington, and he finally wrote to Major-General Halleck, October 18, 1863: "If you have any orders to give me, I am prepared to receive them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in the guise of opinions as you have recently honored me with, particularly as they were not asked for. . . . If my course, based upon my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to be, and I desire to be, relieved from command." ¹ The correspond-

¹ 49 W. R. 346.

ence shows that General Meade had but little patience, and that General Halleck was without that charming trait—a sense of humor—indeed, as devoid of it as are the Ten Commandments.

In September, 1863, the President suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus for the duration of the war in support of the new Conscription Laws. The authorities would not use force to raise men for the war, thus causing riots in New York City, to quell which and to enforce the draft troops were sent from the army at the front.

The Army of the Potomac, therefore, followed the Confederate army, and crossed the Rapidan River in the latter part of November, and after some fighting, both armies were, at the end of the month, facing each other near Mine Run.

At this period I received a detail as division officer of the day.

An orderly from division headquarters came bearing an order to me. He was leading a white horse for my use, as our horses were not then in the front line. I rode just in rear of the picket line until the bullets came too thickly, when I dismounted, walked, and crawled the rest of the way. I remember that, wishing to cross a little elevation, I put my cap upon my sword, raising it to discover the safety of the situation, when it was immediately the target for three or four bullets whereupon I contented myself with a more roundabout way.

It was very cold weather; some of the men in the picket line were frozen to death in their little shelters before they could be relieved.

Arriving at the proper place, I moved the picket line forward after a little fight, driving the enemy over and beyond a little stream which, with the assistance of a few pioneers, was bridged for the passage of troops. In this work I somehow contrived to fall from the bridge into the stream, becoming a mass of icicles in two minutes.

Moving the line still farther ahead before reporting upon

the situation, I discovered that the stream was only a branch and that the main stream had yet to be bridged. Just at that moment, to my great delight, I received orders to fall back, as the intention to attack was abandoned, and I returned to headquarters.

General Meade says of the situation, before he crossed the Rapidan:—

“General Lee held the line of the Rapidan River from Morton’s Ford to Liberty Mills, which is about west from Orange Court House. He had abandoned the lower fords of the river, but depended for the defence of his right flank upon a line of intrenchments that he had constructed perpendicular to the river at Morton’s Ford, and extending to a place called Bartlett’s Mills on Minè Run, which is a small tributary of the Rapidan. My plan was to cross the river in three columns, to unite at a common point below his intrenchments, and there advancing rapidly, attack him before he could put up any intrenchments. The plan was a good one, but owing to the failure of others to whom its execution was necessarily entrusted, it failed. After I came up with the enemy, one corps commander, in whose opinion I had the highest confidence [General Warren], reported that there was not the slightest doubt that he could carry the enemy’s works in his front, and he was given 28,000 men and directed to begin his attack the next morning at eight o’clock. At the same time another attack was to be made by 15,000 men at a point where the enemy was evidently not fully prepared.

“On the eventful morning, just as the attack was about to be made, I received a despatch from the officer commanding the 28,000 men saying that he had changed his opinion; that the attack was so hopeless that he had assumed the responsibility of suspending it until further orders were received. This astounding intelligence reached me just ten minutes before the hour of attacking, and barely in time to suspend the other attack, which was a secondary one, and even if successful could

not be supported with so large a portion of my army away for the main attack. This lost me much time, during which the enemy so strengthened the part threatened by the secondary attack as to render it nearly as strong as the rest of the line, and to have almost destroyed the before possible chances of success. I could not move any farther around the enemy's flank for want of roads, and with the possibility at this season of the year of a storm, which would render the locomotion off the prepared roads a matter of impossibility, I determined to and did withdraw my army. If I had thought there was any reasonable degree or possibility of success, I would have attacked. I did not think so. On the contrary, I knew that it would result in a useless slaughter of brave men, and result in a serious disaster to the army. In every instance where we have attacked the enemy in an intrenched position, we have failed, except in Hancock's attack on Spottsylvania, which was a surprise discreditable to the Confederate army."

Another instance is Bunker Hill, where General Sir William Howe attacked General Washington's army. The English troops were faultlessly brave, but their officers appear to have been ignorant of what seems to us, with our Civil War experience, the ordinary military movement of turning a flank.

All of General Meade's prominent officers agreed with him as to the infeasibility of attacking the works at Mine Run.

Major-General John Sedgwick commanding the Sixth Corps, says: "I took my position on the right of the Second Corps, in front of the enemy on Mine Run. The enemy's position in my front was one of great natural strength and extensively intrenched. The condition of supplies of forage and subsistence, and the impossibility of replenishing them in our then position, rendering all further offensive movement impracticable, and a return to our base of supplies being, in my opinion, a matter of necessity."¹

Major-General John Newton, commanding the First Corps,

¹ 48 W. R. 796-97.

testifies: "Mine Run, in our immediate front, for men singly on foot, was impossible. They sank in water and mud nearly to their shoulders in crossing."¹

Major-General George Sykes, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, on December 4, 1863, reported: "The line occupied by the rebels on Mine Run was exceedingly formidable, . . . and although some parts of it might have been assaulted successfully, it would have been at great sacrifice of life and might not have determined a favorable issue for a general battle."²

My own experience is taken from a home letter dated December 4, 1863, and from my own recollections: "Once more safe, sound, and comfortable, after a week of danger and hardship. We crossed the Rappahannock on Thanksgiving Day, and reached the Rapidan River—crossing that after dark without opposition. Notice was given to the troops of Grant's victories, and under such influences we took our hard tack as cheerfully as we ever did the best of Thanksgiving dinners.

"Hard Tack. Had this word been then in existence, the comprehensive dictionary of the English language by the late Dr. Samuel Johnson, would doubtless have defined it thus: *Hard Tack*. A kind of bread used as food by soldiers and sometimes given to horses. My own ardent association with it can be paraphrased thus:—

The old oaken *Hard Tack*,
The iron-bound *Hard Tack*,
The moss-covered *Hard Tack*
That we knew so well.

"The next day we marched to Robertson's Tavern, and for three following days remained there in line of battle, supporting the artillery of our centre. The enemy lay in plain sight in strong intrenchments about one mile off, while our pickets were within half gunshot of each other. I was in charge of the division picket line on the day ordered for the battle, and had to advance the line, crossing a stream in our front,

¹ 48 W. R. 689.

² 48 W. R. 795.

which the rebels relied upon as a part of their defence. I, of course, got shot at considerably, but with my usual good fortune escaped with no injury. It was bitterly cold; our pickets could have no fires, and could not be relieved with safety at night. Some men of the Fifth Corps were actually frozen to death that night. I was ordered to build two bridges across the stream, Mine Run, and then ordered to destroy them — both of which orders I obeyed, but in superintending the latter, fell into the Run and immediately became a mass of icicles. The order for the battle was countermanded, and the next night we fell back to the Rapidan, crossing in the morning. There is a feeling of disappointment in the army caused by our retiring without a battle, as the army was never better able or more willing to fight one. It is to be considered that we were cut off from our base and almost out of rations, and in a wilderness with two rivers in our rear. The ration question came to be a very serious one before we came up with our wagon trains, three days' rations having to last five days. I saw men picking up oats in deserted cavalry camps, and acorns and these were the only food for two days. Some men went without food for more than twenty-four hours, while marching all the time. We were very much used up when we arrived last night; nevertheless three hundred of my regiment (39th Massachusetts) went immediately on picket without rations. General Baxter's brigade of our division forded the Rappahannock last night waist-deep, and back again this morning. I forgot to mention that my regiment had the honor of covering the passage of the army across the Germanna Ford of the Rapidan. The enemy crossed the Rapidan in force after us, and were expecting to occupy their winter quarters, but unfortunately for them, we occupy them ourselves. I dread the monotony of winter quarters, and shall be glad to go South or anywhere to avoid it."

My feeling is that we ought to be grateful that the battle of Mine Run never was fought, since with the great number

of men engaged, the loss of life would have been unprecedented, and the result indeterminate. General Lee had perhaps 50,000 men and General Meade 70,000 men, and these two great armies were facing each other in full sight. The intrenched position of the Confederate force made up for the deficiency in men.

If General Warren had not had the courage to express his opinion of the uncertainty of the issue after having already given his deliberate judgment as in favor of an attack, the struggle would have taken place and there would have been mourning throughout the land, with nothing to show for it.

This paper should be read as a supplement to that of General George B. Davis on "The Mine Run Campaign." (M. H. M. 490 *et seq.*)

VI

THE RELIEF OF CHATTANOOGA, OCTOBER, 1863
AND
GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE

BY

COLONEL CHARLES F. MORSE
SECOND MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS

Read before the Society January 5, 1915

THE RELIEF OF CHATTANOOGA, OCTOBER, 1863
AND
GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE

THE battle of Chickamauga was fought September 19 and 20, 1863, and, as we all know, the Army of the Cumberland under General Rosecrans was defeated and driven back to the defences of Chattanooga by General Bragg, whose army had been heavily reënforced by Longstreet with his veteran corps from Virginia, on the eve of that battle.

The situation of Rosecrans became a very serious one, as his army was now practically besieged. With the exception of the strong fortifications about Chattanooga, the enemy was in full control of the country south of the Tennessee River, from Missionary Ridge on his right, to Bridgeport, where the railroad from Nashville crosses that river, on his left. Bridgeport is in the northeast corner of Alabama, and this point became the base of supplies for the army of Rosecrans. Every pound of rations for the soldiers and all forage for the animals, together with ammunition and supplies of every other kind for the army, had to be hauled over a rough, circuitous mountain road, north of the river, a distance of sixty miles. The difficulties of the situation were greatly enhanced by the heavy rains which occurred that season, and which made the road almost impassable for loaded teams.

When it became known that Longstreet was with Bragg at the battle of Chickamauga, preparations were made to reënforce Rosecrans, and September 25, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were started west for this purpose and with the special view of protecting his communications with Nashville.

General Howard was in command of the Eleventh Corps, General Slocum of the Twelfth Corps, and both corps were under the command of General Hooker.

On the arrival of these troops in Tennessee, the Eleventh Corps and the Second Division of the Twelfth, were concentrated at Stevenson and Bridgeport, where supplies were being accumulated; the First Division of the Twelfth Corps was scattered by regiments along the railroad all the way from Nashville to Bridgeport, a distance of 123 miles, to protect it from raids by Wheeler's cavalry and from guerrilla bands, which were very numerous all through this part of the country.

After the retreat to Chattanooga, Rosecrans seemed to be in a paralyzed condition so far as any efforts to relieve the situation were concerned, and he did nothing actively to help matters, even after the arrival of Hooker's command in the vicinity of Bridgeport. Bragg brought his lines close in front of Chattanooga, and though he did not seem inclined to attack this strong position, he waited confidently for our army to be starved out and surrender, or begin a disastrous retreat through the mountains. It was literally becoming a condition of starvation, as the soldiers were on the shortest possible rations and forage for the animals was entirely exhausted. The road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga was strewn with dead mules and horses which had given out along the line or had been picked off by shots from guerrillas, who were very busy in their operations at this time. The artillery horses in Chattanooga had practically all died of starvation, and if a retreat had been attempted the guns would have been abandoned. Altogether the situation was most critical and Rosecrans seemed incapable of grappling with it.

The occasion called for a man, and on October 16, an order of the War Department created the Military Division of the Mississippi, with Grant, fresh from his victorious Vicksburg campaign, in command. In the same order, by Grant's suggestion, Rosecrans was relieved and Thomas placed in

command of the Army of the Cumberland. One of Grant's first acts was to telegraph to Thomas that Chattanooga must be held at all hazards, and the prompt response from General Thomas, which has become historic, was, "We will hold the town till we starve." Those who knew Thomas had no question but that he would do this.

A few days later, October 21, Grant reached Bridgeport and made a personal inspection of the situation, going over the road from there to Chattanooga. He gave immediate orders for opening more direct communication with Bridgeport, and this was effected in pursuance of a plan which had previously been carefully worked out by General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, and which was fully approved by General Grant. Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee River, and at that time was connected with the north side by a bridge, over which all supplies for the army were hauled. About six miles below the city, beyond the base of Lookout Mountain, was Brown's Ferry, and a few miles farther west was Kelley's Ferry, a good road connecting both of these ferries with Chattanooga. From Kelley's Ferry to Bridgeport the river was navigable for small steamboats, but from this ferry to Brown's Ferry the current was so swift through the mountain pass that further navigation was regarded as impracticable. The problem then was to control the country south of the river from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry, and this problem was quickly solved.

General Grant ordered Hooker with his command to cross the river at Bridgeport, October 26, and begin his eastward march to Brown's Ferry. At about the same time General Palmer with his division was ordered to march from Chattanooga by a back road north of the river in the direction of Bridgeport, crossing the river at a point opposite Whitesides, a station on the railroad, to protect the latter after Hooker had passed on his eastward march. General Smith was placed in full charge of the movement from Chattanooga.

Before daylight, October 27, sixty pontoons, with thirty men in each, under command of General Hazen, started to float down the river to Brown's Ferry, passing the picket of the enemy. By keeping under the shadow of the north bank this was successfully effected under cover of darkness, and at about five o'clock in the morning Hazen's men surprised and captured the rebel pickets at the Ferry. Simultaneously with this movement, General Smith with about two thousand men marched from Chattanooga by a road well concealed from the enemy on Lookout Mountain on the north side of the river to Brown's Ferry, where he arrived at about the same time with Hazen's command. Smith's troops were quickly ferried over the river, and the united forces on the south bank took possession of and fortified a hill which commanded the Ferry. A pontoon bridge was speedily built and direct communication established with Chattanooga.

Howard's corps of Hooker's command reached the vicinity of Brown's Ferry the afternoon of October 28 and Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was halted near Wauhatchie station a few miles distant. The enemy's pickets along the river from Brown's Ferry to Bridgeport were all cut off from their supports by this movement of Hooker's and soon came in and surrendered.

As soon as a connection was made between the troops from the east and from the west, steamers were started from Bridgeport with supplies, which were carried as far as Kelley's Ferry by river and thence by wagon to Chattanooga. The mule teams of Hooker's command, which had been well fed and were in good condition, were used for the wagon portion of the transportation.

These operations opened the "Cracker Line" as the soldiers called it, and within a week's time the army of General Thomas was receiving full rations, with a supply of clothing, and the situation at Chattanooga was wholly changed. This plan for opening communications was well designed and well

executed, and Grant gives W. F. Smith the whole credit for its conception ; but, although previously submitted to General Rosecrans, the latter, with the same means at his command, failed to take advantage of it. Rosecrans was an able strategist and a fine man, with great personal popularity, but he lacked the instincts of a soldier in times of serious emergency. Grant, with his quick perceptions and underlying common sense, had these qualities in large measure.

The enemy was wholly surprised by Grant's quick action, and Hooker encountered no serious opposition in his march from Bridgeport, but after connection was made with Chattanooga a serious night attack was made on Geary's division and a portion of the Eleventh Corps which came to its support, by troops of Longstreet's corps near Wauhatchie. This attack developed into a battle of considerable magnitude, but after fierce fighting the enemy was defeated and driven from the field. In this battle the Thirty-third Massachusetts distinguished itself by a gallant charge up a steep hill, and its commander, the brave Colonel Underwood, was seriously wounded. General Thomas, in a congratulatory order to the troops engaged in this battle, says: "The bayonet charge of Howard's troops, made up the side of a steep and difficult hill over two hundred feet high, completely routing the enemy from his barricade on its top, and the repulse by Geary of greatly superior numbers who attempted to surprise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats of arms of this war."

This was the first action in which the soldiers of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were engaged since leaving the Army of the Potomac, and it gave them a standing with the Western army which was fully sustained in the subsequent campaigns with Sherman.

After the relief of Chattanooga soon followed the successful battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge ; also the raising of the siege of Knoxville, where Burnside with his

command had experienced nearly the same starvation conditions as those of the army at Chattanooga. These operations of Grant opened the way for Sherman's great campaigns of 1864, and the year in Tennessee closed much more cheerfully for the Union army than seemed possible in the gloomy period which succeeded the battle of Chickamauga.

Tennessee next to Virginia was the fighting ground of the Civil War. From the capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February, 1862, to the final rout of Hood's army by General Thomas in December, 1864, there was hardly a month during the entire war period when there was not fighting of greater or less importance somewhere in the State. There was a large Union element in Tennessee; in fact, the mountain region of East Tennessee had mostly a Union population, and there was a good sprinkling of Union men through the central part of the State.

These two opposing elements in the population and the constant warfare for four years developed great numbers of guerrillas all through the State, and a complete story of their operations would be a record of bloody outrage and cruelty. These guerrillas differed in their methods from those of Virginia; in the latter State Mosby's men were entitled to be called partisan troops, as they operated in considerable numbers in a regular organization and, besides making raids on our communications, were always ready for a fight when they encountered our cavalry. Mosby, besides being a good fighter, was something of a humorist, and some of his actions and messages to our quartermasters and others are interesting and amusing. No doubt there was occasional brutality by some of his men, but on the whole his prisoners were well treated, after being deprived of whatever they might possess of value.

In Tennessee it was different. The guerrillas generally moved about in small bands with little or no organization. They made raids on the railroads, wrecked trains, and captured occasionally some of our soldiers, but a great deal of

their activity was directed against Union men in localities not within the protection of our army. As previously stated, the First Division of the Twelfth Corps, when it reached Tennessee from Virginia in September, 1863, was posted, in small detachments of a regiment or less, at different points along the entire line of railroad from Nashville to Bridgeport. At these points small earthworks or block houses were constructed and the railroad was operated to its full limited capacity during the autumn and winter months of 1863-64; but it was a single-track line and it was necessary to guard it at every point to insure a regular supply of rations for the men and forage for the animals.

There was no serious attack on the line during the winter, but it was threatened at all times by detachments of Wheeler's cavalry and by the numerous bands of guerrillas which then infested that part of Tennessee.

General Slocum, who commanded the Twelfth Corps, had his headquarters at Tullahoma that winter, and for a portion of that time I was Acting Assistant Adjutant-General of the corps, which made me familiar with the events which I will relate.

The importance of keeping the army at the front well supplied with forage, combined with the deficient supply of rolling stock on the railroad, made it necessary to secure as much hay and other forage as possible from the country adjacent to the line. Such supplies were regularly receipted for, and on reasonable proof of loyalty, were paid for in cash by the quartermasters at the different posts. The country surrounding Tullahoma was fairly well populated and many of the people were loyal to the Government. A majority of them, however, were strongly rebel in their sentiments, and the feeling between these two elements of the population was very intense.

After the retreat of Bragg's army from Stone's River, the loyal citizens had become somewhat bolder, but this was followed by such a series of cold-blooded murders and other out-

rages by guerrilla bands that at the time of which I write they were living in a state of terror. These murders of citizens were as often the result of private feuds as of feeling aroused by the condition of civil war, and in many cases the guerrillas were members of what were considered the best families of the State. Reports were frequently brought to General Slocum's headquarters of murders and other outrages perpetrated by guerrillas, in which Union citizens were the victims, but these were usually by small bands which would scatter on the approach of any military force, so that it was rarely possible to locate them and bring them to account. Their rebel friends would house them and hide them, and the loyal citizens did not dare give information that would lead to their discovery, for fear of being added to the list of victims.

An unusually brutal outrage which occurred late in December, 1863, attracted much attention from the military authorities and led to such vigorous steps being taken that there was a considerable suppression of guerrilla activities in that part of Tennessee thereafter.

The foraging parties which were sent out from Tullahoma usually consisted of a small wagon train with an officer and detail of armed men as guard, but after many expeditions had been made that encountered no signs of an enemy, proper precautions were not taken, which resulted in the tragic event which I will relate. Perhaps the story can be best told by quoting from a home letter written at the time, while under the full influence of surrounding conditions.

The letter is dated, "Tullahoma, December 27th, 1863," and is as follows:—

"I have a story to tell you now, a true story, — a tale so strange and horrible that, if woven into a Scott's or Cooper's novel and laid to the charge of wild Highlandmen or wilder Indians, would have seemed of almost incredible cruelty.

"The troops that are stationed along this railroad and the

adjacent posts, obtain all their forage (that is, hay, corn, and oats) from the country; this, of course, necessitates the continual sending out of forage trains. Last Wednesday a train left this post at daylight in the morning and went out into the country about twenty miles. At about dark, the train, having scattered to the various farms to load up, began to gather together for the purpose of going into camp; three of the wagons were a little separated from the rest. With the exception of the officer commanding the guard, no armed men were in the immediate vicinity of these wagons. Suddenly, as they were going through a narrow, dark part of the road, a party of guerrillas darted out from the side, seized four unarmed wagon men and the officer, and before any help could arrive, hurried them off out of sight, by narrow, unknown paths; even with daylight it would have been difficult to have followed them. The guerrillas with their prisoners hurried across fields, brooks, and woods until about one in the morning, when they halted, tied the hands of the prisoners, built a large fire which illuminated all around, and said they were going into camp. This camping-place has been described to me as on the banks of the Elk River, a deep, rapid stream, with a rocky bed. The fire was built under the shelter of a large, high rock, which rose perpendicularly to some height; all around, with the exception of close about the fire, were thick woods. After a short consultation of the guerrillas among themselves, our men were ordered to stand up; their pockets were searched and every article of value was taken from them. Before they could get the pocket-book of the officer, however, he managed in some way to get it out of his pocket and kick it out of sight. After the robbery was over, our men with their hands tied were ranged along with their backs to the rock. These wretches then told them to get ready, for they were going to be shot. Just imagine what a horrible situation. Here were our men out of reach of all human aid, in the hands of relentless fiends, without a chance

of striking one blow in their defence, but to be shot down like beasts in cold blood. The guerrillas walked off three or four paces and then began firing; all except the officer were hit at the first discharge and dropped to the ground; only one, however, was killed. The lieutenant at the instant of firing made a rush forward through his persecutors, jumped over the bank into the river, and most fortunately freeing his hands managed to swim to the opposite side amidst the shots of the guerrillas, some of whom mounted their horses and leaped them into the river after him, but before they could reach him he had secreted himself among the bushes under the shadow of the opposite bank. In the meantime the poor wounded men were taken one by one to the bank of the river, their hands untied, and then swung between two of the human wretches and launched into the water. The next day the train guard, while searching for their lost comrades, found the dead bodies of two of them floating in Elk River, bullet holes through the head of one and the body of the other. Two men had gained the shore and crept along some distance under the bank, then dragged themselves to the farmhouse where they were found, one of them just dying. Two days after these murders the lieutenant got into this post more dead than alive, with a dislocated ankle and bruises from head to foot.

“This is my story. I think it will strike you as it did me, as a case of incredible barbarity. A party is out searching for these murderers. If found they will be hung at short notice. You may all be thankful that you live in a part of the country where such deeds of violence are unknown.”

My letter ends here, and does not state that I visited the officer, Lieutenant Porter, Twenty-seventh Indiana Infantry Regiment, in hospital, and found him so crippled with rheumatism from his terrible experience that he was unable to move any of his limbs and was suffering excruciating pain. From his own lips I learned most of the facts here related.

After visiting him and receiving his detailed account of this

affair, General Slocum directed me to make a full report of it to General Thomas. This was done, and the story was told much as given in my letter. The following order was then published, which was unique in its treatment of the offence and, so far as I know, without parallel in our Civil War history:—

Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Tenn., January 1, 1864.

General Orders

No. 6.

It having been reported to these headquarters that between seven and eight o'clock on the evening of the 23d ult., within one and a half miles of the village of Mulberry, Lincoln County, Tennessee, a wagon which had become detached from a foraging train belonging to the United States, was attacked by guerrillas, and the officer in command of the foragers, First Lieutenant Porter, Company A, Twenty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, the teamster and three other soldiers who had been sent to load the train (the latter four unarmed), were captured. They were immediately mounted and hurried off, the guerrillas avoiding the road until their party was halted about one o'clock in the morning on the bank of the Elk River, where the rebels stated they were going into camp for the night. The hands of the prisoners were then tied behind them, and they were then robbed of everything of value on their persons. They were next drawn up in line about five paces in front of their captors, and one of the latter who acted as leader commanded "ready" and the whole party immediately fired upon them. One of the prisoners was shot through the head and killed instantly and three were wounded. Lieutenant Porter not hit. He immediately ran, was followed and fired upon three times by one of the party, and finding that he was about to be overtaken, threw himself over a precipice into the river, and succeeding in getting his hands loose, swam to the opposite side, and although pursued to that side and

several times fired upon, he, after twenty-four hours of extraordinary exertion and great exposure, reached a house, whence he was taken to Tullahoma where he now lies in a critical condition. The others after being shot were immediately thrown into the river. Thus the murder of these men, Newell E. Orcutt, Ninth Independent Battery, Ohio Volunteer Artillery, and John W. Drought, Company H, Twenty-second Wisconsin Volunteers, and George W. Jacobs, Company D, Twenty-second Wisconsin Volunteers, was accomplished by shooting and drowning. The fourth, James W. Foley, Ninth Independent Battery, Ohio Volunteers, is now lying in hospital, having escaped by getting his hands free while in the water.

For these atrocious and cold-blooded murders, equalling in savage ferocity any ever committed by the most barbarous tribes on this continent, committed by rebel citizens of Tennessee, it is ordered that the property of all other rebel citizens within a circuit of ten miles of the place where these men were captured, be assessed, each in his due proportion, according to his wealth, to make up the sum of \$30,000, to be divided among the families who were dependent on the murdered men for support, as follows: Ten Thousand Dollars to the widow of George W. Jacobs, of Delavan, Walworth County, Wisconsin, for the support of herself and one child; Ten Thousand Dollars to be paid to the widow of John W. Drought, of North Cape, Racine County, Wisconsin, for the support of herself and two children; Ten Thousand Dollars to be divided between the aged mother and sister of Newell E. Orcutt, of Burton, Geauga County, Ohio. Should the persons assessed fail, within one week after notice shall have been served upon them, to pay the amount of their tax in money, sufficient of their personal property shall be seized and sold at public auction, to make up the amount.

Major-General H. W. Slocum, commanding Twelfth Army Corps, is charged with the execution of this order.

The men who committed the murder, if caught, will be sum-

marily executed, and any person executing them will be held guiltless, and will receive the protection of this army; and all persons who are suspected of having aided or harbored these guerrillas will be immediately arrested and tried by a military commission.

By command of

Major-General THOMAS.

WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

This order was carried out to the letter. General Slocum detailed Colonel Ketcham, of the 150th New York Infantry Volunteers, to take charge of the assessment, and this officer proceeded with a sufficient force to Fayetteville, the county seat, and there found and took possession of the records, which gave the last assessment roll of the county. Within the area fixed by General Thomas' order a *pro rata* assessment was levied on each rebel citizen sufficient to raise the full amount, \$30,000, the last assessment being used as a basis of taxation. A notice was sent to each person of the amount of his or her tax and fixing the day on which the tax was to be paid at the county seat.

On the day thus fixed there was a strange assembly at the county court-house. Men and women of all classes were there, and without exception, all were provided with means in some form to pay the tax. Most of it was paid in gold and silver that had been hoarded since the beginning of the war, but there were many who brought in bales of cotton, which at that time was as good as gold. When the entire tax was collected and converted into current funds, the amount was placed in the hands of one of General Slocum's aides who personally paid it to the persons named in the General Order or to their proper representatives, vouchers being returned to the headquarters of the army.

In these times of peace, remote from all the conditions then

existing in this country, such an order as that of General Thomas may seem harsh and unjust, and doubtless it caused privation and suffering to many innocent and unoffending persons, but it was one of those inexorable war measures which were needed in this guerrilla-infested portion of Tennessee, and to us at the time it seemed a righteous judgment.

To carry out the final clause of the order of General Thomas, the Third Wisconsin Regiment, Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Colonel William Hawley, was sent to Fayetteville, and a strong detail of this regiment was mounted and placed under the command of Captain Silas E. Gardner and Lieutenant Alex. D. Haskins. These two officers were bold and adventurous, and to them and to the veteran soldiers who followed them hunting guerrillas on horseback was like skylarking, after two years and more of active service in the Army of the Potomac. Their work was well done, and although the perpetrators of the murders at Elk River were never identified, there were some thirty of the guerrillas captured during the winter, and the country was made so hot for them that the others disappeared.

The captured guerrillas, including three notorious desperadoes, Elliot, Short, and Miller, were sent to Tullahoma to be imprisoned in a stockade there and tried by a military commission. Murders were proved against a number of them, who were sentenced to be hung and were afterwards executed at Nashville. Miller, one of the worst of the band, was convicted of the cold-blooded murder of a very estimable old Union man, against whom he had a personal grievance, and was sentenced to be hung with the others. He belonged to what was regarded as one of the best families in that part of Tennessee, and was rather a good-looking fellow with nothing of the desperado about his appearance. He had a mother and sister, the latter a very pretty girl. They both came to General Slocum's headquarters to plead for the boy's life. The General would not see them, as he knew he could not

grant their request, but directed me to allow them to visit the prisoner at the stockade. This they did, and they then went to General Thomas at Chattanooga, who, with all the facts before him, would not grant any commutation of Miller's sentence.

The sister, who, besides being very attractive in appearance, was an eloquent pleader, went as a last resort to Washington, and through some strong influence procured an interview with President Lincoln, who with his tender heart could not refuse the girl's tearful plea and he commuted the sentence to imprisonment. Miller was regarded as the most cruel and bloodthirsty of all the guerrillas who were captured, and nothing but his sister's persuasive eloquence saved his life. I never heard of him after his removal to Nashville, but he was probably released with other prisoners at the end of the war, and unless speedily shot by the friends of some of his victims may have become a respected citizen of Tennessee.

As an instance of the summary way in which guerrillas were dealt with, there was about this time a report on file of General Crook, who then commanded the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland, which was to this effect: That he (Crook) fell in with a party of guerrillas, twenty in number; that in the fight that ensued, twelve of them were killed and the rest were taken prisoners. He regrets to report that on the march to camp the eight prisoners were so unfortunate as to *fall off a log* and break their necks.

With the exception of these guerrilla episodes, there was but little excitement or activity of any kind during that winter in Tennessee, and the troops remained quietly in their quarters until the general breaking of camp which preceded Sherman's Atlanta campaign.

VII

PETERSBURG, JUNE 15—FORT HARRISON,
SEPTEMBER 29: A COMPARISON

BY

GEORGE A. BRUCE

CAPTAIN THIRTEENTH NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS AND BREVET-
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

Read before the Society February 6, 1917

PETERSBURG, JUNE 15—FORT HARRISON,
SEPTEMBER 29: A COMPARISON

WHILE reading, a short time ago, for the third or fourth time, "Plutarch's Lives of Illustrious Men," the thought of writing this paper and its subject occurred to me. After giving an extended life of his heroes Plutarch often selects two, generally soldiers, and, in a short separate chapter, compares one with the other. In thus holding up the two, as it were, side by side, pointing out wherein they agree and differ in character, strength, and weaknesses, the magnitude of their achievements and the various methods by which they were accomplished, Plutarch enables his readers to gain a distinct and striking portrait of each and a more correct estimate of their relative standing in the military profession and the value of their lives.

The two events chosen as the subject of this paper present as striking a contrast with each other as any to be found in our military history: of one much has been written, while the other is very near lost to sight in the vast number of conflicts in the Civil War. In regard to the assault on Petersburg on the 15th of June, four papers have been published by this Society; the first in order of time by Colonel Livermore;¹ the second by General Smith² in a vain endeavor to answer, in his own defence, the final and important conclusion of his former staff officer; and the other two³ by Mr. Peabody, which give such a careful grouping of all the evidence in regard to the number of the forces participating in the defence of that city, that his conclusions can be accepted with the confidence the annual report of a business company commands when certified by competent and reliable account-

¹ M. H. M., vol. 5, p. 33.

² M. H. M., p. 75.

³ M. H. M., pp. 125-47.

ants. These papers show that up to some hour in the afternoon, that cannot be fixed, — probably, however, about three o'clock, — the force that was resisting General Smith's advance consisted of one regiment of infantry, two companies of Home Guards, seventy-five militia, four light batteries, and two regiments of Dearing's cavalry; General Smith's force consisting of three divisions of infantry numbering 10,000 men, and a brigade of cavalry not less than 2500. General Beauregard sent two regiments of infantry¹ and two of cavalry from Swift Creek in the afternoon as a reënforcement. The hour of three o'clock would seem to be the earliest moment that these forces could arrive, as the distance would be about five or six miles. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of Beauregard's statement that 1200 men of all arms was the largest force at any time confronting General Smith's two divisions of about 7000 making the assault at 7.30 o'clock in the evening.

General Smith, on reporting to Butler at Bermuda Hundred during the afternoon of the 14th of June, was ordered by him to take and to hold Petersburg, thus feebly defended, the following day. His instructions were verbal, but there can be little doubt of their character. General Grant went up to Bermuda on the 14th and explained to General Butler the object of moving the army to the south of the James River and the importance of seizing and holding Petersburg as the first and most important step in his strategy.

Whatever may be thought of General Butler as a soldier, no one ever questioned his administrative ability and intellectual power. He had a most inquisitive and enquiring mind, a love of work and capacity for it without limit, with a boundless ambition. There must also be conceded to him the possession of one quality of every good commander, that of obtaining information of the enemy in or near his field of operations. In this particular he had no superior. He always

¹ M. H. M., vol. 5, p. 150.

found men, either in peace or war, anxious to serve him regardless of danger to themselves. By the aid of scouts, spies, and agents of various kinds, male and female, from information given freely by deserters and prisoners vigorously examined and cross-examined by himself, he was able to make a roster of the enemy's forces practically accurate as to numbers and organization. If he had been a Frenchman living in the age of Napoleon he would have rivalled Fouché as Minister of the Superior Police and might have displaced him in that office. It was a characteristic of his mind to give to one intrusted with any enterprise minute instructions and all the information he possessed to aid him. It would be difficult not to believe that Butler gave to Smith—as he says he did—a list of all the forces in or available for the defence of Petersburg. The latter admits that he told him that the fortifications were “not at all formidable” and “no force of any consequence” behind them. The last of his statements was absolutely true. General Smith complained that an engineer officer was refused him, which leads one justly to infer that in addition to correct information he was instructed to move rapidly, and when in front of the fortifications to assault them at once; that the great danger would be, that if the character of the movement as a surprise was disregarded, and time wasted in interminable reconnoissances, Beauregard, thinking Petersburg of more importance than his Bermuda line, might send his whole forces there before he would be ready to attack. This was his own opinion as well as that of General Grant.

The forces were to be assembled at Broadway on the south bank of the Appomattox at daylight, but, owing to the absence of the cavalry, the forward movement did not commence until five o'clock, an hour and a half late. This delay would have been of no importance if reasonable use of his remaining hours had been made. Here was one of the few opportunities given to a corps commander to do great work and win for himself lasting renown; indeed, it was the most important

the annals of the war reveal. Every motive that could stir a patriot or inspire a man of ambition urged him on, for Smith was a patriot and a man of ambition,—even so light a motive as gratitude to General Grant, who, impressed with his intellect and his skilful but simple plan for the relief of the half-starved army at Chattanooga, had secured his appointment as Major-General and put this day's work in his hands, was not wanting. For the present it is sufficient to say that the defences at Baylor's farm, such as they were, were carried at eight o'clock, the whole corps arrived in the immediate presence of the main line about Petersburg at noon, and Battery No. 5 was carried by assault at about half-past seven and other batteries to the left, as far as and including Battery No. 11 with connecting breastworks, by nine o'clock in the evening.

Leaving for later comment this branch of the subject, I now enter upon a more extended account of the movement with which the first is to be compared—especially for the reason that it has never been even partially described, and was the most carefully planned and finely executed operation that came within my observation during the war.

The Eighteenth Corps rejoined the Army of the James on the Bermuda front on the 27th of August, under General Ord, who had succeeded General Smith on the 18th of July. Since the crossing of the army to the south bank of the James there had been no Union force permanently stationed on the north side of it. The movement of General Early into Maryland in August had temporarily retarded the settled purpose of extending the left flank of the Army of the Potomac westward around Petersburg, and finally resulted in sending the Sixth Corps and two divisions of the cavalry under General Sheridan to Washington. The army of General Lee was soon thereafter weakened by reënforcements sent to General Early, the force left north of the James being reduced to a few thousand.

On the 20th of June an attempt was made to break through the Bermuda defences, during which General Walker was killed, and on his body was found a map of the country between Petersburg and Richmond with all the Confederate lines of fortifications marked on it. This was a capture of great value. General Butler marked upon it the location of all the troops north of the James River, with the number at each place, and furnished duplicate copies to each of his corps commanders. Two attempts had been made in July and August to gain important positions on the north side, which, proving unsuccessful, the forces had been withdrawn. General Grant, being of the opinion that the Confederate Government would have something the same feeling in regard to the safety of their capital that the authorities at Washington had in regard to that city, thought that if their outer line could be taken and held, even if nothing further was gained in that direction, it would neutralize as many men and probably more in the defence of Richmond than he would require to use as a constant menace to that city. General Butler, being acquainted with his views, in the last half of September sent his scouts and secret-service agents throughout the territory, and after receiving and verifying their reports, formed his plan, which was fully stated in a written order directed to his two corps commanders and General Kautz of the cavalry. It is probably the longest war order ever issued, filling eight pages as printed in "Butler's Book," published in 1892. It was submitted to General Grant, who authorized the movement, and, as stated by Butler, commended him warmly for the clearness and fulness of his instructions to those who were to execute them.

The brigade commanders of Stannard's division of the Eighteenth Corps were directed to appear at his headquarters at eight o'clock of the evening, September 28, where during an hour's conference they were minutely instructed as to what was expected to be accomplished the following day

and the manner of doing it. It is probable conferences of the same character were being held at the same time at the headquarters of every division to take a part in the enterprise. Up to this hour no intimation of the movement had descended beyond division headquarters. Soon after the conference ended, two divisions of the Eighteenth Corps were under orders to be at Varina Landing at twelve o'clock that night, and the Tenth Corps and the colored division, at Deep Bottom at the same hour. Five minutes before the hour the head of Stannard's three brigades was at the designated place and the Tenth Corps was not a minute behind. As soon as it was dark, the pontoons were taken up the river, and a small company of infantry, on hand, was silently rowed across and placed as guards about the few houses at and near the landing. As ordered, the bridge was laid, and well covered to prevent noise, at midnight. I have reason to believe that Colonel M. T. Donohoe was selected by General Ord to command the skirmish line which consisted of his regiment, the Tenth New Hampshire and the One Hundred and Eighteenth New York. These regiments first passed over the bridge and moved out some distance and formed in line on either side of the Varina road, which led up to within a third of a mile of Fort Harrison, there curving to the east to unite with the New Market road. At three o'clock the remainder of Stannard's division began passing over and halted on the north bank for an hour or more. A slight fog had settled over the river and either bank, which retarded the advance, or, rather, made a short delay advisable.

Soon after crossing the bridge Stannard's division was formed in two columns; the brigades of Generals Burnham and Stevens on the left of the Varina road and that of Colonel Roberts on the right. Each regiment was in close column of divisions. The column on the left had a depth of sixty ranks, and that on the right of forty. At five o'clock the order to move forward was given. The Varina road, which

was to be followed, ran for a quarter of a mile near the river-bank, then at nearly a right angle across wide bottom lands, leaving which, it rose over a sharp incline to the higher level beyond. Owing to the darkness, intensified by the fog, the first mile was made at a slow pace. At the edge of the woods a mile from the landing, the enemy's skirmishers were met, and the crack of rifles was heard along a line for nearly half a mile on either side of the road, which soon sent a few wounded men limping to the rear. From the time the first shot was fired until the skirmishers had reached the open fields, one mile from Fort Harrison, not a halt was made, the column never being more than four hundred yards in the rear. In a little over two hours an advance of four miles was made, at first with such opposition as a strong picket line could make, soon strengthened by a small Tennessee brigade, which, the force now driving them, had met near Drury's Bluff the previous May, so depleting its ranks as to make the present encounter less difficult. For two miles through the woods, across swampy stretches covered with thick brush, the rattle of musketry was as rapid and continuous as seldom heard between skirmish lines, swelling occasionally into a volume like that arising from a smart engagement. The Union commander was operating in the immediate presence of Generals Ord and Stannard, who sometimes rode by the side of the column, and more often in front of it. There were times when many caught glimpses of an impassioned rider on a horse covered with foam, hurrying from right to left, or left to right, shouting, "Forward! Forward!" with a vehemence as if the fate of the nation rested with him alone. In very truth Donohoe was a hero that day, and when soon after he received the brevet of Brigadier-General, a united voice said, "Well earned." As early as seven o'clock the Confederates were driven from the woods, when, facing to the rear, they were seen hurrying back to Fort Harrison. At this time the division halted, and literally it was for the first time since the

start from Varina Landing. But the advance was accomplished only at considerable loss, not only in the front line, for in the column one officer and some of the men were wounded.

Generals Ord and Stannard, together with the brigade commanders and many staff officers, went forward to the field by the edge of the woods from which a clear view of the enemy's line was had. Smooth, level fields stretched in front for nearly a mile to the foot of the bluff on which the great fort stood. The house of Mr. Aiken was near the Varina road to our right and Mr. Childrey's residence some distance to the left. A Virginia rail fence ran across the fields on either side of a lane to the Childrey residence. With these exceptions there was no obstruction between the woods and the fort; nor was there a visible object of size sufficient to give protection to a single individual during the attack.

To the left of the fort breastworks extended to the river more than a mile distant, and also to the right, visible for half a mile, to Fort Gilmer, strengthened at intervals with redoubts all fully armed. Fort Harrison was constructed along the edge of the bluff, following its contour with six distinct faces and open in the rear. These faces measured 1463 feet — one fourth of a mile. A traverse thirty feet at the base and eighteen feet in height extended back one hundred feet. Fifty feet to the west was a smaller traverse, which became known as "General Grant's traverse" for reasons to be later explained. On either side of the larger one was a 100-pound cannon, which, with six small guns, constituted its armament. No fort of the same size and strength had confronted the army in Virginia. As compared with Battery No. 5 about Petersburg it appeared like the construction of Titans at war with their own. Such was the situation before us.

The group of mounted officers near the edge of the woods, among which would probably be the commander of the forces, offered too great a temptation to the enemy to test the range and accuracy of their guns to be neglected; and several of

them opened fire, which proved that skilful gunners were behind them. All of our batteries were ordered to remain south of the James subject to instant call. In some way one had come to the front and was standing in the road near the woods. A shell struck and exploded so near it as to kill three horses and disable a gun. Another shot struck the breast of Captain Bessy's horse, aide to General Stannard, passed through his left side, broke the Captain's sword, and twisted the scabbard into a knot, without the least injury to the rider. During this reconnoissance to the front, if such it may be called, which lasted only ten or fifteen minutes, all irregularities in the two columns were rectified, caps removed, and bayonets fixed. The second division (Heckman's) was ordered to follow the first, form in like manner on its right, and join in the assault. It was not seen or heard of until hours later. The Ninety-sixth New York was placed in line in front of the First Division, then commanded by Colonel Edgar M. Cullen, only twenty years of age, since the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. At 7.30 o'clock the two columns, consisting of 2000 men, with guns at a right shoulder emerged from the woods and caught their first sight of the work before them. The achievements of the Tenth New Hampshire and the One Hundred and Eighteenth New York may have been an inspiration, but whether so or not, on they went in perfect form and with firm step, unmindful of the artillery from which alone they first suffered, answering the call of duty. A halt for a moment only was ordered in front of the fence referred to while this obstruction was being removed. Soon after, the advance seeming slow to the impatience of those viewing it from the rear, General Stannard sent Captain Elder to give the order to double-quick. When this was given in a loud voice, the men shouted in reply, "No, no — the distance is too great"; and their decision, with better judgment than that of their commander, was final. The first shot from a 100-pound gun came soon after the fence was passed, its huge projectile

being seen from the time it left the muzzle until it struck the ground on the left front of the column, from which it ricocheted over it and landed in the woods half a mile in the rear. The time required to load, aim, and fire these monsters was such that each was fired only twice and no harm was done by them; yet the nearer we came, they seemed to grow larger and larger and to open wider and wider their savage jaws; and at the same time the bluff and fort to rise higher and higher over which the great traverse towered like a cliff against the sky.

It is unnecessary to go into a minute and harrowing description of the advance, as step by step the columns diminished in numbers until they reached a slight cover near the goal, where all dropped upon the ground for rest and safety. General Ord, fearing a failure, now sent all his staff to aid and stimulate the men for a final effort; but before they appeared in sight, Colonel Roberts, commanding the Third Brigade, the senior officer present, a tall, lank, and lean man, perhaps fifty years old, having allowed the men time to catch their breath, got up and said to them in a quiet but assured tone of voice: "Come, boys, we must capture this fort—now get up and start."¹ All in an instant jumped up, sprang forward, rushed into the ditch, and then up as best they could, quickly covering the sides of the fort with uniforms of blue, then its crest, from which hundreds leaped inside, and the citadel was won.

The victory was won at no small loss of life. More than one fourth of the division were killed or wounded. General Stevens was very seriously wounded while leading the First Brigade. The color sergeant of his regiment was killed and every one of the color guard, six in number, was either killed or wounded. The last, while planting the colors on the parapet, rolled inside the fort. The garrison did not await a bayonet charge, not being prepared for such an encounter, but retreated quickly for further resistance from behind the large

¹ *History of the Thirteenth New Hampshire Volunteers*, p. 479.

trees and the many log houses within the vast area of the fort. It was considerably more than an hour before they were all driven beyond range of our muskets. The division organization had disappeared during the last rush and scramble over the parapet, and it was some time before the men could be gathered together about the regimental colors. As soon as a sufficient organization could be formed, it was sent to clear the line toward the river, all of which was finally secured except the large fort close upon its bank. To the right toward Fort Gilmer not more than a fourth of a mile of the intrenchments was secured. Twenty-two guns and three hundred prisoners were the further evidence of the victory. As soon as the fort was secured, Generals Ord, Stannard, and Burnham rode into it. Burnham was killed almost immediately, and Ord, soon after, was wounded while directing the force that was moving down the line to the river. Colonel Donohoe was badly wounded at about the same time while engaged in the same enterprise. In his official report General Ord says, "Had General Heckman obeyed his orders many valuable lives would have been saved."¹ It was the irony of fate that the command of the Eighteenth Corps, by reason of General Ord's wound, should fall into his hands, coming, as he did, to the front an hour or more after the victory was won, to occupy a position he could not fill.

General Grant came up at ten o'clock and took a view of the situation. It is not probable that anywhere two hundred men could be seen together, so scattered was the remnant of the division over the line then held, half of them entirely out of sight in the woods to the rear of the fort. Having completed his survey, and learned all that could be obtained from General Stannard and others, he sat down on the lower step of the small traverse, and was writing a despatch to the Secretary of War when a large shell from a gunboat in the river came over and struck the side of the great traverse toward

¹ 87 W. R. 794.

which he was facing and rolled down to the floor not many feet from him. The group about him instantly scattered for cover, some throwing themselves flat upon the ground. Grant looked at it for a moment and then resumed his writing without making the slightest movement. The fuse went out and did not explode, though all say it was burning when it rolled down the traverse. The little traverse was thereafter called "General Grant's traverse." Had the belief entered his mind before that he was a man of destiny and immune from danger until his work was finished? Leaving orders that the captured works should be held, he returned to City Point.

The capture of Fort Harrison is unique in our military history. There is no record of a division or any larger body of men assaulting a strongly fortified position, or being ordered so to do when it was obliged to advance for nearly a mile under a withering fire of artillery and infantry before the final rush could be made. In this, however, there is no intention of claiming for the division that made it superiority over others. There were many divisions in the army that would have done as well, none better, and many more that would have entirely failed.

The news of the day's events caused the greatest excitement in Richmond ever known. Mr. J. B. Jones records in his "Rebel War Clerk's Diary":¹ "The offices and government shops were closed and the tocsin was sounded for hours. All the local troops were hurried out to defend the city, and guards on foot and horseback scoured the streets with orders to arrest every male person between the ages of seventeen and fifty and send them to Cary Street for service. Two members of Mr. Davis's Cabinet were caught in this sweeping net, the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General. Such was the need of fighting men that the type-setters of all the newspapers, who had a general exemption, were taken into the ranks, and the 'Richmond Whig' was the only paper published the next morning."

¹ Vol. 2, p. 295.

The loss of Fort Harrison and connecting lines so alarmed the Government and people for the safety of the Capital that General Lee hastened up from Petersburg with seven brigades to recover them. During the night the men of the First Division were busy constructing breastworks in rear of the fort connecting the wings to make an enclosed work, but the time was not sufficient to complete it. About noon a rapid and continuous cannonade was kept up upon the captured post for an hour or more when the assaults by the infantry commenced. Three distinct efforts, at intervals not exceeding half an hour, were vainly made to break through the line, which to the right was entirely without protection. No line of the enemy or any part of one was able to advance beyond a swale covered with bushes about fifty yards from their goal, where many lay down for safety. The firing ceased late in the afternoon and when a heavy picket force was sent out, five hundred Confederates rose up and surrendered. No official report of Confederate losses was ever made. The "Rebel War Clerk" reports, under date of October 1, that Judge Lyons came in from the front and estimated that Lee's losses were from seven hundred to one thousand killed and wounded. There is evidence enough that, including prisoners, they were about two thousand. This was the second time the division had fought on the defensive under partial cover, and for once it can truthfully be said that the men were eager for the fray.

When the artillery ceased some one commenced singing "The Battle Cry of Freedom," which a thousand voices instantly took up and hurled as a defiance to the enemy. A cannonade answered by a song! As the long, well-dressed lines of infantry appeared, there was the wildest manifestation of joyous emotion and excitement as flag after flag was unfurled and planted on the breastworks — a second challenge to the foe. This is no fancy picture of the imagination — only a narrative of what I saw and heard. It was poetic justice that the division capturing and holding this fort should be per-

mitted to march from it on the 3d of the following April and first enter and occupy the Confederate Capital.

General Butler's order contemplated that, after the anticipated success at Chaffin farm, his forces should push on and, if possible, capture Richmond. It is not difficult now to believe that, if the Tenth Corps had followed the Eighteenth, and General Ord had been spared from wounds to command the fifteen thousand troops that would have been available, such might have been the result; or at least a position so near it gained that the subsequent campaign might have been radically modified.

Unlike the task confided to General Smith, the movement to the north of the James was an independent one, no strategic campaign, important or unimportant, being dependent upon its success, or in any way to be affected by its failure. There is this only in common to each, the crossing of a river, a five-mile march to the enemy's line, and a subsequent assault; here the parallel ends and a sharp contrast begins and continues throughout.

Reference has previously been made to the four papers relating to the first part of the subject of this article. The "Failure to take Petersburg, June 15" was written by the present President of the Society in 1878, at a time when General Smith, on whose staff he had served, was a member also, which must have caused the former some embarrassment. Colonel Livermore has been for many years a close and profound student of the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, and evidently especially interested in its final campaign. The writer is of the opinion, without knowing the fact, that he early formed the intention to write, not a narrative, but a critical history of it. The first paper appeared in 1877, the second in 1888, and the last in 1906, making a noble trilogy of great merit and value which will remain as a monument to his careful research and rare military judgment. Impressed, as he doubtless was, by the extent to which the bold and brilliant strategy

of General Grant in moving the army to the south side of the James was adversely affected by the failure of the 15th of June, and the war thereby prolonged, he was compelled to write the paper, notwithstanding his conclusions were to place a severe censure on his former chief and a heavy burden of responsibility which even now, perhaps, cannot be fully measured. He rather hints at, than states, the serious mistake of General Smith in sending in Hincks' division at Baylor's farm in the manner he did, involving a loss of three hundred or four hundred men, when the same result could have been accomplished by a flank movement or a strong and extended skirmish line with slight loss, and probably in as short time. The following quotation from his paper cannot be accepted without material qualification: "It is not disputed that General Smith had up to his arrival in front of the enemy's main works (twelve o'clock) acted with great promptness and spirit." If an earlier hour had been adopted for this commendation it would have been readily enough accepted. It will always seem to the writer that the reservoir of "promptness and spirit" possessed by General Smith was so small that a single draught from it at Baylor's farm left it dry. Various theories have been suggested as an explanation of his conduct—one, that he could take no interest in executing a plan not his own; another, that from enmity to General Butler, he did not wish to assist in making a military reputation for him, neither of which is believable.

A partial sketch of his military career may help to explain what on other theories seems inexplicable. On the 6th of May the Army of the James was in position on a line known as the Bermuda front, the Eighteenth Corps, under General Smith, holding the left at the Appomattox and the Tenth Corps the right. General Heckman was sent the same day with a strong brigade to seize the Richmond and Petersburg railroad, about three miles in front. Guarding the road at the time were only nine companies from two South Carolina regi-

ments officially reported as numbering six hundred men.¹ After a contest lasting an hour at long range, Heckman retreated back to camp, reporting that he had developed two brigades which he might have overcome only at the possible annihilation of his command.² General Smith reported³ this misadventure to General Butler, informing him that to accomplish the object in view he required five brigades, "enough for a feint attack and a real one with an *irresistible force*," to use his own expression. Early the next morning he drew out the five brigades and started to repair the misfortune of the day before—Heckman's brigade for the feint attack, and the other four for the real one. The former went forward from the left for two miles and there remained during the day, not firing a shot except from a light battery supporting him. There were now two small Confederate brigades in front of the railroad, Bushrod Johnson's, numbering 1168, and three regiments just up from Charleston, under General Hagood counting 1500, a total of 2668. The four brigades took the Bermuda road, and when about two miles out received a half-dozen shots from a picket post, then stopped, formed in two lines of battle, Drake's brigade next to Heckman, then Burnham's, Barton's with Plaisted on the right,—more than 8000 men with muskets in their hands. The three left brigades did not move forward three hundred yards from the position first taken, and only the skirmishers of Burnham's brigade were in any way engaged. It is singular, but Drake and Johnson, facing each other, each reported one killed and three wounded by shells—their total loss. The Eighth Connecticut was thrown out as skirmishers by General Burnham and kept up a pretty sharp contest with the enemy, but no other part of his command was in any way engaged. Five were killed and sixty-eight wounded, nearly all of the Eighth Connecticut.

In the early afternoon a small squadron of cavalry on the

¹ 68 W. R. 255.

² 68 W. R. 153.

³ 68 W. R. 521.

extreme right, pioneering on their own account, reached the railroad without meeting a Confederate soldier. When General Smith was informed of this, he ordered the two right brigades to move forward. General Plaisted reached the road without opposition; but General Barton, overlapping the short line of the enemy, struck the left flank of Hagood's three regiments and compelled him after a sharp conflict to abandon his position and form a new line at a right angle to the road, his right connecting with Johnson's left. After this some telegraph poles were cut down and a short piece of the road was wrecked, but not badly, for the next day trains were running as usual between Richmond and Petersburg. The two brigades were then ordered to retire to their former position in line, for the reason, as officially stated, "that all the troops were engaged in fighting and none were left to destroy the road";¹ and for hours thereafter 8000 men stood facing 2600 of the enemy, the distance between the two varying from one half a mile to double that distance! At sundown this "irresistible force" was marching back to camp. The loss for the day was 339, nearly all by Barton's brigade and the Eighth Connecticut.

When General Butler read the reports that came to him the following day, he came to the front in hot wrath at the comedy of the last two days, and issued a sharp order for the Tenth Corps to move on the 9th at daylight to Chester Junction, four miles in front, and the Eighteenth to Walthall Junction, three miles out, at the same hour. General Pickett sent directions at ten o'clock in the evening of the 7th to Generals Johnson and Hagood to retire with their brigades to the south side of Swift Creek and fortify a defensive line there,² leaving a small force sufficient to picket the roads leading to Bermuda Hundred. Gillmore reached the Junction without opposition. A mile and a half out on the Bermuda road, Smith met the enemy's pickets, at once halted, and

¹ 68 W. R. 124.

² 68 W. R. 242.

ordered the Eighteenth Corps into line of battle. About half-past nine his skirmishers reported back that they had discovered the enemy at or near the Junction. Without any attempt to find out what the reported force consisted of, he sent a note to General Gillmore, three or four miles away to the north, stating that some of the enemy were reported at Port Walthall Junction and requesting him to move the Tenth Corps down the railroad to capture them.¹ Gillmore sent a message, dated 10.15, to General Butler,² informing him of Smith's request with which he soon complied. The date of Gillmore's message to Butler establishes the fact that the Eighteenth Corps had consumed the time from daylight to about 10 A.M. in going forward about a mile and a half, possibly two miles, with no enemy in front. Before noon the two corps had surrounded the Junction, but on reaching there no enemy was found. The two corps, forming in line across the railroad, then moved down near Swift Creek and returned to Bermuda the next day. Gillmore reported that no ford for crossing the creek could be found. No attempt had been made to find one, of which there were many—a very good one in the immediate front of the army, through which the enemy's pickets crossed in our sight.

After resting two days in camp, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 12th, the movement toward Richmond commenced, the advance being given to the Eighteenth Corps, to which was added Turner's division of the Tenth Corps. At the Richmond turnpike, Smith ordered the army into line of battle, which, when formed, extended from the James River a division's length west of the pike. Two days were consumed in reaching the Halfway House, about four miles north of Butler's intrenched camp. There is no mention of any attempt to resist our advance in any official Confederate reports or in Southern books as yet discovered. There was, of course, some skirmish firing, but, at times, for hours not a shot could be

¹ 68 W. R. 580.

² 68 W. R.

heard. There were many witty things said by the men in the line at the expense of our corps commander, generally with a sarcastic flavor to them. As to his movements toward the enemy, they described them as being made at the "double-slow step." The conundrum was early started around the camp-fires — "How long is it going to take to get to Richmond if we go out three miles a day and come back at night?"

On the morning of the 16th the army had been in possession for two days of about three miles of the Confederate outer line of works for the defence of Fort Darling on the James River, the Eighteenth Corps on the right and the Tenth Corps on the left. During the night General Beauregard massed in front of the Eighteenth Corps, of which seventeen regiments only were present, Ransom's division of nineteen regiments and two battalions and Hoke's division of ten regiments, with the ambitious intention of breaking through on our right and capturing the whole army. During a dense fog in the early morning, Ransom went forward, wheeling considerably to the right, and came in contact at first with Heckman's brigade holding the Union right. Heckman's men opened a rapid fire as well-directed as the obscurity of the fog would permit. Gracie's brigade was not able to overcome the resistance; his men hesitated and dropped upon the ground to escape the destructive fire. Kemper in the rear went to Gracie's aid, and only after an hour of desperate fighting was a break made in the line by overlapping the Ninth New Jersey and coming in to its rear. During this time the rest of Ransom's division was making furious assaults on Weitzel's division except his three left regiments. Soon after, General Hoke advanced with his ten regiments, when the whole front of the Eighteenth Corps was a blaze of fire. For more than two hours these attacks were continued, but at every point, save the one alluded to, they were repulsed with heavy losses. Three regiments from the reserve division were sent, at Ransom's request, to his assistance and put in between his

division and Hoke, which met with the same disastrous repulse as the other brigades. Thirty-four regiments and battalions out of the forty-four constituting Beauregard's command had met only with disaster, except the early success over Heckman's brigade, which was stayed by two regiments brought up from the rear. Ransom's great division was scattered, out of ammunition, and incapable of further offensive work. Gracie said that his brigade was reduced to a skirmish line as early as half-past six. It was not until ten o'clock that Ransom had gathered the remnants of his command together, and then told Beauregard he could not advance without endangering his division.¹ "The severity of the enemy's fire," General Hagood reported, "is illustrated by the fact that 57 bullet marks were found on the flag of the 7th S.C. battalion after the fight, and in one of the companies there were 65 casualties, of which 19 were killed outright. The general list will show that the losses of this battalion were scarcely exceptional."² There was not fighting strength left in the two divisions to meet a fresh brigade if sent against them.

It may seem that this is a far wandering from my theme, but it is only preliminary and necessary to illustrate later the conduct of General Smith which is closely related to it. When the crash came in the morning General Smith left his headquarters near the front at the Friend house and took a new station by the Halfway House, a mile in the rear, and sent word to the division commanders where he could be found. First making request for reënforcements he sent orders to all the corps batteries to retire "in all haste."³ When the muffled roar of the Confederate guns, that had been pressed up to within a half-mile of our main lines, was heard, ours were seeking safety in flight. General Smith apologizes for the capture of Belger's battery because the order to retire did not reach him. Captain Belger in his report says the order was sent and delivered to a sergeant with the caissons a mile in

¹ 68 W. R. 202.² 68 W. R. 254.³ 68 W. R. 116-48.

the rear, who was killed while carrying it to the front. The Confederate reports furnish ample evidence of the efficient service it was enabled to render by the intelligent act of sending an order a mile to the rear to a battery in a fierce struggle on the firing line. Very near the end of the assaults already described and just before the fog lifted, General Weitzel sent word, for what it was worth, to Smith that there was a rumor or report that a Confederate force was moving farther to his right.¹ Smith at once sent orders for the whole corps to retreat, first Weitzel, then Brooks. There was no truth in this report and no reason for belief in it. A cavalry picket extended from Weitzel's division to the James River, and it had not been disturbed. Weitzel's division had retreated only a short distance when the sun came out bright and clear, and Smith saw that on a wild camp rumor he had abandoned a battlefield. Attempting to repair what was irreparable, he ordered Weitzel to retake the abandoned line. In his report Weitzel states that, while executing the order, Smith directed him again to retreat, which resulted in the Army of the James returning leisurely back to the Bermuda line.

I now make a short intentional digression from my subject. Having served in the Army of the James during the whole time of its existence, I take naturally a deep interest in its history, have read and carefully digested every report made by its officers from the general commanding down to captains of companies. I see clearly its opportunity for great achievements and think I know the reason of its lamentable failures. General Butler has been the object of merciless criticism, some of which is without excuse. Soon after the battle of Drury's Bluff began, it was clearly apparent that Beauregard had massed the bulk of his army against the Union right. General Butler being of this opinion sent an order to General Gillmore to attack the enemy on his front at once. There were before him at the time only five small regiments.

¹ 68 W. R. 153.

Gillmore replied that he would attack as soon as his troops were ready, and at the same time notified the division commanders to be ready, but no word as to where, when, or in what manner, the attack was to be made. An hour and one minute later he informs Butler by letter¹ that three assaults had been made on Terry's front which had been handsomely repulsed, closing with this ominous sentence: "If I move to the assault and meet a repulse our loss would be fearful." What the three assaults on Terry's front were are revealed by General Hawley, who had captured a hill just in front of his picket line on which were the ruins of some burnt buildings and there stationed the Seventh Connecticut. From time to time a group of skirmishers made rushes toward this point, when the regiment opened fire for a minute or two and stopped at the call of a bugle. This is all there was to the three assaults,² reported doubtless as an excuse for his intended inaction. No assault was made or preparation for making one at ten o'clock when Gillmore was directed to retire, which he did in such hasty and heedless manner that the corps lost more men in retreating than it probably would have lost in capturing the enemy's works.

When the order was given to Brooks' division at Baylor's farm, on June 15, to deploy into lines of battle, it had to the men an old and familiar sound. The skirmish line consisting of the Thirteenth New Hampshire, one hundred and twenty men from the Eighth Connecticut, two companies of the One Hundred and Eighteenth and one hundred and fifty men from the Ninety-second New York, was put under command of Colonel Stevens, of the regiment first named, a brave and efficient officer. From Baylor's farm to the main line of the enemy was a mile and a half, and three hours were consumed in making the distance. If Colonel Stevens had been instructed to press back the enemy with all possible speed, he would have accomplished it by ten o'clock. The men, now

¹ 68 W. R. 834.

² 68 W. R. 53.

thoroughly familiar with the methods of their corps commander, followed a well-established precedent, dawdled along, and took three hours for an hour's work. The opposition to their advance was as nothing compared with that which Colonel Donohoe met north of the James. There was only one man hit in the Thirteenth New Hampshire, his thumb just grazed by a bullet. This dawdling was no fault of the men. "Like officer, like men," is an adage older than Roman Military history, the truth of which each succeeding generation has confirmed. The Second Corps was the most efficient and powerful corps in the Army of the Potomac, because something of the spirit of its first commander—the gallant and impetuous Sumner—flowed down through division and brigade commanders until it reached the last man in the last file of its regiments. Under its succeeding leaders—Couch, Hancock, and Humphreys—its warlike spirit never grew less.

Martindale's division marched by the river road, near the Appomattox, and was in connection with Brooks at noon and Hincks was only a few rods in the rear, and if there was any necessity for it, of which there was none, could have been on the same alignment in a few minutes, the whole force in the exact position they were ordered to take from which to make an immediate assault. From noon to seven in the evening is a long wait for a surprise attack. Many things might happen in seven hours, and one did happen—four regiments came to strengthen the defence and Beauregard might have abandoned Bermuda, as he did the next morning, and made the line impregnable, and this, perhaps, he ought to have done. Nothing was expected nor could happen by delay to be of assistance to the attacking force.

Of these two considerations General Smith seems to have taken no account. In the paper written in his defence he says: "I am very confident that any man standing at 12 M. on that day before those works, who would at once have ordered an assault, belongs at one extreme or the other of the

long scale of human intellect," — meaning that such rashness and folly would put him at the low extreme. This is merely a phrase without meaning as applied to the situation. I can think of only two corps commanders in the army, who, standing in the supposed situation at the hour named, with the orders and the information given to General Smith, would not, after a short examination in front, have made an assault and carried out the essential further part of his mission by the capture and holding of Petersburg, neither of whom stood, however, at either end of the two extremes of human intellect. It was a sad day when these two officers were assigned to the Army of the James. In the year 1878 the historian of the Thirteenth New Hampshire carefully measured the distance from the position at the edge of the woods where the skirmish line was located to Battery No. 5. To the French rifle pits was four hundred yards and from there to the battery three hundred yards. The smooth grass land sloped gently all the way to the deep ravine just in front of Battery No. 5, which a charging line would reach so quickly that the guns could be fired not more than twice and probably only once. The moment the picket line was reached, the danger to their own men would have been such that further firing would very likely have ceased. The seven hours of fatal hesitation were spent as follows, according to Smith's own story: three in making reconnoissances along the front of the divisions of Brooks and Hincks, two in a ride over to the right and back, and two in getting the troops ready, including the artillery, which is said to have delayed the assault for an hour. We have never been informed of anything of value gained by the three hours spent in reconnoissances along the front of the centre and left divisions, the very thing General Smith had been cautioned against by his commanding officer, which in the service would generally be construed as a command. The weak point in the enemy's line was the salient, immediately in front of the centre division, which is revealed to an

educated or experienced soldier at a glance, the view being unobstructed for a long distance along the front of Hincks' division and on the right clear to the Appomattox. It seems evident that General Smith was consuming time in making preparations for a faulty method of attack, which required that the three divisions should first be on a common alignment, touching elbows, as it were, so that all could move forward together. As the capture of the fortifications was only an incident of no consequence in itself, but merely a preliminary step to the capture and occupation of Petersburg, which was the real object of the movement, the preparations for their capture should have been confined to the centre division, and when the wide door was opened, the other divisions should have been held in readiness to pass through it and press forward into the city. As the door, in fact, was opened by the skirmishers alone, the three divisions would have been available.

Any one familiar with the terrain to the east of Petersburg must be aware that it would have been impossible for the enemy to move troops from the line running across the low Appomattox valley in season to reënforce the salient, even if there were any available, before it would be taken, or the attack repulsed, and the two hours spent by Smith in a visit to Martindale, simply to direct him to move forward with the other divisions for a useless purpose, was pure waste; in any view it was a duty that should have been performed by a member of his staff.

The delay of the assault for an hour for the reason that the chief of artillery had sent all the horses away for water is additional evidence that information of a surprise attack had not been sufficiently communicated to the army, unless the existing long wait was a justification of Captain Elder in the belief that all thought of it had been given up, and further operations postponed until the following morning. It may well be questioned whether there was excuse for delaying the

attack so long a time, or, indeed, any time, by reason of the absent artillery. There was a tendency to overrate the value of this arm of the service during the war. There was a too generally accepted belief that little or nothing could be done, nor ought to be attempted, without it. The estimate made, that only from three to five per cent of the losses suffered by either army during the war came from the artillery, is probably very near the truth, though the data on which the estimate was made are rather meagre. Its relative power and effectiveness at the present time is well known to be far greater. The one hundred and forty-seven guns on the Stafford hills that poured shot and shell for half a day into Fredericksburg did not disturb the small Confederate brigade that held it, and which would have held it indefinitely but for the infantry sent over in pontoon boats, who drove them away. The great cannonade at Gettysburg between one hundred and fifty guns on Seminary Ridge and eighty on Cemetery Ridge, lasting two hours, said to have been the most noted in the history of war up to that time, gave notice of the place where, and the time when, the attack was coming, scattered quickly numerous sutler's wagons and other teams, and killed about an equal number on either side, but had not the slightest influence on the battle. It found its proper and efficient field of action in defence of a line, either fortified or open, against which infantry is moving either in line or column. This was illustrated at Gettysburg. After the cannonade ended, and the Confederate infantry came on to attack, — the same here as on many other fields, its destructive power was manifest until what was left of the shattered columns were lost to sight.

You will search the records in vain to find an instance where field artillery has been of much service in preparing an attack or as a cover to one made by infantry against fortifications. Hancock stormed the salient at Spottsylvania without it, capturing a Confederate division. Sheridan, Wood, and Johnson carried Missionary Ridge with infantry alone. It has

previously been said that no batteries were allowed to cross the James in aid of the assault on Fort Harrison. Fort Wagner cannot be cited adversely to this contention, for it was evacuated after a long siege; nor Fort Fisher, where the navy destroyed its guns, and made all necessary preparation for a successful assault. At Petersburg General Smith might as well have turned Elder's guns toward City Point, for they were not and could not have been of any service on that occasion.

Not until seven o'clock or a little later was everything arranged for the assault which was to be made by five hundred men of Brooks' division, Hincks and Martindale to advance as soon as the skirmishers were seen to be in motion. Of this plan General Smith says: "The plan adopted was evolved only after a long and laborious reconnoissance, and as the difficulties of finding a place to assault in the usual way were developed. It was to me a novelty in the art of war; educated soldiers who are not geniuses treat novelties with wariness; and therefore it took time to get hold of the plan and to determine to adopt it." Though the idea of the plan occurred to Smith earlier, he did not decide to adopt it until after his return at five o'clock from General Martindale, being then convinced that in no other way could the salient be carried. In 1878, after all the evidence from Confederate sources as to their numbers was well known, he still expressed the same opinion. When the order was given to the five hundred skirmishers to advance, General Smith certainly must have expected they would be able to succeed, else he would not have sent them forward. Here, then, is the strange phenomenon of a man, who at noon placed among the lowest ranks of human intelligence any one possessed of the rashness to order an assault on a position with a division of three thousand men, at seven o'clock in the evening of the same day, with no more knowledge of the Confederate forces than he possessed at noon, sending five hundred men of the same division to do what he says three thousand could not do, when the line had been strength-

ened by reënforcements amounting to four regiments. He was convinced in his own mind, and acted on it, that the works were well manned in the forenoon from the abundance of artillery that would not be left for capture without sufficient infantry support, from the fact that the enemy had sent out a mile and a half to Baylor's farm a force to fortify and defend a causeway, from the persistence with which his advance from that place was resisted, and also by the negative argument that because only a few were seen inside the fortifications was no sufficient proof that many were not there. To justify his inaction the best military authority is cited to show that one man behind breastworks is equal to three outside. Having, as he claimed, sufficient evidence that there were at least three thousand Confederates confronting him, he drew the conclusion that with only about ten thousand he would not be justified to act until after the most thorough investigation. All this work was carried on for seven hours to quote his own language, in order "that when I did strike the blow I might make no failure and murder no men." Oppressed with the thought that, by acting in accordance with his orders and what the situation demanded, he might sacrifice the lives of a few more men on the 15th, he faltered. Not gifted with an historic imagination, that far-off vision of other fields, distant and near, which his inaction was to redden with the blood of tens of thousands was not for him. If there had been basis for his belief that not less than three thousand men were behind the works on the front to be assaulted, or even any considerable fraction of that number, the fate of his five hundred would have been that of the famous six hundred at Balaklava or worse.

There is no reason to suppose that General Smith did not give the order to some one to attack the salient with skirmishers alone; but it is certain that no such order was ever given to them; they were sent forward, as such troops usually are, expecting to be followed by the division in line or column.

They formed a line half a mile long. If a work of such apparent magnitude was to be given to a few men to perform, at least, they should have been informed of it and instructed, as they advanced, to converge toward the centre, so that the whole number might join in the attack of the battery on its various faces at the same time, the front having an extension of only one hundred yards. No instructions of any kind were given. The men rushed forward in a straight line quickly overrunning the French rifle-pits, capturing or killing nearly all within them, and then straight forward again, so that when the ravine in front of the battery was reached by those advancing toward it, more than four hundred of the whole skirmish line were moving down into the Appomattox Valley far from the fort they were expected to assist in capturing.¹ In the ravine, soon coming together into a group, were Captain Julian, who had shot dead with a pistol in one of the pits a man in the act of making ready to fire at him, Captain Stoodley, Captain Goss, and less than twenty men, all of the Thirteenth New Hampshire. As they were looking up to the works forty feet above them, Captain Stoodley, the most unwarlike-looking and appearing officer in the regiment, but possessed of initiative and true courage, said, in a half-feminine voice, "If we follow this thing right up *now*, we can take this battery," to which Captain Julian, one of the bravest of the brave, replied, "Then we will take it, follow me," and the whole group instantly commenced climbing upward. Julian was the first in the fort, and for a few seconds was there alone, but was joined by the rest as soon as each could get there. There were not over a dozen Confederates in the battery, officers and men. There was one gunner remaining for each of the six guns, indicating that the intention was to fire once when the expected column should appear and then for all to retire. Colonel Council, of the Twenty-sixth Virginia Regiment, and Major Beatty readily surrendered their swords to

¹ See map.

Julian; and Captain Stoodley secured Captain Sturtevant's, the commander of the battery. From the captured work a clear view was had for a long distance to the right and left, and those within reported that only a few Confederate soldiers were seen making hasty steps toward Petersburg. It occurred to the mind of an uneducated soldier, a simple captain of infantry, looking up to a vast pyramid of earth above him, that the less than twenty men about him could capture the battery, and they did it, before which the commander of an army of thirteen thousand men had been standing for seven hours acting on the belief that he had not a sufficient force even to make an attempt to capture. The discovery of a new method of attack, unknown before in war, had nothing to do with it. It was captured simply for the reason that there was no force for its defence, and could have been taken as easily at 12 M. as at 7.30 in the evening.

Hincks moved forward as ordered and captured all in front of him up to and including Battery No. 11. The small loss suffered was proof enough that the resistance encountered was not great. As soon as the salient was taken, Smith moved Brooks' division forward and placed it in position near the Friend house "to resist an attack." The failure of General Smith to go forward into Petersburg after breaking through the enemy's lines, I will not touch upon, as it has been thoroughly discussed and a correct conclusion reached in the paper by Colonel Livermore.

General Smith was one of the few highly educated men in the army. He was gifted with a scientific mind to which was not added the gift of imagination. It is characteristic of the scientist to reach his conclusions and establish his theories only after minute and painstaking investigation. He carried with him this spirit and sought for certainty in war, where certainty is not to be found. So far as education goes, he was more highly educated than any of our great soldiers — than Grant, Thomas, Sherman, or Sheridan. He was familiar with

the history of wars during the ages, and the lives of the world's great captains, as also the spirit with which they carried on their campaigns which gave them name and fame; nor could he have shut his eyes and locked his mind to the deeds of those in the Civil War on either side of the line, and the methods by which they were won. But for him, as an incentive, all the teachings of history and contemporaneous events were as a sealed book. There can only be sympathy, or even pity, for one who had devoted his life to prepare himself to be of use to his country in times of stress and storm, who, by constitutional limitations, was prevented from achievements that would place his name among those of her illustrious soldiers.

A coarse, uneducated, perhaps brutal, slave-dealer from Memphis, Tennessee, became the first cavalry leader of the South, who early learned all of the art of war he thought of any value, summed up in the words, "Get there first and then strike quick and hard," — General Nathan B. Forrest.

VIII

CEDAR CREEK, OCTOBER 19, 1864

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO COLONEL BENJAMIN W.
CROWNINSHIELD FROM GENERAL W. H. EMORY

(Referring to Volume 6, p. 155)

I RECEIVED your note and the pamphlets on the battle of Cedar Creek. It is the best and truest account of that extraordinary battle yet written. I could have wished that you had mentioned two repulses I had given the enemy, one on the banks of Cedar Creek early in the morning, when not much was done, and one in the afternoon, when the repulse was decided, after we got into line of battle. But these repulses were of minor importance, and do not seriously obstruct the flow of your description, truthful in all essential particulars, of the most remarkable development of negligence and stupidity that ever was shown in the conduct of a battle in its beginning, and of energy in its close, and glorious termination for our arms.

The day before the battle, on my invitation, Crook and Wright, who both ranked me at the time, rode to the left of the line (our left), where I pointed out to them the exact point at the foot of the mountain, where the enemy could, and did, mass his men, *unobserved*, and attack us if they chose. Crook pooh-poohed the thing as impossible, saying the enemy was crushed, and dare not attack us, and Wright maintained, if we were attacked, it would be on the *back* road, where he placed some, if not the great mass, of his cavalry. I got no thanks for this, but the probable ill-will of both. Neither mentioned the fact in their reports, and Wright never mentioned the fact that he had ordered me to leave a commanding position, which I had already commenced to strengthen.

IX

THE CAPTURE AND OCCUPATION OF
RICHMOND

BY

COLONEL GEORGE A. BRUCE

Read before the Society April 16, 1915

THE CAPTURE AND OCCUPATION OF RICHMOND

No event of the war gave rise to more legends than the capture and occupation of the Confederate capital. All the early general histories of our civil conflict gave the credit of this achievement to the colored troops, none of whom came within about two miles of the city, except a regiment of cavalry, which, in violation of orders, found its way into Broad Street an hour or more after its complete occupation by one of the brigades of General Devens' division. The origin of this tale was in a speech of General Butler in Washington on the evening of the 3d of April, who in exultant language spoke of the poetic justice which had overtaken the proud Southrons in having their capital first occupied and guarded by their former slaves.

The original publication of the "Life of Lincoln" by Nicolay and Hay in the "Century Magazine" followed General Butler's Washington speech; but from evidence furnished by me they corrected this error when the work was afterwards published in book form. Mr. Hay told me that they admitted no fact into their history that was not supported by contemporary written evidence. As this paper will contain only what came within my observation and experience, and is written with the hope of correcting more than one error that has crept into what are considered historic publications, it is not improper for me to say that I wrote an official account of occurrences during the night of April 2, published in Serial 95 of the "Records of the War," and soon after a rather full account of the occupation of Richmond which is substantially the body of this article. This fact is mentioned solely to show that what follows is not a record made up from memory stretch-

ing back through the haze of half a century, but a transcript of events and experiences seen, participated in, and felt, as recorded by the writer at the time.

In the spring of 1865 the forces confronting General Lee south of Richmond and Petersburg formed two distinct divisions, — the Army of the Potomac, commanded by General Meade, and the Army of the James, commanded by General Ord. The Army of the Potomac held a line extending around Petersburg from the Appomattox on the right to or near Hatcher's Run on the left; while the Army of the James held the Bermuda front, and north of the James the line captured on the 29th of the previous September, extending from the river across Chaffin's farm beyond the New Market road and then retiring until the right reached a point near Deep Bottom, — a continuous line of intrenchments from thirty to forty miles in unbroken extent, save where the Appomattox and the James passed through them. The Confederate lines ran throughout their entire length nearly parallel with our own, the distance between the two varying from a hundred yards to nearly a mile on the extreme flanks.

The situation was quite like that existing to-day between the Allied and German armies on the western front of the present war, except that neither flank of the European armies is liable to be turned, resting as they do on the North Sea and the territory of a neutral state. It is probable that if the French and English had at first resorted to the system of defence by intrenchments so fully developed by us during the Civil War, the Germans would not have been able to overrun Belgium, — certainly not have gained so advanced a foothold on French soil.

During the late fall of 1864 and the winter of 1865 little or no change took place in the relative positions of the two armies. Never before during the season when earth and sky placed an embargo on campaigning in Virginia had the hostile forces been so near to each other. So close was the contact

that we could almost feel the pulse and hear the breathing of the hostile army. It was the most laborious and trying, yet the most interesting, of all our winter encampments; for we were looking forward with feelings of certainty to the not distant day when through the smoke of battle we should see the sun of peace shine once more on a united land. The season was one of more than average severity. Snow fell on ten different occasions. From November to April there were forty-three days of rain, varying from moderate showers to storms of almost tropical violence.

The extensive pine forests in rear of the Army of the James furnished the right material for comfortable houses and plenty of fuel for the necessary fires. Though the labors of the army were very onerous, yet its health remained good and its spirit rose to the height of the greatest achievements.

The Army of the James was reorganized in December, the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps discontinued, the white troops brought together to form the Twenty-fourth Corps, and the colored men united into the Twenty-fifth. The former were placed upon the right, holding the line from near Fort Harrison to Deep Bottom, and the latter on the left. In January General Ord succeeded General Butler in command of the Army and Department of Virginia. General John Gibbon was transferred from the Army of the Potomac to be chief of the Twenty-fourth Corps, with Generals Alfred H. Terry, Adelbert Ames, and Charles Devens in command of its divisions.

There still remained three months of "watchful waiting." Though nothing could have been more pleasing than an attack by the enemy, anywhere or at any time, yet the utmost vigilance was maintained day and night in order that it should be promptly and successfully met. The picket details were very large. At three o'clock every morning a staff officer left General Devens' headquarters for the front line, and there remained until long after daylight. At five o'clock the whole

division was in line of battle in rear of their intrenchments. Fortunately a truce or tacit understanding existed, at least so far as the white troops were concerned, that no firing between pickets should occur, and none did occur during the winter.

Though desertions to the rear had been very numerous from all the Confederate armies after the passage of the Conscript Act in April, 1862, it was not until 1865 that they became numerous into our own lines. It was at this time considered a very poor night when none came in, for there was a record of forty in twenty-four hours on the front of a single brigade. So eager were the later conscripts to escape the perils of the service that the prejudice of the color line was ignored, and more or less came in to the Twenty-fifth Corps, happy when having gained the protection of their former slaves. From this source much valuable information was gained. So accurate were their descriptions of the Confederate defences and the strength of their armament, that we had all the information in regard to them that General Longstreet himself possessed. Their report of the buried torpedoes, where they began and where they ended, proved later to have been absolutely correct. We gained, also, a pretty correct impression of conditions inside the Confederate lines, the feeling of despondency pervading not only the army but the whole community. The Confederacy was then on its sick-bed, and for those who still gathered around it for support there came much during that trying winter to discourage—little, if anything, to cheer. They were compelled, from time to time, to hear the hundred-shotted guns that informed them of the destruction of Hood's army at Nashville, the capture of Savannah by Sherman, the fall of Charleston and Fort Sumter, the loss of Fort Fisher, and the occupation of Wilmington. Such events, following in quick succession, were enough to try the nerves of heroic men in any cause. Yet through all ill-fortune the Army of Northern Virginia displayed its wonted courage and kept its honor bright, nightly setting its guards, ill-fed and thinly clad,

through tangled swamps and over bleak and storm-swept hills around its beleaguered capital.

The last fall of snow came on the 24th of March — what we call in New England the robin snow — that gives the first touch of green to our lawns and the promise of renewed life to all the throbbing earth. Three days later, during the night of the 27th of March, the Army of the James was secretly transferred to the south of Petersburg, except Devens' division of the Twenty-fourth Corps and Kautz's division of the Twenty-fifth, which were left to hold the lines north of the James, under General Weitzel.

At Weitzel's request General Devens moved from his camp to the headquarters of the army, as the telegraph line terminated at that point. For this reason it happened that I, being on General Devens' staff, first received and read all the dispatches sent by General Grant to Weitzel, informing him almost every hour of events about Petersburg and his wishes of what should be done or attempted along our line.

On the 1st of April General Sheridan turned the enemy's right at Five Forks, which was followed by the grand attack along the whole line on the morning of the 2d. General Grant, in telegraphic communication with every corps commander of the army, directed with unerring judgment over a field twenty miles in extent the storm of battle that was hurled like an avalanche against the Confederate right, left, and centre.

The 2d of April was a day of intense interest and anxiety to those of us who were fully aware of the magnitude of the events that were transpiring about us and divined what the morrow might reveal. In Virginia the spring comes forward suddenly and with greater splendor than in our more northern latitude. It seemed to me that a more perfect day could not have dawned on the earth since the creation than that battle-Sunday about Petersburg. The sky was cloudless, and through the hushed air I heard distinctly for the first time the church

bells of Richmond some seven miles to the north, and at the same time, though less distinctly, the subdued murmur and roar of the battle fifteen miles to the south. About eleven o'clock in the forenoon I rode along the picket line, climbed a pine tree which commanded a good view of the Confederate works for some distance, and concluded from the slight evidence of life within them that the forces on our front were small in numbers. On reporting my observations and impressions, General Devens requested me to ride over to see General Weitzel. Having reported to the latter, he quickly replied that "we should find plenty of rebel heads showing themselves the moment we got within firing distance of them." A few moments after my return I had the pleasure of sending to him a telegram from General Grant stating that Fields' division had left his front and was then at Petersburg. Weitzel was an officer of much ability, but lacked confidence and the spirit of enterprise. From our maps I traced out the movements and achievements of the army in front of Petersburg, as reported during the day, and was convinced that Lee would certainly retreat during the night. I told General Devens that I should remain up during the night, and if anything of importance occurred would at once inform him.

With evening there was no further intelligence from Petersburg. The sullen boom of artillery at long intervals indicated that the contest had not ended in that quarter. The closest watch was ordered along our lines. At midnight I observed a bright fire, but the direction of it being toward the Chesterfield Court-House it was not considered indicative of any movement of importance. A few hours later two deserters from the Tenth Virginia Battalion came in, who assured me that the enemy were then retiring from our front. Having informed General Devens of their report I was authorized by him to take possession of the Confederate works, if I found it could be done without too much risk or danger. I at once rode to the various brigades with orders for them to be placed

under arms, and then to the line of pickets to make them ready for a move.

It was a warm, still night. A soft wind, touched with the perfumes of earliest flowers and the first buds of spring, was moving gently from the west. The sky to the zenith was free from clouds, but toward the horizon a bank of smoky mists had settled, as is usual in that climate during the later hours of night. I cannot express the emotions with which I was stirred, as I rode alone through the night, with no sound heard and no object seen save the stars above and the wavy swells of the dusky earth beneath, with full authority, and with a full determination, to set in motion the right wing of the army, which I well knew would result in the immediate occupation of the Confederate capital and the speedy fall of the Confederate Government itself.

The long line of fires, marking the position of the sentinels standing guard for the safety of the army, were burning dimly at the approach of morning. The report of the rebel deserters had passed along the line and every soldier was standing, with musket leaning against the ground, peering into the gloom, with every faculty strained to catch some note in confirmation of the glad tidings. Everything beyond was hid in obscurity. The deep baying of a watch-dog, as if disturbed by some unaccustomed visitor, was occasionally heard in the distance. Save that, all was still.

Presently a bright fire was observed in the direction of Richmond. Soon other fires appeared, spreading rapidly and increasing in volume, which quickly lighted up the whole northern circle of the heavens. Then the line of the James River was marked by the burning of the Confederate fleet. No words can adequately picture the burning fleet and town. The scenic display was equal to the catastrophe in the greatest tragedy of history. While we were standing almost speechless, wondering at the scene, just to our left a huge volume of smoke like an illuminated balloon shot high into the air, fol-

lowed by an explosion that shook the earth under our feet. The echoes rumbled heavily along the banks of the river and then died away in the distance. The ironclad Richmond had blown up. This was followed by other explosions of greater or less magnitude, and in a few moments the James River fleet, which had so long been the pride of the citizens of Richmond, was no more. Then, in the name of the commanding general, I ordered the pickets to advance to the front line held by the Confederates. This having been safely accomplished, with private Duncan of the Ninth Vermont I rode forward through the main works of the enemy. Meeting a Confederate soldier on his way towards us, I turned him about and directed him to lead us to the path used by the enemy in passing out daily for picket duty. He conducted us to a well-beaten track that took us safely to our goal. It passed through three well-constructed lines of abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and fraise. Between the abatis and chevaux-de-frise to the right and left, as far as could be seen, was a row of sticks, a few feet apart, bearing a strip of red cloth, each indicating the position of a buried torpedo. The tents were all standing in lines at right angles to the parapet, but the occupants, as we expected, were all gone. Riding back, I directed that the men were to file to the right and left and follow me as guide, and they were deployed again into line about a hundred yards beyond the Confederate fortifications. One man of the Ninth Vermont, who attempted his own pioneering, was killed by a torpedo. Guards were placed over the guns in the forts and batteries on the line, and I was particular to place sentinels in the forts covering half a mile of the Twenty-fifth Corps front. As this work was completed, daylight began to appear. As I was starting to return to headquarters, I was met by an orderly sent by General Devens with instructions not to advance the pickets, fearing lest some serious accident might occur, the responsibility for which had better rest with the commander of the army. I rode rapidly

back to the General, who was standing in front of his headquarters, and told him that his message came too late, as I had already taken possession of Fort Gilmer and the whole Confederate line. He extended his hand to me and said in his courtly way, "Hail to thee, Count of Gilmer." Word was immediately sent to Weitzel, and in his report he says, "General Devens was the first to report to me (at about 5 o'clock) that his picket line was in full possession of the enemy's works in his front." Soon thereafter orders came for the division to move forward to Richmond at six o'clock. I was directed to return to the picket line at once, and move them forward as fast as possible, as skirmishers. As I came near to the point where the New Market road passed through our breastworks, Major Atherton H. Stevens, with a squadron of the Fourth Massachusetts Cavalry, passed by me under orders to enter Richmond. I observed that the pickets of the Twenty-fifth Corps had just then commenced to move forward. I joined our picket-skirmishers at the station where I had left them, impatient to hear the word "forward," and when it was given they pressed on joyously, with a quick step and light hearts. It was a refreshing march in the pleasant hour of a delightful morning. The green fields on either side furnished a pleasing contrast to the district about our encampments, pulverized as it was into dust by the constant passage of our innumerable trains. The road was dotted here and there with comfortable farmhouses, which were generally closed, with no evidence of life about them, — not even a dog to protest against our *pollution* of the sacred soil. Stragglers in considerable numbers (about two hundred) were gathered in, some on their way to meet us, while others quietly waited for our approach by the sides of the road. The first one I met saluted me with the financial question, "What are you paying now when deserters bring in their arms and equipments?" — and then added, as if for the purpose of getting a favorable reply, "I guess the Confederacy is about played out at last."

As the roads on which the divisions were marching gradually converge, until they meet about two miles from the capital, when about four miles out the skirmishers were covering the two, and I then passed over from the New Market road to the Osborne Pike. From there I saw that Kautz's division was marching rapidly by the flank about a mile and a half in our rear. General Edward A. Wilde, the commander of the leading brigade, seeing that there was a force far ahead of him, rode rapidly forward until he overtook me, when he informed me that the whole army was ordered to move to Richmond and advised that I should fall back and join my appropriate column. As the information was not new, and his advice was unheeded, he soon turned about and joined his own command.

On a hill just by the line of inner defences we gained our first sight of Richmond—a sight that none will ever forget. The city was wrapped in a cloud of densest smoke, through which great tongues of flame leaped in madness to the skies. A few houses on the higher hills, a spire here and there half smothered in smoke, and the hospitals to the east, were the only buildings that could be seen. Added to the wild tumult of the flames, ten thousand shells bursting every minute in the Confederate arsenals and laboratories were making an uproar such as might arise from the field when the world's artillery joins in battle. But just on the verge of this maelstrom of smoke and fire, cattle were grazing undisturbed on the opposite hillside, and I saw a farmer ploughing in a field while cinders from the burning capital were falling at his feet.

A little beyond the junction of the New Market road and the Osborne Pike, the skirmish line was halted to await the arrival of the division. This point was just below Rockett's, now a ward of Richmond, at that time an independent municipality. Here Joseph Mayo, the Mayor of Richmond, soon appeared in an open barouche for the purpose of surrendering the city. With him came his brother, who, in a state of extreme excitement and alarm, told me that Richmond was in

control of a mob and would soon be totally destroyed by fire which no one was attempting to control. In his opinion everybody would be arrested and their property confiscated. He expressed surprise when I assured him that no one conducting himself properly would be disturbed or deprived of his property. He was the owner of a fine estate on the James River, called "Powhatan," the entrance to which was nearly opposite where we then were. On account of his fears that his plantation might be overrun and plundered, at his request, I gave him a reliable man for guard and went with them to his home — a large colonial mansion having a fine view along the river valley. The estate took its name from King Powhatan, and was formerly his abode and the headquarters of his tribe. With some pride the owner took me into his garden and pointed out the rock on which the head of Captain John Smith was laid for the execution averted by the intercession of Pocahontas, the historic Indian princess. During our conversation he said to me, "My sister married your General Scott," putting marked emphasis on the pronouns "my" and "your." A few days later he came to me in Richmond and expressed his thanks for the favor I had rendered him. The young guard had relieved him of all his fears; and not the least disturbance had happened to the peace of his family, nor any loss to his property. He was in a more cheerful and hopeful state of mind than at our first meeting. Order had then been restored in the city, and it seemed likely that the reduction to slavery of the whole population foretold by General Lee, Davis, and other leaders would not be realized. He said that as I had granted him one great favor, he was going to ask one more, which was the privilege of buying some sugar, coffee, tea, and flour of our commissary, as he had no food in his house save potatoes, corn meal, hams, and bacon. Taking from his pocket a twenty-dollar gold piece, he told me that it was the only good money he possessed, and this he had kept sacredly during the war. Thinking our commissary might forget to make any distinction between

coin and paper money, I gave him twenty-eight dollars in greenbacks in exchange for his gold, and with my note to the proper officer he left me and we never met again. I was afterward informed that Mr. Mayo was one of the wealthiest men of Virginia.

Returning to the junction I soon had the pleasure of seeing our division pass out of the New Market road into the one broad highway to Richmond, a few moments only before the arrival of the colored troops. Poetic justice required that the advance into the Confederate capital and its subsequent occupation should fall to Devens' division, which on the 29th of the previous September, unaided and alone, had captured Fort Harrison and the Confederate line north of the James, and on the following day had held it against the supreme effort of two divisions of the Confederate army under the direction of General Lee to recapture it.

Major D. D. Wheeler, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Twenty-fifth Corps, very soon came up with an order from General Weitzel to send the first brigade he met into Richmond, and to encamp the remainder of the army outside the city by the circle of inner forts. As he first met the brigade of General Edward H. Ripley, the leading brigade of Devens' division, the honor, as also the responsibility, of first entering and guarding the Confederate capital fell to this organization. As the situation was critical, Ripley's command was moved rapidly forward. Passing through Rockett's we were forced to witness something of the misery and suffering the war had brought upon the people living in what appeared to be the lower suburb of the capital. It was the shipping port of Richmond, and was the home of the class of people who find employment in loading and unloading vessels and other labors incident to such a locality. Handkerchiefs and strips of cotton cloth as flags of truce were pinned on the door-casements of the houses, from which women and children came out with piteous appeals for food, which then we could not but later did

furnish with a free hand. As we approached the river a gunboat was seen anchored in midstream, from which a Confederate flag was still flying. Captain William J. Ladd, of Devens' staff, jumped from his horse and rowed in a boat to the ship. He quickly ran up the mast, secured the flag, and had just stepped ashore when the magazine blew up and scattered the gunboat in fragments from bank to bank. This flag he now retains in his home in Milton.

There have been numerous claimants to the honor of having been the first man to enter Richmond on this morning. I have read several obituary notices of deceased soldiers in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts who had gained the reputation in their own locality of being thus distinguished. In historic publications Major Atherton H. Stevens, of the Fourth Massachusetts Cavalry, has been often mentioned as the man. Captain Ladd was my tent-mate. Soon after arriving at the picket line at three o'clock on the morning of April 3, I sent a note back to Ladd, advising him, if he wished to be in at the "killing," to join me at once. Being the owner of a fleet horse he was very soon thereafter by my side. At five o'clock I returned, as above related, to division headquarters, at which time, or a few moments later, Major J. C. Brooks, of the Ninth Vermont, and Ladd started together to ride into Richmond. It soon after occurred to Brooks, who was in command of the pickets of Ripley's brigade, that duty required him to be with his men, and he returned. Ladd rode on alone and within an hour entered Capitol Square. As he was riding up Franklin Street near the Bullard and Exchange Hotel, one of a group of sailors from a Confederate gunboat rushed out from the sidewalk with a drawn cutlass and endeavored to stab him. Warding off the blow, he rode on, and after wandering through the city without further molestation he came back and joined General Devens. It was 5.45 by the clock when Major Stevens passed through our breastworks at the New Market road with his squadron of

cavalry, and by this time Ladd must have been in or very near Richmond. Whatever of honor or distinction attaches to the man who first entered the Confederate capital belongs, without a doubt, to Captain Ladd.

The news of our approach was, of course, known in Richmond, and as we passed over the ridge that at the time separated Rockett's from the capital, we were met by a delegation from the Loyal League that had come out to meet and to greet us. The temptation to remain behind and share in the general plunder of the city was great, but the feeling of gratitude in the breasts of the freedmen was greater; and there they were in strong numbers, to extend to us such a welcome as king or conqueror never knew. From the colored population of Richmond we received such a reception as could only come from a people who were returning thanks for the deliverance of their race. There was something peculiarly affecting in the exhibition of feeling manifested by these unlettered children of Africa which communicated itself to all. I well remember General Devens, by whose side I was riding, turning to me, his eyes filled with tears and voice stifled with emotion, and saying, "This is a great sight for us to behold — the deliverance of a race."

As soon as the column turned into Main Street, all the bands were brought to the front, and then, with all the regularity of a parade, colors flying and every musician doing his best at "Yankee Doodle," followed by "Rally round the Flag," with its refrain, "Down with the Traitor and Up with the Stars" and the "Battle Cry of Freedom," through various streets to Capitol Square, — up Main to 27th Street, up 27th to Franklin, from Franklin to Governor, from Governor into Capitol Street, where the brigade was brought to the front and there stacked their arms. Sweeter music never reached the human ear than the rattling of those Union muskets on the pavements of Richmond as they dropped upon the ground.

The square was a scene of indescribable confusion. The inhabitants fleeing from their burning houses — men, women, and children, white and black — had collected there for a place of safety bringing with them whatever was saved from the flames. Bureaus, sofas, carpets, beds and bedding, in a word, every conceivable article of household furniture, from baby-toys to the most costly mirrors, were scattered promiscuously on the green. As the flames approached, as if in anticipation of the destruction of the whole city, the sick and infirm had been hurried from the houses, and, attended by a few friends, were lying on their extemporized beds in the more secluded parts of the yard.

The wind, increasing with the conflagration, was blowing like a hurricane, hurling cinders and pieces of burning wood with long trails of flame over the houses to distant quarters of the city. The heated air, dim with smoke and filled with the innumerable particles that float from the surface of so great a fire, rendered it almost impossible to breathe. At every gust the crowd turned to escape its fury as men turn to escape the fury of a driving snowstorm. Rising among the trees in the centre of the Square, amid this carnival of ruin, stood the great statue of Washington, against which fire-brands thumped and rattled, little respecting the majestic form of the Father of his Country.

The citizens were entirely helpless. A committee of respectable gentlemen had remonstrated to the Confederate military authorities against the burning of the army stores as sure to bring destruction upon the city; but the remonstrance was disregarded. As the last Confederate troops filed across Mayo's Bridge, all attempts at government ceased. The civil authorities made no effort to preserve order. It is not probable that the mob would have respected an authority that had no longer the power to enforce its decrees. The doors of the buildings containing the food-supplies were first thrown open, and there at once commenced a contest for the bread and

flour. The colored men, quick to assert their freedom, entered into the contest, and, for the first time in their lives, were unmindful of stepping on a white man's toes. Hunger, too, sent crowds of women into the streets to obtain a share of the few loaves and fishes which Mr. Davis left as a legacy to his people. After rifling the public storehouses, the mob commenced their attacks on the buildings that were in danger from the fire, and retreating slowly as the destructive element approached, left only naked walls to be consumed. As is usual in the breaking-up of governments, the doors of the jail and prison had been opened, and all the convicts set at liberty. The better part of the community were paralyzed at the magnitude of their calamity. There was no one to take charge of the few fire-engines in working order, and the flames at their own wild will leaped on from house to house in triumphant glee. Men living in places of no immediate danger remained at home to protect their own property from being burned from cinders that were falling upon every part of the town. Those who were already homeless looked on in utter dismay.

Such, in brief, was the condition of Richmond when the Union troops stacked their arms in front of Capitol Square. General Weitzel remained constantly on duty at the State House. General Shepley was appointed military governor and General Devens assigned to the command of the city troops. The execution of all orders, and a thousand details in restoring order and providing for the peace and safety of the city, fell upon General Ripley. No one better fitted for such an important and delicate task could have been found. He was one of the youngest officers of his rank, just arrived at the age of twenty-three. He was a scholar, a gentleman in the true sense of the word, and a soldier of much experience and proved courage. Tall, possessed of a fine figure and an open and attractive countenance, with an eye that beamed with kindness and inspired confidence, he possessed a maturity of judgment beyond his years. What seemed to many recipients

as favors were regarded by him not as favors, but requests granted or acts done only in the line of duty. Firmness there was when firmness was required, but it was never accompanied with the harshness too often characteristic of military commanders. The many appreciative letters received from the leading citizens of Richmond, and the commendation of his superiors, were the evidence of a just, firm, and kindly administration of a conquered city.

All of these experienced officers at once applied themselves to their important duties. The few fire-engines in order were sought out and placed in the hands of our boys in blue, who worked as earnestly to save the city of Richmond from destruction as if performing a like duty for their native towns. A police was organized, and within an hour every street was under the protection of a Union sentinel. The printing-presses were brought into action, and by noon circulars had been prepared and distributed, announcing the rules deemed necessary for the temporary government of the inhabitants. Not a soldier was allowed to come within the city limits, excepting those detailed for its special protection. The men seemed to understand that they were called upon to uphold the name of the American soldier in a new sphere of duty, and right nobly did they perform it.

By night the fires had been subdued. In accordance with orders, the citizens remained in their own or their neighbors' houses. The streets were unlighted, silent, and deserted. Above, the stars shone out bright in the bending blue. Hour after hour I walked alone through the streets of that proud but conquered capital, — past the luxurious abodes of wealth then knowing the first pangs of hunger, — past doors where had proudly entered, and as proudly departed, great military heroes, the tread of whose armies had made the continent to tremble and filled the world with their fame, — past homes but yesterday tenanted by the rulers of an empire, now fleeing to escape the threatened punishment of their acts, — through

narrow lanes and filthy alleys where dwelt the sons of toil upon whose humble roofs the calamities of the war had fallen with a double stroke, consigning fathers and sons, with all the savagery of an unpitied fate, to their untimely graves, bringing at last to those desolated hearthstones the horrors of a famine which had blanched the cheek and thinned the blood of wife and child till the coming of that hated army was looked upon as their only hope of deliverance, — while over all alike, palace, hall, and hut, I could seem to feel the shadow of a great sorrow resting, darker than the shadows of the night which no star then broke through to let in the rays of hope.

From the Governor's mansion, which General Devens had taken as his headquarters, one looked over the wide expanse of ruin. The whole valley stretching west of Franklin Street to the river, which embraced the whole business portion of the town, seemed like a lake of liquid flame agitated by a gentle wind. The spectral walls, edged here and there with tufts of flame fluttering in the breeze, were all that remained of the great shops and warehouses that once adorned the beautiful city that sits at the head-waters of the James. There were many sad hearts, no doubt, about us, and some happy ones, too, for the silken folds of the Union banner were floating once more above Virginia's capital and Richmond was sleeping securely, if sleep they could, under its protecting power.

And there, too, amid the ruins of that heroic city, we, the victors, slept; while to the west, through the long reaches of the night we heard, or in dreams we seemed to hear, the steady tramp of our brothers of the Potomac and the James, who, in their fierce pursuit, paused not through the darkness of the night or the heat of the day until that 9th of April, when amid the acclamations of the civilized world our Northern oak struck down the Southern pine.

The 4th of April, in all the qualities of beauty and loveliness, was a fitting successor to the preceding day. About three

o'clock in the afternoon I was sitting on the broad step in front of the Governor's mansion, our headquarters. Governor Smith's wife and daughter were still occupying some of the upper chambers, as also a young lady from Warrenton Springs, who, a year before, had come there for a short visit, and by reason of the advance of the Union army had not been able to return. An uproar had broken out which, gradually approaching nearer and nearer, so startled Miss Smith that she came to the window and asked me what the trouble was. Not knowing, I told her I would soon find out and let her know. Going to the rear of the house and through the garden to the embankment wall at Governor Street, I saw President Lincoln in the middle of the road leading his little son Tad, surrounded on either side, front and rear, by a dozen or more sailors arranged by Admiral Porter for his protection. The uproar was caused by thousands of freedmen who thronged about and followed their emancipator. No attempt will be made to describe the demonstrations made by them when they first beheld the man on whom they looked as something more than human, and little, if at all, less than the Saviour of mankind.

When I reported to Miss Smith the occasion of the noise which she thought might be an uprising of dangerous character, she quickly withdrew without remark. Soon thereafter I received a note from General Devens, who was with General Weitzel at the late residence of Jefferson Davis, requesting me to send to him at once our headquarters wagon and come myself to meet the President, who was holding an informal reception. The reception over, President Lincoln, Tad, General Devens, and Admiral Porter entered the carriage I had sent. It was a light carriage, with three seats and covered with black oilcloth. The President and the General took the middle seat, Admiral Porter and Tad the rear one. I am particular in giving these details for the reason that the New York illustrated papers represented Mr. Lincoln riding through

Richmond in an open barouche, with hat in hand, bowing to the crowds lining the streets through which he passed.

From the Confederate White House he was driven out to Camp Lee, with perhaps twenty-five officers galloping along on either side or in rear of the carriage. There were then no people in the streets, but when a quarter of a mile out, the carriage road in advance of the cortège was seen to be filled with hacks and carriages. General Weitzel rode forward for the purpose of ordering them one side just as the body of General A. P. Hill was being brought out of a house to be placed in a hearse. The President's carriage was then turned about and took a parallel street. From Camp Lee President Lincoln was driven to Capitol Square and stopped immediately in front of Crawford's great statue of Washington, which faces to the west, holding in the right hand a baton pointing in the same direction. After looking at it for a moment, the President quietly said, "Washington is looking at me and pointing to Jeff Davis." He was then taken to a point where a view of the ruins was had, and from there to the river and on the Admiral's ship. Not leaving it again he returned to City Point in the afternoon of the following day.

In reference to this visit, the following entry was made in "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," under date of April 3, the most noted and often-quoted Southern diary: "4 P.M. Thirty-four guns announced the entry of President Lincoln. He flitted through the mass of human beings in Capitol Square, his carriage drawn by four horses, preceded by outriders, motioning the people, etc., out of the way, and followed by a mounted guard of thirty. The cortège passed rapidly, precisely as I had seen royal parties in Europe." There is a misstatement in every sentence of this extract. No gun was fired, and there were not a dozen people in the Square when the carriage passed through it, the two horses walking. The President did not call upon any person in Richmond save General Weitzel, or enter any house except the late residence of President Davis.

There was a sudden and great change in the everyday aspect of Richmond when it ceased to be the Confederate capital. The Confederate uniform disappeared, as by magic, from the streets. Some two thousand of those wearing it having failed, for reasons known only to themselves, to join the ranks of the retreating army, were placed in Libby Prison and Castle Thunder, together with a few private citizens whom, for the public welfare, it was thought best to deprive of their liberty for a short time.

In the previous November, Lieutenant H. H. Murray, of the Thirteenth New Hampshire Regiment, with two other officers, had been selected by the Confederates for execution, in the event of the sentence of death passed upon three Southern raiders being carried into effect, and for three months he was confined in a basement cell of Libby, at the corner of East Cary and Twentieth Streets. He endured untold misery at the hands of Dick Turner, the notorious jailer, until February 20, 1865, when he was exchanged for a nephew of Vice-President Alexander H. Stephens. Being reduced to a mere skeleton by his treatment, he was not able to return to his regiment until after the fall of Richmond. While a prisoner, he and his two associates had labored for several weeks in digging a tunnel for escape, which was nearly completed when his exchange was effected. Learning on his return that Turner was a prisoner in his own cell, he went immediately to Libby, with the double purpose of seeing Turner in his appropriate situation, and informing the new jailer of the possibility, through the labor of his own hands, of Turner's escape. Murray told me that he was so excited by the pleasure of seeing his persecutor in his own former place of torment that he could form no opinion of the length of time he spent in gazing at him, and finally came away entirely forgetting the most important object of his visit. That night Turner escaped and never was recaptured.

The lines of communication with the North being again open, crowds of visitors poured into Richmond to see some-

thing of war now that it was ended. Senators and Representatives were walking the streets in numbers, probably sufficient to hold a session of Congress in the late Confederate capitol. I had been appointed recorder of a military commission for the trial of all persons charged with crime in the department. We were trying, in the Confederate Senate Chamber, a person charged with having killed a woman, when, on the 6th of April, Vice-President Johnson and Preston King, of New York, entered the room. The court took an intermission and received its visitors with the respect due their position. The Vice-President sat down beside me, in the seat of Senator Hunter, of Virginia, and was soon in a full tide of denunciation of the men who had instigated and carried on the rebellion. What he most feared was the tender heart of President Lincoln. "If I was President," he said, "I would order Davis, Lee, Longstreet, and all the most prominent leaders before a military commission, and, when convicted of treason, they should be hung," — bringing down his fist with vigor on the desk before him. Nine days later he was President of the United States, and not one of them was even tried.

On the 10th of April information of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia was received, which was considered as the end of the war. No such fitting close of a great civil conflict was ever before known. When our exulting soldiers were preparing to fire a hundred guns in honor of the event, General Grant, rising to the height of a great event, bade them stop. He would not permit notes of triumph over his fellow-citizens, or those soon to be. Charles Sumner later rose to the same level of statesmanship when introducing in the Senate a resolution prohibiting the names of battles to be inscribed on the regimental flags of the army. Massachusetts now applauds what once she harshly censured. The spirit of Lincoln, "With malice towards none, with charity for all," has gradually won over all feelings of enmity and distrust, and become national.

For three months longer we remained in Virginia awaiting the expiration of our terms of service, a little impatient at last to take up the thread of life so suddenly dropped at the outbreak of the war.

Never can I forget that pleasant morning in June when, in obedience to orders from the War Department, in company with three New Hampshire regiments, I embarked on board a steamer at Richmond for our homeward-bound voyage to Boston. It was a day of supernal splendor, and as we sailed down Virginia's imperial river to the ocean, and saw for the last time her blue hills fade away in the distance, I began to experience that strange sensation of awe and uncertainty that comes over one as he stands on that mysterious borderland between one sharply contrasted mode of life and another.


The great war was over. Our battles had been fought, our marches ended; our tents would no longer glisten on hillside and in valley; the voice of the bugle was hushed; the throbbing war drum would be heard no longer; the long-sought peace had fallen like a blessing from God over the land, and we were once more at home. How glad we were to leave behind us Virginia and come back once more to our ancestral homes by the mountains and by the sea! How glad to lose sight of fields blighted by the curse of war and to look out on the pleasant hillsides and fertile valleys of New England, then smiling with the prospects of a generous harvest! How glad to escape the burning skies and almost tropical suns of the South, and to drink in the pure air that blows off our rough old granite hills! How glad to leave behind us a people whom we had conquered by our swords, and come again to live among those who quite conquered us by their kindness! How glad forever to lose sight of the desolation and suffering with which for three long years we had been surrounded, and to live once more amidst peace, happiness, contentment, and abundance!

The survivors of the great war, now with a backward vision of half a century, have some cause for pride in what has resulted

from their labors and sufferings. They have lived to the time, and beyond it, when the great majority of the Southern people feel and acknowledge that victory over them was better than victory for them. They have, among the other permanent satisfactions of life, the consciousness that their valor, joining with and aiding that of their fellows, has been wrought into deeds that will live, though many of their names are unrecorded.

The veteran of the Army of the Potomac who in these latter years revisits the scenes of his army life, enjoys an experience which others cannot share. As he crosses the Potomac into Virginia he is stirred by emotions which he cannot elsewhere feel. The general features of the landscape, once so familiar to him, remain unchanged, but its local color is gone. He sees no longer fields blighted by the curse of war, for the intervening years have repaired its infinite waste and healed its multitudinous scars. Within the limits of the Old Dominion five hundred and nineteen conflicts of which history has taken notice have their place. What centuries wrought for the Netherlands, four years did for Virginia,—scarred her surface with battlefields.

By a renewal of those old associations he finds all his faculties kindling to an unwonted glow and memory bringing back remembered and forgotten events with a distinctness at times almost startling. Scenes and incidents of every kind and every description, the grand, the heroic, the sad, the mournful, the tender, the pathetic, the happy, the comical, the disheartening, the hopeful, crowd upon him with all the bewildering distinctness and confusion of the kaleidoscope. Smiles and tears gain alternating control. To revisit a great battlefield is a red-letter day in a soldier's life. He approaches it with feelings of awe and in silence. From afar he pauses and listens, — as if expecting to hear again that most impressive sound that ever reached the human ear, the first indistinct notes of a distant battle. As he stands again on the old bat-



Map
 Showing Attack on
PETERSBURG,
 AND
CAPTURE of RICHMOND,

0 1 2 3 4 MILES
 — Union
 --- Confederate

tle-line, he will perhaps be disturbed to find things so out of proportion to impressions stamped on his memory in the intense excitement of that distant day. The earth has lost that aspect of savagery which it wore as it seemed to rise up frowning at his approach. Yonder ridge so low, so calm and peaceful, so near and easy of ascent, can it be the same that once appeared almost Alpine in height, instinct with life, and crowned with all the enginery that war carries in her train? But it matters not whether our battle-ridges be high or low, our battle-plains be broad or narrow, over and about them all will forever remain the fascination and charm which valor gives the spot where patriot armies in freedom's cause have faced and met its foes.

X

MILITARY PRISONS: NORTH AND SOUTH

BY

MAJOR JOHN CHESTER WHITE, U.S.A., RETIRED

Read before the Society, December 5, 1916

Being one of the appendices to the *History of the Regulars in the Civil War*,
of which Major White is the author.

MILITARY PRISONS: NORTH AND SOUTH

HAVING undertaken to add to the histories of the Civil War, the writer approached this phase of it with extreme reluctance, and only through a sense of it as a duty incumbent upon him through his ability to personally vouch for certain irrefutable facts involved in it.

For the sake of our vaunted civilization, these would be better consigned to oblivion, were it not, that after the lapse of a quarter of a century (when a large part of the survivors of the Southern prison-pens had succumbed to wrecked constitutions), certain writers from that section have had the audacity to assert that the same barbarous treatment of prisoners of war had been meted out to the Confederates in Northern military prisons as were authentically administered at such infamous pens in the South as those at Florence, Andersonville, Salisbury, "Camp-Sorghum," near Columbia, South Carolina, Libby Prison, Belle Isle, etc.

One of the most aggressive in this direction has been Dr. John Wyeth, who is therefore largely responsible for arousing a quasi-controversy on the topic. In an article entitled "Cold Cheer at Camp Morton," which appeared in the "Century Magazine" for April, 1891, he made allegations as to the treatment of its inmates that called forth a vigorous rejoinder which was published in the September number of that periodical, and attested by officers of such unassailable character as Generals O. B. Willcox, Lewis Wallace, A. P. Hovey, and Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, among others.

This was in refutation of these assertions by Wyeth, through an exhaustive presentation of evidence from responsible parties directly connected with the administration of the prison (which was near Indianapolis). This is at such length as to

be impracticable for quotation in this paper, so that to it, as well as to Wyeth's reply in the same number, those interested must be referred. The subject-matter of his statements he has reproduced in his later work, "With Sabre and Scalpel," published in 1914. As before suggested, a possible explanation of his efforts, at that late date, to make the treatment of Confederate prisoners of war appear to have been akin to "the terrible trials of Northern prisoners" (to use his own words), may be found set forth in chapter XI, p. 121 *et seq.*, entitled "A Dissertation on the Perversion of Facts."

While the writer possessed no personal knowledge of the conditions at Camp Morton, it so happened that he gained such at first hand about certain other military prisons in the North. Released upon parole (as one whom it was reasonable to expect would either shortly die, or, at best, would never be fit for active field service again), when newspapers were brought aboard the flag-of-truce boat off Fort Monroe, he learned that a brother-officer to whom he was much attached was lying severely wounded in a hospital at Georgetown, outside of Washington. So soon as his vermin-infested rags could be gotten rid of, some medical assistance received, with some proper nourishment, that hospital was visited. The comrade was found in occupation of a ward, in which, in close proximity lay a wounded Confederate officer, beside whose cot was a small table laden with delicacies, and over him were hovering two ministering women friends, devoting themselves to his alleviation.

The production of a parallel case, south of Mason and Dixon's line, is hereby challenged!

The wounded Federal officer, noticing that his visitor's attention was being largely directed towards the other occupant of the ward, and having remarked that he appeared to be more interested in the Confederate than in him, the response was made: "Not at all! But if you could realize what a contrast there is in this sight and with what was left behind in Libby,

you would not wonder that my gaze is thus riveted"; adding, at once, "But thank God! for such humanity on our side." (It may be also stated that in an adjoining ward lay Lieutenant-Colonel Elwell Stephen Otis, One Hundred and Fortieth New York Volunteers, later the commander in the Philippines under the McKinley Administration.)

Again, upon his arrival at his home in Philadelphia, the writer having learned that some wounded men of the regular brigade were to be found in a hospital in Germantown, upon visiting them, saw a number of Confederates upon cots, interspersed throughout the same wards among the Union victims, and receiving exactly the same attention as they.

The challenge is renewed as to this instance!

An invitation was extended to him to make a visit to Fort Delaware, upon what was called "chicken day."

At Elmira, New York, while *en route* to rejoin his regiment which was being rehabilitated at Buffalo, he made an inspection of the large prison-camp at the former place, then being guarded by the Twelfth United States Infantry. As a regular officer himself, he was at liberty to move about freely, and he now gives testimony to the fact that the said camp provided all requisite shelter and suitable rations for its inmates, while its control was being administered with due reference to military propriety.

This is set forth in detail, and at great length, in a work entitled "The Elmira Prison," by Clay W. Homes, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, being a work of over four hundred pages, including in its attestations those of sundry Confederates. As this was about the largest Federal prison, it is well to make a careful examination of the facts involved.

It had been selected for the purpose in the early days of July, 1864, and to receive the overflow from Point Lookout, Maryland. Its area comprised nearly thirty acres; having been previously used as a draft rendezvous, and also as one for

recruited volunteers, and under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Eastman, Fifth United States Infantry. The site was contiguous to the Chemung River. The barracks provided for the occupants were "in excellent condition" and "well ventilated," according to the official reports; among which were those of Surgeon Charles M. McDougall, Volunteers; the Medical Director of the "Department of the East," Surgeon Charles T. Alexander,¹ U.S.A.; Captain Philip W. Stanhope, Twelfth Infantry; Captain Henry W. Freedley, Third Infantry; and Lieutenant James R. Reid, Tenth Infantry, — all commending the conditions, and up to two days prior to the closing of the camp. Miss Dorothea Dix (the Florence Nightingale of the war) reported, in the interest of the "Sanitary Commission": "Have visited the prison and hospital at Elmira; in both of which the rebels are receiving all necessary care and provisions, fully adequate to all necessities." The buildings were provided with double bunks for four thousand men, while tentage could be furnished for from three thousand to four thousand more. A kitchen had been constructed to cook for five thousand, daily, with a bakery capable of turning out six thousand rations of bread *per diem*. A pond in the centre of the camp having been found to be of an objectionable character, the remedy was applied later in the fall. In the reports above referred to, the *dirty condition of the prisoners upon arrival*, is commented upon. Colonel Benjamin Franklin Tracy (afterwards Secretary of the Navy), then of the One Hundred and Twenty-seventh United States Colored Infantry, relieved Colonel Eastman in September; himself being succeeded by Brigadier-General H. W. Wessells, in December.

As stated in the preface to the book under quotation, "The strongest evidence produced in support of the good character and wise administration of these officers in charge and of the treatment of the inmates comes from the Confederates them-

¹ Of strong Southern sympathies.



(1)



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5)



(6)

A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

(1) Col. Rob't Ould, C.S.A., Confederate Commissioner of Exchange. (2) Major Henry Wirz, C.S.A., and his defender, (3) Lt. Jas. Madison Page, 6th Mich. Cav. (4) Bvt. Maj.

selves," as found in the succeeding pages of the volume. Thus, the written testimony of Sergeant Benjamin Benson, First South Carolina Volunteers, should be consulted upon page 209; that of Joseph M. Womack, on page 169, wherein he says that "there need be no blush for the memories of the Elmira prison-camp" — both of these being escaped prisoners; and also that of A. M. Kelly, Twelfth Virginia Infantry, on page 301, as to his being "treated, in the main, here with a courtesy and kind indulgence that I can never forget, though it comes from foes." When compared with the vitriolic and viciously falsified speech in Congress assembled on January 10, 1876, by Benjamin H. Hill, the demand for such an *exposé* as this of such fabrications will doubtless be recognized. The winter of 1864–65 proved to be a very severe one all over the country, and the prisoner from the Southland no doubt suffered to a serious extent from its rigors at such Northern points as Elmira, Johnson's Island, and Camps Douglas, Chase, and Morton. At the latter, near Indianapolis, the thermometer had registered the unprecedented record of zero. During a part of the previous summer there had been a severe drouth, and in August, when there were 9300 prisoners, there had been 793 cases of scurvy making their appearance, but it is to be taken into consideration that these men had been previously for a long time at Point Lookout. A smallpox epidemic, also, broke out, the treatment of which will be found set forth in the reports of Surgeons McDougall and E. F. Sloan — to be found in the same work. One remark therein is peculiarly pertinent — to the effect that there had been "*a tendency to over eat* on the part of the prisoners — an indiscretion of which we were never chargeable at Libby, and elsewhere!" As before expatiated upon, that distressing malady, nostalgia, seems to have been more pronounced among the Southerners than their opponents, and not a few succumbed to its devitalization.

In volume 7 of the "Review of Review's Photographic His-

tory of the Civil War," upon pages 75, 79, 81, 119, 129, 131, 151, 168, 175, 177, and 179, can be found photographs showing the actual conditions at Andersonville and Elmira, respectively. The contrast to conditions and results obtaining at Camp Alger and at Chickamauga, at the time of the Spanish War of 1898, was, likewise, greatly in favor of the military prison at Elmira, in 1864-65. No doubt exceptional instances of abuse of authority by guards or their superiors may have occurred; but if regarded as exceptional in the North, it can justly be asserted as habitual in the South.

It should likewise be brought to the knowledge of the present-day reader that at the period under mention foodstuff was abnormally high in cost, while the premium on gold was near its top-notch. There appears to have been some twenty-four Federal prisons in all, including detention camps and jails, such as the "Old Capitol" prison in Washington, Belle Plain on the Potomac shore of Virginia, near the terminus of the Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, which had been prepared for the reception of the captives in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania campaigns, and at Rock Island and Alton, Illinois, where at the latter place an abandoned penitentiary was utilized for a short time. At Rock Island, which was continued as a prison-camp for some sixteen months, there had been 9536 in confinement, from among whom there had been 1940 deaths and 45 escapes; which compare with the 12,112 deaths recorded against Salisbury, and the 13,765 at Andersonville.

The Gratiot Street and Myrtle Street prisons at St. Louis were also of but temporary occupation; the one, an old medical college; the other, a former negro market.

Camp Butler, at Springfield, Illinois, was one of similar character, being in use but for a short period of time.

There were also the two old forts, Lafayette and Columbus, in New York Harbor, and Warren, in Boston Harbor, as also Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, and Fort Delaware,

near Philadelphia. These held political as well as military prisoners.

Photographs of the interiors and of some of the occupants can be examined in the book mentioned above.

Lying upon the writer's desk is a holographic note from Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, well known as a historian and statistician of that war, in which he states: "My knowledge of the treatment of Confederate prisoners was confined to Point Lookout. There, they were well treated in every respect—food, clothing, quarters, and discipline." Colonel Livermore also informs the writer that he was on duty at Johnson's Island at the very time to which Dr. Wyeth makes reference.

The most authoritative information obtainable as to actual conditions at Johnson's Island, in Sandusky Bay, Ohio, which had been originally selected as an ideal situation, about which so much had been wildly averred, would appear to be found in the following excerpt from Croffut's "Fifty Years of Camp and Field: Diary of General Hitchcock" (page 460). This seems to meet the case as fully as would a whole volume of refutations of charges of ill-treatment: "General Hitchcock¹ brought back from Johnson's Island one piece of most important news; out of 1882 rebel prisoners of war, only 362 men were willing to be exchanged! The residue preferred to remain in prison. This fact was a striking commentary both on the lack of enthusiasm for the rebel cause and on their treatment in the 'Yankee prison!'" Upon this the diarist comments: "Who cannot see in the above fact the state of feeling that would be manifested in the whole rebel army if an opportunity were offered for declaring itself? Secession was one of those infatuations which sometimes seizes large bodies of people who only need a wholesome lesson to enable them to recover their senses, and cast off their delusions as a horrid nightmare."

¹ General Hitchcock had been deputed by the War Department in September, 1864, to proceed to inquire into and report upon these conditions.

To substantiate this exposition of facts the following is the statement of Captain John A. Walsh, C.S.A., in a book entitled "Camp, Field, and Prison Life," as to his experiences at Johnson's Island: "I am glad to say that prison-life—in so well selected, arranged, and conducted a place as this—has been far more agreeable than I anticipated. . . . I got a room . . . having four beds in it. Myself and three lieutenants filled the beds. We did not have to increase our number." Each building, according to his account, contained eighty prisoners—divided into two messes—with a dining- and cook-room for each, and a stove, well supplied with culinary utensils. His own mess employed two regular cooks, at fifteen dollars per month each. He drew such clothing as he desired from the United States, and quotes one "jolly fellow" as having declared, "If a body could n't live easy, laugh and grow fat here, he ought to die, for we have nothing to do but to eat, drink, sleep, and be merry." Further he states: "All things considered, the whole premises are kept remarkably clean and healthy. Captain Scoville, who has charge of the internal affairs of the prison, visits all parts of the institution frequently, and is very kind in listening to the various questions, and in supplying the wants of the prisoners."

Added to this is the verification of a Confederate surgeon, published in the "Richmond Examiner," as to *his* experiences at Johnson's Island: "The sleeping accommodations were very comfortable, consisting of a bunk, with straw bed, and if the individual has no blanket, one is furnished, and he is allowed to buy as many more as he wants. Every room has a good stove, and is furnished with a sufficiency of wood. . . . The rations are exactly the same as issued to the garrison" (this being followed by an enumeration of them).

Among the first Federal prisoners taken by the Confederates were three officers of the United States Navy, Lieutenants John L. Worden, George L. Selden, and Albert Kautz. The first-named, it will be remembered, was seized by the

Secessionists, while acting as an emissary for the Federal Government to the commands at Pensacola, early in 1861; the last had been captured off Cape Hatteras by a Confederate privateer, on June 25, while in command of a prize brig which had been taken near Charleston. Restrained of his liberty for a couple of months in North Carolina, Kautz was then removed to Henrico Jail, in Richmond, being thus incarcerated and held in retaliation for the imprisonment in the "Tombs," in New York City, of certain privateers. On the last of October he was released upon parole, in order that he might proceed to Washington, where (after having held an interview with the Confederate officials, Benjamin and Mallory, looking to effecting an understanding with the Federal authorities as to future exchanges) he was successful in obtaining the exchange of himself and the two other naval officers. This also led up to the release of three hundred and fifty Union captives who had been taken at First Bull Run, through their exchange with the same number of Confederates who had been captured in the fight at Hatteras Inlet in August. This was the first exchange authorized by the President and his Cabinet.

The humanitarian offices of Miss Van Lew were already being extended to those in confinement at "Libby," particularly, among the sick and wounded. So much has been written about what this loyal and devoted woman did later on for escaping prisoners, who sought a hiding-place at her home prior to striking out upon their desperate efforts to regain their freedom, as well as to her conveyance of important information to the Federal authorities, that it is not considered to be necessary to recount any of it here.

Some sixty-eight places appear to have been in use in the South as military prisons. Among these the most conspicuous were eight in Richmond; Liggon's,¹ the Smith and Pemberton buildings; the Laundry, Crew's, Scott, and Castle Thun-

¹ Where most of the First Bull Run captives were at first immured.

der — at the latter place the inmates were usually limited to political offenders and criminals. In the James River, opposite the city, was Belle Isle, one of the most infamous of them all! At Danville, Virginia, there were six prisons which were designated by numbers. Another Castle Thunder, at Petersburg had been so named on account of the noise of the continual bombardment to which the “Cockade City” was being subjected.

At Salisbury, North Carolina, was a prison-pen where there was the highest death-rate of them all, in proportion to the numbers confined there — 12,034 graves! At Charleston, South Carolina, the Roper Hospital and the city Jail; at Florence, where the mortality had been about as great, proportionally, as at Salisbury; near Columbia, Camp Asylum, or, as it became known,¹ Camp Sorghum, from its almost exclusive diet, was likewise equally distinguished. Castle Pinckney, in Charleston Harbor, was at first selected for the retention of some of those First Bull Run captures, among whom was that Colonel Michael Corcoran, Sixty-ninth New York Volunteers, who had been for a time segregated as a hostage for a privateer under sentence of death in the United States courts. In Georgia there were prisons at Macon, Millen, and the jail at Savannah; the most notorious of them all being Camp Sumter, or, as it is known to the history of that period, Andersonville. Camp Lawton, at Millen, had been created late in '64 to relieve that crowded sink of infamy. In Alabama there were prisons at Cahaba and Tuscaloosa.

Besides Camp Groce, near Hempstead, and that “Camp Ford” in Texas (already referred to), there were many others of minor importance as containing but a few prisoners, and

¹ Since writing the above the information has been supplied by Major Henry Goddard Dorr, Volunteers, who was a prisoner of war at both places, that the Camp Asylum was established as a stockade in the city of Columbia, and later than the Camp Sorghum, being two separate places; and also that a jail in the town was, likewise, in use for similar purposes, and where Major Charles B. Amory, Volunteers, had been confined with others.

these but for a short time, as merely transients, such as Raleigh, Charlotte, and Goldsboro, North Carolina, and Greenville, South Carolina, Shreveport, Louisiana, and the Parish Prison at New Orleans. The conditions obtaining at these places have been further set forth, and at length, in a report made to the Fortieth Congress, by W. F. G. Shanks; and in scores of books, of which the following is but a partial bibliography furnished for the inquiring minds:—

- Lights and Shadows in Confederate Prisons, by Homer H. Sprague, Brevet Colonel Thirteenth Connecticut Infantry. Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York City.
- Southern Prisons, by Morgan E. Dowling. William Graham, Detroit.
- Story of Camp Chase, by Wm. H. Knauss. Publishing House, M. E. Church, Nashville.
- Prisoners of War, by Thos. Sturgis, Lieutenant Fifty-seventh Massachusetts Infantry. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York City.
- Dark Days of the Rebellion, by B. F. Booth, Twenty-second Iowa Infantry. Booth Publishing Company, Indianola, Iowa.
- Fourteen Months in Southern Prisons, by H. M. Davidson, First Ohio Light Artillery. Daily Wisconsin Printing House, Milwaukee.
- Eighteen Months a Prisoner under the Rebel Flag, by S. E. Boggs, Twenty-first Illinois Infantry. Lovington, Illinois.
- Life Struggles in Rebel Prisons, by Joseph Ferguson, Captain First New Jersey. John Ferguson, Philadelphia.
- A Captive of War, by Solon Hyde, Seventeenth Ohio Infantry. McClure, Phillips Company, New York City.
- The Prisoner of War, and How Treated, by A. C. Roach, Lieutenant and A.D.C. A. D. Streight, Indianapolis, Indiana.
- Twenty-two Months a Prisoner of War, by Stephen Schwartz, Ordnance Sergeant, U.S.A. A. F. Nelson, St. Louis.
- Nineteen Months a Prisoner of War, by Lieutenant G. E. Sabre (*nom de plume?*), Second Rhode Island Cavalry. American News Company, New York City.
- Journal of Alfred Ely, as a prisoner in Richmond, edited by Chas. Lauman. D. Appleton & Company, New York City.
- Richmond Prisons, 1861-62, by W. H. Jeffrey. Republican Press, St. Johnsbury, Vermont.
- Seven Months a Prisoner, by J. V. Hadley, of the staff of J. C. Rice. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York City.
- Field, Dungeon and Escape, by Albert Dean Richardson and Junius Henri Browne. New York Tribune Company.
- A Race for Liberty, by Wm. Bursar, Thirty-second Ohio Infantry. W. G. Foster, Wellsville, Ohio.

- Experiences in the Civil War, by Sol. Woolworth. Newark, New Jersey.
- In and Out of Rebel Prisons, by Lieutenant A. Cooper, Twelfth New York Cavalry. R. J. Oliphant, Oswego.
- Life and Death in Rebel Prisons, by R. H. Kellogg, Sixteenth Connecticut Infantry. L. Stebbins, Hartford.
- Battlefield and Prison-Pen, by J. W. Urban, First Pennsylvania Reserves. Hubbard Bros., Philadelphia.
- Prison Life in the South, by W. W. Glazier Harris, Lieutenant, Cavalry. H. E. Goodwin, Hartford.
- Five Hundred Days in Rebel Prisons, by Chas. Fosdick, Fifth Iowa. (A brochure.)
- Cahaba—a Story of Captivity in Alabama, by Jesse Hawes, M.D., Ninth Illinois Cavalry. Burr Printing House, New York City.
- Chronicles from the Diary of a War Prisoner in 1864, by J. W. Northrop, Seventy-sixth New York Infantry. Wichita, Kansas.
- Fast and Loose in Dixie, by J. M. Drake. Authors' Publishing Company, New York City.
- Beyond the Lines, by Captain J. J. Gaer, of the Staff of General Buckland. J. W. Daugherty, Philadelphia.
- Prison Life in Dixie, by Rev. J. B. Vawton. Central Book Concern, Chicago.
- Libby Life, by Lieutenant Colonel F. F. Cavada, One Hundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania Infantry. J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia.
- Prison Life in Richmond, by W. C. Harris, Seventy-first Pennsylvania Infantry. Geo. W. Child, Philadelphia.
- Ten Months in Libby, by Louis D. Cesnola, Colonel Fourth New York Cavalry. (A leaflet.)
- Martyrdom of Andersonville Prison, by E. R. Hamlin, Medical Inspector. Lee & Shepard, Boston.
- Andersonville. Harper & Brothers, New York City.
- Horrors of Andersonville. Statement of John Lynch, Report of Committee. Merrihew & Son, Philadelphia.
- Twelve Months in Andersonville, by Lessel Long, Thirteenth Indiana Infantry. Thos. & Mark Butler, Huntington, Indiana.
- The Tragedy of Andersonville, by General N. P. Chipman. Published by the author, Judge-Advocate of the Wirz Court Martial.
- Andersonville Diary, by J. L. Ransom, Ninth Michigan Cavalry. Douglass Bros., Philadelphia.
- Andersonville, by John McElroy, Eighteenth Illinois Infantry. D. R. Locke, Toledo.
- Captivity at Andersonville and Belle Isle, and Other Rebel Prisons, by Warren Lee Goss, Second Massachusetts Heavy Artillery. Lee & Shepard, Boston.
- Narrative of Andersonville, by Ambrose Spencer.

Narrative of Amos E. Shaw. F. P. Rice, Worcester.

List of Dead at Andersonville. Tribune Association, New York City.

Capture and Escape, by J. A. Kellogg, Brevet Brigadier-General and Colonel, Sixth Wisconsin Infantry. Wisconsin Historical Commission.

Story of the Tunnel Escape from Libby, by Major A. G. Hamilton. J. L. Ransom, Chicago.

Days in Confederate Prisons. Magazine article.

Prison Life. Harper's Magazine, July, 1865.

And more than a score of other magazine articles and leaflets.

Two very interesting newspaper articles upon this topic exist, and are in the possession of the writer; one, to the "New York Times," under date of September 27, 1912, relates the "fearful imprisonment" of some six months in Libby, of Captain Emil Frey, Eighty-second Illinois Infantry, and later President of Switzerland, and with whom, as he states, the horror of it lingers in all the reminiscences of the war; the cold, the hunger, the disease; the other, to the same periodical, under date of December 8, 1912, retailing the experiences of Surgeon Simon Baruch, C.S.A., as a prisoner of war on two occasions in which he describes them as "delightful captivity." Even the most skeptical and bigoted would refrain from asserting that all these writers had conspired to put forth their narratives in an exaggerated or falsified form!

It is but proper to state, however, that Jefferson Davis, many years after the close of the war (December 10, 1888), writing from his seclusion at Beauvoir, for "Belford's Magazine," sought to make a defense, entitled "Andersonville, and Other War Prisons," to which those interested may be referred. There is also a work labelled "Annals of the War," and edited by Colonel Robert Ould and General R. S. Northcott. In passing, the writer pauses to affirm that, in all this literature he has had occasion to carefully and critically examine, among the rest was a work published shortly after the close of the war by Harper & Brothers, under the title of "Prison Life in the South," being a collection of statements furnished by inmates of the various prisons at Richmond, Macon, Sa-

vannah, Charleston, Raleigh, Goldsboro', and Andersonville, and that he had long and intimate acquaintance, even from boyhood, with the following parties under quotation in said book, and can personally testify that they were men of high character and reliable responsibility: Captains S. S. Elder, Edward N. Carpenter, E. J. Pennypacker, J. E. Wenrick, and Lieutenants John Quincy Carpenter (a classmate), Henry G. Dorr, H. B. Freeman, Henry C. Potter, D. D. Vanvalzah, C. E. Widdis, and E. DeC. Loud.

A peculiar work from the pen of a James Madison Page, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, which he terms "A Defence of Wirz," in his story of Andersonville, appeared some years ago. Further remarks upon this will be found at the close of this paper, when a reply may be received to enquiries sent to the author, whose address has just been discovered in Montana. Those who are desirous of probing into this subject still further are informed that they can find all these books upon the shelves of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, or the Massachusetts Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, at the Armory of the First Corps of Cadets, corner of Columbus Avenue and Ferdinand Street, Boston. From all these voluminous recitals of individual and collective experiences a summary may be compiled which is strikingly in accord, and in confirmation of a systematized treatment of Federal prisoners of war such as was indefensible upon the grounds of a common humanity. It will, also, be found upon a close examination of these tales, of differing dates, that this treatment increased in severity, and, indeed, cruelty, as the war progressed in its development, and reflected the ups and downs of Confederate operations, until after Gettysburg and Vicksburg there is evidence that a settled policy had been determined upon to render the prisoners in the hands of the Confederate authorities, who might yet survive such inhumanity, unfit for further active service when exchanged.

In reference to the "Richmond Examiner" of January 21,

1864, and to the House of Representatives documents No. 1109, together with such rebel records as were seized at the occupation of the Confederate capital (*and which were formerly among the files of the United States War Department*), all tend to indicate a directing hand as connecting these various places of confinement with a common centre, and a concerted course of treatment through a system of indignity, deprivation, and severity "by officers, soldiers, and citizens."

In the letter of Colonel Robert Ould, as Confederate Commissioner of Exchange, — which in itself sufficiently attests this, — under date of March 17, 1863, and addressed to General Winder, in his capacity as directly in charge of the prison camps, he remarks: "The arrangement I have made works largely in our favor. We get rid of a set of miserable wretches and receive some of the best material I ever saw."¹

Commanders-in-chief in the field, such as Lee and Joseph Johnston, quite probably regarded the control of such matters as beyond their domain and responsibility; but that it was not known to those in power at Richmond, even if not instituted and encouraged by Davis and his adherents, is scarcely credible by the most credulous.

Belle Isle, lying as it was in the river, in plain sight of the windows of residents in the Confederate capital, and containing those thousands of unfortunate Federals, a large portion of whom were compelled to find what shelter was possible in holes in the ground for want of other protection from the inclemencies of the weather, eliminates all possibilities of extenuation!

The Regulars, surrendered in Texas through the treachery of Twiggs, had constituted the first body of prisoners, and these were confined, for the most part, at "Camp Ford," which was situated about six miles from Tyler, in that State, and about one hundred miles due west from Shreveport, Louisiana. At first merely a camp in the woods, it later became a stock-

¹ *Vide* Nicolay and Hay's *Lincoln*, vol. 7, pp. 459, 460.

ade enclosing some two and one half acres, subsequently increased to six. Without any shelter provided for them (at a period when the South could hardly plead the impoverishment of war), the men sought to protect themselves as best they could by their own ingenuity and energy, and with such contrivances as restricted opportunity afforded. Fortunately, water was abundant!

An imaginary line was established some ten feet from the stockade as a "dead-line," and as to which the sentry on post was constituted the sole judge! "Camp Groce," near Hempstead, in the same State, was of like character. Just at this writing the privilege has been accorded to examine a statement made to the Congressional Committee as to the treatment of Union prisoners, from the pen of Hon. John Read, recently deceased in Cambridge. He, with one hundred and ten other naval officers and men, and whom he describes as "strong, healthy men," was captured at Calcasieu Pass, Louisiana, May 6, 1864, and after undergoing their experiences at this place "equalling in their horror the terrible records of Andersonville and Libby," "seventy-nine of that number had succumbed to the mental and physical strain and to exposure" by December of that year. It appears that in the whole war there was no greater suffering or larger percentage of mortality than in the Texas swamp prison camps. "All were herded on the muddy ground, in so small a compass that it was almost impossible to walk through the camp." His detailed description of conditions and environment typify it as a sink of the most revolting corruption, from which even "the dead were buried like dogs, and often a corpse lay for several days unburied in the camp in the midst of its late mess-mates."

After the battle of First Bull Run (or Manassas), many of the captured Federals (including the Congressman, Alfred Ely) were immured in a tobacco factory in the district of Richmond known as Rockett's, and located at Twenty-fifth and Main Streets. There they were under the jurisdiction of

General John B. Winder, a former captain in the First United States Artillery, with Lieutenant Todd (a brother of Mrs. Lincoln), in direct charge, and Wirz as "Orderly Sergeant." Todd appears to have determined to demonstrate his sentiments towards his brother-in-law by his brutality towards the "hirelings" of the President, as they were complimentarily termed, and among other choice epithets, as "Yankee mudsills," "blue-bellied Yanks," "yandals," and "plundering hordes,"¹ both in their public press and even by certain high ranking officers. Their physical appearance being thus described as furnished "with horns on their heads" and "with hair on their teeth," the "poor whites" and the more ignorant of the Southern populace had been led to believe that the Union armies were composed of a low type of humanity that was very little above mere animals, and which accounted for the vile vituperation to which we were subjected during our enforced movements as captives. Always denounced as "invaders," it was not unnatural for them to desire to wreak vengeance on us as such.

With the restriction of trade occasioned by the state of war, vacant tobacco factories appear to have been the most available places for the confinement of prisoners of war, while civilian offenders and criminals were relegated to such places as "Castle Thunder." Among the earlier prisons was an Atkinson tobacco factory.

Subsequent to the incumbency of Lieutenant Todd, a Major J. T. W. Hairston had been ordered to take charge of the Richmond prisons by Adjutant-General Cooper; this was in the autumn of 1861. To quote his own words, he "found the prescribed duties of a prison-keeper anything but congenial to a liberal and enlightened mind," or "pleasant to a man of human inclinations, and mine were intensely disagree-

¹ The only epithet the writer ever heard used for the Confederates was either "Johnny Reb" or "Grayback," certainly no description of them as differing from ordinary was ever fed out to the Northern troops or public.

able when the retaliatory policy of our government compelled me to put in irons fourteen of the highest ranking officers and confine them in a dungeon." He claims to have "endeavored to make" his "regimen as mild as possible"; and this seems to have been the fact, since he states that he "circulated among the prisoners at all hours of the day and night unarmed and without a guard."

As it had become evident that he would be required to discharge imposed duties of a repugnant character, he succeeded in obtaining an assignment to field service.

While, as a general thing, the treatment extended to Federal prisoners during the earlier stages of the war had not been so malignant as it became later, that appears to have been due to the initial success of the insurgents; while later defeats aroused violence of passion and greater asperities were introduced in their course of action.

This would seem to be evidenced by a statement that, upon the arrival of those first captures at Manassas (among whom had been Congressman Ely), General Winder "called and apologized for the uncomfortable quarters by saying that the arrival of the prisoners was unexpected, and he was, therefore, unprepared for them, but that a separate apartment for the officers in another building was nearly ready, etc."

The sequel of Winder's notorious attitude towards and treatment of prisoners would, therefore, logically be accountable as inspired by the highest authority.

That there may not be room for the charge that a wilful reprobation of Winder's character is herein attempted, the following true copy of a letter written long after the war by a Confederate soldier, who had been on guard at the time of the escape of the "tunnellers" from Libby Prison, and who therein gives his reason for aiding them in their flight, is presented:—

COWIKEE, P.O., BARBOUR CO., ALA.

You may wonder why I, a true Confederate soldier, should connive at the escape of "the damned Yankees" as they were then called. Well, my motives were varied. . . . Another reason for my conduct was revenge. I had received a mortal insult from no less a person than Major-General Winder, at that time commandant of the post of Richmond. I was passing up Main Street one day, and seeing a nice-looking bar-room, I thought I would go in and get a drink. Entering the door I approached the counter, behind which stood a bold, black-eyed girl. Those who were familiar with the bar-rooms of Richmond, during the war, know they were all kept by women. The men having all gone to the war, their places were supplied by women, and the girl who could swear the loudest, and was the most brazen, commanded the highest wages. Well, I approached the bar, and remarked: "Hello! Moll, sling me a little apple-toddy out here." She shoved the decanter and glass on the counter, and I poured out and drank the liquor. I was standing at the counter, toying with the spoon in the glass, when, hearing a noise behind me, I turned and saw an old, gray-haired man, whom I recognized as Major-General Winder, approaching. As he came up, he said to me, "Get out of the way, God damn you!" I was a little dilatory about moving, and flashed a look of defiance and hatred on him, when he raised his foot as if to kick me; but on hearing the click of a pistol behind me, I turned and saw the girl with a cocked six-shooter in her hand, pointing directly at Winder. "Kick! Kick!" she ejaculated, "and I'll bore you through." With that Winder lowered his foot, and I turned and walked out. The girl knew it was to her interest to protect the private soldiers, for they were their principal customers; and she told me afterwards that, had Winder kicked, she would have killed him in his tracks. Now, I come to the main reason which induced me to act as I did. I saw a large number of gentlemen in that pen. They were *gentle-*

men, indeed, if they were "damned Yankees." They were educated, many of them highly so, and many of them were as devoted Christians as I have ever seen in my life; and then, again, a number of them were from New Jersey, my father's native State. Some two or three were from Elizabethtown, where he was born, and knew my grandmother, old Mrs. Marshall. There were as brave men in that pen as I have ever seen, for I had faced them on the bloody fields of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. In fact, I had assisted in putting them where they were. Well, I saw these men subjected to every indignity and cruelty which the devilish ingenuity of "Dick" Turner could devise. He even applied to the Secretary of War for permission to inflict corporal punishment to the prisoners, but to Seddon's credit, he refused, not because he was opposed to it on principle, for he was a tiger-hearted old rascal himself, but because he knew it was contrary to the laws of war as conducted by civilized nations. Then, too, he feared the United States Government would retaliate. Turner, however, found other means to punish the prisoners, and resorted to abuses too indecent to mention. He was a villain of the deepest dye, and, after the war, I fully expected to hear that he had been hanged. The weather was cold, very cold, and the poor prisoners were never allowed to have more than a handful of fire.

I have thus, my dear sir, given you my agency in releasing the prisoners, in durance vile, in Libby Prison, and my motives for it; and now, after the lapse of more than twenty-seven years, I am still unable to decide whether my conduct was more praiseworthy or blameworthy.

I remain, yours truly

(s'd)

W. F. CRANE.

This epistle is thus quoted, as it bears the earmarks of verisimilitude, and gives free expression to his opinion of some of the factors in the management of this monumental disgrace to modern civilization.

Winder, who had been one of the inciters of the mob in its attack upon the Sixth Massachusetts in Baltimore, in 1861, readily became the chief instrument in the infliction of cruelties upon the Federal prisoners under his control when he had sensed the policy of those in power. So notorious did he become in the exercise of his methods that even the malevolent "Richmond Examiner" had a paragraph to this effect, when he was transferred to Georgia: "Thank God, Richmond has, at last, got rid of old Winder! God have mercy upon those to whom he has been sent!"

It seems strange that mere chance should have determined the selection of a commander with such brutal instincts as appear to have characterized Winder. In General Cullum's "Biographical Register of the Graduates of the United States Military Academy," the closing of Winder's record is thus phrased: "Joined the rebellion . . . and became the inhuman jailer of the Libby and other Southern prisons."

The published report that had been made by Colonel Daniel T. Chandler, Assistant Inspector-General, C.S.A., to his chief, Colonel Robert Hall Chilton, at Richmond, to the effect that "the condition of this prison, Andersonville, is a reproach to us as a nation," leaves the higher authorities without any palliation for their responsibility.

Andersonville, through the largest number of prisoners having been confined there, partakes of the greatest infamy, on account of the barbarous treatment that was administered to them by Wirz, under the direction of Winder, who had taken him with him when relieved from duty at Richmond and given the assignment that called for the establishment of the prison. Formerly, the sergeant on duty at Libby, Wirz was not commissioned at Winder's instance, being just the sort of brute who could be depended upon to execute the ruthless policy that had been determined on to wreck the unfortunates who might yet survive their immurement. Its frightful mortality list, likewise, increased its infamy, having reached

the total of more than thirteen thousand, which is about the average of the varying statistics obtainable and verified by existent graves.

The site was about sixty-five miles from Macon, Georgia, to the southeast, and was thus selected by a son of General Winder (so it has been asserted), who was at this time "Commissary-General of Prisoners." Its establishment was to provide for the overflow of the Richmond prisons, which was arising through the cessation of the exchange of prisoners, under orders of General Grant. It consisted of a roofless enclosure of some fifteen and a half acres, and was located upon both sides of a little creek, the banks of which were swampy. Pieces of shelter tents or remnants of blankets stretched upon boughs afforded such meagre shelter for but a few, while the vast majority had either no covering at all, or had dug holes in the ground into which they could crawl. When it is given as a matter of official record that its population had reached, as its high-water mark (in August, 1864), 32,911, some idea can be formed of the crowded and unprotected conditions that existed.

In the northeastern and southeastern corners were spaces about eight rods in length by four in width, and having canvas stretched across the bare earth, which constituted the "hospitals" of "Camp Sumter," as it was denominated in the Confederacy. Under this flimsy intermediary against the fierce heat of the sun in that latitude, the miserable victims of superinduced disease soon sweltered to their doom! The number of *misérables* in that hospital on August 7 is given as 2687; the deaths for that week being 560. In Sergeant Benson's statement he avers that 2990 bodies were deposited in and around the dead-house, previous to burial—an average of more than ninety-six *per diem*. Established in February, by the middle of June the number of prisoners had grown to nearly 20,000; an order from the Confederate War Department requiring all such, east of the Mississippi, to be concentrated there. In con-

sequence, it became necessary to increase the dimensions of the stockade which surrounded it. This was accomplished by taking in about ten acres more, through the work of the more able-bodied of the prisoners under a parole. Constantly increasing occupancy, however, shortly brought about the former congestion.

Since the horrible details of the daily misery dragged out by the wretched survivors are to be readily found in so many blood-curdling narratives, they will not be recounted here. One of the most succinct and exhaustive is that which has been furnished by Sergeant Henry M. Davidson, Battery A, First Ohio Artillery, who, having been detailed by Major Wirz as surgeon's clerk in the hospital upon parole, appears to be peculiarly well acquainted with the facts under his daily observation, while his personal responsibility for his statements has been thoroughly substantiated. The revolting story can be brought to a conclusion in the "summing up" by the Judge-Advocate (Holt) before the Military Commission that tried and convicted Wirz: "The annals of our race present nowhere, and at no time, a darker field of crime than that of Andersonville, and it is fortunate for the interests, alike of public justice and of historic truth, that from this field the veil has been so faithfully and so completely lifted. All the horrors of this pandemonium of the Rebellion are laid bare to us in the broad, steady light of the testimony of some one hundred and fifty witnesses who spoke what they had seen and heard and suffered, and whose evidence, given under oath, and subjected to cross-examination, and to every other test which human experience has devised for the ascertainment of truth, must be accepted as affording an immovable foundation for the sentence pronounced."¹

For the details of the trial and evidence, the reader may be

¹ General Winder having died February 9, 1865, he had escaped the condign punishment that was thus meted out to his jackal. It may be mentioned that the writer was present at this trial.

referred to General Chipman's book, as mentioned in the foregoing list.

The predominant desire among all prisoners was to effect an escape, while cherishing the delusion of a possible rescue by Federal troops. Nowhere was such delusion more exposed than at this remote place in the South. When the possibility that the threatened raid by General Stoneman might result in the release of these prisoners, work was energetically instituted in preparing for defence of the place, ostensibly, but really looking to the destruction of the wretched inmates under guise of such defence. A strong earthwork was thrown up by a large force of conscripted negroes. This, located about thirty rods from the southeastern corner of the stockade, mounted nine light guns, five of which were trained to bear diagonally across the enclosure. About twenty-five rods from the northern gate another earthwork was constructed, mounting five guns, three of which also bore upon the prison-pen. Two lines of stockades were built to encompass the original enclosure, and an earthwork was thrown up at each corner of these latter, except on the southwestern corner. A low entrenchment was then excavated around the northern end of the whole, and so arranged as to enfilade every approach from the northeastern and western, and in case of any attack upon the guards, it would result in one upon the captives. In fine, any attempt to take the place now, by force of arms, must have resulted in the extermination of the hapless prisoners.¹

The *post-bellum* story told by General Richard Taylor, C.S.A., with the view of exonerating Wirz from responsibility for the horrible conditions of the pen, is scarcely commensurate with the evidence brought out in the trial by "some one hundred and fifty witnesses," the recorded report of Colonel D. T. Chandler, a Confederate medical officer, and letters extant (some of which are quoted in the book above referred

¹ *Vide* Winder's Order No. 13, dated July 27, 1864, as quoted in Major Putnam's *A Prisoner of War*, p. 127.

to), and addressed to Davis.¹ So that the plea of ignorance of these inhuman conditions on the part of the authorities is hardly tenable, while the power to investigate and control was unquestionably theirs. That some knowledge of the facts had been forced upon them is also evidenced by the orders that were issued in September to reduce the numbers by sending prisoners to Savannah and Charleston, and, still later, by the establishment of another pen at Millen.

This, like Andersonville, was an open enclosure, nearly square, and contained about forty acres. The conditions were, however, much improved. A stream of clear water ran through it. The stockade had been located in the midst of a pine forest, which had been denuded of its timber up to a narrow strip of small trees near the stream, and had been constructed from the unhewn logs. From their refuse a number of rough huts had been built by some of the prisoners as a protection against the inclemency of the approaching winter season; others, not so fortunate, dug holes in the ground, where they burrowed. A battery of eight guns was planted in a fort near the southeastern corner, so as to rake the enclosure in case of an insurrection on the part of the four thousand inmates during the winter.

At Savannah, a prison-pen had been hastily constructed on a part of the grounds belonging to what had been the United States Marine Hospital. Nearly two acres had been enclosed by a ten-brick wall upon three of the sides, and by a tight board fence upon the fourth. Several fine live-oak trees were embraced in the enclosure, affording a grateful shade. At first, brackish water was obtainable in a limited quantity from a well, but later pipes were laid to the city waterworks. Tents and bunks were supplied, and altogether it has been described as "the Paradise of Southern prisoners" — no inmate was murdered by the guard — "and there was no special abuse to complain of," the rations being "generous and of good qual-

¹ *Vide Richmond Examiner*, January 21, 1864; also H.R. Doc. No. 1109.

ity." A different story, however, is told by H. M. Davidson,¹ as referring to a "prison south of the old jail, which had been built by the British," and where between four thousand and five thousand prisoners, mainly from Andersonville, were confined in October, without shelter of any kind, and where the rations were "too small to satisfy our needs." The death-rate ran into the hundreds, although only two are to be found in the Confederate reports.

Among the earlier captures of Federals had been those taken from Sherman's command at Chickasaw Bayou, in that first attempt upon Vicksburg in the latter part of 1862. The officers of this detachment, fourteen in number, were taken to the jail in that city, and confined in a cell fourteen feet by twelve, upon starvation ration; while the men were corralled in the jail-yard without any shelter against the cold weather.² Later, to the number of more than two hundred, such were confined in the wretched remains of an old bridge across the Pearl River, near Jackson. Without fuel or lights, their food was practically limited to a corn-meal mush, in which the cob was the most pronounced ingredient. The death-rate was in proportion with this treatment.

From that time it would appear to have become the settled policy (although not publicly announced) of those in whose power it was to direct and control such matters to render such as might survive unfit for further service in the Union armies. Letters are on record in which various brutalities are suggested and recommended by the writers, such as handcuffing them, putting them in chain-gangs and employing them upon hard labor, or placing them on a diet of bread and water. One humanitarian proposes that the left leg of each prisoner should be broken and he then turned loose! Another, that they should be corralled at some point easily accessible to the United States Government, which, being duly notified, should

¹ *Vide ante.*

² Testimony of Governor Thomas C. Fletcher (Missouri). H.R. Doc. No. 4064.

it fail to feed and clothe them, they were, as an alternative, to be left to starve! These allegations rest, by no means solely, upon the testimony of survivors, but is buttressed by the captured Confederate records containing the reports of their own surgeons and citizens, who were intimately acquainted with the conditions at various points, as noted. Further corroboration is to be found in the testimony taken before the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.¹

At another place in Georgia, a Camp Oglethorpe, outside of Macon, where the prison-grounds comprised some three acres, the conditions were somewhat better than at the places just mentioned. The grounds were surrounded by a tight board fence, which included the customary "dead-line." A stream of good potable water passed through one corner of the camp, although, below the spring, it became an open sewer for the excrement, and when there was a heavy rainfall the flat surface of the grounds became overflowed. In the centre of the grounds there was an old one-story frame building, seventy feet by twenty, standing upon posts. There were also some sheds, open on the sides, with a roofing of boards; but these were not enough to furnish shelter for all the twelve hundred to fourteen hundred inmates.

At Cahaba, a city of the past, which had been originally selected as the capital of Alabama, but was then but a mere village in Dallas County, about ninety-two miles south of Montgomery, on the west bank of the Alabama River, was a prison known as "Castle Morgan." It consisted of about sixteen hundred feet of open space, enclosed by a brick wall, and included an old building with a leaky roof. It came first into this use in the fall of 1863, and with the design of making it the principal Southern prison. This "old cotton and corn shed" had been the private property of one of the local merchants. A report upon its conditions by Surgeon R. M. Whitfield, C.S.A., in March, 1864, may be found em-

¹ 401-804, 1051-80, 961-1111, *passim*.

bodied in the book upon this place, and included in the foregoing list.

In the early part of 1864 there were from six hundred to seven hundred internes, but as the year wore on the numbers largely increased, reaching the height of eleven hundred and fifty-one by the middle of October. According to the testimony to be found in House of Representatives, Documents, No. 199 (Fortieth Congress), they were treated with studied neglect. An artesian well on the outside supplied water through an open gutter for some two hundred yards, and thence under the street into the prison, thus becoming but "an open sewer in the midst of a small town" and virtually "the receptacle of the filth, solid and liquid, which the careless, indifferent or vicious might cast into it."¹ In many particulars, this is alleged to have been the worst prison, not even excepting Andersonville, both in the treatment of the captives and as reflected in the death-rate.

At Charleston, the jail-yard was the place of confinement for the enlisted men who had been captured. It is described as 'a filthy, lousy place, with an insufficient supply of tepid, brackish water. A few "A" tents had been supplied. The privy vaults were overflowing, while from the heat of the sun, and the buildings (workhouses and jail) cutting off all the sea-breeze, the atmosphere became stifling.

Here the Federal captives were mixed up with the vilest of the "jail-birds." They were also at all times exposed to the fire of the Union guns on Morris Island, as were the officers for a short period, and who were confined, for the most part, in Roper and Charity Hospitals. A classmate of the writer, Lieutenant John Quincy Carpenter, One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania Infantry, and another fellow-townsmen, Lieutenant William Blanchard, Second United States Cavalry, were held the better part of two years — their exceptional experiences being due to their families in each case (being people

¹ H.R. 732, *ut supra*.

of liberal means) having forwarded ample funds, which never, however, reached them : still another confirmation of the wisdom of the heathen philosopher Seneca's well-known invocation : "Heaven save me from my friends!"

Three hundred and fifty-one graves have been found near the jail, although but one hundred and sixty-two deaths are recorded in the Confederate reports.

It is to be remarked that when it became known to the Federal authorities that their officers and soldiers were being thus exposed to the gun-fire of the bombardment, a number of Confederate prisoners were transferred "from Fort Delaware to Morris Island, and there confined in a stockade in front of the Federal lines, where the projectiles from the Federal artillery passed over them. Little or no damage was done." This retaliatory measure had its anticipated effect.

A few miles from Columbia was Camp Asylum, or "Sorghum" as it came to be called from the principal article of diet furnished. Here some fourteen hundred men were confined ; and "this sorghum molasses, with the corn-meal, constituting the sole ration, it gave rise to an active dyspepsia and diarrhœa." As of some historical significance, it is to be recalled that as Sherman's army was entering Columbia in its "march to the sea," the van had passed through the site of this misery, and, if there be any justification for Wade Hampton's charge that the place was fired by Union soldiers, it is to be estimated what effect had been instilled into their minds by what they had learned of the atrocities inflicted upon their comrades, and when still further inflamed by the lavish manner in which they had been plied with liquor by injudicious or malevolent citizens.

To digress still further, the writer has this to affirm, that he was stationed no less than three times in Columbia after the war, and made it his business to probe into this matter as deeply as was in his power, with the resultant conviction that the conflagration had its genesis in the firing of cotton-bales

under Wade Hampton's own orders to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Yankees; just as was the case at the evacuation of Richmond, and against the representations of Ewell as to the inevitable dangers to surrounding property.

But to return; from July to December, 1864, about one hundred and fifty prisoners of war were confined in the Richland County Jail, where they were placed in cells in the second story.

At Florence, which is about one hundred miles due north of Charleston, in Darling County, and on the railroad, another prison-camp had been established about two miles from the town. Something like twenty-five acres were enclosed by a stockade, surrounded by a ditch. As more than a quarter of the space was swampy, it was not available for camping purposes. A large stream that ran through the enclosure furnished the drinking-water, while it also supplied a certain amount of facility for washing and bathing. Upon the lower part of the stream the sinks were located. A furrow marked the "deadline." The only shelter the inmates had was what they might be able to provide for themselves by digging and covering with what they could find. Others lay on the bare ground. When fuel was furnished, at rare intervals, they cooked what was issued as rations; when not, they were compelled to eat them raw! These rations were even less than at Andersonville. Towards the fall of 1864 there appears by the report that there were 11,424 prisoners. The death-rate is given as having been 2793 in three months.

The place selected for the confinement of Federal captives at Salisbury, North Carolina — a railroad centre in Rowan County — was a four-storied brick factory, with five smaller buildings annexed. It was enclosed by a board fence, and covered an area of some eleven acres. There were nine wells within the enclosure, while water was otherwise obtainable from a creek a half a mile distant, but in such small quantities as to only afford a limited amount for use in cooking and

drinking. This lack of means for washing and bathing became the source of much suffering, as the soil was a tenacious red clay, and entirely without any drainage of an artificial character, so that when there were rain or snow falls, the place was soon converted into a mass of mud, while the sinks became a source of pestilence. There were reported to have been 8740 inmates, in November, 1864; and over 1000 more in the following month. These found what shelter they could by digging under the buildings, or by burrowing in holes,¹ or in trenches partially covered with pieces of shelter tents or boughs, with clay spread on top. Those who were not strong enough to dig, had to huddle together, both night and day, for warmth; and when the weather was inclement — the ground frozen — or after a snow-fall of several inches, the wretched prisoners suffered from frosted extremities, unless released by a more merciful death! Eighteen thousand and thirty-four graves have been identified since the war; while only 4694 deaths are recorded in the Confederate reports.

It is, however, proper to state that when General Bradley T. Johnson came into command, early in 1865, these conditions became radically changed in the direction of comparative humanity.

Captain Henry Parkhurst Cooke, A.A.A.G. Volunteers, is on record that at Raleigh, North Carolina, where he witnessed an exchange of prisoners being made, the “well-fed and clothed returned Confederates were surprised and shocked at the appearance of the destitution of our men who had been prisoners in the South.”

Major George B. Fox, Seventy-Fifth Ohio Infantry, states that a Confederate officer remarked to him upon a similar occasion: “If I had been the Confederate Commissioner of Exchange, my regard for the reputation of the people of the South would have never permitted me to turn over such physical wrecks as your men are who have been in Southern pris-

¹ H. R. 704, *ut supra*.

ons, to proclaim to the world the infamous barbarity of the Confederate Government!"

At Danville, Virginia, the places designated for the confinement of their captives were, as usual, abandoned tobacco warehouses, and known by numbers, as before stated, No. 3 being reserved for officers, while the others were used for the enlisted men, both white and colored. A fine town of some two thousand inhabitants at this time, it was situated on the south bank of the Dan River and near the boundary line of North Carolina, a little to the north-east of Greensboro. It had been principally devoted to commerce in tobacco, and, consequently, had many empty warehouses at this particular period. In such places the windows constituted the "dead-line," which meant that to approach them was to draw shots from the guards, who were, generally speaking, and particularly during the last year of the war, either boys or old men, and having had no record for field service were rather desirous of being credited with having killed a "Yank." Whatever may have been the reason for such action (presumably, under orders), in all these prisons it was the custom to shoot any and all who approached near the "dead-line," whether it was a window forty feet from the ground, or a ditch drawn around the camp, or even an imaginary line defined by the untrained eye of the sentinel or guard. The water-supply, from the Dan River, and usually procured by a detail from the prisoners themselves, was, according to various accounts, very limited — at one time as set forth in House of Representatives Document No. 845, it was said to have been but a pint per man each day. Cooked rations, such as they were, formed the food-supply.

At Richmond, the most important as well as the best-known among places of confinement, was Libby Prison, situated at the corner of Cary and Twentieth Streets, the former warehouse of Libby & Sons, ship-chandlers. Its varying conditions and the remarkable escapes through tunnelling by parties under the leadership of Colonels A. D. Streight and T. E.



(1)



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5)

SOME OF THE CONFEDERATE OFFICIALS AT "LIBBY PRISON"

(1) Lt. "Dick" Turner, C.S.A. (the Turnkey). (2) Adj. La Touche, C.S.A. (3) Major Henry Wirz, C.S.A., (formerly, Sergeant at Libby). (4) Brig. Gen. John S. Winder, C.S.A.

Rose, in February, 1864, have given it a prominence due to the exhaustive literature extant in relation to these. It was several months after these escapes that the writer became one of its inmates, and it was probably also due to them that there was much more restriction placed upon those thus incarcerated than appears in the narratives of Colonel Cavada¹ and others of an earlier date. The commandant was Major Thomas P. Turner. He had been an appointée to West Point, as from Virginia, in 1860. Having been detected in an attempt to purloin certain official papers from the headquarters office at the Academy, by the then commandant of cadets, Lieutenant-Colonel John Fulton Reynolds, he had been thereupon dismissed.

There appears to be some confusion in the minds of certain writers in regard to another man bearing the same surname, and on duty at the prison. Lieutenant Dick Turner, the turnkey, was no relation of the Major's, and was a vulgar, coarse brute, who was reputed to have been an overseer, of the "Legree" type, on some plantation before the war. Whether the fact that Major T. P. Turner was of different extraction and equipment might tend to place him in a more favorable light, is left to him who reads to form his own opinion.

As above remarked, the conditions which obtained at "Libby" varied under different régimes, and as those antecedent to the writer's incarceration there have been delineated in the various books mentioned in the foregoing catalogue, he confines himself to testifying as to what he doth know. Since Brevet Major George Haven Putnam, One Hundred and Seventy-sixth New York Volunteer Infantry (later the well-known publisher), became an inmate of the place about the time the writer left on parole, his narrative concludes the connected story. The other officials were a Lieutenant Latouche, Swiss mercenary, like Wirz, who, as above stated, had been

¹ Colonel Cavada, a fellow Philadelphian, met his death in Mexico, after the Civil War, "as a soldier of fortune."

a sergeant under Winder's provost-marshalship at Richmond. Erastus W. Ross — a civilian — was the clerk. There was an undercurrent of belief, generally entertained by the internes, that Ross was disposed to be in sympathy with them, while obliged to be necessarily careful not to indicate it to the observation or knowledge of his commandant. In a paper read before the Massachusetts Commandery of the Loyal Legion (and which had been written up from notes left by Lieutenant David Parker, who had been Superintendent of Mails for the Army of the Potomac), the statement was made that after the surrender he had been invited to dine with Miss Van Lew, and at her table he met Ross, who, Miss Van Lew told him, had been her able assistant and confidant during the continuance of the war in aiding the escape of the prisoners. Ross lost his life when the old Spottswood Hotel was burned in 1873. Latouche also died in Richmond in 1890. *Requiescat in pace!*

“Dick” Turner became a prisoner himself in one of the cells through the bars of which he had been wont to jeer at the unhappy occupants, and behind which he *then* exhibited the craven spirit which belonged to his make-up, until he was released through the magnanimity of the Government.¹

Major Turner made a rapid departure from Richmond when its evacuation had been determined upon (Professor Thompson to the contrary, notwithstanding), being well aware of the threats to kill him on sight. So does the passage of time soften asperities that he was not even arrested in his subsequent place of residence. He never showed himself among the prisoners after he had personally supervised their wholesale robbery, and was never again seen by the writer, excepting when, seated in front of the building, idly whiling away the time, he was wont to hiss his hounds upon any barelegged

¹ General Henry Clay Ward, U.S.A., retired, who had been captured at Fort Stedman, and, after the close of the war, was, for a time, in charge of the prison, has frequently referred to this period and its incidents, in conversations with the writer.



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
SOME PRISONERS OF WAR IN "LIBBY PRISON"
RICHMOND, VA.



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SOME PRISONERS OF WAR IN "LIBBY PRISON"
RICHMOND, VA.

(1) Lt. Jas. Jay Emerson, 17th U.S. Inf. (2) Capt. Geo. T. Brown, 1st Mass. H.A. (the Good Samaritan). (3) Brig. Gen. and Bvt. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hayes, Vols. (4) Capt. John

negro who should chance to pass on the other side of the street — this being one of his “sources of merriment.”

In trenching upon his own personal experiences, the writer has sought to emancipate himself as much as possible from the not unnatural resentful sentiments arising from more than a half-century's suffering from intestinal disease established during his incarceration, and while aiming to be too honest a historian to allow his personal treatment to influence his narrative.

General William Smith (known as “Extra-Billy”) was the military governor at this time, and to his one-armed son was our “mess” indebted for some gratefully received additions to its meagre menu upon several occasions. The dawn of the first morning after his internment (there never were any lights at night during that period) revealed to the writer the person of an old Philadelphia friend, in Captain Benjamin P. Sloan, Second Pennsylvania Cavalry. It seems that Captain Sloan at one time had been in command of troops in the immediate vicinity of the Smith homestead, and had placed a safeguard over it, as well as having extended such consideration to the family as was in his power. Hence these visits of mercy from the crippled son were in reciprocation of the bread of kindness thus cast upon the waters. General Joseph Hayes, with whom the writer had been made prisoner in that *débâcle* on the second day of the battle on the Weldon Railroad, had requested the Regular officers to lie around him on the floor (there being no seats or benches of any kind for us), and what was derisively termed our “mess” through the pooling of our *issues*, was thereupon formed with the accessions of Colonel Francis A. Walker, A.A.A.G. Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonels Arthur R. Curtis, Twentieth Massachusetts Infantry, Charles H. Hooper, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry and Captain W. P. Huxford, One Hundred and Sixty-second New York Infantry. We also included an interesting personality in a Captain William Cook, Ninth United

States Colored Infantry, and a graduate of Yale. He had been a prisoner for a long time, possibly due to his having given a somewhat injudicious play to his sense of humor through having had a pair of trousers improvised (when his own had completely disintegrated) out of an old rebel blanket. This had been accomplished with the aid of a comrade who had followed the contour of his nether limbs with his knife, and so deftly as to bring the letters "C. S." where they belonged. His connection with the colored troops had also made him *persona non grata*.

The description of the building and its interior arrangements have been so profusely given that it is unnecessary to reproduce them here; suffice it to say that the two upper rooms on the southwest corner of the building were crowded by some four hundred officers, while the upper floors of the central division of the structure held the enlisted men, as a temporary receiving station, prior to their being transferred to points farther South, for more permanent confinement; the Confederate capital, by this time, being regarded as somewhat insecure. On the ground-floor of the western end was located what was euphemistically termed the "hospital." A paroled Federal hospital steward (whose name has escaped the memory of the writer) was in charge. In passing, it should be told that he proved to be a rascal, since the money left in his hands by those of us who were released upon parole, to be turned over to our less fortunate comrades who remained in confinement, was never so transferred, as we later were informed. A Dr. Semple was the attending surgeon, but his visits were few and far between during the months when the writer was in the hospital; he, however, made the examinations that resulted in the paroles to correspond to the numbers of Confederates released from Northern prisons. Only one issue *per diem*, and that about mid-day, was made here. As the writer chanced to be transferred thither, before the issue had been made upstairs, and after the one at the hospital, he

would have had to go without food for over twenty-four hours, had it not been for the Samaritanism of Captain George T. Brown, First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, who forced upon him a half of a small loaf of bread that he had gotten from outside. It may also be remarked that, when captured, until his first so-called meal in Libby, he had been entirely without food for more than forty-eight hours! Also, that these *loaves*, which were smuggled in through the negroes employed in a perfunctory cleaning of the floors, were about the size of a large bun, were highly aerated, and cost a dollar in Confederate money, — which was exchanged for us by these same negroes, at five for one, — the outside exchange being fifteen for one. In furtherance of a clear understanding of how any of us came to have any money, it should be explained that in the search for such which was made upon our arrival at Libby, and under Turner's personal direction, a few of the more ingenious had managed to secrete a little beyond detection, when all valuables, including pocket-knives, were confiscated. The writer had been relieved of his pocket-book and contents upon the field, by a cavalry officer, still holding a smoking revolver, with which he had just shot one of the writer's command because he had not hurried fast enough to suit the Confederate; and, consequently, with whom his prisoner did not regard him as open to argument. However, when being marched with the others in the rain, without hat or rain-coat — which had also been taken from him by violence, having his hands in his pockets in his chilled condition, he felt a wad of something, which his experience caused him to examine furtively, and which he discovered to be a twenty dollar bill which he had forgotten. That night, when corralled in an open field with the several hundred other victims of that disaster (and for which they were in no way responsible), he secreted the bill under his shoulder-strap, where it soon became as soaked as the cloth itself, and so escaped detection upon scrutiny. For this he got one hundred dollars in Con-

federate scrip; while for a plain gold ring he received twenty dollars more. These proceeds went to eke out his meagre food, which consisted, while in the upper rooms, of two issues *per diem*; one, in the morning, about nine o'clock, of a piece of corn-bread, about two feet square, and made with the cob ground up into the meal, and a small piece of bacon fat, usually in a rancid condition. The other issue, by poetic license called dinner, was a movable feast, anywhere before or after three o'clock, and repeated the morning repast, with the addition, generally, of an infinitesimal amount of bean-soup, in which the occasional bean had anything but an irreproachable character; a modicum of rice — full of weevils — also made an occasional appearance. No cooking was done at this period, and, indeed, there was no fuel or utensils for such purpose. There were no chairs, stools, or anything else to sit upon, for us, as "fresh fish"; only a very few of the "old hands" had such, improvised out of half-barrels or old wooden spittoons which they had hoarded, and which had been passed down as heirlooms, under an unwritten law, from their former owners who had been released or had died. These latter were used as seats in the daytime and as pillows at night. The others, of whom the writer was one, had to depend upon their boots or shoes (if they had been so fortunate as to be allowed to retain them), or else to rest the head upon one arm — on the bare floor — until numbness necessitated a change of pillows!

Having been robbed on the battlefield as completely as if "held up by highwaymen," and clad in such clothing as the heated season had required, while the windows possessed nothing but iron bars, the chill of night and early dawn made the need of blankets most desirable, but none were ever thrown in to us during the writer's stay. No candles or lights of any description were to be had, and after darkness had fallen there were the seemingly interminable hours to endure, in restless attempts to sleep, made the more so by the hardness of the floor and the rapacity of the crawling vermin.

The upper floor had been preëmpted by the older prisoners, because it was supposed to possess somewhat better ventilation, owing to the pitch of the roof.

There was no reading matter; on one occasion only the trapdoor was raised and some old paper novels were thrown through the aperture, but were sadly torn by the struggling crowd who strove for their possession. (It should be explained that the stairs had been removed lest a rush be made in some attempt at escape, and movable steps had been substituted to reach this trapdoor.) Consequently, even worse than the mere animal hunger was the starvation of the mind thus begotten.

Surely, the plea, habitually put forth by would-be apologists for the conditions in these Southern prison-pens, that the impoverishment of the section entailed by the war precluded the possibility of bettering them, can scarcely be entertained as tenable in this and other similar directions.

During the writer's personal experience there were none of those entertainments resorted to as are to be found in relation to the earlier periods; nor were there any of those classes of study which appear to have been wisely gotten up at other times. Probably that very dearth of mental occupation had given vent to such tendencies to melancholia and morbidity as the hopelessness of exchange had evoked in the individual, leading up to that "leafless desert of the mind," as it has been symbolized.

The Christian and Sanitary Commissions, as well as interested families and individuals, were frequently forwarding supplies for our benefit, but although it is stated in the earlier narratives, and later, when arrangements had been made for the distribution of such under the supervision of selected representatives from both sides, none were allowed to reach the consignees, so far as the writer knew, while he continued to be a guest at Hotel Libby, although the boxes and packages containing these contributions were piled up within our exasperated view in the shed through which the escaping tun-

nellers had emerged — besides those that had been rifled by the guards and others.

There exists no responsible record that Federal prisoners were ever supplied with clothing by the Confederate authorities, although there is such that what had been forwarded from the North for their needs had been appropriated by their jailers at certain places. On the other hand, those who had the opportunity to observe paroled Confederates while passing through the lines can testify that they were better equipped than the rank and file of the "Army of Northern Virginia."

Our food was received in wooden pails, and we ate what we could of it out of a few old tin cups and plates which had been passed down from predecessors. After that second meal had been disposed of, we had to satisfy our cravings "for more" through the Barmecide feasts of our imaginations. (One unfortunate Major of a New York regiment had been so shattered in his intellect, that, upon the slightest encouragement, he would dilate, with the greatest avidity, upon his dreams of six course dinners, with champagne accompaniment. So degraded had this unhappy human being become that he would help himself out of the refuse of our food placed in a corner for removal.)

A very few of us have been so favored by fortune, or aided by their own cunning, as to have succeeded in saving their pocket-knives, thus being constituted as friends worth cultivating.

Such pretence at sanitation as was undertaken merely consisted of those occasional visitations of the aforesaid negroes who perfunctorily flushed the floors in the same way the decks of vessels are swabbed, while we in the lower room had to be careful to stand from under during the process.

The only water-supply in our room was laid down through a single faucet attached to a lead pipe that fed into a wooden trough — this, for both drinking and washing purposes! But as no soap or towels were to be had, "it made no differ-

ence," as the immortal Mr. Toots was wont to declare. Unless this trough represented the "bathtub" depicted in Cavada's book, any other must have fallen into the condition of Dr. Holmes' "one-horse shay"; or had been secreted about the person of one of the oldest inhabitants, unless one of the escaping prisoners had become so in love with it that he had pulled it after him in the tunnel as a souvenir. From the unplastered ceilings and beams, the festive cockroach, and his equally objectionable associate, the Confederate "grayback," were ever wont to drop upon our persons — the latter to start a new colony unless promptly detected and immolated.

In the southwest corner of our room was a closet for the privacy of the inmates. When the trapdoor would be opened for the admittance of some new arrivals (ever hailed with the announcing shout of "Fresh fish!" and the sympathetic injunction to "leave all valuables with the clerk!"), a self-appointed committee would conduct the arrival (if it were night) to that closet (with the shouted instruction to "show the gentleman to the bridal chamber!"), where he would be left to grope his way out, after he had satisfied himself, as well as he could in the dark, as to the uses of the compartment. All this, while coarse enough, furnished laughter; and oh! the value of that laughter!

That the prohibition against approaching closely to the windows had been ruthlessly enforced, was evidenced by the bullet-marks on the casings and walls: tradition recorded that deaths had been occasioned by some of these shots, but none such occurred, to the writer's knowledge, during his tenancy.

As pertinent to this, the following excerpt from the "Army and Navy Journal" for September 19, 1914, p. 70, reads thus: "In 1864, a wounded sergeant of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, said in Richmond, Virginia, 'after a soldier has been in battle he respects his enemy. If the men guarding Libby prison had been in battle, the Union prisoners would have been treated like gentlemen, but the damned home-guard and civilians

attached to that place are brutes, and a disgrace to the Confederacy, and I am sorry to say that most of them are Virginians' !”

In thus skimming over the surface of affairs that came under his observation or within his own experience, the writer has conscientiously confined himself to absolute facts, but yet which he is prepared to believe were not allowed to come within the knowledge of the ordinary citizen of the metropolis, and that they could scarcely be brought to credit an account of what was taking place in their neighborhood. Indeed, in his own case, two witnesses of high character could have been produced to refute these statements from the writer's own mouth. To explain: An uncle of his (an Episcopal clergyman in Philadelphia), having written to former classmates of his at the Theological Seminary at Alexandria in behalf of his nephew, the latter was somewhat startled one day by hearing his name called by Adjutant Latouche. Hesitating, at first, to declare himself, as a momentary recollection of the unpleasant custom that had obtained of selecting hostages flashed across his mind, he soon recognized the ultimate futility of remaining *incognito*, and, upon stepping forward, found that the Adjutant was accompanied by a gentleman in clerical garb, who announced himself as the Reverend J. Peterkin (Rector of St. James' Protestant Episcopal Church, in the city), and that his kindly offices had been thus sought. Upon questioning whether there was any ground for complaint, he received a reply in the negative, the youth, thus catechized, possessing enough acumen to appreciate the certainty of much worse conditions to follow any representations of the actual circumstances, and contenting himself by stating that he was quite comfortable and in need of nothing, *since the Adjutant was remaining beside the clergyman all the time*. The relief to his mind in thus learning that his widowed mother had knowledge of his being alive, and realizing the sparse larders of the average Richmond citizen at that period, he limited his request

for largess to some article of an anti-scorbutic nature. The reverend gentleman, upon his departure, promised to return with some such supply, but he was never seen or heard from again by the writer, until after our occupation of Richmond, when it was learned that he had, indeed, been true to his promise, but had been told by Turner that "Lieutenant White was no longer there, having been sent to Lynchburg," which, of course, was a lie.

This incident was exactly duplicated in the case of the Reverend R. Mason, who called in the same way, and under the same circumstances, made the same kind tender of assistance, which was followed with a similar sequel.

As an additional illustration of how these gentlemen were being deceived, the writer (who has their letters now before him in an excellent state of preservation) finds, in that of the Reverend Peterkin, the statement that "the Rev. Dr. McCabe, our Government Chaplain, . . . visits the prisoners and officiates for them regularly." As a matter of fact, during the writer's incarceration no such visit or discharge of his office came within his observation or knowledge! Dr. Semple, the attending surgeon, made occasional visits to the "hospital" while the writer was an occupant, but they appeared to be merely of a perfunctory character, as a general rule, and not infrequently accompanied by *cursor*y remarks and interrogations of a more or less offensive nature, particularly when directed at a horribly mutilated officer¹ of a colored regiment who had been taken from the "crater" in the "mine" fiasco.

Thus showing how even those who had been able to gain admittance to the prison were hoodwinked as to its actual conditions, and when one reflects upon the fact that, in former years, the residents on lower Fifth Avenue, in New York City, were absolutely ignorant as to the squalor and crime then rampant in the Five Points District, just around the corner,

¹ Captain George Henry Seagrove, Thirtieth United States Colored Infantry, from Uxbridge, Massachusetts.

it can better be comprehended how the average citizen of Richmond should know nothing of the facts which existed at Libby and other such places, and that they could scarcely be brought to credit any exposure of them.

As before remarked, there was ever entertained the hope that some opportunity might occur which would make an uprising with the view of concerted escape; and occasional conferences were held with General Hayes, as our selected leader, looking to such measures as might be adopted, each of us having something secreted to use as a weapon, and "Dick" Turner to start with, since he was accustomed to swagger into our midst with a brace of revolvers in his belt. Captain Daly, a powerful man, had been told off to throttle him, should a favorable moment for such procedure present itself. But with the belief that there were spies among us, and that we might be permitted to progress so far in such an attempt as to gain the street, where we could be shot down by the guards in waiting, no project under consideration ever matured. The condition of our garb was such that it would have been difficult to recognize friend from foe upon the outside.

Notwithstanding such environment, the writer recalls that he ever felt thankful that his lot had been cast at Libby, instead of at Belle Isle, as often he looked across the canal to that acme of misery in the James River, where the thousands of Federal prisoners, from ten thousand to twelve thousand at one period, who were represented by a committee appointed by the United States Sanitary Commission as lying in ditches "like hogs in winter" to keep warm, while, according to the testimony before the House of Representatives, some four thousand were "absolutely shelterless upon the frozen sand."

The place, embracing less than one hundred acres, had been, originally, in 1862, selected as a summer camp, and had then passed into winter occupation, without preparation for the protection of the prisoners from the rigor of that sea-

son. A treeless expanse of sand, the few who had, as first arrivals, been furnished with some old tents, formed the aristocracy of the place, while the great majority were compelled to seek the bosom of Mother Earth for such shelter and warmth as contact of bodies could produce.

About a tenth of this acreage had been enclosed by earth-works, and being of sandy and barren soil, "without a tree for shelter against the heat of summer sun, or to break the force of the bleak winds of winter that sweep down the river from the mountains to the northwestward," it was in marked contrast to that occupied by the Confederate guards, which was "a high and rolling bluff covered with trees and sward." That low part where the Federal captives were confined "was but little elevated above the waters of the river, and when the river was in flood became frequently flooded to the depth of several inches." Although surrounded on three sides by the river, "the prison-camp had but meagre access to it for obtaining water—and this was only possible through a lane, constructed of boards twelve feet high, and to which, indeed, all access was cut off at night by the closing of a gate. Here, on the water-front, at the end of the lane, were located the sinks, the close proximity to which rendered the place reserved for getting the water-supply an unfit one for uncontaminated drinking purposes. Wells, to be sure, had been sunk by a few of the men within the enclosure, but these became soon impregnated by the *excreta* from the sink, confined to the limits during the night, and the water correspondingly vitiated." Further details, unprintable and indescribable, will not be entered into here; they can be readily found by the prurient, who so desire.

When it is considered that these excavations had been made "with pieces of bone, sticks of wood, and in many instances with their fingers alone, as no tools or material to construct a shelter were allowed them," it will throw more light upon their deplorable condition. They had "no means

of living as civilized men, nor any way of helping themselves as savages.”¹

Lest all this be set down as exaggeration, the following is quoted from the “Richmond Examiner” of January 21, 1864:—

“WARNING TO DOGS”

“According to a statement of ‘A Citizen,’ who writes us on the subject, Belle Isle, the *dépôt* of the Yankee prisoners in Richmond, is unhealthy for dogs—especially well-conditioned dogs. The Yankees eat them; and this our correspondent knows from facts that have come within his knowledge. Several gentlemen on that ‘lone barren isle’ have lost, recently, their favorite heel-companions, and our correspondent affirms that it is well known to the guard that the Yankees caught, fricasseed, and eat [*sic*] them! And that, moreover, the Yankees have begged some citizens to ‘let them have their dogs to eat.’ Horrible! We are advised, if we doubt the statement of our correspondent, to visit the island and take a dog along, and we will come away alone, and convinced. All we have to append to this dog story is, that we never did admire Yankee taste in anything; but if they prefer a steak of canine meat to the rations of beef, bread, potatoes, and soup, furnished them from the Commissary Department by the prison officials [!] it is to their liking, not ours. Some animals of a carnivorous nature rather like the flesh of another animal of a like nature. In the above case it is ‘dog eat dog,’ perhaps.”

Towards the end of January, 1864, the fear of an uprising of the eight thousand prisoners among whom smallpox had broken out and the decimation was being rapidly increased by the scourge, there was a general removal to Danville. That same paper, under date of the 26th, stated: “The fatality among the prisoners from this and other maladies is very

¹ Lieutenant A. C. Roach, *The Prisoner of War, and How Treated*, p. 61 *et seq.*

great. Several wagon-loads are hauled out to the graveyard every day from the general hospital, besides those who die of smallpox." Before turning from this amiable sheet, its humane characteristics can be more fully appreciated by quoting from it, when, in the previous October, through the fear that some Federal force might be able to enter Richmond and release them, it had counselled their *ultimate removal* in these words: "The Yankee Government, under the laws of civilized warfare, are entitled to these men, and if they will not take them, let them be put where cold weather and scant fare will thin them out in accordance with the laws of nature." (!)

When it is made known to the present-day reader that the writer of the inhuman advice, Mr. Edward A. Pollard, when later, a captive himself in the North, was treated with the greatest consideration, and, indeed, with marked respect, — was finally paroled and remained for some time with friends in the city of Baltimore, where he also received attention from uninformed Unionists, — the reader will be able to better comprehend the total absence of any parallelism between the treatment of war prisoners, in the respective sections.

The refusal of the Confederate authorities to exchange prisoners, man for man, through the issue raised regarding the recognition of negro troops and their officers, had created a hitch between the then Federal Commissioner of Exchange, General Butler, and the Confederate official, Robert Ould. This had even been preceded by the rejection of Butler on the ground of the absurd pronouncement of Davis declaring him "an outlaw," and putting a price upon his head. This inevitably increased the sufferings of the Federal captives in their "durance vile."

The rankling remembrance of the manner in which the paroles granted on the field to the surrendered forces under Pemberton at Vicksburg, had been then violated, together with a clear recognition of what constituted the realism in such exchanges as were being effected, and as announced in

that letter of Ould's to Winder,¹ caused Grant to write the War Department, August 18, 1864, that while "it is hard upon our men held in Southern prisons, not to exchange them, yet it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. At this particular time, to release all rebel prisoners in the North would secure Sherman's defeat and compromise our safety here."

Such paroles and subsequent exchanges as were thereafter made from Confederate prisons simply followed upon the arrival of a quota of released Confederates, and seemed to be confined to those holding the lowest rank and who were the most reduced in vitality. (In the writer's case, he was but a lieutenant, and was not expected to last much longer.)

The report rendered by the eminent Dr. Valentine Mott, of New York, as chairman of the United States Sanitary Commission, in 1864, will be found to be direct and conclusive as to the terrible conditions through which these Union prisoners were being rendered physically and mentally useless as soldiers thereafter. It records its conclusion in these words: as being "unavoidable, therefore, that these privations and sufferings have been designedly inflicted by the military and other authorities of the rebel Government, and cannot have been due to causes which such authorities could not control."

As early as September, 1862, Augustus R. Wright, as the chairman of a committee of the Confederate House of Representatives, had made a report to their Secretary of War, George W. Randolph, stating that their conditions were "terrible beyond description"; . . . that the committee could not stay in the room over a few seconds; . . . that a change must be made . . . and that the report was thus made to the Secretary of War, and not to the House, because, in the latter case, it would be printed, and "for the honor of the nation such things must be kept secret."

In December, 1863, Henry S. Foote, another member of

¹ *Ante*, p. 163.

that House, offered a resolution for the appointment of a committee of enquiry concerning the alleged ill-treatment of Union prisoners (voted down). In the course of his remarks Mr. Foote had read testimony, which he said was on record in their War Department, to prove the charges of cruelty; and that Northrop (Lucius Ballinger), the Commissary-General, had placed their Government in the attitude charged by the enemy, and "has attempted to starve the prisoners in our hands"; while citing an elaborate report made by that official to the Secretary of War, and which course, he further declared, had been endorsed by Seddon, the later Secretary of War. This same Mr. Foote also, in a letter written from Montreal, in the spring of 1865, stated that "a government officer of respectability" had told him "that a systematic scheme was on foot for subjecting these unfortunate men to starvation."

The seemingly logical deduction has been since drawn that in view of the attitude assumed by the Federal Administration as to exchange, the Confederate authorities determined upon this, hoping to compel the former to recede from their refusal.

It is also a matter of record that a committee of the United States Sanitary Commission sought access to the prisons in Richmond and on Belle Isle, in order to afford relief, with the understanding that similar commissions would be allowed to visit Confederate captives, but this was refused for obvious reasons, as above indicated.

It is being continually asserted by certain Southern writers that the same sustenance was distributed to the Federal prisoners as that which was issued to the rank and file of the Confederate armies; but no one who had had actual experience with the virility of the "Army of Northern Virginia," in campaign and engagement, could ever be brought to entertain the belief that they accomplished what they did on those occasions upon any such starvation and injurious diet. That the former

were legally entitled to the same ration was indubitably established by the enactment of the (so-called) Confederate Congress at Montgomery, Alabama, in May, 1861, to this effect: "*That all prisoners of war should be given the same rations, of the same quantity and quality as those furnished the enlisted men of the Army of the Confederacy.*" Also by General Order No. 159, from their Adjutant-General's Office, it was directed that "*Hospitals for prisoners of war be placed upon the same footing in all respects, as other Confederate state hospitals.*"

That clerk in their War Department (before had in quotation) makes an entry in his "Diary," in these words: "*On dit*—that the only persons in the Confederacy who were in enjoyment of anything like plenty and luxury were those engaged in blockade-running, the army contracts, the officials about Richmond, and those who had charge of the prisons for United States soldiers. Officials connected with the Richmond prisons appeared to be the most prosperous individuals in the Confederacy." (!)

This statement from one of their own, and from behind the *penetralia*, would, in itself, seem to characterize such contentions, as referred to above, as at once inadequate and futile, as well as all else that has been adduced to the contrary.

The report submitted to the (so-called) Confederate Congress on the 3d of March, 1865, in an attempted refutation of the Federal charges of "deliberate and wilful cruelty to prisoners of war" which had been brought in the United States Congressional Committee's report,¹ and by the "Sanitary Commission," with appended photographs (copies of a few of which accompany this paper), would seem to fall short of carrying conviction to any fair-minded examination of its claims upon the matters in disputation; unless on the basis of the exasperated Psalmist's dictum, "all men are liars."

As an example of how such statements can be distorted,

¹ H. R., Fortieth Congress, 3d Session, No. 45.

the writer's attention having been called to a statement of the explorer, Henry M. Stanley, as to his unhappy experiences at "Camp Douglas,"¹ he made a critical examination of the text of the "Biography," where he found that Stanley, while deprecating his enlistment in the Confederate service as a "blunder," relates his capture on the second day's battle at Shiloh, and that (on p. 215) he speaks of the "filthy condition" of himself and comrades prior to that action. That a liberal distribution of such foreign population was effected, upon reaching their place of confinement, cannot be surprising. He gives a description of the place and its provisions for its occupants (who are stated to be about three thousand upon his arrival), and speaks of "bilious disorders, dysentery, and typhus" making their appearance, which he attributes, somewhat, to "reaction from the excitement and activity of campaigning," as well as to what he claims was the "exclusion of any medical, pious, musical, or literary charity that might have alleviated our sufferings." On the other hand, there are statements from others that they were allowed visits from friends, and who supplied them plentifully with funds. Stanley himself records that bunks upon platforms were furnished for a certain number of men,—the others lying upon the floor,—while hay was provided for bedding and blankets to each man. He quotes the ration furnished as of fresh beef, soft bread, coffee, tea, potatoes, and salt for each mess. As

¹ This camp had originally been established for the occupation of State troops, when responding to the call of the President. It was located on land belonging to the estate of Stephen A. Douglas (hence its name), on the outskirts of Chicago. The barracks were enlarged when it was hastily converted for the reception of the prisoners from Forts Donelson and Henry. At that period no anticipation of such large bodies of captures had ever been entertained, and, without any antecedent experience of such requirements, the conditions were unquestionably not only crude, but unfit to meet the necessities that arose. This is borne out in the report of President H. W. Bellows, of the Sanitary Commission, June 30, 1862. The reader, however, might form his own conclusions after examining the counterfeit presentment of the prisoners and their environment as given on pp. 22, 73, and 159 of Vol. 7, of that *Photographic History of the Civil War*, already had in reference.

to the then commandant, Colonel James Albert Mulligan,¹ Twenty-third Illinois Infantry, he has no complaint to make, although he claims, in reference to the ignorance which generally obtained at that period as to requisite sanitary measures, that "one intelligent and humane supervisor would have wrought wonders."

In bringing to a close this reference, it may be added that Stanley was "persuaded" to transfer his allegiance to the United States service, a change of fealty that does not appear to have agreed with him, as he was shortly "taken ill and discharged."

It may also interest some reader to be informed that the Confederate Burgevine referred to in his book (p. 166) entered the Chinese service after the close of the Civil War, and became the commander of the "mercenaries" against the Taipings. Later dismissed by the Imperialists, he sought service under the Taipings. "Wearied of his new masters," he conceived a project of dethroning the Emperor and reigning in his stead; he even went so far as to try to tempt Gordon to be his accomplice. Finally, falling into the hands of the Imperial Army, he was sentenced to death by Ling Chi, and was hacked to pieces in small morsels, as the punishment of his high treason, the remains being shipped in a large packing-case to Chefu, a quaint little town in Northern China.²

It was the custom for paragraaphers in sympathy with the "Lost Cause," for some years after the war ended, to refer to Jefferson Davis' incarceration at Fort Monroe as in a "cell." As already noted in the foregoing text, the casemate assigned to him was identically the same as had been used for years, anterior and since, by United States officers, and as a matter of fact became later the quarters of the writer as well as of others.

A still more recent and notable falsification came to the

¹ Killed at Winchester, Virginia, July 24, 1864.

² See Lord Redesdale's *Memoirs*, vol. 1, p. 337.

notice of the writer in the "Boston Globe," where it was stated, in appropriate headlines in "bold-faced type," that the Confederate "General Buckner finds the cell he occupied, in 1863, at Fort Warren." General Buckner at this date was making a visit to Boston, and had been given receptions at the principal clubs as a possible gold-money Democratic nominee for the Presidency; at two of which the writer, being a member, met him, and elsewhere. When this article appeared, the chronicler wrote General Buckner, requesting him to designate the particular "cell" he had occupied; since during a period when he was in command of Fort Warren (in 1878, and subsequently), he himself had been unable to discover any "cells" or "dark, damp dungeons," as mentioned in said article, where prisoners of war had ever been confined. Failing in eliciting any reply from General Buckner, and determined to stamp this atrocious perversion of facts as it should be, he then addressed the then commandant, Major Carle A. Woodruff, Second Artillery (to whom, of course, he was well known), requesting official information as to the exact "cell" which had been designated by General Buckner as the one in which he had been confined. The response was accompanied by a diagram on which this was duly marked, and which, as had been well known before, was simply one of the casemate quarters had in occupancy by us officers for years prior, and subsequently. That General Buckner neglected to reply to the polite inquiry of the writer may have been due to his time having been taken up with the various receptions tendered him, and for the delivery of a homily he read to Bostonians, then and there, in a lecture entitled "The Duty of the Patriot to his Country"!

"Can such things be,
And overcome us like a summer's cloud,
Without our special wonder?"

Still later (November 30, 1908), in the "Boston Herald," an article made its appearance, purporting to represent prison

life at Fort Warren, and illustrated with a cut representing an outwork, opposite the sally-port, which the text represented as the "dungeon" in which "Mason and Slidell" were confined: this in the face of the fact that it was merely an obsolete possible means of defence against a landing-party from the city side, and had *never* been used "as an old military prison long fallen into disuse," as the text has it.

The consensus of testimony of many Confederates, including these same commissioners,¹ General Walker and other notables, is extant, and so distinct as to the considerate treatment they received at the hands of kindly old Colonel Justin Dimick, and the statement of the post surgeon of that period to the effect that these prisoners were furnished with ample and nutritious diet such as the Government issues and good cooks could supply, as well as from purchases in the market of such delicacies as their money, liberally furnished by friends and sympathizers, could purchase, while also allowed to take exercise upon the parapet, at certain hours, under proper surveillance, that it seems unnecessary to dwell further upon the subject.

Reference having previously been made to the "Photographic History of the Civil War," published by the "Review of Reviews Company," the writer, as one of its earliest subscribers, feels himself fully justified in expressing not only his own dissatisfaction and even indignation, but in voicing that of many others with whom the publication has been discussed. This is directed not only at the inaccuracies in label-

¹ In a letter to his wife Commissioner Mason stated, as to his experiences at Fort Warren: "I have nothing but the detention of my person to complain of. No privilege consistent with that is refused. The Commissioners occupied one large room; their secretaries another. Received daily mail and papers; played cards; saw visitors; wrote letters and had the freedom of the fort for exercise, being treated with every consideration by the officers. Besides supplies *ad libitum*, and daily from Boston, everything that is good and homelike comes to us from Baltimore—fine hams, by the dozen; turkeys; saddle of mutton, and canvas-backs. Indeed, we have a better table than any hotel affords, and whatever wine or other luxuries we choose."

ling some of the, otherwise, excellent photographic reproductions, but, particularly, at the manner in which the text has been prepared, indicating a bid for wide sales in the South and among the sympathizers with its "Lost Cause."

Confining himself for the present to the topic of this appendix, the scribe would invite attention to the irresponsibility of the editor of the articles on "Prisoners of War," Professor Holland Thompson. This is at once evinced in his remark on page 24, volume 7, "naturally a South which did not believe that there would be a war, and therefore did not adequately provide for the contest," etc., etc.; in view of the now well-recognized fact that such preparation had been going on for more than a previous quarter of a century — a fact as patent as the "preparedness" of the Teutonic onslaught on August 1, 1914.

Born a North Carolinian, and dating from 1873, and belonging to a generation that has grown up since the war, and imbibing his opinions, through hearsay, from the local sectional bias of the older group, he presumes to set himself up as an authority in the premises, and in contravention of the testimony of scores of the victims of the inhuman treatment of Federal captives at the hands of the Confederate authorities, while attempting to sweep them aside with the sneering remark, "as sensational," and "so popular after the war" (p. 80). It has been this sort of thing which has stimulated the writer, as one with *personal* experience and observation as to the facts under discussion, to expose the sophistries set forth in the effort of Confederates to exculpate themselves, and to establish a parallelism between the Northern and Southern prisoners of war experiences while in duress.

Before passing from this would-be historian, the reader is invited to compare his contention, on page 157, that "the South had nothing wherewith to feed its own soldiers, and went to the extent of liberating thirteen thousand sick prisoners" (?), with his other intimation, on page 182, "even to

the end there was food in the South, but it was in the wrong place.”

While the writer does not entertain that regard for statistics which appears to be so fully accorded by some, the following statements are given, probably as accurate as may be, although differing to some extent from others of reputable authority:—


211,411 Federals were captured during the war; of whom
 30,218 Federals died in captivity.
 16,668 Federals were paroled on the field.
 462,634 Confederates were captured during the war; of whom
 247,769 Confederates were paroled on the field,¹ and
 25,796 Confederates died in captivity.

Although in possession of memoranda respecting the authorized ration allowance at these Southern prisons, he does not think them entitled to space in this paper, since their actual issue was so far, in most cases, from that stated allotment.

In bringing to a close this grievous and deplorable chapter of the Civil War, the writer recommends those interested to examine the photographs accompanying the report of the Sanitary Commission (copy to be found in the Library of the Commandery), as furnishing indisputable proofs of the allegations made in the works above listed, and so inhumanly mentioned in that letter of Colonel Robert Ould, the Confederate Commissioner of Exchange.² These wretched wrecks of humanity were forwarded on flag-of-truce boats only to drag out their miseries for a short time after their exchanges were effected; and the writer here goes on record with the statement that while awaiting his own final exchange at “Camp Parole,” near Annapolis, Maryland, he personally met certain of these transports upon their arrival at the dock, where he saw some of these moribund survivors. E. A. Abbott is the authority for the statement that there were two hundred and

¹ This difference is due to the inclusion of the Confederate armies surrendered under Lee, Johnston, Taylor, and Kirby Smith.

² *Vide ante.*



PHOTOGRAPHS OF EXCHANGED PRISONERS OF WAR FROM SOUTHERN PRISONS

Taken for United States Sanitary Commission



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A FAMILY OF FAMINE SUFFERERS IN INDIA

Since a certain criticism has been passed upon the genuineness of these reproductions of the photographs accompanying the report of the United States Sanitary Commission, the writer presents here the illustration to an article on the famine in India, in the July (1917) number of the *National Geographic Magazine*, which shows conditions almost identical.

eighty-seven of such cases at Andersonville alone. It is safe to assert that if any such specimens of undone humanity existed among the exchanged Confederates, *their* photographs would be found on the pages of that "Photographic History" published by the "Review of Reviews Company."

The chronicler fully realizes that there will not be wanting those who are at once so short-sighted, as to the effect misinformation must necessarily exert upon those ignorant of the facts, or so shuffling in their adherence to temporizing policies, as to vent a Pecksniffian deprecation of what they will be pleased to stigmatize as tending to revive sectional bitterness and the "waving of the bloody shirt."

He therefore, again, religiously disclaims any such Corsican impulse, and as conscientiously asserts that this paper has been written, not without many painful reminiscences which had been relegated to forgiveness (but not forgetfulness), until made indignant at the invidious efforts of certain advocates of that "Lost Cause" to have the uninformed deceived into the belief that the same barbarous treatment of prisoners of war was administered in the North as in the South. He would, therefore, feel that he had been recreant to the memories of those thousands whose lives had been thus lingeringly sacrificed, should he fail to discharge this trying duty in recording the facts as found, not only in research, but through personal experience and observation; nor would he feel prepared to join those who have gone before without having done so!

XI

THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S
REËLECTION UPON THE WANING
FORTUNES OF THE CONFED-
ERATE STATES

BY

BREVET MAJOR HENRY S. BURRAGE

Read before the Society, February 2, 1915

THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S RE-ELECTION UPON THE WANING FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES

WE are approaching the fiftieth anniversary of that sad April day on which tidings came to us of the assassination of President Lincoln. How heroically he had fought a good fight, how nobly he had kept the faith! Glowing eulogies were spoken in the high places of Church and State throughout the North, and here and there in the South. In the half-century that has followed, he has come before us in even grander proportions, and he stands out now, not only as the first American, to use Lowell's words, but as the one commanding figure of the nineteenth century, as Washington was of the eighteenth century, and Cromwell of the seventeenth century.

Yet you and I can easily recall the names of men distinguished for public service, and ardent lovers of their country, who failed to estimate Mr. Lincoln at his true worth, and who were strenuously opposed to his renomination and reelection. There were evidences of such opposition in the latter part of 1863, and especially after the meeting of Congress in December of that year; but the movement received greatly added strength with the opening of 1864. Late in February, a secret circular made its appearance in the interest of this movement. Secretary Welles, in his "Diary," makes a reference to it under date of February 22. "A circular 'strictly private'; signed by Senator Pomeroy, and in favor of Mr. Chase for President, has been detected and published."¹ In it, as making against the renomination of the President, there was mention of the "one term principle" as essential to the safety of our institutions; but plainly other objections to the

¹ Vol. 1, p. 529.

renomination were more forceful. The reëlection of Mr. Lincoln was declared to be "practically impossible," while equally positive was the assertion that "more of the qualities needed in a President during the next four years" were to be found in Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, the Honorable Salmon P. Chase, than were "combined in any other available candidate." Although the circular was marked "confidential," it soon found its way into the newspapers, and Secretary Chase, in a letter to Mr. Lincoln, hastened to disclaim any knowledge of it before its public appearance. He admitted, however, the fact of his candidacy, and added, "If there is anything in my action or position, which, in your judgment, will prejudice the public interest under my charge, I beg you to say so."¹ In his reply Mr. Lincoln let it be known that he "was not shocked or surprised" by the circular, as he was not without information concerning Senator Pomeroy's activities in connection with the matter. But he had known "just as little of these things" as his friends had reported, and he added: "Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service; and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change."²

¹ *Private Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase*, by Robert B. Warden, p. 574.

² *Complete Works*, vol. 2, pp. 489, 490. In his *Diary*, John Hay says that, on returning from a short stay in New York, he told the President what he had heard concerning Secretary Chase's efforts "to cut under" for the Republican nomination. He had determined, Mr. Lincoln said, to shut his eyes to all these performances, that Chase made a good Secretary, and that he would keep him where he is. "If he becomes President, all right!" He added: "I hope we may never have a worse man. I have all along seen clearly his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide it in a way to give offence to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me, and persuades the victim that he would have arranged it very differently. . . . I am entirely indifferent to his success or failure in these schemes so long as he does his duty as the head of the Treasury Department." (*Harper's Monthly Magazine*, January, 1915, p. 171.)

Prominent among the Senators who were opposed to the renomination of the President were Benjamin F. Wade, James W. Grimes, and Henry Winter Davis. The objection urged against Mr. Lincoln by these men, and others outside of the Senate who were in agreement with them, have been summarized as follows: "He was felt to be too easy-going; to be disposed to give too much time to trifles; to be unbusiness-like in his methods; slow and hesitating where vigorous action was required; and the objection in general was, that in capacity and temperament he was inadequate to the responsibilities of the head of the Nation at such a momentous period."¹ There can be no question as to the sincerity of the men who had come to this conviction of Mr. Lincoln's unfitness for the position in which he had been placed. But how imperfect their judgment! How completely and surprisingly they failed to make any just estimate of the President's true character and work! "Easy-going"; giving "too much time to trifles"; in other words, "a man of infinite jest." Yes! but who does not know that just those characteristics enabled Abraham Lincoln to bear his heavy burden of public duty and responsibility — a burden heavy enough to crush one less favored with resources for change and cheer? But even if these were defects, who does not see that they were greatly outweighed by the President's many excellences, recognized then and now as the outstanding, shining qualities of mind and heart that made Mr. Lincoln the man he was?

As might have been expected, the opposition weakened when the country was heard from; early in June, 1864, Lincoln was nominated at Baltimore for reëlection. But even then, within the ranks of his own party, opposition to the President did not cease. August 14, there was a meeting at the house of David Dudley Field in New York, at which Horace Greeley, Parke Godwin, Henry Winter Davis, and twenty or more others were present, and as a result of the meeting

¹ *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, vol. 4, p. 195.

a committee was appointed to request Mr. Lincoln to withdraw as a candidate. Charles Sumner, it is said, shared in the opinion held by the opposition, as to the President's "limitations," and thought a change of candidate desirable, "but only with Mr. Lincoln's free and voluntary withdrawal."¹ The same position was taken by Senator Collamer and the Honorable John Hay.

A little more than a week later, Thurlow Weed, a political leader of ability and long experience, addressed a letter to Mr. Seward, in which he used these words: "When, ten days since, I wrote to Mr. Lincoln that his reëlection was an impossibility, I also told him that the information would soon come to him through other channels. It has doubtless ere this reached him. At any rate, nobody here doubts it, nor do I see anybody from other States, who authorizes the slightest hope of success. Mr. Raymond,² who has just left me, says that unless some prompt and bold step be now taken, all is lost. The people are wild for peace."³ Who does not now see that Thurlow Weed and Henry J. Raymond misunderstood the people as seriously as they misunderstood Mr. Lincoln!

Evidently Thurlow Weed's visit to the President, and the emphatic way in which he declared the impossibility of the President's reëlection, together with the "information" that doubtless soon reached the White House "through other channels," made the designed impression. Indeed, on the very day in which Mr. Weed wrote to Mr. Seward, the President penned the following memorandum: "This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reëlected. Then it will be my duty to so coöperate with the President elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground, that he cannot possibly

¹ *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner*, vol. 4, p. 197.

² Editor of the *New York Times*.

³ *Abraham Lincoln. A History*, by John G. Nicolay and John Hay, vol. 9, p. 250.

save it afterwards." Upon the back of this memorandum, which was so folded that it could not be read, Mr. Lincoln asked the members of his Cabinet to write their names, withholding from them even a hint as to the nature of the memorandum. Not until after the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln did it become known that this was the President's way of pledging himself and the members of his Cabinet to a loyal acceptance of an anticipated adverse verdict at the November polls.¹

That adverse verdict, however, was not rendered. The nomination of General McClellan, August 31, on a platform designating as a "failure" the attempt "to restore the Union by the experiment of war," aroused deep feeling in the North, and rallied the friends of the President enthusiastically to his side. Tidings from the Union armies greatly added to this enthusiasm. The day following that on which Thurlow Weed wrote to Mr. Seward, stating that he had told the President he could not be reëlected, Mobile surrendered. A few days later, Sherman captured Atlanta, an achievement for which Sherman and his soldiers received the thanks of the Nation, and in honor of which Grant ordered a salute to be fired from shotted guns by every battery in his lines before Richmond and Petersburg. The first of Sheridan's brilliant victories over Early in the Shenandoah Valley was won on September 19, and the Nation was thrilled by the victor's report, "We have sent them whirling through Winchester." On September 20, Thurlow Weed wrote to Mr. Seward, announcing the collapse of "the conspiracy against Mr. Lincoln." September 23, at Fisher's Hill, Sheridan again defeated Early, capturing sixty cannon and one thousand prisoners. But most thrilling of all in this Valley Campaign was the announcement of the great victory at Cedar Creek on October 19, when, hurrying from Winchester after a short visit to Washington, Sheridan arrived in season to turn defeat into a crowning

¹ *Abraham Lincoln. A History*, by John G. Nicolay and John Hay, vol. 9, p. 251.

victory — an achievement that awakened contagious enthusiasm throughout the North, and forever silenced the voices of those who had declared the war a “failure.” In fact, before the close of September, Lincoln’s doubts as to his reëlection had fled. The September elections in Maine and Vermont were interpreted as prophetic of coming victory. The October election of the great States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana emphasized the significance of the September elections. If there were those who still looked forward with grave apprehensions to November 8 — as there were — the President was not one of them. When the Honorable E. B. Washburne, of Illinois, one of Mr. Lincoln’s strong supporters, wrote to him on October 17, “It is no use to deceive ourselves. . . . There is imminent danger of our losing the State,” Mr. Lincoln wrote on the envelope “Stampeded,” and quietly laid the letter aside.¹

The South, meanwhile, had not been an uninterested spectator of the progress of political feeling in the North. The importance of the growing opposition to the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln, that had developed in the loyal States in the early part of the year, had been fully recognized by the leaders of the Confederacy. The Honorable Benjamin H. Hill, Senator from Georgia in the Confederate Congress, writing to the Honorable Alexander H. Stephens on March 14, 1864, stated his views very frankly. Lincoln’s defeat at the ensuing election, he said, would be followed by peace. Elaborating his thought, he insisted that Mr. Lincoln’s accession to power was the declaration of war. His continuance of power had resulted in the continuance of the war. Equally clear was it to him that Mr. Lincoln’s ejection from power would be the end of the war; and he added: “I think, therefore, that policy, as well as necessity, indicates that we should now make a direct appeal to the people of the United States against Lincoln and

¹ *Abraham Lincoln. A History*, by John G. Nicolay and John Hay, vol. 9, p. 372.

his policy and his party, and make them join issue at the polls in November — we shaping that issue.”¹ Such men regarded with satisfaction the efforts of Northern peacemakers with reference to the Presidency, while later in the year, with equal satisfaction, they looked upon the nomination of General McClellan as affording ground for hope that, with a change of administration, favorable terms of peace could be arranged along lines mutually agreeable. The “*Charleston Courier*” of September 7, therefore, only a few days after the nomination of McClellan, gave expression to this general feeling in the South in the following words: “All of us perceive the intimate connection existing between the armies of the Confederacy and the peace men in the United States. These constitute two immense forces that are working together for the procurement of peace. . . . Our success in battle insures the success of McClellan. Our failure will inevitably lead to his defeat.”² The actual situation, from a Southern point of view, could not have been more accurately described.

The election day, November 8, came. In Washington the day was rainy and dark. The hours as they passed, however, were not hours of gloom and depression with the President and his friends. No doubts were awakened by even the first returns that were received at the National Capital; and as the evening wore on, and from more and more distant parts of the country telegrams multiplied, it was made clear that the people of the North had rallied in the spirit of the soldiers in the earlier part of the war, when they sang, “We’re coming Father Abraham,” not “three hundred thousand more,” but a mighty host, giving the President, when the total vote was finally registered, 212 electoral votes; while only 22, those of New Jersey, Maryland, and Kentucky, went to McClellan.

The public rejoicings in Washington that followed found

¹ *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1911), vol. 2, p. 635.

² *Abraham Lincoln. A History*, by John G. Nicolay and John Hay, vol. 9, pp. 352, 353.

varied expression from the quiet, undemonstrative words of the President to the most enthusiastic cheers of tumultuous crowds. From near and distant States congratulations poured into the White House, while General Grant, from his headquarters at City Point, hastened to express his own conviction of the importance of the victory that had been won at the polls. The feeling of many a loyal heart in the North was fittingly recorded by Professor Charles Eliot Norton in a letter soon after the election: "The reelection of Mr. Lincoln was a greater triumph over the principles of the rebellion than any military victory could be. The 8th of November, 1864, — the election day, — will stand always as one of the most memorable days in our history."¹

November 1-3, 1864, I was a prisoner at the headquarters of General A. P. Hill in the outskirts of Petersburg; and as I was paroled, awaiting some inquiries with reference to my capture, I had opportunities for frequent conversations with the members of General Hill's staff. Their greatest interest in these interviews had reference to the impending presidential election in the North. Without exception I found them strong in the conviction that General McClellan was to be the successful candidate. To my assertion that they were deceiving themselves — that the September and October elections furnished the best possible evidence of the prevailing sentiment at the North — they were unwilling to give any consideration whatever. Their information was from sources they evidently deemed trustworthy in the highest degree, and they remained as firm in this confidence as I in mine.

When in Richmond, Virginia, a few years ago, I called at the City Bank on Colonel W. H. Palmer, General Hill's Adjutant-General, and the surviving member of his staff. I had not seen him since I was a prisoner at General Hill's headquarters. He invited me to dine with him at his beautiful home in Richmond; and in the course of a long conversation

¹ *Letters of Charles Eliot Norton*, vol. 1, p. 282.

that followed the dinner, Colonel Palmer referred to the confident expectation he and others entertained with reference to the presidential election in the North at the time to which allusion has just been made. The result was not what they expected, and it was at once seen, he said, that Mr. Lincoln's reelection could have no other meaning than the continuance of the war—a war to the finish. This was the view not of the leaders only, but of the men of Lee's army; desertions began to increase, and he added, "From that time on, the only way we held our army together was by our military executions." I was greatly impressed by this statement, and also by what was further said in reference to the condition of affairs in Lee's army at that time. Concerning desertions to our own lines on the Petersburg and Richmond front, to which Colonel Palmer referred, we had, of course, the best of testimony. Moreover, we knew concerning their losses in battle, and were aware that they must have had losses from sickness. But I had not before learned how great were their losses by deserters, who turned their feet homeward, or to places of security in the Confederacy. Recently I have had the opportunity of examining the "Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies" with reference to Colonel Palmer's statement, and I find in them abundant testimony confirming it.

Indications of the general depressing effect of Lincoln's reelection within the Confederate States are not lacking. But naturally the feeling was strongest in Richmond and vicinity. In that interesting record known as "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," under date of November 15, the significance of Mr. Lincoln's reelection is mentioned in these words: "The large majorities for Lincoln in the United States clearly indicate a purpose to make renewed efforts to accomplish our destruction."¹ But for the most complete information with reference to the effect of Mr. Lincoln's reelection on the Confederate army, we must turn to the army reports. General Longstreet,

¹ Vol. 2, p. 331.

November 14, 1864, reported that there were in the guard-house about one hundred of General Pickett's men who had deserted; and he accounted "for this state of things by the fact that every man sentenced to be shot for desertion in his [Pickett's] division for the past two months has been re-prieved."¹ November 18, ten days after Lincoln's reelection, General Lee, in forwarding General Longstreet's report, added the following endorsement: "Respectfully submitted for the information of the Secretary of War. Desertion is increasing in the army notwithstanding all my efforts to stop it. I think rigid execution of the law is [*sic*] in the end. The great want in our army is firm discipline."² The Secretary of War sent General Longstreet's report with General Lee's endorsement to President Davis, who returned it November 29, with the following somewhat unamiable comment: "When deserters are arrested, they should be tried, and if the sentences are reviewed, that is not a proper subject for the criticism of a military commander."³ Evidently a tender spot had been reached by these references to President Davis' action concerning court-martial cases; but the criticisms are also significant as to the means deemed essential, by both Lee and Longstreet, to prevent this increased loss by desertion, namely, military executions.

December 1, General A. P. Hill, commanding the Third Army Corps, wrote as follows to General Lee: "I have the honor to report the following desertions from my command since the 20th of November. Nearly all of the deserters went to the enemy. Wilcox's division, Lane's brigade, 1 officer and 10 men; Scales' brigade, 3 men; McGowan's brigade, 4 men; total, 1 officer and 17 men. Mahone's division, Finegan's brigade, 27 men; Sorrel's brigade, 3 men; Sanders' brigade, 1 man; Weisiger's brigade, 3 men; total, 34 men. Heth's division, Archer's brigade, 4 men; Cooke's brigade, 3 men; McRae's brigade, 1 man; total, 8 men. Grand total, 1 officer and 59 men."⁴

¹ 89 W. R. 1213. ² 89 W. R. 1213. ³ 89 W. R. 1213. ⁴ 89 W. R. 1249.

As the closing weeks of the year passed, the same conditions were reported all along the Confederate lines. President Davis' message to the Confederate Congress, in which he suggested the proposition to arm and free forty thousand slaves to be employed as engineer soldiers, General Meade regarded as the President's acknowledgment of the exhaustion of the white race in the Confederate States, as nothing else, he said, would have made President Davis willing to free and arm the black race; and General Meade added, December 23, "I think the Confederacy is beginning to shake."¹

In January these disheartening conditions within the Confederate lines continued. On the 21st, Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Duncan, Sixteenth Mississippi Infantry, addressed the following communication to Brigadier-General Joseph Finegan, then in command of Mahone's division of Hill's corps: "Desertions are becoming amazingly numerous, and I beg leave to submit for your consideration what I esteem to be the main cause of this dissatisfaction, and is, in my opinion, the controlling influence that prompts our men thus to desert—it is the insufficiency of rations. Our men do not get enough to eat. I have been long convinced of this important fact from my own careful observation. I have conversed with the field and line officers of different regiments on this subject, and their statements all concur in establishing the above facts, and unless something is done soon to remove this evil, which of all others weighs most heavily on the minds of the troops, I fear that the number of desertions will be greatly increased during the winter."² This communication General Finegan forwarded to corps headquarters with his approval, and General Hill added the following endorsement: "I believe that the ration is insufficient, yet nevertheless other troops bear without complaint these evils they know we cannot help."³

January 22, eight company officers signed the following

¹ *Life and Letters of General Meade*, vol. 2, pp. 241, 255.

² 96 W. R. 1144-45.

³ 96 W. R. 1145.

communication: "The undersigned, company officers of the 9th Florida Regiment, respectfully call the attention of the commanding officer of the regiment to the discontent of the men of their companies, which, noticeable for some time past, is now so general as to deserve serious consideration. They give it as their opinion that the recent desertions from the regiment are mainly the result of this discontentment, and that the chief causes of this state of feeling are the insufficiency of rations and the failure of the paymaster to pay the men off."¹ In forwarding this communication, Colonel D. Lang, commanding Finegan's brigade, wrote: "The same discontent, resulting from the same cause, prevails to some extent throughout the brigade, and is, I think, one of the main causes of the large number of desertions from the command recently."²

Evidently these communications with reference to the causes of increasing desertions in the Army of Northern Virginia had their source in enquiries proceeding from General Lee, who, on January 27, 1865, in sending the information thus secured to the Secretary of War, wrote as follows: "I have the honor to call your attention to the alarming frequency of desertions from this army. You will perceive from the accompanying papers, that fifty-six deserted from Hill's Corps in three days. I have endeavored to ascertain the causes, and think that the insufficiency of food and non-payment of the troops have more to do with the dissatisfaction among the troops than anything else. All commanding officers concur with this opinion. I have no doubt that there is suffering for want of food. The ration is too small for men who have to undergo so much exposure and labor as ours. I know there are great difficulties in procuring supplies; but I cannot help thinking that with proper energy, intelligence, and experience on the part of the Commissary Department a great deal more could be accomplished."³

¹ 96 W. R. 1148.² 96 W. R. 1149.³ 96 W. R. 1143.

This unanimity of testimony concerning the increase of desertions in General Lee's army during the closing weeks of 1864, and the beginning of 1865, is noteworthy as proceeding from officers of all grades in the Confederate service. But how ill-informed these officers were as to actual conditions, unless General Hill's qualified endorsement may indicate that in his mind there was some other cause for these increased desertions, which he did not deem it best to mention! Unquestionably there was insufficiency of food in the Army of Northern Virginia, and the paymaster, doubtless, was destitute of funds with which to meet just requirements; but facts, at hand, conclusively show that these were not the real causes of the dissatisfaction among men who never before had faltered in their support of their beloved commander; and this General Lee himself soon came to know, as will later clearly appear.

There was need, however, that something should be done if with the opening of the spring campaign the Army of Northern Virginia was to receive any additions to its depleted ranks. Certainly, Grant would not lack reënforcements, and Sherman, having made evident, even to casual observers, the exhaustion of the Confederacy in its southern parts, was now on his victorious march northward from Savannah to bring added strength to the Union forces. The outlook for the Confederacy was gloomy, indeed, and it was becoming more and more gloomy, day by day. If the war was to continue, the question in thoughtful minds might well arise all along the lines in front of Richmond and Petersburg, "To what end is the struggle prolonged"? Was any answer possible that would bring relief to anxious, troubled hearts? Evidently it is not too much to say that hope of any arrangement for peace less than that of unconditional surrender was now generally abandoned. To General Lee, however, it occurred to make a personal appeal to those who had taken this hopeless view of the situation, and singly or in squads had dropped out of the

ranks and made their way to some secure retreat. Would they not listen to the call of their old commander, and with the promise of a full and free pardon once more take their old places in the lines? In the hope, perhaps in the belief, that they would, General Lee, in a letter to President Davis, proposed that a proclamation should be issued, "Calling all deserters and other absentees to return to their proper commands on the ground of pardon, if they would do so within a certain time." On February 10, the President replied, approving of such a proclamation; but, he added, "It will be well to warn all soldiers that this is the last interposition by an amnesty for deserters."¹

The proclamation appeared on the following day in the form of "General Orders No. 2." The soldiers who had so long and so nobly borne the hardships and dangers of war, General Lee felt, required no exhortation from him to respond to calls of honor and duty; but it was far otherwise, he asserted, in the case of those who by desertion had "abandoned their comrades in the hour of peril"; and he directed his words especially to them, offering an opportunity in which "to wipe out the disgrace" they had brought upon themselves, and thus "escape the punishment of their crimes" by accepting the pardon he was authorized to promise on the authority of the President of the Confederate States, and by returning to the commands to which they belonged "within the shortest possible time, not exceeding twenty days" from the publication of his order. By the same authority it was also declared in these orders that no general amnesty would again be granted.²

Little consideration could have been given to this proclamation. Events attracting wide attention were now fast crowding upon one another. The people were beginning to be heard from with reference to the discontinuance of the war. Shortly after the issue of General Orders No. 2, the editor of

¹ 96 W. R. 1228.

² 96 W. R. 1229, 1230.

a newspaper published in Raleigh, North Carolina, discussed existing conditions in words that were designed evidently not only for his regular readers, but also for a much wider circle. "Peace and equality," it was claimed, "might be had now by conciliation and compromise; but if we go on and lose," it was added, "we lose all and become the slaves of the conquerors. . . . This is the people's war, and we are satisfied from our intercourse with them, that an immense majority are for stopping it."¹ Such freedom of expression was of itself an evidence of strong public feeling, and apparently was inspired by a public demand.

Meanwhile desertions from General Lee's lines continued. On February 24, General Grant wrote to General Schofield: "Deserters from the rebel army are growing very numerous. Many are now bringing their arms with them. This morning forty-five came in a single squad and from a single regiment — a South Carolina regiment at that."²

At the same time General Lee was receiving new light with reference to his losses by desertion. He now knew that the occasion of these losses was something more serious than a lack of food and the absence of the paymaster; and on the same day that Grant wrote to Schofield, General Lee wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War as follows: "I regret to be obliged to call your attention to the alarming number of desertions that are now occurring in the army. Since the 12th instant [i.e., almost from the time of the issue of the amnesty offer to deserters] they amount in two divisions of Hill's corps — those of Wilcox and Heth — to about 400. There are a good many from other commands. The desertions are chiefly from the North Carolina regiments, and especially those from the western part of the State. It seems that the men are influenced very much by the representations of their friends at home, who appear to have become very despondent as to our success. They think the cause desperate and write to the sol-

¹ Rhodes' *History of the United States*, vol. 5, p. 75.

² 99 W. R. 558.

diers, advising them to take care of themselves, assuring them that if they will return home the bands of deserters so far outnumber the home guards that they will be in no danger of arrest. I do not know what can be done to prevent this evil, unless some change can be wrought in the state of public sentiment by the influence of prominent citizens of the State. The deserters generally take their arms with them. I shall do all in my power to remedy the evil by a stern enforcement of the law, but that alone will not suffice. I have thought that you might be able to enlist the aid of prominent citizens of North Carolina, who might do something to cheer and stimulate the people. These desertions have a very bad effect upon the troops who remain and give rise to painful apprehensions.”¹

In all the Confederate correspondence in the “Official Records” connected with the closing months of the Civil War, I know of nothing more pathetic than this letter of the General-in-Chief of the Confederate armies. Evidently, however, the situation was not one that could be aided by efforts along the lines suggested by General Lee. As we have seen, the people of the South, and especially of North Carolina, were beginning to take things into their own hands. Under these circumstances, General Lee’s assertion of his purpose to do all in his power to put an end to desertions in his army “by a stern enforcement of the law,”—in other words by military executions,—opens before us a view of the situation at Petersburg and Richmond that no one of us at the time, I am sure, could hardly have imagined. Yet even a lower depth of despondency in the heart of the Confederate leader is revealed in a letter which General Lee, on the following day, February 25, addressed to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, replying to a request to suspend the execution of a soldier who had been condemned to death for desertion. “Private Huddleston’s execution,” General Lee wrote, “will be suspended as directed. Have reëxamined case, and

¹ 96 W. R. 1254.

he is not entitled to mercy under General Orders No. 2. Hundreds of men are deserting nightly, and I cannot keep the army together unless examples are made of such cases.”¹ These last words are almost a repetition of the statement made to me by Colonel Palmer at the interview mentioned already, when he said that after Lincoln’s reelection “the only way we kept our army together was by our military executions.”

Notwithstanding these extreme measures the losses by desertion greatly increased. As General Lee said, hundreds of men at Petersburg and Richmond deserted nightly. This was made more clearly to appear three days later, February 28, when, from his headquarters at Petersburg, General Lee wrote to the Honorable J. C. Breckinridge, Secretary of War, concerning desertions in his army between February 15 and 25. In the three divisions of Longstreet’s corps there were in these ten days 148 desertions; in Early’s corps, 143; in Hill’s corps, 586; and in B. R. Johnson’s division of Anderson’s corps, 217. The total number was 1094. “Most of these men,” General Lee said, “are supposed to have gone to their homes, but a number have deserted to the enemy. In B. R. Johnson’s division alone 178 are reported to have gone over to the enemy. In addition to the above, General Gordon reports that on the night of the 26th from 75 to 100 of Grimes’ division deserted, and 15 from Johnson’s . . . division. These men generally went off in bands, taking arms and ammunition; and I regret to say that the greatest number of desertions have occurred among the North Carolina troops, who have fought as gallantly as any soldiers in the army.” A large detachment from Heth’s division of Hill’s corps had been sent to certain counties in North Carolina with a view to the arrest of the deserters; and a brigade had been detached to guard the ferries of the Roanoke. “I have only heard as yet of sixty-three having been captured,” the writer continues, and

¹ 96 W. R. 1258.

he adds, "I shall do all in my power to arrest the evil; but I am convinced, as already stated to you, that it proceeds from the discouraging sentiment out of the army, which, unless it can be changed, will bring us calamity." The communication closed with words that reveal the depth of the writer's feelings occasioned by the situation, as he adds: "This defection in troops who have acted so nobly and borne so much is so distressing to me that I have thought proper to give you the particulars."¹

The failure of the Hampton Roads Conference seemed to leave no opportunity for added peace considerations, except upon the conditions laid down by Mr. Lincoln at that time. However, a few weeks later, in an interview between General Longstreet and General Ord, of the Union army, with reference to an exchange of prisoners, further conversation was held, which, as reported to General Lee, led him to suppose that General Grant would favor a military convention or conference for the consideration of matters relating to peace, and General Lee at once seized upon the opportunity to ask General Grant for such a meeting. This request General Grant forwarded to President Lincoln, who promptly replied through Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, though the words of the reply were penned by the President himself. Emphasizing in this way his complete mastery of the situation, Mr. Lincoln informed General Grant that he was not to have any conference with General Lee except for the capitulation of his army, or on some purely military matters; adding that he held such matters "in his own hands," and would "submit them to no military conferences or conventions."² This reply was transmitted to General Lee on March 3 and any hopes awakened by the suggestion of a military conference or convention were at once destroyed.

The feeling of despondency in General Lee's army was now more and more apparent, and it was no less apparent among

¹ 96 W. R. 1265.

² 96 W. R. 801, 802, 1264.

the people generally throughout the South, many "prominent citizens," to whom a little while before General Lee desired that an appeal should be made to aid in preventing desertions, now sharing in this feeling. In a letter written on March 5, Colonel Walter H. Taylor, Lee's Adjutant-General, made mention of what had now come to be a general conviction as to the situation. "Some high in authority," he writes, "tell us that the people are tired . . . and that public sentiment has undergone a change. Claiming to be prompted by a desire to prevent a further effusion of blood, these talk of terms and reconstruction." However, he did not consider the situation hopeless, he said, by any means; and yet he was constrained to add: "I confess matters are far worse than I ever expected to see them."¹ One gleam of hope, nevertheless, now seems to have been discovered in dreams of a possible juncture of the Army of Northern Virginia with Johnston's army in North Carolina; but it proved to be only the merest glimmer.

For like conditions in Virginia were discoverable elsewhere if one only looked. On the same day in which Colonel Taylor made this record, the Honorable J. A. Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of War, gave expression to his views concerning the situation in a letter to the head of the Department. "General Preston² reports that there are over 100,000 deserters scattered over the Confederacy; that so common is the crime, it has in popular estimation lost the stigma which justly pertains to it, and therefore the criminals are everywhere shielded by their families and by the sympathies of many communities." Nor was this all. "The States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and perhaps others," he adds, "have passed laws to withdraw from service men liable to it under existing laws, and these laws have the support of local authorities."³ This was an application of the doctrine of States' rights that could hardly have been anticipated.

¹ *Four Years with General Lee*, p. 144.

² Head of Bureau of Conscription.

³ 108 W. R. 1065.

The use of negro troops in the service of the Confederacy had been under consideration in official circles for some time, and a bill for the employment of such troops was now passed by the Confederate Congress. On March 16, advertisements for recruiting negro soldiers appeared in the Richmond papers.¹ This action by the Confederate Congress had the sanction of General Lee, and on March 24, evidently under the pressure of conditions in his army, he wrote to President Davis: "I have the honor to ask that you will call upon the governor of the State of Virginia for the whole number of negroes, slave and free, between the ages of 18 and 45, for services as soldiers authorized by the joint resolution adopted by the Senate and House of Delegates of the State [of Virginia] on the 4th of March. The services of these men are now necessary to enable us to oppose the enemy."²

When General Lee wrote these words he was making his final preparations for an attack upon the Union lines at Fort Stedman in front of Petersburg. General Gordon, to whom General Lee entrusted this movement, tells us that it had as its aim "the disintegration of the whole left wing of the Federal army, or at least the dealing of such a staggering blow upon it as would disable it temporarily, enabling us to withdraw from Petersburg in safety, and join Johnston in North Carolina." This, certainly, was quite an undertaking for an army in desperate conditions. The venture, however, was carefully planned, and the dash at Fort Stedman, in its first reaches as outlined, was successful. The Union pickets were completely surprised, supposing that this early morning on-rushing was that of a still larger band of deserters.³ But only the first rush was successful.⁴ This was to have been followed

¹ *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 444, 450.

² 97 W. R. 1339.

³ "The six hundred prisoners were completely surprised — their pickets supposing our troops to be merely deserters. This indicates an awful state of things, the enemy being convinced that we are beaten, demoralized, etc." (*A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, vol. 2, p. 459.)

⁴ General James A. Walker, who commanded the division of Gordon's corps

by an equally rapid movement upon the three forts in the rear of Fort Stedman. But the meaning of the attack was already revealed, and General Hartranft, with his division of Pennsylvanians, soon made it impossible for Gordon "to make further headway." As General Gordon says, he could not carry out his plan in the face of "Grant's gathering and overwhelming forces." Some of those who attempted to return to the Confederate lines succeeded in the venture, but many did not make the attempt. Colonel Taylor says the Confederate loss that morning was between 2500 and 3000 men. General Parke, in his general order concerning the that held the line of trenches from which the assault on Fort Stedman was made and led it, relates an incident that illustrates conditions in the attacking forces when they reached this point in the movement. He says: "When the head of the column reached the enemy's works, and the first files were lying down behind the breastworks at the point where those before them had crossed, I enquired for the officer in command, but getting no answer, ordered the men to move forward, which they did. We had just crossed over, when a soldier sprang in front and said, 'These are my men and they shall not go.' I demanded who he was, and he replied that he was captain of that company, and that his men should not be slaughtered. He was ordered to lead his men forward, but positively refused, and when he did so I made a blow at his head with my sabre, which he dodged and then rushed at me with the point of his infantry sword. I stepped aside, and drawing my pistol from my belt, with the muzzle almost touching his head, pulled the trigger. The cap did not explode and then his men ran between us, as I was about to make a second attempt to shoot, saying, 'Don't shoot, General. He is our captain and a brave man.' The captain then said he was ready to go forward, and tried to excuse his conduct by pretending that he did not know me by the starlight, and that, if he had recognized me, he would have obeyed my orders; but I refused to accept his explanation, and told him that I would have him court-martialled and shot if we both came out of the battle alive. . . . As to the captain, I never saw him again, as he did not return to the Confederate lines. What his fate was I do not know. He may have been killed that morning, but it is most likely that he suffered himself to be captured, rather than return and be shot by a sentence of court-martial. I have always declined to give the name or regiment of this man. If he or his descendants are alive, I would not give them pain by publishing him. He had a good record as a soldier, and was unquestionably a brave man. Why he acted as he did on that occasion can readily be accounted for. He saw, as nearly all the men in the ranks saw, that the Confederate cause was hopeless, and that they were shedding their blood in vain, and that valor and patriotism must inevitably yield to the overwhelming numbers and resources." (*Southern Historical Society Papers*, vol. 31, pp. 26, 27.)

attack, mentions the capture of 1941 prisoners, including 71 commissioned officers, besides many killed and wounded. "Lee knew," says General Gordon, "as we all did, that the chances against us were as a hundred is to one. . . . It seemed better therefore, to take the one chance, though it might be one in a thousand, rather than to stand still while the little army was being depleted, its vitality lessening with each setting sun, and its life gradually ebbing, while the great army in its front was growing and strengthening day by day."¹

The fight at Fort Stedman, as has already appeared, was in the early morning of March 25. On that day General Longstreet wrote a long letter to General Lee. In it, however, he made no mention of the attack upon the Union lines. His thoughts were still busy with the alarming increase in the number of desertions. Referring to the fact that Georgians at home were writing to the Georgia troops in his command, offering to them inducements to return and join home organizations, increasing desertions in this way, he urged "the publication of a general order warning all officers or persons authorized to raise local organizations against receiving such deserters, or in any way harboring them, and cautioning all such parties that they shall be punished for such crimes under the 22d and 23d articles of war." The letter was closed with the following words: "If these matters are not speedily taken hold of by a firm hand, I fear that we shall be seriously damaged by them."²

Two days later, March 27, General Lee, in a report to the Secretary of War, stated that from March 9 to 18, both inclusive, there were "1061 desertions, with only partial reports from the artillery and cavalry, which would increase the

¹ *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, p. 412. But "to stand still" was not the only alternative. The deserters evidently held that it was better to stop fighting than to continue with chances against them of one in a hundred or of one in a thousand.

² *From Manassas to Appomattox*, pp. 651, 652.

number considerably." The largest number, he said, was from Longstreet's corps, Pickett's division "having lost 512 men while moving recently." Expressing the hope that some of the men would return, he added, "but the number is very large, and gives rise to painful apprehensions as to the future."¹

On the same day, in accordance with General Longstreet's suggestion, General Lee issued an order in which, referring to persons who were inducing soldiers to return home, he reminded them that "the penalty for advising or persuading a soldier to desert is death"; and he directed that this order, and the 23d Article of War, should be "forthwith read to each company in the army once a day for three days, and to every regiment at dress parade once a week for a month; and at such other times hereafter . . . as commanding officers may deem proper."² Events now were hastening so rapidly, however, that the order could not have had many of these prescribed readings.

Of course General Grant was fully informed concerning these conditions. "I knew from the great number of deserters," he writes, "that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly, and so long for the cause which they believed in—and as earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting—had lost hope."³ The evidence, as we have seen, is abundant. The large losses of the Confederates at Five Forks on March 31 and at Petersburg on April 1 and 2—at the former 7000 and at the latter 6000, according to Colonel Taylor—reveal the fighting qualities that were still exhibited in this remnant of Lee's army; but it also reveals just as clearly a deep-seated conviction on the part of many of its rank and file that further loss of life was uncalled for. "Not over 25,000," says Colonel Taylor, "began the retreat that terminated at Appomattox Court House."⁴

¹ 97 W. R. 1353. ² 97 W. R. 1357. ³ *Personal Memoirs*, pp. 426, 427.

⁴ *Four Years with General Lee*, pp. 187, 188.

The losses multiplied during the retreat of the Confederate army. In a letter dated April 3, General Meade wrote: "Lee, broken and dispirited, has retreated towards Lynchburg and Danville. . . . The last estimate of our prisoners amounted to 15,000, and deserters and stragglers are being picked up by the thousands."¹ Lee, however, did not reach either Lynchburg or Danville, and six days later he surrendered the remnant of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox. The end at length had come. It was the only end that could come after President Lincoln's reëlection. The sorrow of those who had held out to the end, and had failed in the endeavor that had animated them through four long years, we can well understand. Non-realization naturally brings disappointment and despondency. In the lapse of years, however, a new point of view is not unfrequently reached, and the retrospect shows that the sorrow has been healed. In the introduction to his "Military Memoirs of a Confederate,"² General E. P. Alexander, who directed the Confederate artillery fire at Gettysburg which preceded Pickett's charge, has recorded his own change of view in these memorable words: "The world has not stood still in the years since we took up arms for what we deemed our most invaluable right — that of self-government. We now enjoy the rare privilege of seeing what we fought for in the retrospect. It no longer seems desirable. It would now prove only a curse. We have good cause to thank God for our escape from it, not alone for our sake, but for that of the whole country, and even of the world."

¹ *Life and Letters of General Meade*, vol. 2, p. 269.

² Page viii.

XII

THE OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1898

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U.S.V.

Read before the Society February 4, 1908

THE OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1898

ON the 11th of May, 1898, it was decided in Washington that Wesley Merritt, Major-General, United States Army, should be assigned to the command of the expedition to the Philippines, and, upon the occupation of Manila, be made Military Governor. He was summoned to Washington that night, and accepted the appointment. About the 30th of May he arrived in San Francisco.

The first expedition, under command of Brigadier-General Anderson (consisting of about 2380 men), left Honolulu on the 4th of June. Some troops were already at San Francisco, and more continued to arrive. A small proportion of regular regiments and batteries, in which there were many raw recruits (the rest volunteer regiments just enlisted), made up this force. Fine-looking men from California, Idaho, North Dakato, Minnesota, Oregon, Utah, Tennessee, Kansas, Washington, Montana, and Nebraska were the components of this army. Much time was necessary to accustom these raw troops to the habits of camp life, drill, and discipline. Their adaptability was wonderful, and it was an extraordinary circumstance that by the 29th of June all the troops had sailed and reached Manila, with very few casualties, and in an extraordinary state of efficiency.

The second expedition was composed of about 2428 men, and commanded by General Francis V. Greene; and the third, under General MacArthur, about 4603.

During the time spent in San Francisco, there was constant talk of our troops on the Atlantic Coast going to Cuba, and constant postponements, for one reason or another. About the 25th of June, there were rumors that Camara had sailed from Spain and was then at the Isthmus of Suez, and was to

proceed at once to Manila. On the 26th of June General Merritt received a telegram, urging a quick despatch to Manila — direct if possible; that is, without stopping at Honolulu. But the agent of the Pacific Mail Company said that this was impossible.

On the 27th the *Indiana*, City of Para, Ohio, and Morgan City sailed. On the 28th, the *Valencia*, and on the 29th, the *Newport*, with General Merritt and about twenty-five officers, and Batteries D and K of the Third Artillery, and the Astor Battery — the latter an excellent organization and very well officered, a fine quality of men.

In the doubt attending the movements of Camara, General Merritt's instructions were to proceed to a point six hundred miles due east of Cape Engano, — a northern point of the Island of Luzon, — there to be met by a war-vessel, a convoy, if one could be spared by Admiral Dewey.

On the 4th of July a dinner, rather better than usual, was served to the men, and an oration given by the chaplain. The oratory of several of the officers was aired at lunch. In the afternoon, owing to some deficiency in the machinery, there was a delay of a few hours. The "blower" broke — probably with envy of the speech-makers.

On the 6th of July the transports of the third division arrived at Honolulu, with the exception of the *Newport*, which arrived at about seven on the morning of the 7th. While the ship was coaling, the day was spent by the Commanding General in consultation with the United States Minister, Sewell, with President Dole, in the establishment of a hospital, etc., and the next day (the 8th) the transport departed.

There was great discussion among the officers on the *Newport* as to whether it was better for the ships to sail separately or to keep together, and all sorts of plans — some of which might be deemed impracticable — were suggested. One — which at the time seemed absurd — was that the vessels should keep together, and in the event of any Spanish warships ap-

pearing, should bear down on them and engage their men in a hand-to-hand conflict and take possession of their ships, without any artillery which could be used by us. After the showing made by the Spaniards in their naval engagements, perhaps this was not so absurd.

General Merritt decided to go on with the Newport, which was faster than the other vessels. On the 19th of July, at four o'clock in the afternoon, Asuncion Island was sighted; also Farallon de Pajaros (at 8.15), an active volcano. The view at sunset and during the evening was very beautiful.

On the 23d of July Point Engano was sighted — about 426 miles from Manila. Almost all the lights on the Newport were extinguished. No convoy from Admiral Dewey had been met and there was complete ignorance as to events; but on the 24th of July, at about eight o'clock in the morning, a steamship, with the American flag, was sighted, moving towards China, which clearly showed that no Spanish fleet was in those waters. This was the last day of the long journey, of which was noted at the time, in a journal kept by one of the officers: "The most noticeable thing is the admirable quality and conduct of all the men on board. No quarrelling, no unusual noises, no drunkenness since we started."

About six that evening the blackest rain-cloud appeared, but diminished as the steamer went in. There was hard rain all night, and strong wind. It seemed very much like a typhoon, but fortunately it was escaped. The daily performance of the steamer was 292 miles; 303; 303; 311; 307; 317; 312; 313; 327; 322; 303; 323; 333; 320; 285; and 275 miles; and on the 25th of July, at 9.30 A.M., Corregidor Island was passed and Manila was soon reached. The thermometer registered from 80° to 89° during the voyage.

Admiral Dewey at once called upon General Merritt and gave news of the surrender of the Spanish army at Santiago, and destruction of their navy, and that the Spanish fleet, reported at Suez Canal when our expedition left San Francisco,

had returned to Spain. The Admiral also stated that he had made up his mind, in case he received information of Camara coming on towards Manila, to abandon Manila Bay and to sail east to meet his monitors. Also the annexation of Hawaii to the United States was reported.

This was the rainy reason of Manila and it rained pretty severely every day and night. The temperature continued at about 80° at all times. No lights were permitted to be displayed on any of the vessels during the night.

A peculiar condition of things existed. The Americans and the insurgents both occupied Cavite. The latter had gradually approached Manila from the south and confronted the Spanish line. A few shots were exchanged every day and night. General Greene took line directly in rear of the insurgents and up to that time had taken no part in the operations. The three companies, including one of light artillery, which went out on the Newport, reported to him on the 26th.

On the 27th of July a delegation of bankers and merchants from Manila came on board to talk with General Merritt. On the 28th the Admiral called, and he and General Merritt went together on the former's boat to the Olympia, where they met the Belgian Consul, Mr. André, who was a semi-intermediary from the Spanish Governor-General. The Spaniards' fear at this time was that Aguinaldo and his forces would get into the city, and their wish was that when the army surrendered it should be to the American army and navy, on the condition of their protecting the city and the Spaniards against the insurgents. An attempt was made at this time to construct a pier at Paranaque, or in that vicinity, since the landing of troops and stores was very difficult and dangerous.

The Filipinos at Cavite at this time were very clean and intelligent-looking — small, but active and strong. A few Spanish prisoners were guarded there by them — rather thin and emaciated, the privates begging, and selling their em-

blems to the soldiers. The problem was immediately forced upon us — “What shall we do with the insurgents?”

On the 28th of July General Greene had been instructed to notify them that he would replace their troops on the left of our line on the beach for some hundred yards. They had to refer this question to Aguinaldo. Answer came at midnight that there was no objection.

So the position was taken. Two field guns were placed there, and two more ordered. This was the first real confronting of the enemy. The five transports which left Honolulu at the same time with the Newport and Monterey were anxiously awaited. The American ships of the navy and transports were all anchored about two miles from Cavite and four from the camp. About Manila were the foreign vessels — English, German, Russian, and Japanese; also Belgian and Chinese merchantmen. Communication between our fleet and the others (with the exception of the British *Immortalité*) were rare — purely formal — no social visits. All lights were covered at 8 P.M., while people on the ships would look on the electric lights in the streets of Manila.

An extract from the journal of an officer of the expedition is as follows: —

“Two of the English friends who visited us a few days ago came to-day with a written request for some understanding or promise of protection of their northern properties — rice, sugar refineries, etc. After their mission was complete — General Merritt promising them a reply the next day — I engaged the principal in talk and asked him the reason of the hatred of the insurgents for the priests. He said it was on account of the immorality of the latter. There are, among the Filipinos, men of property and some taste and refinement and with good ideas of life. He had dined with some where there was silver-plate, glass, etc., from London, and whose manner of living indicated respectability. The priests would claim the wives or daughters of these men, and upon the objection or refusal, the

husband or father would be deported. While the women are not particularly virtuous or chaste, yet after marriage any encroachment is regarded with the same indignation as it is with any more civilized nation. The influence of the clergy is great with the Spaniards, yet its bad conduct, corruption, and manner of living have made them odious to the natives, and they are, as it seems, responsible—with the onerous taxes, for which they are in a great degree accountable—for the revolution. A most extraordinary condition of things. Spaniards fear the insurgents. Have feared us and believe everything bad of us. The insurgents are cocky, want to rule, and we must suppress both. Hunger is pressing the city.”

On the 30th of July there was considerable firing on the American line, but very slight casualties. Before this it had been decided to send a brigade to the north of Manila to operate there, but upon examination of the country, and on account of the probable difficulty in landing, it was deemed unwise, and the plan was abandoned.

On the 31st the other ships of the expedition arrived, one officer and four men having died on the voyage. The transports were all crowded and were not loaded with any discrimination. Commissary, quartermaster, and medical stores, entrenching tools were all mixed up, so that it was very difficult to find anything.

On the 1st of August there was an unfortunate conflict which seems to have been provoked by a misunderstanding. The generally accepted interpretation was, that the Spaniards fired at about midnight and that a great deal of sharp and wild musketry and artillery firing followed. The night was very dark. Men were probably wounded as they advanced to strengthen the picket line. The American line was rather a poor one, being enfiladed, and had there been an adversary with more gallantry and dash than the Spaniards, with the heavy rains, it would have been almost impossible to

hold it. Reports of casualties were nine dead and forty-six wounded.

The plan of going to the north of Manila having been abandoned, a division was organized — General Anderson to command — and MacArthur's brigade was ordered to join General Greene's. The second Oregon and an artillery detachment in charge of prisoners remained at Cavite.

On the 3d of August a report came by Ruyter's telegrams to Hong Kong, that peace proposals had been made. Very bad monsoons and continual storms raged at this time. General Greene wrote, on the 3d of August, asking that the Navy should open on the Spanish battery which fired upon our lines. Admiral Dewey declined, being unwilling to bring on a general engagement until the arrival of the monitors, at the same time expressing regret at the exposure of the men and losses. Difficulties of landing troops multiplied. Two cascos were swamped about this time and at least three natives drowned in the harbor from their canoes.

The Monterey arrived about 9.30 on the evening of the 4th. The place of landing of the American troops was at this time changed to Bacoor, Aguinaldo's new headquarters. But all landing was attended with difficulties. The thermometer at this time was noted at 86° at eleven in the evening.

On the 6th of August General Merritt proposed to Admiral Dewey a joint letter to the Spaniards, suggesting that women and children should be moved from Manila, as bombardment would follow unless firing from their batteries ceased; also sent a letter to the Governor of Cavite, translating letter from Aguinaldo, enclosing copy of orders to American troops and suggesting similar one to be issued by him, enjoining order and abstinence from outrage when the Americans entered Manila, the letter not to be sent until just before attack.

On the 7th General Merritt visited the Admiral on his flagship. They were in complete accord. The meeting resulted in their agreeing on and signing the following: —

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY AND NAVAL FORCES.

MANILA BAY, P.I., August 7th, 1898.

To the General-in-Chief commanding the Spanish forces in Manila.

SIR: — We have the honor to notify Your Excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defences of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner, if made necessary by an attack on your part. This notice is given to afford you an opportunity to remove all non-combatants from the city.

Very respectfully,

WESLEY MERRITT, Major-General, U.S. Army.
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.
GEORGE DEWEY, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.
Commanding United States Naval Forces and
Asiatic Stations.

The Admiral expressed his feeling at the losses (which were inconsiderable) every night by the firing of the Spaniards, and had formed his plan of attack in various localities by the Charleston, Raleigh, Boston, Olympia, and Monterey. The message was sent on the 9th instant to the commander of the British ships, by him to be sent to the British Vice-Consul, who represented the American interests in Manila, with letter of transmittal to the latter, requesting him to deliver it in person, and note time of delivery.

The conduct of affairs in Manila at this time was said to be vested in five persons — the Acting Governor-General, the Commander of the Army, Admiral Montojo, the Minister of Finance, and the Archbishop. Admiral Dewey read a letter received that morning from a British resident upon whom he relied, expressing the opinion that little resistance would be made, and hoped the American troops would be comfortably

housed before the bad weather of September. The Belgian Consul had lately expressed similar opinions.

A despatch boat was expected to arrive from Hong Kong on the 11th or 12th of August, and there were many speculations as to the news to be received about peace negotiations. The boat arrived, but with nothing at all definite.

On the 9th instant Admiral Dewey went on the Newport and a demand for surrender was prepared as follows:—

HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY AND NAVAL FORCES.

MANILA BAY, P.I., August 9th, 1898.

To the Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

SIR:—The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defences of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel sure, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a General capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which Your Excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor. We therefore submit without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor and duty which Your Excellency entertains, that surrounded on every side as you are, by the constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front, deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack. And therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly we demand the surrender of the City of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command.

(Signed) WESLEY MERRITT, Maj.-Gen., U.S. Army,
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.

GEORGE DEWEY, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Forces
and Asiatic Stations.

The letter from General Merritt and Admiral Dewey was transmitted by the British Vice-Consul, with the following letter, which is quoted *verbatim*: —

BRITISH CONSULATE, MANILA, 9th of August, 1898.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: —

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's communication under to-day's date, which was delivered to me on the wharf. I immediately drove to see His Excellency, the Governor-General, and handed personally the communication addressed to His Excellency by Your Excellency and Major-General Merritt. It was half past twelve P.M. when the communication was handed to His Excellency and I begged of His Excellency to cause the time to be stated in His Excellency's reply when the communication was received. I have the honor now to transmit here enclosed to Your Excellency the answer from His Excellency, the Governor-General.

I have the honor to be Your Excellency's

Most obedient and humble servant,

H. A. RAMSDEN,

British Vice-Consul in charge of the
United States Consular Interests.

To His Excellency Admiral Dewey, etc.

The answer from the Captain-General was as follows: —

Having received an intimation from Your Excellencies that in obedience to sentiments of humanity to which you appeal, and in which I share, I should surrender this city and the forces under my orders, I have assembled the Council of Defence, which declares that your request cannot be granted. But taking into account the unfortunate circumstances existing in this city, which Your Excellencies recite, and which I unfortunately have to admit, I would like to consult my Government, if Your Excellency will grant the time

strictly necessary for the communication by way of Hong Kong.¹

(Signed) FIRMIN JAUDENES.

This proposal or suggestion was rejected and preparations were ordered for extending the American lines.

This Governor-General Jaudenes had been directed by the Madrid Government — by a telegram-dated 24th of July — to relieve Governor-General Don Basilio Augustin Davila. The reasons for the latter's relief were not known to the American Army, but the rumor was that after the Cadiz fleet turned back from the Canal, Augustin cabled from Hong Kong that further resistance was useless. He is best known by his proclamation of 23d of April, 1898, as follows:—

Spaniards:—

Between the United States and Spain, hostilities have broken out. The moment has arrived to prove to the world that we possess the spirit to conquer those, who, pretending to be loyal friends, take advantage of our misfortunes and abuse our hospitality, using means which civilized nations count unworthy and disreputable.

The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of Victories will give us one as brilliant and complete as the righteousness and justice of our cause demand. Spain, which will count upon the sympathies of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly from the new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those States, that, without cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and

¹ Cable communication with Manila had been destroyed. To telegraph and get reply from Spain would have required seven days at least.

the ungrateful spectacle of chambers in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism.

A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honor and liberty. Pretending to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable, the North American seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realization the substitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion you profess, to treat you as tribes refractory to civilization, to take possession of your riches as if they were unacquainted with the rights of property, and to kidnap those persons whom they consider useful to man their ships or to be exploited in agricultural or industrial labor.

Vain designs! Ridiculous boastings!

Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt to carry them into realization. You will not allow the faith you profess to be made a mock of; impious hands to be placed upon the temple of the true God; the images you adore to be thrown down by unbelief. The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers; they shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, or appropriate the property your industry has accumulated as a provision for old age. No, they shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish and abase the people, that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the natives of North America instead of bringing to them the life of civilization and of progress.

Filipinos, prepare for the struggle, and united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies let us oppose with the decision of the Christian and the patriot the cry of "Viva España."

Your General,

MANILA, 23d April, 1898.

BASILIO AUGUSTIN DAVILA.

The priest of the California regiment and the chaplain from the Newport, at the request of the Archbishop, went, under a flag of truce, into the city about this time, and met the Archbishop and Captain-General. The former sent his card to General Merritt as follows:—

My best compliments to General Merritt from the
P. NOZALED A, *Arzobispo de Manila*.

During all this time Aguinaldo had been conspicuous by the absence of any communications from him or intercourse with the American officers, but at this time one of his aides called on General Merritt and asked for an interview. As arrangements were being made for the attack and surrender of the city, and as the commander of the American Army had already been in the harbor eighteen days without any advances or visits from Aguinaldo, it was not practicable to receive them then, and General Merritt's answer was:—

“My compliments to the General, and I will send an officer to him to indicate when I can see him. I shall be busy to-morrow. Among other things I wish to return the call of the Governor of Cavite [who was Aguinaldo's subordinate] and I have an engagement on Saturday.” (Saturday being the day which was marked for the attack.)

The Belgian Consul continued his intervention, and his latest proposition was that the operations nominally threatening the city, which were named for Saturday, the 13th, should be called a reconnaissance; the American ships to anchor off Manila, not to bombard; the Spaniard's not to fire their large guns (Krupps — possibly they had no ammunition); the Navy was to attack their works, the powder magazine, batteries, etc.; slight resistance to be offered, to be followed by surrender.

The attack on the 13th was ordered for nine o'clock in the morning. A furious rain-storm occurred at six, which was followed by great humidity, interfering somewhat with the

accuracy of the firing from the *Olympia*. General Merritt, with about ten of his staff officers, went on the *Zafiro* (Lieutenant McLain), which was lent by the Admiral, at 8.30, steamed to the flagship, where there was a brief interview with the Admiral. At 9.35 the naval attack began, the *Olympia*, *Boston*, and *Raleigh* participating, while the *Callao* (a ship captured from the Spaniards on the 1st of May, Lieutenant Tappan) went close to the shore, showing great dash and gallantry. The firing continued about one and a half hours. Then the signal was given from the flagship: "Firing ceases." Shortly after that the American line of troops advanced up the beach, the soldiers marching in the water of the bay, many of them up to their waists, and crossing the creek near the powder magazine. There was some firing. The casualties were slight. The fort was soon taken and the American flag replaced the Spanish at 11.35. On the Americans' right, under General MacArthur, the firing and casualties were of greater volume, but not very heavy. In accordance with the arrangement, the Admiral displayed the signal "Surrender." It was soon responded to by a white flag displayed on the fort protecting the inner or walled city. The Admiral then asked General Merritt to send an officer to accompany one from the Navy, to arrange preliminary terms of surrender.

This narrative must now take a more personal form, as I had the good fortune to be selected as the representative of the Army to receive the surrender. I went in the launch of the Belgian Consul, with Lieutenant Brumby, of the Navy; Mr. André, the Consul; and two signalmen of the Navy. We landed, with some difficulty, on a stone pier — or rather a wall of rocks — built out into the Bay. Two carriages awaited us, and an interpreter — Carlos Casademunt — together with Colonel of the Staff Don José M. Olaguer, and Captain of Artillery Don Francisco Chavairi — who also spoke English.

On the way to the palace of the Captain-General we passed some fifteen hundred Spanish soldiers, apparently in good condition, marching into the city from the outer works. They had some rude field artillery with them. At the palace we found some forty or fifty officers — among them Admiral Montojo. They had a number of pages of stipulations in regard to the surrender, among which were that all their army should be sent back to Spain; second, that in case they or we should evacuate the country, their arms should be returned to them. It would have saved considerable trouble and expense if the first-named condition had been granted them.

Admiral Montojo was more self-possessed than any of the others. The Captain-General seemed very excited and nervous. He soon reported, in great trepidation, that the insurgents were moving into the city. I assured him on this point that it was impossible (though I did not at the time know how near they were). They had, in the morning, before the firing, started an attack which was suppressed by the judicious action of our officers. But they followed very closely the movements of our troops, nor did their proximity cease until they were driven away and beaten, after a long campaign.

The Captain-General next reported that our army was at their walls and about to attack. As General Greene's orders had been to go around the walled city and occupy the business section, Binondo, I did not think it possible, and so assured them, but the proximity of the insurgents, and other circumstances, rendered it necessary, in General Greene's judgment, to make the move he did. I sent him a note substantially as follows:—

Commanding Officer U.S. Forces:—

It is reported that an attack is being made by our troops on the walled city. As the negotiations for surrender are being made by Lieutenant Brumby, for the Navy, and myself

for the Army, it seems expedient that this attack should be suspended.

Lieutenant Brumby now returned to the ship, carrying a note from me to General Merritt, with request that he should land at once and bring the six hundred men of the Oregon Regiment who had embarked at Cavite on a Chinese chartered ship which had followed the *Zafiro*.

Asking quarters for the Commanding General, I was told that the *Ayuntamiento* was the best, and the Spanish officers and myself went there. I asked to have all of the troops in the city marched to the Plaza, which was done at once; that their arms should be stacked in the courtyard; but they declined to do this, as capitulation articles had not been signed. After this, General Greene appeared, remained about half an hour, leaving a note for General Merritt, saying he had been unwilling to go around the city with five thousand armed men in it, but that I had assured him that there was no danger in doing it, so he had left to carry out his original orders. The Governor of the city (and second in command of the Army — General Rizzo) arrived and was introduced as the officer who had surrendered the city and the army therein. So he, the same official (interpreter), myself, and two signalmen started with two carriages to meet General Merritt, signalled many times from the beach at different points, but got no reply. Then we drove to the Pasig River and found that unfortunately he had landed there and had walked up to the city — a warm walk — and without the condition of things being explained to him.

Then long conferences followed and preliminary conditions of surrender were signed, it being arranged that commissioners should meet on the following day and make formal terms. On the whole, it was a very satisfactory day for us. Casualties were very slight and it was a prearranged show of resistance, rather than any vigorous defence on the part of the Spaniards.

On the next morning—the 14th of August—a commission to determine the details of the capitulation of the city and defences of Manila met at the Ayuntamiento and remained in session from eleven in the morning until about five in the afternoon. The result of their conference is expressed in the following:—

MANILA, August 14th, 1898.

THE UNDERSIGNED, having been appointed a Commission to determine the details of the capitulation of the city and defences of Manila, and its suburbs, and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with the agreement entered into the previous day by Major-General Wesley Merritt, U.S. Army, American Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines, and His Excellency Don Firmin Jaudenes, Acting General-in-Chief of the Spanish Army in the Philippines,

HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING :

1.—The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate with the city and its defences, with all the honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States, and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers and subject to control of the aforesaid United States authorities, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations.

All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2.—Officers shall retain their side arms, horses and private property.

3.—All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

4.—Complete returns in duplicate of men by organizations, and full lists of public property and stores shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

5.—All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be rendered to the Government of the United States at Washington.

Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them.

The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or when the American Army evacuates.

6.—Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the United States and Spain.

All the funds of the Spanish Treasury and all other public funds, shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

7.—This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments and its private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.

F. V. GREENE,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, United States Army.

B. P. LAMBERTON,

Captain United States Navy.

CHAS. A. WHITTIER,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General.

E. H. CROWDER,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate.

NICHOLAS DE LA PENA,

Auditor General Excmo.

CARLOS REYES,

Coronel de Ingenieros.

JOSÉ MARIA OLAQUEN FELIU,

Coronel de Estado Major.

That afternoon Aguinaldo's Chief of Staff and three other officers of his army called and wished to get a definite statement of their status. General Merritt gave them assurance of his friendship, and they agreed that there should be no conflicts, that we should be permitted to operate the waterworks, and practically that they would withdraw to positions acceptable to us. But when these conditions were reported to their chief, they were not accepted in their full spirit — at least it was quite a time before the waterworks part was carried out and before they retired from their positions adjoining ours in the city.

Major Bement was sent the next day to complete the waterworks arrangement, but was unable to do anything on account of the presence and attitude of the insurgents.

On the 15th I had another interview with the Captain-General about the silver plate in the palace at Malacanang (which had been selected as General Merritt's headquarters), and also about the money in the treasury, of which there were: bank certificates of deposit, \$170,205; bank-notes, ₱225,705; silver, \$132,968 — all Mexican currency; copper, ₱295,700.

The Captain-General was in a state of great agitation, walking up and down the room, pressing his hands to his head and exclaiming: "Oh, my poor head! What shall I do!"

The plate was given up at once, but the matter of the treasury funds was held in abeyance and finally they were taken by us, under protest from the Spaniards.

On Tuesday, the 16th, there was very heavy rain, with typhoon. The streets on the way from the palace to town were knee-deep with water, the whole width. At about 3.30 on that afternoon messages came to the palace, sent through Admiral Dewey, announcing that a protocol had been signed by the Secretary of State and the French Minister, acting for Spain, agreeing upon a suspension of hostilities.

Visiting the Captain-General to announce this, I found him

in bed, in a squalid room — a cheap iron bedstead, four or five cigar-stumps on a rough table by his bedside ; looking ill and evidently suffering mentally and physically. It was very unfortunate for him that he should have surrendered on the 13th, when peace was practically signed on the 12th, and had his request for time in which to communicate with his Government been granted, he would have come out with better reputation, and not as the very doubtful hero of an inglorious defence.

So far as the insurgents were concerned, our position was now one of great embarrassment. Under the protocol we were entitled to hold the city, port, and Bay of Manila. Aguinaldo kept a portion of the city. We demanded that he should give that up — to which his representative agreed ; but in seeking confirmation from him, he made the condition that in case we left the country they should be restored to the positions which they had taken. This would involve the surrounding of the city, the occupation of the waterworks — in fact, all the settled part of the island, except Manila, as well as some of the southern country. Matters were patched up and Aguinaldo moved his headquarters to Malolos, twenty-three miles up the railroad. Besides, he felt that he had had some encouragement from the American authorities, from the fact that he was sent on a United States vessel from Hong Kong ; that he raised his flag at Cavite ; and that when there was a failure on the first day of his adherents to gather, being discouraged and suggesting a return to Hong Kong, he was dissuaded by our Admiral from leaving at once ; advised to try it a little longer ; and in the next two or three days crowds of insurgents joined him. Without doubt his action in surrounding the city and occupying the waterworks and a considerable portion of the Island of Luzon had greatly helped our operations and made them comparatively easy.

The insurgents had managed their occupation of the country in a very able manner — were brave, tolerant of fatigue and hunger ; amenable to command and discipline ; very tem-

perate and quiet; skilful in trade, occupations, and professions; good accountants; quiet and diligent; skilful as makers of cigars, cigarettes, and straw hats; as mariners, weavers of pina and jusi cloth; as station-masters and employees of the Manila railways, comparing favorably with any I have ever seen at ordinary way-stations; good musical instrumentalists.

The railroad (the only one in the Philippines) from Manila to Dagupan was soon reopened for traffic. At the invitation of the general manager, Mr. H. L. Higgins — an Englishman of great ability — and Mr. Robert Wood, of Smith, Bell & Co., owners of rice-mills on the line, I made the first through trip after our occupation — a distance of 123 miles; a most extraordinary country in fertility. Rice is the principal product, some sugar and indigo, with possibilities of cotton, coffee, cocoa, etc. Tobacco is not grown here, its production being limited to the northeastern part of the island, over the mountains, in the valley of the Rio Grande.

The insurgents were apparent in small numbers all along the line, but were mainly distributed in pueblos in bands of fifty. Railway stations are three miles apart, as directed in the charter from the Spanish Government.

There were two earthworks in process of construction; four military divisions between Manila and Dagupan, each commanded by a division general.

We spent the night at Bayamban where there were a rice-mill and new house owned by Smith, Bell & Co. Seven or eight half-breeds — sons and daughters of Englishmen and native wives — joined us at dinner. A small orchestra of natives from the adjoining town came after dinner, playing Spanish and Italian airs wonderfully well.

The next day, at seven in the morning, we started for Dagupan — a different quality of country, prettier, with high cocoanut-palm trees, in one of which there was a house where had lived some Frenchman of title who had probably tired of his native land.

We found soldiers strolling through the town and about three hundred just arrived on a train, who said they had driven eight hundred Spaniards and twelve hundred natives out of Vigan, where there is a custom-house. The Spaniards went north on a steamer. (All of which we regarded as a little doubtful.)

On the following Sunday I went up the Pasig River to the Laguna and over to Baños, an old health resort of Spanish days. We saw a few soldiers. The scenery was unique; perhaps not, on the whole, as interesting as the railroad trip, but very good.

On the 29th of September I received an invitation to breakfast at Malolos, the "Solemne Ratificacion de la Independencia Filipina," with a menu enclosed (on one side of which was printed "Libertad," and on the other, "Fraternidad") in type, as follows:—

DÉJEUNER

Hors d'œuvre

Huitres — Crévettes roses — Beurre
 Radis — Olives — Saucisson de Lyon
 Sardines aux Tomates — Saumon hollandais

Coquilles de Crabes
 Vol-au-vent, à la Financière
 Abatis de Poulet, à la Tagale
 Cotelettes de Mouton, à la Papilote
 Pommes de Terre paille
 Dinde Truffée, à la Manilloise
 Filet, à la Chateaubriand
 Haricots verts
 Jambon froid
 Asperges en branche

Dessert

Fromages — Fruits — Confitures
 Gélée de fraises — Glacés

Vins

Bordeaux — Sauterne — Xeres — Champagne

*Liqueurs*Chartreuse — Cognac
Café — Thé

It was not practicable to accept this invitation, interesting as the occasion would have been.

All this time the insurgents continued throwing up little earthworks in sight of our lines, a menace which should have been stopped at once.

Rumors of collisions in Manila and Cavite between our troops and the insurgents were frequent — generally with absolutely no foundation.

Business was resumed. The receipts at our Custom-House, from August 22 to September 16, amounted to \$548,735, Mexican.

General Merritt was relieved from command and ordered to appear before the Peace Commission at Paris. He left on the 27th of August.

On the 21st of October I received a similar order and, before going, I arranged — through Mr. Higgins, general manager of the railroad — an interview with Aguinaldo, that I might be able to present his views to our Commissioners.

Early that morning Mr. Higgins and I left on a special train and soon arrived at Malolos. We drove to Aguinaldo's headquarters, about a mile from the station. He was occupying a large house — very clean — with a guard of thirty or forty men in the courtyard below. We were met by Buen-camino and conducted through a legislative hall, where there were about two hundred chairs, into a room occupied by the insurgent leader — very neat, very clean, well furnished, and with a beautiful Spanish flag suspended from the wall.

Aguinaldo was attired in an evening undress suit of black, with a large white tie. I began the talk by announcing to him

that I was to leave in a few days to appear before the Peace Commission and that I had a very friendly feeling for the Filipinos, and admiration for many of their good qualities — their quiet, cleanliness, great imitative power, and possibility of learning almost any profession or business; that I would like to be able to present to the Commission his and his people's views and demands and what relation they expected to hold to the United States in case we decided to keep the Islands.

Aguinaldo replied, rather naïvely, that his people were divided into two parties — those in favor of absolute independence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties were about equal; that he was waiting to see who would have the majority and then to take his position with them. I stated to him that it would probably be useless to try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to any change of opinion, but that they must consider that they are without any navy and without capital which is greatly needed for the development of the country; that the Philippine Government alone would not possess the elements of strength to insure the retention of the Islands without the assistance of some other Government; they would be at the mercy of any of half a dozen powers striving to take either a part or the whole of the Islands, and that they must consider that their greatest prosperity would come by the gradual accession of power under American auspices. He said, "But the civilized nations of the world would see that our possessions are not taken from us."

I replied, "How has it been in China, where England, Russia, France, Germany, etc., all strive to control territory?"

To this he could make no reply. I further asked what they would expect America, acting the rôle of protector, to do. He said to furnish the navy while the Filipinos held all the country and administered civil offices for its own people.

"And what, then, would America get from this?" said I.

"That would be a detail which would be settled hereafter."

After discussing the subject for some time, Buencamino re-

turned, and Aguinaldo reported to him everything he had said to us. After a little talk between the two, Buencamino said that he — and he was sure that the President — was in favor of an American protectorate, and seemed to approve the suggestion that we should have the nucleus of an army; that his people should be joined to it, filling the place of minor officers, with the possibility and the hope that within a few years they should fill the most important civil and military functions; also that I could be certain that if the protectorate were granted they would do their best to have it accepted by their people on the lines I have stated, agreeing with me fully that to hold one island and to give the others to other powers, would be most unfortunate and not to be considered. They expressed pleasure at my having come to them, feeling that they had been rather neglected by the Americans.

In my judgment the exercise of a little tact and efforts at conciliation would have prevented any hostilities and have left the Islands and the natives in the same conditions as to-day, without the immense loss of life accruing in the last three years.

Aguinaldo, in a letter of August 1, 1898, to our late Consul at Manila, Mr. Williams, said: "Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life."

It is to be feared that they have had a sad taste of savagery on the part of some of our troops.

The day before I left Manila, I received the following letter from Aguinaldo: —

MALOLOS, October 30, 1898.

To Brigadier-General C. A. Whittier,
Manila.

MY DEAR SIR: — As it is not possible for me to see you off personally, I appoint General Pantaleon Garcia, and Señor Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Director of Diplomacy, accom-

panied by my Adjutant, Señor A. Burgos, to pay you a visit on my behalf.

I had the pleasure of receiving your photographs and the beautiful cigar case you kindly sent me as a present, for which I thank you heartily. Allow me the pleasure of reciprocating with another present, although not so valuable as yours. It is a dagger, locked into a case, which will be handed to you by the bearers. This present has no more merit than that it, at the same time, serves as testimony of my friendship. The weapon has been used by me; it may serve you as a souvenir of the country, inasmuch as the dagger and the case were made at home.

May you have a happy passage; meanwhile I and the Philippines are hoping confidently that you will be a genuine interpreter and a very vigorous defender of our aspirations and legitimate rights before the Hispano-American Peace Commission in Paris.

I am, dear sir,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) EMILIO AGUINALDO.

That the Islands are very rich, there can be doubt. Sanitation, cold-storage houses, railroads to the mountains — where comfort and health in the hot season can be obtained — and a just, firm government, are the essentials, and that the latter will be obtained under the able and judicious régime of Governor Taft is certain.

XIII

FILIPINO CHARACTERISTICS AS MANI-
FESTED IN DIPLOMACY AND WAR

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL E. S. OTIS, U.S.A., RETIRED

Read before the Society, April 7, 1903

FILIPINO CHARACTERISTICS AS MANIFESTED IN DIPLOMACY AND WAR

GENERALLY I have successfully resisted all invitations to give expression to any opinion I might have regarding Philippine conditions. They were and continue to be a subject of animated controversial discussion, attended with considerable political significance: and as an old soldier relegated to the retired list for both physical and mental disqualifications, it does not become me to enlighten the public on matters which it cannot be supposed that I am able to comprehend.

Even if the law had not declared me incompetent for active military service, it would not be in consonance with wise discretion to advance views on undetermined questions of national importance. It is the province of the soldier to act and not to talk, and if he will confine himself to his proper sphere of duty he may rest assured that others will do all the talking necessary. It is, therefore, with a feeling of constraint that I am here to remark upon the mental and moral complexion of the inhabitants of our islands in the China Sea. If I have erred, may the responsibility rest, in part at least, with the chairman of your Executive Committee, whom I declare an accessory before the fact, for he by his persuasive methods appealed to my vanity and by him my better judgment has been warped.

I am conscious that what I shall say may not meet the demands of a society maintained for historical discussion; though what time is required to crystallize fact, or even falsehood for that matter, into history, I know not. Nor will my remarks specially concern military affairs, and hence it would seem that I shall fail to meet another requisite of this organization; but I hope to be able to sufficiently present, by way of illustration

and in proof of statement and theory, Philippine war events to save criticism in this particular.

In like stages of development all people exhibit similar mental and moral qualities, varying in disposition and intensity in accordance with racial peculiarities. True, these qualities are affected by climate and environment, so that people of identical stock may be differently actuated by traits of character held in common, but not to such an extent as to lose the distinguishing racial features which characterize them. In the state of barbarism all men are suspicious, deceitful, superstitious, regardless of others outside of family or community; and the primary work of civilization is to inculcate confidence, a knowledge of individual rights, and self-imposed restraint. All types of men have been undergoing a process of development since the world began, and those which have retained nomadic habits are far removed from the savagery of prehistoric ages. All have in a measure elevated themselves in the scale of humanity: some very slowly, to be sure, but nearly all have succeeded in establishing domestic and social customs, precedents to govern individual actions in their relation to society, some kind of political system, and elaborate ceremonials expressive of spiritual belief. Improvement is irresistibly influenced by racial peculiarity. In the nature of certain races craftiness and the tendency to commit cruelties may be more deeply rooted than in that of others, hence more difficult to suppress, while in intellectual advancement divergent directions are given by unlike mental perceptions and processes, by dissimilarity of moral and religious convictions.

In speaking of the characteristics of the Filipino we intend to confine our remarks to those which appear to be his by heredity, touching occasionally, it may be, upon practices of life which he has acquired by his three hundred years of intercourse with the Indo-European. By so doing we may give significance to this statement, since our people are engaged in an endeavor to impress him with our own mental conceptions and

trends of thought; and since, as we think, his hereditary traits of character will pervade whatever form of higher civilization he may be induced to strive for. In support of this last assertion it might not be amiss to comment briefly upon the result of past efforts to engraft foreign beliefs and customs upon an alien stock, in order to convey an impression of the immense regenerating labor this country must perform to confine Filipino tendencies in desired channels of progress and the impossibility of effecting more than a fairly approximate assimilation.

The experience of the United States in proselyting has been confined to its Indian population, and we all know that our past Indian policy has accomplished little except to encourage Indian demoralization and pauperism. But ever since the discovery of America and the ocean passage by the Cape of Good Hope, modern European nations have been endeavoring to fix upon alien people the white man's ways; and they have been constantly extending the field of experiment until they have brought within the sphere of their influences, as colonies or dependencies, one third of the world's population and more than one third of the land area of the earth. And what has been the result of their efforts? Strange as it may appear, their long-continued labors to fasten their civilization upon representatives of antagonistic races, whether by conquest and military rule or by precept and example, has not produced a single stable political organization, unless extensive amalgamation has essentially modified original proclivities.

The reason of this failure by alien people to acquire a practical knowledge of our social and political economy is commonly ascribed to erroneous teaching. It is widely believed by our citizens that if, instead of the application of force which has been and is still being applied to make the brown and black man better, persuasive methods had been employed, expected results might have been accomplished! In our estimate of men of another type, we assume that a radical change in

thought, action, and custom is essential to their salvation and must consist in their abandonment of cherished habits and superstitions for the practices which we follow. We assume that ours is the only true civilization ; that it is easy of comprehension and appeals directly to the intelligence of all well-intentioned people, whether cultured or uncultivated ; that the personal comforts and benefits it bestows are so immeasurably great in comparison with those which attend other codes and customs by which life is regulated, that its acceptance by every class of the world's inhabitants is certain when they are fully informed as to its character. We forget that this civilization is the product of centuries of determined struggle in which the opposing mental, moral, and religious convictions peculiar to a minor portion of a single race of men contended for the mastery ; that some of the elements which entered into it, and by which, indeed, it is still maintained and propelled, are the distinctive features, the special characteristics of the race. The intelligent, moral, practical individualism which pervades it, and which is its vitalizing principle, is the slow growth of time, and it would require prolonged study on our part to discover all the forces with which that individualism has been compelled to battle, how it has been built up, how conditioned and modified, and what has been its retroactive effect upon the forces with which it contended. This civilization, which, as we think, commends itself to all sorts and conditions of men because of its simplicity and practicability, is, in fact, of very complicated construction. We who are born to it, who have received it as a heritage, fail to realize the complex nature of our institutions, and the difficulties which one alien by inheritance would experience in trying to comprehend them.

Every type of man is in a progressive stage. Cause is continually at work inspiring mental activity and results show themselves in improved conditions. Mental and moral characteristics are transmitted and there is a steady advancement in that particular direction whither natural tendency, influenced

by attending circumstances, leads. The Asiatic or African has established a mode of life as fixed and permanent as that which prevails in white communities. In the course of development he has proceeded in a direction divergent from the one the white man has pursued, and in some respects on a diametrically opposite path. Particularly is this the case as regards mental processes, moral conceptions, and religious convictions. Therefore the change which we think necessary to convert him into a useful and self-sustaining specimen of manhood involves not only a different manner of living, but a reversal of thought, conscience, belief, and inclination. To effect such transformation speedily, if at all, either by decree, statute, persuasion, or military power, or by all of these agents combined, is an impossibility — not for the reason that representatives of other races are mentally deficient, but because they cannot comprehend, or at least appreciate, that which we offer.

I take it that the underlying force in our modern civilization is that which insures personal liberty as interpreted by our best construction of natural or positive law. To secure it, several centuries of mental effort have been expended to ascertain the absolute and relative rights of man, to discover what privileges belong to him as an individual, and what duties arise from the social relation. As a result his status as regards his fellow-men has been defined, the elements of society have been analyzed, and a legal code has been created by which individual profit and social well-being have been indissolubly linked. As a further result, questions of social progress and individual advancement in worldly interests have been constantly presented, confining investigation to intensely practical channels. It has sought to unfold the laws of the material universe. It has endeavored to find out the basis of things. Seeking ultimate fact for its postulate and for its director the infallible guide of experience, it has constructed its theology, philosophy, and civil institutions. As a consequence, we have

the regeneration of the moralities, eternally rooted, as we hope, in accepted social and business creeds with appliances to compel their observance — all existing and flourishing not only in educated conscience, but in advantageous personal, communal, and state policy.

In the varied civilizations of other races some of which (centuries older than our own) have displayed wonderful intellectual capacity, with art and architecture highly developed, with psychological inquiry penetrating the mysteries to a height and depth we can neither measure nor fathom, there is nothing to define or nurture liberty as distinguished from license, nothing to stimulate prolonged honest individual labor. There is no code of ethics to govern action between man and man, nothing more encouraging than is expressed in the verities of Buddha which suppress the aims and purposes of life which our civilization fosters. Would it not appear, therefore, that the radical change which is deemed necessary to convert the representative of another race into a fairly good member of our modern society, requires that he practise certain virtues of which he knows nothing and to which he attaches no value? In his case (and I speak of him as an exponent of the great mass of the world's inhabitants whom we deem wanting in mental and moral expression), natural deceit must give way to an acquired love for truth, characteristic cruelty to the dictates of educated humanity, the impulse to retaliate to a controlling desire for justice, and habitual indulgence to zeal and industry in creditable employment.

The difficulties which beset attempts to impose upon other races those elements of our civilization which we consider essential to progress are so varied and excessive, it is not surprising that the effort has not been more successful. The work involves individual reanimation, social advancement, political regeneration, the introduction of our modern business methods and commercial growth, without which a country cannot hope to achieve even tolerable prosperity, however

avored by climate, productiveness, and ocean advantages. The magnitude of these difficulties may be inferred from the fact that in spite of all past effort there is not to-day a single native colony of all the great number which have been founded beyond European boundaries by European nations, which could sustain itself if European supervision were removed, while every colony planted with European subjects and properly nurtured in infancy, no matter in what section of the earth, has become self-sustaining, thrifty, and to all intents and purposes independent.

In this seeming digression I have not indulged in argument, but have presented statements which will not be seriously questioned. They sufficiently suggest our theory, that the racial characteristics of the inhabitants of the Philippines determine to what extent they are capable of taking our civilization.

Who or what are these eight millions of inhabitants, dwelling in many islands rich in nature's gifts, only slightly developed, and having a total area in territory of about one hundred and ten thousand square miles? They show diverse ethnological peculiarities, but practically all are of Malayan stock. Separated by arms of the sea, they exhibit strong hereditary dislikes often culminating in bloody strife, and this antagonism is frequently visited within the borders of the same island. For language they employ more than sixty different dialects, so pronounced that people of adjacent provinces cannot communicate by speech. In religion they are Christians, so called, having the shell of Christianity stuffed full of their heathen superstitions; Mohammedans, by declaration and in the more crude outward observances of that creed; pagans of infinite variety from the basest fetishism to a mysticism of a highly imaginative order. They have no real cosmopolitan spirit. In domestic and social life the clan or family custom generally prevails. Their cities, even Manila, have been made up of a number of these clans,

which located in near proximity have extended to former limits of separation. The residents of *barrios* or wards of cities, sometimes distant from main centres five miles and more with intervening spaces uninhabited, are held together by consanguineous ties and affiliate with allied clans for protection and governmental purposes. They have subtle and acute mental powers, and, lacking initiative, inventive genius, and comprehension of the practical, have the imitative faculty wonderfully strong. They are fairly industrious for people of the tropics, and of agricultural proclivities. Their personal attachments are circumscribed by the ties of domestic relationship. To the casual observer they are impassive in countenance, apathetic in demeanor, still ready impersonators of the usual observances of cultivated society. By disposition they are hospitable, yet cunning, deceitful, revengeful, and fiendishly cruel when opportunity is offered to avenge supposed inflicted wrong, and they can await opportunity in apparent tranquillity. As for civil liberty, the essential principles of representative or of any other form of government which is not entirely dependent upon brute force, they have no definite conception.

In this estimate of character and qualities we have excluded from computation the few cultured natives who have been graduated from the advance educational institutions of the Islands (especially the University of Manila), who possess excellent business qualifications and show proficiency in science, law, and medicine — some of whom have improved their professional attainments by study in the best schools of Madrid and Paris. The majority of these are of mixed blood with European or Mongolian strain — a small percentage being, to all appearances, of pure racial descent and in no respect inferior to the *mestizo* in mental and moral equipment. Nor have we taken account of the densely ignorant portion of the population — the tribesmen of the mountains which bisect every island of importance, most of whom are barbarians,

though having among them the *ladrone* element which has always robbed the permanent residents of the lowlands. But in our estimate we have endeavored to portray the composite Filipino — the type of the great mass of the inhabitants of the Philippines.

When our political relations with them originated, they had received the benefits of three centuries of European colonial supervision which improved all classes with whom it came in direct contact, acquainting them with European modes of life and occupations and arousing a well-nigh universal desire to follow them. Their moral deficiencies we are wont to ascribe to long-continued Spanish domination, but erroneously so, for when Spain found them they were not susceptible of degeneration. The society of the whites did not make them any worse and did appeal to their intelligence. The religious orders, which wielded sufficient political power to shape government policy and which controlled all educational work, charge them with base ingratitude, since, as the friars assert with considerable truth, they taught them all they know. They at least gave them sufficient instruction to enable them to realize that they were the victims of friar cupidity and official injustice. Spanish guardianship, while it may have retarded a development which better example might have accelerated, gradually advanced them mentally and socially, even to a degree which some say has fitted them to exercise the duties of representative citizenship.

Regarding their vigor and attainments we quote from a newspaper article of June 8, 1897, prepared by an educated Englishman who had lived among them many years and who also had a practical acquaintance with the inhabitants of India, the neighboring islands and indeed of the whole southern Asiatic coast. It will be perceived that it bears date shortly after our naval victory in Manila Bay, when Philippine affairs were becoming interesting. The writer says: "The possession of Manila no more means the possession of the Philippines

than the possession of New York means the possession of America; and without the good-will and assistance of the inhabitants I beg leave to state that neither the United States nor any other nation could ever hope to take the Philippines except with an army of two hundred thousand men or more, if even then, no matter what theorists may say to the contrary. . . . Such crass ignorance of the state of the Philippines and its inhabitants exists on every side that it is almost useless to try to explain to outsiders that the Philippines are as different from British India, Ceylon, Burma, the West Indies, etc., as light is from darkness. The people are the most enlightened and vigorous branch of the Malay race and have been Christians for centuries — in fact longer than the principles of the Reformation have been established in Great Britain — and are the nearest akin to Europeans of any alien race.”

It is granted that the Filipinos are the most enlightened of the Malays and have adopted European habits to a greater extent than any other alien race. The reason is, doubtless, that they may have been longer and more completely under European influences. Spain, different from other colonizing nations of modern times, controlled her territorial discoveries through a board of Government officials, created in 1511, and did not farm them out to trading combinations, as did Great Britain and the Netherlands. The former kept immediate control of her colonial trade, sent to colonial subjects her citizens, her teachers and clergy, who dwelt among them, while the chartered trading companies of other nations excluded from communication with natives until a recent period all except their own agents, whose business it was to cheat them. In every important coast province of the Philippines there were constructed quite early churches, convents, schools, and markets for the exchange of products. The church became the centre around which population assembled and from which civilizing influences radiated. Practically those islands have

had one hundred and fifty years more of European tutelage than any other of the Asiatic or Pacific Ocean colonial holdings.

Some months before this newspaper article appeared, representative Filipinos who had been prominent in the island revolutionary movement of 1897 were fugitives, temporarily residing in Hong Kong. Our controversy with Spain was approaching an exciting stage and these Filipinos believed it would result in war. They had formed in Hong Kong their revolutionary club, or Junta, and continued their plottings against their old enemy. On November 3, 1897, our Consul-General there reported that he had been visited by the foreign agent and high commissioner of the new Republic of the Philippines, who was duly accredited by the President, members of the Cabinet, and General-in-Chief of the same; that he offered on behalf of his Government an alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the latter should declare war against Spain; that the Republic wished the United States to send to the Philippine coast rifles, and ammunition to be paid for by it upon recognition, and it pledged as security for payment two provinces and the Custom-House at Manila.

This formation of a Philippine Republic in foreign parts by a few exiles who took all the offices, is an example of Filipino political sagacity, and the offer of alliance under the conditions then existing is a commentary on their appreciation of international law. The incident is introduced to illustrate, in connection with later proceedings to which reference will be made, the crafty simplicity of Filipino diplomacy and the lack of comprehension which characterized it. Still, without the aid of the documentary evidence which Aguinaldo's captured war chest contained, we might even now be unable to determine whether the *insurrecto* leaders had then or afterwards a predetermined plan of action, or willfully deceived us as to their early political intentions.

The foregoing reported interview indicates that a Philippine Republic was then in vague contemplation; but Aguinaldo at the time was fighting the Spaniards in Central Luzon, with no thought, as he declared, of creating an independent government, only to compel certain political reforms. He had succeeded in gathering a considerable force and had ingeniously imposed the belief on the colonial authorities that he commanded a formidable army. Spain directed that he and his principal confederates be bought up at a cost not to exceed two millions of dollars. The purchase was effected and what is known as the Treaty of Biac-na-bato resulted. By it Aguinaldo and his chief officers, in consideration of one million two hundred thousand dollars, agreed to counsel peace, disband their army, and surrender their arms, he, with a number of his lieutenants, to leave the country, receive one third of the gross amount, the remaining sum to be paid later when certain promises should be fulfilled. Spain shipped him with some twenty of his admirers to Hong Kong during the last week of December, 1897, and deposited the stipulated sum of money to his credit in a Hong Kong bank, where it soon became a matter of judicial proceedings between him and former comrades who demanded a share of these spoils of war.

The peace of Biac-na-bato was of short duration. The Hong Kong Junta, now dominated by the Philippine warriors, charged Spain with breach of faith in withholding the remainder of the purchase money and not inaugurating the promised political reforms. Proof of reform promises exists only in the parole statements of the purchased revolutionists. As for money, the Spanish Government paid the four hundred thousand dollars, although Aguinaldo asserted that he received but half of it, but certain of his friends claimed that a noted Filipino dextrously covered in the balance. It is possible, indeed very probable, that neither party to the treaty intended to execute its covenants. The colonial authorities had accom-

plished all that they desired in the disbandment of the revolutionary army and the withdrawal of its leaders. They considered themselves able to handle the situation, and made no change in policy, and punished with more than ordinary severity. The leaders accepted the offer of money and withdrew from the Islands in order to obtain funds for the purchase of arms and a better base for future operations. They raised the cry of fraud against Spain to excuse their plottings, renewed before they could show that she did not intend to keep faith; and, indeed, their activity in that direction had only slight cessation.

The Governor-General of the Philippines proclaimed the new peace amid great rejoicings and festivities, but a destructive guerilla warfare followed immediately upon the breaking-up of the revolutionary army organization. Said our Manila Consul on February 22: "War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial and Manila is under martial law." The Hong Kong Junta was active, but particulars of its proceedings are not reported. Our Consul-General at that city, in an explanatory communication of later date, asserts that Aguinaldo "was in and out of his consulate for nearly a month," which is understood to mean the month previous to his journey to Saigon and Singapore on which he departed during the first half of April. On April 24 he had a conference with our Singapore Consul-General and made tender of assistance to the United States. It is well known that the Singapore Consul returned him to Hong Kong for consultation with Admiral Dewey; that the Admiral had sailed for the Philippines before his arrival; that he reached Manila Bay with seventeen of his followers, on May 19, and established himself at Cavite, where on the 24th of that month he issued certain proclamations assigning reasons for his return, intimating his purpose to declare a dictatorship, and instructing natives in rules of warfare. It is due him to say that in these early proclamations, as well

as in those of a later issue and until the Malolos Government was established, he nowhere makes a pretence that the cause of the Filipinos is other than that of liberty and independence. In the Singapore conference he is reported to have stated that he "hoped the United States would assume protection of the islands long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own." And not until January, 1899, after the Malolos Government had taken shape, had voted him president and subsequently dictator, not until he had announced to the world that the political constitution of the Philippine Republic had been promulgated and awaited recognition, did he openly manifest a determination to compel the United States to withdraw. In his public, official action he appears to have been consistent. He stood out as the representative of a people engaged in a revolution, contending for independence; and although he confined our troops within the limits of Manila, constructing about that city strong lines of circumvallation, he did it, as he asserted, to be in readiness for the return of the Spaniards.

How, then, shall we account for the illusions of our civil representatives in that region? Said one, officially reporting conditions early in May: "These natives are eager to be organized and led by United States officers, and members of their cabinet visited me and gave assurance that all would swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag. . . . Hence I believe ample assurances are at hand that civil government by us will be easy of organization and gratefully received by the people." On June 16 he reported: "I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treating for return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they had a council to form a provisional government. . . . A form of government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America." And on August 4 he wrote: "I have

traversed the entire ground of government with him in council and he has called his officials from fifteen provinces to meet me for their discussion." As late as September 5, after the insurgent capital had been moved to Malolos, he cabled Washington: "To-day, delegation from four thousand Viscayan soldiers, also representing southern business interests, came to me pledging loyalty to annexation, several insurgent leaders likewise."

Another of our representatives made report on July 18 as follows: "In reply, the State Department instructed me to courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding the alleged mission"; meaning the occurrence of November 3 of the previous year. "I obeyed these instructions to the letter until the breaking-out of the war when, after consultation with Admiral Dewey, I received a delegation from the insurgent Junta, and they bound themselves to obey all laws of civilized warfare and to place themselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were permitted to return to Manila. . . . I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the monied men among the insurgents, and in spite of all statements to the contrary I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States desires to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. . . . On April 27th in company with [here naming the Manila Consul] we received another delegation composed of Señors [here naming eight delegates, three of whom afterwards became the most villainous of insurgent officers]. We agreed on behalf of Dewey to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila, etc. . . . It was May 16th before I could obtain permission to allow Aguinaldo to go. . . . Immediately on his arrival at Cavite he issued a proclamation which I had outlined for him before he left, forbidding pillage and making it a criminal offence to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator —

an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain control over the natives." On August 9 our representative is a little shaken in his bestowed confidence, for he writes: "Aguinaldo has written me by every opportunity and I believe that he has been frank with me regarding both his actions and his motives. I do not doubt but that he would like to be President of the Philippine Republic and there may be a small coterie of his native advisers who entertain a like ambition, but I am perfectly certain that the great majority of his followers and all the wealthy educated Filipinos have but one desire — to become citizens of the United States of America." Early in May, between the 6th and 15th of that month, he cabled to Washington in behalf of certain members of the Hong Kong Junta (some of whom proved to be among the most implacable of our enemies) their submission of allegiance to the United States, stating that they had "instructed their relatives in Manila to render every possible aid to our forces."

These recorded convictions of our civil officials in the chief ports of the China Sea could have resulted only through the practised duplicity of the principal Filipino insurgents — members of the conclave which held their meetings in Hong Kong. In the correspondence to which we have referred, not a single native is mentioned who manifested friendly feeling toward us during the subsequent insurrection or who gave us aid in building up an island government.

The sentiments expressed by this Junta on November 3, 1897, and their offer of alliance has been noticed. In a widely circulated article published in the "Singapore Free Press" of May 4, which recounts the particulars of Aguinaldo's visit to that city, as gained from a personal interview, his policy is announced in part as follows: "General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily on the same basis as that which might be instituted hereafter in

Cuba." This was and continued to be substantially the policy secretly advocated by a majority of the insurgents, although a great many of the ablest natives, who affiliated with them until October, 1898, proposed the acceptance of United States sovereignty and deplored the signs of approaching conflict. As for Aguinaldo, it was his policy when he returned to the Islands, but as continued marvellous success attended him, his self-importance and ambitions correspondingly increased. Said one of our consular officers on August 9: "Aguinaldo had for some weeks been getting what Admiral Dewey calls a big head and writing me sulky, childish letters." In his own estimation he grew rapidly in greatness. When his Congress had formulated a Constitution he withheld his approval until voted Dictator. The Government became an autocracy, with Congress, the Judiciary, and the priesthood the pliant tools of the Autocrat, and assassination became an acceptable remedy when troublesome individuals interfered. In the December, 1898, rising of inhabitants in certain Luzon cities against his authority, the leaders were assassinated and the common people were *tranquillized*, as stated, by the summary action of bodies of soldiers. The insurgent Secretary of War reported that "he had sent there six companies of soldiers with explicit instructions to their commander to make the people return to a peaceful life, using a policy of *attraction*." And still Aguinaldo's ambition for great power and more abundant honors waxed stronger. His fertile imagination pictured an empire beneath his sway, and those upon whom he relied for support — the officers of his army, who clamored at Malolos for war and overpowered the advocates of peace — indulged in inspiring reflections of personal aggrandizement. On January 13, three weeks before he inaugurated active warfare, they wired their Honorable Presidente: "We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mentioned in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our Government is arranging for the forces that will be able first to enter Manila." And the

President replied, over his own signature: "As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the heroes will have as rewards a large quantity of money, extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of *Biac-na-bato*, Marquis of Malta, *Ermite*, Count of Manila, etc., . . . and more, if they capture the regiments with their generals, and if possible the chief of them all, who represents our future enemies in Manila. . . . The ultimatum has not been sent, but *will be* within a few days."

We will now return to the occurrences of a former date in order to ascertain the reason for our failure to sooner comprehend insurgent intention. It will be remembered that by official correspondence of November 3, 1897, it appears that the accredited High Commissioner of the Republic of the Philippines proposed an alliance with the United States. Whoever the parties styling themselves the chief officers of a Republic might be, they were not known to the world except as the rebellious subjects of Spain, and instructions were issued to our representative not to hold intercourse with them. This the members of the Hong Kong Junta doubtless discovered. When our war with Spain commenced they understood that they could be recognized only as private individuals, and hence they preferred individual requests for permission to return to the Philippines and render assistance to the United States — professing a desire to have the latter Government firmly established there. Aguinaldo remained in Hong Kong some two weeks after his return from Singapore and before his departure for Manila Bay. During that period the Junta held an important session. The minutes of its proceedings were found among the papers of Aguinaldo captured in November, 1899. They indicate that the late Republic had vanished, as they show that he was the choice of the Junta to represent it in the Islands because of the great prestige he had already acquired there. He was commissioned to take command of such native forces as he could gather, obtain what aid he could from the

Americans, work harmoniously with them until the Spaniards were worsted, and then, if the former manifested an intention of remaining permanently, turn and drive them out. The speeches made on the occasion (the substance of which are incorporated in the minutes) illustrate Filipino characteristics applied to diplomacy even better than the conclusion of the Junta. Aguinaldo, either from lack of courage or because of honorable impulse, hesitated to assume the task marked out for him, but yielded to the eloquence of the orators, who pleaded that it was imperative in order to secure their inalienable rights and God-given liberties, and therefore dictated by the noblest sentiment of humanity. He was a master in dissimulation. A cross of the Chinaman and Filipino, he had the cunning of the one and the pertinacity of the other. Illiterate, as compared with many of his associates, he was their superior in ability to impress himself upon the people through tactful appeals to their passions and superstitions. Taciturn, apparently retiring in disposition, aping great dignity of deportment, looking to self-prominence, without much public display of his amazing self-conceit, he for a time acted well the rôle of liberator.

No sooner had he arrived in the Philippines with his seventeen subordinates and landed at the captured Cavite Arsenal, than the natives gathered to his support. Armed with the rifles brought from Hong Kong and the additional number turned over from the Arsenal, they quickly drove the Spaniards from the western portion of Cavite Province. Reports of these victories spread rapidly throughout Luzon. Fierce rebellion was again rampant, and the Spanish troops having been drawn in large numbers to Manila to confront our threatening demonstrations, it was impossible for the colonial authorities to meet emergencies. Aguinaldo, with the subtle, yet self-sacrificing and individually honest paralytic, Mabini, as his mentor, assumed the status of an ally of our Government. As early as June 10 he addressed the President of the United States,

greeting him, as he said, "with the most tender effusions of my soul and to express to you my deep and sincere gratitude, in the name of the unfortunate Philippine people, for efficient and distinguished *protection*." Eight days thereafter he proclaimed his dictatorship, confessing unworthiness, but declaring his inability to resist the designs of Providence. Within the next week he promulgated his decree, creating and establishing a revolutionary government.

This was quick work. It was not attended with much danger, as the majority of the Spanish soldiers were confined in Manila, one half of Spain's native troops had deserted to the insurgents, and our Navy was busy watching Spanish demonstrations.

On June 30 the first contingent of our expeditionary force arrived, landed at Cavite Arsenal, and friction ensued. Soon thereafter Aguinaldo moved his headquarters to his old home at Bacoor, distant a few miles, on the shore of the Bay and on the road to Manila. The second contingent arrived and a proper locality for encampment was sought. The "big head" had wonderfully developed, and on July 24 Aguinaldo instructed our Army authorities as follows: "I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish without a previous notice to this Government, because, as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops a violation of its rights. . . . Because of this, I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the necessity, that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this Government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation." This pretence of advocacy of the people's rights and wishes was the sham which Aguinaldo continued to employ throughout his career as Dictator and Commander-in-Chief. The people welcomed the troops and would have rejoiced to see them overrun all Luzon in pursuit of the Spanish

foe. They had hitherto fought for reforms, not for independence, and the cry for the latter had birth at Aguinaldo's headquarters and, ignorant as the people were of its meaning, had an immediate, intoxicating effect. But the self-constituted Dictator and President of the new republic had now become as mentally unbalanced as his duped subjects. He was intoxicated by success, by the greatness suddenly thrust upon him. When dictating terms to the United States Government and forbidding it to land its wearied troops except by his consent, he was preparing his eloquent address "To foreign Governments" issued on August 6, wherein he claimed to have an organized army of thirty thousand men and to have established representative government over nearly all Luzon. "Wherefore," — he announces and prays, — "Wherefore the undersigned, by virtue of the powers which belong to him as President of the revolutionary Government of the Philippines and in the name and representation of the Philippine people, asks the support of all the powers of the civilized world and earnestly entreats them to proceed to the formal recognition of the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Philippines, since they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the equilibrium between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong, to the end that by these means shall shine forth and be realized the most complete justice in the indefinite progress of humanity."

What all that may mean I leave to your own interpretation, but it is wonderfully transparent as compared with Aguinaldo's effusions to his dear people of which he himself was author and scribe.

We pass over the occurrences of the ensuing few weeks. Our disregard of insurgent demands, the events attending the surrender of Manila, the entrance of Aguinaldo's troops, his claim for his share of the booty and supervision of the affairs of that city, the cause of insurgent withdrawal from its interior to its outer lines, are matters of general knowledge. Suf-

face it to say that during the five weeks of joint occupation, Aguinaldo and his officers were busy in appropriating public and private property, in secretly forcing contributions from the citizens through arrest and punishment, and in initiating a secret city government—all this notwithstanding they thoroughly understood that we were sacredly obligated to Spain to protect the lives and property of the inhabitants, and while they still professed for us regard, friendship, and gratitude. Forced to withdraw, they retained in office their civil officials and to the day of Aguinaldo's flight over the mountains of Northern Luzon both an insurgent governor and I were in antagonism, each conducting Manila affairs to the best of his ability.

Aguinaldo, however, never entered Manila from the time of his deportation by Spain until he was taken there as a captive. He lacked the courage to expose his person to any possible contingency which his artful brain might conceive. It may be wrong to charge him with the looting of the city, but he directed the particulars of insurgent enterprise therein to the date of his final discomfiture. Strongly escorted and moving with ceremonious pomp, he early in September swung around Manila in rear of his troops from his headquarters at Bacoor to his capital of Malolos, retaining in Manila for a time the ablest and most irreconcilable insurgents, to deceive and excite the population with infamous statements of our intentions. These men requested interviews, which they obtained. They pretended to desire United States supremacy, wished to be informed of the policy our Government would pursue that they might prepare the populace for its acceptance, and then caused villainous articles to be published in their improved newspapers which were circulated throughout Luzon.

The same duplicity characterized the supreme authorities at Malolos. To one of our officers of rank, Aguinaldo, in a granted interview on October 25, stated that the people were

divided into two almost equal parties — the one demanding independence and the other advocating an American protectorate; that he was waiting to ascertain which party was in a majority in order to take his position. His Secretary of State remarked that he favored the protectorate, as did also his chief; and this was about the date our native supporters were eliminated from the insurgent Congress through the skilful manipulations of Mabini. A delegation from Negros arrived in Manila asking for a few troops to assist the inhabitants of that island to hold it for the United States. It was honest and executed its promises. A delegation from the neighboring island of Panay came. The members were introduced by an American acquaintance who vouched for their integrity. They pledged their loyalty to the United States and eloquently appealed for permission to accompany troops to Ilo Ilo, the chief city of that island, to prepare the way for our peaceful occupation. They went carrying the instructions of Aguinaldo to his commander there to resist the Americans, and the island was temporarily lost to us.

During this period of uncertainty we were greatly assisted by able Filipinos who confessed inability to determine the nature of the difficulties in store for us. We had many Filipino clerks and laborers in our employ, apparently contented, and the inter-island trade was being industriously prosecuted in vessels manned by Filipino sailors. How could one cast the horoscope of events? We watched the childish Malolos efforts to create constitutional government. The Congress framed a Constitution, taking our own as a model; then borrowed from Spanish sources the laws to govern towns and provinces, — even to the provision which permitted a military officer to suppress civil rule at his discretion. We watched the gradual evolution of Aguinaldo into a demigod of the ignorant populace. He was believed to be invulnerable. Should he die he would rise on the third day and lead them on. He had a vision of the night, which he duly made known

where it would do the most good. He saw the Americans driven into the sea after four hours of combat; and a number of his generals informed him that his telegram announcing it expressed a reality rather than a dream. He was law and gospel, speaking through his secretary and the excommunicated priest, the bloody Aglipay, whom he had appointed Bishop of the Islands. The people submitted and applauded. They had a government of their own — the finished product of their highest political intelligence.

We watched the construction of strong intrenchments around Manila's limits, the placing of artillery to sweep its thoroughfares, and the concentration about us of the insurgent army, in numbers double our own, but separated into two nearly equal parts by the Pasig River, over which no crossing was available or possible if we made use of our improvised gunboats. In this and other particulars the insurgents displayed as primitive a knowledge of the art of war as of civil government. We could not reach definite conclusions as to their intentions. Was it all a huge bluff, or had Aguinaldo reached such a stage of developed big head as to believe that he could cope with the power of the United States? We know now that he had reached it and that his rickety imagination foresaw an easy conquest; we know that all his officers were enthusiastic and shared his belief. Manila was ripe for revolt and the native Spanish troops held by us as prisoners under the protocol with Spain had augmented his strength. "Tell them," he wrote, "to keep on good terms with the Americans in order to deceive them and prevent their confining them, since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived." His trusted agent in Manila advised him often: "Are you in position to take the initiative? Do not give the Americans time to receive any aid." Again, on January 8, he advises: "As soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans should be driven into the intramuros district and the walled city set on fire," — advice almost as infamous as that which marks a subse-

quent order of extermination. But the dream was the thing which raised the enthusiasm of his officers to the boiling stage, and the promise of titles and pecuniary rewards appealed to their ambition. We know *now* that Aguinaldo *then* anticipated victory, also that a few months later self-preservation was his controlling motive for action. "For what are you fighting?" I asked the captured Mabini. "To make the best terms possible," was his candid reply.

Apparently, we took no precautions to meet these warlike preparations, assuming an air of indifference; but we did fear the destruction of the city by its ignorant inhabitants, who had gradually changed their former friendly demonstrations to manifestations of dislike. We learned also of the formation of hostile organizations within the city and discovered many concealed arms. To meet the contingency the Provost Guard was judiciously placed and instructed. Still, notwithstanding the exaggerated opinions of their accomplishments which the insurgents manifested, our thorough loss of confidence in their public statements, and their insulting charge of cowardice because we had not resisted their encroachments, it was difficult to conclude that they failed to appreciate their faulty military dispositions and our tactical advantages. On the day preceding the attack I wrote as follows: "I am informed that the chief men of the insurgent Government desire to avoid any conflict at present; possibly for the reason that they are expecting to receive arms very soon; possibly because they fear that they may not be successful; and possibly because they may have a belief that they can secure what they desire without conflict."

The battle of Manila resulted as any competent judge of proper military dispositions, knowing conditions, would have predicted. It was a rude awakening from the dream of victory and booty in which the insurgent soldiers had been indulging, and as for the boastful officers, they must have sought safety in timely flight, for I am not aware that a single one of im-

portance was either killed, wounded, or captured in the fearful punishment our troops inflicted. Aguinaldo, as was ascertained later, had placed great reliance on the assistance of his organized, oath-bound Manila militia, which true to its promises did what it could, but its spirit was quelled before it could sufficiently assemble to take a decided initiative.

And now we had scored not only a victory, but an acknowledgment from the insurgents that the Americans possessed great valor, surpassing possibly their own. They denied, however, that they were discouraged; they could make up in numbers what they lacked in prowess and experience. They made new concentrations to the north and south of us — especially to the north in the direction of their capital, having superior advantages because they held the railway with its entire rolling stock. They confessed that some of their troops were discontented with the service and they made use of the native Spanish soldiers who had joined them, “to train,” as they said, “the discontented in military discipline.” I casually asked Buencamino, when he was presented as a prisoner, “How many men did General Luna shoot up there?” and he answered, “About eighty.” By Aguinaldo’s order all the inhabitants residing between Calocan and Malolos and beyond were summoned to dig trenches, which were placed and constructed along all fairly good defensive positions throughout the country, but our march on the capital was not thereby materially impeded. Only once did the insurgents make a desperate stand, and then the flower of their army, their trained native soldiery, formerly of the Spanish army, was destroyed. Tyros in even the simple principles of waging war, without the element of practicability to devise any efficient methods and depending upon treachery, surprise, and the jungle, they invited slaughter, indeed, compelled it, for no sooner did we rest than they recommenced attack. What did it matter to the leaders so long as in retreat they were confident of personal safety and the sacrifice was paid by the ignorant natives

who were forcibly driven into the ranks without even the preliminary of conscription? And they published these fearful reverses throughout the Islands as great victories. According to their published reports the number of our casualties exceeded the number of our men. The natives believed them. The provincial president of the far-away Northern Luzon country telegraphed Aguinaldo on February 24: "In the name of the provincial council over which I preside and of the entire province of Cagayan, I have the honor to congratulate you on the brilliant victories of our new army, which are unexampled in history." In the fall of that year this same eloquent local president and general conveyed to me the information that if I would send troops to Northern Luzon he would surrender his command with all war material, stating, in substance, that he did not believe the whole insurgent outfit could create a government, much less maintain one.

But we cannot indulge in details, nor are they relevant except to present Filipino characteristics. Considering its more important operations it may be affirmed that no modern war of similar proportions was ever prosecuted with less regard for strategical principles. With our original small army and retaining Manila as a base, we shoved to a point forty-five miles to the northward, capturing the enemy's capital at Malolos, while with a detached force, boldly moved on his flank, we captured his second capital of San Isidro, thirty miles farther distant to the east of north. An object of the second movement was to attack the enemy's flank and rear while we engaged his front, but his swift retreat by railway made it impossible and the detached force was withdrawn. We retained all other positions and secured our long line of communication against constant insurgent efforts until we had traded armies, receiving other regiments for the volunteer organizations sent home. At the same time we held and supervised the island of Negros, captured and held the most important section of Panay, all of the Jolo Archipelago, and to the

south of Manila beat back the forces which Lieutenant-General Trias concentrated to destroy us or oblige us to release our northern hold.

An enterprising, efficient enemy with half of our numerical strength could have broken our attenuated line and compelled us to retreat from a good portion of the Luzon country which we occupied. But we had become acquainted with the methods of warfare practised by the insurgents, and although they greatly outnumbered us we remained confident and occasionally became aggressive, especially when they attempted to press us in large bodies. Conditions, however, required constant vigilance and a knowledge of the movements of our adversaries, which were gained through the reports of inhabitants and native scouts; and as we had captured forty miles of railway we readily reënforced points of threatened or actual attack.

By November 1 of 1899 our effective army had grown to thirty-five thousand men, of which nearly thirty thousand were available for service in Luzon, and twenty thousand more were expected to arrive during the succeeding two months. We then commenced to put in force a plan of operations for which preparations had been made. Experience taught that it was useless to take possession of country unless troops to protect the inhabitants could remain in it. Assured of continued protection the great majority of the people rendered us willing assistance, but without such assurance they remained for the most part passive, fearing consequences on the return of the native soldiers. Many who had manifested a friendly interest were butchered after our departure, and the orders of at least one insurgent general condemned to assassination all who accepted office under our authority or gave us aid. To secure any permanent benefits, therefore, it was not only necessary to have at hand an adequate military strength to conduct a campaign, but also a sufficient number of troops to garrison conquered country.

Our plan of operations, measured by the rules of scientific warfare, was even more faulty than the preceding one. It was to drive back and so punish the army of General Trias to the south of Manila as to keep it quiet for a time, then place all available force at the north, confine Aguinaldo's army in the low country, and there disperse or capture it. We did it effectually, and the hardships endured by our soldiers during the period of six weeks' active movement have never been appreciated by their countrymen.

The short campaign through Southern Luzon which followed was peculiar in conception and execution. The provinces of Cavite and Batangas in which it was to be conducted contained the homes of the most prominent of the insurgents, had been the hotbed of revolt against Spain, and became unusually hostile to United States authority. We had only penetrated the frontier of Cavite, but, holding stoutly the line of the Pasig River from Manila to the Laguna-de-Bey, we had prevented active coöperation between the insurgent army of the south and the one at the north. The former had made repeated attacks on our southern line — in fact, never permitted us to remain quiet, unless for a short season after experiencing a severe repulse when it was obliged to suspend for repairs. These provinces had a dense population, and we ascertained that in so far as a portion of this army was concerned, quick recruitment from and dispersion among the people, preceding and following attack, was the policy practised. The fierce combatants of to-day became the smiling *amigos* of to-morrow, and success required that they be sharply pursued after defeat and not be given opportunity to reach their homes, shed their uniforms, conceal their arms, and take up the rôle of the humble husbandman. A column capable of rapid movement was formed on the Pasig River near the Laguna-de-Bey some ten miles from Manila. It passed swiftly down the shore of the Laguna, turned westward on the main thoroughfare to the seacoast, on which the insurgents had established their arsenal,

storehouses, and hospitals, when its cavalry was let loose. Within twenty-four hours it had captured the enemy's subsistence, reserve ammunition, guns, money, property, and staff officers in charge, and its leading squadron had reached the sea. The other troops of the column followed, relieved the cavalry which concentrated to the westward. In the mean time our main forces lightly engaged the insurgent army twenty miles northward, until sufficient time had elapsed for the column to take designated positions, when by an irresistible attack they drove and pursued it southward to the highway held by the troops of the column which was able to deal efficiently with its disorganized parts. Many small detachments escaped, but were so relentlessly pursued through the provinces of Batangas, Tayobas, and the Laguna that they were unable to effect a union and those not slain or captured disappeared amid the great body of the people.

By February 1, 1900, the power of the insurgent Government was completely broken, its representative men fugitives or in prison, its resources dissipated and the bulk of its war material seized or destroyed, and it had not won a single victory, nor even scored a success by its constantly practised cunning to surprise, ambush, or outwit our troops, either in Luzon or the other islands where they were quite extensively employed. But the labors of the army had not ceased. The great mass of the people were eager for peace and called for protection from the cruelties of the depraved native element. Fifty thousand men destroyed organized rebellion, but it required more than sixty thousand scattered throughout the Islands to restore order and comparative safety from the chaos the insurgent Government had wrought. Hostilities henceforth consisted of combats with guerilla and *ladrone* bands, led for the most part for individual gain by natives without reputation and little former responsibility. The labors of this so-called work of pacification were attended with such measure of success that in June of 1900, our Government, relying

upon native intelligence to perceive the futility of further resistance, the difficulty of escaping merited punishment for murder and robbery, and to appreciate the advantages of liberal treatment, issued its proclamation of amnesty. It was too soon; neither the intelligence and practical sagacity of the native nor his duplicity and natural tendency for sin were rightly estimated. The four months during which the amnesty ran, and while our troops were inactive, witnessed an increase in crime and renewed efforts for hostile concentration which required several weeks to suppress.

But we must stop here. Neither time nor your patience will permit mention of many pronounced manifestations of insurgent policy and diplomacy, both civil and military in character, which clearly indicated an incapacity on the part of the insurgent leaders to create a stable government; nor can I allude to the internal dissensions, the utter lack of confidence, the intrigue for place and prestige, and the cruel vindictiveness which prevailed in insurgent high places, and which would have wrecked any established government except one of pure despotism.

From experience, study, and much reflection upon the characteristics and capacities of the inhabitants of the Philippines, as displayed in social and domestic life, as well as in the domain of politics and field of war, I have reached the decided conviction that they do not yet possess the qualities and intelligence to enable them, unaided and uncontrolled, to properly care for their own interests; the old racial features and tendencies are still too pronounced and require repression, while direction from without, through precept and example, are essential to a healthy development. I have faith that our Island administration will be the means of so improving them that in the fulness of time and at no distant period they will become fitted, under United States protection, to control their affairs, foreign and domestic.

I anticipate for them not that model of representative gov-

ernment which would realize our ideal of what a representative government should be, — one, for instance, like our own, which has been developed by a slow process of education and experiment from the old Saxon love of individual liberty and is a faithful representation of the hereditary sentiments of our people, — but one in the nature of a graft on a somewhat discordant stem, or rather in the nature of an exotic planted in a somewhat uncongenial soil which under proper care and supervision will root and grow and soon secure sufficient proportions for all needful purposes.

XIV

THE VISIT OF THE ALLIES TO CHINA IN
1900

BY

CAPTAIN HENRY LEONARD
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Read before the Society December 4, 1900

THE VISIT OF THE ALLIES TO CHINA IN 1900

ON the afternoon of June 8, 1900, in command of a detachment composed of one second lieutenant and thirty marines, detached from the regiment at Cavite, in the Philippines, I left Manila Bay in the U.S.S. Nashville, and after a pleasant run of ten days, passed up through the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and arrived off the Taku Bar. The sight which presented itself to view was a magnificent one. The water off Taku being very shallow, vessels of heavy draught are compelled to anchor out of sight of land, and here, with an air of calm, with no apparent *raison d'être*, lay one of the finest fleets ever assembled. About forty men-of-war, of every conceivable type and description, from the frowning and formidable Centurion of Her Majesty the late Queen Victoria's Navy, and the stern, forbidding *Rossia*, of the Russian service, down to the torpedo boat Whistle, which glided in and out among those floating fortresses, represented many nations equally diverse, and indicated to the Nashville complement for the first time that more was at hand than the protection of foreign residents from the inroads of a few Boxers. Gun and bugle announced the presence of admirals and other persons of high degree, and the bursting forth of heavy ordnance in salute gave the whole scene the appearance that a great naval tragedy was about to be enacted. The German ships were all cleared for action, and as we hove to, a graceful German cruiser was circling around a Chinese vessel anchored near by, with demonstrations apparently quite the reverse of friendly.

We found the situation to be briefly as follows: On June 15 a concerted demand had been made by the admirals and senior officers present (in which our admiral did not join) that the Taku forts be surrendered, and that this surrender be

made before 2 o'clock A.M., on June 16; that, at a little before 1 o'clock A.M., on the latter date, fire was opened by the forts on the smaller vessels of the nations, lying in the Pei-ho River abreast of them, and that, had these vessels not shifted their berths shortly after dark, in anticipation of, and out of abundant caution against, such action, they would all inevitably have been sent to the bottom; that prior to the demand on the forts, guards had been sent to the various legations in Peking, and that, subsequently, fearing serious trouble, an additional force of about three thousand of the Allies had started for the same place, under command of Vice-Admiral Seymour, Royal Navy; that this expedition, unable to get into Peking, on account of opposition by heavy forces of Chinese, lay cut off from help at some point between Tien-Tsin and Peking; that the foreign concessions of Tien-Tsin were besieged and in the direst distress, and that all communication with Peking was cut off; that in the fight that followed the firing on the ships, the Chinese forts had been and were in the possession of the Allies — that was the situation.

On the 19th, a further force of one hundred marines from Cavite, under command of Major Waller, having arrived off Taku, the entire command, numbering one hundred and thirty all told, started from the U.S. Flagship Newark on board a small German passenger steamer, which regularly plied between Shanghai and the various Chinese coast towns of importance, but had now been "commandeered" by the German admiral and pressed into transport duty. This subject of transportation, the actual getting of the landing parties from the various ships to the point of disembarkation, a distance of miles, was a vexed one which the different admirals were solving, so far as possible, in various ways. There is not a large number of tugs and lighters in the vicinity of Taku at any time, and those that previously had been there were taken up-river by the Chinese when trouble began. As a result of this, long strings of boats, loaded to their gunwales with ma-

rines and soldiers and towed by launches, could be seen shoving off from the various ships in a never-ending procession, from dawn to dark — during all of this time with a sea running so high that, under conditions admitting of delay, boats would not have been even lowered. Antiquated junks and lighters, in such numbers as were obtainable, were doing valiant transport duty, and small passenger steamers were hurrying to and fro engaged in furthering the same cause. Pursuant to arrangements made by Admiral Kempff, we were taken on board a steamer in which German sailors were being convoyed up-river to garrison some of the captured forts. While on this vessel I was surprised to find that these particular German sailors were armed with a weapon of the most antiquated pattern,— the German Militar-Gewehr of the model of 1876,— but, upon making inquiries into the subject, I was informed by German officers that a new rifle of late design would shortly be issued to them, having long ere that been used by their army troops. The precision of every movement of these ponderous Teutons and their knowledge of infantry drill, together with their erect military bearing, was as surprising as it was pleasant to look upon.

The river trip, so far as we went, was a most picturesque one. Lying off the forts were to be seen the vessels which had been engaged in their reduction, and though few of them were seriously damaged, all bore marks of having been recently in action. As we passed this flotilla, three torpedo boats, formerly the property of the Chinese, which had been captured by the British up the river some distance, were being taken out to the fleet. This capture was most generously shared by the Englishmen — the Germans and Russians each getting one and the captors keeping one for themselves. One of the German gunboats, the *Iltis*, had been hit many times, a shell carrying away her bridge and sending her commander, Captain Lands, to the deck below with a shattered leg. This gallant officer, after being thus grievously hurt, struggled to

his feet, and, clinging to the rail, fought his ship for over an hour, until, exhausted by pain and loss of blood, he fainted on the deck. The last time I saw him was on the occasion of a visit to the German hospital at Yokohama, just prior to my departure from that place. After suffering for three months he was still the life of the institution, and remarked humorously to me that he was then engaged in trying to grow three inches of missing bone in his wounded leg, and that he feared the attempt would end in failure.

Subsequent examination showed that shells from the large guns of the ships had made but little impression on the forts, the walls of which, made of clay mixed with rice straw and water and of great thickness, were pierced, but little damaged. The Pei-ho is a most tortuous stream and keeping a vessel in its channel is a most difficult feat. On one occasion after another, one's sense of distance and idea of location were beclouded by finding the vessel doubling on her course and travelling in a diametrically opposite direction from that originally pursued. The banks on both sides were dotted with densely populated towns, in which the houses were built so closely together as to barely admit of passage between them, where streets were unknown, dogs omnipresent, and filth everywhere. Finally, after a trip unusual in that it was devoid of groundings, we arrived at Tong-ku, and saw the U.S.S. *Monocacy* lying alongside the bank. The latter vessel, since broken up for junk, was an iron, side-wheel river gunboat of venerable type, which had been on the Chinese station from time immemorial. She had been ordered up from Shanghai on the outbreak of the trouble, and was fired on and hit during the Taku fort engagement, though she took no part in the same, as, even had her orders contemplated such action, she was at that time filled with non-combatant refugees. This vessel and her officers rendered invaluable service throughout the hostilities. She was the base on which much-needed supplies were collected and from which they were sent

up the river in armed launches and tugs captured by her crew. To her, after the relief of the concessions, the wounded were sent, and there cared for until they could be despatched to the hospital that the English and American surgeons established at Yaku; in her hospitable ward-room numberless refugees found aid and comfort, and as the Government does not provide for such contingencies, the mess-bills of her favored officers waxed ever greater.

In the yards at Tong-ku, which town is the terminus of the Imperial Railway running to Tien-Tsin and Peking, we found several locomotives and many flatcars, and with these it was determined that a train should be made up which would be used as far as the condition of the road permitted. The train having been gotten ready and equipped by firemen from the Monocacy, our command, together with supplies and implements with which to repair breaks in the road, was embarked, and we started on our journey of thirty miles to the relief of Tien-Tsin. After having gone a short distance we overtook a battalion of four hundred Russians, and, our two commands joining forces, we proceeded to Cheng-liang-Cheng, a small station at which the Russians had established a fortified camp. It was ascertained that the troops here had been without food for thirty-six hours, most of which time they had spent in repulsing repeated onslaughts of Boxers. Having relieved their wants, the train pushed on until the road could be repaired no farther, when we disembarked, sent the train back, and pushed ahead on foot. Arriving at a point about twelve miles from Tien-Tsin, a council of war was held, in which it was decided that we would bivouac for the night where we were and push ahead in the morning. In this council Major Waller's opinion that the force, being too small, should await reinforcements, was overruled — the wisdom of his proposed course subsequently demonstrated itself. Early the following morning, June 21, the entire command, five hundred and thirty strong, marched up the road, the Cossacks, a few of

whom were with the Russians, doing the scouting, and at about 7 A.M., when we had arrived abreast of the great East Arsenal, fire was opened on us by a force of about seven thousand Chinese, intrenched. The shooting of the latter was remarkably accurate, and had we not been covered in one direction by the railway embankment, the losses would have been immense. A brisk engagement ensued, in which the Boxer contingent of the enemy's force endeavored to advance upon us over an open field. In the face of a careful fire on our part, they continued to come on, losing many men, but waving their swords and banners frantically; finally, when they had gotten to within about five hundred yards, our fire became so fierce and the demonstrations of the falsity of their theory of immunity so plentiful, that they turned about and ran — leaving behind their wounded, who continued to rise and wave their swords, only to fall again. An action between seven thousand men and five hundred and thirty could not continue long and could, apparently, have but one termination. Having held our ground as long as possible, and the Russians having commenced to retreat, we fell back, carrying our wounded on our backs. The enemy pursued in force — infantry in the rear and cavalry on the flank — and there followed, for four hours, a retreating fight, in which a force that had been reduced to less than five hundred, embarrassed by their wounded, held at bay fifteen times their number, and finally beat them off, when hope seemed preposterous. At 2 P.M. the little band arrived, without further molestation, at the Russian camp previously referred to, having marched thirty miles, eating nothing, fought for five hours, and saved its wounded from the enemy who is not merciful enough to take no prisoners, but saves them for amusement's sake. On this retreat, men, with the bones of their thighs broken, were carried in the arms and on the backs of their comrades for a distance of many miles, when every movement caused the jagged edges of shattered bones to rub together and made the faces of the sufferers gray

with pain; yet neither word nor deed betrayed their agony, and the only request made by any one was to the effect that, if abandoned they must be, they be allowed to keep their rifles.

That evening our force was augmented greatly by the arrival of English, German, Italian, Japanese, and more Russian troops, and with a command amounting to about two thousand men, we, on the following morning, again started for the foreign concessions. Throughout our advance the booming of heavy ordnance being used against the foreigners could be plainly heard, and the fear that the latter would be unable to withstand such furious cannonading, with its inevitable accompaniments, spurred on the lagging steps of men who were hungry, footsore, and weary, and made even the blinding alkali dust, which the heavy wind hurled in a steady storm against the small command and which cracked the membranes of lips and noses until the not over-plentiful ditch water became palatable drink, powerless to materially impede the advance.

On June 23, by a succession of assaults, the Chinese troops were driven from one line of intrenchments to another, until the inner cordon which surrounded the beleaguered city was pierced, and the foreign troops entered, ragged and dirty, the marines, as Major Waller in his report aptly puts it, "like Falstaff's army in appearance, but with brave hearts and bright weapons." The scene which presented itself to view baffles description: the town had been bombarded and subjected to heavy infantry fire for more than a week; the houses were riddled with bullets and shells; roofs were pierced, walls tottering, and no place safe except a cellar; the streets were furrowed by shells, and Gordon Hall, the Municipal Building of the British Concession, was filled with women and children, whose homes had been ruined or destroyed. Trade had ceased — men had given up their usual avocations for the all-important one of fighting the common

enemy. The river was filled with the bodies of Chinese, and the pontoon bridge, which had been immediately thrown over it, had to be opened frequently to prevent a jam of these human logs. Even Gordon Hall, though less vulnerable by reason of its immense stone walls, had been pierced time and again, and persons having the temerity to sleep in the upper stories of an ordinary house enjoyed a large number of chances of their rest becoming an eternal one. To such extremities had the little band of brave women and fearless men been reduced that it had been tacitly agreed that not many more hours could elapse ere the former, with the children, must die at the hands of their own fathers, brothers, or husbands, to insure their escaping a worse fate, while the latter would join them, after having made the last stand as expensive as possible for their hated besiegers. Small wonder that these people hailed the arrival of the relieving force with an enthusiasm scarcely describable and were generously willing to keep our men in one continuous state of hilarity and bliss, by means of gratuitous issues of Mumm's Extra Dry.

The situation was but little relieved of its gravity, however. Before I go further, it may be well to explain that the foreign settlements, as then constituted, were made up of three concessions, lying on the Pei-ho River, of which the German is the most remote from, the English next, and the French nearest to, the native or walled city of Tien-Tsin, which latter is a mile or so from them. The native city is rectangular in shape, and is surrounded by a wall built with embrasures for artillery and pierced for small-arms fire. South of both the Walled City and the foreign concessions, and about one mile distant from the former, is the big mud wall of Tien-Tsin — a wall about twelve feet high and in places nearly as thick. On each side of this wall is a canal, and the ground lying between the wall and the native city is intersected by burial mounds and irrigation ditches.

Now to proceed with the situation. The work before us was briefly this: The Walled City must be stormed; the arsenals around Tien-Tsin, of which the East Arsenal was the most important, taken, and Seymour's column, from which nothing had been heard, relieved, if it was not already destroyed. To attempt the relief of Peking with the force then at hand would have been but to invite disaster, not only to our command, but to everything we left in our rear. After we had been in Tien-Tsin a day, word was brought in by a Cossack courier that Admiral Seymour's command lay besieged in the Si-ku Arsenal, distant about eight miles from Tien-Tsin, which he had stormed and taken from the Chinese troops. On the morning of the 25th, the advance was commenced to the relief of the English admiral, and after comparatively little opposition, beyond considerable shelling from works we were compelled to pass *en route*, we beat back the besieging force and relieved the garrison of about twenty-five hundred men. Admiral Seymour's forces were, like ours, composed of representatives of all nations. We found that he had arrived at a point very near to Peking, after having had several severe encounters with Boxer hordes, but without molestation from the Imperial troops, until the day the Taku forts were taken, when he encountered a large force of the latter, who, attacking him, he was obliged to fall back before them. He retired in an orderly manner before the many times superior force of excellently armed Chinese, being almost constantly in action from that time until his arrival at the Si-ku Arsenal. The latter was rushed and taken, and in it large stores of ordnance, arms, and ammunition were found, together with a place where his two hundred wounded could receive some medical attention. Here he was laid siege to by the Chinese troops, and by turning his captured guns against them, he was enabled to hold them at bay until our arrival.

Shortly after we had come, the Chinese attacked the joint forces, and it was not until we had advanced upon and driven

them for a considerable distance that we could get a respite from their fire. Having driven them several miles back, we were at liberty to return to the arsenal, and after having thrown out outposts, to spend the time which must elapse ere we could improvise a sufficient number of stretchers to remove two hundred wounded men a distance of eight miles to the foreign concessions, in investigating the captured stronghold. This arsenal was built by Major Von Hannicken, formerly of the German Army, who had for a long time been engaged in constructing works of that character for the Chinese and in training their troops. He, with his family, together with a Colonel of the Russian service and a former Belgian officer, who had been similarly employed, were among those relieved by us at Tien-Tsin — the irony of fate (foreign officers training Chinese troops).

The arsenal is constructed in a sharp bend of the Pei-ho River, on the near bank of which were strong intrenchments. Here the Allies had mounted many Krupp, as well as machine guns, taken from the quantities of those found in the place. In the storehouses were found arms of every sort and description, from the latest model Männlicher rifles and carbines, Mausers, Winchester, and Lee straight-pulls down to Remingtons of the vintage of 1860, and Gingalls, the famous two-men guns. The latter, it may be interesting to state, are guns of large calibre, — more than one inch, — and of considerable weight, which are fired by two men, one of them holding the weapon over his shoulder and the other sighting and discharging it; they make fearful wounds, but are, as may be easily imagined, rather clumsy weapons for modern warfare. In addition to small arms, many Krupp and rapid-fire guns of different kinds were stored in the arsenal, together with an immense supply of ammunition for them all, and such quantities of complete cavalry accoutrements as would be sufficient to equip a number of regiments. The marines and sailors from the U.S.S. *Monocacy*, having exhausted their supply of am-

munition for the Lee rifles with which they were armed, discarded the latter in favor of captured Männlichers, and found the change a most excellent and beneficial one.

On the night of June 25, having filled our canteens from a little cove in which fourteen putrid Chinese soldiers were carelessly floating, and having made a detail of sixteen hundred men to carry the wounded, the column prepared to return to Tien-Tsin. Before doing so trains were laid to the magazine and arm and ammunition houses, whose precious contents there were no means at hand of removing, and after the forces were well clear of the vicinity, the buildings were fired, and one of the finest military storehouses, which China had been industriously equipping since the disastrous Japanese unpleasantness of '95, went up ignominiously in smoke. Having returned to the concessions, Admiral Seymour, being the senior officer present, assumed direction of affairs. By an agreement of the representatives of the Powers, Captain Edward Bayly, Royal Navy, was made provost marshal, and First Lieutenant Henry Leonard, United States Marine Corps, deputy provost marshal, with the understanding that this should not interfere with the military duties of this latter officer.

On June 27, a force composed of eighteen hundred men, the major part of whom were Russians, with detachments from the American, English, German and Japanese forces, took the famous East Arsenal, garrisoned by seven thousand Chinese troops, and which had proven the stumbling-block in our way on our first advance of June 21. Here enormous supplies were found, and the Russians decided to garrison and hold the place, their forces having been greatly augmented, and General Stoessel having taken command. A graphic though flowery account of the engagement is contained in the general order subsequently issued by the Russian General, and which I will quote:—

By the aid of God, and the bravery of my troops and those of other nations, viz: German, English, American, and Jap-

anese, we yesterday succeeded in taking by storm a stronghold of Tien-Tsin known by the name of the East Arsenal. Neither the open plain, covered by frightful, hostile fire, nor the ditches filled with water and soft mud, nor the steep walls, were able to stop the advance of the brave storming party, which only would be ordered to cease the pursuit of their task when the enemy fled in all directions. Hurrah! To you, brave comrades, there is nothing impossible. The Lord, our Protector, will show us the way to other victories and glory. On my part, as chief of the expedition, I wish to express to you my heartfelt thanks and my congratulations on the wreath of laurel with which you have decked your glorious colors anew.

STOESSEL, Major-General.

From this time until the 11th of July followed guard duty of the most arduous nature, broken by frequent reconnaissances in force and expeditions with different objects in view. The Race Course, a Chinese stronghold, was taken, and the West Arsenal captured by storm, the American marines and Japanese being first within its walls. Here further quantities of guns and stores were found, and with this capture, the last of the several works before the foreign troops which was feasible with the force at hand, was accomplished.

There remained now the taking of the Walled City, and the relief of Peking. While awaiting reënforcements many difficult problems had to be worked out. The concessions were being constantly fired upon, and the rain of shot and shell knew no cessation day or night. The troops were quartered in immense "go-downs" or storehouses; men were being killed in them every day; one shell burst among the British marines, killing four and wounding ten; incendiarism was rife; a large sugar warehouse was fired near our quarters, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company's building, the fire threatening to spread indefinitely and was only extinguished after untiring efforts on the part of the English, Japanese,

and ourselves. The German concession was having one conflagration after another; ever-busy spies among the apparently friendly Chinese had to be sought out and dealt with; the efforts of the never-tiring "sniper," as the Chinese sharpshooter was denominated, had to be circumvented and repaid in kind. To preserve the sanitary conditions of the town (a most difficult problem under peace conditions) became well-nigh impossible. Dogs, which are the only things more plentiful than natives in China, were becoming rabid from their feasts on human flesh, and no sight was more common than the spectacle of representatives of this type of degenerate, shaggy cur tearing dead men limb from limb. All these problems had to be met and dealt with, and much of the work belonged to the provost marshals; how well it was done results indicate best.

During this entire period, from June 21 until July 11, the United States forces in China consisted of one hundred and thirty marines. They had taken part in every engagement, expedition, or reconnaissance, had marched ninety-seven miles in the first five days, had lived on one meal a day for six days, and yet were ever cheerful and willing. The high opinion which foreign officers entertained of them was never more forcibly testified to than in the letter of subsequent date of General Dorward, who finally commanded the British forces. He wrote: "I desire to express the high appreciation of the British forces of the honor done them in serving alongside their comrades of the American forces during the long and hard fighting of the 13th instant, and the subsequent capture of Tien-Tsin City, and of my appreciation of the high honor accorded to me by having them under my command. The American troops formed part of the front line of the British attack, and so had more than their share of the fighting that took place. The ready and willing spirit of the officers and men will always make their command easy and pleasant, and when one adds to that the steady gallantry and power of holding on to

exposed positions, which they displayed on the 13th instant, the result is soldiers of the highest class."

On July 11 the Ninth United States Infantry and the remainder of the First Regiment of Marines arrived, and I resumed the duty I had been performing in the Philippines, that of regimental adjutant of the latter command. On the 12th a council of war was held, in which it was decided that the Walled City must be taken, even though the number of troops at hand, it was generally agreed, was insufficient. On the morning of the 13th our command marched out of its barracks at 3 A.M., and, passing through the Taku Gate, formed with the English and Japanese in two columns. These columns then marched on a line parallel to the great mud wall, which, as I have once before said, was about one mile south of the Walled City and a parallel to it. The orders contemplated a meeting of the commanders at a point near the South Arsenal, where detailed instructions for the joint attack would be given. The assault from the south was to be made by a combined force of Americans, English, Germans, French, and Japanese, while the Russians, having a number of troops equal to those of the other Allies together, were to attack and carry the Tree Forts and enter the city from the north side. The Allies, approaching from the south, came under fire at long range, and the troops were hurried into action without the previously mentioned meeting ever being held. The line formed up back of the mud wall, the artillery opening fire on the enemy, who were keeping up a rattling fusillade. The guns of the various commands were posted in the West Arsenal and at points along the wall adjacent thereto, their immediate duty being to silence the 4.7- and 6-inch guns of the Chinese, which were making the place almost unbearably warm, and to batter in the South Gate of the Walled City. A battery of 12-pounders and 4-inch guns from the British ship *Terrible* had been previously mounted on the mud wall. These guns were the same ones that had acted so splendidly

in the relief of Ladysmith and bore on their carriages the significant inscription "From Ladysmith to Peking"; their lyddite shells did fine execution in this action.

The artillery duel having been carried on for some time, the order came from General Dorward for the marines to cross the mud wall and advance on the city, having as their special objective a battery of 4.7-inch guns, with which the enemy were making matters more than disagreeable. The plain lying between the mud wall and the wall of the city was intersected with burial mounds and small irrigation ditches. With the exception of this insignificant protection there was no cover to be had, and the only method of crossing this zone, which was constantly swept and ploughed by a storm of bullets and shells, was by advancing by rushes of fifty or seventy-five yards, and then lying down to recover breath and open fire. We advanced thus to a line of trenches about eight hundred yards from the enemy, when word came to hold what we had, the rest of the line not having succeeded in pushing ahead so far. This was much more easily said than done, as, in addition to the heavy fire which was being poured upon us, the Chinese troops endeavored to flank us twice, advancing on the run and almost succeeding in gaining our rear on one occasion — these instances effectually demonstrating the falsity of the doctrine that Chinese will never charge. Had these flanking movements not been successfully resisted, the whole line, taken in flank and rear, and outnumbered by the troops with whom they were engaged by probably ten to one, must inevitably have been cut to pieces.

At about 5.45 A.M. one of the lyddite shells from the British battery struck and exploded the Chinese magazine in the city, the column of smoke and men going up a thousand or more feet into the air, and the shock being plainly felt a mile and a half away. In the mean time the British, Japanese, French, and German troops and the Ninth United States Infantry, on our right, had advanced as far as practicable, and

almost the entire line being fronted by swamps, the only solid ground running to the front being a narrow roadway, it was impossible to continue without first silencing, to some extent, the fire of the Chinese. The Ninth United States Infantry held the right flank of the line; hence both flanks were confided to the care of American troops. In its position on the right the Ninth was being terribly cut up, and word was sent back to General Dorward requesting reënforcements. In response to this the artillery battery of the Marine Regiment, having exhausted its ammunition in its well-directed efforts against the town, was sent forward as infantry, to support the Ninth. Throughout that long day the conflict went on. There were about six thousand five hundred of the Allies, and, as Colonel Meade in his report aptly puts it, "the Chinese had sixty guns and their forces were variously estimated, — nothing being correct, — but there was a large army of Imperial troops and Boxers."

At 2 o'clock on the next morning, the South Gate of the city was blown in and the troops entered the town, the enemy having evacuated and moved toward the west, under cover of darkness. The city was filled with dead and dying Chinese and the bodies of animals. The Russians entered from the north, and Tien-Tsin was the property of the Allies.

In order to come to some conception of what had been accomplished by the Allied forces, it will only be necessary for me to describe the fortifications and approaches of the city. The latter is surrounded by a wall, built to a height which makes scaling impossible, and composed of a facing of three feet of masonry backed by about thirty feet of solid earth — a fortification proof against artillery fire at all ranges. This facing extends above the earth backing a distance of about six feet, and is pierced with loop-holes and embrasures. The south entrance is through a double gate, and troops having penetrated the outer entrance would be subject to a murder-

ous fire from above until the inner gate should also be breached. The position of the city from a strategic standpoint is an excellent one. In front of the south wall is an unfordable moat, and fronting that are marshes which have various depths at different points. As has been said, the only entirely solid ground over which the wall can be approached is a roadway running from the West Arsenal to the South Gate. The defences were planned by "Chinese" Gordon, — Gordon of Khartoum, — and their excellence would enable a small force to hold out against an army corps if proper dispositions were made.

A temporary government was immediately established for the native city, having as its head a board of officers, on which the various Powers were represented. Major Luke, of the British marines, was made Chief of Police, and the Allies sent details for police duty.

The following proclamation was then issued by Major-General Stoessel, the Russian commander-in-chief, and approved by the senior officers representing the Powers: —

To the inhabitants of the City of Tien-Tsin: —

In bombarding the City of Tien-Tsin, the Allied forces only replied to the attack made by the rebels on the foreign settlements.

At present, as your authorities, forgetting their duties, have deserted their posts, the Allied forces consider it their duty to establish in the city a temporary administration, which you all have to obey. This administration will protect every one wishing to deal in a friendly manner with foreigners, but will punish without mercy every one who causes trouble.

Let the bad people tremble, but the good people should feel assured and quietly return to their houses and begin their usual work. Thus peace will be restored.

Respect this.

TIEN-TSIN, *the 16th of July, 1900.*

Having received what came very near being my quietus in the attack on the Walled City, I lay in a field-hospital in Tien-Tsin, hovering between life and death, while the march on Peking was being executed. Men who were in the advance tell me that there was little fighting of any importance after Tien-Tsin fell. The heat, however, throughout the entire campaign was intense, and the forces, having frequently but little food, suffering from thirst and great heat, and constantly on the march, endured on the Peking trip, as before, hardships difficult to describe. Of the relief of Peking and the situation there, I know no more from actual experience than does my audience.

Now a word or two as to transportation, subsistence, etc. After having abandoned our train, on the first day of our advance, we took all the ammunition and food we could carry in belts and haversacks and cut loose from our base. In the various villages through which we passed on our way up, we corralled every available pony and donkey and pressed him into service for pack purposes. Having command of the scouts for the forces, I saw to it that the American contingent enjoyed as large a proportion of these captures as possible. Probably such a pack-train has seldom been seen: antiquated, solid-wheeled Chinese carts, many of them canopied, and all of them clumsy and heavy, drawn by shaggy Chinese ponies, were mixed indiscriminately with braying donkeys and yelling teamsters, the latter swearing in many tongues at their obstinate charges, yet all with but one end in view — to get to Tien-Tsin in time. The country in that vicinity being remarkably barren and sterile, the only ration obtainable was the not over-abundant supply of hard-tack and canned "Willie" (as the irreverent marine is wont to dub the canned cornbeef with which a wise and beneficent Government provides him). After Tien-Tsin had been taken and sufficient time had elapsed for equipment to be brought from the Philippines, our army mules attracted universal attention and admiration.

The opportunities for comparison of the troops of the different nations, together with their arms and equipment, which were offered in the Chinese campaign, have never been equalled before. The British establishment was well and variously represented. The British marine, who has ever been the admiration of his nation, was to me the perfect type of a splendid soldier. The Wai-hei-wai regiment is composed of Chinese enlisted in the English possessions in China. Uniformed in tight-fitting khaki suits and wearing all the other elements of European dress, the only outward indications that they are Mongols are almond eyes and "pigtailed." These men fought well and with bravery and coolness in every action in which I served with them, and their officers told me that they had done equally well when engaged in suppressing riots, in which their opponents were their own brothers and fathers.

The Indian troops were even more picturesque and interesting, many of them immense men, and all of them with the faces of philosophers. Their quietness of demeanor, splendid discipline, love of and respect for their English officers, in addition to their excellent fighting qualities, make them ideal soldiers. An officer attached to the Sikh regiment remarked to me that the Chinese trouble had been the most beneficial of things for these troops, for, as he suggested, these men, who had previous to this been without honor in their own land, owing to the fact that they had been peace soldiers, would now hold positions of proud preëminence on their return to their native villages on furlough or at the expiration of their enlistments. The expression of keenly felt disappointment which appeared on their faces whenever any expedition went out, of which they were not to constitute a part, testified most forcibly to the fact that they appreciated their opportunities and did not care to have any of them escape unused. The special commissary stores carried by these troops and the numerous little copper utensils with which they are equipped indicate how well England has learned the lesson of respect

for race prejudice. The English troops in general were so excellent, and our relations with each other so cordial, that it was a pleasure to serve with them.

The Japanese I should unhesitatingly number among the best troops in the world. Active, untiring little fellows, highly trained and possessing matchless discipline, they have all the elements necessary to perfect fighting men. During the storming of the Walled City, the Japanese went into action in heavy marching order, and throughout that long, hot day not an ounce of equipment was abandoned; and not only did they come through with knapsacks complete, but appeared on the streets of the Walled City, on the morning following its fall, wearing white gloves. Their rifle, of Japanese workmanship and design, is a combination of the features of several modern weapons. Field artillery of great mobility and effectiveness is another of their possessions, and the marksmanship of their cannoners was demonstrated on many occasions.

The Russians, as troops, inspire respect by their stolid indifference to death and their almost servile obedience; but one gains the impression that the common soldier is better trained, in proportion, than his officers. As to his other traits it would not be the part of policy to comment.

With regard to the German, I should say he is too mechanically taught; and concerning the French and Italians, as I cannot compliment, I do not care to criticise.

With reference to the question of uniform and rifle — the khaki and the Krag-Jorgensen have, in many respects, no superiors, but the blue shirt should go. As an outer garment it makes a target of greater conspicuousness than the much-ridiculed crimson coat of the Briton; the German gray would make a welcome substitute. The emphasis which should be placed on the necessity for the adoption of a suitable intrenching tool for our troops cannot be overestimated.

Now a word or two for the other man — the man we have been fighting. In this war, many theories with regard to the

despised Chinaman have been exploded. The idea that he cannot or will not fight is the most prominent of them, and the impression that he will not charge, another — he has done both of these things. China has for the last five years been going through considerable of a military renaissance. The Japanese War taught her that, though she might despise and hate the white man, with his ridiculously young institutions and religion, she could not afford to spurn his military sagacity and destructive inventions. So foreign officers are sought after and highly paid, foreign engineers build her forts and arsenals, foreign concerns make and sell her arms, and settling down to real business, though on a proportionately small scale compared to her resources, she decides to profit by these things. The improvement that has been made is amply demonstrated by the fact that these men who, a few years ago, fought with spears, bows and arrows, and tom-toms, fired modern rifles and great guns with an accuracy of marksmanship which more than surprised every officer engaged against them, including their former instructors. In every case of the panic-stricken rout of the Chinese in the late trouble, the inspiring cause of it was the anxiety of their officers to save their own precious skins, which caused them to depart precipitately when the Allies came at them with a charge and a yell; the best of troops have been known to break, when deprived of their leaders. Apropos of Chinese it may not be uninteresting to state that, when the military college at Tien-Tsin was attacked by the foreigners on the outbreak of hostilities, the cadets, though outnumbered and cornered, fought until the last, being killed under beds, in which positions they refused to surrender and were taking final shots at the enemy.

What a man will do as a soldier who looks forward to death as a consummation greatly to be desired, whose condition is at present as bad as it can possibly be, and who hopes for, and is taught to expect, the best in a subsequent world, — who can live on a handful of rice, drink dirty ditch

water without any evil effects, sleep in the mud and stand the greatest of fatigue, — what this man will do, when excellently armed and trained and well led by competent officers, is a question pregnant with possibilities. What a hundred million of them will do, under like conditions, is a matter which it is not pleasant to contemplate.

XV

THE NECESSITY OF A BROADER SYSTEM
OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION IN
THIS COUNTRY, AND OUR
MILITARY POLICY

BY

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CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.A.

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THE NECESSITY OF A BROADER SYSTEM OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION IN THIS COUNTRY, AND OUR MILITARY POLICY

I APPRECIATE very much the honor done me in inviting me to address you on the military policy of the United States. I am particularly anxious to present to the people of our country, in a broad and general way, our present condition of unpreparedness and lack of any systematic, well-ordered scheme for the development of our military resources on lines and through methods which would make them immediately available in case of war.

A serious attempt is being made to secure a proper redistribution of troops—a redistribution which will be both strategically and economically advantageous. At present our troops are scattered over the country, many of them at stations which now have no military utility—stations which were built long years ago to guard the settlers against Indians who are now dead or scattered; so that there is no military reason for the continuance of troops at these points. Many of them are remote from the centres of population and supply, the country roundabout them furnishes little in the way of supplies and few recruits, and their location is such that in case of manœuvres or a concentration on either frontier they have to be moved long distances. The forces which have worked for their continuance have been purely local interests, both of communities and individuals; these have been strong enough to continue in many instances a most undesirable, expensive, and, from a military standpoint, unsound, disposition of troops.

The present policy is to concentrate the troops of the mobile army (infantry, cavalry, and field artillery) in three areas:

on the Pacific Coast, near Puget Sound, San Francisco, and Los Angeles; on the Atlantic Coast, in the Buffalo-Albany region, in the Atlanta-Chattanooga area, and in the vicinity of San Antonio; and two or three main groups in the Mississippi Valley; also an east-west line of stations through the Central West, including Forts Riley, Leavenworth, and Benjamin Harrison.

The reservations which will be abandoned can be sold ultimately to good advantage, and it is hoped that the funds obtained from such sales will be deposited and held subject to appropriation by Congress for the reëstablishment of the army at the new stations. It is not intended to concentrate all the troops of an area at the same post or station, but within these areas to have them so located that they can be concentrated for manœuvres without undue loss of time or undue expense.

The policy is a sound one; it means economy and a strategically sound disposition of the army. It is bound to go through, although there will be strong opposition from communities and individuals adversely affected. These dispositions, of course, do not include the seacoast artillery, which necessarily is stationed at the various seacoast defences along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts.

The general plan above outlined will result not only in economy of supply and maintenance, but will permit of concentration of the tactical units — brigades and divisions — for the instruction and manœuvres, without involving an expense which is under present conditions prohibitive, and will make it possible for our officers of high rank to handle commands such as they would be called upon to command in war, and give these officers very necessary training. It will permit the different elements of the regular army — infantry, cavalry, and field artillery — to operate together and get that kind of practice which will build up team play; enable them each to play their proper part in conjoined operations. This is just as important for the army as it is to get the different portions of a foot-

ball team to working smoothly together. We can do much work apart, but to weld the team into an effective whole, line and backs must work together. So it is with the different armies; they must work together in peace to be a smooth working whole in war. To wait until war comes to do this is to have learned nothing from experience, and to court disaster.

We have spent great sums of money upon our army. We have spent, are spending, and will have to spend for a long time enormous sums for pensions. We are not receiving an adequate return for the money spent on our army; too few men are included in our scheme of instruction, and men are retained in service much longer than is necessary to instruct them properly in their duties as soldiers. I do not refer to non-commissioned officers, or to the commissioned personnel of the army, who are really the teaching force, but to those private soldiers who come into the army and remain thirty years, serving, many of them, for retirement, others for a long period of years, and through lack of a reserve system are lost to the service.

What we are especially anxious to establish is a system under which we can pass through the regular army as many men as possible consistent with their thorough preparation to discharge efficiently their duties as soldiers in case the country should require their services, and to hold them in an organized reserve for a number of years.

It is most important that men, after their period of active service, should be held in a reserve, so organized as to make them immediately available in case of war. For a considerable time the War Department has been attempting to secure the enactment of legislation looking to the establishment of a reserve, and the matter has received much attention on the part of various members of Congress, and legislation secured which, while far from perfect, makes the beginning of a reserve possible, though its many objectionable features will, I fear, make recruiting much more difficult. A bill has recently been intro-

duced in Congress by Mr. Tilton, of Connecticut, which is perhaps the best presentation of the subject that has been made to Congress in the form of a proposed legislative enactment.

The reserve should be sufficiently large to fill the regular army to the maximum authorized strength and to provide for the losses which would occur during the first six months of war. This should be the maximum expected of a reserve. It would be far wiser to have the reserve of such strength that it would be sufficient, not only to fill up the regular army and provide for the losses of the first six months, — which amount to about thirty per cent, as a rule, from all causes, — but also to provide officers and men for new organizations.

The same general reserve principle as that proposed for the regular army should be applied to the militia, in order that it may have enough reservists to bring it to full statutory strength and provide for losses during the period above referred to. The War Department has expended, and is expending, a great deal of effort in making the militia thoroughly efficient. Especial care is exercised in the selection of officers who are assigned to duty with the militia, and no effort spared to build up interest among the militia and to raise its standards. The response of the greater portion of the militia has been very encouraging, and it is believed that under the system now in force the militia will, within reasonable time, become a very efficient military force, ready to take its place immediately in the first line and with the regular army meet the shock of the first months of war, during which period the volunteers must be raised and given such hasty instruction as will always be necessary until our system of military service and obligation has been much extended. The purpose of the Department is to have one officer of the regular establishment with each military regiment or equivalent thereof. At present the great shortage of officers does not permit this being done.

‡ I want to invite your attention briefly to the great and useless sacrifice which lack of preparation has cost us in previous

wars, and the humiliations which have come upon us from depending upon the sudden call to arms of totally untrained and undisciplined men. The United States has never engaged in war with a first-class power prepared for war in which aid has not been furnished us, either directly or indirectly, by another power.

In the Revolutionary War, as you know, we received most valuable aid from France at a most important and critical period — aid, the value of which only those who have studied the Revolutionary War from a military standpoint appreciate. The French fleet and regular division were of simply inestimable assistance, and their part in bringing about the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was one the importance of which is difficult to overestimate.

Our war with England in 1812–14 was only a military incident of the great war which England was waging. She had nearly all her military strength engaged in the great series of campaigns which terminated in the downfall of Napoleon, and the force sent to the United States was a small one. Her aggressive operations were few, and principally limited to the attack on Washington, which was wholly successful, and the unsuccessful attack on New Orleans. On our side, the conduct of the war was exceedingly discreditable and frightfully costly. We suffered a long chain of defeats, and failed almost entirely in our aggressive operations. The greatest number of British regular troops in this country at any one time was about 16,800, while we enrolled for the war 527,000 men. Washington was abandoned and our President compelled to fly from our Capital after a defence which is one of the most humiliating incidents in our military history. Although our troops greatly outnumbered the attacking force, they made only a show of resistance, and abandoned the field and the Capital with a loss of eight killed and eleven wounded. The only resistance worthy of the name was made by a small party of sailors from some vessels of the navy; and yet the men who constituted

the greater portion of the defence were drawn from a section which had furnished some of the best troops of the Continental line; but they were untrained and unprepared, and their conduct was such as should have been expected. On the sea our navy did most creditable and gallant service. Its men were trained and well organized.

The war with Mexico was very successfully conducted. Mexico was a weak power, and not in any sense a first-class power prepared for war.

The conditions under which the Civil War was fought were peculiar, and would not apply in a war between our country and any of the great powers. In the Civil War, both North and South started upon a more or less equal footing, so far as their training and lack of preparation were concerned; both sides learned the art of war together, and in time developed magnificent armies and splendid leaders; but it is not difficult to see what the result would have been had either side been well prepared. Our next enemy will be prepared to the minute, and the blow will fall before we realize war is to come. Our wealth and population will not make good our criminal lack of preparation.

It should be remembered that undeveloped military resources are of no more value in the sudden onset of modern war than an undeveloped gold mine in Alaska in a crisis in Wall Street.

There is one thing which the Civil War gave us which few people appreciate. It gave us, from the 2,600,000 men in the Northern armies, and the million or more in the Southern armies, a reserve of probably two millions of men trained in that best of all schools — the school of war. This reserve was for a number of years available as an effective force, although not organized, it is true, but the men had had extensive military experience, and represented tremendous military potentiality, and for perhaps fifteen years after the war would have given us splendid material with which rapidly to build up

effective armies. But this force has now passed away as a military resource, as those who survive, both officers and men, are too old for active military work; and in case of war to-day we would be required to build up armies almost wholly from untrained and uninstructed men. We would have as a nucleus of such a force only the regular army and the militia, the latter less valuable than the former as a leaven for the mass of raw material, because it would itself require concentrated and hard work to bring it to a degree of first-class efficiency, and could not safely absorb any large amount of raw material other than that which came to it from its own reserve.

It will be seen that we are confronted with a very serious difficulty in the way of building up a reserve of trained enlisted men. At present we have no available reserve of trained men except, possibly, such a one as could be made up of men who have passed through the regular army, marine corps and militia, and are still of an age which renders efficient service possible. These men are under no obligation to come to the colors, other than the influence of patriotism; they are not organized, and we do not know where they are; and the idle, foolish talk of the "Peace-at-any-price," "No-more-war" people is doing a great deal, not only to destroy all sense of obligation on the part of this class of trained men to hold themselves in readiness to return to the colors, but tends to dull the natural instincts of others to fit themselves for service. These blind leaders of the blind are doing this through reiterated and empty assertions that there are to be no more wars, and statements depreciative of patriotic ideals, depreciative not only of sane preparation, but belittling willingness to make the supreme sacrifice when the needs of the country demand it. They are refusing to put the lifeboats on the ship, and asserting that storms are to come no more.

The reservists, if they are to be immediately available, should be listed; their whereabouts and all the details about

them known—their qualifications, sizes for uniforms, shoes, etc. These data should be carried in the companies to which they are assigned, and the reservists in turn should know exactly to what organizations they are to report. These are the simple general basic principles which should govern in any well-ordered reserve. The reservist's card of assignment should carry with it an order for transportation on any railroad line to his designed point of rendezvous in case of a call to arms.

Serious as the question of men is, the question of officers is still more serious. We have a very small force of trained officers in this country, and we have not taken any systematic or well-ordered steps to secure one in time of war. We should require, for a mobilization of 600,000 men, including regulars and militia, which would be our minimum mobilization in time of war, at least 16,000 new officers. Six hundred thousand men does not seem a large number when it is remembered that in the Civil War, on the Northern side, we enrolled something over 2,600,000 men, and on the Southern side, probably over 1,000,000. Considering our long coast-line and many important cities to whose defences a number of troops must be assigned, the estimate of 600,000 men is an extremely conservative one; probably we should have to exceed it greatly in the first months of war. So that the question of officers to handle, with any degree of efficiency, this enormous amount of new material, is one of the most serious problems which confront us. The question is, Where are we going to get them? The quick onset of modern war does not give time for preparation after its declaration. Modern nations are prepared to act quickly; wars are quickly undertaken and rather quickly over, and woe to the country which is not prepared. No time will be given us to train our officers; we must find some method of developing them in time of peace. We have the regular army from which a limited number of officers could be taken, presumably for assignment to higher commands; the militia, which would furnish a certain number of

officers for the volunteers ; and the graduates of some of our best military schools, who will undoubtedly go largely into the volunteers : but after exhausting these, we should probably require at least sixteen thousand officers. These must be developed from absolutely untrained material. It does not require argument to show the folly of permitting a situation of this kind to continue. We must make some adequate preparation for training to a reasonable extent a body of reserve officers. The question comes up as to how we can best do it. I believe the following plan is a practicable one.

We have at military schools throughout the country officers of the regular army, active and retired, on duty as instructors in the military art. The number of pupils at these schools is something over twenty-five thousand. If we could take from the four or five thousand students who graduate at these colleges each year, say, eight hundred young men who are recommended by the military instructors as being of the right type, commission them for one year in the regular army as provisional second lieutenants, junior in rank to all second lieutenants in the regular establishment, give them full pay and allowances of second lieutenants, but not require them to purchase all the uniforms, and at the end of a year discharge such as qualify with certificates of fitness for the position of an officer of volunteer infantry, cavalry, field or coast artillery, we should accomplish a great deal toward building up this reserve corps of officers, and we should adopt an economical and effective method of securing them, for nothing can be so frightfully and woefully expensive as to develop them at the cost of the lives of thousands of our men, lives thrown away due to lack of preparation.

Moreover, the young men serving for a year with the regular army would in a measure serve to offset the absenteeism of officers incident to duty with the militia, schools and colleges, recruiting service, etc. Again, it would give us an opportunity to select from these young men those who should go

up for the regular examination for appointment to the army from civil life. I believe the plan would be an attractive one to a great many youngsters in these schools, who have a desire to fit themselves for possible military service. They would be able to leave the service with a considerable amount of money in pocket, and the year in the regular establishment would be of all-around benefit to them. They would be sought for by the militia, and as our reserve is built up would be available for assignment as officers of the reserve force.

This plan certainly has sufficient merit to warrant its being given a trial, and I believe it is one which, if tried, will, with such modifications as experience may indicate, provide a reserve of fairly well-instructed officers, certainly far better instructed than under any conceivable method which could result from instruction given in the short period which intervenes between the declaration of war and actual fighting.

As to the cost of a reserve: We can maintain ten men in the reserve for what we can maintain one on the active list. The reservist, after furnishing his period of service with the colors, or active service, could pass to the status of a man on furlough, and receive a small monthly pay, say, \$2.50, and should be given to understand that he will not be called to the colors — that is, to active service — during his reserve period, except in case of war and for instruction; for this latter purpose, for not to exceed ten days every other year. When mobilized or called to the colors for instruction, he should receive full pay and allowances, transportation, etc. Under this system the reservist would be able to make his arrangements to enter into business, follow his trade, contract for services, etc., with an assurance that nothing but war and the far separated periods of instruction would interfere with his business pursuits or obligations.

We trust that with some modifications of the reserve law recently enacted we shall be able to build up a really efficient reserve, and that the militia, through the necessary legal en-

actments in the various States, will be able to do likewise, and will follow along the general lines indicated by the army. The system of enlistment upon which we have proceeded until very recently has been short-sighted and extravagant, and one which is of little value in preparing the country for war with a first-class power.

Under our old system we rather encouraged the men to stay on as long as possible with a view to retirement at the end of thirty years. This long service, in the purely police work which the army was doing in connection with Indian wars, had certain advantages. It kept in the service a certain number of men who had become habituated to conditions on the frontier and the method of Indian warfare, etc.; but even for that work the advantages were few and the disadvantages many.

One of the most demoralizing effects of this long service was upon the officers themselves. The company was filled up with old soldiers; the men had been through several instruction periods; the necessity for training in night operations, practice marches, instruction in field fortifications, etc., became less and less apparent, and were more and more neglected. Officers became more or less indifferent. It was a good deal as though a man were teaching school, having the same pupils all the time, with a very limited course to give them, and going over it year after year until both students and instructor become indifferent and inert. It was destructive of initiative and progress.

Again, looking at the long service from the standpoint of cost, it will be seen that it is a most unwise and extravagant system. The soldier's pay increases progressively for the first eighteen years of service, and then runs on flat up to the date of discharge. We take our men anywhere from twenty-one to thirty-five years of age, and get most of them in the early twenties. Their physical condition is probably at its best for the first fifteen years; from that time on they are physically

less fit for field service, and therefore less valuable as soldiers, and yet they are receiving the maximum of pay and are approaching a time at which they will be retired. It is generally the practice to retire old soldiers on thirty years' service as non-commissioned officers, many of them as first sergeants, with the retired pay of \$67.50 per month. In other words, we keep a man for thirty years; we give him ten times the period of service which is necessary for his thorough training; the last half of his thirty years being at the maximum of pay, while he is physically on the decline; and we then retire him with retired pay running in round numbers from \$30 to \$67.50 per month — we retire him on a pay, which he draws until he dies, equivalent to the pay of from two to four and a half active soldiers during their first enlistment, during their period of greatest physical efficiency. The system does not give us a single reservist, and is a most extravagant one in every way. It is unsound from the standpoint of military efficiency, and it is undesirable in that it creates a class of long-service soldiers, not belonging to the teaching group above referred to, namely, officers and non-commissioned officers; and it is deadening to both officers and men.

Under the new system which it is hoped it will be possible to put in force, the army will become a training school, in which the officers and non-commissioned officers occupy the places of instructors, and as many men will be put through it and passed into a reserve as is consistent with thorough training. We want to train as many men as possible in the shortest time consistent with thorough instruction, and then return them to their industrial careers, to which we believe they will return better for the training they have received. The period of reserve service which should follow the active service should be sufficiently long to guarantee a reserve of at least three times the strength of the active establishment.

Just how long it takes to train a man thoroughly is a question; but, personally, I believe we can train a man thoroughly

in two years. I am willing, however, to accept the three-year period, with a proviso that at the end of two years men who have demonstrated their fitness can be transferred to the reserve. Generally speaking, men who object to the reserve idea are those who expect to depend wholly upon volunteers in case of war. They tell you that it takes three years of hard work to make a soldier, and in the same breath speak confidently of developing volunteers in case of sudden war. In view of the suddenness of modern wars, those statements are so inconsistent as to deserve little attention.

I believe the new policy will be carried out, and that we shall be able to build up a reserve system; and I hope we shall be able to revivify in the youth of this country a sense of their responsibility to the country in the time of war, and that they will see that it is up to them to support measures looking to the provision of an adequate system of training, in order that if we are so unfortunate as to become involved in war they may be ready to play their part efficiently.

We do not now see any war in front of us: but three months from now we may be confronted by a great crisis; no one can tell. We have recently mobilized a large portion of our regular establishment; and elsewhere grave questions confront us which may at any time involve us in a struggle with some great power well prepared for war. The statement that there will be no more wars is an idle, foolish statement; it is to assume, without any reason for the assumption, that the conditions that produce wars no longer exist. So far as we know anything of history we find it full of the stories of war, and it is difficult to understand how any straight-thinking man can for a moment assume that wars will not continue to occur. As for our wars, all of us who have read, even superficially, the history of the country, know that they have, from an administrative standpoint, been badly conducted, and that they have been wasteful in the way of money and unnecessarily extravagant in human life, through lack of any well-

ordered system looking either to proper administrative handling of the war or the preparation of trained officers and men. We have stumbled into military complications without any reasonably adequate preparation in time of peace, and as a result we have paid enormously, both in men and treasure. Are we always to do this? Fortunately, hitherto we have not met, unaided, a great nation prepared for war; that experience is surely before us, sooner or later. As yet we have done little in the way of intelligent preparation.

It seems to me that there is a very sharp distinction between advocating militarism and preaching military preparedness, and that we show lack of intelligence and prudence in disregarding entirely the lessons of the past and in failing to take notice of the object-lessons given us by the preparedness of foreign countries, countries with which our great commercial development and other serious questions are liable to involve us in difficulties, difficulties which, much as we may want to adjust them by arbitration, will result in war, and be settled only by a resort to arms, for there are many questions which cannot be arbitrated. We cannot well arbitrate questions involving the Monroe Doctrine, for instance, or questions involving rights of certain aliens to citizenship in this country. In brief, many of the most vital questions which confront this country are outside of the field of arbitration. And again, those who preach arbitration of everything, even questions of national honor, are forgetful of the fact that peace, under certain conditions, is more dreadful than war, because it indicates an absence of many of the best qualities which go to make a people, and that their place has been taken by those ignoble qualities which mark the decadence of a people and have the stamp of moral degeneracy. They also fail to recognize the fact that human nature has not undergone a radical change, and that war cannot be done away with until great and powerful peoples, recognizing a necessity vital to their race or interest and realizing that they have the power to acquire what

they need through force of arms, are willing to subordinate everything to the decision of others. This means a radical reconstruction of human character, and the removal of the forces which result in the survival of the fittest; and they who are preaching to the youth of this country the policy of "Do not fight, no matter what happens; arbitrate everything, even national honor; raise no questions as to citizenship, even though it involve the injection among the people of this country of material impossible of assimilation," are injecting into the patriotic spirit of the youth of this country a kind of moral syphilis, which will be as destructive to the patriotic spirit of our youth as is syphilis itself to their bodies and their physical health.

It is well to remember that history and human experience do not warrant the assumption that peace breeds better men. No one can claim with justice that Italy, from 1720 to the Napoleonic wars, presented a condition which from a moral standpoint was preferable to those of less peaceful times. As a matter of fact men degenerated. The present tendency among certain well-meaning but unguided people to ask some one else to settle our difficulties means, if accepted by our people, national degeneration. Lack of conviction and of a willingness to die for what we believe to be the right, is decadence, nothing more, no less.

It has been well said that a virtuous community which neglects its political duties may fall before a less moral nation which discharges those duties. Cromwell realized this, and expressed it. He knew that justice and spiritual aspirations would have been of little avail without discipline and training.

Armies are not necessarily for conquest; in fact, under present conditions they are seldom so used. They are maintained more for protection, and the reason for their being is based largely upon apprehension, or a desire to hold what a nation considers vital to its interests. They are to nations

what safe deposits and police are to the citizen — something to safeguard things which there is reason to believe other people would take if they were not adequately protected.

Then again, there is another effect of military service which our people often overlook, and that is the benefit to the nation from the physical upbuilding and the mental discipline which results from military training. The military countries of Europe have a criminal rate far lower than our own, and we must admit one of two things: either that they are inherently a more law-abiding and morally better people, or that they have had something in the way of training which has made them more respectful of authority, of law, and more observant of the rights of others. We cannot admit that they are inherently a better people, and I think it is only fair to conclude that the effect of their military training has been, not only to build up the physical well-being of the men, but to increase their respect for law and order and their observance of the rights of others. Those who are best qualified to speak on the subject say that the gain in efficiency resulting from military training, in France and Germany, for instance, has been from fifteen to thirty per cent. The man who has passed through his military service has not only been improved physically, learned to respect law and order, and become disciplined in mind and body, but is in every way a more useful and valuable man, whether it be as a laborer, or as an employee in a business house, or in any other position of trust and responsibility; he is a more dependable and better-trained working machine than a man who has not had this training. The time lost is far more than offset by the gain in efficiency.

Moreover, there is another thing which is of vital importance in any country: I refer to the effect of universal service which, broadly speaking, all share alike. It makes tremendously for the building-up of a firm national spirit and the binding together of all classes of society in one common purpose, namely, the defence of the country, and the creation of

a spirit of sacrifice and willingness to prepare one's self so to be ready that each one may be prepared to discharge efficiently his particular duty in war. This influence is tremendous and far-reaching in making a nation.

Again, the men learn how to take care of themselves, not only in matters of personal sanitation, but under conditions of outdoor life. There is all the difference between a man, when he comes to the colors and when he leaves after two years, that there is between an undeveloped, untrained horse and the well-developed hunter. No one who has seen the recruits coming to the colors and the two years' service men leaving can doubt the physical benefits which these men have received. It is the general experience of all observers that they have been greatly improved in efficiency. They are the better men for the work and struggle of life. The discipline and habits of promptness and exactness which they have acquired in the service make them desired in preference to men who have not had this training. They learn to do things when and as told.

The economic gain to the countries having military service has been very great; and coincident with general military service has been a rapid advance in wealth and education, and great improvement in the conditions of public order; since its establishment, the great countries of Europe have had more of peace than ever before.

Beneficial as general military training would be to our youth, such a proposition would not at present receive any large measure of support; but I believe that as time goes on it will be more and more thought of, and that we shall eventually come to it, or something very close to it.

Probably the Swiss system more nearly represents one which would be workable in this country than any other. There practically every able-bodied man has to prepare himself to discharge the duties of a soldier, and yet the training is so arranged and divided up into short and condensed pe-

riods of instruction that very few men are under arms for any length of time. This country, with a small population, has a military system under which it can turn out on two or three days' notice 230,000 men, and has back of these some 300,000 well-trained men as a reserve, and it accomplishes all this for less than six million dollars a year.

No people in the world are more law-abiding and self-respecting than the Swiss. Their criminal rate is far lower than ours. The sense of individual responsibility among these people is so thoroughly developed that practically all the men on the active list have their military arms and equipments in their houses, well taken care of, and always ready for use. In other words, every man, during the period of his military life, realizes his responsibility to the country, and stands prepared and ready to discharge it. He would be discredited and without honor among his people if he failed to perform this most sacred duty of the citizen.

What intelligent person would claim that a system of military instruction which would prepare the young men of this country to discharge efficiently their duty as soldiers in war, develop a sense of individual responsibility to be ready, and give them a period of helpful discipline and healthy life, would not be of the greatest benefit? Our young men have not received any serious impression in the schools and colleges of their duty to the country in war; at least, it has not been impressed upon them that a part, and a very vital part, of the citizen's duty to the State, is to fit himself to discharge a duty which is little thought of in this country, namely, the duty of a soldier when his country needs him. They have heard too much of the arbitration quackery of the day, and been taught that it will replace the resort to arms when vital issues arise. (I use the word "quackery" deliberately, because while we want arbitration this talk of arbitration of everything savors of the patent remedy which is advertised to cure all diseases.) No statement is more completely indicative of

a failure to appreciate the teachings of history and few are more untrue, more dangerous, or more destructive of those qualities of firmness and spirit of sacrifice when duty calls, which a people must guard and cherish if they are to live and progress.

There is a great deal of idle talk, by people who have not looked beneath the surface, which would lead one to suppose that armies and navies are anxious for war, and are often the creators of war. Nothing is farther from the truth. The causes of war are almost always traceable to those great vital issues which surround the life and welfare of the people; the people themselves, acting under the impulse of popular feeling, make war; governments only declare it. To say that armies and navies desire and encourage war simply because they are trained for it is about as sound as to say that the life-saving service on the New England coast is thirsting for an opportunity to put their boats out in a winter gale simply because they have been taught to do it in case they have to do so as a life-saving measure.

Despite all we may do and say, wars will come in the future as in the past, and our duty is to make reasonable preparation. We have not done so yet. No greater service can be done the people of this country than by impressing upon them these facts: To wait until war is upon us is to invite grave disaster; to fail to establish a definite military policy and to depend in the future as in the past upon the most expensive, vicious, and demoralizing of all systems, — the bounty system, — is to announce that we have learned nothing from the lessons of our past wars and their needless expenditure of life and money. We have no right to send our young men into war without previous training, and under officers who are ignorant of their most elementary duties; it is criminally wrong. It is well to remember, as I have stated before, that we have not had any experience in war with a first-class power prepared for war in which we have not been aided, directly or indirectly. We have never been engaged in

war under modern conditions with any great nation prepared as all of them now are for immediate action. Any one who looks back to the panicky conditions on our Eastern seacoast when it was reported that an insignificant Spanish fleet was bound in this direction can realize what the state of public mind would be in case we were confronted with a war with a great power, full of energy and ready to the moment.

Please do not think I am preaching militarism, for I am not. We do not want a large standing army in this country. We do want a system which will give us the largest possible number of instructed men — men who have had sufficient military training to fit them to discharge their duties as soldiers in war, and have returned to their industrial careers ready to respond when needed.

XVI

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

BY

CAPTAIN F. E. CHADWICK, U.S.N.

Read before the Society March 4, 1902

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

I THINK I may start the subject of the Naval War College by saying that war is a pure matter of business; an enterprise like any other, it is a mere question of degree of importance. As to this degree, it must be granted, of course, that the business of war stands in the front rank, as the consequences of its outcome are of supreme importance to the State.

Say what we may, feel as we may regarding war, its iniquity, its cruelty, its injustice, we have to face the fact that it is with us, for this generation at least and probably for many more. No man can now foresee the time when nations will cease to wage war. It certainly will not come until there is such a feeling of universal brotherhood that the custom-house and national boundaries shall disappear; until it shall make no difference to any man as to the race which looks after the moral and social well-being of any particular part of the earth, and that we shall be as content to live under the administration of the Chinaman as under that of our own blood. This is the stern logic of such a discussion. We have only to put the question to ourselves as to whether we shall sit quietly and let certain races expand and occupy lands at will; whether we should be content to see Russia overwhelm and occupy all Asia, Constantinople, and the near as well as the farthest East, and, if she thought well of it, to overrun and swamp by mere numbers the western coast of America. Or should we be willing to see Germany do the same, though so much more closely allied with us in what we may call race genius? And such things are on the cards. The final outcome, I believe the final world government, is going to be in the hands of the race, all other things being equal, which shows the greatest

productiveness, which rears to manhood the greatest number of men. I do not think the importance of this phase of the question can be exaggerated. The race that breeds the greatest number of children must in the end overtop and overwhelm any race of like mental quality whose productiveness is not equal to that of the former. This has been one of the great elements of England's superiority; it is to-day one of the points in Germany's favor; it is at the root of the decadence of France.

The only thing which can save the less productive race in the contest for world supremacy is a greater mental and physical ability; a greater capacity for government; a greater command of the elements of force. We ourselves are beginning to think we have a right to a voice in the world's affairs; we have said so very markedly in regard to one part at least, South America; and we have intimated lately that we have considerable interest in the way things are going in China. But apart from any antagonisms which may arise from mere interference in world matters, as a member of the world's society, we are rapidly advancing to a time when we are going to find in the greater part of the rest of the civilized world an enmity with which heretofore we have never counted. The world's feelings are governed by its *pockets*, and we are putting our hands very deeply into those of Europe, and they are, by the necessity of a *force majeure*, going much deeper. This *force majeure* is coal. Coal is the basis of manufacturing energy. The United States by the grace of nature has had bestowed upon it this power in a greater degree than any other country in the world, so far as yet known. In cheapness, in wide distribution, there is no country which can for a moment stand comparison. Our product is increasing in a rapid ratio and is of practically unlimited extent; that of Europe is practically at a standstill and must soon decrease, not only from the depth of mines and difficulty of working, but from actual working-out of deposits. We are thus destined to be the

manufacturing centre of the world, and we have to seriously consider what will be the attitude of the nations which will be so vitally injured by this preëminence.

If history has taught any one thing, it is that in later ages at least war is the outcome of commercial rivalry. We have come to recognize the fact that commerce is the great war-producing factor; that nations fight in order that they may sell, and we are faced, as never before, by this question as applied to ourselves.

You may think, possibly, that there is not much in this about Naval War College, but the fact is that herein is to be found the reason for its existence, which is the study of these great conditions which we are bound to face, and to devise, as far as may be done by preparation, the way of meeting the difficulties which may arise through the antagonisms which are bound to come.

The War College is thus a place for the study of war conditions in all phases.

As suggested before, I think we may grant that war is the largest and most difficult business in which any one can engage. It is always the disruption, in some degree, and sometimes in their entirety, of all our social forces and conditions, and a clearing of the way for their reconstruction. It is the letting loose of the social volcano, and the guidance of these gigantic forces is principally the province of the admiral and the general. If study and experience are necessary in banking, in administering a governmental department or a great system of railways, it is naturally the part of wisdom to suppose that they may be good, in fact, necessary, in this business of war which is so much greater than any which can fall to our civilian brother. It would seem that the statement is axiomatic, but the great mass even of military men are unquestionably loath to accept it in practice, at least in England and the United States. We have generally been accustomed to go on in the routine of the service, doing what comes to

our hands to do, hoping that when the time comes to beat an enemy we shall be ready and able to do so by the gift of God which comes to us by steady advancement through the grades of the service.

But all experience is against this; there have been certain great masters in our profession, some half-dozen of the foremost rank; and though we do not know overmuch of the views and habits of study of most, we know very thoroughly those of Napoleon, the greatest of them all; and no one can be more emphatic in regard to the value of the study of the work of those who had preceded him; and there is no question that he himself was a most diligent student, genius as he was. If such a man thinks study necessary, how much more needful is it for those who are not geniuses, and who must, therefore, depend upon the principles which govern our business. For there are such principles. War is not a haphazard game any more than the great game of commerce. It requires the study of conditions, of means, appliances, and, above all, that study of lines and bases of operations which is known as strategy.

The great eye-opener, to the Anglo-Saxon part of the world at least, was the Franco-German campaign of 1870. We saw a great and warlike nation suddenly overwhelmed, and with the greatest apparent ease, by one which only a lifetime earlier had been under the heel of the former, and whose own troops had formed part of the armies which had marched to and fro over Europe at the beck of the French Emperor. There was a cause for this; it could not be accident, and the chief cause at least was not hard to find. It lay in the studies and work of the German General Staff. This dates, on its present basis, from 1821. Its numbers have gradually increased until in 1898 there were attached to it two hundred and twenty-nine, of whom twelve were general officers. Within the General Staff is what is known as the Great General Staff, of one hundred and twenty-three officers, where they

are entrusted, under the immediate direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, with the preparation of plans of large military operations, with the collection of knowledge of and comparison of military administrations and the study of the theatre of war; and, in addition, with the preparation of maps, the promotion of military history, and finally, with the training of young officers.

Ninety-three officers of the General Staff are with the troops to execute the measures inaugurated by the Great General Staff while obeying at the same time other (minor) orders of the general commanding the units of troops to which they are attached.

Appointments to the General Staff are through the War Academy, where four hundred officers are maintained by the admission through competitive examination of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty yearly. These officers must have had at least three years' service with the troops. They remain three years at the War Academy, being assigned three months in each summer while there to regimental duty with another arm of the service than their own. The fourth summer is taken up by a General Staff journey. On graduation all return to their regiments until the following spring, when about twenty of the total are selected to take a probationary turn with the General Staff as full-fledged members, those unsuitable being returned to their regiments. A temporary return to regimental duty is, however, compulsory from time to time for all the General Staff officers.

The extraordinary care and time expended in the selection of these officers show the immense value set upon staff work by the German authorities. That it has had full fruition we all now know in the results of the campaigns of 1866 and 1870. The downfall of two great empires was the direct outcome of the thorough staff work of which at the time Von Moltke was, and had been from 1857, the head. In the face of the mighty results of the system it is vain to decry such

studies. The other great military powers of Europe had, of course, some such organization, but none had the complete and flexible system of Germany. France began fair, but in 1832 the system of return of staff officers to the line was given up, and the staff naturally stiffened into the unwholesome and unprogressive routine inseparable from the continued occupancy of directive posts. There can be no surer road to inefficiency; not that it is downhill, but that it ceases to ascend, and we had the natural results when the two systems were pitted against each other in 1870.

We have now fairly covered the field of the German Great General Staff by the establishment of our General Board, the Intelligence Office, and the War College. It has taken many years to effect this. The first to come was the Office of Naval Intelligence, established in 1882, and the work done in which was the basis on which was built the present navy. At this date (1882) there was violent opposition with us to building ships of steel instead of iron; we had not a single modern piece of ordnance; we could not make a steel shaft for so small a vessel even as the *Dolphin*, built in 1884. Her shaft had to be forged of iron. We put into the four ships of this date — which were the first of our new navy, the *Chicago*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, and *Dolphin* — engines which were years behind those then being produced abroad. We had in fact to begin at the very bottom and acquire the necessary information. We know the outcome. By 1890 we were in a position to build ships of any type and manufacture ordnance and armor to meet any demand, and much of this great advance was due to the careful, unremitting, and zealous work of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Naval War College followed the Office of Naval Intelligence very closely, being founded in 1884. But it was not until 1900 that the General Board came into existence and rounded out an organization very closely assimilated to the German system. These three organizations are thus closely interlaced, and as time goes on they will become more and more

so. The partial separation is not at all a disadvantageous one, and, in fact, has many advantages. The Intelligence Office is our collector of information, very much of which does not apply to military study; the War College is the collator of such information on military subjects, whatever its origin, which has a bearing on questions of war. It is in no wise a teaching establishment in the ordinary sense of the term. It is a place for the study and discussion of military problems; for the study of war in all its phases, historical, strategical, tactical; of the events which lead up to war; of the international situations and of the probabilities or possibilities which might arise therefrom. Besides carrying on the study of such questions as continuously as its limited staff will allow, it prepares and lays before the General Board such studies as may be particularly called for. The aim, however, is to prepare, in connection with the General Board, studies for all eventualities, so that the Navy Department may be able to furnish a commander-in-chief in war with complete studies of the theatre of war; with thought made to hand, so to speak, and enable him to act unhampered by the necessity of forming a judgment offhand regarding a great variety of questions on which hasty judgment cannot be safely made.

I should like to quote here some words of Admiral Taylor's, taken from his "Memorandum on a General Staff for the Navy." After speaking of the real functions of the General Staff of an army or navy, he says:—

"The second element, though rarely recognized in a formal manner, is by far the more important of the two. It is the mental training of officers engaged in this plan-making, and their consequent readiness to confront warlike situations in general. It does not equal the school of actual war, but it is only second to it — and there is no third method. This trained readiness of officers' minds, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, constituted the essential value of the diligent staff work done by the Germans during fifty years of peace. What the

world at large saw were the plans of work perfected in minutæ, railroad cars numbered for special work, arriving near battlefields on schedule time, bringing guns or men, pontoons or hospital beds. This it was which, being so admitted, gave to the staff its reputation among non-professional people, and it was, in fact, a most valuable aid in the battle and campaign; but far greater, as a factor of efficiency, was the state of mind of German officers — from generals down to majors — that familiarity with war situations, acquired in the staff work of peace, which enabled them to confront all emergencies of the campaign with ready energy and composure of mind.”

While the Germans have been foremost in general staff work, the individual who did most to give it form was the Swiss officer Jomini, who served first with Napoleon and later with the Russian army. His was the first complete and methodic dealing with the subject, and his epoch-making work has become a classic, which, though it has had many successors, still stands in the front rank. He divides the study of war as an art into six distinct parts: —

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, either for defence or invasion.
3. Grand tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering — the attack and defence of fortifications.
6. Minor tactics.

Though Jomini only touches upon maritime affairs, “to be taken,” he says, “in connection with maxims of descents,” his treatment of his main subject applies in principle to fleets as well as armies. The fleet is simply an army moving with much greater rapidity than land forces. Its supply and maintenance involve the same considerations, and it is extraordinary that so great and original a mind as that of Jomini should not have grasped the more essential facts connected with command of the sea. It is the great pride of the Naval War Col-

lege that it was the instrument of bringing before the world the views, now accepted by all, of the overpowering influence of the army of the sea as compared with that of the army of the land. It was the fine mind of Mahan which accomplished this revolution, giving sea power its logical supremacy in the minds of men which we can now all see it has always had in actuality. Had the War College never had any further outcome, had it stopped with this result alone, its establishment would have been justified many times over. Mahan's work in giving naval power its just due has had a revolutionizing effect in international policies. It is not too much to say that no event in the latter half of the nineteenth century did more to direct the world of statesmanship into new lines of thought than these great works of an officer of our navy, and I do not think that the weight which the War College had in directing his own thought, and in the production of his great works, which were first produced as lectures before the College, and as the natural outcome of his duties there, should be lost sight of.

Administrative reforms with us work slowly. The Naval Academy had to be forced upon the service. I myself was on duty there with an officer (and it was only twenty-six years ago) who, when he took up the duties of superintendent, was an utter disbeliever in its utility. I had this from his own lips, when he assured me, however, that he had now seen enough of it to change his mind. We have been more than a hundred years in bringing about the establishment in the Navy Department of a Bureau of Personnel, thus gathering into one section of the Department nearly all things military, and we have been more than a hundred years in establishing a General Staff which I hope is now accomplished in the triune organization of the General Board, the War College, and the Intelligence Office.

Going back to Jomini's tabulation of the art of war into six parts, the first of these, it will be noted, is the great field of statesmanship, under which he brings, among other matters,

military policy and military statistics and geography. Under the first mentioned he embraces all the combinations of any projected war, except those relating to diplomacy and strategy, including the passions of the nation to be fought, its military system, its immediate means and reserves, financial resources, character of government, the characters and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet council or councils of war upon their operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the military geography and statistics of the state to be invaded.

I would beg to recall how much we would have given in our own little war with Spain for thorough and accurate information regarding that which I have just quoted. There is no need to dwell upon the importance of such knowledge as an element of success. No man can deal with war without feeling that, after ships and men, the one all-important thing is information, and no expense, no difficulty, and, above all, no preliminary study should be spared to provide this.

While information is mainly the field of the Office of Intelligence, the remainder of Jomini's tabulation is largely the province of the Naval War College, covering a vast field of study, to much of which there is definite solution in any particular case.

An important field of work for the College is always that of battle tactics, to which we cannot give too much thought and study. The development of the musket and of field artillery, the development of heavy guns and of the torpedo, have caused both armies and navies to go about their ends in a very different manner from that of fifty and one hundred years ago. The principles remain the same, but the methods must differ, and the land and sea forces of the whole world are now studying this vital question. That it may take some time to develop these to perfection is not improbable, but we may hope that it will not take the centuries that were needed for the development of tactics under sail.

It may not be generally known that for a hundred years previous to the appearance of Clerk's work on tactics in 1779, all actions between the French and the English were of a very indecisive character. Rodney made a first application of Clerk's principles in his action with De Grasse. Clerk was a civilian. The final and successful tactics under sail were thus worked out in the solitude of a student's study, though there were hundreds of officers at sea to develop views, and scores of battle-ships with which to test them. This is an extraordinary fact and one which should not be lost sight of when the value of a place of study such as the War College is discussed ; and I thus believe it is at the College where the question of tactics will finally be solved, because it will probably be there that some active-minded genius will have the time and opportunity for thought and study which one so rarely gets at sea. England, at the period of the publication of Clerk's tactics, had few officers who made an independent study of either tactics or strategy and to this is clearly due a failure which made certain the loss to her of the American colonies. Had Rodney not gone home on leave just at the time he did, it is beyond question that he would have been on our coast in 1781 and that with the opinions and views held by him, De Grasse would have been prevented from supporting Washington and Rochambeau ; Cornwallis would have been relieved, the Yorktown expedition would have failed, and the consequences would probably have been fatal to the American cause. Rodney left orders covering the eventualities, but they were not obeyed. Admiral Graves, with faint conception of the enormous importance of his influence upon the situation, failed after his action with De Grasse to enter the Chesapeake, which, if he had done, would have prevented De Grasse from reëntering and would have prevented the reception by the allied forces of the siege train sent with the squadron of Barras from Newport. The British fleet would have been in the Chesapeake instead of the French, and the siege of Yorktown would not have been. The result was one

of the great turning-points in the history of the world. This incident is mentioned merely as one of many to illustrate the fact that we cannot ignore preliminary study of strategic questions; that there must be a general study of these in order that we should not be at the mercy of chance as to whether the commander-in-chief has thought or not.

If we do not have this general study, the chances are that he will not have thought; and even if he be a man such as Rodney, it is far better that he should have the aid of many minds instead of standing alone and unassisted. The united and long-continued study and thought of a large group of men are of more value than the offhand thought of any one man of like mental calibre, and it is on this principle that we have, in some countries, at least, a general staff and places of study for such a staff akin in some degree to that which is the subject of this paper.

To come to the history of the College.

On the 30th of May, 1884, the Secretary of the Navy, then William E. Chandler, of New Hampshire, constituted a Board of Officers, which consisted of Commodore Stephen B. Luce, U.S.N., Commander W. T. Sampson, U.S.N., and Lieutenant-Commander C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N., to consider and report upon the whole subject of a post-graduate course or school of application for officers of the navy of the United States.

On the 15th of June following, this Board of Officers made a full report to the Navy Department. Among other reasons for establishing such a school of war, the following were given:—

“The bare statement that our naval officers not only do not study war as a science, but have no adequate school of practice, seems in these days of broad and liberal culture so extraordinary, that it is alone, in the judgment of the Board, sufficient reason for the early founding of the institution which the Department now has under consideration.”

The Board outlined a course to last six months, and recommended very strongly practical exercises in combination with the North Atlantic squadron, during the summer or autumn months. In considering the location of the proposed War School, the Board took into consideration the following places: Washington, Annapolis, Newport, New York, and Boston. As practical exercises afloat were considered important in connection with the course, Newport and its adjacent waters and especially its proximity to the sea, offered exceptional advantages. The fact also that the Navy Department was already in possession of ample grounds and the necessary buildings at Coasters' Harbor Island, near Newport, had weight with the Board in its recommendation of location at this point.

The principal building then upon Coasters' Harbor Island was that which was formerly used as the asylum of the city of Newport. It was put in good condition and suitably arranged, with a library and lecture-room, and upon the 4th of September, 1885, a class of officers, eight in number, reported for duty and attendance upon the course. An appropriation of eight thousand dollars had been previously made for the maintenance of the College, in the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1885.

Lectures were delivered during the course by Commodore Luce, the President of the College; Rear Admiral Ammen, Commander H. C. Taylor, Professor J. R. Soley, U.S.N., General Gordon, U.S.V., General Palfrey, U.S.V., and that friend of most excellent memory of so many of us here, John C. Ropes.

Rear Admiral Luce, to whose efforts the establishment of the College was nearly wholly due, and who was its energetic upholder through the years necessary to convince the service of its need, was its first President. He was succeeded by Captain Mahan, to whom was mainly due the development of the College on its true lines, that of a place for the study of the

art of war. The College itself is a striking instance of the fact that one can never wholly forecast the direction of the development of any organization, whether a government or anything else. Thus the College has dropped entirely all post-graduate functions, such as were first laid down for it, and it has worked steadily, by force of circumstances, by that curious intangible subdirection which almost unconsciously influences so greatly human life and endeavor, to become what it should have been designed to be from the first, that is to almost purely a place for the study of war problems. There is a permanent staff of officers who are at work on these at all times. During the four months from June 1 to October 1, a number of additional officers are in attendance, usually from twenty to twenty-five, who take up a problem of the same character, and to the study of which the whole four months are devoted. These officers are generally of high rank. Those in attendance last summer were (besides the staff) one rear admiral, six captains, six commanders, and five lieutenant-commanders. These officers are divided into four committees for this work. Each deals with the problem as a whole, but each is also assigned certain details. We find the four months none too long for the subject. The first hours of every morning, except Saturday, are given up to tactical games which are played with miniature fleets on large tables laid off in short distances to facilitate manœuvres. These games are played under elaborate printed rules, and it is through these we hope for the development of the coming tactics. Many think that with the great speed and handiness of modern ships, the admiral must lose control of his squadron as soon as the action gets well under way, and that the result must be a *mêlée*. But this is not so; if the two squadrons are nearly equal, victory will always rest, barring pure accident, with him who holds his squadron well in hand and carries out his preconceived tactics. Saturday morning is always given up to a game in strategy, in which one committee plays against another. The problem is laid down a week in advance, so that

action can be well considered. The two commanders-in-chief issue their preparatory orders and plans of action as in actual service. They occupy separate apartments as do also the officers in command of the scouts, or of divisions separated from the main body of the fleet. They are given such information of events by the umpire as would fall to them in actual service and upon this information are issued the necessary orders. The umpire, assisted by several officers, pricks off upon a large chart the movement of every squadron or scout, so that at the end there is a complete graphic illustration of the strategy involved. The issue is usually made to turn upon the junction or the prevention of the junction of an enemy's force or upon the successful occupancy of an important position before he can be brought to battle. These games are a remarkable test of ability, and they frequently excite the greatest interest. They simulate actual war to a remarkable degree.

During this period of attendance in summer a number of lectures are given by men prominent in the field of their subjects. While these lectures are often not directly concerned with the study of war, they are always on subjects with which naval officers have to deal and with which they must be conversant. They cover such ground as international relations, international law, diplomatic questions, questions of government, and I hope I may not be trespassing too much on his modesty when I say that one upon the last-named subject, which gave the widest satisfaction last summer, was by the accomplished scholar who is chairman of your Executive Committee and who has several times honored the College by giving us some of the results of his thoughtful work. During these summer months the subject of international law assumes, and almost necessarily, very considerable prominence. The subject is dealt with by cases, the solutions of which are handed in by the four committees into which the officers are divided for the summer work. These solutions are then discussed in committee of the whole by the officer and professor

charged with the superintendence of the subject. Three periods of a week each are taken for this, and the result is a work which, while it represents mainly the thought and expression of the professor, represents also his thought as tinged by the criticisms and views of the officers, some of whom have probably been the leading actors in the cases discussed. The last summer's work was under the direction of Dr. John Bassett Moore, of Columbia University, whose name is too well known in the subject to need encomium from myself.

The College thus tends steadily toward becoming one of the foremost schools of international law in the world. It has the special quality of having as students men who both make and interpret the law and who thus come to the subject with an intensity of interest such as the student who deals with it as an abstraction cannot have. It is a very concrete matter to the naval officer. It is a subject, one may say, which is daily part of his life when afloat, and one in which he knows he cannot afford to make a mistake.

But apart from this summer's course which thus includes some of the addenda, so to speak, of the profession, the College as a whole adheres strictly to its real work in the study of the art of war and its problems. In the more practical part of this work it labors to prepare for every eventuality; studies every harbor, every coast, the resources of every country, its conditions, its military power, the character of its government, of its leading men, in fact everything which can have a bearing upon our own action. This is, of course, a large field and it is not covered in a year nor ten years. Germany took sixty years in which to prepare the overthrow of France, and I have no possible doubt to-day that had we had all the knowledge regarding Spain which we should have had, we should have finished the war in two months instead of three. Knowledge is power in war as in everything else. What every commander thirsts for when he begins operations is information. He wants every scrap and of every kind available.

War is a great game, and the man who goes into it unprepared plays it blindfold. No genius can take the place of complete preparation. We cannot make sure of having the genius, but we can always make sure of the other if we make the proper effort, and it is to this end the Naval War College exists.

XVII

THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

BY

ANTHONY J. ABDY

COMMANDING FIFTY-THIRD BATTERY, ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY

Read before the Society January 7, 1902

THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

THE events that led to the despatch of a force of all arms from India to Natal in September, 1899, are so well known that nothing need be said about them.

A few words, however, on the nature of service of batteries and their mobilization for active service in India may not be out of place.

The Fifty-third Battery, Royal Field Artillery, of which it is the purpose to describe the movements and doings, in the year 1899 was serving at Deesa, a military station in Northern Gwzevat; there is no other artillery, but a small force of cavalry and infantry is stationed there. Deesa is situated on a branch of the Metre-Gauge Rajputana-Malwa Railway, and, although the soil of the country is very sandy, it affords excellent opportunities for the drill and instruction of a battery. That these opportunities had not been neglected may be judged from the fact that in 1898 the battery had won the Commander-in-Chief's Prize as the best shooting battery in all India, and in 1899, when the competition for prizes was restricted to Presidency commands, the battery had won the first prize for all batteries in the Bombay command. If nothing supervened, the battery was under orders to embark for England in October, 1899, after a tour of nearly fourteen years in India, and, in consequence, was full of well-seasoned old non-commissioned officers and men, every one of whom knew his duty and could be trusted to do it. In August an order was received to the effect that, owing to the dark outlook in South Africa, no reliefs to England from India would take place before March, 1900.


On the 6th of September, after a very satisfactory inspection of the battery, General Hogg, commanding the Deesa

District, informed the officer commanding, confidentially, that, if any force were sent from India to South Africa, the Fifty-third Battery would form part of it; and, on the 8th came a telegram from Simla warning the battery to mobilize for service out of India.

As on mobilization for service some of the men and horses and parts of the equipment are found unfit to go, the custom in India is for each battery about to be mobilized to have told off to it another battery which will supply all deficiencies. In the case of the Fifty-third the supplying battery was the Thirty-fourth, stationed at Ahmedabad. It is only a grateful act of acknowledgment here to place on record the loyal and generous way in which the Thirty-fourth supplied its more fortunate fellow-battery; the best of non-commissioned officers and men, the most skilful of artificers, the finest of horses were none too good to be handed over in place of invalids and wastrels; later on will be told how nobly some of these transferred men served the Fifty-third.

As the battery had expected to leave India in any case, perhaps the work of mobilization was somewhat easier than it might otherwise have been, but, on the other hand, matters were rather complicated by an order that no natives of any sort were to accompany the battery. This meant that all cooking was to be done by men of the battery, that the places of the various native artificers who help the farrier, the wheeler, and the collar-maker were to be filled by soldiers, and that each officer was to provide himself with a soldier servant and soldier groom. The establishment of horses on mobilization was increased from one hundred and ten to one hundred and forty-three, and, as Deesa is a very unhealthy station for Australian horses, it resulted that the Thirty-fourth was called upon to provide no less than seventy-two horses and forty non-commissioned officers and men and one lieutenant.

As Ahmedabad is the southern terminus of the narrow-gauge line and lies on the way from Deesa to Bombay, sanc-



The extent of the Perimeter was thirteen miles, and to hold this long line of defences Sir George White had only 10,000 men available. This map is a chronicle of every important event that took place during the siege

PLAN OF LADYSMITH
(Facsimile of a sketch by W. T. Maud)

tion was given for the Fifty-third to halt there from the 15th to the 18th of September in order to complete establishment and hand over what was left behind. The work of entraining a battery in the small trucks of the narrow-gauge railway at Deesa was very heavy, and the heat, over 100° F. in the shade, was very trying to all ranks. On the 15th the battery marched out of barracks at 4.30 P.M., and, though the station was two miles off and badly provided with platforms, everything was safely installed in two trains soon after 8 P.M. The work of entraining in the broad-gauge trucks at Ahmedabad on the 18th was much easier.

Attention may here be called to the difficulty of economically carrying on railway trains the long modern field guns; their muzzle must not project beyond the buffer stops of the truck, and the time taken is too great to allow of dismounting and remounting the gun on its complicated carriage, if the gun is being conveyed by rail straight on to the battlefield, as is often the case.

The battery reached the Prince's Dock, Bombay, at dawn on the 19th of September and found the S.S. *Booldana* still in the hands of painters and fitters, but, by the time everything was detrained and ready to embark, the ship was ready. The work in the muggy heat of Bombay was even more trying than at Deesa or Ahmedabad, but the hydraulic cranes and crews of skilled stevedores were of great assistance. Here, as on each other occasion, the subaltern officers did all the really difficult jobs, such as getting a vicious or wayward horse into the slings and, when every one was employed on his allotted task, the officer commanding seemed to be the only person with time to look about him. In the course of embarkation the ship was inspected by General Sir R. Low, commanding the Bombay Army, who expressed himself pleased with all he saw. At 8.30 P.M. the tide served, and the ship left dock, cheered on her voyage by a crowd of Europeans collected at the dock head.

There were no other troops on the *Booldana* besides the Fifty-third, but a captain of the Royal Artillery Medical Corps and a lieutenant of the Artillery Veterinary Department were attached for medical and veterinary charge, respectively, on the voyage. All spare room in the ship's hold was filled with stores for men and horses. The whole force sailing from India took with it complete stores of food, fodder and forage for three months; it was these stores that later on rendered the prolonged retention of Ladysmith possible.

On the morning of the 5th of October the ship reached Durban and by noon she was moored alongside the wharf. The battery disembarked at once and entrained in three trains. The weather was not ominous of good, as it was one succession of squalls of wind and torrents of rain. The men and horses were in open trucks, and, as the line in parts reached a height of more than three thousand feet above the sea, the cold was very trying.

The entraining at Durban was worse than either time in India, as the trucks were iron and their floors were covered with sand and coal dust in order to prevent the horses from slipping; this was only partially successful, and the battery lost one or two horses in the night's journey to Ladysmith. Excellent as the Natal State Railway is in every other respect, it is not well designed for the carriage of troops, so far as regards their comfort. The three troop trains had started at an hour's interval between each and reached Mooi River Station at 7, 8, and 9 A.M. respectively; here a breakfast of tea and bread and cheese was provided for every man, and the trains then went on through to Ladysmith, the last arriving at 2 P.M. The baggage was quickly all packed on transport wagons and carted off to the Tin-Camp, some two miles from the station, and by 7 P.M. the whole battery was established in the lines lately vacated by one of the three batteries serving in Natal which had gone up to Dundee with Sir Penn Symons's force. The Twenty-first and Forty-second Batteries, which had come

from India, were found in the lines and the Brigade Division was now complete under Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Coxhead, who had Captain A. L. Walker as his adjutant. The next few days were spent in shaking down, drawing regimental transport, and trying to get horses fit again after the voyage. On the 7th of October a fourth subaltern joined the battery, having been transferred to it from the Garrison Artillery at Mauritius.

Although on the 9th the Forty-second was warned to be ready to move out with a flying column, it was not until the 12th of October that the two Republics of South Africa declared war on England.

On the 13th the Brigade Division paraded at 2 A.M. and marched through Ladysmith to join a force of all arms on the road to Van Reenen's Pass. It was a weird experience marching silently through the dark streets of Ladysmith, passing all the time a column of mounted troops, Natal Mounted Volunteers, who were moving by another route to the rendezvous. At daybreak the whole force moved toward the west until about 10 A.M. when it halted under a rocky kopje, which five months later became most intimately known as Camp Arcadia. It was in the "prepare for action" on this occasion that a gunner asked his section officer if he was to load with live shell. The Free State, or Commando, which had been expected was not found; so, after watering and feeding horses and issuing rations to the men, the force returned to Ladysmith, meeting on the way back the Manchester Regiment which had marched out straight from the train to the would-be battlefield. This was one of the last days of the cold weather, and, as there had been a recent fall of snow on the Drakensberg, the views of that range from sunrise until nearly midday were lovely. The ground manœuvred over was full of artillery positions, and perhaps it was for this reason that the Free State column never appeared.

The air was full of rumors connected with the war, but,

whether Natal was particularly badly situated for the obtaining of news or whether news was withheld, the fact remains that in Ladysmith, except those who received information from the Staff, no one could say anything about the Boers or their movements, and the idea that they might take matters into their own hands and invade the Colony, although the Indian troops had arrived, was never mooted.

However, this idea must have been strongly impressed on some of the inhabitants of Pietermaritzburg, for it was in answer to a request from the Capitol that a flying column, consisting of the Nineteenth Hussars, Fifty-third Battery, Imperial Light Horse, the Liverpool Regiment with its Mounted Infantry, field hospitals, and a supply column was despatched from Ladysmith at 3 A.M. on the 18th of October. The march of this column was of peculiar interest in that its route lay through Colenso, over the Bulwer Road Bridge and by the Blaaukrau's River Bridge to Estcourt, crossing much of the ground about to become famous in connection with Buller's operations a couple of months later.

On the night of the 18th the column bivouacked at Colenso; at 2 A.M. on the 19th it marched halfway back to Ladysmith and lay in the folds of the high ground above Onderbrook waiting for a Free State column, which was reported to be moving on Ladysmith and whose flank would be exposed to attack. Very pleasant it was lying in the grass or sitting about on old anthills trying to discern the Boers, and at last it seemed as if hopes were about to be realized, for from among some trees in the proper direction duly heralded by a cloud of dust a column moved steadily into the open ground; every glass was fixed on it and, after careful spying, the column proved to be one of cattle only. Lying here the Staff were amused by the cheery tales of Colonel Scott Chisholm, who, two days later, met his fate gallantly leading his Imperial Light Horse at Elandslaagte. The flying column returned to Colenso that night and bivouacked in heavy rain. The next

day the march was to Estcourt without the Imperial Light Horse, which returned to Ladysmith. The two marches through the Onderbroek Pass to Colenso enabled those who took part in it to recognize later on the almost insuperable difficulties this route presented to Buller, and that, if he was to relieve Ladysmith, he was not likely to come this way. The next day, the 21st of October, the Liverpool Regiment alone continued the march. The rest of the column stood fast until 5 P.M., when orders came to move back to Colenso by night march. At 4 P.M. a heavy thunderstorm had burst and the slipperiness of the steep hills out of Estcourt was most trying to the artillery horses. Altogether the march of twenty-two miles through the dark and wet was very trying and tiring, and it was welcome news to all to hear at 8 A.M. on the 22d that the column was to return by train from Colenso to Ladysmith. Elandsplaagte had been fought, the Dundee column was just starting on its withdrawal to Ladysmith, and the need of all available troops in Ladysmith had been recognized. Once more the Fifty-third was entrained; this time under greater difficulties than ever and it was astonishing to see loaded wagons lifted bodily into trucks by men standing around and men handling them.

On reaching camp at Ladysmith every one of the other batteries was full of tales of Elandsplaagte, and very bitter were the feelings of all connected with the Fifty-third at having missed so successful a battle, the more so as the battery had been specially selected to go on the flying column.

On Monday, the 23d of October, the battery shifted to a camping-ground near the Iron Bridge alongside the other batteries of the Brigade Division, and from this ground the guns and horses never moved until the 15th of March, 1900.

On the 24th the Twenty-third paraded at 4 A.M. and marched with a strong column of all arms up the road to Newcastle. At about 8.30 A.M., while still in column on the road, Boers were seen on some heights to the left (west) of

the road, and the range-takers were told to take range. While this was being done, a gun was seen to fire on the top of the hill and a shell dropped near the head of the column. The Forty-second and Fifty-third Batteries immediately wheeled to the left, formed line (the Forty-second on the right) toward the west, and advanced at a trot to a level crossing over the railway line some six hundred yards from the road. The two batteries formed column inward to cross this, and, as they did so, the gun on the hill opened rapid fire on the crossing, of which those serving the gun had evidently previously found the range. This unexpected fire, opening on the battery in the first moments of its ever coming into action against an enemy, might have proved somewhat disconcerting, but all ranks continued their duties quite calmly and the batteries re-formed line again on emerging from the crossing, the only casualties being one officer of the Forty-second and two of the Fifty-third, all slightly grazed by shell splinters.¹

About five hundred yards beyond the crossing the batteries came into action against the gun, but, owing to an intervening ridge, the Forty-second could not bring any fire to bear. The first gun of the Fifty-third was fired with an elevation of four thousand yards and was not seen to burst, so the next round was fired at three thousand six hundred yards, and, by what can be little short of a miracle, hit the gun, causing it to cease fire and be withdrawn. Were all the conditions connected with this shot to be calculated out, the resulting odds against its hitting the gun must be millions to one, but staff officers, newspaper correspondents, and officers of other arms on the field all declared that the shell burst at, or on, the gun. The battery fired a few more rounds and prepared to move to another position, farther to the west again. The new position introduced the battery to the novelty of coming into action on a kopje, and a very typical one it was, — a ridge, running more or less north and south, rising abruptly out of the plain

¹ One of these was Major Abdy, I think. (A. P. R.)

on which the battery had been in action, to a height of some two hundred feet, covered on its sides with rocks and boulders. The Forty-second was the first to surmount it and essayed to come into action under cover against the enemy's position on the ridge, which was now very distinct. There was no room on the left flank of the Forty-second for the Fifty-third to come into action, but, after a little reconnaissance, an excellent position was found some five hundred or six hundred yards farther to the left, and immediately opposite to it was a rocky knoll, less than fifteen hundred yards distant, from which the enemy opened a sharp musketry fire. The battery was led on to the officer commanding by the senior subaltern, Lieutenant A. M. Perreau, who fell from his horse shot through the left shin bone just as he was about to dismount for action; unable to stand he lay on the ground and continued to direct the fire of his section until removed on a stretcher. Here the battery remained for about three and a half hours, the rate of its fire varying as the enemy's rifle fire increased or decreased; whenever the battery's fire was directed on to the kopje in front for any considerable period, the rifle fire died away and ceased, only to recommence after the battery had ceased firing for some time.

More than once a gun was dragged forward by the Boers close to the same point on the high ridge where it had first appeared, but each time one or two rounds from the Fifty-third caused it to disappear again. On this same high ridge also and farther to the south large parties of Boers were reported to be collecting, and toward them the fire of one section of the Fifty-third was directed; the bursting shell after a little set light to the grass, which blazed up all over the hill-top. At about 3.30 P.M. the Boer fire had grown very slack and nearly died away, so the Forty-second and Fifty-third were ordered to withdraw across the railway and cover the withdrawal of the infantry. This they did, firing a few rounds against the crests of the high ridges.

While the Fifty-third were in action in their main position, the Forty-second had passed across their rear and taken up a position lower down the kopje about another half-mile to the left, and No. 10 Mountain Battery had come up and into action about two hundred yards to the left also of the Fifty-third; that is, between the Fifty-third and Forty-second. As soon as the infantry appeared on the plain, the batteries were ordered to take up positions on each side of the road to Ladysmith, and from them they moved back to camp without coming into action again. Of the cavalry nothing has yet been said, as nothing had been seen of them all day. The infantry had not been called upon to press home an attack, but, unfortunately, the Gloucesters had got too far forward and lay for several hours under the fire of the Fifty-third, about halfway between the battery and the enemy on the kopje, — unfortunately, for, though their losses were small, they included the commanding officer, Colonel Wilford, who was shot dead. On the way home the cavalry could be seen at work farther to the north, covering the withdrawal. About 5.30 P.M. a heavy rainstorm burst, but did not quench the spirits of the battery, which were cheered up by Sir G. White's information that he had achieved his object. It was long afterwards learned that this object was the prevention of the Free State army from joining the Transvaal armies to harass the march of General Yule's force from Dundee. The number of rounds fired by the Fifty-third this day was three hundred and fifty-four.

The next day, the 25th, a small column of small arms, which the Twenty-first battery joined, moved out under Lieutenant-Colonel Coxhead to escort the Dundee column. It went out in heavy rain, which lasted persistently until the following morning. The story went that some of the Dundee force expressed annoyance at the idea that any one should have been sent to bring them in, while the commanding officer of one corps in that force was most indignant that Colonel Coxhead had not provided hot coffee for his men at 3 A.M., quite over-

looking the impossibility of keeping a fire burning in the torrents of rain then falling.

Whatever has been said as to the miserable appearance of the Dundee column was not visible at 11 A.M. on the 26th, when the major and captain of the Fifty-third met it some two miles beyond Ladysmith on the Helpmakaar Road. So far from the battery horses looking played out and nearly ready to drop, their fine condition excited the envy of officers whose battery was horsed with Australians. On the 27th the three batteries turned out with a strong column of all arms and bivouacked north of the Modder Spruit, where it crosses the Helpmakaar Road. Colonel Ian Hamilton was in command, and a careful reconnaissance was carried out before dark. Whatever operations had been determined on by him were frustrated by an order from Sir G. White for the force to return to Ladysmith. This was complied with at 3 A.M. on the 28th.

The 29th of October was a fine hot day and the whole of the forces in Ladysmith moved out at midnight; the artillery to a rendezvous north of Limit Hill, where all lay out silently in the warm fine night waiting to move to position. This move was a difficult one, as the left of the front assigned to the artillery was covered with enormous boulders, which so confined the space available for the guns to come into action that at first there was room for only two guns of the Fifty-third, which tried to open fire against some Boer guns in position to the west of the Newcastle Road and to the southwest of Pepworth's Farm. The formation of the ground was such as to render impossible both fire and observation of fire, so the Twenty-first and Fifty-third were ordered to take up fresh positions farther to the north, still facing much the same way, but this time against the Boer guns on Pepworth Hill.

Now for the first time was seen a "Long Tom" or ninety-four pounder Creusôt gun, mounted on a disappearing carriage and firing black (smoke) powder. Nowhere was there a trace of the expected Boer batteries manœuvring to come into action

in a favorable position, but, from various points on the hill, an occasional flash denoted that a gun firing smokeless powder was mounted in a concealed emplacement. Of Boer riflemen, or mounted troops, there was not a sign. The ranges to Pepworth's Hill were just about four thousand yards, and shell burst at this and approximate elevations generally caused fire to cease, at least temporarily, from a gun that could be located. After a bit, however, the Boer gunners would return to their gun and fire another round; presently, too, the fire from the guns first attacked became more harassing, especially as they were taking the batteries in flank. It was by now, say 8 A.M., evident that the Brigade Division was not firing at the enemy's main position, or any portion of it likely to be the point of assault, so Lieutenant-Colonel Coxhead rode off with Major Blewitt, the commanding officer of the Twenty-first Battery, to seek a position whence the fire of the batteries might be made of greater use. In their absence Sir G. White rode into the batteries, and, not liking the effect the flank fire was having on the batteries, ordered the commanding officer¹ of the Fifty-third to retire the Twenty-first and Fifty-third and to take up a new position where he could find useful work for them. Thereupon this officer retired these batteries some three quarters of a mile towards Lombard's Kop, and then wheeled them to the left, advanced the Fifty-third and brought it into action toward the east against Boer guns hidden in thick scrub. Just after the batteries had wheeled to the left, Major Blewitt came up, resumed command of the Twenty-first, and took it off among the folds of Lombard's Kop in response to an urgent request for artillery sent by the officer commanding the cavalry there. The Twenty-first disappeared up what looked to be a nearly impossible passage and was soon heard in action, but could not be seen again. Some day it is to be hoped that a full account of what the Twenty-first did and saw may be published; it will be of remarkable interest.

¹ Major Abdy.

The Fifty-third remained in position for two or more hours firing at different rates at guns in the scrub, or rather at what were believed to be guns, as both gun and flash were quite invisible. Presently, however, it could be seen that a battery in front was gradually drawing a heavy fire upon itself from many Boer guns, and Lieutenant-Colonel Coxhead, coming to the Fifty-third, gave leave to its commanding officer (Major Abdy) to take his battery to the assistance of the one in front. This necessitated an advance of about one and a half miles over a plain with one donga crossing it, which was passed without mishap, and the Fifty-third came into action on the right of the Thirteenth Battery commanded by Major J. W. G. Dawkins. The Boer artillery fire was certainly trying, as it came simultaneously from the front and two flanks. Major-General Hunter, the Chief-of-Staff, with his aide-de-camp, was on foot in this battery, and, after the Fifty-third had ranged itself on a Boer gun to the east at over 2350 yards range, gave an order that the batteries were to withdraw alternately toward Ladysmith and cover the infantry, who were retiring through the batteries. As it had come there the first, the Thirteenth was the first to retire and it took up a covering position some eight hundred yards to the south. Being left alone, the enemy's fire must have been concentrated on the Fifty-third, as two or three shells burst among the limbers and their teams. The wheels of one gun limber were completely ruined and it was necessary to leave this gun on the position; the five other guns moved off at a walk to take up a position again beyond the Thirteenth, and, as soon as morale would permit, broke into a steady trot. In recrossing the donga good fortune deserted the battery, as one of the remaining five guns turned over. Notwithstanding the heavy shell-fire which followed the battery all the way, Lieutenant J. F. Higgins, with only its own detachment, succeeded in righting the gun and brought it up into line very shortly after the battery had once more come into action. Then, too, was shown one of those fine

pieces of work that prove the value of sound drill and training. On seeing the gun limber disabled, Battery Sergeant-Major Vevers at once sent to the rear for a wagon limber. This took some time to come up, and, indeed, the battery must have been nearly into its new position, when Captain Thwaites, with Corporal Saunders, three team-drivers, and two gunners seated on the limber, rode out under the shell-fire, hooked onto the lonely gun, and brought it back to the battery. The infantry were by this time nearly all in safety, so the two batteries continued the movement of alternate retirement until they could themselves get under cover to refit and horse themselves. The losses of the Fifty-third were lighter than might have been feared; they were five men wounded, twenty-one horses killed and wounded, one wagon and one limber with all their kits and stores left on the field. At about 3 P.M. the march homeward commenced, and by 5 P.M. the battery was back again in camp, having fired two hundred and thirty-nine rounds.

Such is an account of "Lombard's Kop," "Farquhar's Farm," "Black Monday," as called by the British, "Modder Spruit," as called by the Boer, — an account of things seen and done by the Fifty-third Battery. Of what happened in the neighborhood at the fateful "Nicholson's Nek" nothing can be said here, as nothing came within the knowledge of any one connected with the battery. It was not until the next day that rumors of that sad disaster were circulated, and rumors they have remained to this day.

A few points connected with artillery fire may be noted here: —

"In withdrawing Grimwood's three advanced battalions from the ridge that they had held for hours, they crossed the open in some disorder and lost heavily and would have done so more had not the Fifty-third Field Battery dashed forward, firing shrapnel at short ranges in order to cover the retreat of the infantry. Amid the bursting of the huge ninety-four-

pounder shells, and the snapping of the vicious little automatic one-pounders, with a cross-fire of the rifles as well, Abdy's gallant battery swung round its muzzles and hit back right and left, flashing and blazing amid its litter of dead men and horses. So severe was the fire that the guns were obscured by the dust knocked up by the little shells of the automatic gun. . . . Then, when its work was done and the retiring infantry had struggled over the ridge, the covering guns whirled and bounded after them. So many horses had fallen that two pieces were left until the teams could be brought back for them, which was successfully done. . . . The action of this battery was one of the few gleams of light in a not too brilliant day's work." ¹

It was on this day that acquaintance was first made with the largest and smallest of the Boer weapons, namely, a "Long Tom" and a "Pom-Pom." The former, as remarked previously, was a Creusôt ninety-four-pounder mounted on Pepworth Hill, and, for the most part, directing its fire toward the town of Ladysmith. Even at that early stage of proceedings the emplacement in which it was mounted resembled a small castle. The Pom-Pom, or one and one-fourth pounder Vickers-Maxim quick-firing gun, was probably mounted somewhere near the north end of Pepworth Hill, and its fire was turned on various objects moving on the plateau over which the Fifty-third manœuvred. There is no record of any damage being done by it on this day, and it may safely be said that, throughout the ensuing bombardment, the garrison of Ladysmith never came to regard the fire of this weapon with the same dread that was noticeable among all ranks of Buller's relieving army. What the effect of the fire of the British batteries on this day was will probably never be known, but it must certainly have been strongly deterrent, for the Boers made no attempt to follow up the withdrawing infantry, and

¹ "Lombard's Kop," from A. Conan Doyle's *History of the Great Boer War*, p. 99.

could be seen walking aimlessly about on the summit of Long Hill. It would seem as if the Boers quite failed to realize the advantage they had gained by their victory at Nicholson's Nek, which carried with it the retirement of the infantry from a critical point of the main field of battle to guard the unprotected and now exposed town of Ladysmith.

On the morning of the 31st all the officers of the Brigade Division of the Light Battery attended the funeral of Lieutenant Macdougall, of the Forty-second Battery, killed by a shell wound from the flanking fire to which his battery was exposed when in action against Pepworth Hill.

The 1st of November was a very hot day on which no movement took place, while on the 2d trains and mails ceased to come and the Boers began a slight bombardment chiefly from Pepworth and Isanblwhaua, commonly called Bulwana, Hills; on the 2d the Twenty-first and Fifty-third moved out from camp across the Klip River by the Iron Bridge and then to the southeast through the mimosa scrub, in order to try and silence the Boer guns on Bulwana. No one could locate them, so the batteries returned to camp.

This going out from and returning to camp by the Iron Bridge was no joy, for directly a battery got on the road at the foot of the bridge, it became visible to the Boer gunners on Bulwana, who were able to see the battery move for more than a mile up the open road to Range Post, if it took that direction; while, when moving to the southeast, it was only out of sight from Bulwana for two or three minutes shortly after crossing the bridge.

On the 2d of November it was generally recognized that Ladysmith was cut off from the outer world, and officers discussing the situation agreed that it must be at least ten days before the advance of Clery from Durban would enable the garrison once more to move with freedom. The troops from India had heard so little news since they sailed, that few of them were in a position to gauge the situation, nor could they

tell but that it might be due to some unknown error of their own that they were thus placed in restraint. The feeling of being in such a position through the strategy of a so-called pastoral people was peculiarly irksome. After the first month of investment, as news of British non-successes in South Africa and the unexpected strength of the Boers filtered through, this feeling died away and was replaced by a feeling that, in retaining as many of the enemy as possible around Ladysmith, the garrison was rendering the most valuable assistance possible towards the salvation of South Africa.

At daybreak of the 3d the three batteries had roused and harnessed up, but were not wanted then. At about 6.30 A.M. the Twenty-first Battery, with the Cavalry Brigade, the Natal Carabiniers, Border Rifles, and Imperial Light Horse, moved out over Range Post to reconnoitre to the west towards Lancer's Hill; the Twenty-first took up a position and opened fire against an enemy on the hill, while the cavalry tried to move around its south flank and the Colonial troops operated against the enemy on End Hill. The troops this day were under the command of Major-General Brocklehurst, who had arrived in Ladysmith by one of the last trains running. The fight never developed into anything on a large scale, but more of the enemy were found to the south and southwest than had been expected, so orders were sent to camp for the Forty-second and Fifty-third to come out. They started about 12.30 P.M. and, on getting outside Range Post, divided, the Fifty-third going to join the Twenty-first in action, while the Forty-second moved with the Eighteenth Hussars to Rifleman's Ridge, where they remained observing the enemy without being ordered into action. The Fifty-third fired but few rounds while in action with the Twenty-first, and was finally ordered to coöperate with that battery in an alternate retirement in action towards Ladysmith, covering the withdrawal of the cavalry. In the course of this movement, while crossing the plain below Sign-Post Ridge, the troops drew upon themselves the fire of

a Boer long-ranging field gun mounted somewhere in the direction of Telegraph Hill; several rounds fell or burst near the battery, but no damage was done. There was another curious shot fired by the Fifty-third in this retirement. A Boer gun, or what looked like a gun, was driven up into the space between the end of Rifleman's Ridge and Lancer's Hill. Lieutenant Higgins laid the gun with an ordered elevation of four thousand yards; the shell appeared to burst right on the object, and mounted men ran or galloped away from it. After crossing Range-Post Ridge the batteries came under fire of the Bulwana guns again, and, to avoid the danger of a block in crossing the Iron Bridge, they went to a drift some half-mile lower down the river. This had to be approached across an open piece of ground, over which each gun hurried singly. The driving down the right and up the left bank was very difficult, as the roadway on each side was most elementary; guns stuck in the river-bed and on the roadway, but were quickly extricated by gunners with drag-ropes. This passage showed how difficult the drift would be if the river were at all high, and, as a matter of fact, the batteries never used it again.

On the 4th there was no fighting, but all civilians who could be persuaded were removed to Intombi Camp, a spot some four miles from Ladysmith, halfway between Bulwana and Cæsar's Camp, and close to the railway; thither also on the 5th of November the chief hospitals were moved and established to the north of the line, the civil camp being to the south.

On the 5th the commanding officer of the Fifty-third took a party of ten gunners from each of the three batteries and made the beginning of a roadway to enable artillery to be taken up the west end of Cæsar's Camp; another, a zigzag road, had been laid out by Captain Walker, Adjutant Royal Artillery, leading up a reëntering angle on the northeast side of Cæsar's Camp, and this became the main road on to the top of that hill.

It was up this latter road that the Forty-second Battery took their guns on the night of the 7th of November, and established themselves in gun emplacements admirably designed by Major Goulburn, who commanded the Forty-second. With the exception of five days in December, the Forty-second remained always on Cæsar's Camp; during the rest of the Ladysmith operations, the Twenty-first and Fifty-third Batteries lay side by side ready to move where wanted, taking their shares of various tasks alternately.

The Forty-second was considerably broken up, as they had only their guns on the top of Cæsar's Camp; to man them they had their gunners under the major and three subalterns, while the drivers under the captain remained in their old camp beside the Twenty-first. The Cæsar's Camp party were established in a charming little plateau amongst mimosa bushes halfway up the northeast face of the hill, some quarter-mile from the camp of the Manchester Regiment, which was pitched at the top of Captain Walker Road.

The Twenty-first and Fifty-third were hooked in every morning, ready to move off, at daybreak, then about 4.15 A.M.; and very trying work this was, especially for the drivers who had to harness up in the dark. It was wonderful, when daylight came and the battery could be inspected, to see how few mistakes the men ever made. The men stood by their horses and guns in their respective gun-parks, while the officers collected and waited for orders on the main road of the town which ran past two of the gun-parks.

Two of the officers were always down by the river-bank, some half-mile from camp, on the lookout for an attack on the Helpmakaar Post. Had such an attack come, the batteries had orders to move to this part of the river-bank and there come into action against the flank of the attack. This spot, which the Royal Artillery named Blewitt's Post, and which was close above the drift from the town on to the "flats," was a very good point from which to observe the commencement

of the Boer artillery fire each morning. As the mists rose and the light increased, there would be a duel of snipers on each side, and, as this duel began at much the same time and in much the same places nearly every day, it must be supposed that a mutual interchange of shots between the same men took place daily throughout the investment. As it got fairly light, a pom-pom somewhere on Bulwana always fired at the cavalry vedettes coming in along under the Helpmakaar Ridge, and, though this happened daily, no casualty was ever heard of as the result of this fire. Next, the big "Long Tom" on Pepworth would open fire on the town, and then a field gun on Bulwana would fire round after round at the balloon, which generally made its first ascent about the hour of sunrise. On the 8th of November "Long Tom" on Bulwana first fired, and it was always a matter of interest to see him begin work for the day. Occasionally it was rather startling, while watching the fire of the various Boer guns, to find a shell from one of them burst close to Blewitt's Post, having been fired at one of the many herds of cattle driven out each morning over the drift to feed on the flats. A herd of cattle always possessed an irresistible attraction to the Boer gunners, and the firing at herds was so persistent that it would almost seem as if by this means unskilled layers were being trained in the art of firing on moving objects.

As attacks were only expected early in the morning, there was no need for both batteries to remain hooked in all day, so the horses of the battery not on duty generally filed on to their lines about 6.30 A.M., and the morning passed in the usual routine of stables and orderly room; the horses remained harnessed up until 5 P.M., so their grooming before that hour could not be very thorough. All through the first part of the investment, in fact up to Christmas, the horses were well fed, largely from supplies of hay and corn brought from India; they were exercised up and down the main roads of the town, shaded by trees from the Boers' sight.

November 9 was a notable day; first, because on it the Boers commenced attacks on Cæsar's Camp, Observation Hill, and Helpmakaar Post, but pressed none of them home, except, perhaps, that on Cæsar's Camp, where they were repulsed. These attacks were well backed up by their guns, which were estimated to have fired between eight hundred and nine hundred rounds this day. They failed to draw the naval guns until noon, when a royal salute of twenty-one shotted guns was fired from the naval batteries in honor of the birthday of His Royal Highness, the Prince of Wales. If the failure of the attacks and the firing of a shotted salute were not sufficient, the fact that, for the first time, heliographic messages were sent through to a hill south of Colenso should have sufficed to make the day notable. Among the first messages were birthday congratulations to His Royal Highness from the Natal Field Force.

From the 10th to the 13th the weather was misty, rainy, and cool, and the bombardment only slight. The 14th was the first day of a most unpleasant duty, which, from the 21st to the 28th, was taken on alternate days by the Twenty-first and the Fifty-third Batteries; it was as follows: At 3.15 A.M. the battery marched off up to the old "Tin Camp," and two sections — four guns — were posted ready to open fire at day-break from a position in the open close under "Ration Post"; the other section, of two guns under Lieutenant Higgins, was placed near the Klip River Camp Bridge, ready to open fire on an enemy showing on Star Hill. The guns at Ration Post were directed against a Boer field gun, probably a twelve-pounder, in a strong emplacement on Thornhill's Kopje distant about thirty-two hundred and fifty yards and a howitzer in an emplacement on Surprise Hill distant forty-three hundred yards. The Fifty-third was sent to these positions to allow the Sixty-seventh, which had hitherto occupied them, to move out with the Twenty-first Battery and the cavalry against a Boer gun and convoy. As soon as the batteries

appeared over Range Post, the Boer guns on Telegraph Hill, three in number, opened fire on them, and, in order to check this fire, one section of the Fifty-third was moved some half-mile nearer to Thornhill's Kopje and brought into action to the left against Telegraph Hill. This advance was covered by the remaining section which fired salvos against the gun on Thornhill's Kopje. Telegraph Hill was distant about four thousand yards, and, though the fire of the section against it was good, its value was the greater in that it diverted the attention of the Boer guns from the force moving out by Range Post. As soon as this force withdrew, the Boer guns ceased firing, and the advanced section of the Fifty-third rejoined the other section in the same manner as it had come.

When not engaging the enemy, the guns were left loaded, standing out in the open, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men being withdrawn on to the kopje of Ration Post, where they remained all day. This kopje faced east and was exposed to the heat of the sun's rays through the greater part of the day, and, by dinner-time, the rocks became nearly hot enough to fry meat. It was necessary to stay on this face of the kopje, as every other side was exposed to the fire of the Boer guns mentioned above, as well as a very annoying one fired from near where the Blaaubank Road crossed Rifleman's Ridge. A small Boer gun was constantly fired at the earthworks on King's Post, or at mules grazing between that and Ration Post, or even at single men passing from the Tin Camp to behind King's Post; this gun was either a three-pounder or a pom-pom. After the two sections were reunited, the trumpeter had tied his own, the major's, and the captain's horses to a wheelbarrow at the foot of Ration Post. A shell from the Blaaubank gun hit and burst on the barrow and scattered the horses, which galloped off back towards camp. When caught, both the officers' horses were found to be wounded, but both recovered within a week; the only serious damage done was to the wheelbarrow, much to the annoyance of the Sixtieth

Rifles, to whom it belonged. This is a good illustration of the small and very local effect of a percussion-fused long-ranged shell.

The battery was ordered to return to camp as soon as it was dusk, which was not until after 7 P.M. Rain had begun at 5 P.M., and had made every one wet, but had never rendered it dark enough to anticipate the hour of dusk, so the battery returned in the dark to the camp it had left in the dark.

This night at 12.30 A.M. the Boers for the first time opened fire from their guns at night, and judging by the sound, they fired one round from each gun in turn; partly, perhaps, on account of this and partly because heavy rain began at 9 A.M., there was no further bombardment on the 15th.

The 16th, 17th, and 18th produced what may be called an average bombardment. This consisted of the early morning firing previously described, which usually ceased about 6 or 6.30 A.M., probably for breakfast. Another period, or series, was from 9.30 to 10.30 A.M. Sometimes there was another soon after noon, after which there was always a lull as for dinner and siesta, and then the evening series, which was often the heaviest, began about 5 P.M. and lasted occasionally until dark. The firing from their heavy guns was usually opened either on Cæsar's Camp or on the Camp of the Gordon Highlanders near the iron bridge over the Klip. After three or four rounds at them it was turned for the same number on to the neighborhood of the Royal Artillery Camp; thence to the camp of the Imperial Light Horse, and so on to the Poort Road and the general's house, to the Ordnance Parks, the railway station, and Helpmakaar Post. Very often, however, before these had all been visited in their turn, the naval guns would open on them, the Boers would at once reply, and a duel would ensue, lasting until one or the other had fired the number of rounds allotted to that series, when the other would also "cease fire." Siege artillerymen will at once recognize

that the Boers worked by no scientific system; their use of heavy guns was only in the form of a casual bombardment, and the chief result was an enormous waste of ammunition.

Although the Boers observed the daylight of Sunday as a peace or holiday, it did not prevent them from bombarding at 12.30 A.M. on the 19th of November. On the afternoon of this day a team of press correspondents came and played a cricket match against the officers of the Royal Artillery Camp. The only ball that could be found was made of rubber composition, which slowly chipped away, but which lasted long enough to allow of one complete innings for each side; the Press made 21, the Royal Artillery Camp, 58. Poor Steevens,¹ of the "Daily Mail," and Mitchell, assistant correspondent of the "Standard," who both fell victims to enteric, took part in this match.

On the 20th the bombardment became heavier and was again repeated at night about 11.30 P.M., and, on this night, the Boers used a searchlight from the north. On the 21st, 23d, 25th, and 28th, the Twenty-first Battery went off to Ration Post at 3.15 A.M., returning to camp about 8 P.M. The Fifty-third took this unpleasant duty on the 22d, 24th, and 27th. The only day on which either of the batteries fired any rounds was the 24th, when the Fifty-third fired ten rounds at the Boer gun on Thornhill's Kopje. This gun was firing at the mounted infantry, who had gone out to try and round up a herd of commissariat oxen which had grazed off too near to the Boer lines. The gun returned the fire and dropped several shells just over the battery without touching anything. The following official statement for the 24th of November may be of interest:—

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Horses and mules</i>
Killed to date	24	171	276
Wounded	83	799	100
Missing	47	1,153	
Died of wounds	6	34	
Died of disease		9	

¹ Author of *With Kitchener to Khartum*.

Ammunition expended to date

4.7 inch naval guns	239 rounds
12-pounder naval guns	272 "
6.3 inch howitzer	12 "
15-pounder B. L. guns	5,870 "
9-pounder muzzle-loading magazine rifle guns	529 "
.303 inch rifle	594,127 "
.303 inch carbine	73,945 "
pistol	241 "

There were requiring to be rationed on this day some thirteen thousand military and four thousand civilians, and there remained supplies for another eighty days.

While employed on Ration Post, it was easy to observe the Boers building an emplacement for a large gun on End Hill to the west of Wagon Hill, and, on the 27th, a gun firing black powder, probably a Creusôt ninety-four-pounder, opened fire in the forenoon against the northwest corner of Cæsar's Camp, where a naval volunteers' nine-pounder gun was mounted. The first three rounds were all unpleasantly near this gun, and every one was watching where the fourth shell would pitch, when there was a crash some six hundred yards short of Ration Post. The shell had pitched close to the reservoir where a battalion of the Sixtieth Rifles was lying under shelter, and where the horses and limbers of the Fifty-third were resting, as it was thought, safely under cover. The explosive in this shell was very powerful, as splinters of shell or rock fell thickly on Ration Post. Four more rounds did this gun fire close to the same spot, and the Rifles wisely adjourned to seek better cover under the river-bank. Again, once more nothing was touched.

From this day forward the morning routine for some weeks was for batteries to exercise from 4 A.M. to 5 A.M., at which hour both were hooked in ready to move off. There was no more duty at Ration Post.

On the 30th of November another large gun opened fire from Gun Hill, a hill which may be described as an underfeature of Lombard's Kop. This soon proved itself to be one of the most annoying guns throughout the investment. And now the bombardment came heavier, so much so that on the

2d of December it was found necessary to shift the tents of the men of the Fifty-third to a spot in the peach orchard of a house close to the ground their camp had hitherto occupied, and it now became necessary to issue orders that, directly a "Long Tom" began to fire, every man was to retire to the shelter trenches dug under the left bank of the Klip River. Each battery had its own trenches, and there is no record of a shell ever touching one of them. Those of the Royal Artillery were poor places compared to the caves dug by the Gordons, or to the elaborate mines excavated by the skilled miners of the Imperial Light Horse a little higher up on the opposite bank of the river; but, as just mentioned, they sufficed.

It should not be overlooked that, on the 29th of November, both batteries were warned to go out with a large force that night to seize Rifleman's Ridge. Had this been done, the idea was that the ridge was to be held as an advanced post by the Rifle Brigade. Whether it was ever seriously intended to attempt this operation will probably never be divulged, but there can be no doubt that, quite early in the day, the Boers had full and accurate information of what was proposed, for, instead of its usual deserted appearance shortly before sunset, the ridge was observed to be occupied in force. The result of this was that, about 10.30 P.M., the orders were countermanded. The Boers had an excellent system of espionage and of communication from inside to the investing lines of Ladysmith, and an order had only to be written out for them to know it, very often sooner than some of the forces of the defence.

Early in December flying columns were detailed to be ready to move out; presumably to coöperate with Buller. On the nights of the 2d and 6th of December the column assembled at a rendezvous at 9 P.M., and was not dismissed until the supply wagons had been duly marshalled and moved off along an indicated road in the town.

On the night of the 7th-8th of December a party of one hundred each of the Natal Carbineers and Imperial Light

Horse, with Captain Fowke and Lieutenant Turner, both Royal Engineers, all under Major-General Sir A. Hunter, made a most successful sortie against Gun Hill, destroying a "Long Tom" and howitzer, and bringing back a Maxim gun. The whole affair was carried out as a surprise, and orders connected with it were only issued by word of mouth.

On the morning of the 8th the cavalry brigade under General Brocklehurst moved out towards Limit Hill and along the Newcastle Road to find out the strength of the Boers in that direction. The Fifty-third was ordered soon after 4 A.M. to move to a rendezvous on the Newcastle Road just above the town and wait there for further orders. The rendezvous spot brought the head of the battery to a halt where the road winds over the hill and was fully exposed to the view of the Boers on Bulwana. Nothing would be visible until the sun rose behind Bulwana, but, directly the first rays appeared, it was evident that the unwonted presence of troops must draw down a heavy artillery fire. Surely enough, within a minute of the sun showing over the crest of the hill, the first round was fired from Bulwana. Never was an order more welcome than that given to the commanding officer of the Fifty-third to move from the rendezvous and advance to a place under cover of Observation Hill. By 6.30 A.M. Sir G. White had learned all that his cavalry could tell him, so the battery was sent home at once.

On the night of the 10th-11th of December another surprise visit was paid to the Boers. This time the hill visited was that appropriately named Surprise Hill. The officer commanding the troops was Lieutenant-Colonel C. Metcalfe, K.B. Lieutenant Digby-Jones went as Royal Engineer officer to carry out the explosion part of the operations. The howitzer was successfully destroyed, but not without a heavy casualty list.

The flying column paraded at 9.30 P.M. on the 12th and at 9 P.M. on the 13th, and these parades were utilized to give the infantry regiments composing the column a short night route march around the various streets of the town.

In the evening of the 11th Major Goulburn had taken four of his guns of the Forty-second Battery from Cæsar's Camp to relieve Major Wing's Sixty-ninth Battery, in position on Observation Hill, in order that the Sixty-ninth might accompany the flying column. At night on the 16th Major Goulburn returned to Cæsar's Camp, and Major Wing to Observation Hill. The flying column was no longer wanted; Buller had made his attempt at Colenso and failed.

The news of this failure became generally known on Sunday the 17th, and, in a measure, the disappointment was not so great as might have been the case. This was due to the fact that Buller's guns had been fired on the 13th and again very heavily on the 15th, and, as no good effect had resulted, there was a general feeling that all was not going favorably with the relieving column.

Saturday, the 16th, had been Diugaau's Day, and the Boers had celebrated this important holiday with a heavy bombardment from 4.30 A.M. to 6.30 A.M. Unfortunately Driver Midwood, of the Fifty-third, was one of the few men hit; a shell from the Bulwana "Long Tom" grazed his back as he was riding his horse at battery exercise in the main street of the town. The shell burst in the road a yard or two beyond him and hurt no one else. Midwood was taken off his horse and carried to the field hospital in the Poort Road, but died in twenty minutes. His was one of the very few known cases of a man being touched by a shell in its flight, and what made it the more sad was the fact that he was one of the wagon limber drivers who rode out with Captain Thwaites and recovered the gun on the battlefield of Lombard's Kop. A few weeks later, too, Corporal Saunders, who was the non-commissioned officer of this party, died of sickness at Intombi Camp; he was a great loss to the battery.

On the 18th of December began the first of a series of disastrous shell bursts. On this day a ninety-four-pounder shell fell in the lines of the Natal Carbineers, striking and bursting

on a horse. The pieces of shell killed three men, severely wounded two men and several horses in the neighborhood, while other pieces flying forward to the Royal Engineers' lines killed a sapper, and alongside in the lines of the Twenty-first Battery wounded Captain Campbell's charger so badly that it had to be destroyed. The same evening another shell wounded a man in the Twenty-first Battery. On the 20th a shell struck and burst on a sunburnt brick wall in the Fifty-third Battery's lines and killed five mules picketed behind it; inspection of their carcasses showed that they were more damaged by the blast of the explosion than by the splinters of shell. In each of these cases it is noteworthy that the damage seemed due to the fact that the shell burst on some object above the level of the ground, and it was very rare that a shell which fell in the open soil did any harm. On the 22d another of Bulwana's "Long Tom's" shells burst with disastrous effect in the camp of what was left of the Gloucester Regiment.

On the 21st this gun had fired at Sir George White's house in the Poort Road. The first round pitched in the road some two hundred yards short of the house, the next about one hundred short, the next only fifty, and the fourth struck the house, pitching in the room occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson, assistant adjutant-general, who, luckily, was out of it at the time. Sir George was in the house lying sick with fever, and it was with great difficulty that the Staff persuaded him to move into Mr. Christopher's house on the ridge less than a quarter of a mile off.

The greater portion of the Headquarters Staff moved to another house, which was conspicuously labelled Headquarters Staff, and which was well under cover of the ridge. Perhaps the Boers' information as to Sir George's new residence was faulty, but no further attempt was made to shell it. Although the flying column was no longer warned to be in readiness, the Twenty-first and Fifty-third Batteries tried to keep their horses fit for any movement, and, to this end, each battery

went for a route march from 3 A.M. to 4 A.M. on alternate mornings; the Fifty-third usually went out over the iron bridge up to the foot of Range Post and back, making a little tour of some of the streets of the town. In this way horses got both up and down hill work.

Christmas Day, by the thoughtful care of Colonel Ward, assistant adjutant-general, was kept as a feast day by all the garrison, every man getting enough flour, currants, etc., to make an excellent plum pudding and a ration of rum with which to wash it down. Notwithstanding a bombardment morning and evening officers went around and visited their friends. The heat at this time was very great. The maximum registered in the shade on the 26th of December was 107° F., and thunderstorms burst or were visible in the neighborhood daily. On the 26th the bombardment was heavier than usual. As the batteries now had got into a regular routine of exercise and harness before dawn, stables and orderly room about 9 A.M., feed and water at the usual hours, it became easy for officers of the batteries to go out of camp and see other parts of the works and their friends occupying them. It was a great treat to go to the Intelligence Division or Headquarters and hear the news heliographed in or see papers recently brought in by runners.

Interest in the relief was revived on the 26th by the sound of guns to the southwest.

On the last day of 1899 Captain Slayter, Royal Artillery Medical Corps, who had been in medical charge of the batteries from the arrival in Natal, was removed to Intombi Camp sick with enteric. His was a remarkable case, as it was his third attack of enteric. Thenceforward the batteries were in medical charge of subordinates of the Indian Medical Staff.

The year 1900 was welcomed by the firing of another salute directly after midnight from the guns mounted on the works. The Boers did not reply except, perhaps, by making the bombardment heavier than usual on the 1st of January.

At 6 A.M. on the 2d of January, as Second Lieutenant O. S. Cameron, of the Fifty-third, was riding out of camp to take up his lookout duty on Blewitt's Post, a shell from Bulwana "Long Tom" pitched about two yards over him, causing him to be thrown violently from his horse and sustain a concussion of the brain. He was taken off to the hospital and soon got better.

In the early morning of the 6th of January there was considerable noise of rifle fire, and at about 3 A.M. a sound as of a bullet striking the corrugated iron stable in the Royal Artillery Officers' Camp was heard. Rifle fire continued all the time the batteries were harnessing up, but nothing happened until 5.15 A.M., when it was quite light. At this hour one staff officer came and took away with him the Twenty-first Battery over Range Post, and another took the commanding officer of the Fifty-third to reconnoitre the ground by Blewitt's Post and see what sort of a position was available for the battery there. This staff officer was Captain Wales, of the Natal Volunteers, on the staff of Colonel Royston, commandant of Natal Volunteers, who had charge of the "flats" section of the defences. Captain Wales, having seen the position, rode off across the drift to report to Colonel Royston, and from him sent another staff officer, Captain Tatham, also of the Natal Carbineers, to join the Fifty-third in its gun-park.

Captain Tatham soon arrived and reported that the Boers were lodged on the southeast point of Cæsar's Camp, having eluded the pickets and patrols in the dark, and were in such force that the troops on the top of the hill could not dislodge them. The battery was to move out over the Klip River to do this. Accordingly, just before 5.30 A.M. the Fifty-third started in column of route round by the road over the iron bridge and along parallel to the crest of Cæsar's Camp. The commanding officer halted the battery in the mimosa scrub about three thousand yards from the point to be attacked, rode forward and selected a position some seven hundred yards nearer to the point, and quickly brought the battery into action.

The laying, as usual, was admirable, and, in a very few minutes, shells were bursting with lovely accuracy all down the edge line of the hill end. Up to the time of coming into action the Boers on Bulwana and Lombard's Kop, for some unaccountable reason, had not fired a round at the battery; they soon made up for this by a rapid and concentrated fire of all the guns they could bring to bear. Shells fell fast all around the battery, and the outline of one gun carriage was marked by the craters of five burst shells,—thus.

Once more the ground was soft, and to this was due the singularly few casualties in the battery. All the men working at the guns in the Fifty-third always did so as far as possible kneeling down, and, when not employed, sat down. Sergeant Boseley, of No. 2 gun, was sitting in his place as No. 1 of the detachment, resting his left elbow on his left knee, when a splinter of shell struck knee and elbow simultaneously, causing fearful wounds. He retained consciousness and said, "Roll me out of the way, boys, and get on with the gun," and a minute or two later, when being carried off to the rear on a stretcher, called out, "Buck up, No. 2." It is satisfactory to know that his wounds were so admirably dressed on the field by Assistant-Surgeon Kelly, Indian Medical Service, in charge of the Fifty-third, that the operation of amputating both leg and arm was successfully performed that same evening in the hospital, and that, on the twenty-ninth day after the operation, Boseley, perfectly convalescent, was being driven about Ladysmith in a Cape cart for a Sunday outing and change of air. It is worth remembering that he was one of the transfers from the Thirty-fourth Battery. Another piece of the same shell struck Gunner Pollard, of No. 1 gun, on the right leg; he, poor fellow, was not so fortunate as Boseley, and in October, 1900, had to go into the hospital for a tenth operation on the stump of his leg.

Sergeant Boseley's place as No. 1 was taken by Bombardier Cooke, who, in his turn, was wounded in the right leg by one

of the next shells. He, that week, was Battery Orderly, and, as he lay on the ground waiting to be removed, told those around him where his book of duty rosters would be found in camp and whose turn it was for various duties. Happily, his was a satisfactory case and he rejoined the battery shortly after the relief to find himself a corporal and noted for early promotion. There were many narrow escapes from shells, but there was no other serious wound that day in the Fifty-third, and, for some time, the Boer shells dropped persistently in one spot about one hundred and fifty yards in front of the battery.

After the battery had been firing for an hour or so the Gordon Highlanders and other British troops could be seen getting near to the point being shelled by the battery, and, so well were the guns laid and so accurately were the fuses set, that it was not until these troops were within, what was called, twenty yards of the Boers that Colonel Royston sent the orders to cease fire. As soon as the battery ceased firing the Boer guns turned their attention elsewhere. The battery's guns were left standing in the open ready to commence firing again whenever required, while the officers and men took shelter under the steep bank of a donga, or dry bed of a stream, which débouched on to the plain a few yards above the guns. Here the rest of the day was spent inactive, eating breakfast and dinner, listening to the sounds of fighting going on in other directions, talking to the escort of Natal Volunteers, or hearing from time to time reports of how the fight was going elsewhere. As the day wore on, one of the usual thunderstorms began to threaten and worked its way all around Ladysmith from west to northeast; suddenly, about 4.30 P.M., it rushed up from the direction of Lombard's Kop and burst like a water-spout over the battlefield. As the storm increased, so the sound of rifle fire on Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill sounded louder and closer, and the Staff on Wagon Hill felt so sure that the attack was being pushed home by the Boers

that they drew their revolvers. Above the roar of thunder and constant roll of rifle fire, the guns of the Forty-second Battery on the top of Cæsar's Camp continued to fire at regular intervals, marking the time, as it were, of a horrible music. It was about this time that the Devons made their historic charge and swept the Boers from Wagon Hill.

The change of the scene around the Fifty-third was so rapid as to be hardly credible; in one quarter of an hour from the burst of the storm the donga, which had sheltered the men all day, was full, and five minutes later the water was overflowing its eight-foot high banks. As the stream fast threatened to cut off the guns from the limbers, the commanding officer of the Fifty-third gave the order to limber up and return to camp, and it was with difficulty that this was reached, as every donga, which had been dry in the morning, was now a raging torrent. One of these was pronounced by some of the Colonials to be impossible to cross, but the battery drove through gun by gun, and, although one of the horses fell, washed off his legs by the current, all eventually got across with only the loss of a few helmets. The driving of the teams on this occasion was much admired by the Colonials. Besides the commanding officer, Lieutenants Stobart and Higgins alone were with the battery this day, as Captain Thwaites was sick with fever and Cameron disabled, as previously described. Late into the evening the roar of rifle fire continued, but never so loud or so threatening as during the height of the storm, and, although the battery unhooked and turned in for the night, it was in the expectation of a renewal of the fight at dawn next morning.

Dreadful were the stories that the morning brought. The most distressing to officers of the batteries was the news of the death of their Royal Engineers neighbors, Digby-Jones and Dennis, while all hoped that the wound to Colonel Dick Cunningham, of the Gordons, might not prove fatal. He had been struck within a quarter of a mile of camp by a stray

bullet, which dropped over the hill of Maiden Post, fired in the attack on Wagon Hill. He was only recently convalescent from a wound received at Elandslaagte, and, unhappily, succumbed to the fresh wound on the 8th.

Sad as were the tales of losses incurred by all the troops engaged on Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill, there was some comfort in the thought that they were not in vain, for every report gave the losses of the Boers as the heaviest of the campaign so far. Throughout the next week each report increased the numbers of their losses instead of, as after previous fights, decreasing them.

Again, it is well to remark that this account of the 6th of January is only of the part taken on that day by the Fifty-third Battery. The Twenty-first Battery, in action against the end of Wagon Hill and the Boers on Middle Hill, had a very similar experience to that of the Fifty-third, losing two men wounded and fourteen horses, all from shell fire; they were exposed to the fire of the Blaubank, Rifleman's Ridge, and Telegraph Hill guns. On the 8th of January the bombardment was heavier than had been the case for some time previously, and it seemed as if the fire from Bulwana was more particularly directed at the Royal Artillery Camp, especially that part of it occupied by the officers' tents. One shell pitched exactly on the spot where Second Lieutenant Cameron's tent had stood up to the date of his going to the hospital. At 7 P.M. on the 8th a thanksgiving service for delivery from the assault of the 6th was conducted by Archdeacon Barker in the English Church. All who could attend and the members of the Staff assembled in the chancel for the singing of the "Te Deum" at the close of the service. The bombardment for the next five days was very slight, and, on the 13th, though Bulwana "Long Tom" fired six rounds, only four of them fell in the Royal Artillery, or adjoining Royal Engineer, camps.

On the 15th of January, not only the garrison of Lady-

smith, but the whole literary world, sustained a loss in the death of that brilliant writer, G. W. Steevens, of the "Daily Mail." His death was a cruel surprise, as, to within two days of the end, he had made good progress toward convalescence.

By this time it had become evident that the tents in the Royal Artillery officers' lines were objects selected for the aim of the Boer gunners on Bulwana, so, at dawn on the 16th, the officers' tents of the Twenty-first, Fifty-third, and Brigade Division Staff were shifted to neighboring sites on the river-bank where they were not visible to the Boers.

From the 11th to the 16th the gunners of the two batteries were employed at night in making new emplacements for guns on Junction Hill at the other end of the town. These were designed for occupation only in case of an attack on Observation Hill. On the 16th, also, Colonel Coxhead, with the commanding officer of the Fifty-third, selected sites for guns on Poundburg Hill, which would form a second line of defence in event of the outer line — Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill — falling. Happily neither was ever required to be occupied.

On the 17th the guns of the relieving force were for the first time heard firing from the direction of Potgieter's Drift, — that is, to the left of Colenso, — and this day the flying column was once more warned to be ready to go out. Every day, until the 25th, heavy firing was heard from the direction of Potgieter's and Acton Homes, and from certain points on Cæsar's Camp and Observation Hill shells could be seen bursting on Spion Kop and its neighboring hills. Still the flying column was not ordered to move, and, on the 26th, when the firing in the distance had ceased and no news was promulgated, uneasy feelings as to the doings of the relieving force once more arose. Colonel Frank Rhodes was one of the very few, if not the only one, to gauge the situation aright. He said, judging from what he had heard and seen from Observation Hill, "I believe we have seized Spion Kop and lost

it again." On the 27th of January the news of what had occurred became known.

It probably was fortunate that the flying column was not called upon at this time to take the field, for both horses and men were by now beginning to feel the want of proper food, proper rest, and proper exercise; sickness was rife, many who ought to be in the hospital were living in camp, as the hospitals were full, and, without doubt, if the flying column had tried to march ten miles and fight a battle at the end of that journey, it must have failed.

On the 28th of January Cameron, who had rejoined the battery on the 13th, more or less recovered from his concussion, had another bad accident: his horse trod on a stone and came down on top of him, crushing and bruising him so severely that he was moved to Intombi Camp for treatment, and, after the relief, was invalided home to England.

The bombardment never again became anything more than slight, and it would seem as if most of the Boer forces were withdrawn from around Ladysmith to operate against the relieving forces. Those, too, who were left were probably an inferior stamp of soldier, for, on more than one occasion at night, they began to fire on a false alarm, and must have fired away hundreds of rounds quite harmlessly. It is worthy of note that this fire was not replied to, nor did the British once, during the whole investment, open fire by night on a false alarm. This is in rather marked contrast to what has occurred in most modern campaigns. On the 1st of February food for the horses and oxen had become so scarce that orders were issued for all horses, beyond one hundred in the case of each battery of artillery and seventy-five in the case of each cavalry regiment, to be turned out to find what grazing they could on the flats and over Range Post. In this way the Fifty-third turned out thirty-one horses. These, with those of the other two batteries and ammunition column, were driven out of camp each morning by a party of mounted drivers

under an officer. A small picket of drivers was supposed to watch them during the day and at night those that could be rounded up were driven into a laager formed by the ammunition column wagons. Many grazed away, got lost in the scrub, or fell into muddy dongas and were too weak to scramble out again, so that, in a very few days, the herd to be driven out was but a small one, and, after the 3d of February, the survivors were required for slaughter, a certain number each day, to make "chevril," or issue as a meat ration. The allowance of corn for each horse retained was two pounds a day, sometimes oats, sometimes ground mealies, and sometimes whole mealies. The allowance of grass was nominally sixteen pounds for each horse a day, but this was brought in wet, cut by a corps of Indian coolies, Zulus, and Cape boys. It had to be dried for a day and, when given to the horses, can rarely have amounted to ten pounds apiece. There had been no "horse-sickness" hitherto, but, about the middle of January, all the horses were suffering from some form of diarrhœa, which was accompanied by a persistent cough.

On the 7th of February, Captain Thwaites was ordered to Rifle Post to take charge of four fifteen-pounders in emplacements there. While on this duty he contracted dysentery, with which he was invalided home soon after the relief.

On the 8th of February firing was once more heard from the direction of Colenso, and this was repeated nearly every day until the 18th, when the sound came as if from the east of Colenso, and thence it continued to come for the next nine days.

On the 23d of February the commanding officer of the Fifty-third was ordered to ride out and reconnoitre for a position beyond the southeast point of Cæsar's Camp, whence a battery might fire on a dam the Boers could be seen building across the Klip River some mile or more below Intombi Camp.

A most careful reconnoissance of the ground failed to dis-

cover any point from which a fifteen-pounder could possibly reach the dam; but a place was found on the east end of Cæsar's Camp plateau where a naval long-range twelve-pounder gun was mounted and from which it could reach the dam. Although it transpired later that this dam had been part of the scheme for reducing Ladysmith, which had been determined on by the Boers at a very early date in the investment, work on it had not been prosecuted with any vigor until about this time. Doubtless the Boers began to find the left flank of their Colenso lines seriously threatened by Buller's operations against Hlaugwaue, and to see that, if the river were to rise suddenly, their retreat by way of Bulwana and the Modder Spruit was liable to be closed. They, therefore, determined to push on the construction of the dam as fast as possible, more with a view of enabling them to control the flow of the Klip and keep a drift open than with a hope of flooding out first the helpless Intombi Camp and afterwards Ladysmith.

So successfully did the relief force seem to be advancing that on the 22d of February a full bread ration of biscuit was issued, and, on the 28th, the good news of the capture of Kronje and Buller's victory at Pieter's Hill were published.

It was soon evident that the truth of both these disasters was realized by the Boers, for, on the afternoon of the 28th, a gyn or derrick was erected above "Long Tom" of Bulwana, and, notwithstanding the fire of the naval guns directed against it, the Boers worked away at the operation of dismounting for some time.

As evening closed in, shouting and cheering from the direction of Blewitt's Post marked the arrival of Lord Dundonald and some mounted volunteers. Hopes had been too often raised only to be miserably shattered for any great enthusiasm to be shown by the relieved garrison. No doubt, if relief had come two months sooner, the excitement would have been far greater.

On the morning of the 1st of March a small force of all arms was despatched under Colonel W. Knox, C.B., up the Newcastle Road to try and cut off some of the flying Boers. Lieutenant-Colonel Pickwood went out in command of the Royal Artillery, which consisted of the Fifty-third and Sixty-seventh Batteries, formed into a brigade division, and two guns of No. 10 Mountain Battery. The brigade division was directly under the command of the commanding officer (Major Abdy) of the Fifty-third. The batteries came into action against Boer riflemen on Long and Pepworth Hills, and drove them from those positions. As the Staff rode forward to reconnoitre over the Modder Spruit Boer railway station, a train slowly moved some quarter of a mile out from the station and pulled up, when, immediately, the bridge over the spruit was blown up behind it. Again the train moved forward and a culvert went up behind it, and this manœuvre was repeated twice more.

It was not long before Colonel Knox found both men and horses knocking up, and felt himself obliged to send word to Sir G. White to say his troops could do no more. At about 1.30 P.M., shortly before the retirement began, Colonel Pickwood was shot through the right thigh by a bullet from Pepworth Hill. There were few other casualties this day, but several horses in the cavalry and two or three in the artillery succumbed to weakness.

To enable the Fifty-third to turn out, it was lent eighteen pairs of horses by each of the Thirteenth and the Sixty-ninth, and twelve pairs by the Twenty-first Battery while Captain Bright, of the Royal Artillery Staff, took the place of the commanding officer of the Fifty-third in command of that battery for the day, and a subaltern from the Thirteenth came for the day also. On return to Ladysmith visitors from Pieter's Hill Camp were found, and the investment, or siege, as it has been called, of Ladysmith was at an end.

Many matters of interest have been omitted, or overlooked,

in this slight sketch, but there is one subject that should be noted and testified to by every writer; it is the magnificent patience and soldierlike bearing of the rank and file throughout those trying weeks. For officers there were during more than half the time many of the comforts and small luxuries of a mess; for an officer, too, who knew where to go there were several excellent libraries; and officers who fell sick and did not want to go to Intombi were taken into civilians' houses, where at least they had a roof over their heads and a floor beneath them. For the rank and file there were none of these, and camp life was worse for the men of the Indian force than for others, as, up to the date of sailing from India, they had everything in the way of washing, cooking, and cleaning their lines done for them by natives. In Ladysmith, moreover, they had no syces to help in the care of the horses. Men, so weak from sickness that they ought to be in bed and cared for by nurses, would crawl down to the horse lines and feebly try to groom a horse. Much has been written of the splendid bearing of the British soldier on the field of battle; those who saw him in the festering camps of Ladysmith can state how nobly he bore himself there.

XVIII

A JUDICIAL VERSUS A MILITARY SETTLE-
MENT OF SOME INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM CROZIER, U.S.A.

Read before the Society February 10, 1914

A JUDICIAL VERSUS A MILITARY SETTLEMENT OF SOME INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

I FEEL a good deal of trepidation in appearing before this Society without more preparation than I have had the time to make. The Society has a right to expect that the addresses which take up its time shall have been preceded by a good deal of research, and shall form a contribution of evidence tending to bring out or to clear up interesting facts in regard to a species of history whose accuracy, even in regard to important points, is often difficult to establish. But the conduct of a busy administrative government office does not give opportunity for research, which, being of absorbing interest, is also absorbing of time; and I can therefore only, using some well-known facts of history, put before you certain reflections upon a subject which has in recent years occupied a good deal of the attention of a considerable number of statesmen, public educators, and other thinkers who may fairly be said to be conducting or guiding the affairs of this world in which we live.

In speaking about a judicial settlement of international disputes I wish to emphasize the difference between that kind of settlement and a settlement by diplomacy, or by any sort of adjustment in which the parties make mutual concessions. You are well aware of the existence in this country of a prominent association whose name is the "Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes." The kind of settlement advocated by that Society is a settlement by a court similar to the courts established within nations, before which a cause may be tried, and from which the party rightfully appreciating that it has the law and precedent on its side can confidently expect judgment in its favor; however radical such judgment may be, and however completely it may deprive

the other party of any shred of comfort from the result. The character of such an international court has been often described by prominent members of the Society. At the meeting of the Society in Washington, on December 15, 1910, Mr. Elihu Root made the following statement in regard to it:—

“Now it has seemed to me very clear that in view of these practical difficulties standing in the way of our present system of arbitration, the next step by which the system of peaceable settlement of international disputes can be advanced, the pathway along which it can be pressed forward to universal acceptance and use, is to substitute for the kind of arbitration we have now, in which the arbitrators proceed according to their ideas of diplomatic obligation, real courts where judges, acting under the sanctity of the judicial oath, pass upon the rights of countries, as judges pass upon the rights of individuals, in accordance with the facts as found and the law as established.”

In an address before the Society in Cincinnati, on November 7, 1911, President Taft, in speaking of the treaties of arbitration which he had negotiated with Great Britain and France, said:—

“Personally, I would have made the treaty—if I had had the making of it and the ratification, too—I would have made the treaty so that the board of arbitration should have had the jurisdiction to decide, upon the application of either party, whether the question arising came within the treaty. I would leave the question to a court of superior jurisdiction. But evidently we have not yet quite got to that stage, though this is a step in that direction. I believe the arbitral court to be the solution of the difficulty; and when I say ‘arbitral court,’ I mean a court whose jurisdiction and power are established by joint agreement of all nations, a court into which one nation may summon another for a hearing upon a complaint and for a judgment, and may rely upon the judgment being carried out through the public opinion of the nations,

or by an auxiliary force, if necessary. When we have such an arbitral court, then disarmament will follow."

The article of the treaties which caused most discussion, and the one whose material amendment by the Senate afterwards caused the treaties to be dropped, provided an agreement that there should be submitted to judicial settlement all questions which should be justiciable in their nature, and these were immediately defined in the article to be such questions as would be susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law and equity. This would, of course, mean nothing but the principles of law or equity as they were understood at the time, resulting from previous practice. It was well recognized by Mr. Taft that such settlement would result at times in the complete defeat of one of the contesting parties. He said:—

"Arbitration cannot result in victory for both parties. Somebody has got to be beaten. We cannot play 'Heads I win, tails you lose.' We have got to have the people accept the fact that sometimes we may be beaten. We ought not to arrange something with a string to it so that when we think we are going to lose we can back out of arbitration, and open up the possibility of war. We ought to put ourselves in such a situation that sometimes it will hurt us; we ought to subscribe to and carry out the treaty and stand to its terms. If we do not, then we are not making any progress. Therefore, while I appreciate the sensitiveness of the Senate with respect to this, and while I regard that feeling with respectful consideration, nevertheless, I think it is mistaken. I believe that we can well afford to go ahead and occasionally lose an arbitration in the general cause of the peace of the world."

I have thus dwelt upon the character of the judicial settlement which many well-disposed and intelligent people urge us to bind ourselves to, in order that we may submit it to the only kind of test which is worth anything, in the absence of practical trial; that is, the test of its application to incidents which

have arisen in the world's history, and the estimation of its probable effect. We can examine the causes of some of the wars which have occurred, and form an opinion of how these causes would have been settled if the judicial process had been employed, instead of the process of war, and see how we should have liked the result.

Taking our own nation; the war which resulted in its birth may not with strict accuracy be called the culmination of an international dispute, since it was the revolt of colonies from the mother country. But it was a war between communities of considerable size, geographically separated, over distinct questions of policy, and thus exhibits quite enough for our purpose of the characteristics of a war between nations. We have been in the habit of assigning as the most immediate cause of the war objection to taxation without representation, but the objection to this upon the part of the colonists was only a part of their claim that the American colonies constituted such distinct communities that they were entitled to local self-government in their internal affairs, and even in certain affairs which concerned their relations with the outside world. The reasoning of the colonists upon the new state of affairs which had arisen in the progress of the world led them to a conclusion which was at variance with the principles which had theretofore been considered as universally governing. It is true that some representation as a condition precedent to taxation had been enjoyed by British subjects in the home country, but the extension of the principle to colonial peoples was a brand-new subject, constituting a departure. Even as a right of subjects at home it had been acquired by the exercise of or show of force, and in being so acquired had upset previously existing practice. As to the right of self-government, this was a more radical departure from precedent than the other claim, in that it involved a broader abandonment of the old rules, and included not only representation for taxation, but a general freedom from the authority which had theretofore always been dis-

tinely claimed, although it had been in many respects leniently exercised with reference to the American colonies. The claims of the colonists were therefore revolutionary in their character, and by this very statement of their nature are stamped as having been such as could not have been allowed by a judicial tribunal, which has no authority to make new laws, or to change laws which are in force.

I am not losing sight of the fact that courts must often make application of laws to situations which were not in the minds of the legislators at the time the laws were made ; but this admitted duty of the courts includes no authority to change the laws when there is no doubt as to what they are, and they do not, in the opinion of the court, suit the situation which is before it.

We are familiar with the comparatively recent instance in which the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that the Sherman Law prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade applies to certain acts of labor organizations in the maintenance of the boycott. Since the boycott had not at the time of the passage of the Sherman Act made its appearance as the evil which the courts have since that time frequently stated it to be, it is altogether improbable that Congress had in mind this kind of activity, by this kind of association, at the time of the passage of the Sherman Act ; but the court held that the principles of that act so suitably fitted this new kind of combination in restraint of trade as to bring it clearly under the prohibition of the law. The American Federation of Labor is now endeavoring to have a new law enacted which shall relieve labor organizations from the operation of the Sherman Law ; and if it should succeed the courts will, of course, have to be governed by the new law. What I wish to hold your attention to is the fact that the court has not made any new law, and has not reversed or rendered inoperative an old law ; but that it has simply declared the existing law to be applicable to the new condition which had arisen since its passage.

The colonists wished the old rules, not to be applied to a new condition, but to be reversed, which would involve some kind of law-making process, as it is inconceivable that it could have been done by a judicial process. That the previously existing law was not statutory law does not obscure our understanding of what it was. It is often thus, with international law, which is none the less clear because it has not been enacted by a legislative body. If the American colonists could have won their contentions before a judicial body such as could have been gathered together in the world at that time, it seems clear that it would have been because of the prejudice aroused in the civilized world against the power and prestige of Great Britain, and would have necessarily resulted from such an abandonment of the judicial attitude which becomes such a body as to cause the latter to lose its proper character as a court.

The first distinctly foreign war in which the new American nation was engaged was that of 1812. In regard to this war the Honorable John W. Foster, in an address before the Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, at Washington, on December 15, 1910, stated that "the single question upon which war was finally declared was that of blockade, and immediately after the war began the question was transferred to impressment, both of which are pure subjects of international law and practice."

As the first-mentioned cause had really ceased to exist at the time war was commenced, we may leave it out of consideration and examine only the question of impressment. I quite agree that this was a subject of international law and practice, and it is pertinent to examine what the law and the practice were, and how we should have come out of a judicial determination of them. General Foster makes many quotations in support of his view that the subject of impressment could have been brought under the rules of existing international law. In quoting Hall on this subject he states Eng-

lish practice at the beginning of the nineteenth century to have been that "if a foreign-naturalized Englishman was met on the high seas in a foreign merchant ship he could be taken out of it, the territoriality of such ships not being then recognized." He calls attention to the statement of Canning, British Foreign Secretary, that "when mariners, subjects of His Majesty, are employed in the private service of foreigners, . . . those subjects may be taken at sea out of the service of such foreign individuals and recalled to that paramount duty, which they owe their sovereign and their country. . . . It is needless to repeat that these rights existed in their fullest force for ages previous to the establishment of the United States of America; and it would be difficult to contend that the recognition of that independence can have operated any change in this respect." A great deal of authority is cited by General Foster in support of the doctrine that at that time the inalienability of national allegiance was universally conceded. Even American authorities, both administrative and judicial, then held this view, and Justice Story, in 1830, in delivering an opinion of the court, according to General Foster, said: "The general doctrine is that no persons can, by any act of their own, without the consent of the Government, put off their allegiance and become aliens."

The attitude toward change of allegiance which was common to the rest of the world was also largely held with reference to allegiance to the United States, as evidenced by Chancellor Kent who, in his *Commentaries on American Law*, in 1826, wrote: "A citizen cannot renounce allegiance to the United States without the permission of the Government be declared by law."

The United States, from the beginning of the argument of the question, denied the right of visitation and search for impressment, and commenced almost immediately to give expression to this denial. But the British Government held strictly to it and when Madison was Secretary of State, gave the fol-

lowing instructions to the British Minister at Washington: "The pretension advanced by Mr. Madison, that the American flag should protect every individual sailing under it on board merchant ships, is so extravagant as to require no serious consideration."

Admiral Mahan, in his "Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812," gives a most interesting discussion of the claim of the right of visitation and search and impressment which was the cause upon which the War of 1812 was actually waged. He demonstrates the practical impossibility of an abandonment of this claim by Great Britain at the time when she was engaged in a desperate struggle for life against the power of Europe under Napoleon, and when she was following the practice which had theretofore not been questioned. He gives evidence to show that British opinion found a good deal of support among American public men, and quotes Representative Gaston, who, speaking of the British practice as a right, steadily defending, of course, the immunity of American seamen from British impressment, went so far as to say that should Great Britain consent to relinquish the right of taking her own subjects it would be no advantage to our individual seamen, because of the competition of British seamen in the American merchant service, which brought down the rate of wages. Admiral Mahan also quotes Gouverneur Morris, who wrote: "Let the right of search and impressment be acknowledged as maxims of public law."

I think enough has been cited of the opinions of these two eminent authorities to show that Great Britain had a strong case in the exercise of the right of impressment of British seamen, when their presence on board of American merchant ships was disclosed by the visitation and search which she had concededly a right to effect during war-time, in order to determine the nationality of the vessel visited and the character of her cargo. Admiral Mahan reminds us that the acute character of the question arose from the new condition which

came about in the world when another nation came into existence, of people of the same race and speaking the same language as those of the greatest existing maritime nation, whose interests were most strongly bound up with the question of allegiance of her maritime subjects. Up to that time the probability of making mistakes in the impressment of alleged British subjects was negligible. When the new state of affairs came into existence the old practice was found to possess disadvantages theretofore unsuspected, but there was no law-making process or authority by which the practice could have been forbidden, and the nation profiting by it had as much right, if not a great deal more, to adhere to it, as the new nation, adversely affected, had to object to it.

Conceding General Foster's position that the subject of impressment was not quite within the scope of international law and practice, I cannot understand his argument otherwise than as indicating that if the case had been judicially settled in accordance with international law and practice, it must have gone against the United States. It is true that the war did not settle it, because we lost out in the war, and were in no position to claim our contention at the treaty of peace; but the practice ended by reason of the termination of the war between Great Britain and Continental Europe, and the question ceased, for the time being, to be an acute one. It, however, merged into the question of the right of visitation and search in time of peace, by reason of the efforts of Great Britain to suppress the slave trade, and this right was not formally given up by Great Britain until as late as 1860. It was, however, finally given up, and the whole question was settled in favor of the American view. I do not see how it can be contested that the result was brought about through force, at first unsuccessfully exerted, but even thus demonstrated to be a process which the United States was willing to resort to.

I suppose the Mexican War is generally acknowledged as one in which the cause of the United States is most difficult

of defence. Questions of boundary in new countries, where the geography was unknown at the time when the people of the two countries contesting about the boundary first commenced to occupy the disputed region, are bound to be attended with much difficulty. I do not intend to detain you by any examination of the relative rights of Mexico and the United States to the disputed territory. General Foster holds that the movement of American troops into that territory, while the boundary question was still under discussion, was an overt act of aggression which naturally brought on the war. It is not altogether easy to admit this, since there is lack of apparent necessity for the attack on these United States troops in the disputed territory, and their presence there need not have caused the termination of negotiations. There was plenty of other territory into which Mexican troops might have been similarly moved. The whole question has received too extended examination for me to be justified in going into it here, but it is less difficult to notice the character of the results which followed the military settlement which was effected. Can anybody maintain that it is a pity that Colorado, Utah, California, etc., are not now in the condition of Chihuahua, Sonora, and Durango? Selfishly speaking, the United States is, of course, incomparably the gainer in the possession of the rich country which was acquired by the war which, including the purchase price of the ceded territory, cost less than one hundred million dollars. The inhabitants of the acquired territory, both those who were in it at the time of the dispute and those who have since settled there, have reason to thank Heaven that the change of nationality occurred; while the world at large, being able to engage in relations with a part of the United States instead of being condemned, with regard to this acquired territory, to such as are now prevailing between the rest of the world and Mexico, must necessarily be heartily congratulated. The only unfortunates would appear to be those in control of the central gov-

ernment of Mexico, and of these persons the principal grievance would seem to be that, having at that time been deprived of the power of exploiting the inhabitants of the ceded territory, they now have, in the restricted area in revolt, a less dignified adversary to yield to, in case they shall finally be compelled by the northern revolutionists to relinquish their control, than they would have had if the ceded territory had been left to join the revolt against them.

I am not contending for the settlement of questions irrespective of their real merits, and I am quite willing to concede that questions of boundary are such as to almost universally lend themselves to judicial settlement; but I do maintain that the method of judicial settlement is at least upon its explanation when it can be made to appear so clearly that, as in the case of the Mexican War, the failure to resort to it, and the settlement of that question by the process of war, produced a result which must be universally regarded as one which it would be extremely unfortunate to have lost. The incident certainly raises a suspicion that the principles which must guide in judicial settlement of international disputes are subject to grave error, and that, in the absence of the possibility of correcting them by other means, the international law-making process of war is oftentimes the very best that can be resorted to.

Now, take the familiar case of our Civil War, the greatest in our history. Of course this war also was not one between nations, but, like the Revolutionary War, was between such considerable and such distinctly separated communities that it can be considered as a war between nations for the purposes of this discussion. Its inspiring cause, the extension of slavery into the new territory of the United States, and its immediate cause, the exercise of the right of secession, lend themselves easily to an examination with reference to the outcome of a judicial settlement. The first-named cause was submitted to such a settlement, in the *Dred Scott* case, before

the tribunal which we consider the best which has ever been created, namely, the Supreme Court of the United States. It was by that body held that slaves were property and as such could be carried into the new territory of the United States to be there entitled to its protection. This judicial settlement must be accepted as according to the law as it then existed. Of course, the whole world now concedes that it was not in accordance with right, but that, as distinct from the lawful aspect of the case, it was not within the province of the court to determine. Equally certain was it that in the existing state of affairs the law could not have been changed by the usual process.

As to the right of secession, of course we shall not attempt to reach any conclusion by discussion ; but I think we will have to admit that, as a question before a court, the right was certainly doubtful. Mr. Charles Francis Adams, a distinguished citizen of New England, thoroughly identified with the Northern cause, has more than once stated that the question was not determined at the time of the formation of this Government, and that the quality of legal right could be claimed by either party to the contest. Another distinguished son of New England, the Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, has said that at the time of the formation of the Government, and for a considerable time afterwards, the right of secession was not only generally considered to exist, but also to be a right that would, in all probability, be exercised. Under these circumstances, how would the different fundamental questions of the dispute have lent themselves to judicial settlement? If the Supreme Court was right, the judicial settlement would probably have been different from that which was brought about by the war; and if the distinguished gentlemen whose views I have just cited were right, it is at least entirely uncertain that the judicial settlement would have determined the right of secession in the same manner as did the sword. Those of us who are well pleased with the result that was attained as to

secession, and those of us who would have been dissatisfied with the continuance of the opposite result as to slavery, and I think such now include practically all of the inhabitants of this country, have reason to congratulate ourselves that the questions of the Civil War received a military instead of a judicial settlement.

Coming now to the last war which the country has waged, it is pertinent to examine the object which the United States had in entering into it. This can best be gathered from the Resolution of Congress giving the directions to the President under which the war was prosecuted. These are found in the Joint Resolution of Congress approved April 20, 1898, as follows:—

“1st. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

“2d. That it is the duty of the United States to demand and the United States does hereby demand that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“3d. That the President be and he is hereby directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the Militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to put this resolution into effect.

“4th. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.”

The object of the war is thus seen to have been the termination of the sovereignty of Spain in Cuba, for reasons which are set forth in the preamble to the Resolution as “abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders,” which are said to “have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United

States, to have been a disgrace to civilization," etc. Undoubtedly, the United States, in a judicial proceeding, might have obtained a judgment to the effect that the conditions in Cuba were abhorrent, and that Spain was responsible for them and should terminate them; but abundant representation had already been made to that effect, and this country was convinced that, after long trial, Spain was powerless to remedy them. There is a good deal of contention that when national sentiment, roused by the disaster to the *Maine*, was supposed to have urged this country into a hasty war, the condition of the negotiations was such that with a little more time the differences between this country and Spain might have been diplomatically settled. I have no doubt that Spain would have expressed a willingness to concede the necessity for reform in Cuba, and probably would have been willing to grant some kind of a measure of autonomy to that island; but I very seriously doubt if she knew how, or had any persons capable of effecting any real self-government in that island, and consequently any permanent remedy for the evils which existed there. The deliberate conclusion of this country was that her sovereignty there must be terminated, and it is apparent that our demand could not have been granted by any judicial tribunal. The sovereignty of Spain in Cuba was as firmly established as anything in international law, and without a change in such law it could be terminated only by some such revolutionary process as that of war.

I am far from believing that efforts looking towards a peaceful settlement of disputes between nations should cease, or even should diminish their activity. I think there are classes of cases which lend themselves unmistakably to this kind of settlement; but there are other cases which distinctly do not, for the reason that the law and the precedent and the established order, being human-made, are subject to error, and in the course of the progress of the world are therefore likely at a given moment not to accord with the conditions as they

exist. In such cases there arises a demand for a change, and if the change is resisted by a nation whose interests are bound up in the wrong order, the change must be brought about by the process of war. The judicial process, being held bound to the very principles which are claimed to have been outgrown, and holding the world looking backward instead of forward, cannot effect the revolution which is demanded, and which must be brought about by some kind of a law-making process, laying down new principles. I have no fear that, at the time of being confronted with such a situation as we have frequently met in the past, the people of this country will submit to judicial arbitration questions concerning which the existing principles are such that arbitration would unrightfully go against us. But I would like to call attention to the fact that, since a judicial process cannot constitute a universally safe reliance upon which to lean in our conscientious efforts to promote the progress of the world, we should not neglect reasonable preparation for resort to the warlike process which we shall certainly have to resort to under such circumstances, and which has served so frequently in the past to establish principles which, without it, would not have been born into the world for an indefinite time after the period when they really did commence to exercise their beneficent influence. A case by judicial process must be settled according to the principles which govern the court; if these are not such as we can adhere to we can have no chance of gaining our contention, unless the principles are changed. This change of principle has been the cause of those wars which have produced the greatest effect in the improvement of the world.

Processes have been suggested which are based upon the assumption that wars often result from precipitate action, without time for sober second thought or even for careful investigation of the circumstances embodied in the cause of the dispute. Such proceedings, and the agreements which lead to them, can do no harm, and should probably be encouraged;

but I think it is easy to place more reliance upon them than the facts of history justify. When at the First International Peace Conference at The Hague, in 1899, it became apparent that the nations engaged in the conference were not going to bind themselves by a hard-and-fast agreement to submit contentions to arbitration, various forms of moral pressure, looking to the use of arbitral methods, were resorted to and embodied in the convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which was adopted by that Conference. The most prominent of these was Article XXVII, which states: "The signatory Powers consider it their duty in case a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the permanent Court of arbitration is open to them. . . ."

How woefully this article failed of its object is appreciated by reference to the fact that since the adoption of the convention three wars have occurred, namely, the South-African War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan War; and with regard to not one of them did the signatory Powers of the Convention think it worth while to remind the parties in dispute that the court of arbitration was open to them. It is perfectly evident that an appeal to the court would never have served the purpose of the disputants in any case, and therefore the duty imposed by the article was completely and sensibly neglected. There may be in the future, as there have been in the past, wars which result from temporary irritation, from hasty action, which the various processes of delay which form the subject of present negotiations between nations may be of service in softening; but wars for great principles are not of this class, and for doing away with them I cannot see that any suggestion which is now before the world offers reasonable guarantee.

XIX

THE GEOMETRICAL FACTOR IN NAPOLEON'S
GENERALSHIP

BY

PROFESSOR R. M. JOHNSTON

Read before the Society February 4, 1913

THE GEOMETRICAL FACTOR IN NAPOLEON'S GENERALSHIP

“To be a good general,” said Napoleon at St. Helena, “a man must know mathematics; it is of daily help in straightening one’s ideas. Perhaps I owe my success to my mathematical conceptions; a general must never imagine things, that is the most fatal of all. I can distinguish what is essential in a question from every angle. The great art in battle is to change the line of operations during the course of the engagement; that is an idea of my own and quite new.”

It is at least curious that among the numerous historians and military theorists who have written about Napoleon, none has thought it worth while to discuss what the greatest of soldiers deliberately stated was his one individual addition to the science of war. Jomini, von Clausewitz, Thiers, and the more modern writers, disagreeing in most things, agree in passing over Napoleon’s statement in solemn silence. They fail to understand him, just as several generations failed to understand the equally subtle, elusive thing that Nelson did at Trafalgar, and so, with all historical gravity and decorum, they passed the fact over as of no historical importance. It is another proof of how difficult a subject is military history and of how badly historians may fail when they get on this ground.

The explanation of this dictum of Napoleon is in reality quite simple, but the illustrations of it few; it will be better, therefore, to attach the theory of changing the line of operations during the course of an engagement, to a subject a little wider of which it will appear as merely one aspect. That subject is the geometrical factor in Napoleon’s generalship.

It must at once be said that in all generalship there is

essentially a mathematical and geometrical aspect. In every branch of war, calculation is necessary. The formation of infantry, the trace of a fortification, the problems of transportation and supply, the velocity and curves of missiles, all these are scientific problems in the routine of the soldier's work. It is clear, therefore, that taking any great general of whom we have a fairly adequate record,—the case will fit Napoleon, or Frederick, or Lee,—there can be no great difficulty in accumulating more or less instances to prove that he was a man of mathematical or geometrical attainment. But that really is not the point; it is rather this, that among great exponents of the military art we always find in Napoleon a geometrical predisposition, when in others, like Frederick or Lee, it is something else.

Frederick, it would seem, was always the drillmaster, his mind set on evolving some unexpected enfilade by a *right wheel* or *companies left* and thereby dislocating the European equilibrium! Lee, with troops that manœuvred none too well, and a personal inclination to disregard what sort of figure his line of communications might describe on the map, was always the psychologist, playing skilfully and boldly on the characters and attainments of his opponents, his old companions of West Point and of the United States Army. Napoleon was what he had become as a schoolboy and as a young man, the accomplished mathematician and geometer.


The evidence is ample as to his youthful proficiency in this matter. And his career appears to bear the interpretation that largely owing to this mental habit, he achieved much success in his early years, but failed to learn anything in his later ones. For mathematical proficiency exacts its price: it develops the logical faculty, but it tends to crystallize ideas and to render them rigid. Now, it is part of the argument that Napoleon in his later days showed rigidity. In 1796 he was already the full-fledged geometrician general, correct in his solutions and with triumph opening before him; in 1815 he was still apply-

ing the same solutions to his problems, but disaster was staring him in the face. The principles of geometry had not changed, nor had the man; it was only that his opponents had been investigating his system of geometry. He really admits all this himself when he says: "Fighting sixty battles taught me nothing I did not know at the first one."

Here, perhaps, objections may be advanced. It may be said that great changes are observable in the methods of war followed by Napoleon at different epochs of his career. This is true, and yet it is more apparent than real so far as his fundamental processes of thought are concerned, for those changes were mostly due to facts external to himself. After 1805, his armies grow in size; after 1807, they deteriorate in quality; but the larger and inferior bodies, in whatever way utilized, present themselves for handling as a problem in ballistics. "The impact of an army," says the Emperor, "like the total of mechanical coefficients, is equal to the mass multiplied by the velocity."

Before coming now to some examples that illustrate how peculiarly Napoleon's mind worked along the line already indicated, a minor point must be disposed of. It might be argued that as a tactician, in the sense of minor tactics, he displays the same bias, but this is hardly justifiable. The material for the study of Napoleon as a tactician is singularly slight. So far as it goes it would seem to show that in his early years he was a follower of Guibert, perhaps the only one among the French theorists of the period in the strict sense. Some preferred the column, others the line; some made use either of the column or of the line as circumstances seemed to demand. But Napoleon, whenever he appears to be responsible for the tactical formations of his subordinates, uses line and column together, in the "ordre mixte" of Guibert, deploying, let us say, one battalion of a demi-brigade and forming the other two on either flank in columns. The standard formation of Guibert's battalion column was by divisions and taking it at


company distances, it must be admitted that diagrammatically the result had quite an engaging appearance for a geometer.



A DEMI-BRIGADE OF THREE BATTALIONS IN "ORDRE MIXTE"

It is quite possible that Napoleon's evident liking for this formation was connected with his bias for the geometrical, but that is quite as much as can be safely said.

Taking up the problem of the change in the line of operations during the course of an engagement, it must first be pointed out that to Napoleon an army ranged in battle is never represented by a line, but by a "T." The battle front and the line of communications together make the organic whole, and the general's art largely consists in guarding his line while seeking to reach his opponent's. It need hardly be



CASTIGLIONE

said that the line of communications produced forward towards the objective point becomes the line of operations.


At Castiglione, in 1797, we have the first instance of the change in line of operations during the course of the engagement. Napoleon awaits the Austrians in the position marked by the full lines, with a line of communications running towards Brescia-Milan. To the south of him lies Serrurier's division driven back from Mantua, and with a parallel line of communications through Cremona-

Milan. Napoleon brings up Serrurier for the battle, and crushes the Austrian left and centre, his second disposition, with changed line of operations, being indicated by the dotted lines.


The Austrians, misled by Napoleon's first position, deployed in such a way as to give him every advantage.

Austerlitz is another example of the same thing. There Napoleon, facing about east, had an ostensible line of communications running almost south to Vienna, making his right wing to all appearances extremely vulnerable. But within a few days of the battle, unknown to the Allies, he had established an alternative line of communications running due west. Again the full lines represent the apparent, and the dotted lines the real tactical and strategical situation of the army; they explain why Napoleon could afford to let the Allies press in on his left while he bulged out through the centre. He did what they never suspected, changed his line of operations during the course of the battle.

At Bautzen, in 1813, something very similar happened. Napoleon's line of operations appeared to be from west to



AUSTERLITZ




BAUTZEN

east, say Dresden-Glogau. The Allies met him and held him back for a while at Bautzen until Ney, coming in from the northwest with a line of operations running back to Torgau-Leipzig, outflanked them.

Best known of all Napoleon's geometrical operations is the strategic march leading to Jena and the occupation of Berlin in 1806.


He describes it to Marshal Soult as the march of a battalion square of two hundred thousand men, in such close supporting distance as to be free to move with the utmost rapidity towards any strategic objective and irrespective of the enemy's army. Should any point of the square during this operation come into contact with the enemy, the remaining parts would immediately begin to manœuvre about that point. It was this scheme that sent the French army to Jena, while its right under Davout went circling around to Auerstadt.



BATTALION SQUARE MANGEUVRING
ABOUT A POINT, IN FORMAL
DESIGN

Quite another standpoint from which the geometrical working of Napoleon's mind may be observed is afforded by the Eckmühl Campaign in 1809. That campaign was notable in many ways, but the only point it is desired to make here is the mathematical rigidity with which Napoleon made the whole operation depend on a line of communication that ran from Strassburg about east to the river Lech, a south-bank affluent of the Danube, and on a strong defensive front along the Lech. The outbreak of war had found Napoleon for once unprepared, badly unprepared. He was hesitating between

two plans: the first was to concentrate as near Vienna as he could, and this meant about Ratisbon; the second was, should the Austrians anticipate him, to concentrate farther back on the line of the Lech. Massena with one large corps was hurriedly concentrating on the Lech; Davout with another was




diagonally crossing Germany from Hamburg towards Ratisbon. As he began his long march, Davout, of course, drew his supplies from Hamburg. Then, as he reached central Germany, he turned to France and began to draw them from various points on the Rhine. But, as the despatches show, Napoleon was watching this process closely. He presently narrowed Davout down to Mainz, and the instant he was fairly in Upper Bavaria, he cut him off from Mainz and insisted that the line of communications must be a branch of the line which already connected Massena's wing with Strassburg. Elaborate instructions were then issued for closing every bridge across the Rhine save that near Strassburg, and at that one a whole system of army and police control was put into operation. In other words, the T—Strassburg-Lech—became the sole foundation of the French armies in Germany.

But partly owing to Napoleon's initial error as to when was likely to break out, partly owing to Berthier's bungling before Napoleon could reach the front, Davout, instead of being brought back safely to the line of the Lech where Massena's troops were fast accumulating, was allowed to reach Ratisbon at the very moment that the Austrians crossed the

frontier. A few days later Napoleon arrived in the valley of the Danube post-haste to find a desperate situation. The Archduke Charles with overwhelming numbers was almost between the two French wings and apparently had the French army at his mercy. To extricate it, gain the offensive, and wrest success out of the very hands of Fate, Napoleon clung resolutely to that geometrical design he had already traced on the map of southern Germany. The front on the Lech must be held firm till a fair chance for snatching the offensive should come, while Davout, however great the risk, must march along the south bank of the Danube, between the river and the Archduke, to effect his junction with the main army. To march along the north bank looked much safer, but it would have destroyed the fundamental unity that Napoleon's mind absolutely demanded. The event justified him. Davout fought his way through with the barest possible margin at Thann. Napoleon guessed the Archduke's moves correctly, seized the very instant when he could throw Massena forward, and succeeded in reaching Eckmühl with a united army on a single line of operations and striking at the communications of his opponent.

But all this logic and courage left no room for psychological deductions and intuitions. Napoleon took almost no heed of his opponent's mentality. The map and the compasses filled



his mind. In 1815 he formulated precisely the same scheme to defeat the English and Prussians as he had in 1796 to defeat the Sardinians and Austrians. The armies facing him had

divergent lines of communications that came together at the French frontier.

If only he could strike hard and suddenly at the apex of the angle and start both, or only one retreating, then the retreat must be divergent and separate the Allies, leaving him interior lines, whence he could destroy them in detail. But, had he stopped to think of it, one of those opponents, Blücher, at the crisis of the campaign of 1813, had achieved his end by cutting loose from his line of communications; he had repeated this in 1814; in both cases with results disastrous to the French. But to a geometrician men count for little and angles for much; and as Napoleon could not see Blücher on his map of Belgium, but only a great angle of which the apex lay at Charleroi, one of its sides led away through Namur to Cologne and the Rhine, while the other appeared to lose itself in the Scheldt at Antwerp. But midway to Antwerp lay Waterloo, and there Blücher, refusing to act geometrically, turned up on the fatal 18th of June.

Napoleon tells us that it was said of him at school: "That boy is no good except at geometry." Shall we say that those words were pregnant with his fate? That would not be just. The master quality of his mind, though it brought him to ruin at the end, is not to be rated lightly. Even in Bergson's system of philosophy, which places intellectualism lower than it has been estimated since the Greeks, the geometrical sense is held to be the cardinal and distinctive quality of the human mind. In few men has it been so developed as in Napoleon, in few has it produced so powerful or so great results.


XX

AMERICAN TACTICS IN THE PRESENT WAR

BY

THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM

Read before the Society February 5, 1918



U.S.S. CONSTITUTION (OLD IRONSIDES)

The Symbol of the Spirit of the United States Navy. The Ancestor of the Modern Dreadnought.

U.S.S. Constitution 1797

U.S.S. Niagara 1856

U.S.S. Monitor 1862

U.S.S. Roanoke 1863

U.S.S. Michigan 1909

U.S.S. Pennsylvania 1916

(From the print by Bowen in the collection of the Marine Museum, Boston, Massachusetts. By courtesy of the Society.)

AMERICAN TACTICS IN THE PRESENT WAR

ALTHOUGH it is known in a general way that American tactics are being used in the present Great War, few realize that this war is dominated by tactics and weapons which had their origin in America. On land the European formal battles and formal fortresses have been superseded by armies manœuvring and intrenching, as developed in our American wars. On the sea, American ideas have been even more universally adopted. It may be truthfully said that, in their effects on tactics and weapons of warfare, our three wars, the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Civil War, are beyond comparison.

Our War for Independence, the American Revolution, was one of the most extraordinary in history, when one considers the great results achieved almost without resources. Unusual conditions on land and sea existed at the beginning of this struggle, which was destined to differ in tactics from any previous war, and for such a war on land and sea the Colonists were well prepared. This is very little understood, even by those who have some historical knowledge ; but a careful study of the history of the Revolution shows that, although the Colonists were poor in resources at the outbreak of the war, the American soldiers and sailors had already been schooled in the qualities that gave them victory.

On land, the idea that “embattled farmers” sprang forth fully armed is wrong from every historical point of view. The so-called “French wars” had given our people the right preparation for the Revolution. Scattered through all the Colonies were officers and men who had served in the French and Indian War. Consequently, from Washington down, through the personnel of our Continental Army, were men who had

learned the lesson of tactics adapted to this continent. They had also learned, many of them from bitter experience, that such tactics were very effective against the Regular Army.

On the other hand, the conduct of the War of the Revolution by the Royal Army shows plainly enough that they had not learned their lesson. The contrast between the failure of the Regulars under Braddock and the effective work of the Provincials at Lake George was forgotten. The final victory of Wolfe at Quebec, where Montcalm reverted to European tactics and gave battle on the Plains of Abraham, summed up the French and Indian War in the mind of the British Army—a triumph for the Regulars!

As a result of this, it was not the professional Regular soldier who was prepared for the Revolutionary War. It was the Colonist who was prepared. In the end this outweighed all the resources that could be brought against the revolt.

On land, the Revolutionary War was really decided the day the first shot was fired, when an action was fought that was prophetic of great changes of tactics. The Lexington and Concord fight showed the helplessness of the old formal school against a line of battle in extended order, taking advantage of every natural shelter, never giving a set battle, but attacking, here, there, and everywhere. A column of Regulars, supposed to be strong enough to march anywhere in the Colony, barely escaped under the cover of reinforcements. From that day the Regular Army never dared to venture into the country unless in overwhelming force. Even at that, the war was a repetition of the same thing. Saratoga was Lexington on a larger scale.

But the best example of such tactics was the campaign of Greene in the Carolinas, which finally drove Cornwallis into Virginia and eventually into Yorktown. Greene made the country what Cornwallis called a “hornet’s nest.” Sometimes Greene’s army was united, at other times it would be divided into partisan bands, but always attacking and harassing the

Regulars, yet not giving Cornwallis the chance to force the Americans into a set battle. Worried and menaced everywhere, Cornwallis did not know which way to turn.

In desperation he detached Tarleton against Greene's lieutenant, Morgan, who led Tarleton into a trap and destroyed his force. Stung to anger by this disaster, Cornwallis moved against Greene, who drew him several hundred miles from his base, and so weakened his army that he gave up his campaign, and moved into Virginia.

The American tactics of avoiding formal battles, keeping their weaker army in the field, and constantly wearing down the enemy, won the campaign. The European tactics of trying to force a set battle, and retiring with a weaker army into a fortress, resulted in the capture of Cornwallis at Yorktown.

Within two months after Lexington, another epoch-making action was fought — the Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775.

A weak earthwork had been thrown up in the night, by the Provincials, threatening the Royal troops in Boston. The few hundred men who defended it might have been easily cut off, but a greatly superior force of the best troops in the British Army attempted to storm this position, and succeeded in taking it only after the ammunition of the defenders was exhausted. The British losses were nearly equal to the numbers of the Americans. The reason is plain. It was an intrenchment defended by weapons of precision.

At that time drilled troops of all nations "presented" their pieces and fired. Their muskets were not even sighted. The Provincials, who defended the intrenchment, were all skilled marksmen. Every man aimed at an individual enemy. Such a deadly fire had never been experienced in European warfare.

The resultant awful loss made such a deep impression on the Regular Army that intrenchments defended by Americans were ever after objects of great respect. Washington's army at Valley Forge marked the lowest ebb of our military strength. That army would have been an easy prey, if the

Royal Army had ventured an attack—but the menace of intrenchments defended by weapons of precision was too great. This respect of the Regular Army for Americans in intrenchments was of great tactical value to us throughout the war.

On the sea the Colonists had another element of preparedness which is not generally appreciated. Nowhere in the world were there hardier and more intelligent seamen. Their ships had been on every ocean, and American designers were already noted for the speed of their ships. American sailors all over the world had gained the experience that was destined to make them so resourceful against their enemies. Many of them had seen fighting in every kind of naval warfare. They were thus especially well equipped for war against a superior naval power, in which ingenuity and daring were necessary qualities. The same irregular, harassing tactics, which were successful on land, were adopted by the Americans on the sea.

With the poor resources at their command, the Colonists could not hope for a strong navy, and the number of ships commissioned in the United States Navy was small. The British control of the sea was absolute, and the seas about Great Britain were patrolled by her great fleet; but, with the enterprising American seaman, it was no question of being daunted by this superior force, or of playing the game of the enemy.

American naval vessels boldly sailed into these well-guarded seas, and actually harried the British coasts. These raids, culminating in the exploits of Paul Jones and the fight off Flamborough Head, had a serious effect on the British public. The amount of actual damage was small, but the fact that landings had been made on their coasts upset for the first time the idea of complete control of the seas.

Our Navy also did damage to British commerce, and here another class of American ships was of great tactical value. As there were so few naval ships to give service to our seamen, private enterprise began to fit out ships. Soon a swarm of privateers was scattered over the seas preying on the Brit-

ish merchant marine, and for the first time commerce-destroying became a determining factor in war.

Privateering before this had been carried on in the wars between the British and the French; but it had been a matter of give and take, with profit to many merchants of each nation. It is doubtful if it ever affected the result either way. But in the Revolutionary War it was another thing. British commerce was devastated with no chance of equal damage to the Americans.

English insurance rates were raised, and merchants were even deterred from shipping goods at any rate of insurance. The American privateers captured or destroyed about six hundred ships of the value of eighteen million dollars — very great losses for those days.

“In all the memorials presented to Parliament the argument used to bring about peace was the unprecedented destruction of English commerce,”¹ and many authorities believe this argument of commerce-destroying by the United States Navy and American privateers did more to gain independence than any other factor in the war.

Probably, however, the most extraordinary event in the Revolution, in relation to the present war, was the first use of the torpedo and the submarine. Various forms of mines had been tried before with indifferent success, but nothing approaching the torpedo as used in the present war.

In 1775 David Bushnell, of Connecticut, who graduated from Yale that year, built the “diving boat” known as the “American Turtle.” Its design was astonishingly modern in many ways. It was made of iron plates, propelled by a screw, and guided by a compass made visible by phosphorus. The torpedo was carried outside, to be attached to the enemy ship, and then cast loose. The action of casting off started a clock-work, which gave the submarine time to get away to a safe distance.

¹ Maclay.

This submarine and torpedo were first tried against the *Eagle*, a sixty-four-gun ship, lying off New York. The operator in the submarine found difficulty in attaching the torpedo, which contained one hundred pounds of powder, and the explosion was not near enough to the *Eagle* to cause any damage. It was again tried against the *Cerberus* at New London. The submarine missed the large ship, but blew up a schooner that lay near her, with several of her people killed. It was Bushnell who in 1778 set afloat torpedoes against the British shipping in the Delaware River near Philadelphia. They were in kegs and did little damage, but inspired the amusing poem, "The Battle of the Kegs," written at the time.

These attempts with the submarine and the torpedo, although they did very little actual harm, caused so much alarm and kept the enemy ships away from narrow waters to such an extent that it is perfectly fair to say that the submarine and the torpedo had a tactical value in the Revolution.

Consequently it may be said that in this war were found the germs of some of the most important tactics and weapons of the present war.

On land:—

The mobile army in the field, and the end of formal battles.

The tactical use of intrenchments defended by weapons of precision.

On the sea:—

The tactical use of the submarine.

The tactical use of the torpedo.

Commerce-destroying as a factor in war.

Raids upon an enemy's coast by a weaker navy.

The War of 1812 found the Americans totally unprepared on land. The generation of the American Revolution had passed away, and there was no element in the population with any experience in war, except a few Indian fighters in the

western part of the United States. The wretched showing of the Americans on land was a natural result. The often cited Battle of New Orleans was only the mistake of Bunker Hill repeated by an over-confident British general, who attempted the tactics of the Peninsula War against intrenchments defended by expert marksmen.

On the sea, things were very different. Our seamen had become even more expert in the interval between the two wars; our ships had maintained their superiority in speed, and our privateers repeated the damage of the Revolution, but on a larger scale. The American privateers captured or destroyed in this war no less than thirteen hundred ships of the value of thirty-nine million dollars. Such losses were unprecedented, and this destruction of commerce again won us an advantageous peace.

The following from the London "Times" is enough to show the effect of these losses on the public mind: "Lloyd's list contains notices of upward of five hundred British vessels captured in seven months by the Americans. Five hundred merchantmen and three frigates! Can these statements be true? And can the English people hear them unmoved?" The reference to the loss of "three frigates" is a comment on another offensive developed by the Americans on the sea, which was the beginning of great changes in naval tactics.

At the outbreak of the War of 1812 the United States Navy had only the following ships in commission:—

President, frigate	44	guns
Constitution, frigate	44	"
United States, frigate	44	"
Constellation, frigate	36	"
Chesapeake, frigate	36	"
Congress, frigate	36	"
Essex, frigate	32	"
Adams, corvette	28	"
John Adams, corvette	28	"
Wasp, sloop	18	"
Hornet, sloop	18	"
Argus, brig	16	"
Siren, brig	16	"

Enterprise, schooner	12 guns
Nautilus, schooner	12 “
Vixen, schooner	10 “
Viper, schooner	10 “

It was not thought possible that such a weak fleet would make any showing against the powerful British Navy, but in this small navy were concentrated skilled officers and men, making up a personnel probably never before equalled. As was natural in such a picked body of men, excellent methods of seamanship and gunnery had been developed, superior to those used by the officers and crews of the men-of-war of the time. The United States Navy had also gained experience of warfare in the Tripolitan War, etc., and it was far ahead of its time in construction and armament.

Our naval constructors, with an intuition almost prophetic, had built a class of frigates, of which the Constitution is best known, and placed long twenty-four-pounders on them. Such an armament was ridiculed abroad, and it was predicted that such ships would be useless — but, in the War of 1812, these frigates became the wonder of the world.

The British frigates were simply overwhelmed, and the individual superiority of this class of frigates was never overcome in the war. Another extract from the “Times” shows again the state of the public mind: “The fact seems to be established that the Americans have some superior mode of firing.” The “fact” that the “Times” could not understand was the great advance in naval construction shown by these frigates of the United States Navy. This advanced design by American naval constructors was the birth of the “all-big-gun-ship” idea, which was destined to dominate naval construction; and the Constitution may fairly be called the ancestor of the modern dreadnought.

In the War of 1812 the American inventions of the torpedo and the submarine were of tactical value, although not in actual use. Robert Fulton had attempted to develop the Bushnell inventions, for the French and for the English; but he

had returned to America discouraged. There was some aid voted for his machines, but nothing was ever done with them in actual warfare. However, as in the Revolution, the idea that the Americans possessed such dangerous weapons proved a good defence for portions of our coast in this war.

But it was in the Civil War that these germs of American tactics attained a development that revolutionized warfare. To understand the Civil War it should be kept in mind that, from the first outbreak of secession, a military situation existed that made the grand tactics of the Civil War sound. This was not from any definite plans of any generals; but the efforts to keep the Border States in the Union, to save West Virginia, Missouri, and the Unionists of Tennessee, with the necessity of getting control of the Mississippi River, and the blockade of the Southern coast, all meant the beginning of the envelopment that in the end strangled the Confederacy. Consequently the problem was for the North to constrict, for the South to break the circle; and the resulting tactics had the right basis, in spite of mistakes by commanders on both sides.

The early battles of the Civil War followed, in general, European tactics. It was natural, however, where armies of such great intelligence in both officers and men were contending, with no traditions to hamper them and a sound basis of strategy for both sides, that new tactics should be developed. The outstanding feature of the campaigns of the Civil War was the tactical use of what are known as "hasty intrenchments." These intrenching tactics were a new factor in warfare. "The art of constructing and using hasty intrenchments on the field of battle is a contribution from America to the war knowledge of the world."¹

Intrenchments are as old as fighting, and were constantly used in European warfare, notably in Marlborough's wars. Such trenches were, however, formally planned and laid out

¹ Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, U.S.A., *Papers of Mass. Mil. Hist. Soc.*, vol. 13.

by engineers. Whenever an army "came out of its trenches," or was "driven out of its trenches," the trenches ceased to be a factor. The idea that an army might move, and literally take its trenches with it, was the product of the Civil War.

Like the men of the Lexington fight, the intelligent American soldiers of both armies began to take advantage of all natural shelters. The next step, at the battle of Gaines' Mill, was using rails, logs, trees, etc. Then followed the use of the spade to help out such improvised shelters, until, later in the war, armies manœuvred, digging themselves in, and thus strengthening their positions as a matter of course.

All of this was a gradual development of American ingenuity, not the inspiration of any tactician.

Sherman's wonderful campaign against Atlanta is the great example of hasty intrenchments reaching definite strategic value. Sherman intrenched and threw out turning forces around his enemy's flank. As a result of these tactics, repeated again and again, the Confederates were compelled to abandon positions that would have caused prohibitive losses to direct assaults, and finally they were forced to evacuate Atlanta.

In Grant's last campaigns against Lee, from the Wilderness to Petersburg, the use of hasty intrenchments was perfected. In May, 1864, Grant moved against Lee, who intrenched against him with a greatly inferior army in the Wilderness. The campaign that followed was a series of attacks, and moves to turn Lee's right by Grant. Lee, beating off direct attacks on his trenches, moved to the right whenever Grant attempted to outflank him, and kept his army steadily between the Federals and Richmond. Each army intrenched as it moved, Grant attacking from his trenches whenever he thought there might be an opening, Lee defending by counter-attacks. The armies, thus facing one another, swung to Cold Harbor — and then came the final deadlock and long struggle at Petersburg.

These were not battles in the European sense of the word. The Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor were all a series of attacks and counter-attacks of armies intrenching against one another in each manœuvre. Petersburg was the same with the armies brought to a standstill, trench against trench.

Formal fortresses, in the European meaning of the word, were not used in the Civil War. The superiority of earthworks and intrenchments was too evident. These Civil War tactics have dominated the present war, and, if we can believe the lessons of the war, the day of formal battles and formal fortresses has passed.

It seems strange at first glance that Europe did not realize the value of the tactics thus developed in the Civil War. But the prestige of Napoleon remained too overpowering for Europe even to consider innovations from America. The great Emperor fought against general staffs and generals imbued with the book-lore of war. He was infinitely better at their own game. Much of his superiority lay in his knowledge of what his enemy would do under conditions governed by existing tactics. At Austerlitz the Emperor's order told his army just what the plan of the enemy would be. Why should he have changed the game? Yet who knows what he might have done, had new tactics been necessary?

Consequently European tactics remained unchanged. Only five years after the Civil War came the Franco-Prussian War. In spite of an inefficient staff and bad generalship, the French Army fought hard and maintained its organization. After gallant efforts in the field to repel the systematically planned German onslaughts, it was drawn into fortresses where capture was only a matter of days.

It is no exaggeration to say that Woerth and Gravelotte might have been another story, if American intrenching tactics had been followed. To quote again from Colonel Wagner: "The defence of the village of Froeschweiler by a French brigade


against the frontal attacks of a German army corps showed what MacMahon might have done had his whole position been intrenched . . . the sun might have set upon a field of French victory [Gravelotte] had Bazaine taken heed of the lesson so plainly taught in the American War."

Lee was dead — but if Sherman or Grant could have commanded the French Army, kept it in the field, and used the intrenching tactics of the Civil War, would the Von Moltke campaign have gone through like clockwork? The present war, using the tactics of Sherman, Grant, and Lee, is the answer to this question.

Such tactics were first used to some extent in Europe by Skobeloff and Osman Pasha in the Russo-Turkish War, and increasingly in the Russo-Japanese War and the wars in the Balkans. In the present war these American tactics have been so universally accepted, that we are forced to the conclusion that the old systems have been discarded. There seems to be no future possibility of the formal battle of European tactics. The formal fortress has been proved not only useless, but a death trap; and the use of "hasty intrenchments" has become the basis of the tactics of to-day. Many forms of such intrenchments have been devised — but the factors in the war are mobile armies, manœuvring and taking shelter — attacking, defending, and counter-attacking from "hasty intrenchments."

On the sea the Civil War also brought about great changes in tactics. Before this war, in the same spirit of progress that had placed the heavy guns on the *Constitution*, the United States Navy had built steam frigates which had the most powerful armaments of their class. The U.S.S. *Niagara* carried twelve eleven-inch guns. This American idea of mounting heavier guns on warships, instead of adhering to the policy of increasing the number of guns, led naturally to the use of heavy guns on armored ships by both sides in the Civil War.

The attack in Hampton Roads on the Union fleet by the



U.S.S. NIAGARA

Carried "12 Dahlgren guns, weighing 14 tons each, 11 inches in diameter in the bore, throwing a solid shot of 270 pounds or a shell of 180 pounds a distance of four miles." This was a very powerful armament for the times.

(From the lithograph by Currier and Ives in the collection of the Marine Museum, Boston, Massachusetts. By courtesy of the Society.)

Merrimac, converted into the casemate ironclad Virginia by the Confederates, showed decisively the helplessness of wooden ships against armored ships. The fight that followed the next day between the Virginia and the first turret ship, the Monitor, was the first challenge to big guns in casemates by big guns in turrets. The construction of the epoch-making Monitor had been hurried,¹ and she was defective in many ways. Consequently, although the Monitor saved the Union fleet, the question of superiority between the two types remained undecided in many minds.

The less known fight in Warsaw Sound in 1863 established the superiority of a few big guns in turrets over a greater number in casemates. The Atlanta, a Confederate casemate ironclad of the type of the Virginia, came out to destroy two monitors, with two excursion steamers to watch the destruction. The monitor Weehawken fired just five shots — and the contest was ended for all time in favor of big guns in turrets. The all-big-gun ship commands the sea in this war — and the big guns in turrets have never been supplanted.

In the Monitor type from one to two turrets was but a step, and many such monitors were built. Then came the Roanoke (1863), another stage in the development of the monitor. The Roanoke was a "sea-going turret vessel" with three turrets, all aligned over the keel. Here were the essentials of the dreadnought of to-day,² and this American design of big guns mounted in turrets, aligned over the keel, has prevailed over all other types of armored warships.

Foreign navies have been reluctant to accept this design. They have built all kinds of armored ships, and on their turret vessels have used various arrangements of the turrets. English and German dreadnoughts, the most recent development of

¹ Launched January 30, 1862, 100 days after keel was laid. Commissioned February 25, 1862; fought battle March 9, 1862.

² "For one nowadays to see a drawing of the battery plan of the U.S.S. Roanoke is to be reminded that there is nothing new under the sun." (Lieutenant-Commander W. P. Cronan, U.S.N., *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*.)

battleships, have other dispositions of the turrets ; but, in the latest classes of dreadnoughts, all foreign naval constructors have conformed to the American design of turrets aligned over the keel, from which we have never swerved in mounting our heavy guns. The turret and deck-plan diagrams show this American development of the modern dreadnought, which makes the design of U.S.S. Michigan one of the great steps in naval construction.


From the Constitution, to the Niagara, to the Monitor, to the Roanoke, to the Michigan, to the Pennsylvania, are but steps in the American idea of the all-big-gun ship.

In the Civil War there was also a great development of the torpedo and of the submarine. The use of the torpedoes by the Confederates was of real tactical value to them. Their torpedoes were placed, as are mines in the present war, to protect narrow waters and harbors. Covered by artillery fire, these mine-fields undoubtedly proved a good defence in many cases against the superior naval power of the North. Many Federal warships were destroyed by them, among these the monitors Tecumseh and Petapsco. In fact they were a forecast of the great mine-fields which now defend the German bases against the stronger British fleet.

There was also developed a tactical use of the torpedo as a weapon of offence, the Confederate ram Albemarle being the most important warship so destroyed. The Albemarle was torpedoed in Cushing's daring night attack. As is well known, with a volunteer crew, he attacked in a launch, with his torpedo rigged on a spar and exploded by pulling a lanyard.

The Confederates also made great strides in the development of the submarine. Under-sea boats approaching the modern type were used, especially at Charleston. One design had an engine, and ran along awash with the surface of the sea, carrying its torpedo thrust out from the bow on a spar. This was called a "David," but the best-known Confederate submarine was the boat built at Mobile by Horace L. Huntley, after

whom the craft was named. It was designated as a "submarine torpedo-boat" by General Beauregard in an order at Charleston ;¹ and this general's description of the H. L. Hunt-



DIAGRAMS SHOWING AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE DESIGN FOR BIG GUNS IN TURRETS ALLIGNED OVER THE KEEL


ley shows that it deserved the title, even in the modern sense of the words :—

“It was shaped like a fish, made of galvanized iron, was twenty feet long, and at the middle three and a half feet wide and five feet deep. From its shape it came to be known as the ‘fish torpedo-boat.’ Propelled by a screw worked from the inside by seven or eight men, it was so contrived that it could be submerged and worked under water for several hours, and to this end was provided with a fin on each side, worked also from the interior. By depressing the points of these fins the boat, when in motion, was made to descend and by elevating them it was made to rise. Light was afforded through the means of bull’s eyes placed in the manholes.”²

¹ Special Order No. 271, Dec. 14, 1863.


² *Southern Historical Society Papers*, April, 1878.

This submarine was very dangerous for its crews. On a tablet of the monument at Charleston the inscription begins: "Of more than thirty men drowned in this desperate service




DREADNOUGHT (BRITISH 1906)

First British design. Note that at many angles the turrets interfere with one another, and that one turret cannot be used in a broadside. Four British First Line Dreadnoughts have this arrangement of turrets.




HELGOLAND (GERMAN 1908)

First German design. It is evident that there is still more interference of the turrets, and only eight turrets can be used in a broadside. Eight German First Line Dreadnoughts have this arrangement of turrets.



NEPTUNE (BRITISH 1908)

Echelon arrangement of turrets. Although all turrets can be used on a broadside, at many angles there is still interference of the turrets. Three British and four German Dreadnoughts and many British and German battle-cruisers have this arrangement.



U.S.S. MICHIGAN (1906)

American design of turrets aligned over the keel. This ship was designed before the nameship Dreadnought, though the latter was completed first. This design of the Michigan has prevailed over all others.

DIAGRAMS OF DECK PLANS SHOWING ARRANGEMENTS OF TURRETS IN MODERN FIRST LINE DREADNOUGHTS

the names of but sixteen are known"; and the first name on the list is that of the inventor, Horace L. Huntley, who lost his life in his submarine. Yet successive crews volunteered for "this desperate service," and February 17, 1864, the Huntley sank U.S.S. Housatonic off Charleston, going to the bottom with its victim. Years afterward the submarine was found in the same place, and raised with the bodies of its captain and all its crew. The boat which made the attack on U.S.S. New Ironsides was of the "David" type.

These Confederate developments of the original American idea of the submarine undoubtedly paved the way for Holland, Lake, and others, and led to the recent high efficiency of the U-boat, which has become so important a factor in the grand tactics of the present war.

As a dangerous commerce-destroyer nothing approaching the U-boats has ever been seen. The other commerce-destroyers, the light German cruisers, which early in the war made such destructive raids on British shipping, closely followed the tactics originated by the Confederate Navy in the Civil War. This was the first navy to make commerce-destroying a factor in war after the abolition of privateering.

In spite of the prohibition against privateers in the Declaration of Paris,¹ the Confederate Government at the outbreak of the Civil War hoped to create a fleet of privateers. This proved impossible. The South did not have the ships, and privateering was never of much importance in the war. The South then tried new tactics, and the Confederate Navy commissioned regular warships whose mission was commerce-destroying.

These cruisers, Sumter, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, etc., almost drove the United States flag from the seas. With the command of the sea hopelessly against them, their raids were carried on with the greatest ingenuity and daring, and it was very difficult to catch them.

¹ "Privateering is and remains abolished." (Declaration of Paris, 1856.)

In the present war the German cruisers imitated the tactics of these Confederate commerce-destroyers, and did a great amount of damage, with the same control of the sea against them. The *Alabama* and the *Emden* will always be associated in their kinship of successful audacity.

For the Federals on the sea the hardest task was the blockade of the Confederate coast. Blockades had been used before in warfare, and the status of a blockade was well defined.¹ But what the United States Navy accomplished was no "cabinet blockade," but an effective blockade such as had never been seen.

Here was one of the longest coast-lines in the world, where harbors and inlets gave every advantage to the blockade-runner. The United States Navy had not ships enough to carry out the task, but, with characteristic energy all kinds of craft were utilized. The steamer *Circassian*, one of the most valuable prizes of the war, was actually captured by a Fulton ferry-boat. At first the blockade was *de facto*, as different portions of the coast were policed and notified of the blockade, but in an astonishingly short time the long coast-line was effectively hemmed in. "As to the legal efficiency of the blockade after the first six months there can be no question."²

This was only the beginning of the undertaking. Great profits offered inducements to blockade-runners. After the blockade became stringent and ships were being constantly seized on the high seas, attempts were made to evade capture by clearing for one of the available neutral ports, touching there, and then trying to run into a Confederate port.

Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, and Matamoros were these ports, of which Nassau was much the most active. The idea was that the claim of neutral destination would protect the ship for most of its voyage, and it would be in danger only in the short run between the neutral port and the Southern port.

¹ "A blockade to be legal must be effective." (Declaration of Paris, 1856.)

² Professor J. R. Soley, U.S.N.

This practice proved easy to stop, as the character of cargo and evidence of final destination brought condemnation in the courts. This evidence was most difficult in the case of Matamoras, the only town of importance on the Confederate southern border, but so general became the forfeiture of ships and cargoes that some other evasion was necessary.

The next scheme tried was clearance for the neutral ports, and then trans-shipment at the neutral port. The return cargoes were to be handled in the same way. "But here again the courts stepped in, and held that though a trans-shipment was made, even after landing the cargo and going through a form of sale, the two voyages were parts of one and the same transaction, and the cargo from the outset was liable to condemnation, if the original intention had been to forward the goods to a blockaded port. Nor did the decision stop here. As all property, both ship and cargo, is confiscated upon proof of breach of blockade, it was held that ships carrying on this traffic to neutral ports were confiscable, provided the ultimate destination of the cargo to a blockaded port was known to the owner. In the words of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 'The ships are planks of the same bridge.'"¹

The last resort of the blockade-runners was most ingenious, to break the voyage by shipping to a Federal port, then to a neutral port, then to the Confederate port. Goods were shipped to New York by regular steamship lines, thence to Nassau, to be sent to the South. This was ended, when it was observed that trade with Nassau and Bermuda was abnormal, by orders issued to the collectors of customs to refuse clearance to vessels whose cargoes were in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, and to require owners to give ample security where there was ground for apprehension that cargoes were destined for the enemy's use.

These orders were general and named no particular ports. Yet the "merchants of Nassau" complained of this "unjust

¹ Soley.

discrimination" and persuaded Earl Russell to take up the subject diplomatically. The correspondence that followed showed so plainly that "the trade of the Bahamas" was blockade-running, that the British Government "derived little satisfaction," and the traffic was ended.

Thus were overcome difficulties, physical and legal, that seemed insuperable. The amount of harm done to the South by these perfected blockading tactics cannot be estimated.

This well-established case of successful legal blockading tactics was at the command of the British Government at the outbreak of this war. Enforcement of a legal blockade against the Teutonic Allies would have been very difficult, but, if the British had proclaimed such a blockade at the outset, they could have attempted to build up their case on the case already established. Such a policy at the start might not have caused undue friction among the neutral nations.

Instead of this, Great Britain attempted to keep goods from the Teutonic Allies by using her command of the sea, and by proclaiming an increasing list of contrabands, and "war areas" in the North Sea. It is now recognized that this method was a mistake, especially the "war area" policy, which gave Germany the chance to play the same game, and Great Britain is now imitating our Civil War blockade.

The American invention and development of the airplane is so recent that there is no need to describe it.

It is impressive to sum up these American contributions to the tactics of the present war.

On land:—

The mobile army kept in the field, and the end of formal battles.

The superiority of intrenchments, and the end of formal fortresses.

The development of "hasty intrenchments," and of armies manœuvring and intrenching.

The development of the airplane.

On the sea:—

The development of the “all-big-gun ship.”

The tactical superiority of the armored ship.

The tactical superiority of guns mounted in turrets—
and of turrets aligned over the keel.

The tactical use of the torpedo.

The tactical use of the submarine.

Raids on an enemy's coast by a weaker fleet.

The development of a legal blockade of a long coast-line.

Commerce-destroying as a factor in war.

The development of the hydroplane.

The facts and results given in this paper are not exaggerated. In truth they are understated. No attempt has been made to give a list of American inventions that have been used in warfare—the purpose has been only to show to what extent America has influenced the grand tactics of the war. This should not make us self-satisfied with our past—on the contrary, it ought to be a stimulus in our present great task.

INDEX

INDEX

- Abbott, E. A., 240.
- Abdy, Major Anthony J., commanding Fifty-third Battery, Royal Field Artillery, 361, 370, 373, 374, 375, 377, 389, 393, 396, 398, 400, 402.
- Acton Homes, 398.
- Adams, Charles Francis, 418.
- Adams*, corvette, 443.
- A Defence of Wirz*, 162.
- Aglipay, P., whom Aguinaldo appointed Bishop of the Philippine Islands, 286.
- Aguinaldo, Gen. Emilio, 238, 239, 241, 247, 253, 254, 257; reply-as to what relation the Filipinos expected to hold to the United States, 258 *et seq.*; his letter, 259, 260; his treaty, 274 *et seq.*; arrival at Cavite, 277; his policy and ambition, 278, 279; rewards, 280; papers captured in November, 1899, 280, 281 *et seq.*; instructs our army authorities, 282; address "To Foreign Governments" issued August 6, 283; occupation of Manila and flight, 284 *et seq.*; interview on October 25, 285; his advice on January 8, 286; his order, 288; his congratulations on February 24, 289.
- Ahmedabad, 364, 365.
- Aiken, Mr., 92.
- Alabama*, 453.
- Alabama River, 175.
- Alabama, State of, 67, 158, 175.
- Albemarle*, 450.
- Alexander, Gen. A. P., 232.
- Alexander, Charles T., surgeon, 152.
- Allies, 298, 306, 310, 312, 313, 317, 429, 430, 433.
- Alton, Ill., 154.
- American Army, 238, 245, 247, 252.
- American colonies, 353, 410, 411.
- American contributions to the tactics of the present war with Germany, 456, 457.
- American Federation of Labor, 411.
- American forces, 309.
- American Historical Association, 215.
- American inventions, 456.
- American Marines, 308.
- American Navy, 238.
- American privateers, 441, 442.
- American protectorate, 285.
- American Revolution, 437 *et seq.*, 442.
- American tactics in the present war, 435, 437, 439, 445, 448.
- American troops in China, 307, 309, 312.
- American troops in the occupation of Manila, 241, 248, 282.
- American Turtle*, diving boat, 441.
- Americans in intrenchments, 439, 440.
- Ames, Gen. Adelbert, 123.
- Ammen, Rear Admiral, 355.
- Amory, Major Charles B., 158.
- Anderson, Gen. Richard H., 225.
- Anderson, Brig.-Gen., first expedition to the Philippines under, 235, 241.
- Andersonville and Other War Prisons*, 161.
- André, Mr., Belgian Consul, 238, 243, 247, 248.
- Annals of the War*, 161.
- Annapolis, 355.
- Antietam, 1, 5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 27.
- Antietam Campaign, 5, 7, 17.
- Antietam Creek, 1, 2, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17.
- Antwerp, 432, 433.
- Appomattox, 232.
- Appomattox Court House, 231.
- Appomattox River, 87, 99, 107, 109, 122.
- Appomattox Valley, 109, 113.
- Archbishop of Manila. *See* Nozaleda, P.
- Archduke Charles, 432.
- Archer, James J., 218.
- A Rebel War Clerk's Diary*, 96, 97, 140, 217, 228.
- Argus*, brig, 443.
- Armory of the First Corps of Cadets, 162.
- Army and Navy Journal*, excerpt from, 189.
- Army of the Cumberland, 67, 69, 81.
- Army of the James, 88, 99, 105, 108, 122, 123, 125.
- Army of Northern Virginia, 7, 41, 45, 124, 142, 188, 197, 220, 221, 227, 232.
- Army of the Potomac, 1, 7-9, 37, 41, 45, 48, 59, 67, 71, 80, 88, 98, 107, 122, 123, 144, 182.
- Articles of War, 22d and 23d, 230; 23d, 231.
- Artillery, at Antietam, 12; at Gettysburg, 24, 32, 37; reserve, 8, 26, 27; in the Mine Run Campaign, 49, 51, 52, 62; Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 93, 96, 97, 108, 110, 112; Battery No. 5, 108; Battery No. 11, 114; at Manila, Batteries D and K of the Third and the Astor Battery, 236; in China, 310, 311, 312, 316; at Ladysmith, Thirteenth Battery, 375, 402; Twenty-first, 366, 373, 374, 378, 379, 381, 383, 386, 391, 393, 397, 398, 402; Thirty-fourth, 364, 394; Forty-second, 366, 367, 370, 371, 372, 378, 379, 381, 390, 396; Fifty-third Battery, Royal Field Artillery, 363-381, 383, 384, 386, 387, 389, 391-400, 402; Sixty-seventh Battery, 383, 402; Sixty-ninth, 390, 402; Sixtieth Rifles, 384, 387; a few points, 376; ammunition expended, 387; Boer artillery fire, 382 *et seq.*; Garrison Artillery, 367; losses, 376,

- 386, 397; Mountain Battery No. 10, 372, 402; Veterinary Department, 366; at Petersburg, 92, 93, 97, 110, 112, 113, Battery No. 5, 88, 92, 108, Battery No. 11, 88, 114.
- Art of war, tabulation of, 350.
- Asia, 343.
- Asiatic coast, 271.
- Asuncion Island, 237.
- Atlanta, 213, 446.
- Atlanta*, 348, 449.
- Atlanta-Chattanooga area, 322.
- Atlantic Coast, 235, 322.
- Auerstadt, 430.
- Austerlitz, 429, 447.
- Australians, 373.
- Australian horses, 364; entraining, 366.
- Austrians, 428, 429, 431, 432.
- Ayuntamiento, 250, 251.
- Bacoor, Province of Cavite, place of landing American troops, 241; Aguinaldo's old home and headquarters, 282, 284.
- Balkan War, 422, 448.
- Baltimore, 169, 195, 211.
- Baltimore pike, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34.
- Baños, an old health resort of Spanish days, 256.
- Barker, Archdeacon of the English Church, 397.
- Barnett's Ford, 45, 53.
- Barras, Louis, Comte de, 353.
- Bartlett's Mill, 47, 48, 60.
- Barton, Gen. William B., 100, 101.
- Baruch, Simon, surgeon, C.S.A., 161.
- Batangas, Province of, 291, 292.
- Battle of the Kegs*, 442.
- Bautzen in 1813, 429, 430.
- Bavaria, upper, 431.
- Baxter, Brig.-Gen. Henry, 63.
- Bayamban, 255.
- Baylor's Farm, 88, 99, 106, 112.
- Bayly, Capt. Edward, Royal Navy, 307.
- Bazaine, François A., 448.
- Beatty, Major, 113.
- Beauregard, Gen. G. T., 86, 87, 103, 104, 105, 107, 451.
- Beauvoir, house of Jefferson Davis, 161.
- Belford's Magazine*, 161.
- Belger, Capt. James, 104.
- Belgian Consul. *See* André.
- Belgium, 122, 433.
- Bellows, H. W., President of the Sanitary Commission, 199.
- Bement, Major, 253.
- Benjamin, Confederate official, 157.
- Benner's Hill, 22.
- Benson, Sergt. Benjamin, 153, 170.
- Bergson's system of philosophy, 433.
- Berlin in 1806, 430.
- Bermuda, 454, 455.
- Bermuda Front, 99, 122.
- Bermuda Hundred, 86, 88, 89, 101, 102, 107.
- Berthier, Marshal, 431.
- Bessy, Capt., 93.
- Biac-na-bato, treaty of, 274 *et seq.*, 280.
- Bingham, Capt. Henry H., 50.
- Binondo, 249.
- Biographical Register of the Graduates of the U.S. M.A.*, 169.
- Blaaukrau's River Bridge, 368.
- Black Monday, as called by the British, 376.
- Blanchard, Lieut. William, 176.
- Blauubank Road, 384, 397.
- Blewitt, Major, 374.
- Blewitt's Post, 381, 382, 393, 401.
- Blücher, Marshal Gebhard, 433.
- Boer Artillery, 375, 382.
- Boer gunners, 374, 378, 382.
- Boers, 368, 369, 371, 377, 378, 379, 383, 385, 386-398, 400, 401, 402.
- Bombay, 363, 364, 365.
- Booldana*, S.S., 365, 366.
- Border States in the Union, 445.
- Boseley, Sergt., 394.
- Boston, 57, 143, 355, 439.
- Boston*, 242, 248, 348.
- Boston Globe*, 201.
- Boston Herald*, 201.
- Boxers, 297, 301, 302, 305, 312.
- Braddock, Gen., Regulars under, 438.
- Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 67, 68, 73.
- Brandy Station, 45.
- Breckinridge, Hon. J. C., Secretary of War, 225.
- Brescia-Milan, 428.
- Bridgeport, Tenn., 67, 68, 69, 71, 73.
- Bright, Capt., 402.
- British Army, 439.
- British control of the sea, 440.
- British fleet, 353.
- British forces, 309.
- British Government, 413, 456.
- British losses, 439.
- British Marines, 308, 315.
- British Minister at Washington, 414.
- British Navy, 444.
- British non-successes in South Africa, 379.
- British troops in this country, 325; in China, 311; at Ladysmith, 395.
- British Vice-Consul. *See* Ramsden, H. A.
- Brocklehurst, Maj.-Gen., 379, 389.
- Brooks, Major J. C., 133.
- Brooks, Brig.-Gen. William T. H., 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 114.
- Brown, Capt. George T., 185 *et seq.*
- Brown's Ferry, 69, 70.
- Brownson, Capt. Edward P., 50.
- Bruce, Col. George A., 119.
- Brumby, Lieut., 248, 249, 250.
- Buckner, Gen., 201 *et seq.*
- Buencamino, Señor Felipe, 257, 258, 288.
- Buffalo, 15.
- Buffalo-Albany region, 322.
- Bullard and Exchange Hotel, Richmond, 133.
- Buller, Gen., 368, 369, 371, 388, 390, 401.
- Bull Run, First, 157, 158, 164.
- Bulwana Hill, 378, 380, 382, 389, 390, 394, 397, 398, 401.

- Bulwer Road Bridge, 368.
 Bunker Hill, 61, 439, 443.
 Burgos, Señor A., 260.
 Burnham, Gen. Hiram, 90, 95, 100.
 Burnside, Gen. Ambrose, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 71.
 Burrage, Bvt.-Maj. Henry S., 207.
 Bushnell, David, built diving boat known as *The American Turtle*, 441; in 1778 set afloat torpedoes against British shipping, 442 *et seq.*, 444.
 Butler, Gen. B. F., 86, 87, 89, 98-102, 105, 106, 121, 123; as Federal Commissioner of Exchange, 195.
 Cadiz fleet, 245.
 Cæsar's Camp, 380, 381, 385, 387, 390, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 400, 401; Boers attack, 383 *et seq.*
 Cagayan, Province of, 289.
 Cahaba, Ala., 158, 175.
 Calcasieu Pass, La., 164.
 California, 247.
Callao, 248.
 Calocan, Province of Manila, 288.
 Camara, Admiral, 235, 236, 238.
 Cameron, 2d Lieut., O.S., 393, 396, 397, 399.
 Campbell, Hon. J. A., Assistant Secretary of War, 227.
 Campbell, Capt., 391.
 Camp Alger, 154.
 Camp Arcadia, 367.
 Camp Lee, 140.
 Camp Sorghum. *See* Military Prisons.
 Candy, Col. Charles, 23, 32, 33.
 Canning, British Foreign Secretary, 413.
 Cape Engano, Luzon, 236.
 Cape of Good Hope, 265.
 Cape Hatteras, 157.
 Carpenter, Capt. Edward N., 162.
 Carpenter, Lieut. John Quincy, 162, 176.
 Casademunt, Carlos, 248.
 Castiglione in 1797, 428.
 Castle Thunder, 141.
 Catharpin Road, 49.
 Cavada, Col., 181.
 Cavalry, at Antietam, 8, 12; in the Mine Run Campaign, 47; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 86, 105; at Richmond, 121; at Ladysmith, 379, 383, 389.
 Cavalry horses, 402.
 Cavite, Province of, 238, 239, 241, 250, 254, 257, 275, 277, 281, 291, 297, 298.
 Cavite arsenal, 281, 282.
 Cedar Creek, 117, 213.
 Cemetery Hill, 22, 25, 37.
 Cemetery Ridge, 110.
 Central West, 322.
Centurion, H.M.S., 297.
Century Magazine, 121.
Cerberus, 442.
 Chadwick, Capt. F. E., 341.
 Chaffin's Farm, 98, 122.
 Chancellorsville, 27, 45, 168.
 Chandler, Col. Daniel T., 169, 172.
 Chandler, W. E., Secretary of Navy in 1884; 354.
 Charleroi, 433.
Charleston, 242.
 Charleston, S.C., 124, 157, 162, 173, 176; 450, 452.
Charleston Courier of September 7, 1864, 215.
 Charlotte, N.C., 159.
 Chase, Mr. Salmon P., 209, 210.
 Chattanooga, Tenn., 65, 67-72, 81, 88.
 Chavairi, Capt. Don Francisco, 248.
 Chefu, 200.
 Chemung River, 152.
 Cheng-liang-cheng, 301.
Chesapeake, frigate, 443.
 Chesapeake Bay, 353.
 Chester Junction, 101.
 Chesterfield Court-House, 126.
Chicago, 348.
 Chickamauga, Tenn., 57, 72, 154.
 Chickasaw Bayou, 174.
 Childrey, Mr., 92.
 Chilton, Col. Robert Hall, 169.
 China, 237, 344; the visit of the Allies in 1900, 295, 297, 307, 309, 315, 316.
 China Sea, 263, 278.
 Chinese forts, 298; troops, 303, 305-307, 311.
 Chipman, Gen. N. P., 160, 172.
 Chisholm, Col. Scott, 368.
 Christian and Sanitary Commission, 187.
 Christopher, Mr., 391.
 Cincinnati, Society of, 408.
Circassian, 454.
City of Para, S.S., 236.
 City Point, Va., 96, 111, 140, 216.
 Civil War, 21, 40, 41, 57, 61, 72, 85, 115, 122, 149, 204; conditions under which it was fought, and the one thing which it gave us, 326; number of men enrolled, 328; its inspiring cause, 417 *et seq.*; settlement, 419; tactics and weapons of warfare, 437; intrenchments, 445 *et seq.*; tactics on the sea, 448; development of torpedoes and submarines, 450; blockade, 454.
 Clerk's work on tactics in 1779, 353.
 Clery, advance of, 378.
 Coasters' Harbor Island, 355.
 "Cold Cheer at Camp Morton," article in *Century Magazine* for April, 1891, 149.
 Cold Harbor, 446, 447.
 Colenso, 368, 369, 383, 390, 398, 400, 401.
 Colgrove, Col. Silas, 23, 24, 30-32, 34, 36.
 Collamer, Jacob, U.S. Senator, 212.
 Cologne, 432, 433.
 Colonists, 412, 437, 438, 440.
 Columbia, S.C., 158, 177.
 Commando, or Free State, 367.
 Commentaries on American Law, 413.
 Concord, Mass., 438.
 Confederate Army, at Antietam, 7, 14, 15; at Gettysburg, 41; in the Mine Run Campaign, 58, 59, 61; at Richmond, 124, 132; the effect of Mr. Lincoln's reelection, 217; desertions, 124, 218, 225, 231, 232.

- Confederate Burgevine, 200 *et seq.*
 Confederate Cabinet, disagreement, 58.
 Confederate Congress, 219, 228.
 Confederate Congress, May, 1861, 198.
 Confederate Congress, March 3, 1865, 198.
 Confederate fleet, burning of, 127.
 Confederate Government, 15, 89, 127, 168, 180, 453.
 Confederate House of Representatives, 196, 197.
 Confederate losses, at Antietam, 14; at Gettysburg, 34; in Mine Run Campaign, 53; at Ft. Harrison, 97; at Petersburg, 104; at Ft. Stedman, 229-232.
 Confederate Navy in the Civil War, 453.
 Confederate War Department, 170.
 Confederate White House, 140.
 Confederates captured, in Northern military prisons, 149; died and paroled, 204.
Congress, frigate, 443.
 Congressional Committee, 164.
 Connecticut troops, Seventh, 106; Eighth, 100, 101, 106.
 Conscription Act in April, 1862, 124.
 Conscription laws, 59.
 Constantinople, 343.
Constellation, frigate, 443.
Constitution, 443, 444, 448, 450.
 Continental Army, 437.
 Cook, William, 183 *et seq.*
 Cooke, Bombardier, 394.
 Cooke, Capt. Henry Parkhurst, 179.
 Cooke, Brig.-Gen. John R., 218.
 Cooper, Adjut.-Gen. Samuel, C.S.A., 165, 224.
 Corcoran, Col. Michael, 158.
 Cornwallis, Lord, 353, 438, 439; at Yorktown, 325.
 Corregidor Island, 237.
 Cossacks, 301.
 Couch, Maj.-Gen. Darius N., 107.
 Council of Defence, 244.
 Council, Col. J. Calvin, 113.
 Cowikee, Ala., 167.
 Coxhead, Lieut.-Col. J. A., 367, 372, 374, 375, 398.
 "Cracker Line," 70.
 Crampton's Pass, 89.
 Crane, W. F., letter from, 167, 168.
 Crawford's statue of Washington, 140.
 Cremona-Milan, 428.
 Creusôt gun, or "Long Tom," 373, 377, 382, 388-391, 393, 394, 401.
 Croft's *Fifty Years of Camp and Field*, 155.
 Cromwell, Oliver, 335.
 Cronan, Lieut.-Commander W. P., 449.
 Crook, Gen. George, 81, 117.
 Crowder, Lieut.-Col. E. H., 252.
 Crowninshield, Col. Benjamin W., 117.
 Crozier, Brig.-Gen. William, 405.
 Cuba, Island of, 235, 279; Joint Resolutions of Congress approved April 20, 1898, 419.
 Cullen, Col. Edward M., 93.
 Cullum, Gen. George W., 169.
 Culpepper Ford, 46.
 Culp's Hill, 22, 23, 25.
 Cunningham, Col. Dick, 396.
 Curtis, Lieut.-Col. Arthur R., 183.
 Cushing's daring night attack, 450.
 Custom House, receipts at, 257.
 Dagupan, 255.
 Daly, Capt., 192.
 Dan River, 180.
 Daniel, Brig.-Gen. Junius, 32, 37.
 Danube, valley of, 432.
 Danville, Va., 158, 180, 194, 232.
David, type of submarine, 450, 453.
 Davidson, Sergt. Henry M., 171, 174.
 Davila, Don Basilio Augustin, Governor-General of Manila, Proclamation of 23d of April, 1898, 245, 246.
 Davis, Gen. George B., 45, 47, 64.
 Davis, Henry Winter, 211.
 Davis, Jefferson, 58, 96, 131, 136, 139, 140, 142, 161, 163, 173, 195, 200; action concerning court-martial cases, 218; message to the Confederate Congress, 219; his reply to General Lee's proposed proclamation, 222 *et seq.*
 Davout, Marshal, 430, 431, 432.
 Dawkins, Major J. W. G., 375.
 Dearing, Gen. James, 86.
 Deep Bottom, 90, 122, 123.
 Deesa, a military station in Northern Gwzevat, 363-365.
 De Grasse, Admiral François Joseph Paul, 353.
 Delaware River, 442.
 Dennis, death of, 396.
 Department of the Cumberland, 77.
 Department of Virginia, 123.
 Devens, Gen. Charles, 121, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139.
 Devons, 396.
 Dewey, Admiral George, 236-238, 241-244, 248, 253, 254, 275, 277, 279.
 Digby-Jones, Lieut., 389, 396.
 Dimick, Col. Justin, 202.
 Diugaau's Day, important holiday celebrated by the Boers December 16, 390.
 Dix, Dorothea, 152.
 Dole, President, 236.
Dolphin, 348.
 Donohoe, Col. M. T., 90, 91, 95, 107.
 Dorr, Major Henry G., 158, 162.
 Dorward, Gen., commander of British forces, 309, 311, 312.
 Douglas, Stephen A., 199.
 Doyle, A. Conan, 377.
 Drake, Jeremiah C., 100.
 Drakensberg range, 367.
 Dresden-Glogan, 430.
 Drought, John W., murdered at Elk River, 78.
 Drury's Bluff, 91, 105.
 Duncan, Lieut.-Col., J. H., 219.
 Duncan, private, 128.
 Dundee, South Africa, 366, 372, 373.

- Dundonald, Lord, 401.
 Dunkard Church, 10, 13, 18.
 Durban, South Africa, 366, 378.
- Eagle*, 442.
- Early, Gen. Jubal A., at Gettysburg, 32; movement of, into Maryland, 88; at Fisher's Hill, 213; desertions in his corps, 225.
- East Arsenal, 302, 305, 307, 308.
 Eastern Coast, 340.
 Eastman, Lieut.-Col. Seth, 152.
 East Tennessee, 72.
 Eckmuhl, Campaign of 1809, 430, 432.
 Edwards' Crossing, 8.
 Eighteenth Army Corps, at Petersburg, 88-90, 98, 99, 101-103; at Richmond, 123.
 Elandslaagte, 368, 369, 397.
 Elder, Capt. Samuel S., 109, 111, 162.
 Eleventh Army Corps, at Gettysburg, 22, 25, 28; at Chickamauga, 67, 68, 71.
 Elizabethtown, N.J., 168.
 Elk River, 75-77, 80.
 Elliot, notorious desperado, 80.
 Elmira, N.Y., 151.
 Ely, Alfred, 164, 166.
 Ely's Ford, 54.
Emden, 454.
 Emory, Gen. W. H., 117.
 End Hill, 379, 387.
 England, 344, 345, 353, 363, 367.
 England, our war with, 325 *et seq.*
 English troops, 61, 316.
Enterprise, schooner, 444.
Essex, frigate, 443.
 Estcourt, 368, 369.
 Europe, 344, 414; military countries of, 336, 348.
 European armies, 122.
 European tactics, 438, 439, 447, 448.
 Ewell, Gen. Richard S., at Gettysburg, 28, 34; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46, 47, 53, 178.
- Farallon de Pajaros, active volcano, 237.
 Farquhar's Farm, 376.
 Fayetteville, Tenn., 79, 80.
 Federals captured during the war, died and paroled, 204.
 Feliu, Col., José Maria Olaquen, 252.
 Field, Maj.-Gen. Charles W., 126.
 Field, David Dudley, 211.
 Fifth Army Corps, at Antietam, 2, 8, 9; at Gettysburg, 22, 23, 25; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46-49, 62, 63.
 Filipino characteristics, 263-294.
 Filipinos, 238, 239, 246, 258, 259, 273, 276, 278, 282, 285.
 Finegan, Brig.-Gen. Joseph, 218-220.
 First Army Corps, at Antietam, 3, 8, 9, 17, 18; at Gettysburg, 22, 23, 25, 39, 40; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46-49, 61.
 Fisher's Hill, 213.
 Five Forks, 125, 231.
 Flamborough Head, 440.
- Fletcher, Thomas C., 174.
Florida, 453.
 Florida troops, Ninth Regiment, 220.
 Foley, James W., 78.
 Folsom, Col., 2.
 Foote, Henry S., 196, 197.
 Forrest, Gen. Nathan B., 115.
 Fort Darling, 103.
 Fort Delaware, 151, 177.
 Fort Donelson, 72, 199.
 Fort Fisher, 111, 124.
 Fort Gilmer, 92, 95, 129.
 Fort Harrison, 83, 85, 90-92, 96, 97, 111, 123, 132, 322.
 Fort Henry, 72, 199.
 Fort Leavenworth, 322.
 Fort Monroe, 150, 200.
 Fort Riley, 322.
 Fort Stedman, 182, 228, 229, 230.
 Fort Sumter, 124.
 Fort Wagner, 111.
 Fort Warren, 201, 202.
 Foster, Hon. John W., 412, 413, 415, 416.
Four Years with General Lee, 227, 231.
 Fowke, Capt., 389.
 Fox, Capt. George B., 30, 31, 179.
 France, 336, 344, 348, 358, 408, 431.
 Franco-German War, 346.
 Franco-Prussian War, 349, 447.
 Franklin, Gen. William B., 1, 2, 8, 12, 13, 18.
 Frederick, Md., 8, 9.
 Frederick the Great, 426.
 Fredericksburg, 51, 53, 110, 168.
 Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R., 154.
 Freedley, Capt. Henry W., 152.
 Freeman, Lieut. H. B., 162.
 Free State Army, 372.
 Free State Column, 367, 368.
 Free State or Commando, 367.
 French, Brig.-Gen. William H., 10, 11, 46, 47, 49, 50.
 French army in Germany, 430-432.
 French fleet, 325, 353.
 French troops in China, 311.
 French and Indian Wars, 437, 438.
 Frey, Capt. Emil, 161.
 Friend House, 104, 114.
 Froeschweiler, defence of, 447.
 Frothingham, Thomas G., 435.
 Fulton, Robert, 444.
 Fulton ferry-boat, 454.
 Funkstown, 57.
- Gaines' Mill, 446.
 Garcia, Gen. Pantaleon, 259.
 Gardner, Capt. Silas E., 80.
 Gaston, Representative, 414.
 Geary, Brig.-Gen. John W., at Gettysburg, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32-34, 38-40; at Chattanooga, 70, 71.
 General Board, 348, 349, 351.
 General Orders, No. 2, 222, 225; No. 6, 77; No. 159, 198.
 General Staff for the Navy, 349 *et seq.*
 Georgetown, 150.

- Georgia, 158, 169, 175, 227.
Georgia, 453.
 German armies, 122.
 German concession, 309.
 German cruisers, 453.
 German General Staff, 346 *et seq.*
 German troops, 316; in China, 311.
 Germanna Ford, 46, 54, 63.
 Germantown, Pa., 151.
 Germany, military training in, 336; power in, 343, 344; system of, 348; took sixty years to prepare the overthrow of France, 358; French armies in, 431, 432.
 Gettysburg, 19, 21-23, 25, 38, 40, 41, 57, 58, 110, 162, 168, 232.
 Gibbon, Gen. John, 123.
 Gillmore, Gen. Quincy A., 101, 102, 105, 106.
 Gingalls, the famous two-men guns, 306.
 Gloucester Regiment, 372, 391.
 Godwin, Parke, 211.
 Goldsboro, N.C., 159, 162.
 Goodrich, Lieut.-Commander C. F., U.S.N., 354.
 Gordon, Charles G. ("Chinese"), 200, 313.
 Gordon, General, 355.
 Gordon, Brig.-Gen. John B., 47, 225, 228-230.
 Gordon Hall, 303, 304.
 Gordon Highlanders, 385, 388, 395.
 Gordonsville, 53.
 Goss, Capt. Enoch, 113.
 Goulburn, Major, 381, 390.
 Gracie, Gen. Archibald, Jr., 103, 104.
 Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., in the Mine Run Campaign, 53, 54; at Chickamauga, 68, 69, 71, 72; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 86-89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 114; at Richmond, 125, 126, 142; last campaigns against Lee, 446; tactics, 448; mentioned, 170, 196, 213, 216, 221, 223, 226, 229, 231.
 Gravelotte, 447, 448.
 Graves, Admiral Sir Thomas, 353.
 Gray, Major John C., Jr., 1, 2.
 Great Britain, 272, 408, 412, 414, 415, 440, 456.
 Greeley, Horace, 211.
 Greene, Gen. Francis V., at Manila, 235, 238, 239, 241, 249, 250, 252.
 Greene, Brig.-Gen. George S., at Antietam, 10, 11, 13, 18; at Gettysburg, 23, 24, 26-30, 33, 34, 38, 40.
 Greensboro, N.C., 180.
 Greenville, S.C., 159.
 Grimes, Brig.-Gen. Bryan, 225.
 Grimes, James W., 211.
 Grimwood's battalions at Ladysmith, 376.
 Guibert, French general, 427.
 Gulf Coast, 322.
 Gun Hill, 387, 389.
 Gwzevat, Northern, 363.
 Habeas Corpus, writ of, 59.
 Hagerstown road, 10; pike, 12, 18.
 Hagood, Gen. Johnson, 100, 101, 104.
 Hague, The, First International Peace Conference in 1899, 422.
 Hairston, Maj. J. T. W., 165 *et seq.*
 Halfway House, 102, 104.
 Hall, Gen. Foster quotes, 412-413.
 Halleck, Maj.-Gen. Henry W., 40, 58, 59.
 Hamburg, 431.
 Hamilton, Col. Ian, 373.
 Hampton, Maj.-Gen. Wade, 47, 48, 177, 178.
 Hampton Roads, 448.
 Hampton Roads Conference, 226.
 Hancock, Gen. Winfield S., 22, 61, 107, 110.
 Harper and Brothers, 161.
 Harper's Ferry, 1, 7, 8; Union losses, 14.
Harper's Monthly Magazine, January, 1915, 210.
 Hartranft, Gen. John F., 229.
 Haskins, Lieut. Alex. D., 80.
 Hatcher's Run, 122.
 Hatteras Inlet, 157.
 Havana, 454.
 Hawaii, annexation to the U.S., 238.
 Hawley, Col. Joseph R., 106.
 Hawley, Col. William, 80.
 Hay, Hon. John, 121, 210, 212-215.
 Hayes, Gen., 192.
 Hayes, Gen. Joseph, 183.
 Hayes, Gen. Rutherford B., 8.
 Hays, Brig.-Gen. Harry T., 47, 48.
 Hazel River, 45.
 Hazen, Gen. William B., 70.
 Headquarters Staff, 391.
 Heckman, Gen. Charles A., 93, 95, 99, 103, 104.
 Helpmakaar Post, 381; Boers attack on, 383-385.
 Helpmakaar Ridge, 382.
 Helpmakaar Road, 373.
 Henrico Jail in Richmond, 157.
 Heth, Maj.-Gen. Henry, 218, 223, 225.
 Higgins, Lieut. J. F., 375, 380, 383, 396.
 Higgins, Mr. H. L., General Manager of R.R. in the Philippines, 255, 257.
 Hill, Gen. A. P., at Antietam, 14; in the Mine Run Campaign, 47-49, 53; at Richmond, 140; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 216; report to Gen. Lee on desertions, 218 *et seq.*
 Hill, Hon. Benjamin H., Senator from Georgia in Confederate Congress, 153, 214.
 Hincks, Gen. Edward W., at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 99, 100, 107, 108, 109, 111, 114.
 Hitchcock, Gen., *Diary* of, 155.
 Hlaugwaue, South Africa, 401.
 Hogg, Gen., commanding Deesa District; 363.
 Hoke, Gen. Robert F., 103, 104.
 Holland, inventor of submarine, 452.
 Holt, Judge Advocate, 171.
 Home Guards, 86.
 Homes, Clay W., 151.
 Hong Kong, 241, 243, 245, 254, 273, 274, 278, 280, 281.

- Hong Kong Junta, 273, 274 *et seq.*, 278, 280.
 Honolulu, P.I., 235, 236, 239.
 Hood, Gen. John B., 72, 124.
 Hooker, Gen. Joseph, at Antietam, 2, 3, 8-12, 15-17; at Chattanooga, 68-71.
 Hooper, Lieut.-Col. Charles H., 183.
Hornet, sloop, 443.
Housatonic, U.S.S., 453.
 House of Representatives, 192; Documents, No. 1109, 163, 173; No. 4064, 174; No. 199, 176; No. 845, 180; 40th Congress, 3d Session, Document No. 455, 198.
 Hovey, A. P., 149.
 Howard, Gen. O. O., in the Mine Run Campaign, 57; at Chattanooga, 68, 70, 71.
 Howe, Gen. Sir William, 61.
 Huddleton, private, execution of, 224.
 Hume's Shop, 45, 46.
 Humphreys, Gen. A. A., in the Mine Run Campaign, 45, 47; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 107.
 Hunt, Gen. Henry J., 37.
 Hunter, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 375, 389.
 Hunter, Senator, of Virginia, 142.
 Huntley, Horace L., inventor of submarine, 451, 452, 453.
 Hussars, Eighteenth, 379; Nineteenth, 368.
 Huxford, Capt. W. P., 183.
- Ilo Ilo, Island of Panay, 285.
Itis, German gunboat, 299.
Immortalité, British, 239.
 Imperial army, 200.
 Imperial troops, 305, 312; Imperial Light Horse, 368, 369, 379; camp and trenches, 385, 388.
 India, 271, 363, 364, 366, 367, 403.
 Indiana, 214; troops, Twenty-seventh Regiment, 30, 31, 35, 36.
Indiana, 236.
 Indianapolis, 149, 153.
 Indian troops, 315, 368.
 Indian war, 331, 437.
 Indo-European, 264.
 Insurgent Junta, 227.
 Intelligence Division, 392.
 International Disputes, Society for the Judicial Settlement of, 407, 408, 412.
 Intombi Camp, 380, 390, 392, 399, 400, 401, 403.
 Iron Bridge, 369, 378, 380.
 Isambulwhaua, commonly called Bulwana Hills, 378.
 Isthmus of Suez, 235.
 Italy, from 1720 to the Napoleonic Wars, 335.
- Jackson, "Stonewall," at Antietam, 8, 13, 14, 18; mentioned, 29.
 Jacobs, George W., murdered at Elk River, 78.
 Jacob's Ford, 46.
 James River, 58, 86, 88, 89, 93, 98, 99, 102, 103, 105, 107, 111, 122, 127, 128, 131, 132, 138, 158, 192.
 Japanese troops in China, 311, 316.
 Jaudenes, Firmin, Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines, 243, 244, 245, 247, 249, 251, 253, 275.
 Jena, 430.
John Adams, corvette, 443.
 Johnson, Andrew, 142.
 Johnson, Gen. Bradley T., 179.
 Johnson, Gen. Bushrod, 100, 101, 225.
 Johnson, Gen. Edward, at Gettysburg, 23, 28, 29, 32, 33; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46-48.
 Johnson, Gen. Richard W., 110.
 Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 62.
 Johnston, Gen. Joseph, 163, 227, 228.
 Johnston, Prof. R. M., 423.
 Jolo Archipelago, 289.
 Jomini, Antoine Henri, his study of war, 350, 351, 352, 425.
 Jones, Mr. J. B., 96.
 Jones, Brig.-Gen. John M., 28.
 Jones, Paul, 440.
 Julian, Capt. George N., 113, 114.
 Junction Hill, 398.
- Kane, Brig.-Gen. Thomas L., 23, 28, 29, 33, 34.
 Kane, Dr., 29.
 Kautz, Gen. August V., 89, 125, 130.
 Kautz, Lieut. Albert, U.S.N., 156, 157.
 Kelly, A. M., 153.
 Kelly, Assistant Surgeon, Indian Medical Service, 394.
 Kelly's Ferry, 45.
 Kemper, Gen. James L., 103.
 Kempff, Admiral, 299.
 Kent, Chancellor, 413.
 Kentucky, 215.
 Ketcham, Col. John H., 79.
 King, Preston, 142.
 King's Post, 384.
 Klip River, 378, 385, 388, 393, 400, 401.
 Klip River Camp Bridge, 383.
 Knox, Col. W., C.B., 402.
 Knoxville, Tenn., 71.
 Kronje, Gen., 401.
- Ladd, Capt. William J., 133, 134.
 Ladysmith, South Africa, 311; siege of, 361, 362, 366-369, 372, 373, 375, 377-381, 388, 394, 395, 397, 399, 401-403; official statement for the 24th of November: ammunition expended, 387; losses, 386.
 Laguna, Province of, 256, 292.
 Laguna de Bey, 291.
 Lake, inventor of submarine, 453.
 Lake George, Provincials at, 438.
 Lamberton, Capt. B. P., U.S.N., 252.
 Lancers' Hill, 379, 380.
 Lands, Capt., 299.
 Lane, Brig.-Gen. James H., 218.
 Lang, Col. D., 220.
 Latouche, Lieut., 181, 182, 190.
 Lech, river, 430-432.
 Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, 189.

- Lee, Gen. Robert E., at Antietam, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18; at Gettysburg, 22, 41; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46, 48, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 64; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 88, 97; at Richmond, 122, 126, 131, 132, 142; condition of affairs in his army, 217-227; letter to President Davis regarding negroes for services as soldiers, 228; report to the Secretary of War on desertions, 230, 231; losses, 232; mentioned, 426, 446, 448.
- Leigh, Major B. W., 33.
- Leonard, Capt. Henry, U.S. M.C., 295, 307.
- Lexington, Mass., 438, 439, 446.
- Libby & Sons, 180.
- Liberty Mills, 60.
- Life and Letters of Gen. Meade*, 232.
- Limit Hill, 373, 389.
- Lincoln, Abraham, suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus, 59; interview with Miss Miller, 81; at Richmond, 139, 140; authorized exchange of prisoners, 157; effect of his reflection upon the waning fortunes of the Confederate States, 209-232.
- Lincoln, Tad, 139.
- Ling Chi, 200.
- Livermore, Col. Thomas L., 2, 43, 50, 85, 98, 114, 155.
- Liverpool Regiment, at Ladysmith, 368, 369.
- Lloyd's list containing notices of British vessels captured by Americans, 443.
- Lockwood, Brig.-Gen. Henry L., at Gettysburg, 24, 26, 27, 32, 39, 40.
- Locust Grove. *See* Robertson's Tavern.
- Lodge, Hon. Henry Cabot, 418.
- Lombard's Kop, 374, 376, 377, 387, 390, 394, 395.
- London *Times*, 443, 444.
- Long Hill, 378, 402.
- Longstreet, Gen. James, at Antietam, 14; at Gettysburg, 25; in the Mine Run Campaign, 53; at Chickamauga, 67, 71; at Richmond, 124, 142; report of November 14, 1864, 218; desertions from, 225, 231; interview with Gen. Ord, 226; writes to Gen. Lee, 230.
- Lookout Mountain, 69-71.
- Los Angeles, 322.
- Loud, Lieut. E. DeC., 162.
- Low, Gen. Sir R., commanding Bombay Army, 365.
- Loyal League, 134.
- Luce, Commodore Stephen B., U.S.N., 354, 355.
- Luke, Major, 313.
- Luna, Gen., 288.
- Luzon, Island of, 236, 254, 274, 279, 281-284, 289-292.
- Lynchburg, 191, 232.
- Lyons, Judge, 97.
- Mabini, Señor, 281, 285, 287.
- Macdougall, Lieut., 378.
- Maclay, 441.
- Macon, Ga., 158, 161, 170, 175.
- Madison, James, 325, 413, 414.
- Madrid, 270.
- Madrid Government, 245.
- Mahan, Capt. and Admiral A. T., 351, 355; in his *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*, 414.
- Mahone, Maj.-Gen. William, 218, 219.
- Maiden Post, 397.
- Maine, 214.
- Maine*, disaster to, 420.
- Mainz, Germany, 431.
- Malacanang, Palace at, Gen. Merritt's Headquarters, 253.
- Mallory, Confederate officer, 157.
- Malolos, Aguinaldo's Headquarters, 254, 256, 257, 259, 276, 279, 284, 285, 288, 289; insurgent capital moved to, 277.
- Manassas, 7, 164, 166.
- Manassas to Appomattox*, 230.
- Manchester Regiment, 367, 381.
- Manila, P.I., occupation of in 1898, 235-260; mentioned, 269, 271, 275-277, 279-287, 289-291.
- Manila Bay, 238, 242, 254, 271, 275, 280, 297.
- Manila Custom-House, 273; University of, 270.
- Männlicher rifles, 306, 307.
- Mansfield, Maj.-Gen. Joseph K. F., 2, 8, 10.
- Mantua, 428.
- Marines, First Regiment of, in China, 310.
- Marlborough's wars, intrenchments in, 445.
- Martindale, Gen. John H., 107, 109, 111.
- Marye's Heights, 51.
- Maryland, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 88, 215.
- Maryland Heights, 1.
- Maryland troops, First Battalion, 33.
- Mason, Rev. R., 191.
- Mason and Dixon line, 150.
- Mason and Slidell, 202.
- Massachusetts, 133, 142.
- Massachusetts troops, Cavalry, Fourth, 129, 133; Infantry, Second, 30, 35, 36; Sixth at Baltimore in 1861, 169; Thirty-third, 71; Thirty-ninth, 63.
- Massena, Marshal, 431, 432.
- Matamoras, 454.
- Mauritius, 367.
- Mayo, Joseph, Mayor of Richmond, 130, 132.
- Mayo's Bridge, 135.
- McAllister, Col. Robert, 24.
- McAllister's Mill, 24.
- McArthur, Gen. Arthur, 235, 241, 248.
- McCabe, Rev. Dr., Government Chaplain, 191.
- McClellan, Gen. George B., at Antietam, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 13-18; nomination of, 213, 215, 216.
- McDougal, Surgeon Charles M., 152, 153.
- McDougal, Col. Archibald L., 23, 24, 34.
- McGilvery, Major Freeman, 27.
- McGowan, Brig.-Gen. Samuel, 218.
- McKinley, William, 281; Administration, 151.

- McLain, Lieut., 248.
 McLaws, Gen. Lafayette, 1, 3.
 McRae, Brig.-Gen. William, 218.
 Meade, Col., 312.
 Meade, Gen. George G., at Antietam, 10;
 at Gettysburg, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 38-41;
 in the Mine Run Campaign, 46, 47, 49,
 50, 52, 53, 57-61, 64; at Richmond, 122;
 how he regarded President Davis' message
 to the Confederate Congress, 219; letter,
 dated April 3, 232.
Merrimac, 449.
 Merritt, Maj.-Gen. Wesley, Military Gov-
 ernor of the Philippines, 235-237; meets
 the Belgian Consul, 238; proposes to Ad-
 miral Dewey a joint letter to the Span-
 iards, 241; correspondence, 242-247; on
 the Zafiro, 248; his agreement with Don
 Firmin Jaudenes, 251, 252; gives Agui-
 naldo assurance of his friendship, 253; re-
 lieved from command, 257.
 Metcalfe, Col. C., K.B., 389.
 Mexican currency, 253.
 Mexican troops, 416.
 Mexican War, 415, 417.
 Mexico, 181, 326, 416, 417.
 Michigan, U.S.S., 450.
 Middle Hill, 397.
 Midwood, driver, 390.
 Miles, Col. Nelson A., 50.
 Militar-Gewehr (German), model of 1876,
 299.
 Military Commission, 171.
 Military Division of the Mississippi, 68.
 Military Historical Society of Massachu-
 setts, 64, 85, 162, 407.
Military Memoirs of a Confederate, 232.
 Military Order of the Loyal Legion, Massa-
 chusetts Commandery, 162, 182, 204.
 Military prisons, North and South, 149.
 NORTH, Alton, Ill., 154; Belle Plain, Va.,
 154; Camp Alger, 154; Camp Butler,
 Springfield, Ill., 154; Camp Chase, 153;
 Camp Douglas, 153; Camp Morton, 149-
 153; Elmira, N.Y., 151-154; Fort Colum-
 bus, N.Y. Harbor, 154; Fort Lafayette,
 N.Y. Harbor, 154; Fort McHenry, near
 Baltimore, 154; Fort Delaware, near
 Philadelphia, 154; Fort Warren, Boston
 Harbor, 154; Gratiot Street, St. Louis,
 154; Johnson's Island, Sandusky Bay,
 Ohio, 153, 155, 156; Old Capitol Prison,
 Washington, 154; Point Lookout, Md.,
 151, 153, 155; Rock Island, Ill., 154.
 SOUTH, Andersonville, 149, 154, 158,
 162, 164, 173, 174, 176, 178; description
 of, 169-172; Atkinson tobacco factory,
 165; Belle Isle, 149, 158, 163, 194, 197;
 description of, 192-194; Camp Asylum
 (see Camp Sorghum); Camp Douglas,
 199; Camp Ford, Tex., 158, 163; Camp
 Groce, 158, 164; Camp Lawton, 158;
 Camp Oglethorpe, Ga., 175; Camp Pa-
 role, 204; Camp Sorghum, 149, 158, 171;
 Camp Sumter (see Andersonville); Crew's,
 157; Castle Morgan, 175; Castle Pinck-
 ney, 158; Castle Thunder, 141, 157, 158,
 165; Florence, 149, 158, 178; Laundry,
 the, 157; Libby, 141, 149, 150, 153, 157,
 161, 164, 166, 168, 169, 180, 181, 185, 187,
 189, 192; Liggon's, 157; Parish, 159;
 Richland County Jail, 178; Roper Hos-
 pital and City Jail, Charleston, S.C.,
 158, 176; Salisbury, N.C., 149, 150, 158,
 178; Scott's, 157; Smith and Pemberton's
 buildings, 157; deaths, 154, 158, 164, 170,
 174, 177, 178, 179, 195.
 Millen, Ga., 158, 173.
 Miller, notorious desperado, 80, 81.
 Mine Run Campaign, 43, 45, 48, 50, 51-55,
 57, 59-64.
 Minister of Finance, 242.
 Missionary Ridge, 67, 71, 110.
 Mississippi River, 445.
 Mississippi Valley, 322.
 Missouri, 445.
 Mitchell, assistant correspondent of the
Standard, 386.
 Mobile, Ala., 213.
 Modder Spruit, 373, 376, 401; blowing up
 of railroad station, 402.
Monitor, 449, 450.
Monocacy, U.S.S., 300, 301, 306.
 Monroe Doctrine, 334.
 Montcalm, Gen., 438.
Monterey, 239, 241, 242.
 Montgomery, Ala., 175, 198.
 Montojo, Admiral, 242, 249.
 Mooi River Station, 366.
 Moore, Dr. John Bassett, 358.
Morgan City, 236.
 Morgan, Lieut., 439.
 Morris, Gouverneur, 414.
 Morris Island, 176, 177.
 Morris, Widow, 46.
 Morse, Col. Charles F., 19, 65.
 Morton, Gov. Oliver P., 149.
 Morton's Ford, 53, 60.
 Mosby, Gen. John S., 72.
 Mott, Dr. Valentine, Chairman of U.S.
 Sanitary Commission, 196.
 Mountain Run, 45, 48.
 Mudge, Lieut.-Col. Charles R., 30, 31, 35.
 Mulberry, Tenn., 77.
 Mulligan, Col. James Albert, 200.
 Murray, Lieut. H. H., 141 *et seq.*
 Namur, Belgium, 433.
 Napoleon, 325, 346, 350; geometrical factor
 in his generalship, 425-433; tactics, 447.
 Napoleon guns, 53.
 Nashville, Tenn., 67, 68, 73, 80, 81, 124.
Nashville, U.S.S., 297.
 Nassau, 454, 455.
 Natal, South Africa, 363, 368, 392.
 Natal Carabiniers, 379, 388, 390.
 Natal field force, 383.
 Natal Mounted Volunteers, 367.
 Natal State Railway, 366.
 Natal Volunteers, 395.

- Nautilus*, schooner, 444.
 Naval Academy, 351.
 Naval Intelligence, Office of, 348, 349, 351, 352.
 Naval War College, 341, 343, 345, 348, 350, 352; history of, 354-359; Board of Officers, 354, 355.
 Navy Department, 349; Bureau of Personnel, 351, 354, 355.
 Negroes, Island of, 285, 289.
 Nelson, Rear Admiral Sir Horatio, 425.
 Netherlands, 272.
Newark, U.S. flagship, 298.
 Newcastle, South Africa, 369.
 Newcastle road, 373, 389, 402.
 New England, 143.
 New Hampshire, 133.
 New Hampshire troops, Fifth, 2, 11; Tenth, 90, 93; Thirteenth, 94, 106-108, 113, 141.
 New Hope Church, 48.
New Ironsides, U.S.S., 453.
 New Jersey, 168, 215.
 New Jersey troops, Ninth, 103; Thirteenth, 30, 31.
 New London, 442.
 New Market road, 90, 122, 129, 130, 132, 133.
 New Orleans, 325; Battle of, 443.
 Newport, 353, 355.
Newport, 236, 237, 239, 243, 247.
 Newton, Maj.-Gen. John, 61.
 New York, 355, 442.
 New York City, Five Points District, 191, 455.
 New York illustrated paper, 139.
 New York riots, 57, 59.
New York Times, 161.
 New York troops, Sixtieth, 34; Ninety-second, 106; Ninety-sixth, 93; One Hundred and Eighteenth, 90, 93, 106.
 Ney, Marshal Michel, 430.
Niagara, U.S.S., 448, 450.
 Nicholls, Brig.-Gen. F. T., 28, 29.
 Nicholson's Nek, 376, 378.
 Nicolay, John G., 121, 212-215.
 Nicolay and Hay, 163, 212-215.
 Ninth Army Corps, at Antietam, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18.
 North America, 246.
 North American troops, 282.
 North Anna, 447.
 North Atlantic Squadron, 355.
 North Carolina, 37, 157, 180, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228.
 Northcott, Gen. R. S., 161.
 Northrop, Lucius Ballinger, 197.
 North Sea, 122, 456.
 Norton, Prof. Charles Eliot, 216.
 Nozaleda, P., Archbishop of Manila, 242, 247.

 Observation Hill, 389, 390, 398; Boers attack, 383.
 Ohio, 214.
 Ohio, 236.
 Ohio troops, Seventh, 34.

 Olaquer, Col. Don José M., 248.
 Old Dominion, 144.
Olympia, 238, 242, 248.
 Onderbrook, 368.
 Onderbrook Pass, 369.
 O'Neal, Col. E. A., 32.
 Orange Court House, 60.
 Orange Plank Road, 46, 47, 48-52, 54.
 Orange Turnpike, 46, 47, 49, 54.
 Orcutt, Newell E., murdered at Elk River, 78.
 Ord, Gen. Edward O. C., at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 88, 90-92, 94, 95, 98; at Richmond, 122, 123; interview with Longstreet, 226.
 Ordnance Parks, 385.
 Oregon Regiment, 250.
 Oregon troops, Second, 241.
 Osborne pike, 130.
 Otis, Lieut.-Col. Elwell Stephen, 151.
 Otis, Maj.-Gen. E. S., 261.
 Ould, Col. Robert, Confederate Commissioner of Exchange, 161, 163, 195, 204.

 Pacific Coast, 322.
 Pacific Mail Company, agent of, 236.
 Page, James Madison, 162.
 Palfrey, Gen. John C., 355.
 Palmer, Gen. John M., 69.
 Palmer, Col. W. H., 216, 217, 225.
 Panay, Island of, 285, 289.
 Paranaque, Manila Province, 238.
 Paris, Declaration of, 453; Peace Commission at, 257, 260.
 Parke, Gen. John G., 229.
 Parker, Lieut. David, 182.
 Parker's Store, 46.
 Pasha Osman, tactics used by, 448.
 Pasig River, 250, 256, 286, 291.
 Peabody, Mr. Frank, 85.
 Pearl River, 174.
 Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 297.
 Pegram, Gen. John, in the Mine Run Campaign, 48.
 Pei-ho River, 298, 300, 304, 306.
 Peirson, Col. and Bvt. Brig.-Gen. Charles L., in the Mine Run Campaign, 45, 48, 50, 55.
 Pekin, 298, 301, 305, 308, 314.
 Pemberton, Gen. John C., 195.
 Pena, Gen. Nicholas de la, 252.
 Peninsular Campaign, 16.
 Peninsular War, 443.
 Pennsylvania, 8, 58, 214.
Pennsylvania, 450.
 Pennypacker, Capt. E. J., 162.
 Pensacola, Fla., 157.
 Pepworth's Farm, 373.
 Pepworth's Hill, 373, 374, 377, 378, 402.
 Perreau, Lieut. A. M., 371.
Petasco, monitor, 450.
 Peterkin, Rev. J., 190, 191.
 Petersburg, Va., 83, 85-89, 92, 97, 101, 108, 109, 111, 114, 122, 125, 126, 213, 216, 217, 221, 224, 225, 228, 231, 446, 447.
 Philadelphia, 151, 190.

- Philippines, 151, 235, 251, 255, 260, 269, 271, 272, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281, 283, 293, 310, 314; High Commissioner of the Republic of, 280.
- Philippine Government, 258; Republic, 273, 274, 278.
- Pickett, Gen. George E., at Gettysburg, 37, 41; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 101; men in guard-house, 218; desertions from his division, 231.
- Pickwood, Lieut.-Col., 402.
- Pietermaritzburg, 368.
- Pieter's Hill, 401; camp, 402.
- Plains of Abraham, 438.
- Plaisted, Col. Harris M., 100, 101.
- Plank road, 46, 47.
- Plaza, 250.
- Pleasant Valley, 1, 3, 12.
- Pleasanton, Gen. Alfred, 8.
- Point Engano, Luzon, 237.
- Point Lookout, Md., 151, 153.
- Pollard, gunner, 394.
- Pollard, Edward A., 195.
- Pomeroy, Samuel C., U.S. Senator, 209, 210.
- Poort Road, 385, 390, 391.
- Pope, Gen. John, 7, 16.
- Porter, Admiral David, 139, 140.
- Porter, Gen. Fitz John, 8.
- Porter, Lieut. Samuel D., 76, 77.
- Port Walthall Junction, 101, 102.
- Potgieter's Drift, 398.
- Potomac River, 7, 14, 15, 57, 144, 154.
- Potter, Lieut. Henry C., 162.
- Poundburg Hill, 398.
- Powhatan, estate of Mayor of Richmond, 131.
- President*, frigate, 443.
- Preston, Gen., head of Bureau of Conscription, 227.
- Prince of Wales, 383.
- Prince's Dock, Bombay, 365.
- Prisons, list of books and authors, 159-161.
- Provincials, 438, 439.
- Prussians, 432.
- Puget Sound, 322.
- Putnam, Major George Haven, 172, 181.
- Race Course, a Chinese stronghold, 308.
- Rajputana-Malwa Railway, India, 363.
- Raleigh, N.C., 159, 162, 179, 223.
- Raleigh*, 242, 248.
- Ramsden, H. A., British Vice-Consul in charge of U.S. consular interests, 242, 244.
- Randolph, George W., Confederate Secretary of War, 196.
- Range Post, 378, 379, 384, 392, 393, 399.
- Range Post Ridge, 380.
- Ransom, Gen. Robert, Jr., 103, 104.
- Rapidan River, 45, 46, 48, 53, 58-60, 62, 63.
- Rappahannock River, 45, 58, 62, 63.
- Ration Post, 383, 384, 386, 387.
- Ratisbon, Germany, 431.
- Rawlinson, Lieut.-Col. Sir H., 391.
- Raymond, Henry J., editor of *New York Times*, 212.
- Read, Hon. John, 164.
- Redesdale, Lord, *Memoirs*, 200.
- Regular Army, 438, 439.
- Reid, Lieut. James R., 152.
- Reminiscences of the Civil War*, 230.
- Review of Reviews Photographic History of the Civil War*, 153, 199, 202, 205.
- Revolutionary War, 325, 417; on land, 438; on sea, 441; submarine and torpedo, 442.
- Reyes, Col. Carlos, 252.
- Reynolds, Col. John Fulton, 181.
- Rhine, river, 431, 433.
- Rhodes' *History of the United States*, 223.
- Rhodes, Col. Frank, 398.
- Richardson, Maj.-Gen. Israel B., 10, 11, 12.
- Richmond, Va., 7, 45, 89, 96, 98, 101-103, 167, 182, 189-191, 213, 216, 221, 446; capture and occupation of, 121, 122, 126-134, 136, 138, 140, 141, 143; prisons in, 157, 161, 163-165, 169, 178, 180, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198; concerning desertions, 217, 224, 225.
- Richmond Examiner*, 156, 169; January 21, 1864, 162, 173, 194 *et seq.*
- Richmond*, ironclad, 128.
- Richmond and Petersburg R.R., 99 *et seq.*
- Richmond turnpike, 102.
- Rifle Post, 400.
- Rifleman's Ridge, 379, 380, 384, 388, 397.
- Rio Grande, Luzon, 255.
- Ripley, Gen. Edward H., 132, 133, 136.
- Rizzo, Gen., Governor of Ayuntamiento, 250.
- Roach, Lieut. A. C., 194.
- Roanoke*, 449, 450.
- Roanoke River, 225.
- Roberts, Col. Samuel H., 90, 94.
- Robertson's Ford, 46.
- Robertson's Tavern (Locust Grove), 46-48, 50-52, 62.
- Rochambeau, 353.
- Rock Creek, 22-24, 26, 31, 32, 34, 36.
- Rock Creek Valley, 23.
- Rocketts, 130, 132, 134, 164.
- Rock Island, Ill., 154.
- Rodes, Gen. Robert E., 32, 48.
- Rodney, Admiral Sir George Brydges, 353.
- Root, Mr. Elihu, 408.
- Ropes, John C., 2, 3, 14, 355.
- Rose, Col. T. E., 181.
- Rosecrans, Maj.-Gen. William S., at Chattanooga, 67, 68, 71.
- Ross, Erastus W., 182.
- Rossia*, Russian man-of-war, 297.
- Round Tops, 25.
- Royal Army, 438, 440; troops, 439.
- Royal Artillery, 380, 381, 388, 397, 398, 402; camp, 385, 386, 397; Officers' camp, 393; Medical Corps, 366.
- Royal Engineers, 389, 391, 397.
- Royal troops in Boston, 439.
- Royston, Col., commandant of Natal Volunteers, 393, 395.
- Ruger, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H., 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 34.

- Russell, Earl, 456.
 Russia, 343.
 Russian Army, 350; troops, 316.
 Russo-Japanese War, 422, 448.
 Russo-Turkish War, 448.
 Ruyter's telegrams to Hong Kong, 241.
- Sacket, Col. Delos B., 16.
 Saigon, China, 275.
 Saint Helena, 425.
 Sampson, Commander Wm. T., U.S.N., 354.
 San Antonio, Texas, 322.
 Sanders, Col. C. C., 218.
 San Francisco, Cal., 235, 237, 322.
 San Isidro, P.I., 289.
 Santiago, Cuba, 237.
 Saratoga, 438.
 Saunders, Corporal, 376, 390.
 Savannah, Ga., 124, 158, 162, 173, 221.
 Scales, Brig.-Gen. Alfred M., 218.
 Scheldt, river, 433.
 Schofield, Gen. John M., 223.
 Scott, Dred, 417.
 Scott, Gen. Winfield, 131.
 Scoville, Capt., 156.
 Seagrove, Capt. George Henry, 191.
 Second Army Corps, at Antietam, 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18; at Gettysburg, 25; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46-48, 61; at Petersburg, 107.
 Seddon, James A., Confederate Secretary of War, 168, 197, 223, 230.
 Sedgwick, Maj.-Gen. John, at Antietam, 10, 11, 12, 18; in the Mine Run Campaign, 49, 57, 61.
 Selden, Lieut. George L., U.S.N., 156.
 Seminary Ridge, 110.
 Semple, Dr., 184, 191.
 Serrurier, Gen., 428, 429.
 Seward, William H., 212, 213.
 Sewell, U.S. Minister, 236.
 Seymour, Vice-Admiral, Royal Navy, 298, 305, 307.
 Shaler, Brig.-Gen. Alexander, 33, 40.
 Shanghai, 298.
 Shanks, W. F. G., 159.
 Sharpsburg, 9, 14, 15.
 Shenandoah Valley, 213.
 Shepley, Gen. George F., 136.
 Sheridan, Gen. Philip, 88, 110, 114; at Five Forks, 125; first victories over Early, 213.
 Sherman, Gen. William T., 71, 72, 81, 114, 124, 177, 213, 221; his tactics, 446, 448.
 Sherman Act, 411.
 Shiloh, 199.
 Short, notorious desperado, 80.
 Shreveport, La., 159, 163.
 Sickles, Gen. Daniel E., 25.
 Sign Post Ridge, 379.
 Sikh regiment, officer of, 315 *et seq.*
 Si-ku Arsenal, 305.
 Simla, telegram from, 364.
 Singapore, 275, 280; conference, 276; Consul-General, 275.
Singapore Free Press, of May 4, 278.
- Siren*, brig, 443.
 Sixth Army Corps, at Antietam, 8, 9, 12, 18; at Gettysburg, 22, 25, 33, 38, 41; in the Mine Run Campaign, 46, 48, 49, 50, 61; at Washington, 88.
 Skobeloff, tactics used by, 448.
 Slayter, Capt., Royal Artillery, Medical Corps, 392.
 Sloan, Capt. Benjamin P., 183.
 Sloan, Surgeon E. F., 153.
 Slocum, Maj.-Gen. Henry W., at Antietam, 13; at Gettysburg, 22, 26, 38, 40; at Chattanooga, 68, 73, 74 *et seq.*; guerrilla operations in Tennessee, 77-80.
 Smith, Gen. Kirby, 204.
 Smith, Gen. William, 32, 183.
 Smith, Gen. William F., at Chattanooga, 69-71; at Petersburg and Ft. Harrison, 85-88, 98-102, 104, 105, 107-109, 111, 112, 114 *et seq.*
 Smith, Governor, of Va., 138, 139.
 Smith, Bell & Co., owners of rice mills, 255.
 Snow, Lieut., 34.
 Soley, Prof. J. R., U.S.N., 355, 454, 455.
 Sorrel, Brig.-Gen. G. Moxley, 218.
 Soult, Marshal, 430.
 South Africa, 363, 364; two Republics declare war on England, 367; British non-successes, 379.
 South African War, 422.
 South America, 344.
 South Arsenal, 310.
 South Carolina, 99, 223, 227.
 South Carolina troops, 7th Battalion, 104.
 South Mountain, 1, 9.
 South Mountain Pass, 8.
Southern Historical Society Papers, 229, 451.
 Spain, 235, 238, 245, 249, 252, 253, 271-275; rebellious subjects of, 280; termination of the sovereignty of, in Cuba, 419, 420.
 Spangle's Springs, 30.
 Spanish Army at Santiago, 237; Government, 255, 274 *et seq.*; Treasury, 252; war-ships, 236.
 Special Order No. 271, Dec. 14, 1863, 452.
 Spion Kop, 398.
 Spotswood Hotel, 182.
 Spottsylvania, 54, 61, 110, 154, 447.
 Stafford Hills, 110.
 Stafford, Brig.-Gen. Leroy A., 47.
 Stanhope, Capt. Philip W., 152.
 Stanley, Henry M., 199 *et seq.*, 200.
 Stannard, Brig.-Gen. George J., 89-93, 95.
 Stanton, Edward M., 95, 218, 220, 226.
 Star Hill, 383.
 Steevens, G. W., 386, 398.
 Steuart, Brig.-Gen. George H., 28.
 Stevens, Col. Aaron F., 90, 94, 106.
 Stevens, Hon. Alexander H., 141, 214.
 Stevens, Maj. Atherton H., 129, 133.
 Stevenson, Tenn., 68.
 Stobart, Lieut., 396.
 Stoessel, Maj.-Gen. (Russian Commander-in-Chief), account of the engagement in taking the East Arsenal, garrisoned by

- 7000 Chinese troops, 307, 308; his proclamation, 313.
- Stoneman, Gen. George, 172.
- Stone River, 73.
- "Stonewall" brigade, at Gettysburg, 33.
- Stoodley, Capt. Nathan D., 113, 114.
- Story, Justice, 413.
- Strassburg, 430.
- Strassburg-Lech, 431.
- Streight, Col. A. D., 180.
- Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., 8, 13.
- Sturtevant, Capt., 114.
- Suez Canal, 237, 245.
- Sumner, Charles, 142, 211, 212.
- Sumner, Gen. E. V., at Antietam, 2, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15-18.
- Sumner, Gen. Samuel S., 5.
- Sumter*, 453.
- Surprise Hill, 383, 389.
- Swift Creek, 86, 101, 102.
- Swinton, William, 2.
- Swiss system, 337 *et seq.*
- Sykes, Maj.-Gen. George, 62.
- Symons, Sir Penn, 366.
- Taft, Governor William H., 260; address before the Society of the Cincinnati, November 7, 1911, 408, 409.
- Taipings, 200.
- Taku Bar, 297, 298; Fort, 300, 305; gate, 310.
- Tappan, Lieut., 248.
- Tarleton, Lieut.-Col., afterwards Gen. Sir Banastre, 439.
- Tatham, Capt. (Natal Carabiniers), 393.
- Tavera, Señor Trinidad H. Pardo de, 259.
- Taylor, Admiral, quotation from his *Memo-randum on a General Staff for the Navy*, 349, 350.
- Taylor, Col. Walter H., 227, 229, 231.
- Taylor, Commander H. C., 355.
- Taylor, Gen. Richard, 172.
- Tayobas, Province of, 292.
- Tecumseh*, monitor, 450.
- Telegraph Hill, 380, 384, 397.
- Tennessee, 53, 65, 67, 68, 72; guerrilla operations, 73-81; Unionists of, 445.
- Tennessee River, 67, 69.
- Tenth Army Corps, 90, 98-103, 123.
- Terrible* (British), 310.
- Terry, Gen. Alfred H., 48, 106, 123.
- Teutonic Allies, 456.
- Texas, 163, 164.
- Thann, Germany, 432.
- Thiers, Louis A., 425.
- Third Army Corps, 23, 25, 30, 46-48, 218.
- Thomas, Gen. George H., 68-72, 76, 77, 79-81, 114.
- Thompson, Prof. Holland, 182, 203.
- Thornhill's Kopje, 383, 384, 386.
- Thwaites, Capt., 376, 390, 396, 400.
- Tien Tsin, China, 298, 301, 304-308, 312, 314, 316.
- Tilson, Mr., his bill introduced in Congress, 324.
- Tin Camp, 366, 383, 384.
- Todd, Lieut., brother of Mrs. Lincoln, 165.
- Tong-ku, China, 300, 301.
- Torgau-Leipzig, 430.
- Tracy, Col. Benjamin F., 152.
- Trafalgar, 425.
- Transvaal armies, 372.
- Tree Forts, 310.
- Trias, Lieut.-Gen., 290, 291.
- Tripolitan War, 444.
- Tullahoma, Fla., 73, 74, 78, 80.
- Turner, Dick, 141, 168, 181, 182, 192.
- Turner, Lieut., 389.
- Turner, Gen. John W., 102.
- Turner, Maj. Thomas P., 181, 182, 185, 191.
- Tuscaloosa, Ala., 158.
- Twelfth Army Corps, at Antietam, 3, 8-10, 13, 17, 18; at Gettysburg, 19, 21-28, 32, 37-40; at the relief of Chattanooga, 67-68, 70-71, 73, 78.
- Twenty-fourth Army Corps, at the capture and occupation of Richmond, 123, 125.
- Twenty-fifth Army Corps, at the capture and occupation of Richmond, 123-125, 128-129, 132.
- Twiggs, treachery of, 163.
- Two Taverns, 22, 26, 29, 40.
- U-boat, efficiency of, 453.
- Underwood, Col., 71.
- Union Army, 7, 8, 14, 15, 28, 41, 45, 46, 53, 58, 72, 139, 174.
- Union losses, at Antietam and Harper's Ferry, 14; at Gettysburg, 34, 36; in the Mine Run Campaign, 53; at Fort Harrison, 94; at Petersburg, 100, 101.
- United States, military policy of, 321-340.
- United States*, frigate, 443.
- United States Army, at Manila, 242, 243.
- United States Congress, appropriation approved March 3, 1885, 355; bill introduced for the establishment of a reserve, 323, 324; Fortieth, 159, 176; Joint Resolution of, April 20, 1898, 419; House of Representatives, 175.
- United States forces in China, 309.
- United States Government, 174, 252, 283.
- United States Marine Hospital, 173.
- United States Navy, 440, 441; list of ships in commission at the outbreak of the War of 1812, 443, 444; blockade by, 454, 455.
- United States Sanitary Commission, 192, 197-199, 204.
- United States Supreme Court, 411, 418.
- United States troops, Ninth Infantry, in China, 310-312; Twelfth Infantry, at Elmira, N.Y., 151.
- United States War Department, 40, 68, 143, 155, 163, 196, 323, 324.
- Valencia*, 236.
- Valley Campaign, 213.
- Valley Forge, 439.
- Van Lew, Miss Elizabeth L., 157, 182.
- Van Reenen's Pass, 367.
- Vanvalzah, Lieut. D. D., 162.

- Varina Landing, 90, 92.
 Varina Road, 92.
 Vermont, 133, 214.
 Vevers, Battery Sergt.-Major, 376.
 Vicksburg, 162, 195.
 Vicksburg Campaign, 68, 174.
 Vienna, 429, 431.
 Vigan, Province of Ilocos Sur, P.I., 256.
 Virginia, 67, 72, 73, 92, 122, 125, 138, 143, 144, 154, 181, 228, 438, 439; Department of, 123; Senate and House of Delegates of, 228.
Virginia, ironclad, 449.
 Virginia Campaign, 1864, 45.
 Virginia troops, Second Regiment, 32; Tenth Battalion, 126; Twenty-third Regiment, 31; Stonewall brigade, 32-34.
 Viscayan soldiers, 277.
Vixen, schooner, 444.
 Von Clausewitz, 425.
 Von Hannicken, Major, 306.
 Von Moltke, Gen., 347.

 Wade, Benjamin F., 211.
 Wadsworth, Brig.-Gen. James S., 22, 23, 25, 28, 33, 57.
 Wagner, Col. Arthur L., 445, 447.
 Wagon Hill, 387, 395-398.
 Wai-hei-wai regiment, composed of Chinese enlisted in the English possessions of China, 315.
 Wales, Capt. (Natal Volunteers), 393.
 Walker, Capt. A. L., 367, 380; road, 381.
 Walker, Col. Francis A., 183.
 Walker, Gen. James A., 29, 33, 89, 228.
 Walker, Gen., 202.
 Wallace, Lewis, 149.
 Walled City, China, 304, 305, 308, 310, 314; South Gate, 310, 312, 313, 316.
 Waller, Maj., 298, 301, 302.
 Walnut Run, 45, 48.
 Walsh, Capt. John A., C.S.A., 156.
 War of 1812, 412, 437, 442-444.
 War Academy, 347.
 War College, 345, 348, 349, 351, 353.
 War Records, 121.
 Ward, Col. and Asst. Adjt.-Gen., 392.
 Ward, Gen. Henry Clay, 182.
 Warden, Robert B., 210.
 Warren, Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur K., 46-53, 60-64.
 Warsaw Sound, 449.
 Washburn, Hon. E. B., 214.
 Washington, D.C., 7, 14, 41, 57, 58, 81, 88, 89, 121, 154, 157, 213, 215, 235, 252, 259, 277, 278, 325, 355, 408, 412.
 Washington, Gen. George, 61, 353, 437, 439.
Wasp, sloop, 443.
 Waterloo, 433.
 Wauhatchie Station, 70, 71.
 Weed, Thurlow, 212, 213.
Weehawken, monitor, 449.
 Weisiger, Brig.-Gen. David A., 218.
 Weitzel, Gen. Godfrey, 103, 105, 125, 126, 129, 132, 136, 139, 140.

 Weld, Gen. Stephen M., 2, 3.
 Weldon Railroad, 183.
 Welles, Gideon, Secretary of Navy, 209.
 Wellford's Ford, 45.
 Wenrick, Capt. J. C., 162.
 Wessells, Brig.-Gen. H. W., 152.
 West Arsenal, 308, 310, 313.
 Western Army, 71.
 West Point, N.Y., 181, 426.
 West Virginia, 445.
 Wheaton, Brig.-Gen. Frank, 38-40.
 Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, 68, 73.
 Wheeler, Maj. D. D., 132.
 Whipple, William D., 79.
Whistle, torpedo boat, 297.
 White House, 216.
 White, Maj. John Chester, 147, 184, 191.
 White, Sir George, 372-374, 389, 391, 402.
 Whitefield, Surgeon R. M., 175.
 Whiteside, Tenn., 69.
 Whittier, Brig.-Gen. Charles A., at Manila, 233, 252; breakfast at Malolos, 256, 257; letter from Aguinaldo, 259.
 Widdis, Lieut. C. E., 162.
 Wilcox, Maj.-Gen. Cadmus M., 218, 223.
 Wilde, Gen. Edward A., 130.
 Wilderness, 45, 46, 53, 54, 154, 447.
 Wilford, Col., 372.
 Willcox, Gen. O. B., 149.
 Williams, Brig.-Gen. A. S., at Gettysburg, 22, 26, 27, 38-40.
 Williams, Mr., late Consul at Manila, 259.
 Wilmington, 124.
 Winchester, Va., 200, 213.
 Winder, Gen. John B., 163, 165-167, 169, 170, 172, 182, 196.
 Wing, Major, 390.
 Wirz, Henry, 165, 169, 171, 172, 181.
 Wisconsin troops, Third Infantry at Gettysburg, 31; at Fayetteville, 80.
With Sabre and Scalpel, 150.
 Woerth, 447.
 Wolfe, Gen., 438.
 Wolf Hill, 24.
 Womack, Joseph M., 153.
 Wood, Maj.-Gen. Leonard, 319.
 Wood, Mr. Robert, 255.
 Wood, Gen. Thomas J., 110.
 Woodruff, Maj. Carle A., 201.
 Worden, Lieut. John L., U.S.N., 156.
 Wright, Augustus R., Chairman of a Committee of the Confederate House of Representatives, 196 *et seq.*
 Wright, Gen. Horatio G., 117.
 Wyeth, Dr. John, 149, 150, 155.

 Yaku, China, 301.
 Yokohama, Japan, 300.
 York, Pa., 8.
 Yorktown, Va., 353, 438, 439.
 Yule, Gen., 372.

 Zafiro, 248, 250.
 Zoar Church, 47, 48.

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